


**POLITICAL CHANGE AND UNITY IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:
STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES IN THE RULING PARTIES**

Institute for European Studies
Milton Hill House (Oxford), 24-26/IV/1981

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
 - 1. "The political constraints on American international leadership"/ Leslie Lenkowsky
 - 2. "An American perspective"/ Angelo Codeville
 - 3. "The German Social Democratic Party's view of the Atlantic Alliance"/ Fritz Gautier, Norbert Gresch
 - 4. "West German attitudes towards the Alliance"/ Werner Kaltefleiter
 - 5. "The United Kingdom government and NATO"/ Adam Fergusson
 - 6. "Italian attitudes towards current security issues"/ Cesare Merlini
 - 7. "Italian attitudes towards the Alliance"/ Cesare Merlini
 - 8. "Spain and the defence of the West"/ PedroSchwartz



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CONFERENCE PROGRAMME - 24-26 APRIL 1981

FRIDAY APRIL 24

- 19:00 - Cocktails
19:45 - Dinner. To be followed by briefing.
Chairman's address by : Rt. Hon. Lord George-Brown

SATURDAY APRIL 25

- 08:00 - Breakfast
09:00 - Conference Session. Chairman : Dr. Arrigo Levi
Papers : U.S.A. - Mr. Neal Kozodoy
- Mr. Les Lenkowsky
- Dr. Angelo Codevilla
10:30 - Coffee
11:00 - Conference Session. Chairman : Mr. Melvin J. Lasky
Papers : West Germany - Dr. Fritz Gautier, M.E.P., and
Dr. Norbert Gresch
- Professor Dr. Werner
Kaltefleiter
11:45 - Chairman : Mr. Gerald Frost
Paper : United Kingdom - Mr. Adam Fergusson, M.E.P.
12:30 - Lunch
14:15 - Conference Session. Chairman : Mr. Elliott Abrams
Papers : France - M. Bernard Bonilauri
Italy - Professor Cesare Merlini
Spain - Professor Pedro Schwartz
15:45 - Tea

SATURDAY APRIL 25 (Continued)

- 16:15 - Conference Session. Chairman : Rt.Hon. Lord George-Brown
Paper : - Dr. Robert Jackson, M.E.P.
- 18:00 - Rt.Hon. Roy Jenkins
- 19:45 - Dinner
Chairman : Professor Antonio Martino
Address by : Mr. T.E. Utley

SUNDAY APRIL 26

- 08:00 - Breakfast
- 09:30 - Conference Session. Chairman : Mr. Lee Huebner
Summation of issues raised
in papers and discussion - Dr. Stephen Haseler
- Mr. Neal Kozodoy
- 10:15 - Coffee
- 10:30 - Final Session. Chairman : Rt.Hon. Lord George-Brown
Comments by panel of contributors and members
of Conference and final general discussion
- 12:05 - Chairman's closing remarks
- 12:15 - End of formal Conference
- 12:30 - Lunch

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APRIL 1981 CONFERENCE AT MILTON HILL HOUSE

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

- ✓ Elliott Abrams. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State responsible for International Organisations. Formerly, Lawyer, Member, Councillor Foreign Relations and senior aide to Senator Moynihan.
- Jeffrey Barlow. National Security Analyst, Heritage Foundation.
- ~~Bernard Bonilauri. Journalist, Le Figaro (Paris).~~
- ✓ Ronald Butt. Author and journalist. Political columnist, The Times and Sunday Times (London).
- ✓ Margo Carlisle. Executive Director, Senate Republican Conference, Washington D.C.
- ✓ Dr. Angelo Codevilla. Staff member, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
- ✓ Douglas Eden. Senior Lecturer in History and Politics, Middlesex Polytechnic. Joint Editor, Political Change in Europe (Blackwells) 1981. Secretary, Social Democratic Alliance.
- Adam Fergusson, MEP. Conservative Member of European Parliament for West Strathclyde. Formerly, feature writer, The Times, (London).
- ✓ Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. President of The Heritage Foundation (Washington D.C.). Author. Formerly served in senior positions in House of Representatives and Department of Defence.
- ✓ Roger Fox. Senior Lecturer in Economics, Thames Polytechnic. Formerly Parliamentary Candidate (Labour) and Leader of Labour Group, Kensington Council. Conference Director.
- ✓ Gerald Frost. Director, Institute for European Studies. Formerly, Director, Centre for Policy Studies and journalist, Evening Standard, (London).

/ . . .

- ✓ Dr. Fritz Gautier, MEP. S.P.D. Member of European Parliament.
- Lord George-Brown. Former U.K. Deputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Secretary.
- ✓ Dr. Norbert Gresch. Secretariat, Socialist Group, European Parliament, responsible for Political Affairs Committee.
- Robin Harris. Industry Officer, Conservative Research Department, London.
- ← Dr. Stephen Haseler. Principal Lecturer, City of London Polytechnic. Author of numerous books on British politics, including The Tragedy of Labour. Former Chairman, General Purposes Committee, Greater London Council (Labour).
- Derrick Hill. Political Correspondent, NOW! magazine, (London).
- Dr. Charles Horner. Georgetown University, Washington D.C., and former Legislative Assistant to Senator Moynihan. Frequent contributor to Commentary and to The American Spectator.
- ✓ Lee Huebner. Publisher, International Herald Tribune, (Paris).
- ← Robert Jackson, MEP. Conservative Member of European Parliament, Upper Thames. Fellow All Souls College, Oxford, and previously Chef de Cabinet, President of E.E.C. Economic and Social Committee 1976-78.
- ✓ Professor Dr. Werner Kaltefleiter. Director, Institut fur Politische Wissenschaft, Christian-Albrechts University, Kiel.
- ✓ Roger Kaplan. Program Officer, Smith-Richardson Foundation. Contributing editor to The American Spectator, and contributor to Commentary.
- Brian Key, MEP. Labour Member of European Parliament for South Yorkshire. Member of Budget Committee. Former Councillor and Parliamentary Candidate.
- ✓ Neal Kozodoy. Executive Director, Commentary.
- Gerhard Kunz. C.D.U. Member of Bundestag.
- ✓ Melvin J. Lasky. Editor, Encounter, and author of numerous books including Utopia and Revolution.
- Les Lenkowsky. Smith-Richardson Foundation.
- ✓ Dr. Arrigo Levi. Editor, La Stampa (Rome) and columnist on international affairs, The Times, (London).

- ✓ Professor Antonio Martino. Professor of Economics, University of Rome. Formerly, Professor of Economics, University of Naples. Author, numerous articles and books. Currently Visiting Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.
- ← Carlo Ripa di Meana, MEP. Socialist Member of European Parliament, Venice, and International Secretary, Italian Socialist Party.
- ✓ Professor Cesare Merlini. President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.
- George Miller. Research Officer, Institute for European Studies.
- John O'Sullivan. Editor, Policy Review. Formerly assistant editor and Parliamentary sketch-writer, Daily Telegraph, (London).
- ✓ Gordon Richards, J.P. Author and Lecturer, Senior Lecturer in Government, Hammersmith and West London College.
- ✓ Dr. William Schneider. Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President. Defence analyst for Congressman Jack Kemp. Has served as professional staff member of the Hudson Institute. Author and writer.
- Professor Pedro Schwartz. Universities of Madrid and London.
- Joseph Sobran. Deputy Editor, National Review.
- T.E. Utley. Journalist and Author. Chief Assistant Editor, Daily Telegraph, (London).
- Col. Adelbert Weinstein. Journalist, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
- Observer :
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THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
ON
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP

by

Leslie Lenkowsky
Director of Research
Smith Richardson Foundation
New York, New York

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The views expressed here are solely the author's and not those
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For all the time and money expended upon them, for all the drama that accompanies their unfolding, and for all the apparent decisiveness with which they are concluded, national elections are, in the American system, just the first step in the process of governing. Even after the sacrifices are made and the prize is won, a newly-elected president has surprisingly little real power. Thanks to the Founding Fathers, he must contend with two other branches of government, whose jurisdictions infringe upon his own and whose political loyalties may not. Even among loyalists, the local roots of American politicians, combined with the historical weakness of our political parties, virtually guarantees dissent. Moreover, within his own house, a president is far from being the master; the executive branch is more a collection of feudal baronies, peopled by tenured knights of the realm, than a corps of faithful retainers. Said Harry Truman in 1952, as he contemplated the problems awaiting his successor: "He'll sit here and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike -- it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating."

Even under the best of circumstances, in otherwords, American government is coalition government. The career of Jimmy Carter provides the most recent evidence that the real test of presidential

leadership comes not in winning office but in holding it. To succeed, a president must be skilled in knowing when and how to use the limited power he has. Only out of countless accommodations will his real program emerge and only then can he be judged.

When the votes had all been cast last November, there was no doubt the American people had spoken decisively, but much question as to what they had said. Some observers felt the results were no more than a repudication of the Carter Administration. Others believed a more positive statement had been made. As Norman Podhoretz has put it, "The groups who voted for Reagan are diverse rather than monolithic, and they are by no means unified in their support for particular programs. What they are unified in is a yearning to make the country productive and powerful once more-- to make it great again." At the very least, coming as it did in the shadow of the Iranian crisis, the Reagan election surely reflected a desire for stronger American leadership in world affairs.

To ask whether the Reagan Administration can achieve this is not to question the commitment of the President and his key advisers. Rather, it is to acknowledge the inevitability of compromise in American government. The foreign policy that the Reagan Administration will eventually develop will be constrained not just by its own principles but also by the desires of other powers in Washington and the rest of the country (not to mention the wishes of our allies

and adversaries.) If the President is able to bend these forces to his purposes, he can fulfill his mandate. But if he is unable to do so, his foreign policy will look very different from the one on which he was elected.

One hundred days after the Inauguration is too short a period for determining what the real character of the Reagan Administration will be. Already, there are some hopeful signs for those who would like to see a stronger American role in the world, but some discouraging ones too. Ironically, many of the emergent constraints on the Administration's foreign policy are related to long-standing aspects of American conservatism. Whether these will persist in office or can be overcome will be examined in the rest of this paper.

Butter Versus Guns

At the risk of over-simplification and offense to many hard-working friends, it might be said that for much of the post-war period, American conservatives have been more concerned with domestic issues and liberals with international ones. To be sure, the former were every bit as anti-Communist (occasionally, more so) as the latter and participated in a variety of ways in debates over foreign policy. But conservatives recognized their main disagreements -- hence, potential advantages -- lay elsewhere. Thus, their contributions have been much more memorable and unique in economic policy and the so-called "social issues."

This was especially true of the conservative standard-bearer in 1980. Although Ronald Reagan's sympathies were solidly anti-Communist and well-known, he had come to prominence as a spokesman for free enterprise and opponent of large government. Indeed, during the campaign, his inexperience in foreign affairs was thought a potential liability. However, in the end, it did not hurt when compared with his opponent's demonstrated incompetence and the other issues upon which he had built his career proved decisive.

Not surprisingly then, upon taking office, the President launched a major, even revolutionary, program to revitalize the nation's economy and reduce the size of the public sector. This was not, of course, the only initiative undertaken by the new Administration, but clearly it was the most important, indeed the one by which not just the first hundred days but even the first term were to be judged. (Reagan, it is reported, did not sleep the night before his speech presenting the new budget, so eagerly did he await his chance to do at last what he had been talking about for over twenty years.) As a consequence, the Administration has almost certainly hampered its ability to act boldly in other spheres, including foreign affairs.

This is so for two reasons. First of all, with so much riding on the fate of the economic program, the ability of the President to win political concessions -- at home or abroad -- depends considerably on its success. Yet, despite the truly inspired way

in which it has been developed and presented, this particular program is admittedly untested and extraordinarily hazardous. Furthermore, no government, not even an American one, can fully control or account for the factors which shape national economies. For reasons largely unconnected with the nature of the President's plan, conditions are likely to get worse before they get better. By placing so many of its political eggs in this one basket, the Administration risks becoming a lame duck and losing the "can do" glow it currently has, in much the same way Jimmy Carter's ill-fated energy plan haunted his government until its defeat.

Secondly, and of more direct consequence, enacting the President's economic program will be costly in political capital, some of which will come at the expense of foreign policy initiatives. We have already seen a de-emphasis in talk about El Salvador partly because of White House concern that it was distracting public attention from budget and tax-cutting. (Much the same calculation led Senate Majority Leader Baker to postpone any debate on the "social issues.") If the Reagan Administration is forced to compromise with House Democrats, one of the casualties, judging from the budget proposed by Representative James Jones, is likely to be defense expenditures. In any event, one of the casualties has been the President's own time. If he is devoting many hours to matters other than the economy, no one seems willing to admit it. Whatever this inattention may mean for the rest of

government, it bodes ill for foreign affairs, where presidential involvement is indispensable.

The Problem of Central Control

The reason for this is that of all elected officials, only the President can legitimately claim to speak for the nation as a whole in world affairs. Yet before he can do that, he must not only devote the attention but also assume control of the government itself. To an outsider, the first hundred days of the Reagan Administration suggest it has not adequately addressed itself to this problem.

Like ideologues might be expected to do, the Reagan Administration came into office believing that the permanent bureaucracy was rife with political adversaries, time-servers, or worse. And, of course, this is not untrue. However, the President and his closest advisers also seem to think that once such officials are dispatched and replaced with competent loyalists, the agencies can more or less be allowed to run themselves. Thus, the familiar paeans to Cabinet government, but with the difference this time being that it may actually be tried. In such an arrangement, the president becomes in fact what Truman said he was in jest -- a glorified public relations man, a role this President seems comfortable in playing.

Such an approach to governing is not to be dismissed out-of-hand. Despite its slowness in making appointments, the Reagan Administration has quickly made its mark in the far-flung corridors of official Washington in no small measure because of its willingness to let decisions be made outside the White House as long as the right people were making them. Even the shock of an attempted assassination did little to knock it off stride.

Yet, the departments and agencies of the Federal government are not just empty boxes on a chart, populated by faceless bureaucrats who need only to be mastered. They are, rather, complex organizations with histories and interests, as likely to engulf their new masters as be tamed by them. The centrifugal tendencies in American government are great and a presidential appointment is not enough to guarantee obedience, even if there were vastly more patronage than there is.

In foreign policy, the problems of central control are particularly acute. Not only are several departments often involved on a single matter but within each department, several bureaus or other sub-divisions may get into the act too. The State Department has a mini-Defense Department, while the Pentagon has a mini-State; both have their own intelligence agencies. Rivalries abound and rare is the political boss who can avoid being drawn into them. Indeed, so heated has the in-fighting

been that at times, the hardest task of American foreign policy has seemed to be making peace at home.

Apart from trying to appoint "Reaganauts", the President and his men seem to have no plan for making sure that their priorities will carry the day. To the contrary, National Security advisor Richard V. Allen -- a loyal and knowledgeable man -- has taken the view that his job and that of his staff is not to lead and shape but to assist and coordinate. Without stronger support from the White House, even the most stout-hearted "Reaganaut" will, before long, be at the mercy of the permanent bureaucracy and the overall result will be a foreign policy that tries the impossible task of leading with many voices. We may already have seen early evidence of this in conflicting pronouncements on such important matters as arms control, NATO defense expenditures, and the Soviet role in terrorism.

The Loyal Opposition

Although being master of his own house is difficult enough, the President who wants to be a leader in world affairs must also come to terms with his political opponents. Only partly is this a legacy of our tradition of bipartisanship in foreign policy. More practically, the power of Congress to delay, if not block entirely, an administration's initiatives overseas has grown so substantially that a president would risk major setbacks if he

did not reach a modus vivendi with the opposing party, even if it controls only the lower house. However, for this Administration, obtaining support from Democrats may prove less of a problem than preventing defections among its Republican allies.

Indeed, one of the least-noticed developments of the first hundred days has been the virtual eclipse of the left-wing of the Democratic Party. In the wake of their defeat last November at the polls, the Kennedy-Mondale faction has suffered a string of losses. A moderate technician, Charles Manatt, was chosen party chairman. Despite anguished cries for more social spending in the Senate, the party's statement of economic principles, as well as its detailed alternative budget offered in the House, were clear moves in the direction of the Administration's position. Although no major foreign policy matters have come before Congress yet, the effort of liberal Senators to deny confirmation to Alexander Haig and other appointees has so far failed dismally.

To be sure, one should not count the Kennedy-Mondale wing out. By appointing so many Jackson-Moynihan Democrats to his Administration, President Reagan has, perhaps deliberately, improved the prospects for a liberal revival. Moreover, his economic proposals are likely to shift the political center of the labour movement leftward. If the result is to undermine the position of strong internationalists such as *LANE* Kirkland, the Administration may yet find Democratic support for its foreign policy hard to come by.

But at the moment, the Reagan Administration is having more trouble within its own party. Some of it stems from commitments made to (or extracted by) various groups of Republican voters. Thus, the grain embargo, probably a silly step when it was taken, will soon look even more foolish when it is ended (with the Soviet Union still in Afghanistan) in gratitude to the farm bloc. Similarly, a campaign promise in Detroit almost led an outspoken-advocate of free trade to impose import restraints on Japanese automobiles. Such are the normal compromises of elective politics and not the worst test of leadership is the ability to make them without going too far off course.

A more difficult task altogether will be assuaging those supporters who feel the Administration has already gone too far off course. Fiercely anti-communist, intensely nationalistic, never a majority but always strong, such conservatives have long been a factor in the Republican Party and especially in the camp of Ronald Reagan. As a candidate, he championed their views on matters like the Panama Canal treaty and the status of Taiwan with a degree of political success. As President, however, he has "moved towards the center", even appointing former associates of Henry Kissinger to positions in the Department of State. Consequently, the guardians of the tablets have begun to worry.

However premature, such disaffection must be taken seriously. At the very least, as Senator Helms has already demonstrated, the "New Right" can delay Congressional consideration of appointments and policies. If not mollified, it could even produce the margin of defeat for the Administration on major issues, as shown by the recent rejection of the President's budget following the loss of three conservative Republic votes. Yet, satisfying ideological purists is hard to do, certainly not without endangering other needed support. Thus, a dilemma. Without the "New Right", Ronald Reagan might not have been elected. With it, he may have difficulty governing.

The Two Faces of Foreign Policy

Driven by domestic political complexities, it is little wonder that American foreign policy so often tends toward incoherence. The Carter era was especially notable in this respect. Few decisions were made without calculating (wrongly, it turned out) their impact upon the Administration's political fortunes, the Iranian crisis being just the most conspicuous example. In a democracy, such behavior can hardly be faulted. However, it does lead one to ask whether countries so governed are really capable of international leadership.

The Reagan Administration cannot avoid this predicament. Its foreign affairs will depend upon its domestic ones. Thus,

reinstating the draft seems unlikely no matter how significant that step might be abroad. If the Federal deficit grows too large, defense spending may also fall victim to David Stockman's axe, despite the perilous state of our military forces. An African policy that satisfies the moderates among the Administration's constituents may wind up being offset by a human rights policy that pleases the hard-liners. If ideological constancy is the aim, the foreign policy of a democracy which has elections every two years is not the place to find it.

That our allies understand this is essential. Perhaps because of the images of power associated with American Government and the Presidency in particular, it sometimes appears as though only other countries are allowed to let domestic politics stand in the way of fulfilling their international obligations. In the recent discussions about NATO rearmament, for example, European leaders have reportedly told the Reagan Administration that they could not get support for additional weapons spending unless American-Soviet arms negotiations were first reopened. Apart from the merits of this proposal, its acceptance would cause the Reagan Administration to breach an important campaign pledge -- not to resume arms talks without first restoring American strength. Ultimately, the President may be willing to do so, but by failing to appreciate his constraints, foreign leaders make disappointment inevitable and diplomacy difficult.

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Can a Conservative Govern?

Yet, even though the ability of American presidents to exercise international leadership is not as great as much of the world believes, nothing about the American political system requires the next four years to be a rightward reprise of the past four. (Of all the good fortune that greeted the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, the best was that he happened to succeed a man whose record was universally derided.) If foreign policy in a democracy cannot be the purposeful expression of national interest some people wish it were, it need not be the series of spasmodic gestures it has recently been. Through political skill and effort, a President can impose his vision to some degree on the diverse powers in American government and give the kind of shape to policy that is the prerequisite for leadership. For Ronald Reagan to play a decisive role in the world, he must be ready to have a strong, if not "imperial" presidency.

Whether that is any longer possible is a real question. So much has changed or been "reformed" in American politics that the ability of any chief executive to amass and use power may have been permanently circumscribed. Moreover, this particular chief executive has had a long-standing commitment to weaker government, to getting it "off the backs" of the people. How ironic it would be if a perfectly sensible idea for enhancing freedom at home

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should prove to be an obstacle to the steps needed to preserve freedom abroad.

Of course, there is much about Ronald Reagan that does not fit into the mold of traditional American conservatives. Just as he, almost alone among major figures, could conceive of balancing the Federal budget while also cutting taxes, he may well be capable of simultaneously trying to lessen the President's sway over domestic policy while enlarging it in foreign affairs. On the other hand, he may choose to emulate another atypical Republican, Dwight D. Eisenhower, without realizing that Ike's relaxed style of governing was much better suited to an era of American supremacy than to one of relative weakness. The next few months should tell.

The most important reason for optimism is the new mood of the American people toward foreign affairs. The defeatism that had come over the public as a result of the Vietnam War has faded and been replaced by a willingness to accept a larger American role in the world. Once again, as Norman Podhoretz has recently written, it is safe to be anti-Communist. Just this mood helped propel Ronald Reagan into the White House and like the good actor he was, he responded to it. In the next scene, we will all see whether he can take the lead.

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An American Perspective

Dr. Angelo Codevilla

The peoples of North America and Europe have long become accustomed to thinking of each other as each others' indispensable allies. In Europe, even some Communists would feel uncomfortable were some wave of a magic wand to remove the United States from the scene. In America, people routinely think of Europe the way the British used to think of the low countries. Both sides regard the peace we have enjoyed for over a generation as the result of our conscious alliance. Europeans believe that Americans are their most reliable source of help in need, and vice versa. All this is quite natural given who we are and the kind of challenges we face.

Yet an argument could be made that at least since the mid-1950's Europeans have contributed much to American attitudes and decisions which have harmed the security of all allies, and that Americans have likewise contributed to the decline of Europe. That argument, though always present, has been only an undercurrent. It became visible on both sides of the Atlantic at the time of the Suez War, again in the early 1960's as a consequence of General DeGaulle's plans for Europe (in which connection Robert Kleiman's little book Atlantic Crisis makes worthwhile reading) and in the late 1960's as Europe was pressuring the U.S. to abandon Vietnam. Since 1977 however, the possibility that the alliance with Europe may be doing the U.S. more harm than good has been discussed more and more openly in the U.S. Today, whenever American newspapers report some proposal for military preparedness or political action against the Soviet Union they almost invariably add that "the Europeans" oppose it or are sure to either circumvent it or water it down. Moreover an American public which has become convinced that a decade and a half of arms control talks with the Soviets has resulted in mortal danger read in their newspapers that "the Europeans" demand a resumption of the SALT process as something of a precondition for continuing the alliance.



The European press, for its part, often pictures the U.S. as an overgrown child, whose obsessions exacerbate the gradual pacification of the Soviet Union, feed Israeli imperialism, and threaten Europe's oil supplies. Nevertheless there is an almost universal feeling in Europe that because the U.S. is there and its troops are in Europe, Europe's liberties are safe, and Europe need not really exert itself. There is an unspoken feeling in Europe that although we may not be able to prevent Soviet hegemony, if we accommodate slowly and jointly, Europe's future will be that of Finland, rather than that of Czechoslovakia. There is a widespread feeling in the U.S. that although Europe is pushing the Alliance in the wrong direction, we have to accommodate European pressures somewhat for the sake of the alliance. In short, it is all too easy for each side of the alliance to see in the other the reasons for doing the opposite of what it should, and therefore for the alliance to become the vehicle not for our mutual safety but for its opposite.

The very purpose of this conference, I gather, is to develop means by which each side of the alliance might bring out the best in the other.

Let me begin by pointing briefly to the difficulties before us. First, the military situation of the alliance has long since ceased to deserve the term "balance." The Warsaw Pact's military superiority on the central front is indisputable: a three to one advantage in tanks, four to one in artillery, at least three to one (depending on the index one uses) in long range theater nuclear systems, overwhelming superiority in the means of chemical warfare, and equality in the new antitank and PGM technology. Any military analyst can imagine any number of scenarios for a Soviet victory. Scenarios for a western military victory are hard to imagine. Nonetheless, thus far no official spokesman for any NATO nation has suggested measures to make the alliance capable of winning a war on the central front. Discussions of the Alliance's military predicament simply beat around the bush.

No one suggests that the Alliance does not have the means. No one is willing to say outright that the peoples of Europe would prefer subjugation to fighting for their freedom -- for after all, Europeans spend substantial sums on defense, and have conscription. Yet the argument has never been made in the alliance that whereas one may rationally choose either a policy of pre-emptive surrender or a policy of military victory, a half-hearted defense policy brings on the costs both of war and of surrender, without the benefits of either. The alliance's military discussions appear confined to endless arguments over minutiae, to wild speculation about the reliability of the Soviet Union's East European satellites and to thoroughly wishful thinking about China. This is a flight from reality. If East Europeans are reliable enough to march on each others' countries they are reliable enough to march West. China is not in a position to help Europe. As of now, the Soviet Union could win a war in Europe. The Allies cannot pretend to officially ignore this state of things, for indeed they don't. They must simply choose whether to change it or to accommodate themselves to it.

Second, in recent years, the Soviet Union has conquered Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola, and South Yemen -- not to mention Vietnam. The Soviet Union has ostentatiously urged the Arab nations to nationalize western energy assets and to cut off oil to the west. The Soviet Union has mobilized thirty divisions to thwart the Polish peoples' attempt to enjoy not a full freedom but just a bit more latitude. The Soviet Union's support for terrorists is clear. Yet never have the Socialist parties and labor unions of Northern Europe been so tolerant of Soviet ways and so intolerant of opposition to the Soviet Union. Never have European creditors been so willing to invest in the bankrupt, bellicose economies of the East, or to sell technology there.

The U.S. must bear part of the blame. As the Soviet Union was urging the Arabs to cut off oil to the west, Secretary of State Kissinger was asked whether the Soviet Union's behavior was not dangerously irresponsible, and answered that it was not. President Carter thought that the invasion of Afghanistan did not decrease the Soviets' suitability as partners in SALT. The same Carter apologized to the Soviets for the American Labor Movement's support of free labor in Poland. The State Department bureaucracy's position is that the Polish people's stirrings are dangerously destabilizing. In the State Department, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine is not controversial. It is conventional wisdom. Even after the 1980 election, Senator Percy, for his part, reportedly conveyed to Mr. Brezhnev his understanding for the Soviet Union's "fatherly concern" with Poland. In sum, the Soviet Union is very much on the march in the world, and many influential people on both sides of the Atlantic have a record of not objecting to any given step. Indeed, so long as the discussion of the Soviet Union's position in the world is restricted to this or that issue, all issues will lack proper perspective, and opportunities will abound for discord among us. It would be much more helpful to ask what sort of role in the world we cannot allow the Soviet Union to assume, and by what means we can prevent the Soviet Union from assuming it.

Third, some Arab countries have expropriated energy assets discovered and developed by westerners and then have charged such outrageously high prices as to stop a long-term general increase in Europe's prosperity. They have interfered in Europe's internal affairs by threats and by violence. A generation ago, European nations would have considered lesser provocations as sufficient cause for war. But today's Europeans and Americans have responded by expensive and disruptive measures to conserve oil, and by gradually distancing themselves from the State of Israel. Brilliance is not required to see the futility of this.

Decreases in consumption have been more than outmatched by arbitrary increases in price. There is no logical end to this process. For the same reasons, even vile policy toward Israel cannot be expected to yield relief. If Israel were somehow to vanish into thin air, certain Arab countries would still have no reason gratuitously to permit the west to rise from the groveling position in which it has placed itself. Moreover, it is no secret that the Soviet Union would dearly like to substitute its land for the Arabs' on Europe's lifeline, and that only a few coups d'e'tat -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia (or perhaps just either) would let them do that. It would be helpful to consider our options in this area quite dispassionately.

In the light of the troubles we face, it is natural both for Europeans and the Americans to ask what good is the Alliance? Specifically, it is not difficult to agree that Europeans and Americans are not much good to one another if by their cooperation they field armies and navies obviously destined to lose the next war, (remember that if they cannot win it, they won't be able to prevent it), if their foreign policies cannot manage to reverse the worldwide growth of their joint enemy, or if they can't jointly work out a way to keep from being economically devastated by peoples wholly insignificant except in gall. If the alliance cannot reasonably be expected to accomplish these things, then it surely is not worth what we devote to it. Indeed reliance upon it may dull our individual countries' instincts for survival.

Most Americans who think about Europe see no reason why an alliance which represents roughly double the Soviet Union's population and four times the resources should resign itself to military and political defeat and economic bondage. Yet more and more Americans observing the past decade's trends have concluded that, even should plans be developed to make NATO capable of winning, Europe will not agree to them.

They see that western military power cannot keep Europe from being overrun, and that Europeans are relying not on that, but on the Soviets' goodwill, which they seek to purchase in part by refusing to build military forces actually capable of defense. What, they then ask, is the role of American troops in Europe? They are too weak to stave off defeat, they cannot be a tripwire because to trip that wire would mean the defeat of the United States as well, they are not reassuring enough to reverse the political trends in Europe, and under the circumstances they are probably not usable as forward-deployed elements of a contingency force for the Persian Gulf. In war they would be cannon fodder, and in peace they are hostages. Better bring them home. Moreover, if the search for consensus within the alliance would force the U.S. to suffer losses around the world, even in Central America, then perhaps it is time to stop seeking such consensus. All of this amounts to saying that, if present trends continue, America's best option might be to cut its losses in Europe. It is a frightful option, but nevertheless would be preferable to the continuation of present trends.

Of course, present trends don't have to continue. No one except the Soviets have good reason to want them to. Alas, bad reasons are plentiful. Chief among them are that, for politicians, admission of a need to change is admission of failure, and that powerful political forces on both sides of the Atlantic have particular stakes in the political and military policies of the last twenty five years. The most powerful argument in their favor is that because mighty struggles have been required just to get the alliance to arm itself as well as it has and to take such half measures as it has taken, one cannot realistically hope to build a consensus to do more. Yet we should all have learned by now that one only erodes the support available for tough foreign and military policies by exchanging agreement on half-measures for even silent complicity in the proposition that the half measures are adequate.

Such an approach results in a fateful combination of weakness, false sense of security, and unwillingness to sacrifice. By ceasing to condone half-measures we can confront people on both sides of the Atlantic with clear choices. A strategy for political and military victory would require much. But it would give meaning to and reward for effort.

Perhaps the best current example concerns the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear forces and the target for increased defense spending. Why is there so much difficulty? I suggest that is because 582 missiles and 3 percent increase in spending are inherently meaningless. How would we be better off with them five years from now than we are today? How could they actually be used to increase our chances of surviving and winning a war? These questions do not have good answers because the programs to which they refer were never conceived to provide safety or win a war.

Levels of military spending, in and of themselves are meaningless. Only actual military capabilities count. Comparisons of Eastern and Western military spending are deceiving because the West must spend relatively more on soldiers' creature comforts, and the East gets more for its military rouble. True levels of spending do provide a rough index of commitment. But the choice of 3 percent as a target for NATO's increase is a strange way to demonstrate commitment. The Warsaw Pact has been increasing its military expenditures by about 4 to 5 percent annually for over a decade. During the next decade, in order to overcome the edge built up by the Pact, NATO would have to build up at a rate of about 10 percent per year. By deciding on a 3 percent increase, NATO actually freely and consciously chose military inferiority for the indefinite future. Of course NATO did not choose 3 percent because the figure signified anything specially worthwhile.

Just as it did not reject a 2 percent or a 4 percent increase -- or a 1 percent decrease -- because they were inherently bad. NATO settled on 3 percent as a mere compromise between those who wanted to do less and those who wanted to do more. But none of these figures were related to the question: What would it take to safeguard Europe from the Soviet forces? Such substantive arguments as have been made center on the allegedly healthy psychological effect of having the alliance improving its military forces by a set figure compounded annually. But one is entitled to ask who is supposed to be psychologically impressed by military measures which do not result in the capability to win wars? Who is the alliance trying to impress? They may impress people who are ignorant or irresponsibly disdainful of military realities. In the 1930's France's huge expenditures for the Maginot line impressed the French public. It failed to impress German planners. Certainly Soviet planners, a rather down-to-earth lot, are not going to be frightened by a 3 percent increase. NATO's own political leaders may well use the figure to bolster their images in their domestic political wars, but they know very well that if and when the time comes to face the real prospect of conflict with the Soviets, such paper accomplishments would be small comfort. So in the end, European and American parliaments, faced with concrete political pressures for domestic spending, realizing that no great good would be achieved and no catastrophe avoided by a 3 percent increase, mostly let the target go the way of the MLF.

Similarly, the decision to respond to the Soviet Union's growing superiority in tactical nuclear forces by deploying 108 Pershing IIs and 476 ground launched cruise missiles was wholly unrelated to any rational military strategy. The Pershing II's are to be deployed in fixed soft sites. Since no one suggests they would be used as first-strike weapons, there is no chance they would survive the first moments of a conflict.

The GLCMs are to be mobile, but in what sense could they be construed to counter-balance Soviet SS-20 warheads -- just as accurate, from launchers just as mobile, but much more numerous? Even assuming they did, they would still have no effect on the 400 SS-4s. If they were aimed at the SS-4s (which, by the way, makes sense), of course they would leave the SS-20's alone. Clearly, NATO has no plans either to destroy Soviet theater nuclear forces or to protect its own forces or cities from Soviet attack. Given that, everything else is of secondary importance, and the empty arguments about busing TNF begin to make some sense.

The modernization of TNF is also an exercise in impressing ourselves. But because it is, it is not terribly impressive, and is losing ground politically. Thousands of Europeans of good will have taken on the task of "selling" TNF to their own countries. It is a hard task. What does each country stand to gain by hosting the proposed American deployment? Of course it stands to draw more Soviet fire in the event of war, as well as more anger from the Soviet Union and from its sympathizers. That's taken for granted. But what about the returns? They are hardly visible. Since overall TNF only makes the difference between losing badly and losing very badly, it is not likely to improve the outcome of any political or military conflict. Nor can it help limit damage to the countries which host it. No doubt the burning question on this matter in Europe will soon be how to minimize the deployment while humoring the U.S.

Yet there is no political or military reason to approach TNF this way. Why restrict ourselves in advance to a definite number of missiles? Why not tie their number to those of the Soviets -- always keeping our number higher as a sort of "second strike premium"? Why not make our missiles small, mobile, and ballistic? That would let them survive, and allow us to use them to reduce potential damage to the West. Above all, why not build antiballistic missile systems in Europe? Europe's physical size is well suited to conventional ABM. A few big battle management radars could cover the whole area. ABM missile sites could be mutually supporting. Politically, it would be difficult to object to spending money to provide insurance against mass destruction. Moreover, because of recent advances in precision guidance, nuclear weapons need not be involved. In addition, there are now excellent prospects for space-based defenses against ballistic missiles. This is the perfect course of action for technologically advanced countries which feel compunctions about building offensive weapons but which nonetheless wish to weigh on the strategic balance.

It is regrettable that so many Americans and Europeans of goodwill have committed so much political capital to the current plan for the modernization of the alliance's TNF, when doctrine is the aspect of our TNF in the most urgent need of modernization. The agreed formula on both sides of the Atlantic seems to be that we should combine progress toward deployment of the Pershings and GLCMs with negotiations with the Soviets for the purpose of a general reduction in forces. This formula is silly because neither the plans for TNF nor the proposals for the ^{planned negotiations} proceed from any view of the sort of military situation we would find acceptable.

Europeans and Americans of goodwill can contribute to their own safety by pointing out to all who will hear that it is a violation of every canon of military and political prudence to make plans for major weapons systems and to enter into negotiations without a firmly held view of what constitutes safety, and without a military strategy for achieving it. The argument most popular in official American circles is also the worst. We should enter into such negotiations -- so it goes -- to pacify the Europeans. But we should do so with total cynicism, preparing to go ahead with our plans anyway. The European governments themselves -- so it continues -- won't mind because they too are going into the negotiations as a result of pressures and not because they expect good results. This is the recipe for political disaster. Democracies are not good at cynical policy. The Soviets would exploit the gap between our words and intentions, and generate within the west even more pressures to move in their direction.

Arguments about negotiations with the Soviet Union transcend military matters. Over the past two years the alliance has argued about how to use the west's overwhelming economic power to try to arrest the Soviet Union's march in the world. But while controversy has swirled around the embargo of about 10 M tons of American grain, the U.S. has licensed the export of high-technology drill bits to salvage the Soviet oil industry, and Germany has led the way in a consortium to build a gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe. The Polish crisis has brought rather indiscriminate offers of aid. Again, this sort of thing bespeaks a lack of strategy. What do we wish to see happen to the Soviet Union? Should we be trying to integrate it into the world's economy (understanding that it will relate to the world economy only on its terms) or should we be trying to isolate it so as to weaken it economically?

Should we be selling hardware, consummables, neither, or both? Do we want the Soviet system to prosper, or do we want to bring such pressures on it that its citizens will ultimately destroy it? The Soviet Union claims it is the wave of the future. Do we dispute that or do we not? These are not "far out" questions. Every action we take with regard to the Soviet Union answers them one way or the other. Do we treat the Soviet Union like any other country or do we not? The argument for going ahead with the gas pipeline is that the Soviets are no less reliable suppliers than the Arabs. But this neglects several important differences between them. When we build the Soviet Union's capital base, we are building the permanent power of a political system which is inexorably our enemy, and which is already very strong. The Soviets can be relied on to use their economic power to pursue their political objectives. Once the pipeline is in, it will be impossible to resist the Soviet Union's call for a European energy conference. For what would our alliance count at such a conference? De facto we have embraced the policy that Soviet totalitarianism is here to stay, and that we had better work to improve it. Of course this tends to demoralize all opposition to the Soviet Union. It is one thing to tell people that the road to freedom will be long and hard. It is another reflexively to acquiesce in the steady march of totalitarianism.

The Alliance's political problems are worldwide. As we look at our withered political positions in the world today we can learn much by recalling the arguments which Britain and especially France made in the late 1940's and through the 1950's. The alliance cannot survive, they said, if the rest of the world is turned against it, and the rest of the world will turn against it unless all the allies back each other's efforts to maintain and expand their political bases in Africa, the Near and Far East.

Americans branded these arguments as apologies for colonialism, and forced Europeans to regard them likewise. Today the U.S. is reduced to worrying about Cuba's colonialism not only in Africa but in the Caribbean as well. Of course the alliance has worldwide concerns! What mindlessness it is to regard the taking of a square kilometer of Germany or Turkey as a casus belli and the taking of the Persian Gulf or Saudi Arabia as something else! This is not to say that every development in the world should be of equal concern or that NATO must colonize the world in order to safeguard the Central Front. But it is to say that since the powers which threaten the Central Front are acting against the alliance's interests in the so-called third world, the alliance cannot afford to let them win there without making nonsense of its efforts on the Central Front. East German military advisers are in Angola, Ethiopia, Libya and Syria. (Soviet arms in Libyan hands have just conquered yet another country, Chad). Soviet and East European "technicians" and political agents are in the third world in numbers comparable to those of western operatives in the colonial years. It is not illegitimate to ask, given the level of effort of the alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, what the world will look like five or ten years from now.

The political forces on the Soviet Union's side are well known: the PLO, the MPLA, SWAPO, and so on. The opponents are also well known: Sadat, Niemeiry, Quabus, and so on. What would be wrong with a commitment by the alliance, say, that the regime in Khartoum will not fall and the one in Luanda will? Why not act so that the next decade will see a string of western victories and Soviet defeats and not vice versa? In this regard, the European governments' behavior toward the PLO and Egypt can only be termed suicidal. Why build up the PLO?

Egypt, the Sudan, Morocco, and to some extent Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, not to mention others have very good selfish reasons for wanting western political and military help against Soviet-sponsored enemies -- including the PLO. These countries would even welcome western troops, if the right arrangement could be made. It makes little sense to ask for written agreements on bases and to argue about whose flag shall fly. Nor does it make sense to raise specters by talking about permanent presences. We should be creative: Frequent visits, joint exercises, and maybe even exchanges of troops. It would be both healthy and symbolic to have, say a Sudanese unit helping to guard the Central Front while a West German unit encamped across the Red Sea from Jiddah.

Such moves would also help alleviate the condition most often cited as an excuse for Europe's foreign policy in the 70's -- its fear for its oil supplies. But it must be recognized that the west's -- particularly Europe's -- fears about oil have less to do with the size and deployment of forces, and much to do with lack of foresight, will, and coordination. Recall, for example, the Yom Kipur war, when for fear of an oil embargo, Europe disassociated itself from the United States' effort to help Israel. The U.S.' grumbling was only partly justified. What if the Europeans had told Washington "Yes, we will help, but, in return, you must understand we need the oil badly and agree that if our oil is cut off we will all send a joint military expedition to the area to conquer the oil fields"? The U.S. government would have hesitated, citing uncertainly about the Soviets' reaction and perhaps concern for its special ties with Iran. Under the circumstances, unfortunately, Europe is behaving rationally in moving away from the U.S. and trying to make the best deal it can for its oil. The point here is simple: Europe has gauged correctly that although the U.S. can get Europe in trouble with the oil states, the U.S. is not prepared to do anything to pull Europe out of trouble.

Moreover, until the U.S. commits itself at least to protecting Europe against anything the Soviet Union might do in retaliation for European actions to restore the flow of oil, and Europe makes plans for what it would do in extremis. Europe has no option but to curry favor with the oil states as best it can. There is, of course, another option: to ask the Soviet Union for its good offices with client states in the area. But there should be no doubt at all as to where that short road leads.

As we have seen, the alliance's oil problem will not be mitigated either by reducing consumption or by an eventual solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was brought on by the west's lack of political resolve and coordination. It will last and deepen as long as the west finds enduring the problem less frightening than the frightening plans which must be made to escape from it. The most immediate service which the Allies can render to one another in this field is to ask each other tough questions about what each would do if . . .

In conclusion, let us keep in mind that although the atmospheres of fatuous talk which so easily envelop and choke alliances during periods of calm, and which seem so durable, so impenetrable, often disappear like morning mist when dangers become clear and pressing. Then the partners begin to act rationally, but often too late. Recall the alliance between Britain and France at the outset of World War II. All through the 30's each held the other back -- France falsely reassured by Britain's airplanes, Britain falsely reassured by France's fortifications and tanks, each begrudging the other its consent for political moves to thwart Germany's drive, lest a crisis be precipitated, both squabbling about each other's contribution to the defensive front but both avoiding the question of how to beat Germany if it attacked in strength.

True, some in Britain talked of how little just two British divisions could do on the continent, and that if they were not reinforced massively, it would be better to consider withdrawing them. Such talk was frowned upon on both sides of the channel as impractical and bad for the alliance. After Poland, though, the reinforcements came. But they were not enough, and when the Germans attacked in strength, Britain had to stop committing its fighter squadrons to a losing cause, and scrambled to retrieve its army from the beaches of Dunkirk.

The American people are as committed to NATO as the British were to the French forty years ago. Our commitment of forces to the continent is greater. But more and more Americans, seeing little hope in the military situation in Europe, begin to think less of sending reinforcements in time of trouble than of preparing a withdrawal. No one who talks this way does so with a light heart. Generally, people who talk this way are ones who would much rather build the alliance's power and strategy so as to make the west capable of fighting and winning. The voices of those who, a decade ago, urged reduction of the American commitment to Europe are now stilled. Those voices were based on an unrealistically benign assessment of the world. But the new skepticism about the value of American troops in Europe proceeds from harsh, accurate calculation of the forces involved. Simply put: the new realism in the U.S. will be hard put to allow the last decade's slow decline in the alliance's fortunes to continue. It will demand either drastic strengthening or retrenchment.

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The German Social Democratic Party's view of the Atlantic Alliance

by

Drs Fritz Gautier and Norbert Gresch

The problems of whether to widen NATO sphere of influence beyond the borders of the signatory states and whether the FRG should become an arms exporter, are, for many in the SPD, of paramount importance and seen to be crucial to West Germany's defence and security policy. The current debate, which takes its cue from the resolutions passed at the Berlin party conference of December 1979, is concerned with the line to be adopted by the SPD, as well as by the Government. The debate on this subject will be taken an important stage further at the next party conference to be held this month in Munich.

The external framework for this debate is set by the political and military behaviour of the two superpowers, and, most importantly, by Germany's relations with the United States and her European partners. The internal framework for the debate is set by a protest movement, developing outside rather than within the established parties, which looks like spreading beyond the environmentalist, or "green", lobby. These factors need to be taken into account in any analysis of the present party political battle. What is at stake is how, after ten years of detente, Germany generally, and her Social Democrat-Free Democrat coalition Government in particular, should conduct themselves on these crucial questions.

The SPD, which has been in government continuously since 1966, played a major part in preparing, fashioning and implementing the policy of peace and detente in Central Europe during the seventies. This policy was aimed at tackling all causes of violent international disputes, and, particularly, at narrowing the gulf between North and South, supporting each country's right to self-determination, checking arbitrary power and developing social democracies wherever possible. The results of this policy can be seen in the network of treaties normalising Germany's relations with the East European countries and in the Helsinki Agreement. Its personal embodiment was Germany's first postwar Social Democrat chancellor, Willy Brandt.

During the seventies the SPD's aims and the actions of the Government matched one another fairly closely. The changed international environment since the start of the eighties has made the two increasingly hard to reconcile. Towards the end of 1979, with detente fading and the power balance worsening, the West was faced with two serious dangers. These were the threat from Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles and the threat to western oil supplies by the increase of Soviet military bases in the Persian Gulf. The west reacted to the first danger by deciding to rearm in December 1979. Both threats were highlighted, in the same month, by two Soviet actions. The first was the rejection of the offer of negotiations linked with the NATO rearmament decision, and the insistence that there could be no negotiations without that decision being rescinded first. It was only in the course of 1980, following Chancellor Schmidt's offer in Moscow and again later to enter into negotiations with the United States for limitation of the European medium-range missiles of both sides, that the Soviet attitude underwent a change. The second was, of course, the Soviet Union's armed intervention in Afghanistan, with the added threat the invasion posed to the Persian Gulf. ?

The smouldering conflict this created between the Party and the Government burst into flames when, in January of this year, 24 SPD MPs called for a 1 billion DM cut of the German defence budget in favour of increased development aid. At that time the German Government was also toying with the idea of arms exports - submarines to Chile, tanks to Saudi Arabia. These arms deals, it was argued, could yield a number of useful dividends in an increasingly difficult economic situation. *etc
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The SPD, on top of the nuclear energy controversy at home, is ~~this~~ confronted with the need for crucial foreign and defence policy decisions. But it needs to take these without curtailing the SPD-led Government's freedom of action and while, at the same time, preserving its own credibility in the interest of party unity. These decisions concern the issue of rearmament; the issue of arms exports; and the new Reagan Administration's proposal for an extension of military commitments beyond NATO's existing boundaries for the protection of western oil supplies. *?*

By approving the NATO twin resolution at its December 1979 party conference, the SPD at once demonstrated its capacity for crisis management and underlined its unswerving support for a security to which it has always subscribed. It stated that it was in favour of an active defence policy within the Atlantic Alliance, believing as it does that NATO's political and strategic unity must be preserved and that NATO's political solidarity and integrated defence structure are essential for the Alliance's political and military vigour. And it affirmed that it would continue to back the Government in putting up whatever German defence efforts were needed to keep the NATO strategy in proper working order.

It's in this light that the SPD's support for the NATO rearmament decision in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles should also be seen. To quote from the 1979 party conference resolution:

"Disparities in nuclear medium-range capabilities must be tackled by a combination of defence policy and arms control measures."

"This means that, in order to reduce imbalances, political priority should be given to progress in the field of arms control, and that at the same time the necessary defence policy options should be laid down so that these can be exercised in case such progress fails to be made."

Further:

"Negotiations should be conducted with a view to reducing all nuclear weapons to a minimum, to agreeing that there must be consultation before new ones are produced, and to ensuring by appropriate other means that the deterrent remains credible."

From the above one can gather that arms control negotiations is the most important aspect for the SPD. On the strength of this position, it won the 1980 general election. The commitment to press for arms control talks thus becomes mandatory. According to Defence Minister, Hans Apel, armament and arms control must go hand in hand. The same point was also made in February this year, by Chancellor Schmidt when, in an interview with "Der Spiegel", he spelled out the general line his Government has been following after Helsinki: "On the one hand, a firm will to maintain a military defence capability and not to fall behind; on the other...an equally serious willingness for cooperation with the Soviet Union."

But just as it's essential for both parts of the NATO decision to be observed equally, if only because, on the other side of the Atlantic, President Reagan owes his election victory not least to repudiation of the idea of arms control in its existing form, so, in order to understand the position of the German Social Democrats, it's important to bear in mind the conditions under which the security policy ideas the SPD is helping to uphold can come to fruition. It is important to keep the following in mind: Germany's membership of, and dependence on, both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community; the special position the divided Germany occupies between two highly-armed camps; the exposed position of Berlin, and the Four-Power responsibility for Germany; Germany's renunciation of biological and chemical warfare; her dependence on imported energy and raw material supplies as well as on export markets.

Some sections of the SPD are not altogether happy about, and still question the validity of, the two-pronged approach which calls for NATO rearmament in the field of medium-range missiles on one hand while offering negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the other. Typical of this attitude is the resolution passed last month by the executive committee of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg. This says:

"It is in the overriding interest of all European countries to hold arms control negotiations with the object of abandoning the planned rearmament, and at the same time reducing the SS 20 missiles already installed, if the danger of a nuclear war in Europe is lessened.

"A policy aimed at military superiority, or calculated to worsen East-West relations in other ways, will (as far as the SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg is concerned) be resolutely opposed.

"The basic readiness of both superpowers to negotiate must be followed by the immediate initiation of concrete negotiations without any preconditions.

These could well, among other things, cover an agreed moratorium in Europe for the stationing of strategic weapons.

"To question one prong of the (NATO) decision is also to question the other.

A policy aimed at military superiority, including the stationing of new strategic weapons on German territory, is not acceptable."

This resolution was supported by four Cabinet ministers and one to the same effect will probably get majority backing at this year's party conference in Munich, where many will be demanding to know whether the Berlin party conference resolution still stands or needs to be revised. Accordingly, initiation of immediate negotiations without preconditions, no support for a policy aimed at military superiority is the present party line.

That line, urged from the grass-roots upwards, is also in keeping not only with declared Government policy, but also with a resolution passed by the SPD national executive unanimously (with two abstentions) at the end of March. This resolution states: "The SPD endorses the need for the two-pronged NATO approach of, on the one hand, not accepting a position of weakness nor, on the other, of striving for superiority."

So what has worried some sections of the SPD is not the two-pronged approach as such so much as the fear that disarmament will get nowhere. In particular, the fear is that the new American Administration might be less interested in disarmament negotiations than in building up military strength. Should this prove to be the case, a fresh SPD majority for the whole package will be hard to mobilise. Basically, however, the SPD disquiet over the proposed increase in defence

expenditure and over the strength of the political will to give priority to arms control talks before new weapons are deployed and preferably even before they are developed, stems from uncertainty both about the military logic of the planned new medium-range weapons and about the definition of what constitutes a military balance.

Some in the West, far from being convinced of the need for numerical balance with the Soviet Union in the medium-range area, think that it might, particularly for Europeans, be downright harmful. Though up to now there are many who consider a minimum of new western medium-range weapons as essential for the purpose of a new numerically and qualitatively limited deterrence capability. There are others, including many European Social Democrats, who fear that deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on European territory might actually place the American deterrent at a greater distance.

The new medium-range weapons shorten the periods of early warning. They might, in the eyes of an enemy, be wrongly seen as instruments of limited regional nuclear warfare, even though expressly intended and stated to be merely instruments of an anti-war strategy of deterrence. Indeed, there could be no better illustration of the risks to maintenance of peace and security from a security policy aimed at maintenance and development of military deterrence capability than these new weapon technologies.

Hence the SPD's insistence on arms limitation, on the establishment, in the military, political, economic, scientific and cultural fields, of mutual confidence and cooperation as integral components of any security policy worthy of the name.

A social democrat party cannot accept an accelerating, however balanced, arms race. It will be quite unable to justify such a proposition, or to explain why an unlimited expenditure on defence is necessary. The SPD cannot, in its own country any more than in cooperation with the countries of the Third World, pursue an economic policy aimed at social injustice.

That is why social democrats have complemented the idea of military balance with non-military political, economic and social considerations. For them, military security is neither more nor less important than social and economic security and the preservation of the democratic social order.

The question of German arms exports and of German participation in military commitments beyond NATO's existing boundaries must be seen in the context of the overall concept of German foreign policy. Having learned from the painful lessons of history, Germany relies on economic rather than military instruments.

Germany's increased economic as well as political weight cannot, therefore, end in a bee-line quest for something approaching great power status, nor are increasing military commitments and growing arms exports a proper response to the demand that she should bear her fair share of the white man's burden. When the authors of a report on the "Security of the West", published by four German academic institutes earlier this year, conclude that the good old days of the "Atlantic system", in which Europeans were content to shelter under the all-powerful American umbrella, are over, few German Social Democrats disagreed. The only question is what new system should replace it.

For Germany, participating in a military defence of the Middle East oil resources would represent a fundamental change in her postwar history and a breach of her existing constitution, according to which (under Article 87 (a)), "German armed forces may be employed for national defence only." Using this article as a basis

a German Foreign Office statement last December commented as follows:

"German defence personnel may accordingly, except for transport and similar auxiliary purposes, participate in an international fighting force only if its object is to avert a situation which also constitutes an attack contrary to international law on Germany herself. Although an interruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf would cause economic difficulties, it nevertheless would not represent an attack on Germany which would give her an individual right to self-defence. For German defence personnel to participate in an international fighting force in the Persian Gulf would, therefore, on constitutional grounds, not be justified at present."

At present, there are no signs of the German Government adopting a different position or, for that matter, of being able to do so. Matters with regard to arms exports are, however, rather different. Although the German Government, bowing before the SPD parliamentary pressure, has gone back on its earlier decision to supply two submarines to Chile, it has yet to make up its mind concerning exports of tanks to Saudi Arabia. Such exports would be vehemently opposed not only by large sections of the SPD, but also by the German Trade Union Congress, which only recently has come out in favour of the present curbs on German arms exports being maintained.

Arms exports are, for the SPD, a question of its political credibility. In the interest of political, economic and social reform both at home and abroad, its manifestos and policy statements have always proclaimed a concern for peace, appealing not only to the younger, more open-minded and opinion-forming sections of the German electorate, but also to all those who, within a peaceful framework and without involvement in the East-West conflict, are striving for independence and economic progress in the Third World. For the SPD's political credibility it is therefore of vital importance to maintain this position in more senses than

one. If, at a time when its two major political rivals, the Christian Democrats and the FDP, are stealing some of its own clothes in this field, and the SPD were to waver on the arms dealing issue, it would mean the SPD was being untrue to itself. It could even mean that the SPD is in grave danger of committing electoral suicide.

But, over and above the matter of political credibility, there is also the question of whether the external benefits of arms exports might not be outweighed by their costs to all concerned. If one is to conduct any politically unbiased examination of all the factors involved, the short-term economic advantages to the industrialised countries resulting from arms exports, including the export of sensitive nuclear fuels, equipment and technology, must surely be seen to be more than offset by the threat which militarisation of the Third World will bring. With all the sacrifices of political autonomy and civil progress that such a step would entail, the result would pose a danger to their economic, as well as to their security interests, in the longer run. One does not want at this stage to develop all the pros and cons for the export of arms, particularly as employment which is positively affected by production of arms, is very close to the SPD's hearts.

However, contrary to what is claimed by the arms manufacturers, arms exports play an altogether negligible part in their own costings. Given the time of anything between ten and fifteen years it nowadays takes for sophisticated weapon systems to be developed, manufacturers must make their calculations long before they can expect to book any export orders. Research and development forms an ever increasing proportion of total costs, and the number of people employed on it is not related to the number of units produced. Except in France, which produces more arms for export than for her own requirements, both the number of jobs generated and the

overall cost savings achieved by arms exports are relatively small, all the more so because export orders come sporadically. Moreover, rather than taking up any existing slack, arms orders are used as a springboard for capacity enlargements which, after the completion of the orders have been worked off, are used as an argument for increased defence spending and further exports. A vicious circle develops. If some of us are opposed to arms exports, therefore, it is because, far from solving the unemployment problem, the export of arms ends up by making it worse.

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WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE

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Atlantic Alliance: Strengths and
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West German Attitudes towards the Alliance

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1. The Main Conflict-Lines

West German attitudes towards the Alliance is presently characterised by two main conflict-lines:

- a) There is a strong controversy on central issues of the Alliance among the left wing of the SPD and FDP on the one side and the majorities of these two parties and the CDU/CSU opposition on the other side. But behind these main conflict-lines there exists a second more sophisticated one between the majority of SPD and FDP, that means the government, and the opposition. Sometimes it looks as if this conflict line results only from the governmental attempt to reconcile its left-wing groups. But sometimes the intense conflict between the far left and the rest overshadows the fact that there is also a fundamental difference in the approach of the government and the opposition.

- b) There is a broad consensus among the electorate as to the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Alliance; but if it comes to more sophisticated questions there is indeed a remarkable gap between the CDU/CSU vote and the SPD vote and between younger parts of the electorate and the rest.

Political action groups, private organisations and the media are grouped around these conflict lines, but do not substantially add new points of view.

2. The dispute on NATO issues

With a very few exceptions, the German membership in NATO is not questioned. At party conventions of the Young Socialists, for example, some delegates always criticize NATO as an instrument of conserving capitalism.¹⁾ Even if it can be argued that there is a latent majority against the Alliance among the Young Socialist' delegates, up to now no resolution to leave the Alliance has passed a national meeting of the Young Socialists. This position is officially only shared by different communist groups, but the influence of these groups is negligible. ²⁾

The issue is not the membership in the Alliance. The issues are concrete political questions: The defence budget, nuclear armament, the NATO re-armament decision of December 1979 and the neutron-bomb are the most often disputed issues.

A few examples may describe these positions:

In January 1981 a group of SPD-members of parliament requested a reduction of the defence budget by 1 billion DM in favour of foreign economic aid.³⁾ This, of course, was a hopeless minority in the German parliament. But in 1980 the Federal Republic of Germany had already failed the goal to increase the defence budget by 3% in real terms as the NATO summit of May 1977 had agreed.⁴⁾ And in 1981 the

Federal Republic will fail again. This happens at a time when the Minister of Defence has to admit that his budget is too small to realize the long term modernization program of the German Bundeswehr. The introduction of important weapon systems such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles was postponed.⁵⁾ Nevertheless, a member of the left wing SPD parliamentarians called the 3% increase "just mad".⁶⁾ The NATO decision of December 1979 was heavily disputed at the previous SPD party convention on December 3, 1979 in Berlin. At that time Chancellor Schmidt gained a broad majority by proposing the "dual decision": The re-armament decision was linked to a new arms control proposal: First to negotiate with the Russians on the reduction of LRTNF and the Pershing II and the Cruise Missile should be deployed only if these negotiations should fail.⁷⁾

The linkage was accepted by the NATO council. But in the meantime it became obvious that there is a fundamental difference in the understanding of this decision. The United States, and in the Federal Republic of Germany the opposition, understand this as a dual decision that means: the production and later the deployment of the new weapons is one thing, the negotiation with the Russians whatever the outcome may be is a second and different subject. But the left understands this decision in a much more coupled way. First it has to be proven that the negotiations with the USSR have failed. The new weapons should be deployed only in this case.⁸⁾ Here

it is important that no precise criteria is given to determine failure and success in such negotiations. On this basis the Breshnev proposal of a "freeze"⁹⁾ with regard to longterm theatre nuclear weapons was regarded by leading SPD politicians, for example party leader Brandt, as an encouraging signal.¹⁰⁾ In other words: By agreeing in Berlin the left has hoped that minor concessions of the Soviet Union would be adequate to cancel the deployment of the new weapons.

This became obvious when the spokesman on Foreign Policy of the parliamentary SPD, Carsten Voigt, proposed the idea that the NATO decision has to be renounced because it was based on the assumption that SALT II would be ratified.¹¹⁾ Even if it is difficult to understand why and how the non-ratification of the SALT agreement may have balanced the unbalanced TNF ratio in Europe, this argument does not express strategic thinking but has to be regarded as another approach to eliminate serious defence efforts.

This was the background when Minister Genscher visited Washington in March 1981 and pressed the new administration to start negotiations with the Soviet Union.¹²⁾ This is primarily for domestic policy purposes. But the risks of such negotiations are obvious: As long as these negotiations are in progress and as long as the smallest hope exists that the negotiations would come to any result, there will be a mobilisation of forces against the deployment of the new LRTNF.

It is difficult to believe that Schmidt and Genscher do not see this risk, but their domestic position is too weak and they have to play politics. This, of course, increases the likelihood of conflicts inside the Alliance. When the German Minister of Defence, Hans Apel, strongly pointed out at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich on February 21st. that one approach to regain equilibrium in Europe is arms control negotiations, he was heavily attacked by several members of the American delegation who made it very clear that there is no alternative to rearmament.¹³⁾ Domestically, the conflict-line here is between government and opposition. Nobody knows if the government really believes in arms control, but they are making this point public. And this approach is in accordance with the whole pursuit of Ostpolitik since the early seventies. The opposition, on the other side, does not mind negotiations, but strongly believes that a military balance has to be achieved by military efforts first.

Nuclear armament in general and the enhanced radiation weapon in particular are two more issues to demonstrate the case. During the mid-fifties the SPD was actively engaged in the anti nuclear movement.¹⁴⁾ As in other domestic issues, the left wing of the party did not really accept the shift of policy in 1959.¹⁵⁾ The peace research movement of the late sixties and the early seventies goes back to these old roots.¹⁶⁾ The general anti-nuclear attitude was mobilized during

the debate on the neutron bomb. The secretary general of the SPD at that time, Egon Bahr, spoke of a perversion of human thinking¹⁷⁾ because this weapon kills men and does not destroy homes (has there ever been a weapon that does not kill men?) The meaning of this weapon for the defence of Europe was not discussed in these circles. It was just an ideological position. This spring an attempt was made to mobilize antinuclear feelings again when a left-wing magazin, the "STERN"¹⁸⁾ and quite a few other minor leftist or communist papers published a map that showed the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany. When the new administration in Washington hinted that the deployment of the neutron bomb might be useful for the defence of Europe, the German government pressured the US administration, not by arguing against the military use, the strategic functions or other aspects of these weapons, but by making the argument that such a discussion would make it even more difficult to realize the NATO decision of December 1979.¹⁹⁾

The background of all these unstable positions is the fact that on crucial defence issues the government has only a majority in parliament if it gains the support of the opposition. After October 5, 1980, the last general election, more than 60 SPD members of parliament formed the so-called "Parliamentary Left".²⁰⁾ They find additional support on crucial issues among SPD and also FDP MP's. This means that this group is in the position of a veto-group, because the


overall majority of SPD/FDP over CDU/CSU counts only 44 seats. From this power position the left has transformed, to a certain degree, the conflict line between themselves and the government into a conflict line between government and opposition. And it may soon become a conflict line between the American administration and the German government.

3. Public consensus on the Alliance

In contrast to these disputes, a broad consensus on the principles of the Alliance characterize the electorate. A few figures may demonstrate this fact. In fall 1980 the following questions were presented to a representative sample 21):

Shall we belong to an unchanged NATO or should we try to gain a more loosened or a more solid NATO or do you think we should leave NATO?

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth (up to 24 years) %
unchanged NATO	81	84	83	78	74
more solid NATO	10	13	8	10	11
more loosened NATO	4	1	3	8	7
leaving NATO	1	1	2	2	2
	91	97	91	88	85



Between 85% (young people) and 97% (CDU/CSU vote) prefer an unchanged or more solid Alliance. This is indeed a clearcut majority.

The same result is achieved by a different question: What is better for the security of the Federal Republic of Germany: close military connections with our Allies in Europe and the USA or should we rather rely on ourselves?

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
Connection with the Allies	84	86	85	78	87
Rely on ourself	13	12	13	18	10

This time no relevant differences exists between the respective segments of the electorate. The answer is too obvious.

The opinion on the function of American troops in Europe for the security of the Federal Republic of Germany is a bit more controversial.

American troops are	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
indispensable	33	41	29	30	26
important	48	46	49	54	46
of minor importance	11	8	13	8	18
unimportant	3	2	3	5	4
harmful	2	1	2	2	2

Here again the support for the American troops is highest and strongest among the CDU/CSU vote and lowest and most reluctant among the youth vote. But in general the insight that the American troops are important for the security of the Federal Republic wavers between 72% and 87%.

The question on the problem of withdrawal of American troops from Europe shows nearly the same result:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
in favour of withdrawal	15	10	17	14	23
against withdrawal	82	89	80	81	73

Even if the support of the American troops in Europe is high it has to be noticed that about one fifth of the SPD vote and the youth are in favour of a withdrawal. This can be regarded as a critical minority.

This becomes obvious if the question is asked as to whether the Federal Republic should make financial contributions to avoid a withdrawal of the American troops:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
yes, some contri- bution	59	62	55	63	56
yes, a great contribution	13	14	12	8	10
no, no contri- bution	28	24	33	30	34

} 72 } 76 } 67 } 71 } 66

If the presence of American troops has to be payed for the support is still high but significantly lower than before. The critical minority has the strength of one third. And even among the CDU/CSU vote, opposition to financial contributions climbs up to a quarter. If these people, who are not willing to pay for the American presence are asked how to guarantee

security, neutrality is the answer most frequently given.

One of the main variables that explains the differences between the respective groups of the electorate and which is important to understand other results, too, is the perception of the Soviet threat:

perception of Soviet threat as	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
very great	12	20	6	7	7
great	36	44	33	32	25
not so great	38	27	47	47	53
not serious	10	8	13	12	10
	48	64	39	39	32
	48	35	60	59	63

Only half of the German electorate perceives a great or very great Soviet threat. If one also includes those who perceive a "not so great a threat", the threat perception climbs up to about 86%, which is comparable to the support of the Alliance in general. This implies that already the perception of a limited Soviet threat is regarded as a sufficient argument for the Alliance. But it is a different question if it is enough for the support of effective defence efforts.

The differences between the segments of the electorate are more significant with respect to this variable. Among the CDU/CSU vote, the percentage of a perceived great or very great threat increases to 64% and nearly doubles the figures among the youth and among the SPD and FDP vote. Here it becomes obvious that the perception of the Soviet threat

is an important conflict line in the German electorate.

The general support for the Alliance is one thing, defence spending another. The evaluation of the German defence budget leads to the following results.

defence spending is	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
much too much	5	4	5	9	6
too much	17 } 22	13 } 17	19 } 24	21 } 30	26 } 32
sufficient	58	56	63	55	54
too little	15 } 17	23 } 26	10 } 11	13 } 13	10 } 11
much too little	2 } 17	3 } 26	1 } 11	- } 13	1 } 11

The majority of all segments of the German electorate believes that the present spending on defence is sufficient. A slight majority of those who want a change prefer a reduction. Here it is important that the youth and the FDP vote is most in favour of a reduction of the defence budget.

If this attitude is further analysed, it becomes obvious, that the perception of the Soviet threat is of great importance.

defence spending is	Perception of the Soviet threat			
	very great	great	not great	not serious
much too much	6	3	6	13
too much	12 } 18	10 } 13	22 } 28	27 } 40
sufficient	40	61	64	52
too little	30 } 38	22 } 23	6 } 7	6 } 8
much too little	8 } 38	1 } 23	1 } 7	2 } 8

Obviously among those who perceive a very great threat for the demand and increase in the defence budget is significantly higher than the demand for a reduction. And the core of the request for reduction is located among those who do not realize a serious Soviet threat.

A different question leads to the same result. With respect to the relation between the national security of the Federal Republic and the defence budget, three opinions were offered:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
1. I believe that the international situation is dangerous, therefore we should spend more on defence	20	27	15	13	16
2. We have to spend per capita as much as the other countries in East and West	61	62	63	64	53
3. In the present situation we may reduce the defence budget	17	9	20	23	28

Two comments have to be made. Firstly: The critical minority among the SPD, FDP and youth vote wavers between 20 and 28%. Secondly: The second statement, to spend per capita as much as other countries, obviously was answered on the assumption that the Federal Republic of Germany does so. Given the fact

that the US, France, and Great Britain on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other side spend per capita significantly more than the Federal Republic of Germany was obviously unknown. It can be easily predicted that if the US request a spending comparable to their own these figures will change soon.

These attitudes towards the Alliance have to be complemented by some figures on the trust in the Alliance. Which Alliance is superior, the NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
NATO	15	16	15	11	18
Warsaw Pact	39	42	39	47	35
equal	43	40	44	40	44

Those who believe that the Warsaw Pact is superior is twice as high as those who believe in the superiority of the West. The differences between the segments of the electorate are irrelevant, and the comparison between American and Soviet strength leads nearly to the same result:

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
equal	54	53	56	49	57
US stronger	11	10	11	5	11
US weaker	32	35	29	46	28

It is interesting to note that the percentage of those who believe that both sides are equal is about 10 points higher

if only the US and the USSR are compared instead of a comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Equality and NATO superiority is perceived by only 48% but equality and US superiority by 65%. Does this mean that people perceive the contribution of the Western European countries as smaller than the contribution of the East European countries in the Warsaw Pact?

Finally, does the German electorate believe that in case of aggression, NATO, including the Bundeswehr, would be strong enough to protect us effectively or would the Russians overrun us?

	Total %	CDU/CSU Vote %	SPD Vote %	FDP Vote %	Youth %
strong enough	51	50	53	41	55
USSR would overrun	44	47	43	55	39

Only half of the electorate with minor differences among the segments of the electorate believe that NATO is strong enough to protect its territory. If this result is compared to the perception of the Soviet threat it becomes obvious that mainly those who do not perceive a serious threat believe in the strength of NATO:

Strength of NATO	Perception of Soviet threat			
	very great	great	not great	not serious
strong enough	36	47	59	57
USSR would overrun	59	50	38	42

4. The Inconsistency of the German Attitude and the Forthcoming Conflict in the Alliance.

In the first analysis this appears to be a perfect example for inconsistent public opinion. People have serious doubts whether the Alliance can protect them. They realize the superiority of the other side but they also give overwhelming support to the Alliance in general - as long as they do not have to pay more. But public opinion only reflects politics. If this trend is inconsistent, the likelihood is high that the politics of the last decade was inconsistent. People were told that they can have detente with the Soviets, therefore why spend more for defence. The only problem is that the Soviet Union, obviously, did not believe in this theory. They have spent more, they came close to a dangerous superiority, they invaded Afghanistan and - with the help of Mr. Khomeini and the American hostages - got Ronald Reagan elected President of the United States on a broad consensus, such that great efforts have to be undertaken to re-establish at least an international equilibrium.²²⁾ This new administration now is speaking out on the facts of international politics. They also have taken action, increased their defence budget tremendously and again are willing to accept world-wide responsibility. Their language towards the European allies is still very polite and soft, consultation is the word used most often. But how long will they accept

what they understand as an unfair burden sharing. Senator Tower was quite outspoken at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich on February 22nd. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee has pointed out: "If by the shortcomings of our European Allies a situation should occur in Europe where the risk for the security of our forces becomes unbearable, American public opinion will force the withdrawal of our troops. This would be a tragedy for the Free World".²³⁾

There exists in the Federal Republic of Germany a broad consensus for the Alliance. Even though the readiness to accept higher defence efforts is low, political leadership seems to have the opportunity to create also a new consensus for a higher defence budget. But up to now the government has made no efforts to fight for such a goal - which easily can be explained by the veto power position of the far left in this government. Europe is regarded as an island of detente in a troubled international world.²⁴⁾ How long will the American people accept this policy? On the other hand the Soviet Union tries and will try even more to offer more detente in Europe with the only strategic aim to decouple Europe from the United States.²⁵⁾ The longer the present government is reluctant to follow the new American leadership, the more difficult it will be to get public support for stronger defence efforts and for courageous support for the new American policy. The Federal Republic of Germany is confronted with the period of turmoil.

It is worthwhile to remember how strong Konrad Adenauer had to fight in the early fifties to lead Germany into the Alliance.²⁶⁾ This fight will be repeated under more difficult conditions. The critical minorities among the youth and electorate of the governmental parties may play an important role in this fight. This fight is the price for 10 years of illusion of detente and will, of course, lead to a really troubled Alliance.

Footnotes

- 1) "The NATO, this is for them (the Young Socialists), the West, capitalism, the military securance of the system they so despise. [...] Their fight is against the 'medium ranged rockets, neutron bombs and NATO in general'." (Commentary of the Rheinischer Merkur on June 6, 1980 with respect to the Federal Congress of the Young Socialists.)
- 2) "The national interest of the Federal Republic requires that our country dissolves the unilateral ties to USA-imperialism and imperialistic bloc organizations. The DKP opposes the surrender of sovereign rights to NATO and the European Community. The DKP supports full national independence." (Program of the German Communist Party (DKP) of October 1978, p. 56)
- 3) "It became known on the weekend that 24 SPD-members of Parliament, led by MP Schöffberger of Munich, issued a bill to cut down defense spending in FY 1981 by 1 billion - the defense budget is before the parliament this week - and spend this money for underdeveloped countries." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 26, 1981)
- 4) "With an inflation rate of 4.1% in 1979 the promise of a net growth of 3% in defense spending was not fulfilled." see: Was Bonn der NATO schuldig bleibt. Zur Erfüllung des Drei-Prozent Versprechens wäre eine einschneidende politische Kursänderung notwendig. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 18, 1980.)

- 5) At a conference between Hans Apel and his ministerial secretaries, leading officers, and officials of the Bundeswehr in the Department of Defense on March 4-6, 1981. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on March 7, 1981: "In the Army, parts of the anti-tank missiles 'Milan' were cancelled. Different operational systems of the Army can be ordered only at a later date. The Navy and the Air Force must do without the missile system 'Roland', with which they wanted to defend their bases against air attacks. The Air Force must also do without the improved air-to-air missile 'Hawk'. The engagement of the new air-to-air missiles 'Patriot' will be delayed for two years and the introduction of the guided missile 'Maeverick' as replacement for the 'Tornado' will be delayed for as long as four years".
- 6) "Immediate stop of the stupid 3% increase of the defence budget, which the Chancellor ordered himself and which does not contribute to defence capabilities; instead the reduction of the armaments budget for 1981 by 1 billion to the advantage of immediate aid for the 30 poorest countries of the world, including for example Uganda." (Karl-Heinz Hansen in an appeal "Revote the 'armaments decision'!", published in the magazin "Konkret", No. 2/1981, p. 12).
- 7) "Schmidt's voting success made him the unquestioned victor of Berlin. [...] With their Berlin decision for new medium ranged missiles, the delegates assumed that the US Senate would ratify in the next six months the SALT-II-treaty on the limitation of intercontinental ballistic missiles; - that the Americans would resume arms negotiations with the Russians immediately after the NATO decision for the production and deployment of new medium ranged missiles; - that these disarmament negotiations would be conducted speedily and with the serious intention of cancelling the deployment of new medium ranged missiles if the Soviets make corresponding concessions." ("Der Spiegel", No. 50, December 10, 1979, p. 20).

- 8) " '...fundamental differences exist between the balance of power conception of the SPD, which credit arms control negotiations with political priority and statements made so far by the new American government. Washington's willingness to negotiate anew does not signal a turn towards the political priority of arms control. ... so far the new US-Administration seems to be inclined to a narrowing of the security debate to military matters.' Voigt supported the efforts of the federal government to influence Washington's politics according to social-democratic detente policy, even though the outcome would be a compromise not completely congruent with social-democratic goals." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 21, 1981)
- 9) "He (Breshnev) asked the United States to enter immediate negotiations on weapon systems of all kinds and the possibility of their limitation and demanded a moratorium on deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Centraleurope." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 24, 1981)
- 10) "'Security is only possible on the basis of the NATO-alliance and its decisions'. To this sentence the party board added the request for immediate negotiations. 'Security demands arrangements between East and West. ... The SPD welcomes the proposal made by General Secretary Breshnev a while ago, but this proposal has to be changed and supplemented'." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 28, 1981)

- 11) "Carsten Voigt, MP of the SPD and speaker of his party in the foreign relations committee of the Bundestag, required a new discussion on the dual decision. After the assumption, that the US would ratify the SALT-II-Treaty, was proven wrong, the decision to station new American medium ranged missiles would have to be reconsidered. Since the SPD supported the dual decision at their Berlin Convention in December 1979 because they counted in the ratification of the SALT-II-Treaty. The goals and priorities of the SPD conception no longer had much of a chance. The consequences would have to be reconsidered." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 8, 1980).

- 12) "... the Washington visitor considered it as a personal success, that he convinced the Americans, to concede to the idea of disarmament negotiations - in accordance with the second part of the NATO dual resolution". ("Der Spiegel", No. 12, March 16, 1981).
"... that the German Foreign Minister so emphatically supported the fulfillment of the Soviet wish for a summit meeting". ("Die Welt", March 12, 1981).

- 13) Werner Kaltefleiter, Reagan awakens Europe; in: Kieler Nachrichten, February 24, 1981.

- 14) Susanne Miller, The SPD Before and After Godesberg. Short History of the SPD, Band 2, Bonn 1979, compare pp. 31 ff. "For their campaign 'Fight Atomic Death', started in 1959, and with the goal of creating a zone free of atomic weapons in Europe, the SPD won the support of well-known authors, scientists and theologians." (p. 33). (After the ratification of the Paris treaties, signatures were gathered for a "German Manifest" which was formed at a demonstration in the Paulskirche on February 29, 1955.)

15) see: Peter Arend, Die innerparteiliche Entwicklung der SPD 1966-1975, Bonn 1975, pp. 97.

"From the point of view of the party leadership defense and alliance policy is the basis e.g. the other side of the coin of detente and a policy for peace. [...] Parts of the intra-party opposition, however, deny the necessity of an expensive military preparedness - more so under the motto of worldwide detente efforts. This part [of the SPD] assesses the inclusion of the Federal Republic into NATO and the presence of American troops in Western Europe not as a safeguard for an existence in freedom but [...] as a permanent threat for socialist strategies of transformation in Western Europe. (p. 97)

16) see: Dieter Senghaas, Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit, Frankfurt a.M. 1969; see also Dieter Senghaas and Johan Galtung, Kann Europa abrüsten? Friedenspolitische Optionen für die siebziger Jahre, München 1973.

17) "The neutron bomb is a symbol for the perversion of human thinking." (Egon Bahr in: "Die Welt" , July 18, 1977)

18) in: Stern, No. 9, February 12, 1981, p. 33-34.

19) "The German Foreign Minister mentioned the difficulties European allies could run into while trying to accomplish the dual decision of NATO should they have to cope with an additional unwelcome debate on the neutron weapon. Weinberger's reaction to this was termed 'satisfying' by participants." (Die Welt, March 12, 1981.)

- 20) "... about 50 MPs in the new parliamentary left, still in the process of gathering (this does not automatically mean 50 potential votes opposing government politics)." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 27, 1980)
"... this parliamentary left consists of 50-70 MPs according to the respective issue." (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 28, 1981)
- 21) The study ("Meinungsbild zur wehrpolitischen Lage") was done by the EMNID-Institute; they had 1947 respondents.
- 22) see: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, United States Foreign Policy In A Reagan Administration. Southern African Forum - Position Paper, Vol. 4, 1981, No. 2; January 16, 1981.
- 23) Senator Tower cited in: Werner Kaltefleiter, Reagan awakens Europe, "Kieler Nachrichten", February 24, 1981.
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THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT
AND NATO

By: Adam Fergusson, MEP
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April 25th, 1981

The problems of stockpiling credible weapons against a putative war at an indeterminate date have multiplied extraordinarily since the Second World War. And the United Kingdom is no different from the rest of the leading members of the Atlantic Alliance in feeling the strain of having to run what it regards as a minimum defence establishment on a Budget which barely covers three-quarters of those minimum needs.

There is nothing novel about that. In a democracy in peacetime there will never be enough money available to meet the defensive criteria laid down by those responsible for its security. This is in marked contrast to the capability of a closed society, where political morality does not inhibit, nor public opinion moderate, whatever military policies its leaders may wish to pursue.

There is never a good time in peacetime to start stepping up your defence effort; and there is no doubt that the United Kingdom, whose defence spending has been cut back so enormously over the past few years, is finding this as bad a time as ever in the past. The escalating real cost of modern weapons makes for major difficulties, of course, with generations of equipment becoming obsolete and needing replacement even before they have ever been used (or, rather, perfectly performing their role of preventing war for the few pre-obsolescence years while they are credible).

But a world recession also makes it a bad time for us, not least because of the peculiar vulnerability of a trading and exporting nation to this general misfortune. And a third problem for us is the poor shape and performance of the UK economy itself, upon which the burden of the unproductive sector is already enormous, and for whom increasing defence expenditure can be most easily tolerated only in those spheres which can be commercially justified and exploited.

The claim, though true, that the United Kingdom spends as high a proportion of her GNP on defence as the United States, and a higher one than any of her European allies - it is one-seventh of all Government spending in this country - loses some of its lustre with the consideration that our productivity is so much less than most of theirs. But the burden is greater than the corresponding return.

Although the word is taboo, a review of our defence structure is taking place once again. The governing factors here, as I have indicated, are the escalating costs of equipment (perhaps the central difficulty); the growing gap between what we need to be able to do and what we can afford to do; and thirdly, the appreciation that the threat to the West is now politically, geographically and economically far wider than the original confines of NATO.

The present dispensation at the Defence Ministry is once again tackling the task of providing enough with too little. The annual 3 per cent real increase in expenditure to which the Government is resolved (last year 5 per cent was achieved) will not cope with the needs that the new technologies have created - although the hope remains that, if Britain's economy strengthens, relatively or otherwise, this 3 per cent will prove dynamic. Mr. John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence, remains one of those in the Cabinet most committed to making national ends meet; but he has also pronounced himself strongly against cutting out any of the defence sectors to which we at present subscribe as NATO partners. That is to say, HMG is sticking to its independent nuclear role, prepared to pay for the new TRIDENT missile programme; to its Continental deployment with BAOR (at present 900 Chieftain tanks, 2 Buccaneer and 5 Jaguar squadrons, and 55,000 troops); and to its Atlantic naval role, guarding the sea lanes which would enable US reinforcements to reach Europe if war were to break loose here. Nor are there plans for depleting our home defence forces, on land, at sea or in the air.

In the past, our four main defence activities (BAOR, our nuclear deterrent, our Atlantic role, and home defence) have all suffered from contraction as savings have been forced upon us. Euphemisms have abounded as capability has deteriorated: "slimming", "trimming", "cutting the tail", "rationalisation", "losing fat", "cutting out waste" - what has resulted every time is loss of efficiency through inadequate funds. When even fuel for manoeuvres is cut back, and bullets and shells for target practice are limited, morale slips as well.

Today in the Defence Ministry, the watchword is no longer cuts, least of all across-the-board variety. Support for NATO remains the kernel of our Defence policy: and it is not supposed that any reduction of our effort in any of our key contributions to NATO would be anything but highly damaging to our safety - even though the offset agreement with West Germany has ended and our deployment there cost nearly £700 million a year.

I do not suppose that our commitment to NATO - I speak for the Conservative Party - is in any doubt. But, certainly, HMG's conviction is as great as Bonn's that no defensive arrangements or developments should be contemplated on this side of the Atlantic that could lead to the weakening of America's commitment to the defence of Western Europe. For evidence of that conviction, I merely cite our immediate acceptance of Cruise and Pershing missiles in these islands - and our equal, if slightly unconsidered, readiness to support the joint Rapid Deployment Force proposed by President Reagan.

On "Weekend World", talking to Brian Waldron last month, John Nott spoke of "building up the front line capability of our forces in a more efficient and effective way". Pressed, for example, in respect of the forces in West Germany, he spoke of "savings in resources, yet doing the job better", speculating that anti-tank helicopters, or giving more anti-tank weapons to the ground forces, might be more useful than tanks. "More equipment but of a narrower range" was how he described it. Since then, the new Government White Paper - really excellent in its clarity and scope - has confirmed this line, asserting that too much money is tied up in ships, planes and tanks and too little in weaponry.

The new technological possibilities make different kinds of cost-benefits available.

Now, that summarises Britain's own problems as part of the Alliance that meets the threat to the West. Let me attempt to go a little beneath the surface of Government thinking, and burrow a little bit into some of the attitudes found in the Government policy with regard to defence and NATO.

It is useful to do this from my own particular angle - a member of the Conservative Party, but also able to take a slightly more detached view of Britain's security than can all my colleagues in Westminster. The European Parliament may not be charged with examining the Community's defence, but there is a sizeable multinational element within it for whom mutual security is one of the primary justifications of the Community's existence, and it is increasingly debated and reported upon. The emergence of a Common Community Foreign Policy is not likely to happen to the exclusion of security considerations: and, indeed, the joint approaches adopted towards the Helsinki agreements, the Middle East and time and again in the United Nations, not to speak of joint pronouncements concerning Poland and Afghanistan, have all been directly connected with security, although made under the catch-all title of acting in "Political cooperation".

European Political Cooperation, alias EPC, otherwise known as Po-Co, is an activity of which many politicians in this country, as elsewhere in the Community, are profoundly ignorant. But it is in this context, outside the Treaty of Rome, that the Ten Foreign Ministers meet regularly to concert their joint foreign policy - on which they report back afterwards to the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. At present European Political Cooperation lacks even a permanent secretariat (a new one is supplied by each country in turn as the Presidency of the Council of Ministers rotates every six months). And, yet, the Foreign Ministers have duly discussed security matters specifically within the context of the Community approach to the CSCE Conference in Madrid - and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) as well. There are high hopes in the Conservative Party that the

British Presidency, which begins in July under Lord Carrington, will see significant advances in EPC.

Despite this, the community of spirit evident in some foreign policy matters is less evident when it comes to defence. We are not all innocent of the highly individual - in some opinions, highly dangerous - approach of the French, who regard (or affect to regard) reliance on their allies for any part of their defence as tantamount to a surrender of national sovereignty.

The one serious Community attempt to rationalise our defence effort, in the vital field of arms procurement, has met almost uniform failure. Yes - there has been the Tornado, and the Milan, and the Jaguar, and the Franco-German tank, and this and that; but in no way do these one-off projects represent a coherent joint armaments policy. And armaments and equipment, as we are all agreed, are the one field where escalating costs are driving us out of the business of serious defence. Germany, France, Italy and the UK have a huge collective domestic arms market; and now that the Community has a GNP even larger than that of the United States, our failure to work as one in this field is lamentable.

The United Kingdom pays as much lip-service as anyone to the call for armaments interoperability, and coordination, and cooperation; but I, for one, have found much greater enthusiasm for these necessary things in Westminster than in Whitehall - that is, among the politicians than the bureaucrats and technicians. At the end of the day, the ministerial attitude is this:- cooperative ventures are fine when and where allied needs coincide, provided not more than two or three nations are involved and provided they don't need too much effort or interfere with current defence programmes. A mere 15 per cent of UK arms purchases were non-domestic in 1980.

This attitude, as I say, is not confined to Britain (far from it). And the new Community effort to ensure procurement cooperation is likely to be to try to create the conditions at industrial level in which that kind of cooperation can naturally take place, rather than to urge governments to do what is obviously sensible in the interests of efficiency of economy or of the survival of the Community's high technology.

What lies behind this ultimate unwillingness to pool resources, effort and control for the greater good and security of all? Is it political, economic or military, or all three? Why can't the 9 Community nations of NATO become a unified Western pillar of the Alliance? Well, apart from the status of Ireland and the cautious approach of France, we're not yet a United States of Europe, and our Common Foreign Policy is embryonic, to say the most.

As for Britain, we are not alone in our failure to see Western defence apart from national considerations (which is why it is so hard to agree the specification for joint projects, especially in the aerospace field). Our consciousness of the vulnerability of trade routes, and hence of the importance of naval power, is perhaps more developed than our partners' - though one should not underestimate the new awareness of the threat to the sea lanes which brings Europe's energy, mineral and raw material needs to the Community's shores. And we may be less conscious than some of the strains within the Alliance springing in part from the Carter government's record, and in part from the differing views of the value of detente in the post-Afghanistan period, not least in Germany.

The major blind spot, however, remains HMG's failure to recognise that the European Community might have as significant a part to play in ensuring and engineering the security of the West as NATO itself: indeed, if NATO cannot mount the kind of credible defence posture against an ever more aggressive and powerful Russia, a part that would be both complementary and crucial. The blind spot extends to the Third World too - where HMG overlooks the close economic and therefore political links the Community has developed with the 60 nations of the Lomé Convention, the bulk of them in Africa.

Let me explain what I mean. The question asked in the Conservative Party today is whether the Soviet Union can now be militarily confined in such a way as to prevent its making even greater political use of its present very powerful global position. Already, Moscow is exploiting effectively its carefully constructed capability for destabilisation in every continent - in Africa by surrogate armies, everywhere by ready deployment of arms to terrorist or revolutionary movements. The Soviet military effort of the past ten years, having greatly exceeded that of the West in the supposed decade of detente, has altered the balance of power most alarmingly; and, for those who have hoped in vain, but remained sceptical, that detente could prove a reality, the failure of Moscow to respond to the signs of fear and distress emanating from the West for the past four years has been most alarming of all; for the Russian leadership has thereby ignored the basic rules for ensuring stability in a nuclear world. This point is made most clearly in the recent multinational *to do* Chatham House pamphlet "Western Security".

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The shift in the balance of power, achieved by the Soviet policy of increasing military expenditure during the seventies by between 12 and 14 per cent annually, has been accompanied not only by policies of vicarious and direct aggression against the Third World countries, but by economic failures at home such as would be politically insupportable in any open society. The past decade, too, has seen Western high technology, food aid, general trade and soft credits pouring into the Soviet Union and the Soviet empire on an enormous scale - along with a growing dependence by the West on the Soviet Bloc for a number of vital raw materials, including gas and oil.

? { There should be no wonder that there are those in the Conservative Party who, watching the Soviet military machine on the move, aggressive, unstoppable, are asking whether the time has not come for examining what economic steps might now be taken to reverse that trend. They have seen, in Poland, what a nation will do when starved (despite Western credits and trade) of the essentials of life. Could it be that cutting down on commercial relations

which already favour Russia and her satellites might be the better way of obliging Moscow so to re-order her Empire's economy in favour of consumer goods and at the expense of arms?

The important consideration in all this is that economic action by the West only becomes practicable through the ability of the EEC to act as one, and in conjunction with the U.S. Only when they act together does the economic weapon appear in their hand. To use it, I believe, is the only alternative to embarking on a new lap of the arms race which we can neither afford nor win.

Yet a coherently directed Western economic policy pointed against the enormities of Soviet aggression remains a goal for us. And to this let me add where Lomé comes in - the Community's economic treaty with the Third World. If the resource war is to be won, and if Africa, the Gulf area and the seas around Africa are the key to it, then the sooner the Convention's inescapable political aspects are developed, the safer our interests and those countries' interests will become. We have here, though in politically skeletal form, the ideal response to the network of trade, "friendship" and port-use treaties that Moscow has developed in this sector over the past decade. And here, incidentally, are the countries who need to know that, by invitation, a rapid deployment force would be ready to help them. all the way from the Gulf to the Cape and up to the Tropic of Cancer again.

To return home: the Conservative Party is solidly with the Alliance. The opposition in Westminster now finds itself committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament, the removal of American bases in Britain, and withdrawal from the EEC. The contrast is stark- and if the opposition won power and put these policies into effect, it would be catastrophic for NATO's defensive strength, its forces' morale, and its effectiveness as a peace-keeping organisation. We hope that all such moves could in practice be resisted, for we doubt if they meet the wishes of the great majority of even Labour's supporters.

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ITALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS CURRENT SECURITY ISSUES

by

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Paper prepared for the Conference:

POLITICAL CHANGE AND UNITY IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE:

STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES IN THE RULING PARTIES.

Milton-Hill House

April 24-26, 1981

Background

Originally, Italy's participation in the Atlantic Alliance was controversial both in the country and abroad. It was revealed in recent years that initially some member states had strong doubts about the wisdom of inviting Mediterranean countries to join an Alliance that was meant to link countries of the two sides of the Atlantic which had been allied during World War II. But the requirements of containment, i.e. to stay as close as possible to the Soviet sphere of influence prevailed and what later took the name of Southern Flank of NATO was established.

Sub divisions were also evident not only between but also within Italian political forces domestically. What already at that moment appeared as a choice of the West, was of course strongly opposed by the left but was also controversial among the Christian Democrats, the major central party. People like Fanfani, La Pira and Dossetti who had important support within the Catholic Church and the Vatican, were against. All the authority of the then leader of the D.C., De Gasperi, had to be used to bring about the needed majority to join the Atlantic Alliance. The second major party, the Socialist Party (holding today the defence minister position) was in its large majority against the alliance and the minority which was pro, had to split from the party and form the so-called Social Democratic Party.

The choice of the West associated with the Alliance was also strongly linked to the beginning of the European integration, which had taken place parallel to the ending of the war. The majority of the country that was in favour of a united Europe did not coincide exactly with that supporting the alliance but to a large extent the two overlapped. De Gasperi is definitely listed among the Founding

Fathers of the Community.

Consistent supporters of both were the so-called small lay parties which at that moment participated in the government in coalition with the Christian Democrats: the Liberal party (a conservative political group close to the business sector), the Republican party and the new-born Social Democratic party. Actually they have been more consistent western parties than their great ally.

Despite this controversial beginning, Italy has been a steady and on the whole cooperative, though not so active alliance partner. Alliance issues have been little debated in the country because of the dominance of the so-called "scelta di campo" (choice of camp) that joining the Alliance implied, over the foreign policy act that was. International issues have been frequently used for domestic purposes rather than vice-versa.

The factor of having the major Communist party in the west and for several years allied to it an important Socialist party both pointing at the east as an alternative model, as the other camp, has made the country particularly divided on the East-West issue.

In addition there has been in Italy since the very unity of the country back in the previous century, a strong interest for the Mediterranean and what was the colonial world and is now called the Third World. The country is half European, half Mediterranean, half industrialized and half under-developed. One cannot then be surprised by the existence of a "third-worldist" and Mediterranean tradition in Italian politics. This tradition has occasionally been linked either to power politics ("mare nostrum") or to a more pacifist or neutralist attitude. Post colonial African connections, the increasing use of Arab oil, especially since the times when Enrico Mattei started the powerful oil lobby centred in ENI, and ethnic

links with Latin America are all aspects of such tradition.

Then things gradually began to change, as new traditions were building up. The European Community and to a slightly less extent the Atlantic Alliance, entered the public opinion as perceptions of economic interdependence and common security, in a way they became more popular issues. Actually they became a test of legitimization of parties seeking government positions. This applies to the Socialists, who since the early 60s accepted the European Community and later the Atlantic Alliance (that one as a defensive alliance) as main pillars of their foreign policy positions associated with the then rising expectations about détente. Such an evolution accompanied the process of the Socialist party joining the Centre Left Coalition to govern Italy for approximately ten years. In the following decade the Communist Party followed a somewhat similar evolution, when it proposed the Historic Compromise with the Christian Democrats as a new formula to rule the country.

The PCI came as close as to join the government majority in the 1978 government and to hold key positions in the two branches of Parliament, but did not get any portfolio. Although a year later it had left such majority, the problem of the Communists getting into the government, either as partners of a large coalition or as an alternative to the Christian Democrats, has never ceased to be central in Italian politics. This has not been without influence on foreign policy attitudes; later in 1978 a resolution was passed in Parliament by unanimous vote, for the first time in Italian post-war history, to state the Italian position on international issues. Such resolution restated fidelity to and support for the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. It is probable that by this resolution, the historical period of the "scelta di campo" has come to an end. On the whole we have experienced since then a more mature foreign policy debate.

Attitudes in Government and Majority Parties

I will make reference to the major current security issues: i.e. the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles (LRTNF), the increase in defence budgets and the crisis management outside the NATO area.

The acceptance in 1979 by the Italian government lead by Mr. Cossiga, a Christian Democrat, to deploy LRTNF on its soil was a key decision for the Alliance, on several aspects. By that Italy has joined the major European countries (support being clear also from France) in ensuring such a deployment, then making a difference with respect to small countries. Secondly, it helped the building of a common European position which strictly associated the deployment with the requirement of negotiations with the USSR in order to reach an arms control agreement. Thirdly, it contributed substantially to the strengthening of the Southern Flank of NATO, which was considered, more for political reasons than possibly (and wrongly) military ones, the weak side of the Alliance.

There were also relevant domestic implications. First of all it was a first test of a better foreign policy debate (as mentioned before) based on more objective and documented positions. Secondly the Socialist key position in building a majority behind such a decision stressed the PSI's connotation as a western party and created the conditions for having slightly later a Socialist Defence Minister for the first time. Thirdly, the opposition by the Communist party has not brought such party to revise his attitude of acceptance of the Atlantic Alliance, and the attempt by some conservative sectors to come back to the old oppositions of "scelta di campo" do not appear to have been successful.

The government position on the Euromissile issues has now been to stick to the two-track NATO decision which is shared by the other major European countries. It may face some problems when the choice of the site, or sites for the missiles to be deployed, will come up locally but there is no reason for the time being to predict that the majority which was formed then will collapse. There are, of course, ambiguities related to the two-track position but these ambiguities are inherent to the European balance of power and do not remain with the Italian position only.

If we now consider the NATO decision to increase its defence budget by at least 3%, it can be expected that the Italian position will be to stick to it. However it is likely that the defence expenditure increases will not be only used to match the increased East-West threat. There is an adjustment process of our defence posture which is currently under study by government officials and which may absorb most of the increased military effort. Two main lines are driving such adjustment:

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- a) more attention to the Mediterranean related with redeployment of forces and some movement of them towards South especially as far as ground forces are concerned. Connected with it there is the Italian active role for improving the military posture of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Italian guarantee to the neutrality of Malta;
- b) an increased interest for the use of military capabilities to confront non-military threats like terrorism and natural calamities (see the recent earthquake in the south of Italy).

This program for military readjustment is also meant to contribute to the solution of the third problem, i.e. crisis management outside the NATO area. In fact it is the Italian government position that because of new deployments of forces by the Atlantic countries in the Indian Ocean it is needed to supplement in other areas like the Medi-

terranean and the major Italian task is to help in such action. It is felt in the majority forces that an improvement of capabilities to confront local threats is highly recommended.

This does not go without some divisions. There are those, especially on the right wing of the Italian political spectrum, who would like to have Italian involvement outside the NATO area, and this for several reasons, which go from the fear of being excluded from crisis management action in areas which are relevant to Italian political and economic security to the more traditional support of the American position whatever it is. In this respect those sectors feel, possibly with some domestic considerations in mind, that an Italian symbolic presence in the Indian Ocean area might be of positive interest to the country. In the remainder of the government majority spectrum, people feel that any involvement of NATO outside the area which is attributed to it, would put into question the defensive character of the Alliance, and that any involvement of Italian military capabilities that could not be but symbolic, is not worthwhile and would distract them from more useful purposes.

Attitudes in Opposition Parties

As part of the opposition we will consider the Italian Communist Party, those small parties on the left of the PCI, occasionally some of the Socialists, which are in disagreement with the majority of their party, and the Radical party. Thus we will not take into consideration the extreme right or the neo-fascist party which has been a supporter of the Atlantic Alliance and has often and unsuccessfully been trying to establish an image of itself as being more Atlantic than the others.

As I said before, slogans like "Italy out of NATO, NATO out of Italy" is no longer a slogan of the PCI, let alone of the Socialist party in Italy. Not only has the Atlantic Alliance been accepted but there is a new debate about defence and security issues on which traditionally the Left had been ideological and little practical. The consequences of this previous attitude of the Left has been that it was unable to put up alternative security models. Neutrality or unilateral disarmament have not become articulated and strong political positions though they were from time to time supported by small groups of intellectuals, of sometimes recognized stature.

The consequences of this have been first of all that the Socialists and later the Communists had to accept virtually without condition the above-mentioned foreign policy test for legitimization and secondly that there has been a delay by the Left in acquiring a minimum of sophistication on security and defence issues. However there has recently been a new debate inside the Communist Party about security issues as it is proven by the activity of the party centre of international studies, CESPI, which has been able to produce fairly detailed documents about security problems. Though there exist among the Socialists remaining groups which have fairly ideological approaches, the party in its large majority appears to be behind the current defence minister, Mr. Lagorio, who has a standing that many would consider above at least some of his predecessors.

The fact that the membership in the European Community and the one in the Atlantic Alliance have been now for more than thirty years, the main lines of the Italian foreign policy with the support of a widening, on the whole, political spectrum, has reduced substantially, if not forever, the influence of the pro-third world attitude which was mentioned before. Such attitude is not anyway peculiar of the Communist party, as

it has traditionally received support by other leftist groups including large Catholic sectors.

During the last two years, the Italian Communists have seen the international interest (or curiosity) about them declining sharply from the peaks of the times of Eurocommunism. Of the many aspects that have characterised and maybe sometimes confused Eurocommunism probably the most resilient has been more independence from Moscow. The PCI's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has taken place, though with some internal opposition which took the form - indeed an exceptional form - of some deputies breaking the discipline of the party in a parliamentary vote.

Subsequently new strains occurred with the CPSU about Poland, the Solidarnosc Movement being fairly popular in Italy essentially among trade unions and consequently also with the Communist party, at least in the early period. A revealing sign of this increased distance between the two parties was the fact that at the last party congress in Moscow neither number one nor number two of the PCI participated and this was paid back by the Russians not allowing for the first time the Italian representative to speak in the main congress hall.

As it was said, the PCI voted against and remains today contrary to the deployment of the LRTNF, but this was not a reason for revising the position of acceptance of the Alliance nor has it been so far a major issue of the party propaganda if one compares with other issues mostly domestic. Moreover the party has been careful not to identify its position on the European nuclear balance with the Soviet one. A parliamentarian, who was voted in the party list though without being a party member (incidentally, a former general who took high positions in NATO) and had supported openly Moscow's views on that, has been neglected or even publicly rebuked once by the party.

Rather the strategy of the party has been that of advocating a joint European position to save what can be saved of the détente. Berlinguer, the head of the party, has been a frequent speaker in the Strasbourg European Parliament. The German SPD has been a constant reference point since the very beginning of the debate on Euromissiles, hoping that the strong opposition in that party against the NATO decision would prevail or reach at least a compromise closer to their positions.

Finally, the PCI has so far been apparently little permeable to the kind of "Northern" and "Protestant" pacifism though such "socialist" positions are certainly neither hidden nor criticized by the Communist press. New problems are likely to come about when the issue of the sites for the missiles to be deployed on Italian soil will become hot, especially if by then the pacifist movement gets new momentum in Europe.

One has to remember that at least two small political parties, on the left of the PCI are ready to jump on these defense issues in order to steal votes.

A potential supporter of the pacifist position is the Radical party, a small but combative group. This party has not made defense policy a major issue in its action. Such domestic issues like advanced legislation on abortion, opposition to civil nuclear power and protection of civil rights against possible authoritarian consequences of the fight against terrorism or foreign policy issues like aid to development and the struggle against world hunger have received the total focus of its propaganda and activity.

Prospects for continuity or change

The above described continuity and reliability of Italy as member of the Atlantic Alliance make a sharp contrast with the country's

image of an unstable and uncertain partner. We are likely to continue to live with this contrast in the coming years. What would be more interesting at this moment is to have a look at possible factors that may affect Italian behaviour and help continuity or bring about change.

One is the foreign policy of the United States and its image in the Italian public opinion. Tough policies in Central America or in Southern Africa are likely to be unpopular for most Europeans, who do not see it, as many Americans wrongly assume, as a sign of a stronger ally. In addition, on this side of the Atlantic most governments and citizens, including the Italian, are genuinely convinced of the need of a constructive effort to carry on arms control negotiations, for either political and economic reasons and would react negatively if the Washington attitude would give clear impressions of foot dragging. If those seeds of divergency fall on a ground already prepared by continuing differences on economic matters such as stringent monetary policies, they are likely to grow faster.

A second one is a discontinuity in the parallelism between European integration and the Atlantic solidarity, to which I have referred repeatedly. Cohesion among Community members has deteriorated as far as common economic policies are concerned, while there has been more interest for political, and remotely military, cooperation. If the latter is not such as to help trend reversal in the former, the Community may face a serious crisis. That would have an influence also on the country's position in the Atlantic Alliance. This one is not likely to have the same stabilizing effect domestically that European integration has had. And this applies to the other southern European countries as well: Spain, Greece and Portugal.

Then there is a possible spread of the pacifist/neutralist/anti-American and - I would add - nationalistic movement, presently active

in Britain, in Germany and in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries. Neither of these many aspects is really new in the European political and cultural tradition; nor is it new the religious influence on them. What is new is the mix of all of them and this, in my view, is what makes it dangerous. Italy, as the other Latin-European countries, France and Spain, has been affected only marginally but she is certainly not invulnerable, especially if of two factors before, the US foreign policy encourages antiamericanism and "impasse" in the European Community enhances nationalism.

There have been political analysts who recognize in Italy a current of opinion which gives priority to European integration with respect to Atlantic solidarity as opposite to one that considers the relation with the United States as being more important than our links with the other European countries. The former would be ready to go down the road of equi-distance from the two superpowers either as a neutral block or as a third force. The former would seek "special relations" with Washington, open to risks of satellisation. As I said before, there has been so far much overlapping among political and public support of Europe and of the Alliance. But if for any of the reasons above, divergencies would show up between the two, maybe the potential of such differing currents of opinion should not be underestimated.

Finally a fourth factor could have opposite effects, i.e. to increase European and, possibly, Western solidarity. I am thinking of events that would further deteriorate the Soviet image, already much less appealing to the Italian (and European) left than it used to be, and would increase the perception of threat coming from the East. An invasion of Poland would be one of those events. If it was a plain invasion, most observers say, it will lead to a rupture between the PCI and the CPSU. But there are many other outcomes of the Polish situation short of a Soviet invasion, and the domestic influences in Italy would depend on the nuances that make those many scenarios different one from the other.

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SUMMARY

1. Italy's entrance in the Atlantic Alliance was not without uncertainties among partners nor without sharp divisions inside the country. Different views even within the largest party: the Catholic DCs. Split in the socialist party. Role of the small lay parties in the government coalition. Italy has since been a steady and cooperative member of the alliance, but little active in a period of reduced interest for foreign policy, namely security and defence. Use of foreign issues for domestic purposes. Peculiarities in the Italian position in the Western system: a country partly European, partly Mediterranean; partly industrialized and partly underdeveloped. More recently: higher vulnerability in the energy supply. The "pro-Third World", pacifist, Mediterranean tradition in the Italian foreign policy debate. Atlantic Alliance and the European Community as a decisive test for the evolution of the left parties: socialists in the

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early 60s and Communists in the 70s. Unanimous foreign policy resolution of the Parliament at the end of 1978.

2. The key decision to deploy "Euromissiles" (LRTNF) along with other NATO members.

The importance for the Alliance: i) acceptance of the major NATO countries (with support of France); ii) common European position for deployment and negotiation; iii) military strengthening of the Southern Flank; iv) end of political strains in Southern Europe.

Domestic implications. PCI, back in opposition, is against, without putting in question Italy's membership in the Alliance (see below). PSI has stressed its Western connotations: soon a Socialist to be Minister of Defense. Used by DC, traditionally, to delimitate a majority. An important psychological aspect: a beginning of debate on defense issues.

Currently, the government is stressing the need to maintain the European two-track decision, with nuances between those who consider it little more than lip service and those who remain strongly attached to détente. The intrinsic ambiguity of the issue helps ambiguity in positions .

The 3% defense budget increase. Italy, despite serious economic difficulties has decided to comply. Adjustment of defense posture associated with it. New consideration for possible threats not strictly related to East-West confrontation, which is covered by NATO.

Increased attention for the Mediterranean, may require redeployment of also ground forces toward the South: the problem

currently being studied in detail. Active support for political improvement of NATO situation in Eastern Mediterranean; security guarantee to Malta.

Increased attention also for civil threats. Use of military instruments to fight terrorism and to help in natural calamities (recent earthquakes).

Crisis management outside NATO area. The government position is that: a) the priority remains with improving the country's and NATO's position in the Mediterranean also in relation to possible negative consequences of new deployments in the Indian Ocean; b) there is little Italy can do to perceptibly help out there. "Our navy stays well where it is".

Some political groups, for instance the most conservative of the DC, favourable to a more active role. The debate, mostly restricted, confirms higher interest for security issues, but is apparently dictated by considerations related to US-European relations and domestic implications rather than by the need to protect oil supply.

3. There is national consensus on Italy's membership in the Atlantic Alliance (even more so for the European Community). Not only old slogans of the left ("Italy out of NATO - NATO out of Italy") are abandoned, but there has also been a new interest (socialists and communists possibly more than the moderates) for security and defense related issues. Previously such issues were considered "untouchable" with two consequences: a) the left proved to be unable to put up alternatives and had to accept virtually unconditionally the "Atlantic/European test"

to be legitimized for government (pacifist, third-worldist position marginalized); b) the strategic debate in Italy is still less mature than in most other Western countries. The Communists condemned Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (though with internal opposition, for the first time expressed in parliamentary vote) and have strains with CPSU about Poland (Pajetta not allowed to speak in the Moscow Party Congress). The PCI, while confirming opposition to the deployment of LRTNF, does not make it a major issue (with respect to social problems or public morality) and is careful of not being labelled as pro-Russian (one internal voice in this sense has been publicly criticized). Rather, it advocates a European consensus for saving détente. The party has so far been apparently little permeable to "northern", "protestant", pacifism, though such "socialist" positions are neither hidden nor condemned. The small, but combative radical party has made foreign policy issues even less central in its action. Protection of civil rights, against possible authoritarian consequences of the struggle against terrorism, abortion, opposition to nuclear energy and many other domestic issues get entire priority.

4. Continuity and reliability of Italy in the Atlantic Alliance contrast with image of instability and uncertainty. Extrapolation or possible factors of change.
 - a) Importance of parallelism between European Community and Atlantic Alliance. If European solidarity deteriorates substantially, serious strains would be brought in the Italian equilibrium.

- b) Image of US (i.e. deterioration consequent to unpopular action in Third World) and substance of US-European relations (political and/or economic) will also affect the situation, not only among Communists but Socialists and Catholics as well.
- c) A combination of some a) and some b) would help to spread pacifist movements towards South.
- d) A dramatic outcome in Poland should have the contrary effect though different views on how to react may bring some b) and possibly some a) as well.

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SPAIN AND THE DEFENCE OF THE WEST

Pedro Schwartz *

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"Spain and the Defense of the West"

Pedro Schwartz

This paper has not been written by a specialist in military affairs, but by an economist who believes with Adam Smith that the first duty of sovereign is "the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies". It will attempt to analyse the political attitudes of the Spanish towards the Western Alliance. It will also try to forecast immediate developments with regards to the renewal of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1976 between Spain and the USA; and with regards to the possibility of Spain joining NATO, under the provision of art. 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.

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A discussion of these matters is timely, for the Treaty with the USA ends in 1981 and the new Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo has reasserted the will of the ruling Center Party to have Spain join NATO. The two questions, also, are not unconnected for a renewed Treaty with the US would have a different meaning and perhaps even contain different clauses if Spain is also a member of the Alliance.

The paper will be divided in five parts: part (I) will give a short description of the Spanish Armed Forces; part (II) will present an overview of political attitudes respecting Spain's relations with the Western Alliance; part (III) will list the military possibilities before Spain; part (IV) will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Spain both signing a new Treaty of Friendship and joining NATO; a final part (V) will summarise the foregoing points and venture a tentative forecast of events.

I

The Spanish Armed Forces

It is difficult for a civilian to know the might and preparedness of the Armed Forces of Spain. The military live very much apart from the mainstream of Spanish civilian life. Their social origin is increasingly lower middle class. Some regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country are not greatly represented among the officers. The British custom of starting life as an officer and then moving into banking or industry as a manager has no counterpart in Spain, except that some serving officers work for specialised public enterprises.

For the purposes of this essay it will be enough to use some broad figures published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, so that other contributors, familiar with the NATO Forces, can get an impression of orders of magnitude.

Table 1

SPAIN'S ARMED FORCES

Men under arms (in thousands)	
Army	255
Navy	49
Air Force	38
TOTAL	<u>342</u> (a)
Reservists	1,085 (b)
Civil Guard and Police	104

NOTES: (a) Of which 230,000 National Servicemen.

(b) Having received recent training.

SOURCE: "Spain", *Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980, as published by *Ejército: Revista de las Armas y Servicios*, XLI, 490 (Nov. 1980).

One of the characteristics of the Spanish Armed Forces is their relatively large manpower. Four hundred and forty five thousand men under arms, if one includes the paramilitary Civil Guard and Police, as one would in war time, plus more than a million unsable reservists is no inconsiderable number for a nation of just under thirty eight million inhabitants.

These Armed Forces are however top heavy in the higher ranks. Table 2 gives figures for 1977 which show that the modernisation of the Forces might mean a pruning of the command structure.

Table 2

RANK STRUCTURE OF SPANISH ARMED FORCES
(1977)

Men under arms	4,5% of 18-45 year olds
Generals	500
Commanding Officers	11,000
Officers	23,600
NCOs	36,200

SOURCE: Antonio Sánchez - Gijón, España en la OTAN (Madrid, 1978), pp. 234-235.

Again, it is difficult to give more than a cursory impression of the fighting power of these armed forces and the equipment at its disposal. Its immediate intervention forces are scanty; only one armoured division, backed up by a mechanised division and another motorised, true, each with two brigades. The Cavalry and the Artillery have another immediate intervention brigade each; and there is one parachute and

one aerotransportable brigade more, for rapid intervention. Of these forces, one might guess that the armoured division and the parachute brigade are the handiest and readiest.

It is not necessary to go into all the details of equipment listed in *Military Balance*. Table 3 gives an overview, which suggest less than full preparedness for modern warfare.

Table 3

SPAIN: A SAMPLE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Tanks	
Medium	755
Light	180
Submarines (diesel)	8
Combat aircraft (a)	177

NOTES: (a) Of which 36 F-4C (S);
24 Mirage F-1 CE; for inter-
ception: and bomber fighters,
16 F-5A; 2 F-5B; 11 HA-220.

SOURCE: "Spain", *Military Balance*, 1980.

Under the aegis of the American Treaty, some effort has been made to modernise the forces. The US have supplied much needed hardware especially to the Armada. A seven year military investment plan is in operation, and military expenditure in general seems to be rising more than proportionately.

Table 4

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>
US	5.4	5.2
USSR	11 to 13	
UK	4.9	4.9
France	3.9	3.9
Italy	2.6	2.4
Spain	1.8	2.9

SOURCE: *Military Balance*, Part 2, Table 4

II

The Political Situation

For the purpose in hand it would be otiose to speak of the general political situation of Spain and the success or not of its transition from autocracy to democracy, were it not for the fact that a small part of its Armed Forces and Civil Guard staged a coup on 23 February 1981, with the tacit sympathy of a great part of the military.

The 23 February Coup

Article 8.1 of the 1978 Constitution reads: "The Armed Forces ... have it as their mission to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and its Constitution". Many military men, from what has transpired of their opinions after the shock of the 23 February, interpret this article in a peculiar way. They consider that the democratic governments of Spain have not been sufficiently active in combatting terrorism and have been far too generous in devolving powers to the regions, especially to Catalonia and the Basque Country: this they see as attacks against the territorial integrity of Spain. They also feel that unemployment, which has reached 12.5 of the active population, can be routed by a decided assault with the help of public spending and credit leniency: this problem may not be within their brief as set out in the above-mentioned article 8.1, but traditionally the military in Spain feel they are the last reserve in the event of a social or economic emergency. Finally, they interpret rather partially their duty to defend the Constitution as a duty of allegiance to the King. One of the contradictions of the 1978 Constitution is that the King is stripped of any effective power save an

innocuous looking one: art. 62.h says that the King is charged with "the supreme command of the Armed Forces". This recognises the fact that the King is an Army officer and wields more power than anybody else in Spain through the allegiance of all officers to His person.

The failure of the 23 February coup and the overwhelming democratic sentiment of civilian Spain are immaterial compared with the reality of military political power. This power is a reserve power and is externally manifest in the respect the Armed Forces expect and mostly get from the population. The leniency towards the perpetrators of the coup is an indication of this social reality.

One important consequence can be deduced from all this for the matter of Spain's contribution to the defense of the West: the Spanish Armed Forces are predominantly inward looking and are in fact a political force rather than an organization for the external defence of the country and an effective military machine contributed to the alliance with America.

The Armed Forces and NATO

The review *Defensa*, which specialises in military matters, published a poll on NATO among its readership.¹ It is interesting to note that 52% of the answers only were favourable to entry. However, since the military amongst the people sending replies only came up to 40%, the result revealing military opinion should have to be corrected. We do not have the figures for the military readers, but we do have a breakdown by rank. Of the COs replying 88% were in favour of entry:

¹ Reported in *ABC*, 11 June 1980. Readership of *Defensa*: 8,000. The proportion of replies obtained was not revealed.

of the officers (commanders, captains, and lieutenants) only 48%. Again, while 84% considered that the advantages of joining were mainly military, only half considered that the political advantages overbalanced the ^{political} disadvantages.

All this is a mere indication of military opinion, but it does show that a greater degree of Third World "nationalism" is prevalent among the younger officers, and also that the political rôle of NATO and the political importance of Spain participating in the councils of the Alliance are slighted. *various*

Casual observation and conversation confirms all this. The Spanish military know they could not manage the three Hispano-American bases of Rota, Torrejón, and Saragossa; that their modern equipment and knowhow mainly comes from their association with the Americans; that the Spanish territory and Armed Forces are *de facto* partially integrated in NATO's military organisation. However hostility to full integration exists, perhaps for two reasons: Gibraltar and traditional Spanish isolationism.

Gibraltar

This small and thorny problem will be dealt with cursorily. The Spanish military and, one may suppose, the population in general would dearly love to see Gibraltar come back under Spanish sovereignty. Under the 1978 Constitution a wide measure of devolution would be possible for the Gibraltarians. In fact art. 144.b of the Constitution foresees the possibility of an Autonomous Community smaller than a province, and it was written with Gibraltar in view.

The Gibraltarians however do not relish the prospect of joining Spain, because many do not believe Spain will stay democratic, because they *suspect the* communist and socialist municipalities in their *Hinterland*, and because they fear an erosion of their privileges. They also hope to get all they want for nothing: i.e. the opening of the barriers separating them from their neighbors when Spain joins the EEC.

Unless the status of the military base in Gibraltar is cleared and it is accepted that it will become a Spanish base leased to NATO when Spain accedes, the majority of the military will not want to join NATO.

Spanish neutralism

Spain has not taken part in an European war since the times of Napoléon. Many of the military and a majority of the population feel that Western military affairs are remote, especially if they are taken to include the defence of the Oder-Neisse line, the American mainland, the Middle East oil wells, and the Japanese archipelago.

This myopia is so pronounced that many Spaniards think Spain might be able to stay outside an European war involving NATO countries, despite the fact that the Americans use three nuclear bases on Spanish soil. Again the poll taken by *Defensa* is revealing: among its civilian and military readers, 30% think that the likelihood of Spanish involvement in a nuclear exchange will be lessened if she stays out of NATO, while presumably renewing one Treaty with America.

Political parties

After the March 1979 general election, the center party UCD was able to form a government again, as being the largest minority in a Chamber of Deputies where no party reach half the seats.

The distribution of seats in the Lower House is now as follows, from *right* to *left*: 2.6% for the conservative Coalición Democrática; 47% for the government party, UCD; 4.6 for the Catalan and Basque conservative Nationalists; 34.0 for the Socialists; 6.6 for the Communists; and 5.1% for others of Left and Right.

The small Coalición Democrática group is decidedly pro-NATO. The Center party, which is in power, proclaimed its decision to join NATO in the electoral manifesto, but nothing was done to put this resolution into effect under the premiership of Adolfo Suárez; the present President of the Council of Ministers, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, made it clear in his nomination speech and on a number of occasions since then that it was his wish to see Spain enter the Atlantic Alliance. He would have the backing of the Nationalists for this step.

On the left, the picture is very different. Despite the fact that NATO was the idea of a Labour politician, Ernie Bevin, backed by another European, Georges Bidault, the Socialist group have taken a curious, if not contradictory stance: they favour the renewal of the Treaty with the Americans; they reject entry into NATO; hope for a neutral Mediterranean, or perhaps ultimately for an independent European army; and will overturn accession if they reach power, unless it has been acquiesced in by a referendum. The position of the Communist party is virtually the same, including continu

ation of the American Alliance - no doubt for opportunistic reasons.

However before entering into more details on the attitude of the different leaders and the burden of public opinion, the different defence options open to Spain must be set out.

III

Defence possibilities open to Spain

Spain at the moment finds herself in alliance with the leading nation of the Free World, and contributes to its defence mainly by allowing three Hispano-American bases to function on its territory. Its Armed Forces are numerous, but not adequately equipped or organised, and their attention is mainly turned to the ups and down of domestic politics.

The following options lie before Spain:

1. Simply renew the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USA. This would be equivalent to a military status quo and could have some political disadvantages. The parties of the left say they wish for a continuation of the alliance with the US but when the time to sign approaches, may stir up opposition for two reasons: (a) that the new Treaty is likely to be less "favourable" to Spain than the previous one, because of the increased resistance to granting civilian aid to Allied nations evinced by the American Congress; (b) the Communists, once the adhesion to NATO has been renounced, are not likely to deny themselves the political gains of an anti-Yankee campaign. From the point of view of risk in case of a war, it is difficult to see how it is lowered by harbouring three American bases which are essential for the defence of Europe and the Atlantic sea lanes (from the ^{Rota-} Moron submarine base).
2. Apply to NATO, under article 10, of the 1949 North-Atlantic Treaty. ² One could conceive of Spain joining NATO and not

2 "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty..."

renewing the bilateral treaty with the US. This is a position which has been taken up by some influential publications.³ The end result would be that the three bases would come under full Spanish sovereignty and perhaps then be put to NATO use under ACE and ACLANT.⁴ This solution is most unlikely: its only advantage would be to satisfy the not very virulent anti-Americanism of a minority, while it would give offence to the leading nation of NATO and demand disruptive rearrangement of military disposition, unless it were a pure façade. Hence the option to be considered, and it is that proposed by the Government is a *renewal of the Treaty with the US and entry into NATO*. Since the 1976 Treaty is near expiry and time for full discussions is lacking, the Spanish Prime Minister told Mr. Secretary of State Haig during his April visit to Madrid that a bridging one year agreement should be signed while NATO accession and a new full Treaty are put into effect.

3. *Neutrality*. This is the hoped for state by the parties of the Left, which for questions of political opportunity (mainly trying not to alarm a suspicious Armed Forces that a Communist take-over is in the offing) is hidden behind acceptance of the bilateral alliance with the US. This is not to say that there are no Socialists favouring entry into NATO. In public however, the Left take three positions: (3a) Unarmed neutrality: deputy Solana of the Socialist party, for example, has been heard to say that by becoming neutral Spain could be "the great arbiter of international morality"; (3b) Awaiting an European Army: anti-American

3 The weekly *Cambio 16* and the daily *Diario 16*.

4 Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic.

feeling leads some people of the Left to dream of the day when a united Europe will be the third great power of the World, when Europeans will be independent of Americans and Russians alike; this sort of day-dreaming usually includes imposing much stricter conditions on Americans for the use of the three bases, such as a Spanish power of veto which would make the Treaty a one way obligation on the US to defend Spain against foreign aggression; and slowly bettering the state of Spanish Armed Forces; (3c) Armed neutrality without or including a nuclear capability, as the writers of a heretical offshoot of communism, the *Partido del Trabajo de España*, propose under the pseudonym "Alvarez de Castro".⁵

4. *An Alliance with Warsaw Pact Countries.* Nobody seriously defends this option.

What do the leaders say

After this classification of options, it is easier to explain what the main political leaders propose to do on defence.

Now that Adolfo Suárez has ceased being the Prime Minister, there seems to be cleavage separating Right and Center on the one hand, from the Left. *Coalición Democrática* and the Center governing party seem to favour option (2), the entry in NATO *with* a renewal of the Treaty with the Americans.

5 *Alvarez de Castro [Pseudonym], ¿España en la OTAN? Una alternativa para la defensa nacional (Madrid, 1978).*

Manuel Fraga, the leader of Coalición Democrática, leaves one in no doubt of this: since he became a democratic leader, and even under Franco, he has always been a staunch Atlanticist.

Mr. Calvo Sotelo, who has replaced Suárez and who shows none of the latter's Third World leanings, declared in his programmatic speech, when asking the Chamber of Deputies that they invest him as a Prime Minister on a fateful February 23rd, that he would undertake consultations with all political parties to seek for the least disruptive way of applying for entry in NATO. As was said above, he seems to have solved the problem of the Treaties with the US running out, by agreeing with Secretary of State Alexander Haigh to seek a one year bridging agreement. Also in his recent trip to the Federal Republic of Germany, the Spanish Prime Minister seems to have told Chancellor Schmidt that he envisages Spain entering NATO even before she signs the admission to the Treaty of Rome.

The main obstacle in his path, if he seriously means to take it, is the position adopted by the Secretary General of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). At that same fateful investiture debate in February, Felipe González hooked himself publicly before the TV cameras to oppose entry of Spain in NATO and to reverse any decision taken in that sense in the Cortes by a simple majority vote if the Socialist won the next general election: only an affirmative vote in a Referendum would be accepted as final by the Socialists. A number of embellishments on the anti-NATO position were heard in that sitting: Spain joining the Atlantic Alliance would upset the World balance of power, would diminish the chances of a simultaneous dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would jeopardize the special relationship of Spain with the non-aligned movement, would deflect Spain from the aim of neutralising the Mediterranean or at least excluding alien navies from it.

The Socialists in Spain are, through bitter experience, staunchly anti-Communist. It is therefore difficult to understand the point of all these arguments. The urgency lies in redressing the balance of power against the Soviets who have no compunction about tilting it in their favour. The shambles of the European Security and Cooperation Conference in Madrid should enlighten them about the chances of general disarmament. The non-aligned movement should rather be called the ever-feuding movement. And the very idea of the Soviet Union renouncing its right to send warships through the Dardanelles is utopian.

Be that as it may, Calvo Sotelo has to find some way of letting Felipe González off the hook, or he will have to carry on regardless, *under a lot of political flack*.

Santiago Carrillo, the Euro-Communist leader, is being contested from inside his party and has just lost control of the Catalan branch in favour of the pro-Soviet faction. His protestations of acceptance of the American Treaties, as a stepping stone to a negotiated neutralisation of Spain or of the whole of Europe, could be disregarded, except for the fact that the Communists can take to the streets and mobilise their considerable clientèle in the media, the arts and the University. The Constitutional régime in Spain can hardly afford demonstrations and riots and it is known that the *putschist* military read the radical press with great attention.

Finally, there is the extraparliamentary left, mainly the two branches of ETA. How far the terrorists are being financed and trained by people or countries interested in impeding Spain's entry into NATO is a point on which it is difficult to say anything with certainty.

Public Opinion

In any case the interest of the man in the street for these questions seems to be small. In July 1980, a reliable opinion poll showed a great deal of ignorance about, and considerable opposition against Spain's adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty.⁶ Only 68% of those interviewed had heard about NATO. Of those who had heard, 36% were for entry, 43% were against and 21% did not know.

Only the regional distribution showed significant deviations from the national average, in Madrid and Barcelona. In the two largest and most influential cities, those against increased to 55% and 51% (of the people who had heard of the Organisation).

This is not the ideal setting for a Referendum, even when the Government holding the majority in the Chamber is the only one with powers to call it, as art. 92.2 of the Constitution determines it.

6 *Diario 16*: "OTAN, esa desconocida", 29 October 1980. The article summarises the results of an opinion poll taken by "Metra/Seis", on the basis of 2000 interviews. See full figures in the Appendix.

IV

Pros and Cons of Spain JoiningNATO

Whatever the Government decides in the end, there can be little doubt that Spain should join NATO, if one's aims are: re-inforcing Spanish security; maintaining democracy and freedom in Spain; and contributing to the defence of the West.

Costs

Even within this framework there are costs which should not be overlooked. The first one is financing the new military expenses inherent in NATO membership.

Adam Smith noted that "the first duty of the Sovereign..., that of defending the society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization." (W.N., V.i.a.).

The fortnightly *Mercado*, gave in July 1980 some indication of what it would cost Spain to become a full member of NATO ⁽⁷⁾. It reported that, according to the calculation of then Gen. Alexander Haig, the yearly gross payments by Spain to the Organisation would be \$60 million, of which approximately half would be re-imbursed as rent for the facilities leased to NATO by Spain. The breakdown of this figure is as follows.

(7) *Perspectivas y Mercado*, I, 3 (9-22 July, 1980): "El precio de la OTAN."

NATO compiles three budgets every year: civil, military, and for infrastructure. In 1978, \$50 million were assigned to civil expenditure, especially civil servants of the Organisation in Brussels; \$250 million were assigned to military expenditure at the various NATO Headquarters and as a contribution to yearly manoeuvres. Spain would have to contribute \$10 million to the first chapter and \$50 million to the second.

The infrastructure expenditure is apparently carried out within each country and the contribution of each country (which in the case of Spain would be smaller than the actual expenditure) would simply mean a reallocation of existing or intended military expenditure. Countries are assigned a coefficient according to their GNP and degree of development. In 1979, it seems that these expenditures amounted to \$4,000 million. If Spain were assigned a coefficient like that of Norway, namely 3.1, the expenditure would come up to \$124 million. This sum compared to the \$4,800 million total Defence expenditure by Spain is not great shakes.

Of course there would have to be further expenses to modernise and standardise the Spanish Armed Forces up to the NATO level. But this is already being done by Spain, without the advantage of full consultation with and advice from the members of the Alliance.

The other cost is the increased likelihood of Spain being involved in an European war if she is a member of NATO. This increase is infinitesimal compared with the risk implicit in harbouring three important bases for the use of American forces.

Advantages

In reverse order of importance to the Spanish voter, let us start with the most far sighted consideration: *the defence of the Western Civilisation*

In the Preliminary Considerations to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, the Parties asserted their determination "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

Spain has just restored, rather shakily, a democratic system, enshrined in a Constitution, which, for all its defects, does embody the same principles NATO was founded to defend.

The Western Alliance is going through difficult times. Aggressive rearmament by the Soviet Union, lack of coordination among the Allies, and the impact of the economic crisis have made it plain that the Alliance needs re-inforcing. 8
Spain's contribution to this task would also strengthen the hopes that democracy will survive on its soil as well as on that of all free nations.

The second advantage would be *an increase of Spain's control over her own affairs*. At the moment many decisions fundamental for her safety are taken in Councils where she does not participate.

In a World where defence is so costly sovereignty grows with equal participation in Allied decisions rather than going it alone at one's own peril unless the country is ready to pay the very heavy price of armed neutrality.

By adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, Spain would become a member of the Council of the Alliance and its Defence Planning Committee. Its military men would be taken

8 Cf. K. Kaiser, W. Lord, Th. de Montbriand, D. Watt, *Western Security : What has changed? What is to be Done?* Council of Foreign Relations and Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1981.

in as equals on the Military Committee, and the Commands, especially ACLANT (Allied Command Europe) and the subordinate Command IBERLANT (Iberian Atlantic Area). Instead of being a minor appendage of the American military machine, she would be a full partner of an Alliance of equals.

The third advantage lies in that the Allies would *increase the protection of the Spanish mainland and islands.*

Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty extends protection against armed attack to "the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic Area north of the Tropic of Cancer". The Canary Islands are an especially vulnerable part of the Spanish territories. They are on the main supply routes from South America and South Africa to the European theaters of war. The Caribbean and the African mainland are troubled areas where political pirates roam. The Balearic Islands would also be sensitive in the event of a European war. Spain needs all the help it can get from its friends, on the basis of a fair exchange of efforts, that is, of a sizeable contribution to the defence of the West.

The fourth advantage lies in that NATO is *the best framework for the overdue modernisation of the Spanish Armed Forces.*

True, a sizeable effort is being made by Spain now, with the help of the US. But full integration into NATO would make this modernisation more efficient. It would also contribute to the streamlining of the Spanish armament industries. And last, but not least, it might keep the military busy and take their minds away from local politics.

NATO membership is of course no guarantee against a *coup d'Etat*, as the examples of Greece and Turkey

show. The solidity of democracy is mainly the responsibility of its citizens. However, a clarification of Spanish foreign policy, a reinforcement of its defences, and a transformation of its somewhat ragged Armed Forces into a professional instrument do seem to be an ideal setting for the kind of domestic policies which will make democracy a way of life for Spaniards.

V

Conclusion

This paper began by describing the Spanish Armed Forces: an unwieldy body of men, less efficient and less well equipped than might be desired. Spain however is making an effort to put this state of affairs to rights with an increased defence expenditure, now nearing the 3% mark desired by the North Atlantic Council.

The political situation in as far as affects Spain's adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty was shown in Part II to be complicated. The Army is over political as the 23rd February 1981 coup clearly shows. Political parties, for their part, have not shown themselves to be favourable to the Alliance especially on the left. Gibraltar and a tradition of neutralism were shown to be additional complicating factors.

Part III classified the defence options for Spain. Only three were shown to be relevant: (a) simply renewing the Treaty with the US; this being the short stop position of the Left; (b) entering NATO and renewing the Alliance with the US, this being the position of the Right; (c) armed neutrality, this being the long stop position of the Socialists and the cover of the Communists. Public opinion was shown to be not very interested in the issue, and when informed, mainly against Spain's entry into NATO.

Finally, in Part IV the pros and cons of Spain's adhesion were weighed from the point of view of a wish to reinforce Spain's security; maintaining freedom and democracy in Spain; and contributing to the defence of the West. The money cost of joining turned out not to be very high. And the domestic

and foreign interests of Spain were shown to be fully consonant with membership, especially the increase in sovereignty through participation in the Councils of the Alliance.

What are the chances that the right decision be taken soon? Despite the brave words of the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Calvo Sotelo, they appear to be slim. The opposition of the left when the government needs the barking of all democratic parties to reinforce a menaced democracy bodes ill for an early decision. General elections must come before March 1983, presumably in 1982, and the ruling party has plenty on its plate without adding an added complication which can be solved by the new Cortes.

Hence the friends of the Western Alliance will, one fears, have to be patient before the day comes when Spain will fully join the defensive system of free nations....unless the adherence comes through the unorthodox pressures of the ^{higher ranks} _{of the} military, or simply through a wish to placate them.

POPULATION SEGMENT <i>ok '80</i>	No. of interviews	Knowledge		No. of knowers	Attitudes		% Do not know
		% Heard of NATO	% Really know it		% In favour	% Against	
Total population	(2.000)	67,8	46,4	(927)	36,4	42,5	21,1
S E X							
Men	(1.035)	76,1	60,0	(621)	33,8	48,9	17,3
Women	(965)	59,0	31,7	(306)	41,9	29,5	28,6
A G E							
18 to 29	(536)	86,5	65,1	(349)	37,6	49,6	12,8
30 to 49	(861)	67,6	45,9	(395)	35,1	38,1	26,8
50 and more	(603)	51,6	30,3	(183)	37,2	38,4	24,4
C L A S S							
High + H. Middle	(178)	97,3	85,4	(152)	34,3	48,4	17,3
Middle - Middle	(443)	89,4	72,9	(323)	39,7	39,9	20,4
Middle - Low + Working ...	(1.378)	57,1	32,7	(451)	34,8	42,4	22,8
REGION - ZONE							
Catalonia	(429)	81,1	53,4	(229)	28,7	41,8	29,5
East and South East	(264)	47,6	37,4	(98)	37,1	46,1	16,8
Andalusia	(408)	57,6	39,7	(162)	40,2	44,5	15,3
Centre	(481)	68,5	45,3	(218)	32,5	46,9	20,6
North	(418)	76,9	52,4	(219)	45,5	35,7	18,8
HABITAT							
2 to 15.000 people	(860)	57,8	37,6	(323)	42,1	35,0	22,9
15 to 100.000 people	(371)	63,2	42,9	(159)	39,7	42,5	17,8
+ than 100.000 people	(424)	79,5	55,9	(237)	34,3	43,3	22,4
Barcelona	(123)	82,5	65,9	(81)	24,4	51,2	24,4
Madrid	(222)	84,1	57,2	(127)	29,7	54,5	15,8

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Milton Hill House Conference on
POLITICAL CHANGE AND UNITY IN THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

EUROPE AS A FACTOR IN ATLANTIC POLITICS

Synopsis of remarks by
Robert Jackson, MEP

Historical perspective

1. The original framework of European/American relations was laid down in the immediate post-war period - characterised by American political and economic/military strength and relative European weakness.

- Currencies: The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates backed by IMF reserves and swap arrangements.

- Trade: GATT commitments to multilateral reduction in protection (except in agriculture).

- Economic policy: American support for European economic cooperation/integration.

- Foreign policy/defence: Alliance political consultation plus integrated national forces in NATO.

2. Over the period since 1945, the European/American imbalance has been substantially reduced in all spheres except the military. This has had major implications for the trans-Atlantic framework.

- Currencies: The Bretton Woods system has broken down. After a period of generalised "floating" the continental European currencies of the EEC are flexibly linked in the EMS, floating against the Dollar (and Sterling).

- Trade: Tariff protection has been very considerably diminished, but non-tariff administrative barriers, national subsidies, and exchange rate fluctuations impose substantial distortions on trade flows.
- Economic policy: Significant European integration/cooperation exists through the EEC; since 1974 the Atlantic "Summits" have provided a framework for trans-Atlantic consultations on macro-economic policy.
- Energy: (A new subject since 1973). Trans-Atlantic cooperation (extending to Japan) on conservation, emergencies and oil diplomacy is organised through the IEA and the Atlantic Summits; the EEC coordinates European policies on the same points.
- Foreign policy/defence: European diplomacy is increasingly concerted within EC Political Cooperation: the NATO integrated military structure continues (minus France) with, since 1967, some European cooperation in the Euro-Group and IEPG (concerning procurement):

The Evolution of Europe

3. The increasing organization of Europe through the EC has been a major factor in the strengthening of Europe in the economic and - more and more - the political spheres.

- The Common Market has promoted the inter-penetration of European national markets and the competitiveness of European industries (and agriculture) - including US multinationals operating trans-nationally in Europe.
- The EC Common External Tariff has enabled Europe to negotiate as an equal with the US and Japan in the GATT.

- The EMS has shielded Europe from exchange rate instability centred on the Dollar.
 - EC economic policy cooperation after 1973 helped to arrest protectionism and, in 1973 to 1980, mitigated deflationary tendencies.
 - Energy policy cooperation helped the Europeans significantly to reduce the growth of consumption by a joint approach.
 - European Political Cooperation and development policy have increasingly fashioned joint European positions on the Middle East, on détente and on North-South relations.
4. However, the European structures are now approaching a crisis.
- Following the second (Iranian) oil shock, a second wave of recession and rising unemployment threatens a resurgence of protectionism. At this stage this is still directed towards the LDCs, the NICs and Japan: but informal barriers are increasing within Europe, and the Common Market itself may come under threat (SC. British Left "alternative strategy".)
 - The first enlargement of the EC, in 1973, to include Britain, poses problems that have not yet been resolved, notably (i) the inequity of ^ethe EC budget; (ii) the excessive cost of the CAP.
 - The impending second enlargement of the EC (1981-1984) to include Greece, Spain and Portugal, poses similarly acute problems, for the EC budget, for the organization of European agriculture and industry, and for the functioning of the EC institutions (based on the principle of unanimous agreement between first 6, then 9, now 10 and soon 12 governments).

- Without more active coordination of macro-economic policies - including especially (i) coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, (ii) increasing resource transfers, and (iii) more active energy policy cooperation - and without a more developed external currency policy (vis-à-vis the Dollar and the petro currencies), the EMS exchange rate stabilization arrangements will come under increasing strain.
- EC political cooperation has reached a point at which it has enough substance to exert an influence on world policy, but not enough to make that influence effective.
- In spite of major institutional developments in the 1970s - regular thrice-yearly Summits (the European Council) and direct elections to the European Parliament - there is an increasing lack of confidence in the functioning of the EC institutions, both among governments and on the part of public opinion.

5. Possible outcomes for this EC internal development by 1985 are:-

- (a) Rallying of the existing structures. This would involve the maintenance of the Common Market (perhaps with increased external protection); moderate reforms of the CAP to reduce its economic and budgetary costs; arrangements to ensure EC budget equity; the development of more active EC economic policy coordination; the consolidation of EMS, both internally and externally (reserve rôle for the ECU?); the further institutionalization and intensification of political cooperation (including security/defence issues?); increasing the effectiveness of EC decision-making (majority voting, more powers for the Commission, and for the European Parliament).

In spite of all the difficulties this is still the most likely path, although elements of (c) below will inevitably

enter in; none of the Member States can afford the risk of the EC's disintegration; and unless the Community moves forward it will face growing strains.

- (b) Loosening up. This would involve a more or less formalised shift of the Community to forms of organization based on the principle of voluntary inter-governmental cooperation. The implication is that none of the new developments indicated above would occur (except perhaps some strengthening of political cooperation). ~~The EC budget would revert to financing by national contributions (replacing the proto-federal "own resources" system); the CAP would be~~ ^{national} restructured on a ~~non~~-cooperative basis.

The difficulty that must be faced by the advocates of a looser Community is that there is an irrefragible coherence binding together the central EC complex of Common Market/CAP/common institutions/"own resources" budget. If this breaks up, the whole structure breaks up; similarly, if this structure is not further developed, it will be increasingly strained.

- (c) "Variable geometry Europe". The scenario for Rallying ((a) above) and Loosening ((b) above) assumes that the EC continues to develop as a more or less homogeneous and uniform entity. A possible outcome of the present crisis could be (i) a "multi-speed Community" - in which new EC structures are developed in which not all Member States participate (cf. British non-participation in the EMS exchange rate system; the 1980 special budget measures for Britain); (ii) intensified Franco-German cooperation - i.e., the development of special arrangements between Member States outside the EC framework.

"Variable geometry" will inevitably continue in the future - as in past - to be an essential element in the EC's development. But it is unlikely to establish permanently divisive

structures: successful developments on a partial basis are likely to attract full participation by all Member States (vide Britain and EMS?); Franco-German cooperation by itself is not enough.

- (d) Secessions. It is possible that some existing (Greece, Britain, Denmark?) or prospective (Spain?) Member States may opt out.

This is unlikely (except possibly in respect of Spain). After initial turmoil the effect would probably be to promote a rallying of the EC structure around the Franco-German alliance.

Implications of European Developments for Transatlantic Relations

6. The fact that during the early to mid 1980s Europe will continue to be preoccupied by its internal problems will in itself be an irritant in transatlantic relations: Americans are likely to continue to be able to say, with Dr Kissinger, that Europe's "regional" preoccupations limit its capacity to carry its appropriate share of "global" responsibilities.

7. On the other hand, this fact - together with the growing widespread perception in Europe that the international environment of the 1980s is significantly more dangerous than at any time since the 1940s - is likely to discipline the extent of European self-indulgence in internal conflicts.

8. If the tendency in Europe is towards the loosening of the existing structures the effect would be to promote European introspection and to prevent the emergence of new or strengthened European positions. Transatlantic relations would therefore focus on bilateral connections between the US and particular European states.

The central issues are likely to concern the development of German policy, especially if tension grows in Eastern

Europe or if Soviet actions in the Third World threaten détente in Europe. Washington will therefore continue to attach primary importance to relations with Bonn; this will help to strengthen relations between Washington and Paris.

Under their existing governments France and Britain could find themselves increasingly drawn together with the US in activities outside Europe.

A change of government in Britain towards the Left could introduce serious difficulties not only in trans-Channel but also in trans-Atlantic relations.

9. If there is a rallying of the European structures the familiar problem of the coordination of American and emerging European positions will continue to assert itself.

- The strengthening of EC external trade policy threaten tension with the US based on (i) reciprocal European and American concerns about trade diversion effects; (ii) American irritation at European lack of understanding of Far East/Pacific problems.

Strenuous efforts will be needed to coordinate European and American (and Japanese) trade development strategies. In particular any revival of 'Connollyism' in the US could carry serious risks.

The development of EC economic policy coordination could, again, cause tensions with the US. E.g., EC convergence on a more balanced macro-economic strategy could lead to strains over deflationary tendencies in the US; EC industrial policy could promote disagreements about transatlantic trade competition; resentments over differences in energy policy could be brought into even greater focus. Although, perhaps, now going out of fashion, it will be important in these circumstances to keep the Atlantic/Trilateral 'Summit' system in good repair.

- The evolution of the EMS towards a global rôle as an alternative to the dollar-system could lead to trans-Atlantic divergences.

- Differences in the geo-strategic situations of Europe and America, and divergences in their political perceptions, will inevitably impose upon any emerging European foreign policy system a different cast from the American system.

(i) These tensions are already apparent over the Middle East, where the Europeans accord a higher priority than the Americans to a settlement of the Palestinian issue, and a lower priority than the Americans to the development of intervention capabilities in the region. On the other hand, it is well understood in Europe that the key to a Palestinian settlement lies in Washington.

(ii) An emerging area of strain concerns the response of the Europeans to threats of a breakdown of détente in Europe. The US must understand the difficulties for Europeans (especially the Germans) in applying a strategy of graduated reductions in détente in Europe as punishments for Soviet aggressions. This issue showed itself over Afghanistan; it could become very acute over Poland.

(iii) Differences could emerge over Southern African questions - where, in spite of their relatively greater involvement in South Africa, the Europeans may be more sensitive to African opinion than the new Administration in the US.

(iv) Over the horizon, but coming closer, is the possibility of closer European (or Franco-German) cooperation in security/defence questions. This could pose all manner of issues - from the implications of the development of a more competitive European defence industry (i.e. less procurement from the US; more pressure on the US to buy European), to the question of consultation between the US, NATO and any emerging

European defence organization, to the matter of the harmonization of American force deployment strategy with the emerging European philosophies.

Towards a Conclusion

10. The post-war trans-Atlantic settlement still survives substantially intact in the early 1980s; its dissolution has gone most far in the currency field, least far in the field of defence. At the same time the EC continues to be the central focus for European organization.

11. Nevertheless, both the trans-Atlantic framework and the EC structures are coming under increasing strain. In this writer's opinion the outcome is likely to be the progressive emergence of an increasingly ambitious European entity, and the more or less stressful reorganization of trans-Atlantic relations to accommodate this fact. On the other hand, it is possible that the European structure will perish more rapidly than the trans-Atlantic framework: which would sustain Atlanticism, but put strains upon European-American relations of a different (and more serious) kind.

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