JOINT SEMINAR FOR PREPARING THE FIRST MEETING
**OF THE MEDITERRANEAN STUDY COMMISSION (MeSCO)**
Mediterranean Study Commission
Istituto affari internazionali
Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies
Cairo, 6-7/XI/1993

a. Provisional programme
b. Participants
c. List of invited participants
d. Topics to be discussed
1. "The Mediterranean and Middle East security"/ El Sayed Yassin
2. "Notions and perceptions in the Mediterranean"/ Roberto Aliboni
3. "Arms control and security of the Mediterranean and the Middle East"/ Mourad Al Dessouki

CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Al Galaa St.
Cairo, Egypt.

International Affairs Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome .

Al Ahram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies, Cairo.

Joint Seminar in Cairo on November 6 - 7, 1993.
for Preparing the first meeting of the
Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo)

)VISIONAL   PROGRAM

: One:

,.30 - 10 :   Introdutory Remarks

Al Sayed Yassin -   Roberto Aliboni

0 - 12.30:   Session One:

Notion of Security in Inter-Mediterranean Relations

1- El Sayed Yassin:

The Mediterranean and Middle East Security.

?- Roberto Aliboni:

Notions and Perceptions in the Mediterranean

- 2.30 :   Session Two:

3- Dr. Alvaro Vasconcelos:

Geopolitical Nature of the Mediterranean

4- Brig. Gen. Mourad Al Dessouki:

Arms Control and Security of the Mediterranea and the
Middlc East.

30 - 5 :   lunch.

- 7 :   Session Three:

5- Dr. Abdallah Saaf:

Political Aspects in Inter-Mediterranean Relations.

6- Dr. Gawad Enani:

Economic Aspects in Inter-Mediterranean Relations.

CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Al Galaa St.
Cairo, Egypt.

Day Two:

9.30 - 12.30: Session Four:

  7- Open Discussion; Culture Aspects in Inter-Mediterranean
  Relations.

12.30 - 1 : Break.

  -------- .....

  8- Roberto Aliboni: The Future Composition of the Commission.

2.30 - 5 : Lunch.

5 - 6.30 : Session Six:

  9- El Sayed Yassin:
  Outcome of the Mediterranean Study Commission.

AL-AHRAM CENTER

EL SAYED YASSIN

ABDEL MONEIM SAID

USAMA GHAZALI HARB

MOURAD AL DESSOUKI

M. SAID

ARAB LEAGUE

ADNAN OMRAN

RAMZI BADRAN

HISHAM EL KOUNY

CENTER FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH AND STUDIES

ALI E. HILLAL DESSOUKI

MOHAMMED SELIM

NATIONAL CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

ABDEL HALIM

Couns. NABIL FAHMY

AMB. TAHSEEN BASHIR

AMB. SALAH BASSIOUNY

ROBERTO ALIBONI

MUSTAPHA HAMARNEH

ALVARO VASCONCELOS

International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome
Al Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Cairo

Joint seminar in **Cairo** on **November 6-7, 1993**
for preparing the first meeting of the
Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo)

List of invited participants:

- Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, International
Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome

- H.E. Dr. Jawad Anani, Minister of State, Prime Ministry,
Amman

-Gen. Ahmed Fahkr, National Center fo Middle East Studies,
Cairo

- Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh, Director, Center for Strategic
Studies, University of Jordan, Amman

- Prof. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, Director, Center for Political
Research and Studies, University of Cairo

- Dr. Selim Nasr, Program Officer, The Ford Foundation, Cairo

- Amb. Adnan Omran, Assistant Secretary-General for Political
Affairs, The Arab League, Cairo

- Dr. Eberhardt Rhein, European Community Commission,
Bruxelles

- Dr. Abdallah Saaf, CESR, Centre d'Etudes Stratégiques de
Rabat, Université Mohammed V, Rabat

-Prof. Mohammed Selim, Center for Political Research and
Studies, University of Cairo

- Dr. Alvaro Vasconcelos, Director, IEEI, Institute for
International and Strategic Studies in Lisbon

- Dr. El-Sayed Yassin, Director, Al Ahram Center for Strategic
and Political Studies, Cairo.

- Prof. Ahmed Youssef, Center for Political Research and
Studies, University of Cairo

Note: Other Egyptian collegues from the Al Ahram Center will
also participate.

International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome
Al Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Cairo

Joint seminar in **Cairo** on **November 6-7, 1993**
for preparing the first meeting of the
Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo)

Topics to be discussed:

1. Notion of security in inter-Mediterranean relations
    introduced by *Roberto Aliboni* and *El-Sayed Yassin*

2. Geopolitical nature of the Mediterranean
    invited speaker: *Abdallah Saaf*

3. Military, political, economic and cultural aspects of
    security in inter-Mediterranean relations
    invited speaker: *Alvaro de Vasconcelos*

4. The future composition of the Commission (should North
    European countries, Gulf countries, Iran participate as
    full members or not?) and other organisational features
    of the MeSCo
    introduced by *Roberto Aliboni*

5. outcome of the Mediterranean Study Commission's
    deliberations and works
    introduced by *El-Sayed Yassin*

In principle the seminar is expected to last the full day of
November 6 and the morning of 7. If necessary, it will
continue in the afternoon of November 7.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

by El Sayed Yassin

International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome
Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Cairo
Joint Seminar for preparing the first meeting of the
Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo)

Introduction:

In his highly important book "Lignes d'Horizon", the French economist Jacque Attali begins his study about the future of the world in the 21st Century by raising a number of basic questions as follows:

"Before us while we are approaching the 21st century which only a brief decade is seperating us from it, one may raise the question what political order will be articulated? what type of development? what relations of power between nations? what styles of life will prevail? what artistic tendences will emerge?

We are entering into a new radical period: History is accelerating, the blocs are dissolving. Democracy is gaining spaces, new actors and new problems are emerging.[1]

We think that this set of questions posed by Attali resume the current situation in the world, which is characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability. How can we face this situation? There is a tendency adopted by some thinkers which claim that old theories and paradigmes have fallen apart, after their failure not only to predict, but also to describe and explain what is going on in the world. But there are another group of thinkers while admitting the

inadequacy of the dominant theories call for adopting a more positive approach to knowledge, by formulating a new paradigme, which is more capable of describing the deep changes which are going on in the world, and more than that, predicting the new horizons of development which will determine the future of humanity in the coming Century. This new paradigme, to be able to function effectively, should be based upon the contributions of all the Social Sciences, and open enough to accomodate the new thinking which is emerging within the movement of Post-modernism, in its positive aspects. We are speaking here of a new strategic paradigme. We adopt the defenition of strategy which is presented by J.L. Gaddis "strategy is the process by which ends are realted to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources".[2]

In this paradigme, strategy will broaden its space, to include not only military, political and economic dimensions, but psycological and cultural aspects also.

There is a lot of talk nowadays about the changing mood in the world, cultural interactions, new styles of life, and new world views. All these variables should be incorporated in the new strategic paradigme.

* * * * * *

The Mediteranean and Middle East security which is
the topic of my presentation, should be discused in the
light of the overall changes which happened in the Interna-
tional System. Perhaps the symbolic act which launched the
change, happened on November 1989 when East and West Berlin-
ers began the task of tearing down the wall that had divided
their city, their country, a continent, and World politics.
You know all the events which followed, the most important
between them of course, is the fall of the Soviet Union.

As an introduction to our topic, let us first of all
describe the existing International environment, before
talking about the Security of the Mediteranean, and the
Middle East.

I

A New International Environment

What are the new agenda which will capture the minds of politicians, strategists and thinkers in the coming decade?

The American Writer Charles William Mayens, the editor of Foreign Policy, has highlightend six topics, which constitute this futuristic agenda. What follows is a resume and quotations at length of his important ideas.[3]

1) The Center versus the periphery: "Much has been written about the declining utility of military power, as opposed to the rising salience of economic power. But there is another aspect of the issue of power that deserves' greater attention. From roughly the middle part of the last century until today, the trajectory of technology has led toward a centralization of power. From this historical process national governments benefited. But now with the growing importance of the knowledge industry and the dissemination of information technology, power is decentralized, providing new opportunities for thousands of separate peoples and ethnic groups around the world to assert their rights against centralized authority. There have been many challenges to the authority of the nation-state in recent years. This

new challenge may be among the most important. That is not
to say that the nation-state will disappear, but one of
the critical issues for the future will be the international
and national tensions that will develop as minorities attempt
to redraw the lines of responsibility between local authori-
ties and central authorities.

The Power of Ideas: The events of the past couple of years
should cause everyone in the field of international affairs
to reassess the relative importance of words versus weapons.
It has always been assumed that the latter were all-powerful.
But the former have been shown to have a force that is
extraordinary in an era of rising literacy and more and more
powerful mass-communications. The field of public diplomacy
is likely to become increasingly important, not in the
manipulative sense that many who support big funding for
official radio networks around the world may think-it is
not possible to mold minds as easily as many believe-but
in the sense that the torrent of information that is reach-
ing people is changing the politics of the globe.

The Age of Multilateralism: Most of the major issues on
the international agenda involve the efforts or policies
of a number of states. Examples include arms developments
like nuclear, chemical, or conventional proliferation;
environmental or economic concerns; and medical or social

developments like AIDS or drug addiction. The task of the
coming years will be to find the most effective interna-
tional responses to these issues. Answers will almost
certainly involve a growing number of international organiza-
tions or regimes.

The Democratic Deficit: As issues escape the control of
national authorities to be addressed by international experts
or international organizations, a new problem in democratic
accountability develops. To whom are these experts or insti-
tutions responsible? What is the proper relationship between
those governing, in this case the experts, and those governed,
namely the people? The term democratic deficit first surfaced
in the European Community, where more than 15,000 Euro-crats
in Brussels and Luxembourg have been permitted to adopt
policies that affect the livelihoods of millions. Hence
proposals for enhancing the powers of the European Parlia-
ment. But the problem of the democratic deficit is one that
applies more broadly to other regimes and other international
institutions as power escapes the national framework.

A New Security Order: Humankind seems likely to make a
third attempt at collective security in this century.
Through the transition period the importance of traditional
alliances like NATO will be critical, and premature dis-
mantlement of NATO in particular would be very disruptive

to stability in Central Europe. But the Soviet Union has
ceased to be a hostile power and it seems highly unlikely
that it has either the disposition or the capability to
become one again soon. Its ability to launch a decisive
conventional attach on Central and Western Europe is gone.
It still possesses massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons,
but these are unsuitable for any purpose but deterrence or
retaliation. So the members of NATO will soon face the task
of maintaining support and money for an alliance with no
enemy that can either be identified or named. (A few experts
might privately say the enemy is a resurgent Germany; but
the publics in the West, correctly, regard the new, democra-
tic Germany as a friend). Reviving the image of the Soviet
Union as the enemy would be difficult enough were it not
for another factor: the need to reach out to the Soviet
Union so that it does not feel excluded from the new security
order being created. But there is a central problem: A
security system that includes most or all of the key parties
and is without any identifiable enemy except aggression and
instability in the abstract has been tried twice-the League
of Nations and the United Nations- and proven inadequate
both times. The dilemma appears to be that the current
arrangements will not hold, but the proposed arrangements
may not work. Resolving that dilemma will be a priority in
the years ahead; and even if the new arrangements work in

Europe, is it likely that similar arrangements can work in other parts of the globe? The world's response to Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait a major challenge to the concept of collective security-will help provide an answer.

A New Development Model: As the East-West divide recedes in importance, the North-South divide will increase in salience. In the case of the former, the threat to the West was invasion by armies; in the case of the latter, the threat is a flood of people, a loss of economic opportunity, and an abandonment of ideals and compassion. But the old development model no longer receives adequate donor support. A new developmental paradigm is needed to garner the financial support in the North and the political support in the South necessary to make real progress".

II

Rethinking about the Mediteranean

One of the best descriptions of the mediteranean is presented by the American Ellen Laipson. She stated that "most people think of the mediteranean as a body of water that divides the large land mass of Europe, Africa, and Asia, a sea bordered by countries of widely disparate identities and interests. Yet the sea unites as much it divides, and the nations around its rim are neighbours. It is time... to begin thinking about the mediteranean as a region in its own rights, as a geographic unit that links countries with common concerns, with reason to compete over resources, and with incentives to find cooperative solutions to an ever-expanding list of local problems".[4]

We consider this description of the mediteranean as a region with unique characteristics, a solid base for the new strategic paradigme that we talked about in the beginning. A similar paradigme has been applied in a genuine way by the French Historian Brudel in his classical book, "The Mediteranean in the age of Philipe the Second". In this deep study, the Mediteranean has been studied from the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects, in application of the methodology of the school called "Les Annales", which

transformed the science of history to be an multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary disciplin in the same time.

Even in his excellent book, Brudel has not forgotten to tackle the problem of ways of thinking, and he wrote a chapter about the history of mentalities in the Mediteranean.

In other words, the multiplicity of countries and cultures in the mediteranean, need to be put in consideration, when we formulate any concept of security. There are seventeen nations bordering the mediteranean, whose population total 365 million. Five are NATO members, seven are Arab States, and the remaining defy easy categorization: Albania, Cyprus, Israel, Malta, and Yugoslavia.

Regardless of the historical record which shows a lot of conflicts and rivalities between mediteranean countries, they realize now that "jealously guarded national boundaries provide little protection from many current policy challenges. The proximity of sates in the area both increases opportunities for conflict and insensitives for finding consensual solutions.

The mediteranean has become more politially salient, as asserts Laipson, because of demographic change - potential sources of instability- that are uneven around its rim. Some European countries have been increasingly aware of what has

been called the population bomb in the Muslim States of
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. These states like France,
Italy and Spain have stable or declining birthrates. That is
why they face serious challenges from this population dis-
equilibrium: it affect their economic, immigration, and
foreign policies, as well as their concepts of national
security.

Added to the population disequilibrium in the region,
is the problem of uneveness of power distribution.

At present and certainly for the future, the correla-
tion of economic power greatly favors the northern rim, and
the perception of a growing economic gap is a source of
considerable concern for mediterranean states that are not
members of the E.C.

On the military side of the power equation, national
wealth has been the key determinant of power, as measured
by the quantity and quality of arms and defense capabilities.
This has led to some clear disparties, generally along north-
south lines.

Concerning the changes in political culture regarding
defense issues on the northern side of the mediterranean,
we can trace a strong tendency for arms control measures of
all kinds. On the contrary, because of the continuation of

the Arab-Israeli conflict, arms prolification remains the dominent tendency in the Middle East.

One should mentain also terrorism as another source of power, which creats asymmetry in the region. Without the cooperation between European countries and Arab countries in facing this problem, and in other domains, political instability may be the necessary outcome.

The agenda of issues which need cooperation between countries in the region is expanding: environment, missile prolification, free movement of labour, and drug trafficking. It is very positive that the mediterranean as a region has been building new institutions and mechanisms to cope with these challenges. What is lacking, from our point of view, is formulating a comprehensive paradigm which may permit the enumeration, classification, and analysis of the political, economic, social and cultural variables, which are affecting the interaction process in the area, and leads to creative solution of the problems.

This paradigme is presented by Crown Prince Hassan ben Talal of Jordan, in an article written by him in a recent edited book published in Cairo by Al-Ahram Foundation, in which a number of European and Arabic thinkers have discussed the consequences of the Gulf War.[5]

Before presenting this important paradigme, let me first speak about the Middle East and the world after the Gulf War.

III

The Middle East and the World

The Iraqi invasion to Kuwait was not only an acte of aggression, in violation of International legality, but it was also an acte interrupting the process of changing Arab World View which was going on steadilly before the invasion. In this process a trend was emerging to shift Arabic Politics from authoritarinism to political plurialism and democracy, and from rigid planned economic policies to more libral politices, and lastly from adopting an utopian view of Arab Unity to a more functional approach, stressing mainly economic cooperation. This last development, has been represented by the establishment of three Arab Councils: The Gulf Cooperation Council. The Arab Cooperation Council which grouped Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, and the Maghribi Union.

The Iraqi invasion led actually to a break in the Arab Regional System. Not only different Arab regimes opposed each other concerning the invasion and the Gulf War, but severe cleavages between Arab Intellectuals and masses was observed.

Thus the Middle East appeared to many observers as swimming against the current, moving in a direction opposed to those of the World Order.

Actually the gulf crisis underlined regional structural disparties (rich and poor Arab States) and latent explosive issues (the palestine question and Arab-Israeli conflict). It brought to light the problems of weapons of mass destruction in the region and its heightened levels of arms acquisation. Needless to mention, the crisis demonstrated the continued vitality of oil as a major western interest.

Evaluation of the Arab regional system after the Gulf Crisis, is divided between two opposing views: the first one is negative, asserting the end of Pan-Arabism, and the coming decay of the Arab World. The second one is critical and positive in the same time. In the sense that criticism and Self Criticism are highly important to be practiced to diagnose and analyze the mistaken Arab practices, and the need to shape a New Arab Order.

They have defended their cause in the important conference organized by the Arab Thought Forum, which has been held in Cairo between 7-9 September 1991, to explore new horizons of Arab Regional Cooperation.

This process is deeply related to the establishment of the New World Order. No region in the world, can afford the luxury of development in isolation of the World System.

The question is: on what basis, can the interaction between different regions in the world and the world system can be established?

The proper answer to this challenging question, should be multidimensional, because of the complexity and plurality of the issues involved.

One comprehensive answer concerning security is presented by the report of the Palm commission on disarmament and security issues, which is entitled: "A World at Peace: Common Security in the Twenty-first century".[6] The report states that: "....security is a broader and more complex concept than protection from arms and war. The roots of conflicts and insecurity include poverty, economic disparities within nations and between them, oppression, and the denial of fundamental freedoms. Unless problems of social and economic underdevelopment are addressed, common security can never be truly attained. New threats to security also are emerging from environmental problems and the degradation of certain ecosystems. Against these threats to humanity's survival, the adversaries in the East-West conflict to longer stand on opposite sides: they often confront the same dangers - dangers they share as well in North/South relations. In this respect, common security could evolve

from a concept intended to protect against war to a compre-
hensive approach to world peace, social justice, economic
development, and environmental protection".

But even if this comprehensive concept of security which
covers development and peace is adopted by the emerging New
World Order, there is a need to rethink in a creative way the
concept of progress and its measures. It is indicative, in
the process of changing world views, that the concept of
progress as inhereted from the philosophy of modernity is
being rethought, under the impact of Postmodernism which
characterize Western thought, and is the cultural pillar
of the New World Order, as an example of this debate, we
may refere to the acts of an important symposium held in
Krakow, poland, which took place between 28 and July 1, 1988.
It's acts is edited by J.C. Alexander and P. Sztompka; and
published in a book entitled "rethinking progress". Not only
the concept of progress is rethought but also the measures
of progress.[7] Lester Brown has raised the point in his
important article "The New World Order". In which he criti-
cized the shortcomings of the dominant measures of progress.
Because of the importance of his contribution let me quote
him at length.[8] Brown States that: "Fortunately, there is
a growing recognition of the need for new ways of measuring
progress. Ever since national accounting systems were

adopted a half-century ago, per capita income has been the most widely used measure of economic progress. In the early stages of economic development, expanded output translated rather directly into rising living standards. Thus it became customary and not illogical to equate progress with economic growth.

Over time, however, average income has become less satisfactory as a measure of well-being: it does not reflect either environmental degradation or how additional wealth is distributed. Mounting dissatisfaction has led to the development of alternative yardsticks. Two interesting recent efforts are the Human Development Index (HDI) devised by the United Nations and the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) developed by Herman Daly and theologian John Cobb. A third indicator, grain consumption per person, is a particularly sensitive measure of changes in well-being in low-income countries.

The Human Development Index, measured on a scale of 0 to 1, is an aggregate of three indicators: longevity, knowledge, and the command over resources needed for a decent life. For longevity, the U.N. team used life expectancy at birth. For knowledge, they used literacy rates, since reading is the key to acquiring information and understanding. And for the command over resources, they

used gross domestic product (GDP) per person after adjust-
ing it for purchasing power. Because these indicators are
national averages, they do not deal directly with distribu-
tion inquality, but by including longevity and literacy
they do reflect indirectly the distribution of resources.
A high average life expectancy, for example, indicates
broad access to health care and to adequate supplies of
food".

This wide-range process of revising the major concepts
of peace, development, and security, indicates that we are
entering into a new era. It is the responsibility of Third
World Countries in general, and Middle East countries in
particular to read criticaly these intellectual, social,
political, and economic developments which is taking shape
in developed industrial socities, to join the wave of these
new perceptions, theories and attitudes. They need to
develop a new world view, which may enable their peoples
to face the challenges facing them.

IV

Middle East Development
An Agenda for the Future

Middle East development needs an agenda for the future. This agenda should be based upon a comprehensive conceptual framework, which should take into consideration geo-strategic parameters and security dimensions, defined in a broad way, to include the military, the political and the economic aspects. Before presenting a matrix which shows the different organic links between these multiple variables, we need to face the problems of the present in the Middle East after the trauma of the Gulf war.

First remark, is that the "justice" achieved by librating Kuwait, left behind too much traums. The worst trauma is, needless to say, the vast extent of lives lost and physical damage. The course of action adopted by the Security Council, dominated by the United States of America, which stressed that sanctions against Iraq should continue, has taken unfortunately the shape of "revenge", directed in the last analysis against the Iraqi people who are suffering tremendously, because of the lack of food and medicine. Therefore, we intellectuals, and non-governmental organizations, should appeal to the international community not to

force the Iraqi people to continue to suffer excessively.
The continuation of the sanctions will only make the people
bitter and hostile.[9]

There is an urgent need then to overcome "revenge",
and reduce the gap between rich and poor in the Arab World.
On the other hand the trend towards democratization should
be encouraged by different means. Also controlling the arms
trade, and the reduction of strategic weapons should be
applied not only in Iraq, but also in Israel which is the
major source of threat to the Arab national security. A
great effort should be made to achieve Arab mutual concilia-
tion. Needless to say, for the New World Order, to keep its
credibility, double standards should be removed. The actions
which have been directed against the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait,
should be applied also against Israel, if she refused to
apply the Security Council decisions concerning the occupied
palastinian and Arab territories.[10]

But all these moves, and actions should be guided, as
we have mentioned above by a comprehensive conceptual
framework.

These framework has been elaborated by an important
Jordanian paper entitled "The Gulf Crisis, Jordanian
Perspectives". A matrix has been drawn to show the types

of interactions between Geo-Strategic parameters specified
in the following variables:

Demography, oil, water, debt, radicalism (nationalistic
and relegious), Terrorism and Weapons of Mass distruction,
and Security dimensions, military, political and economic.

This matrix reflects in fact a lot of the thoughts of
Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan The President of the Arab
Thought Forum, to the extent that it could be considered a
point of departure for a fruitful dialogue between the Arab
regional system and the New World Order.

The goals are well defined, the achievement of peace,
development, and prosperity for all countries in the Middle
East. What follows is a complete version of this agenda for
the future.

Toward a New Regional Security Structure:

Recent events have suddenly placed the Middle East region in the melting pot. This occurred rapidly in the wake of epochal events as the global level in 1989. Decision-makers have hardly had time to take stock of the new set of gravitational forces that have emerged with the end of the cold war. Some analysis have pointed-out to the paradoxical disappearance of the "restraining impact" of east-west confrontation on regional powers.

The urgent need for a new and more boradly defined security concept can hardly be over-emphasised. All the economic, political and military dimensions have to be considered in such a security framework at both the global and regional levels. The gravitational forces at work in the current crisis have been moving the region towards a consistly "shielding approach" to safeguard the vital resource of oil for the world community, will inevitably have a divisive effect. An "integrative" regional approach has more chances of success. Without sacrificing principle, a less costly approach, both in human and financial terms, should be sought to deal with the current crisis.

Interests have to be creatively reassessed to help evolve an appropriate process of security and cooperation

in the region. The Middle East does not necessarily have to be plunged into an horrific was before such a process can realistically emerge. Catalystic support from world leaders is needed before it is too late. The rule of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter are basic guiding principles in Jordan's endeavours. It is not that Jordan is unaware of the threats and implications of the current crisis to itself and its region. Rather, it is because of an acute awareness of such implications that Jordan is looking ahead and considering the fallout of the alternative methods for restoring the rule of international law. The groundwork has to be prepared now to avoid decades of turmoil and suffering for future generations.

A naive linkage or conflation of the different conflicts in the region is counterproductive. It only serves to divert attention from the more serious task of considering the existing interaction between regional geo-strategic parameters and security. Some decision makers may consider that currently there is no alternative to the anachronistic military security approach. Different regional conflicts in the Middle East happen to be geographically contiguous, and have to be, according to this antique rational, tackled separately without linkage.

An over-simplistic approach based on the mere geographic
unity of the region is of little practical use. What is
required is to address systematically these other "elements
of unity" within the area. People, resources and ideology
have become intertwined in a web of complex interaction
throughout the Middle East. Palestinians in the intifada
have next-of-kin in both the Lebanon and the Gulf. Almost
as many Palestinians reside in the GCC countries as in Israel
itself or in Gaza. Demographic trends and water needs are
moving along an explosive scenario throughout the region.
Financial flows and regional economic realities provide a
no-less paradoxical pattern. A viable pluralistic approach
is considered by many analysis as the only alternative to
the politics of radicalism (whether nationalistic or reli-
gious) and repression.

The task of evolving a viable regional "process" in the
Middle East deserves to be supported. Rather than aiming at
"naive linkage", the objective is to deconstruct the major
geo-strategic factors and analyse their inter-action with
each other on the one-hand, and their interrelationship with
the different dimensions of security on the other. Such a
matrix of Security/Geo-strategic forces can be useful in
considering a viable new security structure for the region.
This structure should simultaneously satisfy the interests

of the world community and address the priorities and
aspirations of the different states and people in the
region.

It is a fact that the current crisis has widened the
gaps between governments and people as well as between
government and governments. Nationalistic passions of a
bygone age have been resuscitated. They reemerged swiftly
during the crisis to overlap with radicalized religious
inspirations inherited from the eighties.

Within a new and viable security structure in the
Middle East, people and their aspirations have to figure
no less prominently than oil. As we move into the 21st
century, an oversimplified anachronistic security arrange-
ment based solely on military dimensions is very costly
and has few chances of success. The following matrix
illustrates a possible multi-dimensional approach needed
for deconstructing the current complex situation.

The geo-strategic parameters refer to these factors
relating to people (demography); resources (e.g. oil,
water, debt); and ideology/activism (e.g. radicalism,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction). They are marely
indicative and others can be added. The propose of the
matix is to indicate the interaction between geo-strategic

factors and a broadly defined security concept. The stated examples serve to illustrate the inter-action between such factors as demography, debt, radicalism and weapons of mass destruction on the one hand, and the different dimensions of security on the other. A group of qualified experts is needed to work on these concepts to submit a report that can pave the way for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSME).

REFERENCES

1) Attali, J., <u>Lignes d'horizon</u>, Paris: Fayard, 1990.

2) Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982.

3) Maynes, C.W., The New Decade, <u>Foreign Policy</u>, No. 80,
Fall 1990, 3-13.

4) Laipson, E., Thinking about the Mediterranean, <u>Medite-</u>
<u>rranean Quarterly</u>, V.1, No.1, Winter 1990, 50-66.

5) Ben Talal, H., After the Gulf War: Towards Conference
of Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, in:
<u>What after the Gulf Storm: An International Vision</u>
<u>for the Future of the Middle East</u>, Cairo: Al-Ahram,
1992. (In Arabic), 125-136.

6) A World at Peace, Common Security in the Twenty-first
Century, Stockholm. The Palm Comission, April, 1991.

7) Alexander, J.C. & Sztom pka, P., Rethinking Progress,
Boston, Unwin Hymen, 1990.

8) Brown, L., The State of the World, New York: W.W.
Northon and Company, 1991.

9)   Kimura, S., How to Heal the Truma and the Role of
     Japan, Paper Presented to the Second Arab-Japanese
     Dialogue, Tokyo, 7-9, 1991.

10) Dessouki, A.H., The Middle East and Changing World
     Order in the Post Gulf War Era, Ibid.

NOTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
preliminary notes for a discourse on security in the area

by **Roberto Aliboni**

International Affairs Institute (IAI), Rome
Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Cairo
Joint Seminar for preparing the first meeting of the
Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo)

The notion of Mediterranean

The geopolitical notion of Mediterranean is less widely accepted on the southern shore of the Mediterranean basin than is probably thought by many continental, particularly southern Europeans.

Unlike some European visions (particularly in Southern Europe), in which the Mediterranean is often understood as an area of distinctive solidarity, Arabs do not perceive it as such; rather, they consider the Mediterranean as a medium for their relations with Europe, particularly Western Europe and the European Community. In other words, talking about Mediterranean relations is a way to talk about Euro-Arab relations.

This having been said, there are important differences among Arab countries and areas. In the Arab Maghreb, the notion of a Mediterranean link to Europe is widely accepted and popular. The same is true for the notion of a special solidarity and proximity to Southern European countries. No one, however, thinks of a Western Mediterranean solidarity (the "Five + Five" Group) as exclusive or preferential with respect to a wider solidarity with the European Community as a whole. In Maghrebi eyes, the first multilateral partner is the EC; for cultural, historical and geographic reasons, however, the South European countries bordering

the Western basin of the Mediterranean sea may have a special bilateral relationship, or one as a "mentor" in comparison to relations with the EC as a whole.

For many people in the Maghreb, the importance of the EC to the Maghreb countries should be reflected in a priority of the Maghreb to the EC. Consequently, the notion of Mediterranean tends to coincide with a privileged EC-Maghreb relationship.

The support for such a privileged relationship within the Mediterranean also suggests that Europe and the EC should de-emphasize their relations with the Eastern Arab Mediterranean countries (i.e. in general terms, the Near East), so as to concentrate on the Arab Maghreb.

It must be stressed that this vision reflects both the actual geoeconomic proximity of the Maghreb to the EC and the high degree of Westernization of the Maghrebi *élites* in power (higher than in the Near East and the in Arab Mashreq). There is no doubt that an Islamic Algeria would be more attracted by Islamic and Arab solidarities (though it would respect the constraints of geoeconomic proximity).

The vision of a privileged Euro-Maghreb relationship is also the outcome of current international and regional trends. Real and perceived differences between Western and Eastern Mediterranean have always existed, but the consequences of the 1990-91 Gulf war-- with the US taking up the responsibility for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict--are now accentuating such differences. Differences are also exacerbated by the clear differentiation of the US and EC roles in the area: while the US role in the Arab-

Israeli negotiations provides Washington with an overwhelming weight in the Near East and the Gulf, the EC role within the multilateral talks on regional economic cooperation, on the sidelines of the negotiations, is confined to an eventual logistic role and is fading politically. On the other hand, the revived EC interest in the Maghreb (the Declaration on the Maghreb at the June 1992 European Council in Lisbon and the WEU decision in Petersberg to start a dialogue with the Maghreb countries) suggests that a US-EC division of labour is emerging in the Mediterranean such that the division between West and East in the area is acquiring a rationale that is even stronger than in the past.

These trends are also reflected in the Mediterranean notion which currently prevails in the Eastern Mediterranean Arab countries, i.e. Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the occupied Palestine and Lebanon. In these countries, "Mediterranean" is primarily understood as shorthand for relations with the EC. At present, these relations are regarded as very secondary with respect to their central relations with the US, which makes the Mediterranean a very distant political priority. Difficulties in the prospects for European integration, disenchantment with respect to expectations of a more pro-Arab attitude in Europe than in the US, and disappointments about the EC role in Bosnia coalesce to make Euro-Arab relations across the Mediterranean less and less interesting in the Near East.

These feelings are more balanced in Egypt, where the idea that relations with the EC are important is widespresad, particularly in the civil service and in the government. Not only are the Egyptians

considering strengthening of Euro-Arab relations beside and beyond the Arab-Israeli negotiations, they are also thinking that the strengthening of some form of Mediterranean solidarity will continue to prove to be a helpful and essential step toward a closer relation with the the EC as a whole. For this reason, at the beginning of 1993, Egypt's diplomacy revisited its proposal of a "Mediterranean Forum" at the very moment that the Italo-Spanish CSCM proposal appeared completely by-passed by the Arab-Israeli negotiations and the US emerged as the sole player in the region.

It is worth mentioning that, in addition to indifference and disappointments, a more precise argument is now being developed in the Near East to counter the notion of the Mediterranean. The concept of Mediterranean economic cooperation now being aired at the multilateral Arab-Isreali talks is regarded--since it includes Israel--as an attempt by Isreal and the West to replace the notion of Arab solidarity before the political negotiations are concluded. The attempt at establishing a Mediterranean framework for the future of the economic cooperation, so the argument goes, is also a way of putting pressure on the Arabs during the negotiations; consequently, many rebuff the Mediterranean notion or, at least, feel suspicious about it.

To conclude, a word on Libya. In Libya the notion of the Mediterranean also tends to emphasise the need for closer relations with the EC. Today, however, this is a tactical policy in addition to other policies which attempt to find a way out of Libya's international isolation. It is also the outcome of the old Third Worldist, anti-imperialist Mediterranean vision in which the offer

to the European countries of Mediterranean solidarity was an attempt at creating splits and divisions in the Atlantic solidarity. In sum, with respect to the Mediterranean debate, Libya appears to be late and excluded--as is often the case.

Security perceptions related to the Mediterranean

Broadly speaking, security perceptions emerging in the Arab Mediterranean countries with respect to the Mediterranean area and Western Europe can be divided according to three main broad attitudes:

(a) Western Europe might be an essential contribution to stability, democratization and security in the Arab world;

(b) for various reasons, it is to be considered as a threat;

(c) it is almost insignificant.

Assumptions underlying the first attitude are very similar to those of Western analysts: with the end of the East-West confrontation, there is no longer a mutual military threat across the Mediterranean; threats come from social, economic and cultural disparities--both North-South and South-South, and from the possibilities of South-South conflicts.

Consequently, security policies must be based on cooperation, development and dialogue. Shared institutions, like a CSCM, would be very helpful. It is important to note that those who support this school of thought are also those who emphasise the existence of social, political and economic frustrations at the root of Islamist movements rather than identity issues and cultural oppositions. This attitude is therefore that of many moderate,

Westernized people.

The emphasis on socio-economic and political factors brings about the belief that Western Europe can give an essential contribution to modernization, development and democratization of the Arab Mediterranean countries and hence strengthen security both North-South and South-South.

Many Westernized, nationalist intellectuals, professionals and officials, however, believe that Western Europe, alone or as part of the Western/industrialized world, is emerging as a threat to the Arab/Muslim ensemble. Their conclusion is that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US and, to a lesser extent, the Western countries are acquiring an absolute domination, politically, economically and culturally. They share this attitude to greater or lesser degrees with the Islamists, though their respective conclusions about cooperation and relations with the Western/industrialized world may be quite different. The search for and the assertion of identity is what unites and drives these different groups, though very often only as fellow-travellers. This school of thought is currently the most important one.

The Western world, which now includes the "White", "Christian/Orthodox" countries of the former Soviet Union, and consequently encompasses the heart of the industrialized world, tends to impose its culture on the Third World, beginning with its conception of human rights, and hence its political and economic dominance. The implementation of a new international order through the strengthening of the United Nations is only a tool in the hands of the Western world, which in cooperation with Russia dominates

the Security Council and enforces its goals without any opposition whatsoever.

This vision reflects analyses of the Islamists very well, though it is shared by nationalists and the general public. It puts constant pressure on regimes and governments, particularly on those which are firmly allied to the Western world. In 1993 this pressure has brought about considerable clivages and attritions, broadly based on the "double standard" argument, from Bosnia to Somalia, from the 400 Palestinian deportees, to the resumption of bombing on Iraq and the violence against migrants and refugees in a number of West European countries. All these developments are interpreted as evidence of anti-Muslim, anti-Arab policies directed at striking by design at the only culture and the only people who could eventually defy the will of power and the dominance of the Western world.

It must be noted that this vision is affected by the Western and European debate about reforming Western security institutions. Many in the Mediterranean evaluate the debate about including the "out-of-area" in the jurisdiction of NATO and about expanding an EC common foreign and security policy as preparatory steps towards attacking countries which would not fall in line with the "new international order". For example, this was an important factor determining the Algerian military intervention following the Islamists' victory in the December 1991 election. As superficial as it may be, this judgement is very diffuse. The assignment of NATO's AMF to Southern missions and the creation of the Stanavformed have been seen as evidences of such a Western design. It must be said that the nature of the Western and European debate encourages

misinterpretations in the countries south of the Mediterranean, because such a debate focusses on institutions (and the trans-Atlantic, inter-European patterns of power relations) rather than on threats.

It should be mentioned that, ironically, Europe happens to be considered a threat even by moderate, Westernized people because Europeans fail to cooperate with and look after the Arab countries. This vision is very common in the Maghreb, but is also well-represented in Egypt. They complain of the NATO and EC trend to associate the former European communist countries while failing to consider similar approaches towards the South of the Mediterranean. Similarly, it is being said that the inability of the Western world to work out balanced policies to implement a just, new world order is a threat to the security of governments and people willing to have a dialogue with the West.

Finally, it must be pointed out that some people believe that Europe is actually unimportant with respect to Arab security. Security in the Arab world and the Gulf is more than ever in the hands of the US, as either the crucial ally or the capital enemy, as the case may be. In the Arab-Israeli negotiations, it is the only real broker. Moreover, the debate on NATO's role in the "out-of-area" will be determined by the Americans. Lastly, challenged to intervene militarily in the Yugoslav crisis, the Europeans failed to show any political cohesion or resolve. In conclusion, some think that the Europeans are neither a help nor a threat.

A few conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above: (a) Very few people believe that there is room for a distinctive

Mediterranean solidarity; however, many North African countries think that a loose Mediterranean solidarity can help to set up a wider and viable Euro-Arab relationship.

(b) In the eyes of the Arab countries, the Mediterranean area appears divided into a Western area, which seeks a privileged EC-Maghreb relation, and an Eastern area which looks mostly toward the US and considers Western Europe as a very secondary security partner.

(c) While some consider Western Europe as an unimportant factor of security, the majority of peoples south of the Mediterranean strongly associate Western Europe to the threat posed in the post-Cold War world by the uncontrolled dominance of the US and the West.

(d) Some intellectuals and officials support a security vision very similar to the broad security notion which underlies the EC common security and foreign policy doctrine (and even the notion adopted by NATO's Rome Declaration); They look with interest at the possibility for the EC to resume a form of dialogue with the Arabs and to perform a positive role in relation to the Mediterranean security (both North-South and South-South).

(e) As a consequence of these differences, any comprehensive approach of the EC governments and institutions to an intellectual or policy dialogue with the countries south of the Mediterranean will require flexibility and imagination in order to emphasise and work out convergences: one point I found largely shared by people bearing different opinions was that the very success of the Arab-Israeli negotiations may give way to a renewed EC role; at this

prospect, even many among those who now have a *Realpolitik* vision
would agree to work together with the Europeans.

Arms Control and Security of the
Mediteranean and the Middle East

Brig. Gen. Mourad Aldessouky
Head of Military Affairs Unit

Arms Control and Security of the
Mediteranean and the Middle East

Prig. Gen. Mourad Aldessouky
Head of Military Affairs Unit

The issues of armament are currently gaining a signi-
ficant importance as being both a kind of a final attempt
to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, and also a reflection
of the vast changes in the structure of the international
system. A "new world order" has emerged, governed by values
and orientations, the most important of which is arms control
in all arms systems and in every region of the world. There-
fore, the issues of armament are tackled within a wide-range
international operation through which armament is virtually
controlled, and in the light of a regional settlement of a
dispute long based on arms race.

In this context, two points are to be noticed:

1- All countries - Egypt in particular - should review
their previous propositions which were previously given in
a different historic or political context, or with no longer
appropriate aims.

2- The significant role of Egypt now, whether in
rearranging priorities according to the new international
changes or in the settlement process, will involve the pro-
position of regional issues, based on its previous experience
in settling its own disputes with Israel.

Some points on armament issues in the region will be
discussed within the following framework:

a) The curriculum of the study itself.

b) The general current determinants of the armament issues.

c) The levels of posing armament issues.

d) General ideas to pose these issues.

First: The General Ideas of the Study:

1- The concept of negotiation is not confined to the
mere negotiation process, but it also involves a long series
of moves and contacts, whether announced or confidential, in
order to create a favourable climate to pose certain ideas.

2- Discussing armament issues through raising ideas to
be discussed in turn within the available negotiation frame-
works - whether bilateral or regional, considering the changes
imposed by the declaration of principle between Israel and
the P.L.O.

3- The paper is not a comprehensive framework for nego-
tiation but is only presenting general important ideas for
long and precise discussion on every element proposed with
its technical, military and strategic dimensions, either in
the·M.E. or in the Mediteranean Region.

4- The ideas proposed are "preliminary" and appropriate
for a start and can be modified or completely changed along
the negotiation process.

5- A mechanism to link ideas and capabilities has to be
available so as to propose the ideas on "specific fact" pers-
pective of the capabilities of Egypt, Arab countries and

Israel and to employ the international element as much as possible in this context.

6- The stances and capabilities of all other parties will be measured analytically and not explanatorily.

Second: The General Outlines of the Negotiation Process on Armament in the Region:

There are three main determinants affecting and pressing the propositions presented on armament in the region:

1- The First Determinant:

The United States is trying to gain control over the military interactions of the New World Order by such means as:

a) Preparing for the use of Hifa port to be as a permanent naval base for the 6th Fleet in the Mid. will change most of security and arms control perceptions either in the Mediteranean itself or in the M.E.

b) Giving initiatives to deal with the armament issues of the world and exercising pressure to turn these initiatives into international agreements. Moreover, the United States is now arranging for a redraft of "previous agreements" on world armament.

c) Launching intensive negotiations with countries such as China and North Korea that are capable of breaching the

arrangements the United States wishes to establish concerning
setting new bases for dealing with these issues.

d) Gradual intervention in some countries in the posse-
ssion of arms that are likely to breach the international
arrangements.

Thus, the United States has practically moved to find a
new formula for world arms interactions so that when events
like the Paris Statement, the China Talks, the Gulf War, Libya
threatened or North Korea pressed, the capability of any Middle
Eastern country for manoeuvering, changing or adjusting the
current balance, will be contracted. In this way it can be said
that armament in the Middle East is virtually controlled as to
its international dimension.

Within this context, the following points are noticed:

a) The negotiation base is the one available now for the
disputing parties, without any probable radical changes,
particularly qualitative changes, and those relying on external
technology. Israel may escape the situation due to its links
with the United States itself and due to its ability for self-
development on all armament levels.

b) American initiatives and the different stances of the
American administration are of paramount importance in deter-
mining the course of the negotiation process on armament issues.
These can not be ignored as they constitute a fundamental
problem that has to be manipulated by continuous discussion.

c) It is inevitable to apply all available international papers as the international element is basic. In this context, the stance of USSR, China, France and Germany - though not very important - must be taken into consideration. The Soviet paper is of particular interest as the effect of the Israeli mass destruction weapons may reach Soviet Lands.

2- The Territorial Determinant:

It is a pressing though a priori determinant: There is a current settlement in the Middle East. The political sett- lement has always been the prerequisite to dealing with armament in the region, but the problem is whether "priority" is a prerequisite. Can we say that dealing with armament involves dealing with political disputes!? Or is there parallelism away from military issues that has to be inevi- table in bilateral negotiations!? Thus, certain points must be tackled:

a) Settlement must eventually lead to raising armament issues.

b) Armament is an issue on the agenda of all parties, each of which has its own perspectives as to its security considerations.

c) Armament issues are not limited to the disputed area as there may be non-Arab parties involved such as Iran and Pakistan.

d) The declaration of principals creat a better climate for arms control efforts, but this still unclear because of the uneven Israeli situation.

3- <u>The Internal Determinant</u>:

The Gaza-Gerecho Declaration signed between the PLO
and Israel in 13th of Sep. 1993 should be considered as
a catalyst to change the old Israeli paradigm regarding
the Arms Control Issues in the Middle East. Since security
is the keystone in the Israeli thinking even in the context
of Arms Control Issues, it is difficult to expect a sudden
or deep change in the Israeli attentions towards Arms Control.

The Israeli arms control perceptions are quit similar
to this of the Western countries, while Israel insisting to
keep solving problems with peacefull manners; respecting the
independance of the other countries, ironically this prin-
cibale is not applicable either in southern Lebanon, the
Golani Hightes or in the occupied Arab territories itself.

The Israeli Government invite the other countries to
reduce their budgetary defense spending; in the meantime
Israel is continuing the modernization of the Israeli armed
force especially the airforce and the anti-pallestic missile
system.

Inspite of the Israeli invitation to Arms exporting
countries to reduce their exports, Israel itself is trying
to enlarge the Israeli defense industry in some specific
fields -such as electronics- moreover the opening of new
markets for the products of the Israeli defense industry is
a must in the Israeli strategic thinking especially in the
Asian-Pacific Rim and Latin American countries.

I believe that Israel will exploit the new atmosphere created by the Gercho-Gaza declaration in developing its arms relations even in the Arab countries this will be undercover at the beginning and then without later on. The Mediteranean community has great responsibility towards the Israeli intentions towards Arms control issues. It is important to reach to a solution to the Israeli nuclear arsenal and the Israeli defense industry bas, or the situation will be quit dangerous for all the Mideteranean countries.

Third: Levels of Dealing with Armament Issues:

The current armament issues can be dealt with analytically within the new world order and the Middle East settlement given that these issues are relatively distinct as follows:

1- The issue of nuclear armament in the region.

2- The issues of mass destruction non-nuclear weapons (chemical and biological weapons).

3- The issues of strategic weapons (medium-range land to land missiles).

4- The issues of traditional armament.

But, is the distinction coping politically with the real situation, or, in other words, do all parties pose the armament issues within this context?

As answer to this question may be given as follows:

1- Militarily, there is separation and combination in
these levels at the same time. Separation or combination
will be left to the discretion of every party during nego-
tiation. There is a general distinction among the four
levels, particularly between the first three on the one hand,
and the fourth on the other; a distinction between nuclear
weapons and non-nuclear mass destruction on the one hand and
missiles with traditional heads on the other. But, the first
three levels may be combined if chemical weapons are to be
considered as deterrent as nuclear weapons are, and if missi-
les are taken as launchers of nuclear and chemical weapons.
Traditional weapons may be also used as launchers of tactical
nuclear weapons. The issue is complex and demands many complex
scenarios and negotiation drafts.

2- In the light of bilateral and regional negotiation
frameworks, the former may be said to include discussing
some traditional armament levels between two countries, such
as Israel and any Arab country, on the disputed areas or in
general. Other issues may be discussed in the regional frame-
work.

3- The initiatives and ideas of the parties currently
involved in the settlement do not approve this distinction
-though setting a certain other distinction. For example,
the Egyptian initiative (Mubarak's initiative) of April 1990
dealt with the mass destruction weapons in the region, while
Bush's initiative in 29 May 1991 was concerned with the
principles of dealing with both mass destruction weapons and
missiles. The Paris Statement of the five countries in 9 July
1991 dealt with the four levels.

However, these propositions are more general frameworks
of the policies of every party than specific negotiation
frameworks of the four levels. There are more specific frame-
works dealing with each level separately, in addition to the
various international frameworks which can be posed as specific
principles to be negotiated at a specific time. For example,
the Egyptian initiative concerning the nuclear disarmament of
the Middle East, the UN Assembly Resolution (1974-1990) in
this respect -which Israel preservedly approved in 1981- as
well as the Missile Technology Control involving 18 states,
the Biological Weapons Charter of 1972, the Charter of chemical
weapons ban to be concluded in 1992, and finally the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty of 1968.

Thus, the problem is not political or military frameworks
but it is setting specific negotiation drafts for the Middle
East that can be discussed whether on the four levels or on
two or more of them. In fact, the current Middle East exper-
ience seems to demand negotiation drafts that radically differ
from any comprehensive drafts, given the complex armament
situation in the region added to the obvious negatives of
previous frameworks.

Fourth: <u>Armament Issues in the Middle East</u>:

Each of the four levels may be tackled separately -though
the separate formulae of negotiation drafts may not be perfect.
The dimensions may include the real situation of armament in
the region, the general stance of the different parties, and
some suggestions on the current level.

1- <u>Nuclear Weapons:</u>

a) <u>The real situation of nuclear weapons in the region:</u>

Israel monopolizes nuclear weapons in the region; it
is the sole owner. At the same time, it developed its nuclear
arsenal to become a nuclear international might. According
to the latest Simor Hersh estimates, Israel now holds around
300 nuclear units including nuclear Hiroshima carate bombs
(20 k. tons), hydrogen and nitron bombs, and most important
are some kinds of artillery shells and nuclear mines of
tactical nuclear weapons. The ratio of tactical to strategic
weapons in the arsenal is 2:1. It does not officially announce
its holdings of these weapons.

On the Arab side, Iraq, before total destruction of its
arsenal, was about to become a holder of these weapons. It
is not possible to talk of nuclear weapons in Arab countries
for years to come, though Egypt specifically possesses the
basic ability to produce them; but still this will be subject
to a political decision particularly when the uranium fructi-
fication 235 method is likely to succeed.

Iran and Algeria are also capable of producing different
nuclear weapons though the China stance may affect the deve-
lopment of such capabilities, and the new international
climate will make the matter of production, whether in these
two or other countries, a difficult job.

b) The stand of every party towards nuclear armament:

Egypt: Still the UN General Assembly resolution of nuclear disarmament in the region (1974) applies. Egypt added some amendments to the resolution by including all mass destruction weapons after Mubarak's initiative in 1990. Egypt's aim was to create a nuclear disarmed region before 1990 and for Israel to join the 1968 treaty and accept the supervision of the International Atomic Energy, but the aim is not based on reality. It was probably a mere political proposition to press Israel internationally, but not to be considered a base for negotiation. Nuclear weapons already proliferated in the region even before the initiative, there is no previous experience in disarmament, and the system of guarantees will not be effective.

Therefore, Egypt, taking advantage of the April 1990 circumstances, developed its initiative aiming at creating a tie to disarm the Arabs of their chemical and biological weapons against disarming Israel of mass destruction weapons including nuclear ones; a matter which demands discussion.

Israel: Officially, Israel has no nuclear weapons; it will not be the first country in the region to hold these weapons. In 1981, it inclusively agreed on the Egyptian initiative on nuclear disarmament on condition that: This will be subject to direct negotiation and the UN will not be involved. Israeli sources said that Israel prefers the kind of agreements similar to the Tlatilolco Agreement of 1967, availing "nuclear option" to a country like Israel, while prohibiting other countries from any nuclear possession. The Israeli stance has not developed much since.

The United States: Bush's initiative of 1991 reveals
that the United States is convinced with Israeli justifica-
tion for holding nuclear weapons. The initiative, in its
nuclear part, aims at blocking the current situation in the
region based on prohibiting nuclear possession for Arab
countries or their undertaking not to possess them against
Israel's ceasing to develop them under control and super-
vision.

c) Suggestions:

Obviously, the issue of nuclear weapons is the most
complicated issues of armament in the region provided that
Arab countries cannot be disarmed of weapons they do not
hold, against the disarmament of Israel, in addition to
international trends such as the United States' position.
Certain points may emerge in this context:

1- The status quo is better than the status imposed by
the US initiative. The current position at least avails
theoretically the option for Arab countries. Blocking did not
benefit these countries much as Israel is of no need for more
development.

2- It is difficult to make initiatives based on the
Egyptian tie as Israel holds both chemical and biological
weapons of which Israel can be disarmed against the similar
disarmament of Arab countries - then remains the nuclear
weapons.

3- If Arab countries insisted on involving nuclear weapons
in negotiations, and still the US holds its stance, then Israel

can be disarmed of every offensive strategic weapon including long range bombs.

4- There are other propositions: Arab countries may accept to include Israel in the American nuclear umbrella -which Israel cannot accept- given the joint Israeli-American nuclear weapons in Israel. A secret negotiation process may be initiated away from the official regional negotiation for Israeli tactical nuclear weapons, against a pledge by the Arabs not to produce nuclear weapons, and accept mutual supervision. In general, this last point is in need of extensive discussion.

2- Non-Nuclear Mass Destruction Weapons:

This kind of weapons are negotiated separately from nuclear weapons though initiatives tend to include both of them.

a) The real armament situation: Israel possesses developed chemical and biological arsenals, and Egypt and Syria possess relatively developed arsenals, though data on how they are launched are not sufficient.

b) Stances: Egypt and the United States propose disarmament, and Israel seems to agree regardless its official policy.

c) Suggestions: The situation is complex too. To Arabs, these weapons are mainly deterrents to Israeli nuclear weapons, not against chemical or biological weapons. Thus, disarmament

is a matter of Arab security. The present status is the best
so far, unless Arab countries are able to link the matter to
Israeli nuclear arms.

3- Strategic Weapons:

Up till now, there are no initiatives that obviously
propose the missiles issue separately: These missiles can
be taken separately if they have traditional heads, but cannot
be separated if they carry chemical heads.

Israel possesses a developed missile arsenal, exceedingly
more developed than Arab missiles, in Egypt and Syria -except
Saudi Arabia- which have only Scud missiles. More important
is that Israel possesses the ability to produce and develop
missiles in Israel so that it may not be affected by the Bush's
initiative or the missile technology transfer plan. It is worth
mentioning that the United States is greatly pressing China and
North Korea to stop supplying Syria with missiles.

Missiles is again one of the complex issues. If Egypt,
for example, is not able to develop its missiles that are
similar to those of Iraq, or a missile like Badr-2000, or at
least hint to its ability to do this, then Israel itself can
make initiatives to deal with the missiles issue -that is if
the United States does not threat any Arab country to make
this initiative.

4- Traditional Weapons:

This level can be posed in bilateral negotiations in a
certain way and a certain level: It can be put as a start to

gain confidence for example. But, according to Paris Statement, it is not one of the disturbing or confusing levels. It is believed that the United States has agreed with Paris State-ment countries to set the course of developing traditional weapons in the region in a way that will not create "confu-sion" in the future.

Fifth: <u>Armament Issue in the Mediteranean</u>:

The armament issue in the Mediteranean is complicated and difficult to deal due to the differences between the point of views and security situations of the so very different parties involved. Hence it is possible to expect a new atmos-phere to exploit the new spirit created by the end of the cold war in Europe in general and in European Mediteranean countries in particular, while the other side of that global pivot sea attending the newly formed essence of peace in the Middle East, to establish a new and will organized system for arms control either naval, conventional or nonconventional covering all parties of the Mediteranean. The success of such system is depending upon the following:

a) The cooperation of the United States in the field of reducing the naval presence of its fleet to end tension.

b) A new out look for the Mediteranean Region in the strategic planning of the NATO depends upon reducing maneuvers and existance of the NATO troops especially in the tension areas.

c) Re-considering the idea of transforming the Hifa port as a permanent naval base for the U.S. six fleet, as a step to cancel such a move or to postpone it for another period of time.

d) Establishing an organization responsible for the Arms control issues in the Mediteranean and the M.E. will be something quit supportive, all the countries of the Mediteranean should be equally represented in the committee of the organization. Supervising and following up the efforts of Arms control in the area will be the main issue of the organization.

FINALLY:

Negotiation on armament is the most complex part of the settlement, as Arab countries do not have the power to be an important paper in bargaining, the international initiatives prefer to sustain the imbalance state, and finally, actual arms control has already begun in Arab countries.

Consequently, it is believed -if in the interest of Egypt- that settlement may develop better if negotiation on armament is left to the end and if no link between land and traditional arms of Arab countries is maintained during bilateral negotiations.

In general, the status quo is better for Arab countries but may not continue in the future if Israel is to continue implementing its development program of weapons in all levels, and if Egypt and Syria cease their arms programs.

The key element in the situation is separation and
combination of the said four arms levels. Acceptable for-
mulae have to be put in order to guarantee Israel's ceasing
of developing weapons of the third and fourth levels, along
with checking the impact of the first level in particular.
Arab countries should not concede the second level weapons
in any case unless there are virtual Israeli concessions.
For, the sole and important card in Arab hands is that of
second and third level weapons.

It is noteworthy that the first step to establish
negotiation drafts is to provide seemingly asserted informa-
tion to designers about the arms arsenals in the region and
Israeli intentions -in addition to the United States- and
the viewpoint of each of China, USSR and France on their role
in settlement.

Specifically speaking, a general framework for a compre-
hensive draft may by set in an aim to disarm the region of
mass destruction weapons (first, second and third levels).
It can be implemented in 1J years for example, where parties
involved in the settlement may adopt gradual measures that
may eventually lead to establishing a region void of mass
destruction and strategic weapons. Major countries like the
United States may make specific guarantees in each stage till
a certain change in the nature of the dispute occurs in a way
that these weapons no longer exist.

For a start, the implementation of the Security Council
decision No. 487 of 1986 may be called for, which is included
in the UN General Assembly decision of 4 December 1986 concerning

the submission of Israel to the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency over the nuclear bases -in addition to a similar international supervision over Arab countries' nuclear utilities.

Parallel to this, a specific question may be raised by the Security Council to the countries of the region to state their strategic abilities according to the amendment of the second article of the said resolution.

The General Assembly decision on the disarmed region (on 3 December 1986) must be applied to comprise all levels of weapons thereby all countries of the region -Israel and Arabs- cease to develop their capabilities in this field and appropriate guarantees may be presented.

It is then that negotiations may begin on separating and combining the levels of arms in an aim for control then disarmament, taking into consideration the specific uses of these strategic weapons in each country. For, non-nuclear mass destruction weapons are used as deterrents in Arab countries to the Israeli nuclear weapon, and this has to be included in the negotiation process under such item.

Thus, it is possible to present various drafts in this stage and in previous stages. If they are accepted on an equally relative security basis, negotiations will continue. If these are not accepted, the status quo is sufficiently acceptable. But, the problem posed is that this status may continue for the future.