

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting, held at
ISS, 18 Adam Street, London W.C.2 on
26th October, 1967

Present: Mr. Alastair Buchan (In the Chair)

General Baron A. del Marmol	Mr. Peter Ramsbotham
Mr. Francois Duchene	Dr. Klaus Ritter
Dr. Curt Gasteyer	Dr. Theo Sommer
Mr. Niels Haagerup	Mr. Ake Sparring
Brigadier Kenneth Hunt	Signor Altiero Spinelli
Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet	Dr. Wolfgang Wagner

1. Composition of the Study Commission

(a) Members endorsed Mr. Buchan's nomination of Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, recently appointed Deputy Director of the ISS, in succession to Mr. Leonard Beaton who had taken up an appointment in Canada. It was further agreed that Mr. Ramsbotham, a member of the British diplomatic service on secondment to ISS for 1967-8 as a Senior Research Associate, should attend the current meeting as an observer.

(b) Mr. Sparring was welcomed as the Swedish observer to meetings of the Study Commission during Dr. Birnbaum's absence in the United States.

(c) Mr. Buchan reported a letter from Dr. Nils Ørvik, explaining that lack of finance made it extremely difficult for him to continue his membership and suggesting Ambassador Jens Boyesen, currently working at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, as a replacement. After discussion, and recalling the arrangement reached in 1966 that Mr. John Sanness should be the alternate Norwegian representative, it was agreed to write to Dr. Ørvik to the effect that the Norwegian representation was a question for decision among the Norwegians themselves.

2. Forthcoming Meetings

(a) It was agreed that the next meeting of the Study Commission be held in Paris on Friday and Saturday, 16th and 17th February 1968, subject to confirmation with Professor Vernant.

(b) It was agreed that the 1968 European-American Conference be held in Germany in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft; the provisional dates were either the last weekend in April or Thursday to Saturday 2-4 May; Dr. Wagner was still trying to arrange a suitable venue in the Cologne area. It was felt that consideration of suitable topics for discussion should be left until the next meeting.

3. Organisation of Discussion with East European Participants

(a) It was agreed that no formal agenda should be circulated, but that in his introductory remarks Mr. Buchan should indicate the broad headings under which discussion should be grouped in each of the sessions. These were agreed as follows: Friday morning - relations between the two super powers and the effect which events outside Europe are having on these relations; Friday afternoon - the development of relations within Europe as a whole, which would bring into consideration the limits of detente; Saturday morning - the security aspects involved in any alternative to the system of confrontation in Europe. Mr. Buchan would take the Chair for the first session, Professor Mates and Professor Vernant would be invited to preside on Friday afternoon and Saturday morning respectively.

(b) It was agreed to propose to the East European participants that a summary report be prepared for distribution to the participants only, with the attribution of points made geographically rather than nationally or individually, but to defer to their judgment should they be reluctant to have any record kept of the proceedings.

It was then agreed to devote the remainder of the afternoon to discussion of issues affecting relations among the West Europeans which were likely to come into discussion with the Eastern participants.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

(a) Britain and Europe

Taking as the point of departure the most recent statement of Couve de Murville that it was not possible to open negotiations with the British because of the sterling problem, and Harold Wilson's declared refusal to withdraw the British application, Mr. Buchan posed the question, assuming the French opposition was fundamental, (a) what were we to do while waiting for a new evolution, and (b) would the development of European technological co-operation or co-operation in defence, now beginning to come under active discussion, also be at a standstill, or could some half-way house be found?

General del Marmol asked about the reaction within Britain if it became clear that French policy was to delay a clear decision on British entry more or less indefinitely. Would the British Government be content to go on waiting, or did they have any alternatives?

Dr. Sommer asked whether, assuming de Gaulle did want to defer a decision indefinitely rather than to say No, but that if forced to decide he would say No, the British Government wanted the Germans to force clarification of the issue or to concur in the delaying tactics.

Signor Spinelli considered British tactical plans more important than alternative policies. Given the state of opinion among the Five, with the Germans and the Italians in favour of British entry but hesitating to press their opposition to de Gaulle, and the Dutch strongly behind Britain, and with French opinion by no means solidly behind de Gaulle on this issue (he did not rule out a political crisis in France), the British Government should try to secure a common front among the Five. Italian resistance could be stiffened considerably by British diplomatic pressure. He felt that de Gaulle's tactic was essentially one of delay, because of the complications which a veto would lead to in his relations with the Five; therefore if the Five insisted that negotiations begin, France would acquiesce - although the opening of negotiations in itself did not mean very much.

Mr. Duchene did not disagree. But the Six would have to tackle the procedural question among themselves before the British Government could take any initiative. He did not expect the procedural question to be resolved at the November Ministerial meeting, but he doubted whether it could be delayed beyond January. From this standpoint, whatever the French intentions, they needed to know the reactions of the Five; the form in which the Five reacted was very important. If a veto was intended by the French, how strong would the reaction be to the third use of force inside the Community (leaving aside the anti-British aspect)? For instance was a German empty chair policy conceivable?

Dr. Wagner could not see the German Government putting any pressure on the French because they feared that this could only lead to another veto. German policy was to prolong discussions within the Community so long as de Gaulle remained on the scene, at the same time hoping for some compromise. He believed personally that both the German Government and Germans in the Community hoped that Britain would finally settle for some form of association - perhaps with a fixed date for admission to full membership. Dr. Sommer doubted whether German policy had yet crystallised in this direction.

Mr. Haagerup said the general opinion among foreign observers in Paris was that de Gaulle would not veto; on the other hand the French have built up a whole system of defences against British entry and the negotiating phase could well be viewed as yet another line of defence. Mr. Buchan's question of what to do until a new evolution comes about was very relevant. He saw no prospect of a political crisis in France.

Mr. Ramsbotham considered de Gaulle far less subject to political pressures, internal and external, than he was a few years ago; but this was not the main consideration. Personally he believed de Gaulle would be prepared to face whatever the consequences might be of saying No if confronted with the direct choice of negotiating or not. Therefore the question whether the British Government wanted their friends to force the issue or not was a very real one.

Dr. Jaquet said that so long as Luns were in office (although his position at home was not so strong as it had been) he would exert maximum pressure on the French. But he could not force the French - the empty chair policy would not be possible even for Holland.

The latest indications were that de Gaulle would try to make the Five pay the price of political co-operation on the terms proposed in 1961 in return for negotiations on British entry in purely economic terms. Certainly the Dutch position had not changed since 1961. But what about the other four?

Mr. Haagerup saw the latest French proposal for political consultations as directed primarily against Luns - the French were trying to isolate the Dutch.

Dr. Gasteyger was very sceptical whether any of the Five except the Dutch would be prepared to force a confrontation. He quoted Kiesinger's reference in London to a recent public opinion poll in Germany which showed a majority in favour of British entry in political terms, but a minority in favour in economic terms. This meant there was no economic pressure on the German side to have the British in. Moreover there was far less confidence among the Community itself about the strength of its negotiating position than was generally supposed in Britain.

Dr. Sommer held it impossible to have a meaningful opinion poll on the economic consequences of British entry into the EEC. In the circles that count, including German industry, support for British entry was overwhelming.

On the other hand, Germany admittedly did not have much leverage. Kiesinger's personality was not consistent with the idea of putting pressure on the French. An important consideration for Bonn was the French argument that a Community including Britain and the other applicants would be so different that the whole thing would need to be re-negotiated - the instinct was to keep the present incomplete structure rather than embark on a new venture.

Mr. Buchan was led to conclude that so long as people in the Five felt, quite understandably, that it was better to keep what they have, it would not be in the British interest to try and force a showdown. Mr. Duchene agreed.

Mr. Ramsbotham also agreed personally, although official British opinion was divided on this issue. The question was, however, whether it was politically feasible for the Government to maintain for months or even years a stance of being poised for entry. On the other hand to urge an early confrontation which would almost certainly lead to de Gaulle saying 'if you insist on my saying No, I say No', would be to risk a severe reaction in domestic political terms; the sense of humiliation could lead to unwise policies.

Mr. Duchene doubted whether either of these arguments would affect British policy, although they would loom large in debate. British public opinion was neither clearly for nor against entry; but since 1956 the establishment had slowly come round to be nearly 100 percent in favour, and a shift on that level was unlikely.

Mr. Buchan pointed to the lack of leverage due to the lack of a fallback position: suggestions such as a North Atlantic Free Trade Area were not generally regarded as serious alternatives.

Mr. Sparring argued that whether the British Government was going to press for early negotiations or not would depend on the pressure exerted by British industry. For example, he had learned recently that out of 200,000 workers employed by Swedish industry abroad, 150,000 were in Swedish plants in the Common Market (out of a total labour force of one and a half million). One possible interpretation was that Swedish industry does not anticipate joining the Community in the foreseeable future, since any industry's pressure on its own government reflects its assessment of likely trends.

Mr. Duchene said that judging by trading figures, the interest of the Nordic countries in getting Britain and EFTA into the Common Market was overwhelming; a North Atlantic Free Trade Area would be attractive to Britain, but not to the rest of EFTA. Looking at the technological problem, those industries which represent large-scale investment and heavy R and D costs are seeking to solve their difficulties vis-a-vis the United States through strengthening their structure rather than through protection, and they tend to see no alternative to joining the Common Market. If British industry were to change its mind, this would be only if it concluded that the long-term prospects after de Gaulle's passing were no more encouraging than the short-term.

Asked by Dr. Jaquet whether Britain would consider a purely economic arrangement with the EEC, with the Six having a separate political structure among themselves, Mr. Buchan considered this out of the question: British opinion sees the advantages of membership in political as much as in economic terms, and the struggle with the French is also seen in political terms.

Dr. Sommer suggested that if Britain really had no alternative the Six could rest more peacefully than they can now. The question of what kind of alternative Britain might adopt was very relevant to Germany, because on the answer would depend the amount of pressure she might want to bring to bear.

Secondly, coming back to Mr. Buchan's original question, he was not hopeful of progress towards a European technological community, for example; the technological sector was so bound up with the nationalist ambitions of de Gaulle that he would want to reject any proposals in this direction.

Mr. Buchan pointed to the strong French interest ^{bilateral} in co-operation with the British, particularly in aviation; perhaps the one British bargaining weapon was the fact that bilateral arrangements have already proved inadequate and that the French and British aviation industries could only survive in a multilateral European context.

Mr. Ramsbotham said a distinction should be drawn between aviation and the whole spectrum of industry: in general the French have remained unconvinced by the argument that they cannot expect to enjoy collaboration with British industry if Britain is kept out of the Community because British industry cannot be persuaded to continue at a disadvantage vis-a-vis its European competitors.

On Dr. Sommer's first point, he recalled the official British line that it would be wrong to assume that Britain had no alternatives, although these would be a second best and the Europeans would lose as much as Britain herself if she were compelled to adopt them; these alternatives had not been spelt out, however.

Signor Spinelli argued that Britain's tactical position would be greatly strengthened if she showed readiness at least to discuss the position of sterling, perhaps in the framework of a world agreement to replace it by a European reserve currency; the French ^{case} was not entirely without merit.

Mr. Duchene considered this a shrewd ploy; but he doubted whether it would get very far because the creation of a European reserve currency would mean the French and everyone else having to contribute - and the French would not be prepared to do this.

Mr. Buchan added that such a move would face considerable counter-pressure from the United States, which sees the pound as the outer defences of the dollar; moreover the interests of all member countries in the sterling area, who were in varying degrees of economic health, would have to be considered. However, the British Chancellor had already dropped hints in this direction.

(b) Harmel Committee

Mr. Haagerup said the reports of the four study groups were now out and a summary had been prepared. A meeting at State Secretary level would be convened early in November to try to reach a consensus on the summary, and then try to agree on a fuller report for the Council. The reports on East-West Relations and on Defence Planning were fairly uncontroversial; the reports on Relations within the Alliance and on Relations between NATO and the Rest of the World had run into trouble.

Spaak's report on Relations within the Alliance had encountered very stiff resistance from the French, who had rejected it even as a basis for discussion. Without going into detail as to how NATO should be reorganised, the report did come out in favour of some institutionalised form of consultation, going further than had been done already, especially in terms of policies towards the Warsaw Pact countries, and the French found this unacceptable. It was not yet clear whether the French officials had rejected the report for tactical reasons, or because they feared de Gaulle would use it as an excuse to leave the Alliance. The French were present in this study group, although they did not participate in its work.

The fourth report, written by Pateijn (Netherlands) had run into opposition from Canada and the two Scandinavian countries as well as France. It was fairly controversial, advocating that NATO as such should be prepared to take action in crises outside Europe. The Canadian and Scandinavian opposition stemmed partly from the conflict with the United Nations aspect, partly from the domestic political consideration that involvement in controversial issues outside the NATO area would be unpopular. However, these objections could probably be met by a watering-down of the report. The main confrontation would come over the Spaak report.

Mr. Buchan put the question of how seriously a French decision to leave the Alliance would be regarded. The Canadians, for instance, would go a long way to prevent this happening. But would it make very much difference if it did happen?

Dr. Sommer said the German Government would not like France to leave. But there was no question of exerting pressure: short of an attempt to press recognition of the DDR on Bonn, the Germans did not have enough leverage to want to exert any pressure. And if the French did leave, what could the Germans - or the Canadians - do about it? Fresh negotiations would be necessary on the status of the French forces in Germany, already on a bilateral basis following France's withdrawal from the integrated part of NATO, but this could only result in a new bilateral arrangement. Dr. Wagner agreed.

Mr. Ramsbotham recalled that in his letters of March 1966 to the four Heads of State, the letter to Johnson alone contained the important passage that although withdrawing from the organisation of NATO France intended to remain in the Alliance unless there had been a fundamental development in the relationship between East and West. It was not de Gaulle's style to write anything in unless he foresaw a possible occasion when he may want to use it. Since de Gaulle interprets the treaty as coming to an end in 1968, the year in which countries may give notice of their withdrawal, Mr. Ramsbotham considered it quite likely that at about March 1968 de Gaulle would announce his judgement that the profound change he had referred to in his letter to Johnson had come about and that France proposed to withdraw completely. Formal notification would probably be handed over on 24th August, the anniversary of ratification of the treaty, but de Gaulle would give prior warning - and at a time when the Five would no doubt be coming to grips over the British entry problem. Britain would then be faced with the prospect of one member of the Six going completely neutralist.

Mr. Buchan said this would raise a difficulty for Germany too. He saw great reluctance among French opinion apart from de Gaulle to take this step: the prospect of becoming a totally foreign country to the United States in terms of a crisis, or of technology, was quite alarming. If France were to leave NATO it would make discussion on a political community virtually impossible; it would put paid to any form of European defence organisation within NATO, and also to a great deal of bilateral co-operation with Britain.

Dr. Sommer thought there might be sufficient bitterness created to fix German politics on the British entry problem; it would certainly change the picture.

Mr. Haagerup suggested that French reluctance to come to a showdown could also reflect the desire to keep an option open: a decision to leave would be irrevocable.

Brigadier Hunt doubted whether bilateral co-operation would be inhibited - at least in the arms field. He did not accept the view that a common strategy is necessary in order to have a common weapon. Bilateral arrangements could also take care of the early warning problem, for example. Would these be acceptable to the Germans or Italians?

Dr. Sommer saw no alternative. A relationship based on a network of bilateral treaties (which, as Mr. Ramsbotham pointed out, de Gaulle has said he would offer and which would be more committal than Article V of the Atlantic Treaty) would not compensate for France leaving the Alliance; but it would be better than no contact with France.

Coming back to Mr. Haagerup's introductory remarks, was it wise to go ahead with the Harmel study while it was still uncertain whether France would leave NATO or not?

Mr. Buchan said that apart from the French problem, he found it difficult to see how the Alliance could function after 1969 on the basis of any member being able to give a year's notice, although the treaty was of indefinite duration. The implications were very important in the NPT context: the Germans and Italians for instance have argued that as the major guarantor of their security the United States must show that she regards her commitment as indefinite. At least major declarations of intent would be required in 1968-9.

Mr. Haagerup appreciated this argument. However, he felt some governments would be extremely reluctant to see the treaty re-submitted to national parliaments.

Coming back to the Harmel Study, he doubted whether much would come out of it in practice. It would however have domestic implications in a number of countries: for the Scandinavians, and the Belgians, NATO would now seem more in tune with the new international situation by operating as a diplomatic mechanism of detente instead of as a purely military set-up.

(c) Deployment of ABM Systems

Mr. Buchan said there had been a certain amount of study in national departments of defence on the feasibility of a European ABM system, and some people were excited about this as a possible instrument of European unification (Jean Monnet, for example). Personally he felt that given the European population density, the cost of a city defence would work out at no less than that of an American system (i.e. 40 billion dollars), and this would predicate a 20 percent rise in European defence budgets.

General del Marmol said the official Belgian view was that a European system was not justified in terms of cost.

Dr. Ritter added that the MRBM problem would render a European system ineffective. The only future option he thought worth considering which could counter that threat was a seaborne ABM system - which some Americans are advocating. This would be enormously costly too.

Mr. Buchan put the question whether if the United States went ahead with a major (as opposed to an anti-China) system, this would have a psychologically divisive effect on European-American relations, although the American retaliatory capability would not in fact be affected. He had noted at the recent ISS Annual Conference the extremely disturbed reaction of the Europeans towards the American response to Soviet deployment, in contrast to the delighted reaction of the Asians.

General del Marmol considered that a lessening of European confidence in the American deterrent would be inevitable - and so would pressure for some sort of European deterrent. Personally he considered this the only answer for Europe.

Dr. Sommer argued that the European reaction was less predictable than it would have been five years ago. There would be a psychological reaction: the Europeans would probably always judge American intentions less leniently than in logic they should. But the climate of opinion was changing, and while there would be an acrimonious round of debate, if the Russians and the Americans were reasonable it need not come to the point of either a system or a deterrent for Europe. Dr. Wagner agreed.

Dr. Ritter was less optimistic. He agreed about the general tendency towards acceptance of strategic bipolarity because of the shift of emphasis away from security aspects in a climate of detente. But ABM deployment was not in line with this trend; psychologically it would also be very risky because of the NPT connection. He was convinced that if the Americans perfected their system it could psychologically destroy the Alliance. The warning signs were already apparent.

General del Marmol felt that the arms race implicit in ABM deployment could damage detente. Detente was felt more keenly in Europe than in Asia, and that was why the European and Asian reactions noted by Mr. Buchan differed.

Mr. Buchan recalled that the American decision was announced in a Chinese context: that pleased the Japanese and Indians because it strengthened the validity of the American guarantee.

Signor Spinelli did not see that detente would necessarily be affected, particularly since the initial decision to build a limited system reflected tacit agreement by both super powers to reduce the importance of China. He saw the possibility of concerted action, and of the United States and USSR keeping control of the situation.

General del Marmol maintained his argument. And taking into account American deeds as opposed to statements (their heavy spending on improving their capability), he was convinced their system was directed against the USSR.

Mr. Buchan mentioned a recent Soviet comment in private that discussions with the United States about an alternative to ABM deployment had been ruled out by the United States announcing her decision in an anti-China context. He agreed that at the moment the American system did not look like an anti-China system.

Looking towards the discussion with the Eastern participants, Mr. Buchan hoped their own reaction to Soviet deployment would be forthcoming; he also wondered whether the sense of being groups of unsheltered countries in a hostile world would stimulate consciousness of an identity of interest among the two halves of Europe.

He then drew the discussion to a close.

European Study Commission Meeting with
East European Representatives

London, 27-28 October 1967

Friday Morning 27 October

Mr. Alastair Buchan in the Chair

Welcoming the East European participants, Mr. Buchan referred to the value of the discussions on strategic and political questions over the past four years in the European Study Commission, a group of people from ten countries who met as individuals but as neighbours conscious of the interests they had in common. He was very happy to extend this principle of good neighbourly discussion to friends from Southern and Eastern Europe and hoped that these two days would set the pattern for an annual exchange of views. He stressed the private nature of the occasion. With the agreement of all those present, however, a summary of the discussion would be prepared and one copy distributed to each participant.

There was no formal agenda. He suggested however that discussion should move from the general to the particular. This morning we should aim to establish the nature and the extent of détente between the two halves of the developed world and the obstacles that may exist to its further extension. This perspective should begin with some discussion of the relations between the two super powers, and in particular of the effect that developments outside Europe (notably the Middle East, Vietnam and China) are having upon their relations with each other. By this means we ought to be able to achieve some consensus on the extent to which détente in Europe is the product of a stable balance between the two super powers, to discuss whether in fact this balance is stable - for instance whether there could be a new European crisis. We ought also to discuss the question of how the relationship between both groups of European powers to the super powers is altering. This would involve a number of development in Western Europe, including the policy of France, some discussion of the non-proliferation treaty, some discussion of the effects, both political and strategic, upon the European powers of the decision by Moscow and Washington to deploy ABM defence.

It was a striking fact that détente in Europe has occurred in a very different fashion to our expectations of the 1950's. Our then expectations were that there would have to be very wide-ranging agreements on for instance the control of armaments in Europe, on the military presence of the US and USSR, before we would get very much development in the relations between East and West Europe. In fact we have had both an increase in armaments and an increase in détente. Therefore we would want to enquire this afternoon whether détente is at this stage primarily an economic and human phenomenon involving freer human movement as we gain more confidence and become more reconciled to each other's social systems, and, if so, whether there are limits beyond which it cannot go. This would bring us obviously to discussion of the German problem: can we find a solution to the German problem merely by bilateral diplomacy or does it require multilateral agreement including the super powers? There is a natural drive towards co-operation in Western Europe for economic and technological reasons: he would welcome this afternoon the views of East Europeans on the effect on their interests of various forms of West European co-operation.

On Saturday morning we should come to the security aspect. Casting our time frame some years ahead, we should consider what alternatives there might be to the arrangements we have had in Europe for the last 20 years: whether circumstances permit a return to the traditional structure of interstate relations that existed in Europe between the wars or before 1914; whether we could envisage the dissolution of alliances and their replacement by some form of security system and, if so, could we define what we mean by Europe. Or, should we think in terms of the retention of the alliance

systems as a means of super-power guarantee of peace in Europe but bridged by some form of European security organisation? Could we regard Europe as a whole for this purpose, or are the security problems of Southern Europe different from those of the Centre?

This outline having been agreed, Mr. Buchan then opened the discussion. He thought everyone would agree that whatever détente is, it is crucially affected by the calculations and the atmosphere that exists between Moscow and Washington. An observer in the autumn of 1963 could have held out some quite strong hopes of a steady change in the relations between the two super powers - and so there has been in many respects: the atmosphere of super power dealings has changed very markedly during the 60's compared with the 50's. But there have been a number of developments that have reminded us that these relations are dependent on developments not only in Europe but throughout the world as a whole, in particular the war in Vietnam, the recent crisis in the Middle East and the difficult problems raised by the position of China. If these problems became less acute, could we look forward to a steady growth in co-operation between the super powers and particularly as it affects Europe, or did their mere size, the fact that basically their political philosophies are not that compatible, mean we must base our calculations on a continuing element of competition in armaments and in political development between them?

A participant from South-Eastern Europe introduced some further elements. First, considering that the improvement in intra-European relations has progressed noticeably further than the improvement in relations between the super powers, he doubted whether détente in Europe was necessarily or exclusively a function of détente between the super powers. There must be some kind of motive force within Europe itself which has been stimulated by the improvement in the global atmosphere. Secondly, the change in the character of the confrontation between the super powers amounted to a new situation. This was apparent even where the conflict is most acute, over Vietnam. The Vietnam crisis differed from the Korean crisis, the conflict of the 1950's, in two important respects: there has been no lining up diplomatically, let alone active military participation, of the NATO allies behind the United States as there was in Korea; and the super powers themselves, who seized every opportunity to throw oil on the flames in Korea, have both made serious and even strenuous efforts to see to it that the differences over Vietnam do not destroy the possibilities of seeing eye to eye on other issues, particularly those connected with nuclear weapons. This did not mean the Vietnam conflict was not dangerous: the real danger was not so much of it provoking a major war as of relations degenerating into a cold war posture with the consequent crystallising of attitudes and effects spreading to all situations. The third element was that the future of relations in Europe and in the world at large should not be regarded simply in the light of relations between the super powers. By developing intra-European co-operation Europe could produce a salutary effect on local relationships throughout the world. This active role open to Europe was perhaps the most interesting phenomenon: it bore out the thesis that the increasing preponderance of material power in the hands of the super powers did not necessarily enhance their ability to contribute to constructive efforts or to prevent other parts of the world from actively promoting international relations in a constructive way.

He saw grounds for optimism about the prospects for Soviet-American relations evolving along rational competitive lines which could be brought within the limits of co-operation.

A Western participant found himself very much in agreement, particularly with the speaker's comments on the fresh aspects in relations between the United States and Soviet Union. He could not accept his comparison between Korea and Vietnam, however: the Western allies did not give unquestioning support to the United States action in Korea; fears of escalation and of extension of the conflict were very strong (for example the Attlee visit to Truman). Nor did the two super powers throw oil on the flames: they sought rather to limit the conflict, they kept in contact with one another and it was Malik's intervention in 1961 which led eventually to a cease-fire.

This led him to a judgment on détente. The general desire for détente is probably greater now than it was in 1950-51; circumstances are more favourable, for various reasons; there are far greater opportunities for Europe to play an active part. But the very loosening up of international relations and greater freedom of movement which have led to an element of détente have at the same time made crisis management much more difficult for the super powers. Early in 1967 the Soviet Union made a serious effort to limit the conflict and get some move towards a settlement in Vietnam. The failure was due partly to the United States, but also partly to the fact that North Vietnam has more latitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than North Korea had vis-à-vis China in 1950-51. Perhaps we should therefore give some thought to détente management.

A second Western participant felt that given the predominant role of the US and USSR we should begin with an assessment of the possibilities open to them in various fields. In the economic field he saw no obstacle to a steady improvement of relations: economic difficulties were much greater between the US and Western Europe than between the two super powers, and this trend was likely to continue. In the cultural field he saw no very great problems. In the nuclear field, the difficulties were much greater. The super powers shared a common interest in maintaining the present equilibrium; but technological progress made this increasingly precarious, while their efforts to agree between themselves on a non-proliferation treaty brought them into difficulties with their respective junior partners.

Turning to the global policies of the super powers, at the moment he considered the US the more confident in its vision of the future. The US believes, rightly or wrongly, that the developed world is fairly stable and that the underdeveloped world, although dangerously turbulent now, will become less so as it reaches the point of economic take-off; and corresponding to this ideological perspective there is a political will, increasingly translated into intervention, to help this development. The Soviet ideological perspective has been blurred by the Chinese and the Castroite heresies, and the USSR in any case has less means to translate her vision into reality because she cannot intervene in every quarter of the world. This was an encouraging factor from the point of view of détente, since it reduced the number of real danger-points: in certain areas the two sides could afford to be in dispute because the risk of a physical confrontation was remote. He considered Vietnam less dangerous than Korea for this reason. However, we could not draw precise limits.

China he considered a question-mark for both the US and USSR: both are pursuing a policy of containment now, but both have to keep in mind the possibility of coming to terms with her later. Depending on whether economic or ideological motivation prevailed, China could well reach a settlement with either the US or the USSR.

An Eastern participant posed two questions arising from Mr. Buchan's comment that détente in Europe has occurred in a very different fashion to our expectation in the early 1950's. (1) Was what we have now a real détente, or have we grown so accustomed to a situation over the years that we now consider it as détente? Personally he thought we were living in détente. (2) If this were the case, how important still is the influence of the two super powers for progress in détente, both in Europe and elsewhere? He thought both super powers still had decisive influence in the military field; but their influence in the economic and political fields has decreased considerably, with a correspondingly greater freedom of action in those fields for the European members of the two blocs, and this was one reason why intra-European détente has progressed so much faster than relations between the super powers.

He agreed that the super powers have global policies and a global political conception, and doubtless will continue to have. But 15 years ago these policies were centred on Europe to a far greater extent than they are today: Europe is no longer the decisive political and military factor in international relations. This growing preoccupation with events outside Europe has led to two results. (1) We have seen a certain readiness on the part of the super powers to go further in agreements concerning Europe, and on the other hand much more possibilities for the medium and small European powers themselves to take positive action in pursuit of détente, although only in connection with policy in Europe itself. (2) The involvement of the super powers in actions outside Europe must in turn have repercussions on the European situation.

First, the problem of Vietnam. Vietnam was very important in the American global policy, but the United States did not seem to appreciate that by its policy towards Vietnam it was blocking any real and lasting improvement in Europe. Secondly, the influence of the third world on the policy of the super powers and world affairs in general would grow as the super powers necessarily became more involved with events in those areas. For example the recent Middle East crisis raised certain dangers for Europe which could, if not eliminated, harm the future progress of détente in Europe. All these aspects, and the various influences operating on different levels, must be taken into consideration in order to reach a synthesis of all the forces involved in the development of international relations.

A Western speaker recalled that we were really in the third phase of détente: the first phase after the death of Stalin was interrupted by the Suez and Hungary crises; then came the spirit of Geneva and Camp David, interrupted by the Cuba crisis; the present phase could deteriorate just as suddenly - and the lack of détente management already referred to could have an effect on this.

On the question of what détente is: it could mean a change from confrontation to co-operation. It could also mean the acceptance of the status quo in Europe. And here we should remember that there were three 'revisionist' countries in Europe: France, who wanted to create some kind of European identity (which to some extent was different from the interest of the two super powers); Germany, who wanted a change through rapprochement in order to achieve some closer co-operation with the Eastern part of the country and ultimately reunification; and the USSR who wanted to replace the present alliance system.

Taking up the point raised by the first speaker, the extent to which détente in Europe was necessarily or exclusively a function of détente between the great powers, was there something more, a European community of interest which may not be identical with, or may even run against, the interest of the great powers? Was a European community of interest emerging, in the sense alluded to by de Gaulle in Poland when he encouraged the Poles to become more conscious of their own interest as a European power? And how far could European agreement go in advance of great power agreement on Europe? This related particularly to the security aspect. Were there any specifically European interests in the security field? Gomulka had made it clear that Poland's security interests were identical to those of the USSR, whereas in the West, and especially in France, there was a different security concept for Europe compared to that of the United States. On the other hand some community of interest could be seen emerging in relation to the non-proliferation treaty, and it might also emerge in relation to ABM deployment by the super powers.

Another Western participant agreed that détente was real; but it was also a relative and possibly a temporary state of affairs. On the super power level, détente simply meant an absence of a confrontation involving the threat of war. The super powers needed the symbolism of détente (he would include agreements like the non-proliferation treaty under this heading) more than the reality of détente which can only come from solving problems. He saw no possibility of a European solution worked out by the Europeans as long as the

super powers are in confrontation; but the responsibility was now on the Europeans to make détente more than a semblance. This involved two considerations: (1) Did the Europeans, Western and Eastern, have enough latitude to work out solutions which are not initiated by the super powers? (2) Did the Europeans, Western and Eastern, have enough insight to present different proposals from the ones continuously tabled by the great powers?

The only palpable result of détente so far was economic rapprochement. But this really did not represent more than the growth of business instinct on both sides - there was no automatic spill-over into politics. Our political problems might be more easy to solve after an expansion of economic contacts, but they would still require a positive effort of will.

He was unconvinced by the argument that the Vietnam conflict blocks progress in Europe. What affected Europe was European views of European problems, and it was arguable that the Europeans could seize the opportunity to do a deal while the super powers are engaged in Vietnam. We should not use Vietnam as an excuse for doing nothing. Nor had the growing influence of the third world in international affairs any direct bearing on Europe's problems. If the Europeans had the will to solve their own problems, neither the super powers nor the neutrals could stop them.

The next speaker from the Western side agreed that détente may be relative; but given the normal variations in the pattern of international relations it could hardly be otherwise. The point was that the absence of confrontation involving the threat of war between the super powers marked a fundamental difference from the immediate postwar period; for technological reasons this state of affairs would persist. And by excluding the threat of solving conflicts by force, we have accepted that political problems need political solutions. Therefore although the Europeans may disagree about the problems and about the solutions, solutions must be reached through co-operation; détente would make the problems less acute and create a climate in which the reality of détente, the solutions, could be reached.

A speaker from Eastern Europe called attention to the differing attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union towards Europe, due in particular to geography. The USSR is a European power; Europe is her western frontier and her vital interests are linked with Europe. The United States is outside Europe and is oriented mainly towards the Pacific and Asia; she is involved in war in Asia and considers local wars a fact of political life. On the one side we see a certain aloofness on the part of the US towards Europe and separation of American interests from West European interests because of this involvement elsewhere, while the Soviet Union, as a European power, tries to improve her relations with the West European countries; the relationship between the US and the East European countries is not parallel. This differentiation was highly relevant to the problem of improving détente in Europe.

He fully agreed that the Europeans should develop their own initiatives. But a significant improvement in relations must involve the security problem, and this in turn could not be separated from the German problem.

A Northern European participant suggested that the détente between the super powers had limited the stake that up till very recently was bet upon Europe. This did not necessarily mean that Europe was for a long time in for a quieter time: if as a result of the Middle Eastern crisis the Mediterranean became an area of contestation, and if the USSR developed her naval capability, this could have a powerful effect on Europe. But for the moment, and as a hypothesis for the next phase, he could imagine détente progressing between the European states, most probably based on the 'better business' approach that is the present situation.

Two important factors had to be considered in relation to any regional European community of interest that may become more evident over time. First, already mentioned, the USSR is a European power, and this made a difference

between the East and West European situation. This was true politically, but to some extent economically too because the pressures in the smaller East European countries to be part of an international market system were much greater than they were for the USSR itself, just as these pressures were greater for the West Europeans than for the US. Therefore politically and economically the presence of the USSR was a limitation on détente between the Europeans. The second factor was the hypothesis, which he considered real enough, that looking 10 to 15 years ahead, given the signs that most of the big West European countries want to come back on to the world stage, and given the problems such as the technology gap and the defence production problems, we could find an enlarged European Community moving into a new phase. We must take the hypothesis that there would be steps towards a political union. It would be very difficult not to think of Western Europe as a group with a growing cohesion. What would be the position of the smaller East European countries, with the USSR at one end of Europe and a dynamic West European Community at the other? He did not know the answer. But from this point of view he considered the present emphasis by the Eastern countries on bilateral links and approaches to be a mistake.

This problem of détente and the status quo was emphasised by a Western participant. He saw a very real political possibility of events producing change in Europe, including an enlarged western grouping, and this would involve a whole series of major political, economic and military considerations. Even if the present status quo were regarded as the best possible situation, it was inconceivable that it should remain such as it is now for ever. Of course war is ruled out now and we must have political solutions. But we must take the measure of the obstacles to be overcome before we could get to the point of translating détente into concrete agreement. Détente was not enough in itself. Thinking of the security problem, the German problem, the problem of political organisation in Europe, we would be undertaking something enormously difficult, much more difficult than was generally believed. And we could only begin by accepting the fact that changes would have to be made.

Coming back to the point about bilateral links being a mistake, an Eastern speaker disagreed. The central European states depended for their independence and even for their existence on a security system which, whether they like it or not, is the Warsaw Pact. So long as the Atlantic Treaty existed in Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact must exist as a counterweight. The division of Europe into two military blocs had to be accepted for the present as an unfortunate fact of life. So far as economic relations were concerned, due to the fundamental difference between the Common Market and Comecon (the latter being an organisation for the co-ordination of the economies of countries which are all independent) for those countries belonging to Comecon there was at present no alternative to bilateral relations with the Common Market countries, and this situation was unlikely to change in the near future. [The Western speaker made it clear that he was looking some time ahead.]

Politically, the Eastern states would like to see the liquidation of blocs and a new European system based on co-operation between states. And clearly if we want to build Europe the future Europe would be as different from the present Europe as our Europe is from the Europe of the past. But a new construction must be based on a certain state of things, which was the Europe of today, the recognition of countries which exist, the recognition of frontiers, the status quo.

In principle the suggestion that the Europeans should develop their own initiatives was excellent, even ideal, and we ought to work in this direction; but we were very far from this phase at present. He did not believe we could truly start to construct European security just on that basis, isolated from the rest of the world. Europe would be subject to external influences in the future as she has been in the past. The influence from the third world would grow stronger in the future, because the weight of the third world as it develops would become greater.

A second Eastern speaker suggested that the development of bilateral contacts in recent years between East and West European countries demonstrated the general desire of the Europeans to do something on their own initiative. But these bilateral contacts also existed between the USSR and West European countries: we should not put the question so much in the context of European countries versus the super powers. Whether or not it may be helpful for the USSR as a super power to be also a European power, this was a fact. Any European solution must include the major European states:

A Western speaker fully agreed that we should not develop a confrontation between the European view and the super power view in considering the structuring of détente. The problem for the Europeans was whether accepting strategic bipolarity also involved accepting political bipolarity. The Europeans should ask themselves how to shape the new political structure of central Europe.

A second Northern speaker agreed in general that European relations could not be isolated from the structure of international relations as a whole. However, he also believed that the actual crises that have occurred in the third world have had relatively little effect on the development of European relations.

But having said that, he identified two important questions which ought to be discussed: the impact of China, and the influence of defence technology (ABM systems). It did seem, as had been suggested, that the US was getting more aloof to European problems and more involved in Asia - although this was not true in terms of American business investment in Europe. But if China became a powerful and disturbing element in international politics as a whole, might not the USSR stress the Asian aspect of its preoccupation rather than the European?

In the last two years the ABM has passed from a theoretical possibility to an actuality. The USSR has begun to deploy ABMs, probably in modest quantities, and Kosygin in answer to a question during his visit to London defended this as a natural development since the USSR was interested in all forms of defensive weapon. The US has decided for the time being to deploy a small system which would eliminate the possibility of any Chinese attack on the US in the 1970's in the interests of giving greater credibility to American assurances and guarantees to her allies in Asia. In the end, however, it may prove the case that both super powers develop active defences against each other. While this would probably not affect the basic balance of power between the super powers, it may mean that the period of relative stability which has prevailed since 1963 may give way to a period not of hostility but of considerable uncertainty in the strategic balance of power between the big two. Would this tend to weaken the forces making for greater co-operation and détente in Europe, or, since both East and West Europe would be outside this possible network of active defence, may it give the two halves of Europe a greater identity of interest with each other than either has with the two super powers?

Another Western speaker agreed that ABM deployment would not have much affect on strategic stability. But a considerable sense of malaise was already apparent, in Western Europe at least. And Europe would inevitably be affected by the tremendous additional expenditure which the super powers would have to devote to maintaining the balance of terror. Deployment could have a detrimental effect on détente to the extent that the mere decision to strengthen their defences was a step away from closer agreement between the super powers. And from the point of view of purely European security, to the extent that ABM deployment increased the disparity of means between the super powers and their European allies it also gave them greater influence, because it would be more difficult for another European power to participate on the same footing.

A South Eastern participant saw ABM deployment as an element in the trend towards a tripartite composition of the northern hemisphere. We were in the midst of a phase, but extrapolating on what has happened he saw a North American political, military and economic entity in process of formation, regardless of the future form of relations between the United States and Canada, with the Soviet Union as a comparable entity, irrespective of contemporary problems and difficulties, and 'Europe' as the territory between those two masses. But the pattern or pace of evolution within Europe he found impossible to predict.

He considered the question of the influence of the third world very complex because the third world was very complex itself: it covered a lot of continents and peoples at different levels of political, social and economic development. Lagging economic development with all its consequences was the basic aspect, but it also included internal weakness and difficulties which bring about crises in international relations, so that the Vietnam war and the Middle East conflict were all components of the phenomenon of the third world. They were typical of societies at a lower level of development in a world in which the dominant forces were on a much higher level of development. It would be an oversimplification to look upon the international and internal troubles involved in nation-building in Asia and Africa now as comparable to what happened in Europe, because when Europe went through this process there was no other world at a higher developed level. He felt that on balance, events in the third world did influence developments in Europe, not directly but by influencing the political climate, especially on the level of public opinion. And coming back to the economic aspect, since the low level of economic development was a breeding-ground for political strife, by relieving the economic problem we should hopefully be working towards eliminating future crises, which in turn would have an impact on European problems. But this would be a lengthy and complex process.

He found it very difficult to answer the question about China, since China was herself in process of transformation. China was in process of becoming a real great power, possibly a super power, and it would be wrong to presume that when China has gained that status she would want to try to act along the lines being proclaimed now - even today Chinese foreign policy was far more cautious in deed than in word. In the short term the threat of China felt by the existing super powers was to a great extent determining their policy and also reflecting on the scene in Europe; but he did not think any European country, even Britain, was very much affected by this. In the long term, the change possibly in the motivation and certainly in the real standing of China could influence the international scene, including Europe, in a completely unpredictable way.

A Western participant suggested that many of the problems discussed so far were connected with the fact that the present détente was both limited and ambiguous. Limited in the sense that it was based on only two elements: (1) the wish of the super powers to avoid a new world war, and perhaps also to refrain from using their power to bring political pressure to bear, and (2) at least acquiescence in the status quo in Europe. Ambiguous because the first element was world-wide, while the second was European only: the crises in Vietnam and the Middle East showed that, under their umbrella the super powers are clearly trying to pursue controversial policies and to occupy positions in the third world.

This led to the question whether Europe ought to be involved in these events, or whether we should be proud of not having been involved during the past few years. He saw a dilemma here. Certainly détente would have been directly affected if Europe had been involved either in Vietnam or in the Middle East, because of the inevitable cleavage of opinion. On the other hand if it were true that the most important problems of world politics in coming years (with the exception of the German problem) would no longer be in Europe, if Europe decline to become involved in these problems it would hardly be able to play a major role in world politics. Of course it could still play an

important economic role, and this may be acceptable to the smaller European countries; but would a merchant role be acceptable to those countries which have exerted major influence in the past?

The final speaker from South Eastern Europe argued that détente could only be developed if it were founded on the real factors - economic necessity, the general desire of governments and public opinion to improve relations in all aspects, and for certain countries the wish not to repeat past mistakes - which have motivated the bilateral contacts established so far. The state of relations between the super powers was very important; but these relations could change, and this would in turn affect international relations in general. It would be a mistake, therefore to see détente only or mainly in terms of the balance of power.

Friday Afternoon, 27 October

Professor Mates in the Chair

Dr. Gasteyger opened the discussion by raising in a slightly different context some questions already touched on. First, the military confrontation in Europe: was this necessarily explosive or dangerous, and if this were the case why had it helped to create the present atmosphere of détente? And would the abolition of alliances or a reduction of armaments in Europe help or jeopardise détente? One might argue that the only serious threat to security comes from it being taken too easily for granted.

Secondly, what was the relationship between security and the status quo? These two notions tend, quite wrongly, to be identified one with the other. The problem of combining security with the status quo was nowhere so evident as in the case of Germany: no other country had better reason to keep the status quo for security reasons and at the same time for wanting to change it for political reasons. Did we really want (a) merely to consolidate the results of the second world war, i.e. freeze the present situation; (b) neither to accept nor to reject the present status quo but leave it open for possible future change; (c) to change the status quo for something which would lead we know not where? Did we want to see a spill-over from the growing economic contacts into the political arena (he agreed with the view expressed this morning that the spill-over was not automatic)?

Thirdly, would closer economic and political integration in West Europe, including possibly some kind of European defence community, jeopardise, prevent or hamper any further détente with the East European countries, and what would be the effect of an expanded European Community including Britain and the other applicants? He was aware of the view held in many quarters that any further integration in West Europe was likely to prevent further development of our relations with the East.

Fourthly, how encouraging was the return to bilateral relations, both within and outside the alliances and between the alliances? What was the significance of the recently concluded bilateral treaties between the East European countries and between them and the USSR? Was the intention to stabilise the political situation in East Europe which might otherwise be thought to become too fluid? Was the move towards abolition of the alliance in the West to be encouraged? The USSR has always preferred bilateral relations, with her Eastern allies, with Western Europe and with the US; should the Western alliance break down, we might well see a similar network of arrangements between the US and her Western allies. Bilateral relations may well help to re-establish interrupted relations between East and West; but was it satisfactory from the point of view of Europe's relationship with the great powers if Europe did not build up a workable multilateral system?

Fifthly, how should we respond to any change in the commitment of the super powers to Europe? Many Europeans argue that although not a European power the US should nevertheless remain in Europe. Did we want this, and if so, what form should the American presence take? The American commitment seemed to be shifting more from the military to the economic field: did we still need American troops as hostages? The USSR is a European power and her interest remains in Europe. The difference of emphasis between the super powers so far as their interest in Europe is concerned reflected a timelag in their evaluation of the Chinese threat: the US considered this threat immediate and was tempted to shift her main attention to Asia, whereas the USSR seemed to consider it more of a long-term problem.

Finally, public opinion seemed very eager for developing détente as far and as fast as possible between East and West Europe; but this pressure may lead the European governments to take actions which may foster détente in the short run, but which may also pre-empt solutions, not yet ripe, which in the long run are more important for the future of Europe. Was there a divergence between the expectations of public opinion on the one hand and the actual possibilities of taking concrete steps towards détente on the other? Personally he saw very great difficulties in moving much further and in seeing a system developing out of the present situation which would satisfy both our need for security and our desire to change the status quo.

[At the Chairman's suggestion it was agreed to try to separate the political from the security aspects of these questions.] On Dr. Gasteyger's point about our attitude towards the status quo, a Western participant found the idea of maintaining the status quo while pursuing détente a contradiction in terms. To the extent that on the one hand we were referring to a situation which exists de facto rather than de jure and on the other that by détente we mean the political and psychological climate which conditions this situation, as the climate was modified the legal and political problems would not pose themselves in the same terms, even if nothing were to change in a juridical sense.

A climate of détente supposed an improvement in relations between all the European states, including the two halves of Germany; and from the moment when relations between East and West Germany improved the status quo would be modified in a certain sense. Therefore we could not have détente without progressively arriving at a change of the present situation which must in the end take some legal form, although this need not necessarily mean German reunification in a single sovereign state.

A central European participant came back to the difficulty that while the scope for a continuing development of economic, cultural and human relations was recognised on all sides, nobody seemed to have any clear idea of how progress in these directions could be translated into the political field. Indeed a certain frustration was being bred because all the efforts to extend bilateral relations seemed to be a camouflage for maintaining the political status quo. Moreover so long as those responsible for our security based their plans on the assumption that bipolarity will remain he failed to see how other ideas could lead to any practical result.

Another speaker from the Western side saw three main aspects to the problem of détente in Europe. First, the military problem. There has been a certain diminution of military tension. But he did not believe any real security agreement could be reached without the participation, as well as the support, of both super powers. The separation of the US from Europe geographically (but not in other important respects) was becoming less and less meaningful with the development of supersonic transport and communication by television satellite.

Second, the German problem. At the moment no solution of the German problem by reunification or by the acceptance of non-reunification would be acceptable to either East or West Germany. But we could have fade-away effects or spill-over effects: we could have the perspective of a Europe of sovereign national states to which Germany would be the single exception, and in the long run we would not have détente, or we could envisage some form of supranational system in Eastern and Western Europe with a collective policy between East and West Europe, in which the German problem could be diffused.

Third, the problem of organising relations. Reliance on bilateral contacts may lead to détente in the short term. But in the long term it could only lead to difficulties because West Germany was the most important partner in discussion of any problem in Europe.

A speaker from the Western side drew a distinction between a quantitative and a qualitative change of the status quo. A quantitative change, a 'roll back', in either direction, was neither likely nor necessary. But the absence of a qualitative change did impede the progress of détente. This related directly to the German problem: he did not consider an intra-European détente possible in the long run without some kind of intra-German détente, and this must involve a change in the quality of the régime in East Germany. West Germany was now ready to face up to this: in their view the basic issue was not for the two Germanys to live within the borders of one nation, it was the human condition under which 17 million Germans live. Wehner went further than anyone else in expounding this theory when he said that if these conditions in the other part of the country changed, many of the West German objections to recognition could be abandoned; if they developed along Austrian lines, which meant a separate German state but free, or along Yugoslav lines which meant a separate communist German state but free, then Bonn might well reconsider the doctrine of non-recognition. If East Berlin were prepared to meet Bonn halfway, Bonn might accept a formula akin to the Bucharest declaration, recognising the existence of another state and finding a modus vivendi with that state without implying that it is an alien state. Was there a possibility of leaving aside the big problem of reunification, of each part making clear to the other that it has nothing to fear from the other, of taking up relations on a decent basis? So far no encouragement has been noticeable from the East. But unless something did move in that field, all the other efforts at détente in Europe would be stopped too. The speaker did not understand the position of some East European countries who say the German question is a problem for the Germans to settle, but who exempt West Germany from the attempt to improve bilateral relations because they insist on recognition of the DDR as a prior condition. Why interject this obstacle when Bonn was sincerely trying to improve relations?

From the Eastern side it was argued that German reunification was a strategic question. The fundamental consideration was what would happen after Germany were reunified? Would it be integrated with Western Europe, as had sometimes been suggested? Who could guarantee the policy of a future German government, or of Western Europe? One result of the postwar situation was that the East European countries are oriented primarily towards supporting the DDR and they see the best guarantee for their national security in the Warsaw Pact, in close co-operation with the USSR, while support for West Germany is part of the policy of the Western powers. This was one reason for the difficulty of trying to find new solutions in the framework of a multi-Europe complex. So long as this strategic question remained on the agenda, how should we find a better framework than we have now for a solution to the German problem? The question was, where to make a start. The need for change in respect of broadening political democracy and improving the economic situation was accepted by the socialist countries; but why not begin with recognition of the DDR and then wait for changes to take effect?

A second Eastern speaker held that the status quo must mean the territorial status quo, and recognition of the existing states in Europe. Clearly it could not mean stopping the historical development of mankind or petrifying relations between states in their present state. However, he could

not accept the idea of a qualitative change in the status quo. As a point of principle, was it reasonable to make the normalisation of relations between two states dependent upon change, no matter of what degree, in the internal system of either country? If we accepted this idea, he feared we should make little progress.

It was suggested from the Western side that the notion might at least be accepted that West Germany was trying to overcome the problem. The question of a qualitative change was not the most important element, although it was very difficult to improve relations with a country which refused to co-operate. A solution could never be reached by choosing between the alternatives of two sovereign German states or one sovereign German state, which were merely aspects of the same problem. We should rather look forward to an order in which the question of recognition or non-recognition becomes of less importance. Any structure in Europe built on the nation as the entity of political order would be dangerous; the concept of an over-all superstructure was as yet very theoretical. However, unless we could find a real alternative détente would founder on the competition between the divided halves of Germany and of Europe.

Another Western participant said that some Western as well as Eastern neighbours of Germany were reluctant to embark on any change of a situation which did not after all guarantee us against a resurgence of the German problem. But such a view was untenable, first because no-one could guarantee that difficulties would not arise from the present situation, and secondly because it was incompatible with détente.

Recalling his previous line of argument, one solution was completely out of the question to West and East Europeans alike - the integration of a reunified Germany into Western Europe. Nor did he see a solution by integrating the two halves of Germany into the two halves of Europe. But he believed a new framework could be envisaged for Europe as a whole - it would need to be very broad and very flexible, - which would be able to meet the legitimate security considerations of Germany's neighbours and at the same time to lance the abscess caused by the existence of two antagonistic halves of the same nation. A number of conditions would have to be met, both by West Germany and by the Eastern countries. It was fair to recognise that West Germany had come a certain way; the East Europeans should now be more responsive.

A Northern European participant maintained that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative change did offer a way out of the dilemma posed by the Eastern speakers of where to make a start on the one hand and identification of the status quo with the territorial status quo on the other.

He saw no prospect of détente going beyond a set of business relationships unless there were a change in the relationship of the two Germanys. No-one was asking the DDR to go through a fresh political revolution; but until the kind of policy symbolised by the Berlin wall were modified, we should get not the status quo but stalemate. So many different kinds of relationship between states other than recognition of each other's full sovereignty could be envisaged that recognition of the DDR need not be an insuperable problem.

A second speaker from Northern Europe agreed that some satisfaction did exist on the Western side with the existence of two Germanys. But the Eastern countries were mistaken in the idea that if only the smaller European countries would be persuaded to recognise the DDR we should have made an important step forward. Of course such a step would seriously impede the relationship between those countries and West Germany. But fear of Bonn's reaction was not the primary reason for their stand. Indeed a strong sentiment existed to do something to help the other side. The point was that such action would only stiffen Bonn's resistance to moving further in the direction it has begun to move. Recalling the disagreement about whether a solution of the German problem should be sought in a supranational framework, the speaker said it should also be borne in mind that the smaller West European states differ on a very important point from the French point of view: supporting as they do the Western alliance and the integrated military defence system there were reasons

for their preferring changes to take place within an institutionalised environment.

Another Northern participant drew a distinction between détente and co-operation. Détente could only be understood in relation to tension. Tension arose when an adversary was felt to have both the capability of inflicting damage and the intention to do so (hostility). When we spoke of détente we meant that the immediate threat was not so dangerous as it used to be - i.e. that either the capability factor or the hostility factor was diminishing. If either were at zero, there would be no threat at all. Co-operation may exist, however, when tensions are high, and tension would not be affected by co-operation as long as co-operation affected neither the hostility nor the capability to inflict damage. Co-operation stemming from mutual interest had nothing to do with détente, nor had good relations. A different type of co-operation, however, was combined with the political will to strengthen the other man. If and when hostility between East and West Europe was at such a low point that both parties were ready through co-operation to strengthen the other, then we could begin détente.

A participant from South-Eastern Europe considered this distinction very hard to maintain in real-life situations. It would be very difficult to deny that a development of economic relations beyond mere trade on secondary and insignificant commodities, economic relations which did create economic dependence or a vested interest, was conducive to détente and to introducing stability into relations.

Reviewing the problems that have remained unchanged over the past ten years, a speaker from Eastern Europe warned against overlooking the basic facts of the division of Europe into different social systems and the involvement of both super powers in Europe. The existence of the two economic blocs has led to different attitudes of mind taking root. Apart from the development of bilateral contacts, he saw little scope at present for the Europeans themselves to make a significant improvement in their situation: the cold war was still too fresh as a historical period.

A Western speaker urged that we should refuse to think in those terms: we should start to envisage an area in which the term communist or capitalist became irrelevant. This related directly to the German problem. He agreed that trade in itself did not imply or entail co-operation: trade between the two halves of Germany was now at a peak while political relations were at rock bottom. But powerful segments within the West German establishment were willing to move from mere trade to co-operation with the express intention to strengthen the other fellow; it was understood that helping to modernise the East German economy would make it possible for the DDR in future years to lift restrictions because they could be sure that there would be no flood of refugees. West Germany did not want to swallow the East Germans up, buy them off, or sabotage their economy.

Another Western speaker agreed that the West German approaches were very reasonable; but the question arose of their ultimate aim. If the ultimate aim were the national one, the more reasonable the approaches the less credible they would be. He supported the idea of a previous speaker to try to move away from the field of tension of the issue. And as a minimum, thinking in terms of greater freedom for people and goods, the Common Market had a big rôle to play. But this would require a response from the East.

From the Eastern side it was argued that the West German approach failed to take account of some elementary problems. For example Poland and Germany have been neighbours for a thousand years, and for the first time Poland had a friendly state on her western border. The safety of her western border was a vital security issue to Poland, and any attempt to change the status quo would immediately call this security in question. The speaker felt that meetings such as this were possible very largely because the idea of changing the régimes of other countries had by and large been abandoned in Europe.

So long as the West German government considered itself the sole representative of the German nation and favoured the idea of change in the Eastern régime, no matter how this may be presented, this was a destabilising factor, especially when coupled with the ambiguous position concerning Poland's frontiers and nuclear weapons in Germany.

It was argued from the Western side that this desire of the Eastern countries to maintain the friendly German state on their border could lead to grave difficulties for them (a) because the East German régime could not remain permanently as it is now, and (b) because of the lack of a supranational system. Of course the East German régime would remain in the socialist camp; but although it has evolved to a certain extent it has not solved all its internal problems and a political crisis was quite likely at some stage. The speaker considered such small revolutions a sign of growth; but in the absence of some integration of East Germany with the other socialist systems a major crisis would be difficult to avoid. Personally he felt that the big cry for reunification would come from East Germany because it has not yet experienced the normality brought about in the other Eastern states through a political crisis.

This led back to consideration of détente from the point of view of the balance between capability and intention and the general equilibrium within Europe. A Western speaker recalled that the modus vivendi which has brought the present measure of détente has been based on a revised assessment of the intention; but the capacity to commit aggression has in fact been increasing. Economic and cultural exchanges did not go to the heart of détente, what he called a peaceful equilibrium, because this depended on capabilities.

In terms of the European situation, he suggested this meant redressing the balance within the alliance systems as well as between them, perhaps in parallel. The degree of inequality which exists within both alliance systems was something new in history - and the East European countries were perhaps at even more of a disadvantage vis-à-vis their major ally than the West European. Moreover the problem of changing détente into co-operation was compounded both by the disparity in economic and technological capabilities and by the different pace of development in the two halves of Europe.

Following on from this last point, a speaker from Northern Europe saw a complex of questions turning around the technology gap. In Western Europe a fair amount of integration had been achieved on the trade level, and the beginning of common policies among the Six on agriculture. A whole new set of problems was now arising; one of these was the extension or not of the European Community, and this related to the technology problem. The individual West European countries for a large number of industries did not have internal markets large enough to maintain nationally firms of a size to be able to compete internationally with the great international companies, the vast majority of which are American. There had been a migration of the major American companies to Europe without precedent in terms of American industry and unmatched by a move in the other direction. The first reaction had come, understandably, over aviation, because aviation involved the heaviest expenditure among these industries, which were also directly linked to the political aspect of industry through their relation to defence. It was unimaginable that the countries with major defence industries, France and Britain, should allow what has happened in the computer industry (American companies control over 80 per cent of the computer market within the Community) to happen in the aviation industry. Bilateral co-operation having been unable to provide enough markets, the tendency was now towards multilateral co-operation.

A problem also arose in the lack of development of European companies, which would be the obvious idea of a structure able to compete with the American giants. Instead the tendency has been towards concentration into virtually one major company in each country (in computers, in aviation, in motor cars). If each company is a national asset, then political problems

are involved in consideration of industrial ones. Would it be possible to maintain these national, or even European, industries, without the countries concerned going much further in terms of joint economic policies than they have ever done before? The balance of payments problem would also have to be overcome, and we should have to move towards European currency arrangement.

The question of British entry into the Community also involved military problems. It was a large question whether the Europeans stood to gain more influence through economics than through attempts to build up nuclear weaponry. Nevertheless, as the gap between the Russian and American forces and the European nuclear forces grew (assuming the British and French forces remained in being), the pressure towards European nuclear arrangements would remain. At some point (not in the next few years) the West European countries would be faced with problems of integration that go further than anything they have done before. They may refuse to face this. But signs were that they would go an increasing part of the way in this direction, partly out of a desire to use their influence. This would be a different thing, however, to the forms of nationalism that exist at the moment.

A second North European speaker asked the Eastern participants whether the prospect of Western Europe resembling a single comprehensive industrial system in the 1970's made Western Europe a more attractive area in which to seek trade and investment, or whether this created a frightening adversary threat.

It was held that the anticipated changes in the Common Market would inevitably involve changes in the policy of the Central and East European states. The speaker doubted whether it would be possible to continue on a purely bilateral basis. But he also doubted whether the changes would be so revolutionary as was generally supposed: it was appreciated in the West that the need for trade is mutual. Personally he was optimistic that sensible arrangements could be made, because the key people on both sides were reasonable and realistic. He could make no forecast however as to the form relations would take, or how many Eastern countries would be involved.

Pursuing a point made earlier about the disparity in the pace of economic development, a South Eastern participant agreed that before a development including the whole of Europe in multilateral co-operation could come about certain efforts now being made in the Eastern countries must have made further progress. There was no doubt about their willingness, but this was a very difficult problem indeed and some Eastern countries were more fortunately placed than others. Essentially the problem arose from the urgent need for fundamental changes in the economic mechanism to make multilateral co-operation possible at a time when the maximum rate of growth was required to reduce the disparity with Western Europe. Both these requirements could not be met simultaneously, so for those countries which could not afford temporarily to disregard the rate of growth there had to be a compromise, and this too was a strain on the economy.

The political climate was of considerable importance for this development. He did not however believe that the different forms of inter-state relations in Europe were an obstacle to a growing improvement of relations in Europe, provided three conditions were met: (a) if the existing political climate were maintained; (b) if the Eastern countries maintained the will to press ahead with economic reform; (c) if the West continued to understand that it is neither charity nor altruism but in their own interest as part of Europe to assist in co-operation with the Eastern countries. In relation to (c), he mentioned the great readiness shown by Italy in particular for joint enterprises with Eastern countries as showing the possibilities for co-operation irrespective of differences in the social system.

Saturday Morning, 28 October

Professor Vernant in the Chair

In his opening remarks Professor Vernant suggested that the status quo could be interpreted in three senses: (a) as a territorial situation resulting from the second world war; this implied a certain lay-out of frontiers and he did not believe anyone thought seriously about trying to change it; (b) as the existence of different social systems in East and West Europe, and again he saw no serious intention among West Europeans to call in question the economic and social structure of the Eastern states; (c) the aspect for discussion this morning, as a certain organisation of security in both East and West Europe. The problem was to see whether these security systems, which also result from the immediate postwar situation, were the only ones possible, or the best possible, or whether other systems could be envisaged. The most important characteristic of the present organisation was that it involved the presence of American and Soviet forces in the respective halves of Europe and in particular Western forces on the territory of the Federal Republic.

Professor Snejdarek introduced the discussion. First of all, the present situation in Europe was characterised by the system of European security already in existence, based on acceptance of the two blocs. For many years this system has worked, and it would be wrong to deny that it has achieved some positive results. On the other hand, everyone realised that it could not last for ever, and also that the system was very imperfect - the existence of two opposing blocs in itself necessarily constituted a danger since these blocs must always be increasing their military potential. We had reached a point where these facts were having a detrimental effect not only on general policy within Europe but also on the way of life and the whole standard of living. On the other hand, because Europe cannot isolate herself from the rest of the world, if the division of Europe in two blocs were to persist, any involvement of the super powers, and especially the US, outside Europe might seriously endanger peace in Europe itself. For this reason many people in Europe now felt that something must be done to organise a new system of European security and of European co-operation.

With regard to the Chairman's definition of the status quo, Professor Snejdarek was not convinced that the present territorial and ideological aspects were as completely accepted in Western Europe as Professor Vernant suggested. Two very important frontiers in Europe, the Western frontier of Poland and the frontier of the DDR, were not accepted by all European states. He had heard it argued in Western circles that while the frontier of Poland was the frontier of a state, the frontier of the DDR was only a demarcation line inside Germany. This conception proved just how uncertain the territorial status quo still was. He considered it necessary, therefore, to bring in some guarantee of the existing frontiers and of the existing territorial division of Europe - which did not mean that other related problems should be excluded from the discussion. He was referring in particular to relations between the two German states and the need to normalise these relations in such a way that a future arrangement involving both German states could perhaps be taken by the Germans themselves inside a broader European organisation and with the help of the other European states.

He was very glad to hear it said that there was no thought in the West today to change the social systems in Eastern Europe. Naturally these systems were in process of evolution, as were the capitalist states themselves in Western Europe. The situation was much better today than it was ten or fifteen years ago, and he believed the way towards co-operation rather than mere coexistence was now open. On the other hand forces did still exist which accept coexistence and co-operation only as a temporary expedient, although these forces were not in a majority at least as far as Western Europe is concerned.

With regard to the organisation of security: in recent years there has been a great deal of talk in East and West about European security, but no-one has defined what security really is or might be. For his own country, European security had been considered as first of all a recognition of the territorial and ideological status quo, everything connected with the end of the second world war and the treaty of Potsdam. Perhaps rather naively, they had thought that once this situation were attained, all the other problems would be resolved. Personally he considered this mistaken. After two or three years experience, especially in research, he felt we should begin now by elaborating some alternative pattern for a European security on the basis of co-operation, and including the economic and cultural aspects, for example, as well as the military and political aspects.

A Western participant had suggested the previous day that we should try to find some united ideas for Europe, to give the Europeans greater consciousness of belonging to Europe. He entirely agreed. He did not think any of the Eastern states had ever forgotten that they belonged to European culture and the European economy. But two special problems arose in this connection to which he did not have an answer. First, how to create a system for workable economic co-operation among the European states, accepting the changes that have taken place in both halves since the second world war. Whether or not the East Europeans liked the integration that has taken place in Western Europe (and they did not like it), this was a fact and would remain as a fact; therefore any system would have to start from the actual economic and political realities in Europe. However, he believed it would be possible to find means of co-operation on the basis of these realities.

The second problem related to cultural co-operation. A great deal has been achieved already: cultural relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic were excellent, although they did not have diplomatic relations, better than between Czechoslovakia and any other West European country. On the other hand this cultural co-operation was very largely spontaneous. Of course cultural co-operation need not always be co-ordinated; but he saw the need for a system of intra-European collaboration on questions in which every European nation has an interest, for example the preparation of history books.

Although co-operation in Europe may seem slow in developing, looking back to the situation of ten or fifteen years ago we could see how far we have travelled. He considered tourism, especially among young people a very important factor affecting this development; these exchanges would have lasting political consequences. The best thing the Europeans could and should do, he thought, was to encourage common activities, common research, co-operation by social scientists in particular, in both parts of Europe precisely on the question of an alternative pattern for the organisation of Europe and for future European security. By this means we should also be able to influence the pace of development in governmental thinking along these lines in the various countries, and we should probably also do something to bring nearer a conference of leading European politicians on the problem of European security.

A speaker from Northern Europe drew attention to the fact that a far more complicated system exists today in the West than in the East; from the point of view of future plans for a new security structure based on co-operation between the two sides this lack of symmetry was important. Sketching the stages in the evolution of the Western security system over the past twenty years - the Treaty of Dunkirk, the first Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, the second Brussels Treaty following the failure of the European Defence Community, the speaker said that the machinery had hardly changed since these various organisations were founded, although different political elements had emerged. The original purpose of the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties was to resist any revival of an aggressive Germany, and although the North Atlantic Treaty was oriented primarily against the Soviet Union the containment of Germany remained as an element. The third purpose started emerging shortly afterwards when the European Defence Community, which would have given some

expectation of a purely European structure with a strong defence aspect, failed: in its place we had the second Brussels Treaty which involved the commitment of British forces to the continent, Germany and Italy joined Britain, France and the Benelux countries as members, and Germany became a member of NATO. One of the pledges of that treaty was to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. A few years later the Paris and Rome Treaties established the Europe of the Six: attempts to give this a political as well as an economic content have not succeeded so far, but the fourth element on the European side, the attempt to be independent of the United States, has emerged very clearly.

He wondered whether the old fears of a powerful Germany have changed, and in what way, and what new formulations of our present system could allow for that concern in a different way.

It was stated in reply that West Germany understands the need for security on the part of her neighbours; those aspects of the Western alliance system which were aimed at containing Germany have been deliberately accepted by the Federal Republic, and the speaker believed similar aspects in a new European security system would also be deliberately accepted by her. The sole condition was that in any new security system in Europe Germany should be on an equal footing with other states as she is now in the existing Western alliance, even if this equality is sometimes more apparent than real.

A new European security system could be envisaged either as replacing the existing alliances or as supplementing them. The notion of a completely new system did at one time have an appeal in West Germany as leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany which in turn might be an ideal condition for obtaining reunification. German opinion has however now come round to the view that since the general preference in Europe is for a gradual evolution rather than rapid and radical change, the existing alliance systems should be maintained but could be supplemented by additional security measures.

Here too a distinction could be drawn, between promises, such as non-aggression pacts and declarations renouncing the use of force, and actual measures, such as troop reductions, the exchange of observers, renunciation of nuclear weapons, etc. He doubted whether declarations could add significantly to the prevailing sentiment in Europe that security is not really endangered. On the other hand a difficulty arose in regard to practical measures, in particular troop reductions, which he personally would consider the most meaningful step towards a new relationship. On the Western side force reductions have either been announced or are in the offing by the US, Britain and Germany, but it is insisted that this is redeployment, not reduction. Whether or not this was a sound argument, the effect may be to prevent a similar development in Eastern Europe which the West might want to achieve. Did the East European participants consider a reduction of Soviet troops in East Europe feasible, or did they feel a need for those troops at their present strength?

An Eastern participant said that the existing security system was necessary in order to safeguard the status quo; but as confidence increased due to a strengthening of the status quo the military aspect of establishing it on a permanent basis would become less important. So long as there existed important forces in Western Europe which did not recognise the status quo, the Warsaw Pact would remain the best guarantee for the Eastern states' security (the bilateral treaties were not enough because they did not provide for unified command in war).

Looking towards possible East-West initiatives, the speaker favoured conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty as the first move, because of the tremendous importance of the nuclear element for security in Europe. A second step might be an all-European treaty of non-intervention and non-use of force, perhaps combined with an agreement on control posts to give a measure of confidence against the possibility of surprise attacks. At a later stage he would like to see some measures of regional disarmament in Europe: the creation of a nuclear-free zone, perhaps beginning with a freeze of existing weapons,

and this might be linked with force reductions and international control measures.

A second Northern participant stressed that whatever form it might take, a European security system must above all be extremely effective. Europe included a very powerful group of industrial states, most of whom were capable of generating considerable military power, although this power may be small in relation to American or Soviet power. The possibility of a European crisis developing fast and developing significant proportions would always be with us, just because this potential exists. Secondly, there was the inevitable element of asymmetry due to geography: the USSR geographically on the edge of central and western Europe, with the ability to deploy both conventional and nuclear force very rapidly in the area; the US, separated by 3,000 miles, able to deploy strategic power very rapidly against Europe, conventional power rather more slowly. However, he considered it one of the more encouraging things about discussion of European security in the 1960's and 1970's compared with the 1950's that if the US were accepted by both sides as a European power (and he doubted whether much progress could be made unless she were), new technological developments were making it possible for the US to deploy power in Europe much more rapidly than was possible ten years ago.

He saw three basic models on which we could proceed. First, towards the field of disarmament in central Europe which has been exhaustively negotiated by governments over the past ten or fifteen years. He felt however that the various plans tabled for the freezing or reduction of nuclear or conventional forces in central Europe did present very severe practical problems as a measure in isolation and without some structural reform in the organisation of European security. Secondly, the dissolution of alliances and their replacement by some more purely European system. No-one had spelled out whether such a system should have some intervention capability of its own; but unless European power could be organised no purely European system could last, because no European nation would put its trust in mere declarations of intent about non-aggression etc. The difficulty of working in the immediate future towards any concept of European security involving the dissolution of alliances was first of all that there were 31 states in Europe of a very widely varying degree of power - from Malta to the Federal Republic; there was also disagreement about whether states such as Turkey were European or not. Apart from the problem that it would exclude the US, and quite apart from the fact that it would seem to offer no satisfactory framework for settling the German problem, he believed a European security conference would be a highly unsuitable forum in which to negotiate change.

The most satisfactory model for the immediate future would therefore seem to be some modification of the alliance system. He believed we could think in terms of modification of both alliances to include an element of troop reductions, to retain the essential guarantee element which the super powers provide within their respective alliances, and to bridge the two alliances by some wider organisation. This might for instance begin with a hot line between the commanders of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO and develop into a permanent consultative arrangement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO; the essential element was that both super powers should have the right to continuous consultation on security problems with their allies, even if their forces in Europe were at a considerably lower level. This would provide the essential element of confidence to handle crises.

Finally, was a single all-embracing European security system feasible, or should the security problems of Southern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean be handled differently from those of Northern and Central Europe?

An Eastern participant pursued the question of troop reductions in Central Europe. This was a very complicated question, bound up both with progress towards solving the broader political problems in Europe raised in the previous day's discussion and with the American military intervention in Vietnam. On the other hand as an example of military détente it would be to the advantage of many European states. It was generally agreed that Europe is of crucial importance in the world balance of power and that neither side could accept changes which might upset this balance. But were the strategic concepts and the present structure of forces in harmony with the real interests of both sides? In any case, he felt that the size of conventional forces (in the West at least) tended in reality to be conditioned more by economic resources than by strategic considerations. If we could conceive of all the nuclear forces in Europe acting as a guarantee of the existing balance in Europe, without necessarily accepting this balance as final, he believed we could envisage changes in the military field under this combined nuclear umbrella, including some troop reductions, possibly in a specified zone.

A speaker from Western Europe agreed with the remark that it was difficult to talk about a change in European security arrangements when the system we have had so far has been so successful. On the other hand the basic situation was less stable than was generally supposed. For the first time in history, the countries of West and East Europe have given up control over their own security in return from a guarantee from the US and USSR respectively. For the past twenty years this may have been in our interest; but for how long could it continue, failing agreement on both nuclear and conventional disarmament and failing the creation of effective international peacekeeping machinery by the United Nations? Non-aggression pacts etc. might be helpful as a first step; but long-term planning would be required to assure Europe's security, taking account of the realities of the nuclear era. Europe would have to change its basic capabilities.

Another imbalance derived from the different strategic situation in the two halves of Europe. The West European countries were capable of generating considerable military power, certainly in the conventional field and potentially in the nuclear field (he did not accept that the present British and French nuclear capability amounted as yet to more than an option); the Eastern countries did not yet have the same potential, but this relative weakness was more than compensated for by the strategic capability on their doorstep. Missile development may have abolished distance; but while it was unthinkable that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the event of any Western aggression towards Eastern Europe, an immediate American response to any kind of pressure from the East could not be assumed automatically. So however strong the US guarantee may now be, the difference in the strategic situation would remain as a source of weakness for the West.

Another Western participant pursued the relationship between security and the status quo. It was perhaps surprising to hear representatives of states founded on revolutionary principles maintaining that things must stay as they are. However, for a number of countries in Europe security was identified with the status quo and if we agreed that this contained a degree of risk we must then ask ourselves what kind of security we wanted. At the same time he wondered how the network of bilateral military and political treaties which has been re-established between the USSR and the East European countries, involving a strengthening of ties between those various countries over the next twenty years over and above the Warsaw Pact, fitted in with the concept of the status quo. What purpose were these treaties meant to serve? This related to the point raised the previous day about the lack of correspondence to the embryo which does exist in the West of systems which are truly European, not American or Russian (he did not exclude the USSR from Europe).

Recalling his remarks the previous day about the problem of crisis management in Europe, especially in the light of what had been said about the risk of crisis due merely to Europe's industrial potential, he saw the need for serious research by both sides on the likely elements of crisis, including the German problem, and on whether the existing systems were likely to be adequate

to control any future crisis. Nor could we avoid tackling the question of precisely what we mean by "Europe". Perhaps we should then be able to decide whether we should want at some stage to crystallise the status quo, whether the tendencies towards modification should be encouraged, and whether any progress was likely to be made.

It was stated from the Eastern side that the socialist states supported the status quo simply because it was the best guarantee of peace in the Europe of today. With regard to the bilateral treaties, it should be borne in mind the socialist states were quite willing to conclude treaties of friendship with West European countries as well, and perhaps there would be more likelihood of such agreements in the future.

A speaker from South-East Europe said his answer to the question what is Europe would be, in terms of security, the northern temperate zone of which Europe is an inescapable part. This led to the question of what kind of security. He preferred to think in terms of security against what rather than against whom, since in a very large system which is interconnected there are so many variables. It would however be an oversimplification to envisage tension leading to possible conflict necessarily developing along ideological lines. While he doubted whether security was capable of objective definition, he thought we could say what is the measure of security. He would measure it by the amount of co-operation stimulated by a given situation. The higher the degree of security in a certain area, the greater the readiness for active co-operation, just as a defensive posture and holding aloof reflected a decreasing sense of security.

This brought into consideration the relationship between security and armament. Since close co-operation and a relaxed atmosphere tended to weaken the pressure for spending on armaments, the state of armament could also be taken as correlative in the sense of being dependent on security. He stressed this because it was so often argued that security followed from reducing armaments. However, this had never worked in the past, was unlikely to work now, and if it were possible to arrange artificially the only result would be an increase in tension; high tension has usually coincided with a low level of armament whereas the present détente started from a high level of armament and has led to pressure for a reduction in defence spending. We needed better understanding of the working of all these elements in the whole inter-connected area. But to give one example, the rapid development of the military and economic potential of China and of its status in international relations proved that to speak of a status quo in the area was hoping for the impossible and also for the undesirable.

A speaker from Northern Europe, commenting on the arms control measures proposed by Eastern participants, was utterly opposed to the idea of starting with the abolition of the existing alliance systems: this should come as the last step, because these systems provided the member countries with a security which could hardly be equalled. He fully agreed with what had been said about the need to organise European power if a new security arrangement were to prove effective. It was inconceivable, even supposing the withdrawal of a number of member states after 1969 did bring about the collapse of the Atlantic alliance, that the Western states would simply conclude an all-European pact renouncing the use of force and consider this an adequate safeguard of their security. A far more likely alternative would be a Western defence community, including Germany, with its own nuclear capability. Was the desire in the East to get the United States out of Europe so strong that they would prefer such an alternative to the present Western system which could be used as a framework in which the changes we had been talking about could take place?

The likely consequences of a US withdrawal from Europe were emphasised by a Western participant; a greater defence effort, particularly in the nuclear field, would be inevitable. With regard to the possibility of troop reductions, he argued that considering the imbalance which existed in conventional forces, even though reductions were being made on the Western side largely for economic or political reasons, serious progress would not be possible without a reciprocal reduction of the Eastern forces. Of course the Eastern countries would also benefit economically from such a move.

A second Western speaker added that although the military factor was becoming less important, the need for collective security arrangements based on integration remained because the real threat to European security was still nationalism. Of course this did not mean that a system which has proved successful should not be adapted to changed conditions, and he endorsed the various possibilities for partial measures which could improve confidence. But when the time was ripe for serious European negotiation of a European security agreement, was any practical result feasible without the active participation in such negotiations of the major partners of the two sides?

Another Western participant reaffirmed the view that Europe was not the main area of crisis, actual or potential, in the world. If a potential danger existed, it was of an internal upheaval in the Eastern part of Germany which might tempt West Germany to intervene, although he doubted whether this would happen. This led back to the question of qualitative changes raised the previous day. On the question of the US role in the European security balance, while he was in favour of the Europeans trying to find European solutions for European problems he did not think any of these solutions could be found without American involvement in the process of finding them and American/Soviet involvement in guaranteeing the solution found. He believed the whole of Europe outside of France would reject any proposed European system without the US. It had been suggested from the Eastern side that the majority of Europeans wanted a change of the system. The speaker believed that the majority of Europeans were not so interested in the present system because it has worked and was in process of change; but it would be wrong to assume that NATO would not continue after 1969, if only because people did not want to tear down a fence before they had built a new one.

Looking ahead, the problem was to try to fit the military field into the general pattern of détente. Of necessity this would be a step by step process, and the steps were bound to be small. Small steps need not imply a great risk, but might be helpful in confidence building and might lead to further measures. Technological innovation would make things possible five years hence which we could not think of five years ago, such as the thinning out of overseas garrisons and of the military establishment on German soil.

It was stated that there was no question, so far as French policy was concerned of any final agreement on European security being reached or having validity without United States participation and without a United States guarantee. The argument was that the search for solutions should be carried on by the Europeans themselves.

With regard to the question whether the US could fairly be considered a European power, an Eastern participant recalled that the Soviet proposal of 1954 for an all-European conference on European security had envisaged the participation of the United States, as did the Polish proposal for such a conference when it was first tabled in 1964. The US did not respond and had shown little interest since then in problems of European security. For the moment the focus of American interest was in Asia.

However, the speaker suggested it was more important for the time being to concentrate on objectives. He agreed that the existing security arrangements had certain positive aspects, although the balance was precarious in some respects, it was also onerous for many European countries, and, he believed, the prevailing feeling in East and West was that the antagonistic basis of this balance should be changed. On the other hand it would be quite unrealistic to advocate upsetting the balance itself. The question was, of course, how to proceed. The various proposals put forward at the Bucharest and Karoly Vary meetings offered some guidance.

To correct a misunderstanding, he made it clear that the proposal for an all-European treaty of non-intervention and renunciation of force was not intended as a substitute for existing political groupings but as an additional element; it was meant to serve as a first step towards European unity through discussion of European security.

A South Eastern participant maintained that starting from the military point of view was not the best way to solve the problem of European security. We could not do away with the remnants of the cold war by trying to perpetuate the present system of military blocs. The speaker felt that the suggestions contained in the Bucharest declaration provided a far better guide to ways of improving the political climate in Europe and thereby creating the necessary conditions for a truly European security system. The Rumanian initiative at the United Nations which resulted in a unanimous resolution, sponsored by some members of NATO as well as of the Warsaw Pact, calling for actions on a regional level to improve neighbourly relations between European states with different economic and social systems was a significant indication of how far the climate has changed already.

A speaker from the Eastern side thought that the two blocs would probably still exist after 1969, although he was not happy about this prospect. These blocs were becoming a less and less perfect instrument of security in Europe and should be replaced by system based on European co-operation. But as long as they existed, any action which could bring them together was worthwhile. He welcomed the constructive suggestions which had been put forward from Western participants. Perhaps some of these ideas could be realised in the long-standing Soviet proposal, supported by other Socialist states, of a non-aggression pact between the two blocs, or something similar.

A Western speaker identified three possible types of security system. First, a model based on the general idea of a balance of power. Everybody in Europe was more or less satisfied with the balance we have now, and this balance was somehow functioning. He would therefore call this model the system for preserving the status quo. The second model was a revisionist system, based on the idea that a change in military arrangements could be used as an instrument for political change, given that the division of Germany and of Europe was an open question to which we were seeking a solution; this change could go either in the direction of a solution including German reunification, or in the direction of cementing the division. The difficulty here was that at the moment there seemed no way out from the frustration of the different views on the status quo. The third model was an evolutionary system, based on the idea of reducing step by step the importance of the purely military aspects of security and the antagonistic military capabilities and fostering instead the creation of a fabric of common interests and real co-operation. From the sense of the discussion he felt that only the evolutionary model deserved serious consideration.

The speaker related this line of argument to the nuclear aspect, with particular reference to Germany's position. The discussion on article three of the draft non-proliferation treaty illustrated the difficulty of devising a good and workable system of control. But even in this field, control should somehow be combined with co-operation. If we were able to develop economic and technological co-operation in Europe, why should not Euratom or another organisation be a framework for co-operation in the field of civil nuclear technology as part of the fabric of common interests? The control element would then take its natural place in this system; it would cease to arouse feelings of discrimination and would have a correspondingly favourable effect on the general sense of security.

In his concluding remarks, Professor Vernant fully agreed with those who advocated going ahead with small steps rather than engaging in long-term studies. Our objective was to achieve the maximum amount of co-operation between the countries of East and West Europe. This involved consideration of the extent to which co-operation was facilitated or impeded by the continued existence of the present antagonistic security systems. The ideal would be a system involving co-operation at the level of security, adapting the military model to the political objective. It was also essential that the system should be able to control, and if possible prevent, crises. Some form of co-operation should also be effected in the military field.

He saw four possible approaches: First, to maintain the present integrated alliance systems while at the same time taking unilateral measures to reduce tension, such as troop reductions. This would not get us very far, but it was something. Second, to maintain the systems while entering into contractual arrangements between the two alliances. The most hopeful measure would be troop reductions by agreement rather than by unilateral action; a hot line would perhaps be more important. Third, to maintain the alliances for psychological as well as for security reasons, but on a less integrated basis, and also to construct a new European system which has still to be defined but which would pre-suppose the participation of East and West European countries. Fourth, a system containing neither integration nor alliances which would stand by itself. This last possibility was very far off; the other conceptions did however merit study in depth.

Mr. Buchan then drew the proceedings to a close.

EAST-WEST MEETING / EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

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