


**THE YUGOSLAV WAR AND SECURITY
IN THE BALKANS AND IN EUROPE**
Bologna, 10-11/XII/1993

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Eurobalkanism

Ethnic cleansing and the post cold war order

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(November 1993)

Paper for the international conference on *The Yugoslav War and Security in the Balkans and in Europe*, Bologna, 10-11 December 1993.

Eurobalkanism

Ethnic cleansing and the post cold war order

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Since the beginning of the present war in Yugoslavia more than four million people have been made homeless;¹ the most extensive problem of refugees and displaced persons that Europe has experienced since the immediate aftermath to the Second World War. This problem is comparable in scope to a series of other past and contemporary refugee generating conflicts in the world. But they are geographically near. The current armed conflicts in the Balkans and the population displacements they cause also coincide with economic crisis and social unrest in Europe's major immigration countries. This has contributed to the construction of a public understanding of the refugee problems in ex-Yugoslavia as being particularly overwhelming to "the international community" and as overstepping the potentials of conventional post Second World War refugee regimes.

Ex-Yugoslavia is thus becoming one of the testing grounds for new models intending to "internalize" the refugee situation to the regions of conflict (cf. Suhrke 1993). This general strategy of the post cold war global order is currently finding its rationalisation in public claims for allegedly more farsighted and rational solutions to the refugee problems of the world. Emanating conceptions of "contemporary protection" in a number of European refugee receiving countries have developed in conjunction with the Yugoslavian crisis and in particular with the challenges represented by the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The same is true for organized strategies to establish refugee centres in proximal areas (for Bosnian Moslems in Croatia, for example) or so-called "safe havens" in the midst of the zones of armed struggle. This has been combined with initiatives for conflict resolution, emergency humanitarian aid programmes, and punitive sanctions directed towards morally spotted "culprits".

If this reorientation is to represent more than short sighted "strategies of cost reduction" (*op.cit.*: 239), however, then schemes for resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons must be based on comprehensive and long term plans for conflict resolution and on broad regional socio-economic development strategies attempting to tackle the basic causes of the refugee flows.

In global perspective "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans represents only one among a long series of consecutive political upheavals giving

¹ Of whom one in eight is to be found in different European refugee receiving countries outside the region of ex-Yugoslavia (according to data from the UNHCR). For an informed general description of the character of the Yugoslavian refugee-problem see for example Morokvasic (1992).

rise to forced migrations. Each of these, following closely upon each other since the termination of the Second World War, have been marked by specific combinations of "internal" and "external" political-economic causes. Intervening refugee regimes have given shape to their particular character and modelled their particular socio-political consequences.² But while the 1970s were marked by vigilant discussion about alleged basic economic *cum* political "rootcauses" behind flight and exile (*op.cit.*), the post cold war 1990s' debates appear, in contrast, almost entirely to have left this type of general perspective. It has given way to an almost universal preoccupation with "human rights", most often defined in a narrow legalistic *cum* moralistic sense.

A onesided moral or legalistic perspective may, however, if at the expense of careful analysis of internal as well as external political and economic causes, have fatal consequences. This is reflected in a series of short sighted and often contradictory international interventions on the contemporary Balkan stage of conflict (as for example argued by Wiberg 1992 and Øberg 1993). It may even act to veil the fact that the major intervening powers represent themselves parties to the conflicts.

Ethnic cleansing is the indicator of deep dilemmas in the ex-Yugoslavian region connected with dismal processes of "Balkanisation"; a term belonging to political science, which stems from the time of the Balkan wars in the beginning of this century and the break up of the multinational Habsburg and Ottoman empires. It denotes the fragmentation of larger political wholes into minor and mutually antagonistic entities. "Balkanisation" has moreover, in western imagery, been associated with a specific quality of political life, summarized in the disdainful notion of "Balkanism". The substance of the idea of "Balkanism" connotes, according to a pre First World War encyclopedia, "the customs and the system governing the public life of the Balkanic peoples: lack of principles, fighting with irregular and unlawful means, fraud, politically motivated murders, corruption, grab for fast gains, the creeping for superiors, cruelty towards subordinates". Almost like reading an old European handbook on colonial administration, encountering a modern Eurocentric explanation of why "development aid" does not work, or listening to the complaints of contemporary EC peace-mitigators stuck in the political quagmire of the ex-Yugoslavian warfields.

Here, *in passim*, it is worth noting that, just like "tribalism", of which it reminds so strikingly, the notion of "Balkanism" has, historically, in the spirit of "the white man's burden", functioned as a cover for a hidden agenda. Designed for justifying covert geopolitical games of intervention as well as non-intervention in the unruly southeastern corner of Europe, this hidden agenda has always, today as well as yesterday, been invertebrate to Balkanism itself.

Today's processes of Balkanisation, as embodied in the violent fragmentation of the Yugoslavian community of nations, have exogenous as well as endogenous causes. The desolate political condition of a new-old Balkanism has developed in the complex intersection of local systems of government in the Yugoslavian region with global economic and political systems of power. The latter are reflected in incapacitating debt traps, international super-austerity

² For a synthetic outline see Suhrke (1993).

measures, misplaced forms of political intervention (as well as non-intervention) and the replication of old imperial projects. In a situation marked by intense external pressure, where no penetrating domestic reforms and a necessary transformation of a staggering real socialist system of government and resource-management were ever given a fair chance to solidify, the results became social disintegration, political chaos and internal war. At this point armed violence has itself come to act as an increasingly autonomous factor generating further economic disintegration, arid poverty and new sources of conflict. The contorted condition of a permanent complex emergency may ensue. A necessary implication for any successful strategy for lasting peace is a fundamental change of policy, from within, but also from without.

"Ethnic cleansing"

The deliberate instrumentalisation of forced population displacements in the service of the current nationalist policies on the Balkans has given rise to the cynical notion of "ethnic cleansing". Defined as the systematic "elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of members of other groups" (United Nations 1992), this represents a notion with a range of horrifying connotations. "Ethnic Cleansing" has entered the international political vocabulary alongside that of the "holocaust".

"Ethnic cleansing" entered a wider international imagery in connection with the devastating operations of Yugoslavian/Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1991/92. It also came to be associated with Serbian police brutality exercised under conditions of martial law in the Serbian Province of Kosovo since the ascent to power of Slobodan Milošević in 1988; a rule of terror which has forced thousands and thousands of Albanians to leave the region for reasons of political persecution as well as for politically induced economic reasons. Ironically, "Ethnic cleansing" appears, however, originally to represent a *Serbian* term (*etničko čišćenje*, see Janjić 1993: 14), invented in order to describe the effects of a variety of forms of Albanian political-administrative coercion and every-day harassment directed towards members of the local Serb minority population of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo; acts which contributed to a continuous emigration of the Serbian population from the region. This exodus took increasing proportions after the consolidation of an authoritarian Albanian ethnocratic elite in the province since the mid 1970s.³

In reality, various techniques of ethnic cleansing have been employed, not only administered by Albanians to Serbs and vice versa, or by Serbs to Croats and Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but by all parties to the escalating ethno-national clashes in Yugoslavia.

From 1990, after the first multiparty elections in Croatia and the ascent to power of Franjo Tuđman's Croatian Democratic Alliance, a purge of Serbs from positions in government institutions (including the police) in Croatia started. Factually, an extensive expulsion of Serbian employees from their jobs took off in any corner of the Croatian economy and society. This purge was accompanied by other

³ The background to Serbian emigration from Kosovo has been documented in detail by Petrović and Blagojević (1992).

forms of daily life and administratively monitored harassment directed against the Serbian minority. As newly organized Croatian paramilitary forces (The National Guard) took over control of local communities a flight of Serbian villagers from Slavonia (in Croatia) to Voivodina and other parts of Serbia ensued.

In Bosnia and Hercegovina, like in Croatia and in Kosovo, ethnic cleansing was, setting out from the multi-party elections and the ascent to power of three ethno-nationally oriented parties (Serbian, Croatian and Moslem) in 1991, employed in its more mellow administrative forms. From the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina during the spring of 1992 violent armed forms of ethnic cleansing have been employed not only by the Serbs, but also by the other parties to the conflict within the territories that they control (see further, Janjić 1993: 14ff).

The new nationalism

Through abundant mass media reports from the conflict ridden Balkans intimate and bloody details of extensive and violent practices of ethnic cleansing have been brought directly into our living rooms. In contrast to the Allied blitz on Iraq, which was systematically staged by the international media agencies as a just, civilized, rational, tidy and almost clinical operation, an equally systematic, veritably pornographic media obsession with cruel and intimate detail, has helped to construct the general image of the wars in ex-Yugoslavia as something uniquely corrupt, barbarious, dirty, uncivilized and irrational (see further, Andén-Papadopoulos 1993a, b and c). This overwhelming pornographic media idolatry, most often void of any critical scrutiny of sources, grounded research and political analysis, has served as the justification for a number of hasty and incoherent interventions in the conflict by the EC, individual European powers and the United States (*op.cit.*). It has serviced the fabrication in ideological-political terms of the ongoing wars in what has suddenly been baptized "the middle of Europe" (i.e. the Balkans that have usually been described and treated as Europe's outmost periphery) as a profoundly alien, essentially "non-European" phenomenon, easily made the object of a massive moral condemnation.

What is indeed highly problematic compared to the majority of the contemporary nation states of Western Europe is that in the new Baltic States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Slovakia and in ex-Yugoslavia (except for Macedonia) citizenship is explicitly based on nationality defined in narrow ethnic terms. This is the inherently discriminatory constitutional basis for the form of nationalism which we may call "ethnic nationalism" (Kaldor 1993). In ex-Yugoslavia and the Transcaucasian region ethnic nationalism has come to form the typical post-communist basis for populist political mobilisation, the ideological legitimation for warfare and for a systematic and violent "ethnic cleansing" of alleged "national territories".

Certainly, we must emphasize that Ethnic nationalism is not specific for contemporary post-communist states. It also applied to Germany (which in this respect has still not completely ridden itself of its Nazi-past) and several eastern European states in the interwar period. However, the current wave of ethnic nationalism, on the Balkans, in Eastern Europe and in the Transcaucasian region, has a number of

features which cannot simply be understood as a revival of the past, nor, simply, as a post-totalitarian reaction. We are at a juncture where qualitatively new sets of political and economic contingencies are inaugurating mass refugee flows.

State disintegration and war economies

One of the most common forms of "refugee-producing violence in the new" post cold war era has become "a reversal of the state formation process which", under the auspices of one or the other of the two opposed superpowers, "had earlier been a source of conflict" (Suhrke 1993: 226. We may today, in contrast, speak of "*state disintegration*" or an "implosion" of social conflicts, writes Astri Suhrke (*ibid.*) as a major contemporary political feature and a new essential constituent of North-South and West-East relationships. We find a variety of regionally distinct manifestations of this actually or potentially refugee generating disintegration process in different parts of the globe: in Africa, in Latin America and in the post-communist world of the former Soviet Union, in Eastern-Central Europe and on the Balkans. We are apparently dealing with a phenomenon contingent on global changes in the post cold war era. At the same time it is evident that these global trends articulate with a range of regionally and system specific conditions.

In an attempt to explain the dynamics of an ever expanding cycle of ethnic cleansing in today's ex-Yugoslavia Mary Kaldor (1993) contrasts today's ethno-nationalist movements with those of the 1930s. "The new nationalism is decentralizing and fragmentative in contrast to earlier nationalisms which were unifying and centralizing", argues Kaldor (*op.cit.*). "Earlier nationalisms were culturally homogenizing rather than culturally divisive; homogeneity was largely achieved through assimilation rather than through exclusion, although", Kaldor admits, "certain groups like Jews or gypsies were excluded" (i.e. - "ethnically cleansed", one ought to add, to a massive extent, which in cruelty and scope vastly exceeds anything which has so far taken place on the Balkans of the 1990s). Fascism and Nazism were totalizing and integrative phenomena", she goes on, "while the new nationalism is "private, anarchic, and disintegrative".

The current armed clashes between different Moslem factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates very well the segmentary character of the new nationalisms, which Kaldor speaks about. Similar tendencies appear to imminent also in Croatia and in Rump Yugoslavia and may well come to represent a second phase of warfare and fragmentation extending to all of the territory of former Yugoslavia except for Slovenia.

The seemingly unbounded nature of current "ethnic cleansing" cannot, according to Kaldor, be explained with reference to an elaborate and relatively coherent ideological system as for example in Nazism (*op.cit.*). It has to do rather with the particular character of the new nationalism, which, Kaldor argues, could best be identified as "a primitive grasp for power" based on an anarchic "war economy"; - "a social formation dependent on continuous violence". Not a war economy in the traditional sense of sustaining strong states, she continues, but rather to "sustain a loose coalition of petty criminals, ex-soldiers, and power-hungry anonymous politicians all of whom are

bound together", under the token of ethno-nationalism, "in a shared complicity for war crimes and a shared interest in reproducing the sources of power and wealth". The hoarding of wealth may take place through control of territory, the forcible cleansing of its population groups not belonging to "our nation", and the take over of property. Other forms, even them involving the elimination of ethnic "others", involve the nationalisation or privatisation (in favour of new ethnically "clean" bureaucracies) of federal or social property.

A global shift of power

Kaldor accurately describes some conspicuous attributes of the new post cold war regimes on the Balkans and elsewhere. Yet, her reception of contemporary ethnic nationalism hardly takes us far beyond the level of moral condemnation and the distanced and spurious intellectual interpretations dominating Western receptions of the post-communist crisis in general. Global political and economic power relationships, and thus the West itself, remain in intellectual brackets in relation to the stages of ethnic warfare and ethnic cleansing. An analysis of the forces of disintegration at play entirely in terms of an alleged moral "nihilism" of the new "ethnic nationalism" - reducing its ideological content to a question of "identity" (*op.cit.*: 109) - leaves out a necessary discussion of the fragmentation of multiethnic states like Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union in historical-structural and political-economic terms. In effect, it leaves us even with a rather shallow understanding of the apparent present inability of the new successor states to solidify.

In order to formulate a more inclusive perspective on contemporary ethnic nationalism and ethnic cleansing it could be worthwhile to spotlight some recent propositions of the Swedish economist, Kenneth Hermele (1993). He argues that increasing difficulties in establishing meaningful distinctions between a range of categories of refugees is due to the fact that they all flee from the consequences and effects of a certain policy. We can observe, Hermele writes, a central and increasing role of the West in producing refugee fluxes during the 1980s and 1990s; a development closely linked to the debt crisis, which resulted in a shift of power towards the creditors (*op.cit.*).

This logic, being a latent tendency globally, has been particularly evident in Africa. Here, at the same time as the existing governments lost the international guarantees, they earlier had, as important pawns of the Cold War, "slow or negative growth" has, during the 1980s, "strained the capacities of states to provide even a rudimentary framework to support the functioning of civil society and made ethnic compromises more difficult" (Suhrke 1993).

But it has even come to increasingly comply to the situation in a debt ridden Yugoslavia, where Western creditors' enforcement of suprausterity programmes during the 1980s (as part of a general strategy of exporting the economic crisis to the periphery) was to function as one of the most important factors for delegitimizing attempts of important elite factions at the central federal level to implement a policy of economic reform. What is happening today on the Balkans, in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is, quoting Hobsbawm (1993: 61), "the sudden imposition of a

theological dogma as unrealistic as the attempt to construct socialism by central command in a single country." Not that their economies did not need reform. But "the consequence of plunging them into the free market from one day to the next have ranged from the tragic to the fatal" (*ibid.*).

In multiethnic Yugoslavia the results were truly fatal. This holds true, even though market economic reforms did not come "over night", and even though the country was the best prepared for a far-sighted reform policy among all the countries of real socialism.

The 1980s became dominated by the uncompromising imperatives of a series of super-austerity measures forced upon Yugoslavian federal governments by western powers, the IMF and the World Bank (Chepulis 1984). The federal reformers of ex-Yugoslavia could hardly, in a foreseeable future, offer the majority of the population much more than increasing unemployment and the gloomy marginalisation as "new helots" (Cohen 1987) of an increasingly unequal international division of labour. When the last Yugoslav premier, Ante Marković (1989-91), abruptly turned off the safety-valve of hyper-inflation an explosive crisis of legitimacy ensued, which blew the federation into pieces (cf. Buvač 1993). The ensuing vacuum was filled by the hegemony of exclusivist ethno-nationalist populists promising welfare for "all of our nation", but at the inevitable expense of ethnic Others.

Seen in this perspective, what we observe today expresses *also* something deeper and more contemporary than simply senseless traditionalistic tribal wars of small barbarian nations or petty warlords' unwitting sabotage of the grand, rationalist project of liberal modernity; Western standard receptions of the ongoing conflicts on the Balkans. We are, in effect, when speaking about contemporary ethnic nationalism, dealing with contorted popular rebellions against liberal internationalism and against an economy which appears to benefit the few while the majority is left aside.

The fragmentation of a social compact

The reign of a militant post cold war ethno-nationalism emanated as the last distorted cycle of a form of authoritarian-statist political mass mobilisation upon which the legitimacy of Yugoslavian post Second World War real socialism was built (cf. Schierup 1991; Schierup and Katunarić 1993).

Its basis was a specific type of consensus politics (Županov 1983, Katunarić 1988, Schierup 1990). It could be seen as a less sophisticated real-socialist counterpart to Roosevelt's "New Deal" and the grand 20th century compromises between capital and labour in the core industrial states of Europe. It expressed a coalition between unequal partners, within the framework of which the patron (the elite) "protected" the "working class" or the "people" by guaranteeing full employment, a minimal basic income and extended state sponsored programmes of social welfare. "The protected" would, in turn, guarantee the political legitimacy of the elite.

This consensus politics represented originally a *transethnic* political compact. It was linked with a complex strategy to lift the Yugoslavian community of nations beyond the grip of internal forces of fragmentation and underdevelopment as well as with efforts to liberate the region from a crippling position within those days'

unequal international division of labour (see further Schierup 1990). Since 1945 this consensus was repeatedly revived, reformed and transformed (Schierup 1991). This took, not least during the 1970s, dramatic forms marked by a stubborn "conservative-orthodox" reaction. This reaction was mounted against Yugoslavia's first sweeping federal (1960s) economic reform programme and a jeopardising attempt to enter the international division of labour on liberal market economic terms (Schierup 1990).

It remained (in a fashion akin to what we can observe in the region of the former Soviet Union today) entrenched in the local strongholds of local state-elites within the individual republics. A number of mutually competing national-bolshevistic state-bureaucracies opted for a fragmented integration of Yugoslavia's individual units into world capitalism on unilateral terms of financial and technological dependency (Ocić 1983, Schierup 1990). They came to occupy a position reminiscent of that of "comprador bourgeoisies" in, for example, middle America and the less powerful states of South-America. But, combined with a successive revival of old "buried" national projects, popular legitimacy and political power remained dependent upon extended welfare programmes and commitment to working class protection.

The economic basis for a reworked leftist national-populist consensus in the single republics should, essentially, come to be foreign loans taken up on a conflated global petrodollar market. This was combined with large-scale remittances from Yugoslavia's numerous migrant workers. Later (during the 1980s) their role was, increasingly, taken over by a hazardous policy of hyper-inflation. At the same time a defensive, politically orthodox resistance against federal attempts to launch renewed market oriented reforms "at home" continued, however, to block any pervasive penetration of transnational capital. Even the fragmentation of a common Yugoslav economic space and the concomitant economic warfare between the individual political units (Ocić 1983) (which followed the ascent to power of the new mutually competing comprador-like local bureaucracies) came to act as a barrier for the valorisation of foreign investments at a larger scale.

This mounting contradiction - i.e. the *impossibility of reconciling locally established vehicles for mass political and ideological integration with increasingly uncompromising imperatives of global economic cum political embraces* - reached a critical breaking point in the post cold war 1990s (cf. Schierup and Katunarić 1993). It led to economic collapse and uncontrollable political eruptions. It spawned - as the latest cycle of populist legitimisation politics - militant ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing; a grim populist reaction following upon a havocked liberal reform policy and the dure international super-austerity measures of the 1980s. Civil war became the final source of legitimacy left for local state elites and the last political outlet for increasingly impoverished populations void of apparent alternatives. But, once commenced, internal warfare should in itself become an independent factor which is currently acting to establish wholly new forms of social and political dynamics in the region.

Perspectives of the post cold war order

Yugoslavia represents the real socialist country which was longest exposed to the convulsions which a new transnational world order has, since the 1970s, produced everywhere in "the other Europe" (Schierup 1990). The economic and political collapse of Yugoslavia shows us, how the underdevelopment and fragmentation of the Balkans has once again become the historical adjunct to Western and Central Europe's economic and political strength. The inability to break a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and political authoritarianism is certainly produced by endogenous factors (Katunarić 1988, Schierup 1991 and 1992). But the ways in which these very factors are being constantly reproduced in new-old forms are contingent upon the dynamics of a discriminatory international division of labour.

The perspectives for the new refugee regime set up on the ruins of Yugoslavia's multiethnic community of nations in the post cold war era are dependent upon a solution to the central dilemmas of this unlucky part of Europe. Here the pendulum of history has for the last forty years swung futilely between the *Scylla* of authoritarian statism and the *Charybdis* of an extreme liberal (economic) reformism. Distinctive for a truly chaotic present and determinant for an uncertain future is that the dominant political powers of Europe represent not only indispensable parties to a solution, but an integrated part of the problem. This is a presumption behind the concluding discussion of some current tendencies and possible future trends. The crucial watershed represents that of a "rebalkanisation" of Europe versus a "debalkanisation" of the Balkans.

A rebalkanisation of Europe...

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Moslem population group has become the most destitute victims of allegedly historically "unfinished" Serbian and Croatian national projects. The unhappy fate of this part of the Balkans we can, however, hardly understand, unless we analyze it as a playground even for divisive geopolitical interests at a much larger scale.

One should not forget that, at the time of the break down of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany, vestiges of an age old ethno-national consensus politics were still at play in Yugoslavia and particularly in its individual republics. This holds true not least for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the new ethno-national parties that emerged from the first multiparty elections in 1991, initially attempted to reconstruct a consensual system of government (Palau and Kumar eds. 1992 *in passim*). This attempt was indeed tenuous. But it was, ultimately, fractured by the imposition of an ethnocentric conception of majoritarian democracy from without, embodied in the referendum that preceded EC and US recognition in the spring of 1992. The ensuing collective political marginalization of the (strongly armed) serbian population group became a prelude to war.

The use of international recognition as an instrument for outside intervention meant the adoption of the political line of a forceful Germany (Newhouse 1992). After reunification the Yugoslavian crisis presented an occasion for a self confident Germany to demonstrate its political muscle and, in effect, to safeguard vested Germanocentric

economic and political interests in northern (ex)Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina).

This self-assertive action was to become a preamble to the visualization of increasingly evident cleavages within the European Community. Contradicting geopolitical interests in relation to the Balkan region among the European powers could be seen as one of the factors that have contributed to paralyze any concerted European long term policy and set up the framework for a stalemate game of intervention-nonintervention. We have come to see other dominant powers of a Europe in discord becoming increasingly engaged in carving out *their* particular spheres of interest on the Balkans and elsewhere. Exploring this political logic, Bianchini (1993), critically discusses a conceivable Italian, or possibly Italian-French,⁴ imperial project on the Balkans; a Latinocentric *pendant* to the Balkan extension of a Germanocentric *Mitteleuropa*.

This brings to light, beneath the continued outward appearance of unity and brotherhood, the latent *Balkanisation of (EC) Europe*; notes of disharmony in the *concert européen* spawned by the Yugoslavian crisis.

An eventual establishment of a range of diffuse and mutually opposed spheres of interest will, most conceivably, act as detrimental to concerted long term European development efforts in the region. One can assume a scenario where local authoritarian rulers will continue, as they have done it since the beginning of the Yugoslavian crisis, to target their political efforts at obtaining support for their exclusivist ethno-national projects from rivaling European powers. Short term, economically exploitative and ecologically devastating, interests will come to dominate. We will, in the backwater, see continued constitutional insecurity, dire poverty, increasing social unrest, the constant outbursts of new armed ethnic and national conflicts, and the "production" of new flows of internal refugees.

An inglorious, but unfortunately already more or less ongoing "scramble for the Balkans" between the central and Western European powers (but even the United States and Turkey), will, consequently, provide no basis for a projected policy of peaceful resettlement and reintegration of refugees. This basic strategy of the post cold war refugee regime, presently based on so-called "conflict resolution" provided by "the international community" and the extended provision of humanitarian aid, is apt to fail in a situation where the representatives of "the international community" are essentially themselves parties to the conflicts. Rather it will mean a situation where proliferating numbers of "internalized" refugees themselves will, as we have seen it in the case of Palestine, become an increasingly extremist party to a newer ending spiral of ethno-national violence.

"Safe havens" will develop into "Gaza strips". But also the artificial ghettos, about to be created in the receiving states of Europe based on a dubious conception of "temporary protection", will come to form ideal breeding grounds for so-called "fundamentalisation" and continuous "terrorism". Thus a second cycle of forced exodus and

⁴ Specifically Italy has, traditional, and very outspoken economic interests in the Western coastal part of ex-Yugoslavia, while France has, traditionally, had strong political and economic ties to Belgrade.

hideous return will be closed in an ex-Yugoslavia, where much of the extremism and ferocity of contemporary ethnic nationalism is being carried forward (in Serbia as well as in Croatia) by the sons and daughters of post Second World War political refugees and labour migrants; the products of revanchist diasporas based in Europe and overseas.⁵

We may - given an environment marked by economic depression, continuous ethno-nationalist rivalry, the political extremism of huge permanently displaced population groups, and the establishment of divisive spheres of interests at various levels of geopolitical dignity - come to experience a disheartening condition of "permanent emergency" for years to come. This is the kind of condition which, contingent upon "political economies of internal war" (Duffield 1994), we see in the Horn of Africa, in Angola, parts of the Middle East, and in South East Asia (with Cambodia as the most outspoken example). But it increasingly comes to apply as well for the type of situation that we can observe in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and it may be imminent in other parts of the ex-Yugoslavian region as well.

The most conspicuous product of these permanent emergencies is that of never dwindling displaced populations. On the territory of former Yugoslavia we can count, according to the UNHCR (May 1993), more than two million refugees within Bosnia-Hercegovina alone, 800.000 in Croatia, and 740.000 on the territory of Rump Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). But permanent emergencies have winners as well as losers (*op.cit.*). The condition and notion of permanent emergency is premised on the collapse of formal economic structures, writes Duffield (*op.cit.*: 17ff). It is, more particularly, the "process of political survival adopted by the dominant groups and classes within this crisis that gives complex emergencies their special character", and "survival has been associated with the spread of parallel and extra-legal activities which themselves promote inter-ethnic tensions, asset transfer, conflict and population displacement". Large scale humanitarian aid programmes have become integrated as an essential constituent of these political economies of internal war, Duffield continues. External intervention has, typically, "tended to favour and support the politically strong to the detriment of the weak. Hence, international political involvement has served to strengthen "conservative and predatory forces" (*ibid.*).

One can hardly overestimate the importance of, for example, the illegal transfers of arms, drugs and humanitarian aid for the production of conspicuous strata of *nouveaux-riches* profiteers among (mutually intertwined) national *mafias* and local party cadres in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo. But the range of this predatory political economy extends beyond the confines of the states and regions directly involved in the armed conflicts. One example is the trade in arms and preying on international humanitarian relief in Slovenia. Slovenian authorities' manipulation with highly inflated, purely imaginary numbers of refugees is, allegedly, cashed in through excessive demands for financial aid presented to international relief agencies.⁶

⁵ Constituted post-war For an account of the historical development and ideological substance of post Second World War ultra-nationalist Yugoslavian diasporas, see Doder (1989).

⁶ According to the internationally well reputed oppositional Belgrade magazine, *Vreme* (1993). Following an official census on refugees, lately made public in Slovenia, the agency for refugees in that former Yugoslavian republic, has been forced to recognize that an alleged

...or, a debalkanisation of the Balkans

A conceivably increasingly unmanageable situation in ex-Yugoslavia may lead to a point where the EC and the USA will rather try to isolate the Balkan "powder-keg" than to extend their peace making efforts, which have so far proceeded along a series of spurious and unsuccessful interventions. This kind of development would resemble the responses to complex emergencies in the African Horn (cf. Duffield 1994) and elsewhere in the third world, and could even be regarded as symptomatic of a historic transformation of North-South relations in general (*op.cit.*). This shift has already started to take shape in the form of "inward looking Northern economic blocs attempting to manage the crisis in non-bloc regions of the South through the extension, by force if necessary, of donor/NGO safety net systems" (*op.cit.*: 19). It runs parallel to a tendency of disengagement by the main donor governments "leaving NGOs and an increasingly financially and politically marginalized UN to try to pick up the pieces".

It is a major contemporary challenge to break down the protectionist walls of the North, and to reform humanitarian aid, concludes Duffield. But to be proficient any alternative policy must be premised upon the determining importance of indigenous political relations. Arguing in a similar vein, Kaldor (1993) recommends a "bottom-up strategy", involving an extensive commitment to support all those groups and individuals who oppose ethnic nationalism, policies of war, and who are trying to preserve multi-ethnic communities.

This is certainly an essential point of departure. Nevertheless, any strategy to support democratic alternatives and the reconstruction of a transethnic civil society will border on idealism as long as "democracy" remains without any forceful sources of popular legitimacy. Hence, any western attempt to stage a democratic political alternative in ex-Yugoslavia will remain extremely vulnerable, as long as it does not, at the same time, seriously attempt to come to terms with one of the deepest roots of a ruinous political "Balkanism"; a historically conditioned economic maldevelopment of which the continued replication of doubtful imperial projects imposed from without remain a constant contingency.

Seen in this perspective, a successful "debalkanisation" of the Balkans, as well as any auspicious strategy to solve its present dismal problems of displaced populations, remain, in order to speak with Stefano Bianchini (1993: 166ff), dependent on the willingness and capability to implement a *long-term and generous policy acting on all fronts* simultaneously: impartial conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, broad economic and regional development, innovating political and cultural reforms, etc.⁷ This kind of broad commitment could,

presence of 70.000, 100.000 or 110.000 refugees is purely fictive. According to the census there are only 30.000. This is not only "three times less than the number which the right wing Slovenian parties have manipulated in order to intimidate the nation. It is also three times less than the number, which Slovenian institutions have communicated to the international humanitarian organizations, requiring (financial) aid", *Vreme* (1993) alleges. And in total, the Slovenian authorities take the direct responsibility for no more than 10.000 refugees. This, the magazine concludes, only seems to confirm the recent allegation of the critical Slovenian journalist, Marjeta Doupona (working for the critical Slovenian political magazine, *Mladina*), that "the Slovenian authorities channel part of the humanitarian aid received in the name of the refugees into social welfare payments for socially exposed Slovenian families" (*op.cit.*).

⁷ Conceivable concrete forms of which Bianchini (*op.cit.*) discusses in some detail.

Bianchini argues, only be imagined as a *concerted action*; an action which, while recognizing the "clear correlation between the constitution of the EC as a political union and the fate of the Yugoslav regions" (*op.cit.*: 118), would direct human and economic resources towards developmental projects related to the whole of South-Eastern Europe, and not only to individual states (*ibid.*).

The Yugoslavian crisis has, more than anything else, revealed the precarious political configuration of the united Europe, but even of its individual member states, divided as they are between political forces favouring a continued European integration and forceful interests pressing for the reassertion of individual national interests. This, as argued above, represents in itself a strongly destabilizing factor on the Balkans.

But it is even, above all, the strength of a self-assertive nationalism, and not the federal bodies of the community, that has propelled the kind of closure which we call "Fortress Europe".⁸ This has manifested itself in the new post cold war refugee regimes' policies of *containment* (Flaker 1993: 3). These policies do not only mean measures to prevent refugees from crossing borders. They are designed to fundamentally reduce the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees; to obstruct them from achieving significant political, economic or legal empowerment, once they have arrived. Measures to reduce the right to work, access to education and welfare benefits, and guarantees for family reunion are introduced in state after state. This European response acts to make asylum seekers and refugees third-class citizens. It marks substantial cuts in the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention. All of these trends are propelled, not only by new fascist or extreme populist movements, but by an intolerant ethnicist imagery of the media and a broad section of the political spectrum. The paradox is, writes Gorana Flaker (*op.cit.*: 4), that refugees exposed to ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia "come seeking safety but instead are exposed to other forms of violence".

One may, at present, only speculate concerning the long term effects of this discriminatory regime on the refugees themselves and on their Balkan lands of origin. But their exposed situation in the so-called "host" countries is hardly likely to function as a proficient school for learning "democracy" and interethnic tolerance and cooperation. Rather it may generate revanchism together with ethnic absolutism and exclusivism. Hereby the "Fortress Europe" syndrome will, on the Balkans, act to further reproduce the evil historical circle of ethno-national violence to which old politically marginalized diasporas from the Yugoslavian region have already amply contributed. Hence, political stabilisation on the Balkans will, in more than one sense, be contingent upon a "debalkanisation" of Europe in general. This is the juncture from where any proficient politics for the integration of displaced populations must set out.

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n° Inv. 14681
22 NOV. 1994

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HOW TO ORGANIZE

A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE BALKANS?

(Some preliminary considerations)

1. The main trends of contemporary Balkan situation

An attentive observer of the Balkan situation in the late eighties and early nineties will be sure to mention, at least, its two characteristics - the real independence of the Balkan region countries growth, on the one hand, and their simultaneous "crawling" into an acute economic and political crisis, aggravation of conflict potential, spread of nationalism and inter-ethnic contradictions up to appeals to revise inner-Balkan borders, on the other.

Radical changes in the correlation of forces in the Balkans were brought about by the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and the cease of bloc confrontation, which for many years has been separating the Balkan countries according to their membership in the NATO or the Warsaw Treaty. Traditional ties between the Balkan states and the European powers, as well as their alliances, began to revive and come into existence. After the disintegration of the USSR, they faced far from easy tasks of establishing relations with former Soviet republics, with Russia, the Ukraine and Moldova, in the first place.

At the same time the Balkan countries, to more or less degree, found themselves involved in the "instability arc", which came to appear on the territory of former Yugoslavia (SFRY) and in southern regions of the former Soviet Union, as

a result of acute interethnic conflicts. The influence of pseudopatriotic parties and movements on domestic and foreign policies of some newly created states became evident in conditions of a deepening economic crisis. Experience shows that nationalist ideas and appeals, induced into mass consciousness, are sufficient in such conditions to provoke bloody conflicts.

On previous stages, especially in the eighties, the primary reason of crisis in economy and politics of the majority of Balkan countries, was the command administrative system, which originated decay of society, inefficient production, steady decrease of standard of living, accelerated technological lagging, compared to non-socialist countries, including such as Greece and Turkey in the Balkan neighbourhood. Deep contradictions between the ruling leadership and the basic layers of society, full discreditation of totalitarian regimes, loss of support on behalf of the Soviet Union - all these factors have brought about a situation, in which former ruling parties, even renovated, with a changed name and essence of activities, resulted unable to retain power, as it was the case of Bulgaria and Albania in the early nineties.

In those countries, however, where the ruling parties, in one or another form, have conserved their positions (for example, in Serbia), they struck agreement with ultranationalist forces and groups, a fact, which in itself was creating a dangerous situation not only in their countries, but in the Balkan region, as a whole.

All these circumstances produced a decrease in multilateral

cooperation within the region, which in the second half of the eighties became active, when after 1988 on, the meetings of Foreign Ministers and other bodies, with participation of all Balkan countries, became regular. The increasing political instability made them turn, in the first place, to their home problems and search for ways to prevent conflicts with their immediate neighbours. The balance of forces, however, was radically shaken in summer 1991 after actual disrapture of former Yugoslavia and after open military operations between the republics began.

2. Existent and potential ethno-political conflicts as a principal source of tensions in the Balkans

Succesive events on the territory of disintegrated Yugoslavia demonstrated the depth and complexity of up-to-date ethno-political contradictions in the Balkan region. The present high conflict potential in the sphere of interethnic relations in the Balkans, convincingly testifies that after the end of cold war, nationalism has become the main danger in post-communist regions of Europe.

Heterogeneous national structure in the majority of countries in the Balkan region has always been an objective premise to aggravating interethnic contradictions here. Relatively homogeneous, from this point of view, may be considered only Greece, Albania and Slovenia, where national minorities constitute 2%, 4% and 12.1%, respectively. In Bulgaria their share is 20.2%, in Croatia 20%, Macedonia 42%, Montenegro 33.6%,

Serbia 34.5%, Rumania 19.8%. In Bosnia and Herzegovina national composition is most complex: in this country there are 1,905,000 Muslims (Moslems), 1,364,000 Serbs, 752,000 Croats, 240,000 inhabitants, who, in the latest population census, declared as being Yugoslavs, as well as 130,000 representatives of other nationalities.

It has to be added, that national minorities dispersed throughout the Balkan peninsula have, as a rule, their ethnic Motherland within its limits, and in a series of cases they inhabit regions, which are bordering their Motherland. In conditions of growing crisis, economic and political confusion, this gives rise to irredentism and separatism, whose fundament constitutes the hope to receive patronage and support. This, in its turn, is known to lead to complications in inter-state relations, to conflicts and wars.

The sharpest contradictions emerged on this ground in the geopolitical space of former Yugoslavia (conflict between Serbia and Croatia, as well as military actions on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims). In case of unfavourable development of events, the Autonomous Region of Kosovo as integral part of Serbia, inhabited chiefly by ethnic Albanians, as well as the Republic of Macedonia with its numerous groups of Serbian and Albanian population, might become potential seats of conflicts. Certain contradictions remain in force in relations between Hungary, on the one hand, Rumania and Serbia, on the other, connected with the existence of a significant Hungarian minority in these countries. Period-

ically, aggravation of the Balkan situation was produced due to unresolved problems of ethnic Turks in Greece and Bulgaria, the same refers to the Greek minority in Albania and the Albanian minority in Greece. Finally, the Macedonian question, in its different aspects, still has not found final settlement in the Balkan region.

The described situation does not reflect the whole complexity of national and ethnic problems of the Balkans, which are aggravated by social, political, historic and cultural factors. All of them have their profound sense and have been taking shape during entire historical epochs. However, at the end of the 20th century these problems obtained new vigour, conditioned by long-lasting and in many cases troublesome transition of the majority of Balkan countries from totalitarism to democracy and from confrontation to cooperation. Under these circumstances, interethnic contradictions and conflicts inevitably obtain political sense and turn into ethno-political by nature.

Certain limiting factors are the trends of the Balkan countries movement towards cooperation with Western Europe. Every Balkan state, be it voluntarily or not, has to correlate its relations with the neighbours, with the necessities of European politics, which, in reality, plays a positive role in lessening inner confrontation in the region.

3. Specific traits of nationalism in the Balkan region

The Balkans, none the less, remain a specific area, which combines Western and Eastern cultural traditions and a peculiar

mentality, in spite of all political changes and integration processes gaining momentum in Europe. This results in a more slow transition of postcommunist societies of Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania towards democracy and market, as compared to their Central European neighbours. It also determines a more steady character of nationalism in all its manifestations, beginning with traditional barriers of suspiciousness and mistrust towards neighbours, difficult to overcome, and ending with open conflicts with them.

Specific traits of Balkan nationalism were historically determined by the late creation of nation-states in this region. The majority of states new created after World War I, have had considerable ethnic minorities, which became the source of the future interethnic clashes. After World War II nationalism was used by the totalitarian regimes as an instrument to strengthen their dominance. Trying to profit by emotional and irrational instincts, finding ground in backward straits of society, nationalism of such kind easily became a tool in totalitarian states and was used as an instrument to solve various political tasks put forward.

That is why one can state that the fundamental democratization of political ground existing in the Balkan countries, is the most important precondition for preventing national clashes and for crisis management in this unstable region.

4. Adoption of collective rights of national minorities as an important precondition for confirming a new security system in the Balkans

A special problem of the Balkan states constitutes the

urgent necessity to adopt a harmonious attitude to the two interconnected principles of European security: the defense of national minorities' rights and stability (inviolability) of state boundaries. According to the experience of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and, to a far lesser degree, of the West European regions, this is one of most complicated and yet not resolved problems of the present. Of late, pseudopatriotic parties and groupings are raising the issue of some state borders "correction" more and more openly, they do not exclude the possibilities of its forcible solution. In the present circumstances it might lead not only to local wars, but to a more serious European conflict. As the Balkan experience shows, imperial ambitions, inherent not only to "great powers" and now being revived on the basis of rapprochement of pseudopatriotic and former totalitarian structures, might be most dangerous. The absence of strong democratic opposition, its lack of structuring, its heterogeneity, typical for the present stage in development of postcommunist societies, make this danger real, especially in conditions of instability, with an unpredictable character of political processes in the Balkan countries.

The inter-state conflicts which are surging in the present situation when agreements on national minorities' rights and legal international forms of their defense are lacking, are difficult to overcome, and this fact is being realized in political circles of Europe during a long period. At its time, Yugoslavia showed special interest in the issue. In 1978, on its initiative, a workshop in the UNO system was created with the

aim to draw a draft declaration "On the Rights of National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities". Due to a series of reasons, the work on the mentioned declaration went on slowly, and the draft passed its second reading only in February of 1991. Nevertheless, for the first time in international practice, the notion of "collective rights" of national minorities was especially actively proposed by Yugoslavia, Hungary and the Ukraine.

As to CSCE documents, in the Helsinki Final Act the proper term of "national minority" was mentioned, but with a reserve, these minorities had to previously be recognized as being such, by respective governments. In successive CSCE documents, the Paris Chart for a New Europe included, agreements on national minorities were formulated, proceeding from individual human rights to be recognized, which in itself could not mean securing such collective rights as that of cultural autonomy, self-management, etc. Not all Balkan states manifest the same approach to the solution of the problem, which may be explained by the difference in concrete situations and historical traditions.

Thus, not a single of the four postwar constitutions of Greece has had even a theoretical recognition of collective rights of national minorities. In postcommunist Rumania certain shifts could be observed in the item: minorities were granted a possibility to found political organizations according to ethnic principle: nowadays the Democratic Union of Rumania's Hungarians is the second in quantity political party after the FNS. The Albanian constitution recognizes the existence of

national minorities - the Greek, Serbian, Macedonian, their rights to cultural development are declared, and the Greek party "Omonia" holds two seats in the Albanian parliament. In Bulgarian official papers the term "national minority" is not mentioned, although the constitution adopted in 1991 proclaims basic rights and obligations which proceed from international documents referring to national minorities. As to Turkey, the main criteria in its approach to the issue of national minorities is their religion, and in this connection Turkey shows special interest in the Muslim population of the Balkan countries and is disposed to be spokesman of their interests.

The given data indicate to radical differences in national politics of the Balkan states, which, in itself, may be an easy source of contradictions and conflicts between them. It is thus obvious, that the adoption of national minorities' collective rights as an alternative to the existent and extremely explosive principle of nation's self-determination up to secession, would be an important precondition to a new security system creation. It is worth mentioning that the above principle was proclaimed by the Bolsheviki with the intention to destroy the old tsarist empire. In fact, it evoked acute contradictions among nations and national groups, especially if the situation concerned a mixed population and uncertain territorial borders. That is the reason why it is worth searching new forms of ethnic groups' self-determination - for instance, national-cultural authonomy, a large-scale system of self-management in

regions populated by national minorities, and so on. In our opinion, in the Balkans it would lead to a gradual appeasement of the contemporary situation, although the way to a stable peace in this region will be extremely long.

5. Exterior factors which determine the creation of a new security system in the Balkans

Finally, it is necessary to speak about a more significant importance of exterior factors of Balkan security, i.e. the policy of European powers, the role and place of the Balkan countries in European integration processes.

In the situation of a widening Balkan crisis, the Balkan countries - former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Rumania and Bulgaria) - in one form or another, expressed their intention to become associated members to the NATO, which is motivated by their tendency to a more rapid integration into European structures. In reality, however, it is explained by their wish, in case of necessity, to have a "defending umbrella" of the Atlantic alliance. But their appeals were not considered due to several reasons, including the wish of the leading NATO structures not to get the Alliance involved into interethnic conflicts in the Balkans. Even more problematic seem to be the perspectives of postcommunist Balkan states to be associated to the EC.

As more real may be regarded the possibilities of the Balkan countries to participate in different subregional groupings and, on this basis, their cooperation in the region and with the Black and Mediterranean Seas and the Danube countries. The Black Sea

and the Danube directions of multilateral cooperation have come to exist relatively not long ago, and they promise an unexhausted positive potential, which could, in many aspects, promote a solution to the problems accumulated in the region. It has to be taken into consideration that the Balkan, Black Sea and Danubian subregions embark the same countries: the Balkan six, Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, in one case, and the mentioned countries plus Hungary, Austria and Germany, in the other.

As to the Danubian cooperation, its value for the Balkan states is immeasurably increasing after cessation of the Yugoslav war and after the Rhine - Main - Danube channel becoming effective. Participation in multilateral cooperation does not exclude bilateral ties of the Balkan countries with Central European states, such as Austria and Hungary, and will expand possibilities of their immediate contacts with Germany, the most potential European power.

Beginning with the 70s, Germany was a stable and most important trade and economic partner of the Balkan region states. After the fall of communist regimes, it was Germany which initiated rapprochement of the Balkan countries with the European structures (it must be stressed that provisions as to their association and subsequent integration into the EC, form part of all treaties signed by Germany with the countries of the region). Finally, it was Germany which offered maximum of humanitarian and financial help.

Relations of the Balkan countries with their southern neighbours, Greece and Turkey, also constitute a stable factor

in the policy of these postcommunist lands.

Of late, the Balkan policy of Turkey is becoming noticeably active, too; maintaining conflictless and well-set economic and political relations with Rumania, Turkey is simultaneously improving its relations with Bulgaria and Greece. After a sharp conflict in the recent past, the Bulgarian-Turk relations began to improve, while the situation in the Balkans was aggravating. An important premise for their improvement was the change of the Bulgarian administration's attitude to the Muslim-Turk minority, which was heavily discriminated before.

For all Balkan countries without exception it is of extraordinary importance to foster and expand cooperation with the Republic of Greece, which already today might be a binding link between its northern neighbours and the West, with its integration groupings included, such as NATO and EC. Actual problems in the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria cannot strike out the evidence that history has not only aggravated them by conflict and ill-will potentials, but has dispensed them with century-long experience of fruitful cooperation, enriched by spiritual and cultural community, as well.

Having in mind a changed role of the Balkans in Europe and in the world, each Western country demonstrates its common as well as specific interests in the region. For the USA they are connected with the situation in the Mediterranean and on the southern NATO flank, with ethnic groups of emigrants from the Balkan countries residing in the USA; for Germany it is the fact of holding and having a considerable quantity of Gastarbeiter,

the Yugoslavs, Turks, etc.

An increasing interest in Balkan affairs is showing Italy, which not only pretends to be a binding link between the EC and the Balkan countries today, but is actively interested in settling ethno-political conflicts in the region immediately bordering it.

To be sure, the relations between the European powers and any of the Balkan countries depend heavily on their domestic policy.

The position of Russia of nowadays in the Balkan issue is not uniform, as well as that of any foreign state. In the European countries and the USA, in fact, exist groups of extremists, neofascists and neocommunists, although not numerous, which sharply criticize the state policy. In Russia national-patriotic tendencies of different colouring are also present. Their activities may give the idea of their alleged real influence on political decision-making, but actually, Russian policy towards the Balkans during the Yugoslav crisis, testifies the opposite. The real interest of Russian foreign policy seems to be in affirming stability in the Balkans. This was the point of efforts of Russian diplomacy aimed at a settlement of the Yugoslav conflict, as well as of support on behalf of the Russian diplomacy of constructive steps taken by the new Yugoslav republics.

The major direction of Russian domestic policy and that of the majority of the Balkan states is to rapidly realize economic and political reforms. The future depends on their successful implementation - these are the initial positions from which these

countries approach the third millenium. It is therefore of great importance to more frequently revive constructive historical memory, without forgetting historical traditions. Such appeals to history, as well as to contemporary principles of solidary reformation and spiritual pragmatism, might promote gradual settlement of interethnic conflicts, restoration of stability and consent in the Balkans. And this is extremely needed by the Balkan peoples, which, during the 20th century, have lived two bloody wars with intermediate periods of fascism and totalitarism

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22 NOV. 1994

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THE CRISIS IN THE FORMER BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: SOME
REMARKS

Let me begin by expressing my pleasure at being able to participate in a conference on the Yugoslav crisis organized by Europeans. In the United States, interest in the tragedy in Yugoslavia has waxed and waned. Europe, as I see it, better understands the need to remain fully engaged in effort to resolve the crisis. Certainly, the group gathered here today understands that when we address the issue of the former Yugoslavia, we are talking not in terms of years, but of decades of painful effort if we are to see the region return to some semblance of normality.

My task is to address the situation in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina(1). Without doubt, conditions there are grim, perhaps more desperate than at any time since the civil war began. The search for a solution to the crisis appears to have lost its momentum following the disengagement of the United States from the peace process, notwithstanding the recent efforts of the Europeans to revive the peace talks. One cannot help but feel that it will require another major crisis - perhaps the breakdown of humanitarian aid, a renewed Serbian offensive, or the spread of the conflict to Croatia - to draw the Americans back into the search for a solution. The failure of the United States and Europe to cooperate in the efforts to bring a peaceful settlement to the Yugoslav crisis is to be deplored. One suspects that this breakdown of cooperation in the Western alliance is rooted in differences of outlook which go beyond the Yugoslav crisis. If so, the events in Yugoslavia will be seen as the first indication of divisions within the Atlantic alliance following the end of the cold war.(2)

My remarks will not be focus on the U.S. role in the Bosnian crisis, however. My purpose is to stimulate a discussion about how to achieve peace in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. My basic thesis is that we must adopt to the realities of the situation and push forward with the

1. I have made no attempt to incorporate the developments in the paper, which was written while the Geneva negotiations were in progress. Most of my observations anticipate actual developments at the Geneva meeting.

2. For a devastating critique of American policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "America and Bosnia," THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Fall, 1993, pp. 14-27.

task of nation-building in the former republics of Yugoslavia. To do this may require some re-assessment of the the assumptions on which Western policy toward Yugoslavia has been based in the past. In the case of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a re-assessment requires, further, that West becomes more knowledgeable about the politics of the emerging states, above all the differences within their leaderships on how to proceed, once the conflict is over. It is also important that a renewed effort be made to revive person-to-person contacts aimed at strengthening democratic forces that still remain in the urban centers of the successor states. Finally, Serbia and Croatia must be brought into the implementation of the settlement, under the assumption that they will, in the near future - hopefully with the support of the international community - unite with the Serbian and Croatian republics now seeking to gain recognition as part of the peace settlement.

To do these things successfully, meanwhile, requires a delicate balancing act between the politics of realism - which acknowledges that the partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an accomplished fact - and the politics of idealism, which correctly insists that one cannot compromise on certain principles, including respect for human rights, in the search for an end to the conflict. If I appear at times to lean too much toward the "realist" position, it is because I think that the time has come to admit that the international community is not in a position to impose its will on the warring factions for the purpose of returning to the status quo ante. We must move on.

But it will be difficult to move on unless we examine the West's position on the Bosnian conflict up to now. What strikes me in retrospect is how unprepared we all were for the depth and complexities of the crisis. It is not that we did not anticipate a conflict in Yugoslavia. Rather it was that we lacked an historical precedent which would prepare us for the trauma of a brutal civil war and the Byzantine complexity of the search for a solution. Those who studied ethnic conflict in the Third World were best attuned to the nature of the problems which Yugoslavia would encounter. This group of experts did not, with some exceptions, inject themselves into the dispute over how to resolve the Yugoslav crisis, perhaps because their findings were pessimistic and suggested that there was little that could be done, short of waiting for the conflict to burn itself out.⁽³⁾ (In the

3. See the contributions to SURVIVAL, Volume 35, No. 1, Spring, 1993, and the works of Donald Horowitz, above all his ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989).

words of two analysts, "ethnic conflicts, experience seems to show, are nasty, brutish and long.") (4)

American experts on Yugoslavia also failed to define the issues and guide the debate on the crisis, perhaps because we were really not that knowledgeable about the "other" Yugoslavia outside Belgrade. Yugoslav journalists and scholars, were well aware of the destructive potential of a civil war in Yugoslavia, and tried to warn the world of the tragedy that such a conflict would entail. The most urgent warnings of an impending catastrophe came from those scholars and journalists, Croatian and Serbian alike, who had been following the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, and realized that his political ambitions were inextricably linked to fomenting national conflicts and using the notion of a Greater Serbia to extend and consolidate his own power. But these appeals to the West contained their own dangers, since they were usually accompanied by a plea for some form of Western intervention in the civil war, rather than focusing on the complexities of the conflict and the necessity of crafting a solution which would meet the test of political realism necessitated by the collapse of Yugoslavia.

I mention these examples as a reminder of how difficult it has been for post-nationalist Europe, with its homogeneous nation-states and stable boundaries, to accept the reality of the Yugoslav situation, forgetting that the process of "homogenization" of ethnic groups in the rest of Europe involved massive population transfers, borders imposed by violence and war, and the collapse of multi-national empires. That Yugoslavia, too, might pass through such a stage was difficult to acknowledge. Thus, valuable time was lost in efforts to impose solutions which could have only worked if Yugoslavia was, in fact, what she was not - part of a post-nationalist Europe, whose elites were basically in accord over the political order which would emerge in the post-Yugoslav era, and ready to relinquish their nationalist aspirations, even before these aspirations had had a chance to come to fruition through the process of nation-state formation through which the rest of Europe had passed.

Let me now turn to the crisis in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no need to review here the background of this tragic conflict, which the Bosnian people did not seek, but which was forced upon them by the collapse of Yugoslavia. (5) What the West has tended to overlook is that

4. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflict," SURVIVAL, Vol 35, Spring, 1993, p. 140

5. See Paul Shoup, "The Bosnian Crisis of 1992" in Sabrina Ramet (forthcoming), BEYOND YUGOSLAVIA (Westview Press, 1994) and Robert Hayden, "The Bosnian Debacle," in THE

well before the civil war broke out in March of 1992, basic changes had taken place which set the stage for what followed and made the civil war virtually unavoidable. I am alluding to the collapse of the communist regime, and the ascendancy of the nationalist parties, which culminated in the victory of the SDS, the SDA and the HDZ in the November, 1990 elections. What transpired at this time was a turnover of cadre - a veritable elite revolution - which radically altered the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (6). Communists were everywhere replaced by nationalists, who in turn collaborated with one another, at least in the early stages of the process, in dividing up the economy and seizing positions of power in the Bosnian government, the republic administration and the the police. Given the rise to power of these elements, one had to be profoundly skeptical that any proposal for returning Bosnia and Herzegovina to the status quo ante could succeed, especially if such a plan depended on these new nationalist elements for its implementation.

Yet - and this is my second observation - the rise of these new elites to power was a process which was accompanied by many contradictions, and in some cases was not complete. The differences within the ranks of the new nationalist elites are quite evident even today. These embrace the quite obvious differences between the Boban and Kljuic factions of the HDZ and differences in outlook within the Serbian and Moslem camps (in the latter case the dramatic confrontation between Izetbegovic and Fikret Abdic). Certain cities were fortunate enough to elect municipal governments from the ranks of the opposition - Tuzla and Vares are two examples - and these localities remained oases of ethnic toleration well into the conflict. Just as we overlooked, initially, the depth and extent of this "cadre revolution," so we must now avoid the opposite extreme, by ignoring the differences within the nationalist leaderships. This is a theme to which I would like to return later in my remarks.

Meanwhile, the Western response to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, couched in the legalistic language of post-nationalist Europe, was ill-suited to the realities created by the polarization of politics and the rise of the nationalist elites that had preceded the outbreak of the civil war. The efforts to devise constitutional solutions to the Bosnian crisis, although well intentioned, were bound to

DIPLOMATIC RECORD 1992-1993, Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, 1994 (forthcoming); and Srdjan Bogosavljevic et al, BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA IZMEDU RATA I MIRA (Belgrade, 1992).

6. This cadre revolution is discussed by Dusko Janjic in BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA IZMEDU RATA I MIRA, "Gradjanski rat i mogućnost mira u Bosni i Hercegovini" pp. 100-146.

fail, for they were premised on a model of consociationalism laced with human rights guarantees which, the students of democratic governments in multi-ethnic societies agreed, would not succeed if politics was already polarized along national lines.(7) The implementation of the Vance Owen plan, even if all sides had finally approved it, would have been extremely difficult. UN forces would have been fortunate to achieve control of Sarajevo and the major communications routes within the republic.(8) Since ethnic

7. See Kenneth D McRae, "Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville (ed), CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 93-106.

8. This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of the Vance-Owen plan. It is enough to examine the March 25th, so-called "Fourth Version" of the plan, to which Izetbegovic agreed and which was the version Karadzic signed off on May 1, to see what difficulties the UN would have encountered had the parliament of the RS accepted the agreement. The March 25 agreement focused on a government for the interim period. It provided for a Bosnian interim presidency of nine persons, three of each nationality. While the plan provided for voting by various majorities, depending on the importance of the subject matter, the Serbs insisted that the rules of order be adopted by consensus, assuring that each side could veto the actions of the transitional presidency. The provincial governments (with almost unlimited powers) were to be made of ten persons in which the ethnic groups would be represented in proportion to their numbers in the population in the 1991 census. At the same time, Cosic informed the parliament of the RS that Owen had agreed that UN troops would replace Serb troops in provinces from which they had to withdraw. Thus in province number five, embracing Eastern Bosnia, the government would have a majority of Muslims, and the UN would (in theory) replace Serb forces, but control of the province would have effectively remained in Serbian hands (just as took place when UNPROFOR occupied the Serbian minority areas of Croatia). In fact, none of the signatories to the plan agreed with its essential provisions: the Bosnian government set out a list of conditions when accepting the March 25 document which essentially vitiated its substance; the Serbs made no secret of the fact that they intended to carry on negotiations over territory and other issues even after signing the agreement; and the Croats, who could hardly conceal their glee when it appeared in late April that intervention was in the offing, showed their true intentions by launching an offensive against Mostar. Even the NATO plans for placing troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed to bear little relationship to the provisions of the Vance Owen plan. For the March 25 agreement and its annexes which lay out the Muslim conditions for implementing the plan, see United Nations Security Council, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

homogenization was all but inevitable within the ten provinces provided for by the Vance Owen plan, it would have been far wiser to draw their borders along ethnic lines to begin with, except, perhaps, in those regions where one could be reasonably certain that the local political elites were ready to preserve an ethnically mixed population.

I am equally skeptical of the other solutions that were put forth to shorten the war, or to "level" the playing field. All the solutions aimed at equalizing the strength of the contestants in the struggle - and of course I am thinking primarily of the U.S. backed policy of "lift and strike" - would have had just the opposite effect from that intended, that is, they would have sped up the fragmentation and partition of Bosnia Hercegovina, rather than helped preserve it intact, as the advocates of lift and strike implied. Efforts to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina, paradoxically, worked against the interests of those who wished to protect and preserve the multi-cultural traditions of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it left the contending sides (above all, the Serbs and the Muslims) with no alternative but to fight for total victory. In brief, it is difficult to envisage any scenario which could have preserved the Bosnian state, once the civil war began, short of massive Western intervention and the indefinite occupation of the region by a NATO force,

There were several other alternatives. One was to encourage the Croats and Muslims to coordinate their actions against the Serbs, and by limiting Serbian gains, to create the conditions for a Muslim-Croatian confederation after the war. The Vance Owen plan, in fact, rested heavily on the assumption that there would be Muslim-Croat cooperation in implementing the plan. In the event, this assumption proved false. For this President Tudjman is partly to blame. But the major cause for the breakdown of Muslim-Croat cooperation must be sought in the inability of the nationalist leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to reconcile their differences over territory which both claimed. Once more it is apparent that the nationalist elites were the main obstacle to solving the Bosnian question in a rational fashion - in this case, by an alliance between Croats and Muslims which could offset Serbian military superiority.

We are now faced with the consequences of the collapse of these efforts to save Bosnia and Herzegovina. We must now

GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: PEACE TALKS ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, Number S/23479 March 26 1993. For the Serbian interpretation of the Vance Owen agreement, see the Cosic-Milosevic-Bulatovic letter to the parliament of the RS, BORBA April 27, 1993, p.1.

accept the fact that the area embraced by the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, is witnessing the emergence of new nation-states. The question is where the boundaries of these states are to be drawn, whether these states can recover from the trauma of the civil war, and where and how the cause of political democracy and the protection of human rights can be advanced. There must be secure borders and there must be inducements to economic reconstruction and trade. If these states are to be based on the rule of law, the criminal elements which have flourished during the civil war must be brought under control, and those who have committed war crimes, brought to account. (9)

The first step must be a peace agreement, and the recent initiatives of the EU show a commendable desire to use the carrot as well as the stick by encouraging Serbia to press the Bosnian Serbs for territorial concessions in return for easing sanctions. Yet in the process, some of the mistakes that were made last February, when an effort was made to win over the Bosnian side to the Vance Owen plan with territorial inducements, seem to be resurfacing. The objections to the present settlement agreed to by the Croats and the Serbs in September go far deeper than the question of 3-4% more territory, as Izetbegovic would have us believe.

The issue of the future of Sarajevo remains unresolved, and the demands of the hard-liners in the Bosnian government camp for more territory conceal a determination to continue the war which will not be swayed by minor territorial concessions. On the other hand, the peace settlement, by accepting the Serbian conquest of Eastern Bosnia, encourages the Bosnian Muslims to plan for another war to recover lost territories, rather than focusing on peace and economic reconstruction.

9. The question of how war crimes trials should be conducted is an extremely delicate one, which I cannot address in this paper, but there are reasons to fear that the effort is not off to a good start. Lack of funds for investigation of war crimes threatens to undermine the impartiality of the process, since only those crimes that can be easily verified will come to trial. I am personally not convinced that it is wise to hold higher-ups responsible for the crimes of their subordinates except in egregious cases. My fear is that all the nationalist leaders would by this standard have to come to trial. As part of the nation-building and legitimization process which I discuss below, I feel it would be more useful to focus on those who actually committed these crimes (and perhaps their immediate superiors). If this was done, it might be possible to make the turning over of these persons to the international tribunal a condition for international economic aid and recognition.

In the same vein, I have questions about the constitutional arrangements set forth in the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan. The plan provides for a confederation of three independent states, but denies them international recognition. Apart from being unfair to the Bosnians (who presently enjoy international recognition), the solution seems designed to place a constitutional obstacle in the path of the development of nation-states out of the wreckage of the Bosnian civil war. I take this as evidence that the international community and the ICFY are still committed to preserving a Bosnian state in some form, although to what purpose is unclear. (10)

Furthermore, it may be questioned whether the agreements now on the table err by making no provisions for some form of regional autonomy within the three Bosnian republics. This is regrettable, because the central governments of these three new states are determined, just like the Croatian and Serbian governments before them, to impose their will over all independent groups and to curb the autonomy of those regions now outside the leaderships' control. The best guarantee for pluralism, and eventually a degree of multi-ethnic toleration, is decentralization and competition at the regional level. Regional autonomy, furthermore, should be tied to incentives offered by the international community to regional governments to encourage them to abide by human rights norms and other conditions of the peace settlement, in exchange for economic assistance.

Finally, I would like to comment on the efforts of the co-chairmen of the ICFY to "globalize" the Bosnian question by linking the solution of the crisis to other issues. The effort may backfire, simply because it adds new complexities to a question which must be resolved as rapidly as humanly possible in order to avoid a humanitarian disaster, and because the effort would likely prove fruitless unless more

10. The compact for a "Union of Republics" provided for a collective presidency, and a parliament of 120 members chosen by each of the three republics. The only ministry of note was that of Foreign Affairs. The question of whether this entailed Bosnia and Herzegovina giving up her seat in the United Nations occasioned some discussion; in the end the co-chairs promised the Bosnians a seat if the union failed. The weakening of the union began with two Joint Declarations signed in September - one between the Muslims and the Serbs, the other between the Muslims and the Croats, which provided that a referendum could be held within two years to decide if the union were to be retained. By the end of Geneva negotiations on November 30, the Union seemed to be virtually a dead letter. For the Union agreement see LE MONDE Aug 1-2, 1993 p. 3. For the September 16 Joint Declaration between the Muslims and the Serbs, see WASHINGTON POST Sept 17 1993, p. A34.

flexibility was introduced into the negotiations by permitting consideration of border changes and the annexation of the Republic of Serbia and Herceg-Bosna by Serbia and Croatia respectively.

These issues are difficult enough, yet they do not exhaust the agenda. How is the question of Sarajevo to be resolved? Increasingly, it appears that it will not be possible to place the city under UN control as was envisaged under the agreements of last September(11). It may be that the best solution would be to enable those Serbs who wish to leave, to do so(12). (The same right should of course be extended to Serbs in Tuzla and Zenica and to the Muslims who remain in Serbian and Croatian portions of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.) This could be part of a voluntary exchange of populations which would take place under international supervision. However distasteful such measures might be, they are preferable to the uncontrolled process of population displacement, including ethnic cleansing, which is presently going on.

We should be ready to consider the redrawing of the boundaries of Bosnia Herzegovina if this will facilitate a long-term solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. As the process of consolidating national territories goes forward, the rationale for adhering to the borders with the former Yugoslav republics becoming less compelling.(13) The issue must be approached with caution, because the EU remains firmly opposed to altering the boundaries of the former Yugoslav republics, while Milosevic is wary of boundary changes which would legitimize Kosovo's claim to independence and create a rival Serbian state in Bosnia and Croatia. The only solution I can envisage to the problem of the Serbs in Croatia is the voluntary secession of parts of the RSK to Croatia, which would take place more or less coterminously with the creation of a new state of Western Serbia. This new state (or possibly republic within Yugoslavia) would come into being as the result of the union of the RS and those parts of the RSK not ceded to

11. The negotiations of last summer, which are described by Lord Owen in great detail in his letter to the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, August 12, 1993, p.4 Just prior to the breakup of the Geneva negotiations, there was talk of dividing the city as part of an exchange of territory, the exact nature of which remained unclear.

12. The issue of evacuation of civilians, especially women and children, has been one of the most thorny of the conflict. The Bosnian government over the course of time became increasingly hostile to evacuations, and has insisted that only the sick and very old could leave. In December 1992 an agreement was reached in Geneva for free departure from the city, but never put into effect.

13. See THE WASHINGTON POST, November 30, 1993 P. A19.

Croatia. Such a solution is hardly conceivable at the present, but yet may become an option if war breaks in Croatia, or if the Bosnian Republic of Serbia joins Yugoslavia as a third republic.

Let me bring my remarks to a close. There are a myriad of issues, only some of which have been touched upon in my remarks, which must be resolved if peace is to come to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The underlying problem is what vision guides us as we approach the task of establishing peace and rebuilding the former Yugoslavia, as some day we must.

I have suggested that it is unrealistic to expect the process of state formation to leap stages in the Balkans, to conform to the norms of post-nationalist, post-materialist Western Europe. By accepting this fact, I do not mean to imply that questions of human and minority rights, democracy, and the rule of law must be given less of a priority than heretofore. If we must chose, there is no question that the vision of a multi-cultural Bosnia and Herzegovina to which the Bosnian government was committed was infinitely preferable to the Serbian program of ethnic cleansing and forced separation of nationalities. But it must be kept in mind that the possibility that Bosnia and Herzegovina could make the leap into the new European era was doomed by the ascendancy of the nationalist elites - including Izetbegovic's SDA - prior to the outbreak of the civil war. Even with the most enlightened government in Sarajevo - and the Muslim dominated Bosnian government fell short of that measure - some division of the republic along ethnic lines was sure to follow the collapse of Yugoslavia. Now we must live with the new reality of a partitioned Bosnia and Herzegovina, and try to see what can be done to promote peace, security, democracy, and respect for human rights in this new situation.

There are a number of ways these goals might be achieved. It is essential that the boundaries of the new states be inviolable and that the governments and peoples of these states enjoy security. This is above all a problem for the new Muslim state. The Muslim enclaves of Eastern Bosnia are a particularly painful legacy of the conflict, and an effort should be made to enlarge them and link them by a corridor of Muslim territory to the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim republic. The constitutional settlement should drop any pretense of a common government. The Bosnian Muslim republic should be permitted to retain her seat in the United Nations. Croatia and Serbia should be brought into the settlement in anticipation of the time when the territories of the RS and Herceg-Bosna will become part of a Yugoslav and Croatian federation, respectively, for only in this way can the bitter conflict among local Bosnian leaders and warlords be brought under control. More serious

consideration should be given to ways that refugees can be resettled, either abroad or in the new ethnic states. The odds that this can be accomplished will be improved if Yugoslavia and Croatia have annexed the RS and Herceg-Bosna, respectively, and if Zagreb and Belgrade have already committed themselves to a plan for the return of refugees as part of the peace settlement.

There are two other dimensions to the problem of creating the conditions for a long-term settlement. Both present grave difficulties. The first is the demilitarization of the region, perhaps an impossible task short of iron-clad guarantees from the EU and the U.S. that they will take every step necessary to assure that the settlement is honored. Since such a guarantee is hardly possible - it would mean, in effect, that the international community would throw its full weight behind a territorial partition of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina which is unfair to the Muslims - one can only hope that through a combination of carrot and stick, the Muslim government can be persuaded to limit its arms purchases and to accept her present boundaries while holding out the promise of border revisions at a future date. This may not be easy, if the Bosnian government can count on receiving aid from the Middle East, no strings attached.

The second difficulty lies in reviving democracy, and creating the elements of a law-and-order society in these new states. The problem lies not only in the dominance of the nationalist elites whose most extreme elements now are in the ascendancy thanks to the transfer dispossessed population from the villages to the cities, but in the disorganization and broken moral of the opposition forces. It is especially painful to have to ask these democratic elements to regroup and begin the battle for democracy all over again, now that Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which these groups put such store, is no more - all the more so because they hold the West responsible for this tragedy. Yet of all groups the anti-nationalist democratic opposition remains least tainted by breakdown of law and order that took place during the war. This may give them political leverage in the upcoming political struggles between the moderates and the extremists within the nationalist parties themselves.

Over the longer term, if there is a modicum of peace and stability, the democratic forces would seem to have at least a slight advantage, since the nationalist leaders are incapable of resolving the economic and other problems these new nations will face. On the other hand, realism compels us to recognize that the former Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most Stalinist of the Yugoslav republics until shortly before communism collapsed in Yugoslavia. The Serbian government of the RS seems to have picked up many of the habits of this doctrinaire and authoritarian regime.

Of course, the suspension or even abolition of sanctions against Serbia must be part of a peace settlement, as the EU now realizes. But the package offered Serbia should include provisions for future border negotiations with the Bosnian Muslim republic, the extradition of persons found to be directly involved in war crimes, and pledges concerning demilitarization of the border of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Republic, assuming that the RS would become a third Yugoslav republic.

Regardless of the nature of a final agreement over the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must realize that the most difficult problem that will face the international community and the EU will be to persuade the Bosnian Muslim republic that it has more to gain by implementing the settlement than by preparing for a new war to regain lost territories. For the moment the intent of the Bosnian Muslims is clearly to accept a peace settlement in order to fight another day. There is a limit, I think, to which one can entice the Bosnians with economic aid, or threaten them with the withdrawal of that aid, in the expectation that they will become reconciled to the status quo. There should be some hope, on the Muslim side, that they can regain at least a portion of the territories that they have lost. (14) Perhaps the best way to achieve this goal would be to get the RS, as well as Serbia and Yugoslavia to agree to negotiations about border adjustments after a certain lapse of time. The readmission of Serbia (that is, Yugoslavia) into the international community could be made conditional upon the successful outcome of such negotiations. Croatia, of course, should should also be made aware of the need to make some concessions, eventually, to the Bosnian Muslim republic.

The proposals I have set forth here are not fixed in stone. On the contrary, they are meant to illustrate the immense complexity of the Bosnian situation, and the need for a more detailed study of the issues which are posed by the partitioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am not fully convinced that the ICFY is up to the task of assimilating the implications of this new situation. It might be appropriate for a group of experts to prepare a set of recommendations on the future of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. These recommendations might in turn encourage the diplomats to broaden their thinking about the nature of the peace settlement. Perhaps this conference could be the starting point for such an endeavor.

We also need to re-establish contact with the democratic opposition forces in the former Bosnia and

14. The most difficult issue in Eastern Bosnia appears to be Foca, to which both the Bosnian Muslims laid claim at the Geneva talks.

Herzegovina, for without their assistance, and without their participation in politics, the future of the region is grim indeed.

Finally, it is evident that a final settlement will not be achieved in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina without a great deal of pressure being exerted by the international community, including the United States, on the parties concerned. This would seem to call for a new London Conference, as suggested by the French and the Germans. Perhaps a new set of proposals for a peace settlement, cast in terms of nation building and peace in the Balkans, could win American support for such a conference. Certainly it is worth a try.

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International Conference:

"The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans: How to Achieve Security?"

Bologna University, December 10-12, 1993

"SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE BALKANS: A VIEW FROM RUSSIA"

by Nikolai KOLIKOV, the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow

The war in Yugoslavia has indicated an abyss where Europe may slide, and, first and foremost, the Balkans and Russia together with other former Soviet republics. International community must draw the necessary conclusions, before it is too late. Must find an outcome from the disaster-prone situation. I, therefore, support this conference, the initiative of the University of Bologna and express appreciation to the European Union for endorsing this initiative.

From its very outset the crisis in Yugoslavia has been the focus of Russia's most keen attention. There was a lot of debate in the Russian political elite generated by the attitudes to the crisis. There are at least three reasons why:

First, due to Russia's historical involvement in the affairs of the Balkan region and due to its cultural and emotional links with the Slavic and Orthodox peoples living in the peninsula.

Second, Russia's geopolitical and economic interests demand a strengthening of security and stability in the Balkans without which one cannot imagine Europe living in peace and prosperity, taking into account not only the military aspects, but the non-military ones as well.

Third, - last but not least, - what makes one apprehensive is the fact that there are quite many common features crisis processes in Yugoslavia and in the post-Soviet area.

In both places the artificial federations have collapsed and brought about the growth of tension in the relations with largest nation - Russians and Serbs who seem to have been an embodiment of the federation unity idea.

In both places the social transformation process is being accompanied by a true outburst of nationalism. But this kind of nationalism is particular, destructive, drawing strength mostly from the ethnic awareness, ruining the established social and national communities and the century-old habit of ethnic and national tolerance. This kind of nationalism is a serious challenge to the European civilization with its explicit trend towards integration and mutual penetration.

And finally, there coincide even the details of the process of pushing out the units of the People's Army of Yugoslavia from Croatia and the Soviet (Russia's) Army units from the Baltic States and Georgia. Just think of the behaviour of the so-called title nations which, having formed states of their own, adopt an imperial stand towards smaller nations and national groups irrespective of how long, in terms of years or centuries, they have been living in the territory. We witness this both in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus.

There is one drastic distinction, to be sure. In Yugoslavia they are already past the point which separate tension from an open armed conflict. Least this should happen in Russia, it must carefully draw on the lessons of crisis in Yugoslavia. It must do its best not only to put out the flames ravaging the Balkans, but also to facilitate a lasting consolidation of peace and stability in the region.

Let us ask ourselves: what is the best way to do this? What are the best solutions for consolidation of stability in the Balkan peninsula which is the touching point of different civilizations, different religions, where for centuries the interests of great powers crossed?

There are three problems of this kind in my opinion. They differ in scale and character, but all the three are vital for stable peace in the Balkans.

The first problem is surely most complex, if not the most important. It amounts to really safeguarding human rights and minority rights together with solving the boundary issues.

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The UN and CSCE, the peaceful settlement in Yugoslavia have offered noteworthy tips on each of these aspects. But the positive results are yet to come.

I think the reason is the fact that two points are not properly taken into account. First, each of these aspects, like the human rights, the national minorities' rights and the boundary issues are taken up, more often than not, in isolation, just as they are. And the crux of the matter is that their solution has to be comprehensive. Secondly, it is necessary to take stock of the fact that this knot of contradictions is complex and painful not only for Yugoslavia, the Balkans or Russia. It has a bearing on the vital interests of Western European countries like UK, Spain and many others.

This seems to be the toughest issue today in international law and in other social sciences. They must pull together their efforts to find an efficient solution and provide their recommendations for policy which is in need of new theoretical approaches after the end of the cold war.

The second problem is the absence of regional security structures in the Balkans.

The war in Yugoslavia has shown that the UN, CSCE, and NATO efforts as such are insufficient to resolve complex conflicts, with their civilizational, ethnic, social, and territorial components. Besides, these conflicts are burdened with the historical heritage, social transformation problems, and the low level of power's legitimacy in post-totalitarian societies.

Security in the Balkans will remain unstable unless a two-fold objective is accomplished: putting an end to the Yugoslavian war and, at the same time, creating prerequisites to avert new conflicts. Paradoxically, the end of the cold war helped revitalize the myths of Great Bulgaria, Great Serbia, Great Romania, Great Hungary, Great Albania. It is clear that attempts to put even one of them into reality will disrupt the balance of the already unstable Balkan system for years to come.

In my opinion, a way out can be found along the line of shaping Balkan regional security structure, within which national antagonisms between the Balkan countries themselves could gradually be reduced to minimum. Its establishment could

begin with a kind of Balkan Declaration that would incorporate multilateral consultations mechanisms. The next stage would consist in more concrete cooperation in the sphere of security with its both military and civilian aspects. All this in no way contradicts the Black Sea, Mediterranean, or Danube cooperation effort or the Balkan nations' participation in European institutions.

I believe this kind of regional structure should be given guarantees by the UN, OSCE, NATO, WEU, and European Union. Some interested powers, including Russia, could also give their guarantees.

And the third problem is external forces' interference in the region affairs. Without its solution it is impossible to ensure security in the Balkans and hence in Europe as a whole.

It is generally known what this interference led to in 1914. Of course, today the situation is different. But there still are apprehensions in the Balkans that the region may again become a sphere of rivalry between European powers.

In particular, they point out that reunified Germany's stand provoked Yugoslavia's partition. There are fears of Moslem countries' interference in the Balkan nations' affairs, especially of Turkey with its modernized economy and the strongest army in the region. Finally, many believe that as soon as Russia recovers from its internal crisis, it will rush to the Balkans to defend its geopolitical interests.

I think that both the world community and the Balkan states themselves should do their best to prevent the region from turning into a sphere of external forces' rivalry which would directly lead to destabilization in Europe, if not to a new Big War.

As for Russia, today it does not have its old days interest in the straits of Constantinople, which remained an *idee fixe* in the Russian foreign policy up to 1917, and hence it no longer has a geopolitical interests in the Balkans.

I would like to stress that this does not mean at all that Russia should avoid playing any role in the Balkans. Russia is vitally interested in the promotion of the region's peace and

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stability, prosperity of the Balkan nations, establishment of strong democratic institutions in them. Russia does and should play its part in inter-national peace and humanitarian efforts in the former Yugoslavia and not only there. Russia can and should help create and strengthen regional stability structures in the Balkans, which would avert new outbursts of old national hostilities.

But Russia can and must do all this only together with other members of the international community, international security structures, and with active participation of the Balkan states themselves.

What Russia should not do and cannot do for a long time due to the current domestic situation, is to put itself in opposition to other nations, compete with them for predominance either in the Balkans or in Eastern Europe as a whole. For that it has neither enough strength nor vital interests.

The main point is that in the nuclear age, a key role in the Balkan and world affairs should be played by interdependence and collective responsibility of states, not their rivalry.

Only along this line it is possible to come to the Europeanized Balkans, but not to Balkanized Europe.

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LA DICTATURE, LA GUERRE ET LA DEMOCRATIE EN EX-YOUGOSLAVIE

Depuis plus de deux ans, la communauté démocratique est choquée par les images de guerre en ex-Yougoslavie : massacres, nettoyages ethniques, destructions de villes entières, souffrance de la population.

Parallèlement, la diplomatie internationale reste impuissante face à ce conflit au coeur de l'Europe, à quelques centaines de kilomètres de Vienne, Budapest ou Venise. Les hommes politiques sont déconcertés par une situation tout à fait nouvelle : tout le monde fait la guerre à tout le monde. Pas un seul accord signé n'est respecté au-delà de quelques heures. La confusion s'est installée durablement et l'espoir de trouver une solution pacifique et démocratique paraît de plus en plus incertaine.

Mon idée principale est que la guerre en ex-Yougoslavie ne résulte pas de la coexistence de plusieurs ethnies, cultures et langues dans un même espace géographique.

Il n'y a pas non plus de raisons "fatales", qu'elles soient religieuses ou historiques. Encore moins de facteurs qui relèveraient d'un complot international.

La cause principale de la guerre est à rechercher dans la nature du régime, c'est-à-dire dans la classe politique en Serbie (où tout a commencé) ainsi qu'en Croatie (qui a adopté les mêmes principes). Il s'agit bien de régimes totalitaires et dictatoriaux. Pour eux, la guerre est le meilleur moyen de conserver le pouvoir. Le nationalisme agressif est une manière d'étouffer la société civile et le libéralisme, puis de sacrifier l'individu sur l'autel de la masse pour mieux le manipuler. Il est toujours dirigé contre un ennemi extérieur. Un tel régime est voué à "fabriquer" la guerre. A Belgrade, tant que la guerre dure, personne n'ira demander à Milosevic pourquoi la Serbie court à sa perte: personne n'ira demander des comptes sur l'inflation journalière de 20% et sur un salaire mensuel qui ne dépasse guère 10 deutsche marks. Ou

bien, pour quelle raison trois ou quatre cent mille personnes, toutes nationalités confondues, sont mortes. Pour quelle raison trois millions de personnes ont été chassées. Bien sûr personne n'ira le demander, et pourtant le résultat est là : la Serbie n'a jamais connue dans son histoire une situation économique et internationale aussi désastreuse. Ces mêmes questions ne seront pas non plus posées à Tadjman, le dictateur croate. La guerre se révèle donc être la condition de survie de ces deux dictateurs.

Le phénomène NATIONALISME - DICTATURE - GUERRE a déjà un précédent en Europe. Allemagne, à partir de 1933. Hitler et les nazis ont été élus au cours d'élections démocratiques grâce à leur politique nationaliste agressive. Puis est venue la dictature. La dictature et le nationalisme ont dû "fabriquer" la guerre pour survivre. Les conséquences sont connues.

Voilà pourquoi, avec le profond souci que j'éprouve pour mon pays, ce qui est fort compréhensible, je me fais de plus en plus de souci pour l'Europe. "L'affaire" yougoslave pourrait se produire partout. D'ailleurs, elle se produit aux bordures de notre continent, dans les pays de l'ex-Union soviétique.

La question est de savoir pourquoi les dictatures nationalistes sont apparues si vite en Serbie et en Croatie. Pour répondre à cette question, il faut savoir qu'il y a de nombreuses causes générales et que seulement quelques-unes sont spécifiques à la Yougoslavie.

La première partie de la réponse concerne l'ancien système communiste. Ce système était très centralisé. Le pouvoir économique et politique se trouvait dans les mêmes mains. Toutes les tentatives de réformes durant la période communiste portaient sur la décentralisation et donnaient des prérogatives plus importantes aux instances locales. Dans les pays socialistes à caractère multiethnique, les réformes et la décentralisation ont été basées sur des revendications d'autonomie plus importante pour les diverses ethnies.

L'autogestion, développée en ex-Yougoslavie pendant plusieurs décennies, avait pour objectif une autonomie des entreprises et non des régions. Cependant, cette expérience n'a pas réussi à arrêter la montée du nationalisme.

Suite à la chute du communisme, le nationalisme s'est partout renforcé.

On aurait pu espérer un affaiblissement de l'Etat, mais l'on a assisté à un accroissement de son pouvoir totalitaire. On aurait pu attendre une plus grande reconnaissance de la liberté de chaque ethnies, mais l'on a assisté à la volonté de domination de l'une sur l'autre.

Si les événements ont pris la tournure que l'on connaît, la responsabilité en revient à la classe politique. Le pouvoir a été détenu dans les pays communistes par la "nomenklatura", la bureaucratie d'Etat et du Parti. Ce sont les bureaucrates qui étaient à la tête de toutes les entreprises, des institutions culturelles et scientifiques. Il y en avait aussi une partie au sein de l'intelligentsia et de la classe ouvrière. Leur idéologie consistait à conserver pouvoir et privilèges, quant à l'idée communiste dont on peut penser ce que l'on veut, elle a été trahie depuis longtemps.

Suite à la chute du communisme, la structure politique du régime a tout de suite changé d'orientation idéologique. Elle s'est muée en un nationalisme radical. Le but, encore une fois, était de conserver le pouvoir. Ainsi, le totalitarisme d'autrefois a simplement "retourné sa veste". De communiste il est devenu nationaliste.

Le fait que les partis nationalistes aient été élus au suffrage universel en Serbie aussi bien qu'en Croatie s'explique facilement. Ces élections ont été organisées en 1990 et 1991 en ex-Yougoslavie dans un climat de crise économique et de chômage. Un nombre important de jeunes n'avait aucune perspective. Les vieilles valeurs s'étaient effondrées, et l'insécurité grandissait. Dans cette situation, les électeurs ont accepté les réponses

simples à leurs problèmes. Le nationalisme est en effet très simple : la responsabilité des difficultés économiques est rejetée sur les autres, et le leader puissant est présenté comme un sauveur. Ce discours a été soutenu par un monopole des médias.

Dès que Milosevic eut renforcé son pouvoir en Serbie, la politique agressive serbe a commencé à se manifester, d'abord au Kosovo, puis au Monténégro. Cette politique s'appuyait sur les mouvements populistes et les méthodes anticonstitutionnelles. Les hommes politiques indisciplinés ont été remplacés par des nationalistes. La Slovénie et la Croatie se sont opposées à cette politique. En Croatie, le parti nationaliste de Tudjman ayant adopté le même comportement en arrivant au pouvoir. Les conflits locaux se sont étendus et se transformés en guerre généralisée.

Très vite, la Bosnie-Herzégovine est devenue le centre des affrontements. La guerre a commencé par l'agression serbe pour devenir avec le temps une guerre totale. J'évite de parler d'une guerre civile en Bosnie. C'est, en fait, une guerre contre les civils, contre la communauté multi-confessionnelle.

En réalité, la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine est une guerre entre la Serbie et la Croatie dont le but est de s'approprier de nouveaux territoires appartenant à un autre Etat. Les Serbes et les Croates de Bosnie ne sont que des instruments dans les mains de Milosevic et de Tudjman, les vrais "seigneurs de la guerre". Ces Serbes et ces Croates de Bosnie sont avec les Bosniaques les plus grandes victimes de cette guerre.

Je dis bien "Bosniaques" et non pas "Musulmans". Quant on dit musulman en Bosnie, on parle de nationalité, et non pas de religion. De nombreux "Musulmans" sont athées. Le nom "musulman" pour désigner leur nationalité a été mal choisi dans les années soixante, et maintenant cela crée beaucoup de malentendus. Mais, il faut dire aussi qu'en Bosnie, avec les "Musulmans", habitent de nombreux Croates et Serbes partisans d'une Bosnie autonome basée

sur les principes de citoyenneté. Nous pourrions donc, les appeler, donc, tous "bosniaques", et c'est alors que ce mot retrouverait son vrai sens.

Au fond, la situation en ex-Yougoslavie n'a pas changé depuis un an. Les nombreux événements survenus n'ont pas profondément influé sur la situation.

La guerre en Bosnie continue, seulement maintenant, les combats opposent, le plus souvent, Croates et Musulmans. Le dernier traité de paix, un de plus, n'a pas été signé. Il s'agit du partage de la Bosnie en trois parties confédérales sur des bases ethniques. Il est clair que cette solution est le premier pas vers, d'une part, l'union de la partie serbe en Bosnie avec la Serbie, et d'autre part, la partie croate en Bosnie avec la Croatie. Même si ce traité était signé, ce plan aboutirait à d'autres conflits.

Autre conflit qui s'accroît : celui, en Croatie, entre le pouvoir en place et les Serbes qui ont annexé un tiers du territoire de cet Etat. Ceux-ci ont d'ailleurs "proclamé" leur propre Etat.

Les dictatures de Belgrade et de Zagreb tiennent fermement le pouvoir entre leurs mains; l'opposition démocratique est sans influence sérieuse.

La situation économique est dans les deux pays désastreuse. Les réformes économiques et le développement d'une économie de marché sont stoppés. Les premières privatisations de l'économie, entamées par le dernier gouvernement d'ex-Yougoslavie, ont été vite remises en question et les entreprises concernées sont retournées dans le giron de l'Etat. En fait de libre-échange, nous avons des Etats, qui par leurs décrets, gèrent l'économie et fixent les prix.

Dans les deux pays, les partis au pouvoir dominent complètement la vie économique, politique et culturelle. Ce sont, au fond, des systèmes à parti unique.

Le degré de liberté économique et politique, en Croatie aussi bien qu'en Serbie, est aujourd'hui nettement

inférieur à ce qu'il était en ex-Yougoslavie où une forme libérale de socialisme s'était développée.

La politique de la communauté internationale n'a pas changée non plus. Elle est faite de mauvaises évaluations, d'absence d'informations et de buts précis, de résignation face au fait accompli, et de changements de ses principes. Cette politique confuse ne pouvait vraiment pas donner de résultats. La communauté internationale ne porte pas la responsabilité de la guerre, mais le fait est qu'elle est confrontée à cette guerre et qu'elle n'y trouve pas de solutions.

La dernière question à laquelle je désire répondre est la suivante : Est-ce que la Communauté internationale a réellement un intérêt politique à résoudre la crise en ex-Yougoslavie? Je pose la question du point de vue de la "realpolitik", c'est-à-dire de manière plus concrète et au-delà des principes généraux, l'engagement pour la paix, les droits de l'homme, etc. Ces principes vont de soi, bien sûr.

Je répondrai par l'affirmative. Parce que l'Europe et le monde sont beaucoup moins stables politiquement qu'ils n'en ont l'air. La durée de la guerre en ex-Yougoslavie a déjà troublé l'unité de la Communauté internationale. Un foyer de conflits en Europe, avec la possibilité de s'étendre aux Balkans, peut briser complètement cette unité si chère à l'Europe, remettant en question la paix et la stabilité sur le continent.

"Le syndrome yougoslave" s'est d'ailleurs vite étendu dans certains pays de l'ex-Union soviétique. Ainsi, le danger se multiplie.

Nous devons regarder la vérité en face, même si c'est au prix de nos illusions. En Bosnie, les volontaires russes, se sont engagés au côté des Serbes, les volontaires allemands au côté des Croates, et les volontaires islamistes ont rejoint les rangs musulmans. Les mêmes pays leurs fournissent des armes. Donc, nous pouvons dire

que les puissances étrangères sont directement impliquées dans le conflit en ex-Yougoslavie. Pour l'instant, l'importance n'en est que symbolique.

Mais qui peut garantir que demain cela ne va pas prendre des dimensions plus importantes, pour aller jusqu'aux vraies alliances militaires? Ose-t-on imaginer une telle Europe? N'est-t-il pas suffisant qu'une guerre mondiale ait commencé à Sarajevo?

La communauté internationale a donc un véritable intérêt à stabiliser cette région de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Reste à savoir comment?

L'important est de tirer les leçons des échecs précédents de la politique de la communauté internationale. C'est pourquoi j'ai la conviction que cette politique doit être fondée sur les principes suivants:

1. Une solution globale doit être recherchée pour tous les foyers de conflits à la fois: la Bosnie, les parties de la Croatie contrôlée par les Serbes locaux, le Kosovo, la Macédoine, les relations entre la Serbie et la Croatie, etc. Dans le cas contraire, de nouvelles régions ne cesseront de s'embraser.

2. Une solution démocratique durable est impossible tant qu'en Serbie et en Croatie le pouvoir sera détenu par des dictateurs et leurs "vassaux" (Karadzic pour les Serbes de Bosnie, Boban pour les Croates de Bosnie). La politique de la communauté internationale doit encourager les changements politiques à Belgrade et à Zagreb.

Ces deux principes peuvent être réalisés par les moyens suivants:

- a) mettre en place un protectorat des Nations unies sur toute la Bosnie-Herzégovine pendant un an, désarmer toutes les formations militaires, et fixer la date des élections démocratiques dans un an.

Cela veut dire: la non-reconnaissance des leaders et des pouvoirs en place - serbes, croates et musulmans en Bosnie ainsi que le refus de dialogue - avec eux. D'ailleurs, ils n'ont aujourd'hui aucune légitimité au sein de leur population. Leur seule "légitimité" provient

de la communauté internationale qui traite avec eux sur un pied d'égalité.

b) Sous la menace de l'isolement international, exiger des élections démocratiques en Serbie, Croatie et au Monténégro ; la libération des média ; le contrôle, non seulement des élections, mais aussi des conditions nécessaires à la campagne électorale. Il faut soutenir et aider l'opposition démocratique.

c) Proposer un plan global pour éteindre les foyers de crise, qui comporterait les éléments suivants:

- le respect des droits des minorités en Serbie (les Albanais du Kosovo) et en Croatie (les Serbes) doit être statué de la même manière.

- proposer des mesures pour la reconstruction de cette région (l'union douanière, les droits individuels à la nationalité dans plusieurs pays d'ex-Yougoslavie etc.)

- un programme de désarmement, sous contrôle international, pour toute la région.

- un programme d'aide financière internationale pour la reconstruction économique, à condition que les points précédents soient appliqués.

Bien sûr, il s'agit là d'idées qui méritent d'être approfondies. Peut-être semblent-elles utopiques. Cependant, je suis sûr que les citoyens d'ex-Yougoslavie les accepteraient s'ils étaient libérés des "cages nationalistes" dans lesquelles leurs dictateurs les tiennent captifs.

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22 NOV. 1994

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SERBIA BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

Serbia of today lives in the state of anomy. Serbia has, actually, fallen out of development. It is reigned by "Racketeer economy", the spirit of radicalism and militarism. Sheltered behind the armor of international sanctions and isolationism of the ruling regime, it is still reluctant to take a good look at itself and admit that the lack of readiness of the majority to take the challenge of modernization along with the ruling policy have brought it to a historical defeat. Social and political situation in Serbia bears the mark of times bygone. The past, dominated by anti-reformist and anti-modern ideas shrouds the chances, ideas and proponents of a possible democratization, modernization and Europeanization of Serbia.

The period between 1987 and 1992 in Serbia, was characterized by a deep identity crisis and profound economic, political, cultural and ethnic plight. The social life was marked by nationalistic totalitarianism, provincialism and Balkanization. Disintegration of (the former) Yugoslavia turned the overall regression into an agony of a civil war. The ruling regime in Serbia is one of the main factors which contributed to the deepening of the crisis, disintegration of (the former) Yugoslavia and forestalling of Serbia's democratic development.

This paper represents an attempt to delineate a possible framework for understanding of certain aspects of the lasting and deep identity crises of both the Serbian nation and the state. It will deal with only a few of a multitude of aspects of the Serbian national issue, and primarily with the problem of the national identity of the Serbs, their relations with "others" (minorities within Serbia, other ethnic communities and parts of the Serbian nation outside Serbia), and the possibilities for democratization and modernization of Serbia as a state and social community.

Two Views of the Serbian National Programme

The opening of the Serbian national issue was, perhaps, one of the greatest surprises in the post-Tito Yugoslavia.¹ It was a challenge which, within that Yugoslavia, went unanswered. That was predominantly the result of instrumentalization of this issue by Slobodan Milošević (called "Slobo" by his fans and followers) who took the lead of the Serbian communist party in 1987 after a coup of a kind within the party itself. He, then, presented himself as a unifier and savior of the Serbs and Serbia, a guarantor of the Yugoslav unity and a "strong man" Yugoslavia had been waiting for since Tito's death.² In his efforts to "replace Tito" he stuck to the ideal of national homogenization and mobilization of the people. That required a totalitarian and authoritarian rule wherein the leading autocrat alone decides what is just and best for the people, which was just what suited the wishes of a part of the Yugoslav politocracy who, in their attempts to preserve charismatic rule at any cost, chose Slobodan Milošević. Being a "hybrid" himself, he was the best possible product and voice of the "hybrid" Yugoslav social system and its elite. That futile effort to sustain the authority and the system wasted many human lives, material and other values; it also wasted Yugoslavia and prevented Serbia from expressing and resolving the issue of its identity as a civil nation-state and the Serbs from resolving their national issue as the one of democracy. That is, and will remain in future, a source of tensions not only in Serbia and not only among the Serbs.

In effect, the historical experience of the existence of various and mutually conflicting national programmes was repeated. Formulation of various Serbian national programmes - which could be divided into the programmes which regard the national issue as the one of the state and those which consider this issue to be the one of democracy - is the result of varying social concepts but also an expression of the plurality of the Serbian state and nation.

Within the Serbian nation there have been two national programmes, since the beginning of the past century when in its national revolution it placed on the agenda the issue of completion of its liberalization and unification. The first one, in chronological order, invoking upon the medieval state, starts from the request to enlarge and expand Serbia, to attain its "historical rights" which the "other South

1 Svetozar Stojanović, *Jugoslovenska kriza i srpsko nacionalno pitanje*, "Filozofija i društvo", Beograd, III, 1990, p. 261.

2 Jean-Philippe Melchior, *Reflexion sur la crise Yougoslavie*, "Les Temps Modernes", Paris, 1989, p. 277.

Slavs must appreciate" because the "Serbs were to first to start fighting" and are therefore entitled to complete that struggle; furthermore, the Serbs have the right to speak on behalf of all the South Slavs. The second national programme is linked to the appearance of the liberal and, in general, critical thought in Serbia. Its central idea is indivisibility of the external liberation and internal freedom; the nation is not a totality and the national principle is not, by itself, progressive; the unity of Serbia is not a "unity of offices", but the "unity of people". Supporters of this programme were the ones who named the first programme - which they otherwise opposed - the policy of "greater Serbia". They believed that the policy of Greater Serbia in a situation characterized by the lack of ethnographic and geographical borders which would delineate a single "whole" would lead the Serbs into assuming the role of a "conqueror", instead of contributing to the material and cultural development of the Serbian nation. That is an expansionist policy, and the Serbia created through conquests would, of necessity, be a military-police state, and the Serbian nation surrounded by enemies and impoverished. "Greater Serbia" is a weak structure which is incapable of securing the interests of its people. Therefore, as opposed to the Greater Serbia, they supported resolution of the Serbian issue in an alliance of the Balkan and Yugoslav peoples.³ This division into two programmes - two Serbias, has perpetuated and deepened to this date.

The programme of Milošević, although incomplete and largely burdened with political-tactical alliance with the remains of the (ex) federal structure, in the first place the Army, relies on that national programme which, invoking upon the medieval states, demands enlargement and expansion of Serbia; demands the attainment of its "historical rights". That programme concealed behind the project of the "Rump Yugoslavia" has activated the Serbian national issue exclusively as the issue of the state with the leading ideal of homogenization and mobilization of the masses.

Orientation of the authorities in Serbia towards the state, i.e. ~~consolidating~~ ^{TITISTONING} nationalism⁴ combined with certain ideological elements of socialism, enabled these authorities and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) to be perceived as guarantors of continuity (primarily of collectivism and dependence from the state), but also as a "new authority". That resulted in their victory at 1991 elections.

3 Latinka Perović, Nacionalni interesi i nacionalni programi, "Republika", Beograd, 1-5 april 1991, p. 7.

4 Robert M. Hayden, Constitutional Nationalism in the Former Yugoslav Republics, "Slavic Review", Stanford, CA. Winter, 1992.

The structure, ideological commitments and activity of opposition parties - which largely remain in the range of nationalism and chauvinism, already covered by the present authorities- only strengthen the determination of these authorities to strive towards state nationalism and, if necessary, chauvinist positions. Therefore, emphasizing of the national interest as the priority and creation of the state of war, i.e. mobilization for national war objectives, makes the present authorities in Serbia strong. In the background of all this are numerous factors including nationalist homogenization, on one side, and severe inter-ethnic conflicts in Serbia and Yugoslavia on the other. Among these, particular attention should be paid to conflicts of political psychological stereotypes; conflicts of doctrines and conflicts of political institutions.

In the sphere of conflicts of psychological stereotypes, actual, partially altered or entirely fictitious events (various "cases" - "Vojko and Savle"; "the Opačić case", "Mlinar case", "poisoning of school children in Kosovo", etc.) are used for construction or strengthening of stereotypes, and especially those of the type "our people is the victim", "our territory, our homes are endangered". A characteristic feature of these conflicts is that they do not have clear nor final objectives, and can move in various directions; anonymity of those who initiate conflicts is guaranteed, which, - in a situation of control over police and mass media- gives the authorities an unlimited range for "imagination" and operation. Organized groups function as triggers in the creation of mechanisms of spontaneous processes, and spontaneity is of key importance. Therefore, the problem with these processes is that they cannot be controlled and are subjected to the "parallel public opinion". That fact has been confirmed by the strengthening of extreme chauvinism and changeover of an enormous number of SPS members and voters to the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and V. Šešelj.

In the domain of conflicts of ideological doctrines, the battle is being waged to win the members of the Serbian nation for individual ideological concepts. For the time being, the authorities and the SPS have managed to impose the concept of historical and ethnic rights of Serbia and the Serbs, through the formula of the "Serbian lands"; to emphasize the priority of national objectives and the war danger over reform and democracy; to reinterpret the past, especially the period from 1918 to 1945 (as demonstrated in the daily political play with symbols); to make them grant the preference to the Leader and his "allies in the shadow" over the law abiding

state, democratic structure and opposition parties. A chain of political ideas of the Leader, SPS and authorities - political concepts- slogans- legislature, was made.

Already at the time of 1991 elections the conflicts of political institutions became highly pronounced, namely, there were conflicts between political organizations (parties, political blocks, institutions of power, etc.) primarily on the issue of the control of the state, and political rights of individuals and groups. Etatism, strong centralism and Serbian-national collectivism was the basic option of the authorities and the SPS. The main achievements of this option include: creation of a "unified state of Serbia"; activation of the Serbian national issue as the issue of the state; "liquidation" of the autonomies, local self administration and suppression of ideas and political options of regionalism; redefinition of the position of Serbia in Yugoslavia as a "protector of all Serbs and Serbian territories; high political and emotional mobilization and homogenization of masses for national interests; activation of the "national line" in political organization, not only of Serbs but also of all other ethnic groups in Serbia and abandoning of the former single party structure and consciousness-practice; political pluralism and the necessity of the mechanism of elections for provision of legitimacy to the authorities. However, escalation of conflicts in inter-ethnic relations in Serbia, primarily in the relations between the Serbs and Albanians and thereafter also Serbs and Muslims and Serbs and Hungarians, drives the citizens of Serbia of non-Serbian ethnic origin, as well as non-chauvinist Serbs, away from the present authorities.

There is also an obvious intensification of conflicts in the internal territorial-political sphere combined with the ethnic moment, wherein Kosovo and the Albanian population are entirely outside of the control and influence of authorities; control of Sandžak becomes increasingly difficult, the influence on the Muslim and minority groups, especially the Hungarians, is diminishing. Furthermore, there is also the problem of retaining the control in Vojvodina and also of the initiation of the issue of the status of these areas and the actual power, economic strength and meeting of social and individual requirements on the local level.

The question of the position and rights of ethnic and other minorities has also been a painful issue for the present regime in Serbia. This regime, following the logic of the centralizing state nationalism, tries to resolve this issue within the limits of "minimum rights" and reduction of until now existing "surplus rights". Numerous solutions (eg. the one on the language of minorities) fall short of international

standards and by far exceed the existing practice. That adds to the increase of the ethnic distance as well as discrimination, accompanied by efforts of each of the groups (minorities in particular) to independently organize their political life and so resolve their political and social problems. Numerous and more influential ethnic minorities (eg. Hungarians) are increasingly voicing requests for autonomy and reliance on international circumstances and support. Actually, the issue of loyalty of the minorities towards the state and protection of their rights by the state has been relinquished to ad hoc political solutions and the relation of powers "in the field", although Serbia has a large number of members of other national groups amounting to as much as 34,3%.

Improvement of the legal protection of minorities is a part of a long process of stabilization and democratization of Serbia. And Serbia is, just like the FR of Yugoslavia, at the very beginning of the establishment of a new institutional system, including therefore also the system of management and resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts. With that, one should bear in mind that the overall situation of human rights is unsatisfactory and that it affects all citizens and minorities in particular. That is confirmed by the previously stated view: "The fate of the minorities in the modern society is outstanding, uncertain".⁵ And, under the circumstances of an economic and legal collapse, unstable political and social environment, that uncertainty comes close to being dramatic and even tragic. That kind of the position of the minorities is particularly determined by the following factors: disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, its legal system and the federal centre which guaranteed a comparatively high degree of collective rights of the minorities; increase of nationalism within the minorities but also within the Serbian nation; conflicting of the ruling effort to build the homogenous national state and the reality of ethnic heterogeneity of Serbia. In this case, as well, the minority problem is related to inter-ethnic relations within Serbia itself, but also to inter-state relations.⁶ Indeed, the fate of the minorities is linked to certain wider and even regional solutions (starting from the solution for the relations between the newly created states on the territories of (the former) Yugoslavia to Central-European and Balkan integrations).⁷ In view of the force of the problem and the fact that, in the territory of

5 Marciello Carrini, Etničke manjine. Moć i opštenje, "Kultura", Beograd, 76-77/1987, p/109.

6 Luis L.Claude, Jr., National Minorities an International Problem," Harvard University Press" Cambridge, 1955, pp.1-3.

7 Csaba G.Kiss, National Minorities in Central Europe - Definition and Typology (Minorities in politics.... Cultural and Languages Rights, Czechoslovak Committee of the European Cultural Foundation, Bratislava, 1992, p. 77).

Serbia, anyone can, at a particular territorial level, find himself in the position of a minority, the resolution of this problem will have a direct impact on Serbia's shedding of the shadows of the past and entering into a stage of democratization and modernization. Although the moves of the minorities⁸ are also important, still the main burden for the resolution of this issue rests on the authorities of Serbia. Anyway, the majority of complaints on the status of minorities are referred to these authorities. In that context the priorities are as follows:

- resolution of outstanding issues related to the internal legal regulation of the minority status, and
- provision of international guarantees that the minimum joint standards will be observed in the entire territory of (the former) Yugoslavia as well as mediation of the international community in resolution of particularly grave conflicts between majority and minority. That is in the first place, related to Croatian-Serbian relations in Croatia which are again linked to the overall Serbian-Croatian conflict and war (in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Serbian-Albanian Conflict: A Challenge to the Integrity of Serbia

The issue which is shaking the Serbian national and state building is the one of Kosovo. Serbian-Albanian relations are, at present, marked by conflicts which have all the characteristics of inter-ethnic confrontation, bearing in mind that their protagonists, their interests and procedures are "ethnified". That is, essentially, the so called realistic social conflict.⁹ It revolves around the status of the Albanians and control over Kosovo. That is the conflict between the majority (which opted for isolationism) and the minority (which chose separatism), wherein both sides aim at the attainment of pan-ideas (irredentism). Namely, it has to do with the establishment of Greater Serbia and Greater Albania.¹⁰ That is one of the most

8 Milorad Pupovac, Manjine - Ključ mira ili uzrok rata, "Republika", Beograd, broj 73/74, 1-31. avgust 1993, p.28.

9 Vladimir Goati, Politička sociologija, "Mladost", Beograd, 1978, pp.306-307.

10 Anna Maria Boileau, Raimondo Strassoldo, Emilio Sussi, Temi di sociologia delle relazioni etnici, Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale, Gorizia, 1992, p. 1956; Donald L. Horowitz, Patterns of Ethnic Separatism, "Comparative Studies in Society and History", 23. April 1981, pp. 1984-1988; Anthony D. Smith, War and Ethnicity: The Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-images and Cohesion of Ethnic Communities, "Ethnic and Racial Studies", 4. October 1981, p.3.

important political conflicts in Europe.¹¹ However, it is also a conflict which goes beyond the sphere of politics and penetrates all pores of the social life.

The most disastrous effect on Serbian-Albanian relations were the ones of the Albanian demonstrations of 1981 and the repressive response of the then federal authorities. The result was a division into two groups, along ethnic lines, namely "Us" and "Them". Among the people, it intensified the feeling of hopelessness which was reflected in a single view: "Living here is impossible".¹² These events constitute new generators of conflicts between various groups in the Serbian politics.¹³ During these conflicts the Serbian public reveals increasing presence of the Serbian nationalism which assumes the properties of the so called defence nationalism with a pronounced request for the creation of a "unified and independent Serbia". That is also expressed in the views that, in Yugoslavia, Serbia was always a loser, as opposed to others, and that Yugoslavia should be finally dealt with as a "deception of the past". At first sight, it was "a desperate retreat" while actually it amounted to an aggressive approach. This nationalism sees an anti-Serbian conspiracy in almost everything and so, through Islam, links the Albanians with the Muslims and the Muslims with the Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁴

The break of inter-ethnic communication in Kosovo, worked in favour of this nationalism. The feeling of being endangered and the need to be organized on ethnic basis grew among the Serbian population. The psychosis of the threat was supported by the republican centre and media under its control, for the purpose of dealing with the competing Albanian elite.¹⁵ However, with public political conflicts and obvious problems in the achievement of a "Strong and Great Serbia" the Serbian public develops a psychology of a wounded lion. It is rooted in the understanding of the existence of two provinces within the composition of Serbia as a factor of "its weakening" and is intensified with the deepening of the crises of (the former) Yugoslavia and the emerging of possibilities that, once it disintegrates, the

11 New Conflicts in Europe and Resolution, "Current Decisions Report", Oxford Research Group, Number 10, July 1992, pp. 33-35.

12 Milenko Karan, Psihološka obeležja i posledice nacionalizma na Kosovu (Kosovo danas i sutra, Jugoslovenski pogledi, "Pogledi", Split, p. 620).

13 Slavko Milosavljević, Yugoslavia 1990 - 1992, "Balkan Forum", Skopje, Vol. 1, No. 2, March 1993, pp. 148-152).

14 Ljubo Sirc, The national question in Yugoslavia, "The South Slav Journal", Vol. 9, No. 1-2 July 1986, pp. 88, 89.

15 The "psychosis of threat" implies adoption and strengthening of a strong system of prejudices, beliefs and emotions which form a specific kind of a matrix for interpretation of the reality as the one of overall danger for the Serbian national identity.

Serbs might be left divided into a few states, while "the Others" achieved unification.¹⁶ In a situation like that people increasingly believed in the possibility of "fast and summary solutions". In accordance with the tradition of the St. Vitus' Day Constitution which is cherished by the Serbian nationalism, all these solutions are viewed as serving the purpose of construction of a strong, strictly centralized state. In that state the Serbs would rule, while other nationalities would have a subordinated role. From that point of view any decentralization or federalization of Serbia is but "a support of the Albanian and other minorities' separatism" and "partitioning of Serbia."¹⁷

And, while in 1986 the Albanian nationalist movement seems to calm down, the Serbian protests grow stronger.¹⁸ That created an explosive mixture of official nationalism (of the bureaucratic oligarchy and the Serbian party elite) and unofficial nationalism on one side, and political-social demagoguery and populism on the other. That will, later on, be labelled as the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" and the "happening of the people" by the Serbian media and the communist fraction of Slobodan Milošević.¹⁹

But actually, it was an anti-reformist movement within Serbia which relied on similar movements and groups in the former Yugoslavia in its efforts to prevent the initiated reforms. This alliance with other groups outside Serbia will gradually disintegrate in inter-party and inter-republican conflicts resulting from the disturbed balance of power in the federation brought about by liquidation of autonomy of the provinces in Serbia.

Following revision of the Constitution in 1989, the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina lose the attributes of statehood (constitutional veto, part of legislative, administrative and judicial functions).²⁰

16 Preventing War in Kosovo, TFF, Lund, 1993, p. 4.

17 Eugenio Galluto, Conflicts in the states of former Yugoslavia and regional security, "Balkan Forum", Skopje, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 1993, pp. 77, 78.

18 Hugh Poulton, The Balkans. Minorities and States in Conflict, "Minority Rights Group", London, 1991, pp. 60-62.

19 Carl Ulrik Schierup, "The post-communist enigma: Ethnic mobilization in Yugoslavia", New Community, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1992, pp/122-123.

20 This "essential change in the constitutional status" of Kosovo was completed with the Constitution of Serbia (of September 2, 1990), which reduced the provinces to "territorial autonomies" with limited competencies.

The process of establishment of the so called Unified Serbia lead by Slobodan Milošević, which began with the so called anti-bureaucratic revolution of 1988/1989 and 1990's revision of the Constitution of Serbia, has had some adverse consequences for inter-ethnic relations in Serbia and in the whole of (the former) Yugoslavia. Those are the following:

- growing fear of the hegemony of the Serbs as the largest nation in (the former) Yugoslavia;
- resistance and separatism of the remnants of provincial elites and national minorities;
- rise in state nationalism, centralization and xenophobia in Serbia and, especially, flourishing of the Serbian nationalism and efforts to overcome the crisis with repression;
- disruption of the established inter-republican balance of power.²¹

The response came from Slovenia (on September 27 1989) which in pursuit of its policy of "running away from Yugoslavia", on grounds of fear of the Serbian hegemony, proclaimed its independence and secession. That was also a public confirmation that the Kosovo crisis, the Serbian and the Albanian issue are not the only outstanding problems. That there were also the Slovenian, Croatian, Macedonia, Muslim issues, etc.,etc. In effect, all these national issues hinge on one another.²² Initiation of political pluralism created the possibilities for a more extensive manifestation of the problems. That is, by all means, a step towards democracy.²³ However, reduction of democratization to nationalist anti-communism led towards intensification of intolerance and conflicts. The reaction of the Albanians was massive, as many of them believed that the change of the constitutional status of the Province directly deprived them of numerous rights. That gave a new momentum to the Albanian movement. The regime responded by repression and threats to human rights. There were also some measures of discrimination of

21 Actually, with the change of status of the provinces and elites in power in Montenegro and the provinces themselves, Milošević gained control over four of eight votes at the federal top. That increased the fear of Serbian domination in other nations and republics, as well as their alliances on an anti-Serbian basis (Bertrand Largentaye, The Role of the European Community, "Ex-Yugoslavia: from War to Peace", Generalitat Valenciana, Valencia, 1993, p. 37).

22 Sonja Licht, "Yugoslavia and Europe. What are the Lessons Europe Should Learn?" (*Ibidem*, p.29).

23 Prof. Dr Tibor Varady, Narodnosti u Jugoslaviji i mogućnosti međunarodne regulative prava narodnosti (manjina), (Otvoreni problemi narodnosti u Jugoslaviji, "Pravo" i Univerza v Mariboru. Evropski center za proučavanje medetničnih odnosev in regionalizem, Novi Sad, 1991, pp. 81, 82).

the Albanians. The Serbs were, as a community in symbolic and as the elite in actual terms, brought into the position of a privileged minority which operates in line with the needs of the republican centre and exercises control over the executive power and the police which serves the ends of ethnic segregation. That segregation spread through all fields of life.

The Albanian movement, today, emphasizes its resistance to the repression of Milošević's regime as the source of its identity. However, it is incapable of gathering all national components into a cohesive movement, on the basis of a modern national identity. Therefore, eruptions of protests during the '80s and in early '90s have more characteristics of individual rebellions than of a broad strategy. That is influenced by numerous factors, some of which essentially see their ultimate purpose in the primary objective of the Albanian movement - the independent state of Kosovo. The absence of interim or transitory objectives can hardly be considered as a desirable fact for any political movement, because it involves maximum mobilization of the masses for demands which are difficult to obtain. That results in the exhaustion of the masses and shrinks the political span for a dialogue. However, the Albanian movement although being an old social movement which cannot attain a modern national cohesion, can still threaten the territorial integrity of Serbia.²⁴ Therefore, this movement arises the feeling of being endangered within the Serbian nation and multiplies the requests for a "final solution". At that point the relation of this Movement with the ruling regime of Slobodan Milošević becomes absurd. On one side, its identity and legitimacy are being built on the resistance to this regime, while on the other, its radicalism imposes the framework of authoritarianism and chauvinism and precludes a more powerful development of the internal Serbian opposition to the regime thus inhibiting the democratization of Serbia. Indeed, democratization of Serbia would itself impose democratic methods and institutions for the regulation of the Serbian-Albanian relations, but that necessitates the existence of a modern national movement of the Albanians with a cohesive strategy. At present, the Serbian and Albanian relations are dominated by the clash of two authoritarianism and chauvinism, which however do not have matching power or organization.

The civil war on the territories of (the former) Yugoslavia froze and postponed resolution of numerous problems in Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo and in

24 Helena Lindholm, "Nationalism movements: The Palestinian Intifada and Kosovo compared" (*Focus: Nation-Building and Social Identity*, "Spectrum", European University Center for Peace Studies, Shlaining, vol.II, May 1992, 38041.

relation to Kosovo. Many of them have become even more serious and deeper. The conflict in Kosovo truly reminds of a Grecian tragedy. All protagonists are condemned to commit a crime they cannot avoid and for which they cannot be held responsible. Kosovo is a dormant fire and the Serbian-Albanian relations a knot no one has managed to unravel as yet. Still, those who would like to cut it and stir the fire are too many.

The prevailing model of rule in Kosovo still remains the one of intensification of the conflicting situation. Inter-ethnic relations are established according to the model of domination and state authority. The use of state-organizational, constitutional-legal and administrative-police measures resulted in the prevalence of the republican centre. Thereby the problems were suppressed rather than resolved. Kosovo is, at present, brimming with the risks of potential explosion, but the authorities of Serbia and the Albanian leadership still manage to control the situation. However, each new incident adds to the possibility to lose that control.

Numerous observers anticipated the possibility of armed conflicts in Kosovo or in relation to Kosovo. These views take into account both the reality of the political conflict and the existence of paramilitia forces.²⁵ However, in response to the question of whether Kosovo will be the next in line of armed conflicts on the territory of (the former) Yugoslavia, the effects of numerous other factors and protagonists must be taken into consideration. Of them all, the most important are still the internal political situation and the leaderships.²⁶

All in all, Kosovo appears to be closer to the peace than to the war. The war lords in these territories are weary and it is assumed that the USA and NATO will not allow the war to spread²⁷ Above all the present stalemate, or rather the inability of the parties to the conflict to realize their aspirations, creates the circumstances wherein both sides will be forced to start a dialogue. It means that the prospect

25 Aleksandar Vasović, "Braced (and Armed) for Confrontation", Balkan War Report, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London, Number 17, January 1993, p.1).

26 However, with the perpetuation of the war and the crisis, and also the active participation of the international community and, especially exhaustion of local participants, in the war and conflicts, the dependence on external factors becomes increasingly pronounced. In that context, of particular importance is the role of the USA and Europe (General potpukovnik, Prof. Dr.Radovan Radinović, "Vojnostrategijski značaj Kosova i Metohije", Vojnska, Beograd, broj 40, 25.februar 1993, p.22).

27 Škeljzen Malići, Strah od novih ratnih uspeha, "Borba", Beograd, 11-12 septembar 1993, p.5; Stefano Piziali, Forze armate ed equilibri politico-militari nei Balcani, "Yugoslavia e Balcani: Una bomba in Europa, Franco Angeli, Roma, 1992, pp.48,49).

of a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict is being opened. This prospect offers two possibilities: first, division of territories, or an agreed and peaceful delimitation and, the second, guarantees of rights of the Albanians within Serbia i.e. Yugoslavia and the Balkan integration.

The alternative which implies the division of Kosovo, i.e territorial delimitation between the Serbs and the Albanians along ethnic lines was discussed in the Yugoslav public and especially abroad²⁸ in 1992 and 1993. There is little chance that a solution like this could be carried through without numerous local and regional conflicts. Furthermore, solutions of this kind necessitate exceptional courage which the present Serbian and Albanian leaders are both lacking. That is why, with this approach, the Kosovo issue will for a long time yet remain outstanding and will generate numerous new conflicts and problems. Separation of the Albanians, or Kosovo, would most probably intensify the aspirations of Albanians in Macedonia for separation and unification with other Albanian lands. That could launch the issue of new alliances (eg. between Serbia and Greece or Turkey and Bulgaria in cooperation with Albania, Albanians and Muslims from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). With all of these possibilities the position of Macedonia becomes precarious and its future uncertain.²⁹ The solution should, still, be sought for in provision of guarantees of the right to the national identity of the Albanians and the autonomy of Kosovo such as would ensure the relevant guarantees in the cultural; economic, administrative and political sphere. That requires from the majority population - the Albanians- to renounce secession and from Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia, to relinquish a part of their sovereignty in relation to the minority population. This process demands international guarantees and control of the transition from conflicts towards joint living, confidence and cooperation.³⁰ It appears that the approach to this model could rely on the positions of The Hague Declaration on (the former) Yugoslavia of October 18, 1991.³¹

28 Blerim Shala, Risanje zemljevidov, "Mladina", Ljubljana, 26.januar 1993, p.32.

29 Stefano Bianchini, Conflitti e cooperazione nei Balcani "Jugoslavia e Balcani :Una bomba in Europa", "Franco Angeli", Roma, 1992,p.19; Stefano Bjankini, Učiniti granice suvišnim, "Vreme", Beograd, 29,mart, 1993, p.39.

30 Anthony D.Smith, Nationalism, "Current Sociology", Mouton The Hague-Paris, Volume XXI, No.3,1973, pp/19-21.

31 This actually has to do with the idea of a "special status" which guarantees: the right of non-discrimination, cultural rights anticipated by the instruments of the UN, CSCE and Council of Europe; the right of free choice national or ethnic affiliation and the exercise of any rights deriving from that specific affiliation; enjoyment of the "special status" ("autonomy") which includes the right to use national symbols, the right to second citizenship, in addition to the republican citizenship, the right to education; legislative bodies, administrative structure, including regional police and courts ("Jugoslavia treći put", Specijalno izdanje, Borba, novembar 1991, p. 38).

In the Kosovo drama, each of the parties has its own arguments which ought to be respected. Both of them still display stronger attachment to their national objectives than to modernization, democracy and dialogue and, therefore, prejudicially and stubbornly stick to their "final demands"; among them mistrust and mutual allegations rule, while all connections between the Serbian authorities and the political leadership of the Albanian movement have been almost entirely severed. That imposes the need for a "third party", a "mediator". Mediators could, in the first place, be found in parts of the public or the Serbian opposition, or among the Albanians who are not directly involved in the instigation and aggravation of the present conflicts. International mediation aimed at enabling of the first steps - initiation of a dialogue - is necessary and welcome. In that context, the role of international governmental (primarily CSCE and UN), but also non-governmental organization is of extreme importance.

Serbia - an Incomplete State

Serbia is, in fact, a state with a "divided personality": on one side, the old institutions - presently under the influence of voluntarism and subjectivism, the leader and the nationally defined Serbian interest - are crumbling down, while on the other there is the newly emerging state - the FR of Yugoslavia³² which is incapable of defining itself. The identity crisis, inefficiency, lack of democracy in the performance of the authorities affect all citizens, and especially the minorities.

It appears that the FRY is a state and community which is hard to describe, let alone explain. More difficult than that is perhaps, only living in it. Actually, the FRY is an unaccomplished social and state community. This state is, just like the majority of countries of the former Eastern Europe, presently undergoing the process of its political constitution and search for legitimacy. Along with that, the FRY is, today, caught in between the incomplete disintegration of (the former) Yugoslavia³³ and emerging of new states. That very fact is manifested in the dishar-

32 Just like many other terms, this particular one is also attached different meanings and synonyms. There are some who call this state "Rump Yugoslavia", while others refer to it only by the names of its members, i.e. "Serbia and Montenegro". In both cases it is implied that this creation emerged out of disintegration of the former state and is not recognized by the international law. Furthermore, this term is, whenever possible, given to suggest something created by violence-war, and therefore unacceptable. However, for the purpose of this paper, this and other terms will be used as defined in the existing constitutional acts.

33 (The former) Yugoslavia denotes the state and social community which existed in these territories since 1918. The end of that creation was marked by a civil war and recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states by the international community (January 15, 1992).

mony and incompleteness of the constitutional-legal system of the country. That system still retains some of the institutions and norms from (the former) Yugoslavia which persisted by satisfying the interest of minorities (from the ideological-communist one to the ethnic), but also includes new institutions and norms which are running along exactly opposite lines and are disinclined to minorities. The FRY is a state which displays powerful centralization and nationalist homogenization, but also numerous signs of confederalism. Therefore, today, it appears possible for this state to develop into a federation with a strong center and certain decentralization of power, in the form of administrative-political decentralization or the so called, regionalization (alike Germany). At the same time, it also seems possible that confederalist and secessionist aspirations might bring about remolding of the country (eg. separation of Kosovo, or of Montenegro). This creation is, furthermore, under a strong influence of the environment. That influence is so intense that it is hardly clear where the actual borders of the FRY are. In effect, it seems that the process of disintegration of (the former) Yugoslavia and the war have not as yet turned up a decision as to whether the preference should be given to the status quo of the existing borders, territories or to the ethnic principle. In case the latter principle prevailed (in the event of the breakdown of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines), it could influence the changes of the present borders of the FRY (eg. joining of the so called Serbian lands in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the loss of a part or the entire Kosovo and even a number of local communities in Sandžak or Vojvodina.

Secondly, the events taking place within it, and especially the outcome of the war and influence of international factors may produce direct consequences for the internal situation, and especially the status of minorities in the FRY. That is perhaps most clearly demonstrated on the example of the status of Croats in Serbia (i.e. Serbs in Croatia). Although disintegrating, (the former) Yugoslavia is still existent in the life of the FRY. That can be seen in the obscure, or at least vague perception of the relation its minorities have towards it. Of particular influence in that context is the exceptionally powerful habit or memory of the so called acquired rights of minorities in the period of existence of (the former) Yugoslavia. At the same time, there is also the reality of a breached loyalty and a changed social milieu and state framework, characterized by strong centralization, but also by an impoverished and reduced political and territorial framework for fulfillment of the requests of minorities. And, in addition to that, there are also the inherited as well as newly created problems.

For all these reasons, for the purposes of this paper, the term FRY shall denote a semi-constituted state, unrecognized by the international law but , in terms of international politics, de facto accepted , although most often with a negative connotation - until its isolation and introduction of sanctions. This state creation is composed of two comparatively clearly recognizable state entities - the republics of Serbia and Montenegro.

The present Serbia, although with a parliamentary-democratic order has the legitimacy of a nationalist-plebiscite establishment. In fact, it is the case of a split identity . The Constitution of Serbia appears as a mimicry for its actual identity, i.e. crisis. Essentially, Serbia is still, just as Yugoslavia, a pre-political community in which the (national) collectivist principle assumes the universal emancipatory characteristic and a partially constitutional-democratic form. The state of war and the psychosis delay the moment when that will have to be faced, but also sharpen the difference between the constitutional existence and constitutional essence of Serbia. Actually, Serbia is suffering internal material impoverishment and spiritual disintegration. Universal human rights are put to political uses. That awakens the instincts but creates moral stupor; encourages revanchism and suppresses the spirit of tolerance in the absence of which there cannot be elementary humanity or democratic life. Serbia has been sliding towards that since the 70s when the ruling elites of Yugoslavia turned their backs on the reforms despite the existing preconditions and the accumulated human needs and capacities, especially in Serbia, and "dealt with" the growing liberal political elites of Serbia.

The identity crisis of the state is also manifested in the crisis of its population. That is best demonstrated in the instability of the public opinion of Serbia, i.e. the FR of Yugoslavia. This opinion is formed under the circumstances of overall insecurity where anything is possible. Therefore, the public opinion is ready for everything, and especially the most radical options. That can be illustrated by findings of the survey of the public opinion carried out in April-May 1993.³⁴

According to this survey only 13% of all surveyed stated that the breakout of the civil war in the FR is "entirely unlikely". What is more, contrary to the generally

34 The survey " The Yugoslav Public Opinion in 1992 and 1993" was conducted by the Center for Politicological studies and public opinion of the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Belgrade on a sample of 2000 of which 1500 of the people surveyed were from Serbia (excluding Kosovo) and 500 from Montenegro. A part of the relevant data were published in the journal "Vreme" , Belgrade 21 and 28 June 1993. However, this paper made use only of the source material.

adopted views or expectations, especially outside of Serbia and the FRY, the majority finds the reasons for the possible breakout of this war in social circumstances (poverty, unemployment, etc.), while ethnic conflicts come second.

Together with instability the public opinion also displays numerous signs of xenophobia. So, according to the probing of the public opinion of November 1992, only 10% of the people surveyed did not suffer from xenophobia, while two thirds (or even three quarters in April-May) revealed xenophobia in various degrees. According to their perception the majority of the peoples of the world deserve negative judgment, while all international organizations are adversary. The same findings have been reached by the more recent research (see table 1).³⁵ On the other hand, a pronounced ethno-national narcissism is manifest.

One of the main features of this public opinion is radicalism. Radicalism was, in Serbia, preceded by hyper-patriotism. Radicalism is characterized by intolerance and authoritarianism; rejection of the external world; justification of "ethnic cleansing"; allegiance to the view that what is once conquered shall not be given back, etc. Those who manifest radicalism place national identification above everything else and believe that the FR of Yugoslavia is a state only for the Serbs and Montenegrins; in November 1992, when the polls were conducted, they were prepared to vote for the Serbian Radical Party and its leader V.Šešelj, but never for DEPOS. Radicalism has remained a desirable political view to this date. In August 1993, this fact was confirmed in the improved rating of V.Šešelj and V.Koštunica, or the SRS and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) respectively (see tables 2,3 and 4). Break-up of the political marriage between the SRS and the SPS, namely termination of the favourable inclination which S.Milošević demonstrated towards Šešelj - accompanied by an overall media political and other support to the SRS and Šešelj - marked the beginning of the conflict between former allies, with both parties coming out as losers, and especially SRS and Šešelj. However, that in no way diminished the number of available radically disposed voters. The only consequence is that there is a larger number of parties to compete for their votes. At present, the offered list, in addition to the SPS and SRS, also includes the DSS, the Serbian National Renewal (SNO), The National Party (NS) and the Party of the Serbian Unity (SSJ) created for the forthcoming elections and headed by Željko

35 The survey carried out by the MF Agency (since June 1992) with the latest pools in August and November 1993. The surveyed sample consisted of 1150 adults from 22 different local communities of Vojvodina, Belgrade and Central Serbia. The characteristics of this sample were representative of the electorate body which, for the purposes of that survey, excluded Kosovo.

Ražnatović Arkan, the leader of paramilitary units who became notorious in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the man wanted by Interpol. In fact, the appearance of this party reveals the last attempt of the regime to use "creations" of this kind to gather around itself also the most radical voters. It is exactly the same attempt as the one made before with the SRS and Šešelj. Time will show whether this "marriage of convenience" will last out a single election.

It is symptomatic that the majority is willing to accept the ideal of levelling (see table 5). Radicalization of views is particularly reflected in issues of inter-ethnic relations. The most disconcerting in that context is the fact that the greatest degree of radicalism is manifested in Belgrade. Thus, the overwhelming majority (88,4% in Belgrade and 78,4% of the people canvassed in Serbia) believed that the problem of the status of Kosovo no longer existed, while the minority thought that it could be resolved by reinstating the autonomy it had according to the 1974 Constitution; division of the territory or the model of the Kosovo Republic (see table 6). Similar views were obtained on the subject of possible armed assistance to the RS Krajina in case of an attack by Croatia (see table 7). Furthermore, the same tendency was displayed with respect to the possibility of unification of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina (see table 8). Naturally, the majority is for unification of all Serbian lands (see table 98). As for taking sides on the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian public opinion displays an "absolute flexibility", its views ranging from a kind of spectacular acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan to the most recent preference for a three-state confederation (see table 10). Yet, that flexibility still fairly clearly reveals that the public opinion is actually in favour of the authorities and the option they promoted, primarily by means of the TV. That is also confirmed by the fact that 65,5% of the people surveyed in November opposed the idea of global resolution of the crisis (see table 11).

In general, the media interpretation of what might be called the national interest, i.e. patriotism, is one of the most influential factors for the formation of the public opinion, while in that context, "patriotism" covers everything and anything, and in the first place radicalism and exclusiveness. Those who advocate compromise, dialogue and tolerance are still classified as the "fifth column".

All in all, it is the case of a non-democratically shaped public opinion susceptible to influences and manipulations. Factors which have a particularly powerful influence are predominantly of internal nature: propaganda of the regime, nationalist

radicalism and , of late, social demagogy, followed by the media and especially the TV. The sanctions have, on their side, also added to the whole thing by increasing the uncertainty of the public opinion and increasing its vulnerability to the above mentioned influences. In addition to that, the option of isolationism and seclusion has also gained power.

The conclusion is that in the forthcoming elections , under condition that the sanctions are retained and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia continued, with perpetuation of the increasingly grave problem of Kosovo and Metohija, preference shall be given to the parties with marked national and social radicalism. With such views and under circumstances of an economic, social and political collapse and the shaken strength of the authorities (in the first place the President of the Republic Slobodan Milošević, see table 12) there is a greater likelihood of a longer period of instability of government, repetition of the elections and, ultimately, personal semi military-political dictatorship , than of democratization of the political and public life.

In favour of this view is also the fact that the public of Belgrade, according to the data of November 1993, keeps increasing its critical view of the SPS (see table 13), as indicated by all surveys since the end of 1992, but fails to apply this critical approach to Slobodan Milošević, otherwise a president of the SPS. He is still appreciated as someone "beyond responsibility" and "the man who makes the right moves". Even his essentially anti-constitutional dismissal of the Parliament of Serbia and imposition of premature elections in December 1993 are supported (see table 14).

The absence of democratization will also mean the lack of the necessary political will and the social consensus for modernization of Serbia.

That, however, does not irrevocably destroy all of Serbia's chances for a democratic development. Certain important assumptions for democratization and advancement of modernization have still been created in the political, public and cultural life, and also through changes of ownership relations and business ways, namely introduction of certain elements of the market economy. That process has given rise to numerous civil organizations, movements, groups and initiatives, including those related to the civil, liberal-democratic and federalist integration of Europe. Their actions represent the beginning of a new political culture and one of the

important steps towards the opening, democratization, modernization and Europeanisation of Serbia.

Modern development of Serbia is impossible without overcoming of the romantic interpretations of the past, patriarchal and populist trends in the tradition of the Serbian people as well as collectivist ideologies, of both class and national mythology. Indeed, Serbia is - just as the entire former) Yugoslavia - facing the challenge of development and democracy. And the basis for resolution of the Serbian national issue can only be found in a comprehensive development of Serbia and creation of a democratic community with a high level of autonomy, civil and minority rights; a community which will subsequently decide whether it will enter any kind of a relationship with other parts of (the former) Yugoslavia and if so of what kind will that relationship be (starting from the customs and economic union to confederation). That, among many other issues, also assumes a lasting termination of the war, accompanied by the establishment of international guarantees for the rights of the Serbs in Croatia or an international administration in the part of concentrated armed conflicts, along with the resolution of the difficult question of the Yugoslav Army. That, as a task of primary importance, imposes the break-up of the alliance between militarism and conservatism which is only possible through the change of the present authoritarian system of authority and the establishment of a democratic control of executive authorities.

TABLE 1: RATING OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES (IN THE RANGE OF +2 - -2)
(August '93)

<i>STATE</i>	<i>POSITIVE</i>	<i>NEGATIVE</i>
Greece	1.4	
China	0.44	
Russia	0.43	
Japan	0.21	
Romania	0.10	
Israel	0.10	
France		- 0.55
Bulgaria		- 0.63
United Kingdom		- 0.64
Italy		- 0.87
Hungary		- 1.07
USA		- 1.42
Austria		- 1.59
Germany		- 1.68
Turkey		- 1.71

TABLE 2: RATING OF POLITICAL PARTIES
(August - November '93)

<i>PARTY</i>	<i>(November)</i>	<i>BELGRADE (August)</i>	<i>SERBIA (August)</i>
Socialist Party of Serbia (SRS)	21,6%	26.6%	22.9%
Serbian Radical Party (SRS)	12,15%	17.5%	17.3%
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)	9,9%	8.4%	9.1%
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)	7,2%	11.2%	7.9%
Democratic party (DS)	8,6%	9.6%	7.3%
National Party (M.Paroški)(NS)	0,6%	4.3%	3.8%
Serbian National Renewal (SNO)	3,3%	1.6%	1.6%
Civil Alliance (GS)	2,9%	1.2%	0.5%
Party of Serbian Unity (ž. Ražnatović Arkan)(SSJ)	3,1%		
Undecided	16,1%	7.6%	10.1%
Unwilling to participate in the elections	10,4%	10.1%	13.6%
Other parties	1,6%	0.8%	1.2%

TABLE 3 : RATING OF LEADERS
(August '93)

<i>LEADER</i>	<i>BELGRADE</i>	<i>SERBIA</i>
Slobodan Milošević	29.1%	23.5%
Vojislav Šešelj	14.4%	17.5%
Vuk Drašković	9.9%	10.7%
Vojislav Koštunica	10.6%	7.4%
Dragoljub Mićunović	7.2%	6.6%
Milan Paroški	4.7%	0.7%
Vesna Pešić	0.2%	0.7%
Other personalities	9.9%	12.0%
Undecided	5.4%	8.3%
Unwilling to go to the elections	8.1%	10.0%

TABLE 4 *If the elections were held today, who would you vote for?*

<i>PARTY</i>	<i>% OF ALL SURVEYED (August '93)</i>
SPS	29.9%
SRS	17.5%
SPO	9.1%
DSS	7.9%
DS	7.3%
OTHER PARTIES	11.4%
UNDECIDED	10.1%
WILL NOT VOTE	13.6%

TABLE 5: VIEWS ON DIFFERENCES IN INCOME (WAGES)
(August '93)

<i>ANSWER</i>	<i>BELGRADE</i>	<i>SERBIA</i>
In favour of: equal wages	20.7%	29.5%
ratio of 3:1	37.7%	32.2%
small range	16.3%	15.2%
Against wage control	18.0%	11.5%
Undecided	6.9%	11.5%

TABLE 6: OPTIONS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO ISSUE
(August '93)

<i>OPTION</i>	<i>BELGRADE</i>	<i>SERBLIA</i>
Integral part of Serbia	88.4%	78.4%
Autonomy as per '74 Constitution	2.4%	4.7%
Division of territories	3.4%	5.3%
Kosovo Republic	0.3%	1.0%
Undecided	5.2%	10.6%

TABLE 7: What should the FRY do in case of Croatian attack on RS Krajina?

<i>ANSWER</i>	<i>(November)</i>	<i>BELGRADE (August)</i>	<i>SERBLIA (August)</i>
Send volunteers	35,1%	37.6%	32.2%
Declare war	19.1%	28.1%	28.0%
Send the Yugoslav Army	16.7%	19.6%	20.8%
Remain neutral	10.1%	5.2%	13.1%
Undecided	17.0%	8.8%	13.0%

TABLE 8: VIEWS ON UNIFICATION OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA AND REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA

(August '93)

<i>ANSWER</i>	<i>BELGRADE</i>	<i>SERBLIA</i>
Pro	69.8%	53.0%
Pro-conditionally, not yet	16.4%	19.4%
Con	3.5%	5.7%
Undecided	10.0%	20.2%

TABLE 9: VIEWS ON UNIFICATION OF ALL SERBIAN LANDS

<i>ANSWER</i>	<i>(November)</i>	<i>BELGRADE (August)</i>	<i>SERBLIA (August)</i>
Pro	54,9%	57.1%	43.5%
Pro - but later	23,7%	25.5%	28.0%
Con	4,0%	6.7%	10.7
Undecided	15,4%	10.3%	17.7%

TABLE 10: THE BEST SOLUTION FOR BH
(August '93)

<i>OPTION</i>	<i>BELGRADE</i>	<i>SERBIA</i>
Establishment of a Serbian state	28.4%	30.2%
Confederation of three states	60.6%	47.4%
Vance-Owen plan for BH	1.8%	2.7%
Unitary BH	0.7%	2.5%
Undecided	8.0%	17.1%

TABLE 11: What do you think about the idea of global solution of urgent problems of the former Yugoslavia (Krajina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosmet)?

(November '93)

Opposed to any link between the problems of Kosovo and Serbs outside Serbia	65,5%
-Self-determination of Serbs in Krajina demands acceptance of self-determination of Albanians in Kosmet (or part of it)	1,4%
-Greater autonomy of Serbs in Krajina imposes acceptance of greater autonomy of Albanians at Kosmet (or part of it)	6,6%
-Undecided	24,8%

TABLE 12: Has President Milošević fulfilled his promises after the elections?

(August '93)

<i>ANSWER</i>	<i>% OF ALL SURVEYED</i>
No	40.5%
Most of them - yes	25.5%
A few - yes	14.8%
Yes	8.4%
Undecided	10.9%

TABLE 13: Excluding the sanction, who is most to blame for the disastrous drop of the standard of living?

	(November '93)
The ruling party (SPS) and its policy	47,9%
-The Government of N.Šainović	15,5%
-Obstruction of opposition parties in the Serbian Parliament	12,8%
-Assisting the Serbs outside Serbia	6,6%
- No one	15,5%

TABLE 14: Why did the President of Serbia dismissed the Parliament and scheduled new elections?

	(November '93)
It appeared to be the only solution at that moment	46,5%
- Because of SRS which started to pursue an independent policy	22,4%
- Because of expectations that the SPS will win more seats in the Parliament at new elections	28,9%

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The Balkan Crises and Russia

Prof. Boris Shmelev

1. The military and political situation in the Balkan region changed after the downfall of the communism in the East European countries and in the former USSR basically.

The confrontation between two superpowers during the cold war in the region for keeping it under control, which promoted stability as inside Balkan countries as well as in the inter-balkan relations (though it seems to be strange at the first sight) was eliminated because one of the participants of this confrontation - the Soviet Union - was disintegrated.

The Russian Federation is a new state with its own system of national and foreign policy interests that differ much from the interests of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Federation is interested in establishment of partner relationship with European countries, the USA and with all other states through the whole world in order to strengthen the international security and to find its own place in world economy.

The key element of Russian foreign policy is widening of the political and economic cooperation with the world community as an important precondition for the successful implementation of the domestic reforms. The Russian foreign policy is subordinated to the interests of the internal policy, represents its continuation. But the concentration of Russia on its domestic problems does not mean the rejection of the responsibility for strengthening of the security in Europe and in the world including the Balkan region. RF is ready to take an active part in solution of the Balkan crises.

2. The Balkan crises has caused by the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. The disintegration broke the balance of power, which took place in the region, and changed the geopolitical situation in the Balkans.

The old contradiction between Balkan countries and their political ambitions, which during the cold war were kept under control, are aggravated again.

Many questions, which are very difficult to be settled, connected with the right for self-determination of nation minorities can provoke a new revision of the state borders in the region with unpredictable consequences for peace and stability in Europe.

The disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation possesses its own logic.

Such form of state organisation, which was suitable for all Yugoslav nations to live together, was not managed to be found in the multinational Yugoslavia. This fact concerns to Yugoslavia was between two wars and to Yugoslavia after the Second World War.

Since the first day of its creation Yugoslavia has been shaken by violent confrontation between nations, first of all between Serbs and Croats. The efforts of B. Tito directed on the safeguarding stability in the state on the federation principles were unsuccessful. The contradictions between nations in socialist Yugoslavia were aggravated since the beginning of 60-th. Under the pressure of this conflicts the state organisation was practically transformed from federation into confederation. The new Yugoslav constitution adopted in 1974 reflected this new situation in Yugoslav society.

The downfall of the system of socialist self-management eliminated the political obstacles on the way to juridical consolidation of

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confederation. But this variant did not meet the interests of Serbian political elite, which tried to realize the Serbian national idea in the independent Serbian state. The implementation of the Serbian national idea inevitably led to the bloody conflicts with the Croats. At the same time, the political elite of the Croats dreamed about the realisation of the croatian national idea in the form of independent state. This elite did not want or could not take into account the interests and aspirations of the Serb population lived in Kraina. Such policy inflamed contradictions between two nations, transformed into a bloody civil war in Kraina. The Serbs lived in Kraina were supported by Serbia.

3. I do not want to say, that only Serbs or only Croats were responsible for tragic events in Yugoslavia. Both are responsible and the concrete measure of their responsibility and guilty can be defined by the History. The events that are taking place in former Yugoslavia can be characterized by one word - tragedy. It is known that there are neither right nor guilty, there are only victims.

This tragedy has its own historical preconditions. The end of the 20-th century is marked not only by the downfall of the theory and practice of communism but by the explosion of national self-conscious and by active struggle for national self determination. After the long fight for self determination the independent state Eritrea was created, Kurds in Turkey are trying to establish its own state, the palestine question is being solved Namibia proclaimed its independence. The same process is taking place in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. The national idea turns the head of many nations.

The world is facing with a new wave of establishment of national states, which is accompanied with bloody clashes because of the borders and finding the balance of the geopolitical interests. The historical experience shows that if the nation has decided to fight for the political self determination, including the form of establishment of its own state, it achieves its aim as a rule. But the same historical experience at the same time witnesses, that the victory in the struggle for the national self determination does not mean automatically the prosperity, protection of the human rights, stable social and economic development of this nation. It is only one of the preconditions for its prosperity, for the realisation of its potention.

The implementation of the right on self determination in Europe undermines the basic principles of the European security after the second world war: the territorial integrity inviolability of borders, non-interference into the domestic affairs, sovrenity, respect to the human rights and national minorities.

It is obvious, that this historical process is not possible to be blocked. But the world society in the face of the UN is able and has to take an active part in controlling it, knows to manage it in order to minimize the negative consequences of it for the nations, regional and world security.

4. But keeping under control such process is very complicated and it needs spade work. The Yugoslav crises wetnesses on this fact. This one is far from its end, as the balance of interests between all sides of the conflict, first of all between Serbs and Croats, has not been found yet.

Nevertheless, the approaches to the solution became more clear at the last time. The comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crises

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would include the follow basic elements.

- Recognition by Serbia and Croatia of former administrative borders between them as state ones. Recognition of territory integrity of both countries. Rejection to change borders between them by force.

- To improve the situation in the Serbs Kraina Croatia could grant to it right to the political self determination on condition that Serbs Kraina will consider itself as a infeasible part of the Croat state.

- Recognition of an obvious fact that the Wence-Ouen plan failed, as it did not meet the aspirations of Serbs and Croats community in Bosnia. Attempts directed to the imposition of this plan by force can lead to unpredictable consequences for the European and world security. Therefore the Bosnian crises can be settled on the basis of agreement of the world society, and first of all the great powers on the incorporation of the so-called Serb Republic Bosnia and Hercegovina into Serbia or into the Union Republic Yugoslavia, and on the incorporation of Croat Republic Herceg-Bosnia into Croatia Republic. Territories under the control of moslems could be transferred to the rule of the UN in order to create there step by step an independent moslem state with the assistance of world community.

Real borders of this state could be defined on the basis of the UN negotiations with Serbs and Croats communities taking into account conditions which are needed for the creation of muslim state, which would be capable of living. Sarajevo could receive the same status, which Trieste possessed after the second world war till 1953.

- Granting political self determination within Serbia to Albanian of Kosovo on the condition of recognition by them territorial integrity of Serbia. World community should safeguard the territorial integrity of Serbia.

- Granting of the same status to Voevodina.

- Ending of the UN sanctions against Serbia.

5. Russian policy in the Balkans and its activities in Yugoslav crises are basing on the ideas, defining its concrete steps in this region. Russian interests in this region differ from interests of the former Soviet Union. The main aim of its Balkan policy is to stimulate the creation of the preconditions for stable development of all Balkan countries and their including into European political and economic process of cooperation.

The Yugoslav crises is a part of conflicts, which covers the Balkans, Transistria, Crimea, Caucuses, Tadgikistan. Unstable regions are situated on the south borders of Russia and undermine the stability inside it. Therefore the settlement of the Balkan crises is closely connected with the security of Russia.

Russian diplomacy managed to find the right approach to the Yugoslav crises, which can be marked with the word - balance of approaches. At the very beginning of the conflict russian diplomacy supported Croatia together with the world community unconditionally and strongly criticized Serbia. But under the pressure of public opinion the political line was corrected. At the same time it does not mean unconditional support of Serbia, as russian nationalistic forces demanded actively. Such a policy allowed Russia to play an active role in the solution of crises and to use those limited possibilities for impact on situation, that it possessed.

Russia is acting in solution of Yugoslav crises together with UN and NATO countries. It is not capable to engross the vacuum of power

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itself, emerged in Balkan after the downfall of the Soviet Union, but it can not afford itself to avoid participating in the process of settlement of the Balkan crises.

The situation on the Balkans is marked by cooperation of the European countries, and first of all Great Powers. The confrontation between them for the influence was managed to be overcome, and this fact has positive consequences for the European peace and stability. The collaboration of Great Powers of course did not exclude some differences in the interests which does not produce irresistible obstacles for the management of the crises.

Powerful political forces in Russia attack such governmental policy estimating it as the concession to the "imperialism" betrayal of the national interests and "historical allies" on the Balkans. For the present Russia has managed to escape this "historical trap" and cooperates with western partners.

6. The way to peace and stability in the Balkans is long. Success can be reached under the condition of rebuilding the economy and then political cooperation between all states established on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The logic of the development of this geopolitical field, named Yugoslavia demands a new form of its self organisation. In the future this process can be realized in some kind of commonwealth of new Yugoslav states or in confederation of them.

The process of cooperation of all Balkan countries can produce more comfortable atmosphere for the strengthening the stability. Although the potential of such cooperation is rather limited, Russia is interested in development of this cooperation and its capacity will be used to promote it.

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n° Inv. 14681
22 NOV. 1994

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SECURITY OF THE BALKANS - A CHALLENGE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR
STRATEGIES

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You have in front of you a paper dealing with the possible new role of military power in the modern global military-strategic and security environment in the region of South-East Europe. I will, therefore, only point out to the main assumptions and conclusions.

The war in the former Yugoslavia caused numerous dilemmas in the choice of the new concepts of future order of the international security. These dilemmas stem from conflicting influences of a number of factors.

In the first place, it should be recognized that the high level of the global national interdependence and its continuous strengthening, in turn, make the national security increasingly dependent on the global security and deepen their interaction. Specifically:

The internal realities of various countries and international relations have, after the cold-war, been demonstrating parallel development of progressive elimination of the previously existing military confrontation as the main guardian of global security on one side and , on the other, breakout of numerous crises and limited armed conflicts of primarily internal characters,

threatening the national and international security in various regions substantially more than in the period of the cold war. At the same time, wide possibilities are being opened for the implementation of the concept of collective security adopted long ago in the Charter of the United Nations.

As a result, military power, inherited and over-accumulated, in principle, lost its main function of the national and allied defence pursued through the conventional component. The intentions of the nuclear war deterrent simultaneously opened wide possibilities for substantial reduction of the capacity of arms for mass destruction. In effect, however, throughout the world, military forces are retained on the same level they had during the cold war, and are even increased and used in armed conflicts more than before. The results of arms limitation achieved to date are rather modest.

Disappearance of converging interests of the two superpowers in individual regions created temporary strategic vacuums which various local parties tried to use for sudden attainment of their partial objectives, primarily through armed operations.

The global security was, thus faced with a variety of threats; fast intervention of the United Nations became imperative and not only for peace keeping but also for forcible imposition of various conditions required for its restoration. The expanding tasks and the need for fast reaction undoubtedly proved to be rather strong reasons for the UN to resort primarily to forms of pressure and military measures in their interventions. However, some of the reasons for that attitude could be accepted but only in a few specific cases.

However, while fulfilling their role as the main organization responsible for collective security on the world scale, the UN cannot allow themselves to rely mainly on military ways, supported

in the "Agenda for Peace", certain resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council , or the recent proposals for organization of standing armed forces of the UN. In this context there are also some attempts at salvation of the outdated military alliances and therefore also their renewal in a changed form.

Interventions in crises and wars in the Balkans, in Somalia, on Haiti and elsewhere, including in a certain sense also the Gulf War, demonstrated serious deficiencies in their very contents. Conversely, the intervention in Cambodia, encompassing a complex of political, economic, legal and other measures and actions, proved to be considerably more efficient. It did not exclude rather substantial military measures but they were well harmonized with the entirety of the operation. Should not we, at this point, recall the few steps forward made in so difficult a crisis as is the one in the Near-East, however initial or modest they may be?

Anyway, any world order of the free market and democracy of the Western type - which is the general option of the international community - assumes that the international security, as well as the national one, are in principle based on the economic and technological advancement and the development of democracy and human rights. The present crises and wars prove more than ever before that the main reasons for threats to security are, in the first place, found in the low level of economic and social development.

Nationalism, separatism , and particularly attempts to exercise the right to self-determination by force and arms, as well as other similar occurrences, are but the reflection of the low development level of the territories wherein they are generated.

All this requires from the present day military strategies to abandon the previous general concept of military balance as the basis of security in all its dimensions and to seek for the

military power a considerably more limited role in the order of collective security which is based on the economic, political and legal development of society and is, among other things, directed towards progressive elimination of the actual roots of instability and threats to the peace.

It is obvious that the substitution of competition by partnership in military relations between the USA and the Russian Federation which are in the long term prospective still the two strongest military powers in the world, introduces new elements of powerful influence on selection of future concepts of security. For Russia, an appropriate US-Russian long term and cooperative security appears as the most favorable way of preventing the USA to continue strengthening their hegemonistic military power in the world. That way, Russia would at the same time secure for itself the exclusive military influence on territories of the former USSR. The USA, no doubt, have a greater freedom of choice: they could pursue their interest unilaterally up to a certain limit or through a system of cooperative security the contents of which would suit their aspirations at a particular moment; furthermore, their internal and external economic and other problems are certainly by far smaller than those of Russia. The degree of the residual conventional danger from the East will depend on the US conventional superiority to the extent the Russian side could tolerate.

On the whole, it appears that both sides would need to embark upon a long-term reduction and restructuring of military power in all its components: nuclear and conventional, human and material, research and developmental both on account of their matching as well as diverging needs.

Therefore, in the immediate as well as distant future, the successful harmonization of concepts of international collective and US-Russian cooperative security ought also to represent one of important factors for the establishment of a highly stable global

security order. Conversely, should the US-Russian military partnership prevail, there will be a danger of renewal of the arms race in a new form.

The region of South-East Europe with the crisis in the Balkans and the war in the former Yugoslavia as its central issue, represents today the testing ground for various military strategies in search for a new role of the military power, both in the regional and the global world military-strategic environment.

So far, we have seen first the direct use of strategy of military supremacy in its crudest form, followed by visible efforts of all parties to the crisis as well as others, for an accelerated materialization of the strategy of military balance, and finally, it appears that the principles of this strategy also prevail in actions and measures applied under the pretext of collective security.

It is quite obvious that this course of development should be stopped. But, that would only leave military strategies based on the concept of military power still in force, although divided into a larger number of smaller parts. The question is whether a course like that holds a promise of a regionally sustainable and long-term security.

Why should not we turn towards a thoroughly defensive strategy of security which would have considerably wider bases and start from the opening of prospects for a long term economic and democratic development accompanied by powerful reduction of military power. That course provides far better chances for the establishment of a stable order and the single system of collective security in the region.

In place of an exhausting arms race, that course offers:
- a wide spectrum of measures for unilateral limitation of military

power as initial steps which are , at this moment, more promising than others and are aimed at mutual confidence building,

- conclusion of various treaties and agreements to limit the military activities of varying contents and introduction of already acknowledged methods of verification,
- constitution of a single regional system of collective security and, why not, finally, - establishment of a nucleus of a demilitarized region which tends to go on expanding.

They say that every beginning is difficult. The outcome , no doubt, depends on the readiness of the entire environment to provide appropriate understanding and support.

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n° 14681
22 NOV. 1994

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THE COLLAPSE OF YUGOSLAVIA: SOURCES OF ITS INTERNAL INSTABILITY
(by Stefano Bianchini)

1. Some problems in interpretation.

The war in Yugoslavia, which has been taking place during these years, has evoked ghosts that had long been considered buried. Its ruthlessness, the multiplication of disgregating forces at a regional level, the divisions which it has brought about in the world community (from the EC to UN) seem to have revived the old vision of the Balkans as epicentre of continuous local and international conflict.

In my opinion, however, to regard these events as the result of a revival of the "question of the East" can only have a meaning if the great changes which have taken place in Yugoslavia after World War II are taken into consideration.

The drama taking place in Yugoslavia at the moment cannot be explained by means of old, superficial schemes, such as those comparing the age of communism to a "glaciation" at the end of which the same problems characterising the period between the two wars are to be faced again; this idea, though fascinating, erases fifty years of History during which remarkable socio-economic upheaval took place. The results of this are still effective today and interact with most important "long-term" factors. Therefore, each historical "upheaval" presents elements of "continuity" just as "continuity" includes "upheaval".

Similarly unconvincing, though reassuring, is the idea that Yugoslavia was an "artificial State" created by the most powerful countries at the end of World War I. This would imply that there are "non" artificial or natural States, a definition whose criteria are uncertain unless we refer back to ideas similar to those expressed by Herder and German Romanticism concerning the "natural" character of a Nation and apply them, *mutatis mutandis*, to the idea of State. Moreover, in the case of Yugoslavia, accepting such an interpretation would alter the historical reconstruction of the Risorgimento because it would give lesser importance to events and protagonists which in fact had a profound effect on south-Slavonian relationships for at least one century (i.e. the XVIII th century) and laid down those political and cultural conditions essential to the creation of a longed for unitarian State for Serbs, Croats and Slovenians.

It is more tenable from a historical point of view to enclose the present collapse of Yugoslavia into a European framework where, with the end of the cold war, the geo-political structure that had been established, but only partially legitimized by *ex post* treaties of peace signed after World War II, became critical. From this point of view, the devastating crisis of a large part of the South East of Europe and its dynamics do not seem merely a "local conflict" and real fear for its possible spreading all over the Balkans is felt by a largely weak international diplomacy; at the same time another war on the borders of Europe, i.e. in the Caucasus, shows similar dynamics and risks of spreading.

However, it seems to me even more important to underline the political and cultural dimension and the consequences that the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the successive events have had at the international level. This dimension is first of all the result of a conflict between political cultures that cannot be explained by means of the mere antagonism between communism and anti-communism but that

should instead be seen as involving the idea of culture itself, the idea of human civilization, seen as an ensemble of political, economic, social and cultural structures whose syncretistic and syncretic features, peculiar to the age we are living in, are seriously questioned.

The recent destruction of Mostar bridge is not only symbolic of the destruction of what the idea of "bridge" means, but it is also a tangible sign -- already represented by the bombing of Dubrovnik, the destruction of Vukovar and several other villages whose names are still unknown to international public opinion -- of a desire to create a deep chasm between populations and different cultures such as it has never been recorded in the Balkans, not even at the times of Great Empires (the Turkish empire included), whose aim was to establish their institutions and cultures without necessarily annihilating previous, autochthonous ones.

Thus, the inter-Yugoslavian conflict, which the world witnesses with anguish, is with its numbers of casualties, destruction and ruthlessness, the expression of a struggle against inter-cultural tolerance and *difference* which is denied even in its artistic expressions. By destroying the past, Yugoslavian populations would like to transform the Balkans into something that they have never been, that is a region of separate States and populations, instead of a crossing of cultures, nations and interests. To our world, whose development is characterised by communication, exchanges and interdependence in their broadest meaning (implying migrations, new technologies and the spreading of knowledge), the direction taken by Yugoslavia not only represents a counter-trend but also a real political-cultural alternative that can affect and change the meaning of human relationships.

Refusal to accept *difference* is the main feature of the inter-Yugoslavian war and if this refusal should become the trump card, the consequent "disruption" would be much more significant to those populations than the sudden collapse of communism. The dimension of this "disruption", whose consequences are evident even though not yet consolidated, cannot be understood without taking into consideration the events which occurred after World War II, the reasons that brought about the failure of Yugoslavian communism and the way it happened, which, together with an analysis of the ensuing cultural and social void, may explain the importance of "long-term" factors and of the political use which is made of them today. Such considerations lead us to believe that the proven incapacity of Yugoslavian communism is the main reason for instability, in spite of its efforts to substitute Sovietic communism and to *govern the difference* that its versatile society displays. Since such government cannot be exerted in static ways but only through the dynamism that the passing of time imposes, communism was now inadequate *to govern the difference in the social and economic changes* that the government itself produced. This resulted in a crisis of the system of representation and of the legitimacy of power which proved incapable of dealing with the changes that had come about.

Thus, the forces which substituted the communist League, presenting themselves as its alternative both culturally and psychologically, were ready to abandon any idea of *government of difference*, focusing their attention on ethnic homogeneity.

Social classes, however, had great difficulty in coping with the problem of difference in a context that was fast-changing. The absence of a mature, civilized

society and the political, ideological void caused by the collapse of communism determined the conditions for an instrumental and political use of the past by deeply rooted political cultures also shared by the communist parties of the single Yugoslavian republics.

All these factors have caused that internal instability which has led to the tragic events we are witnessing today.

2. The reasons for the crisis of Yugoslavian Communism

a) Economic and social changes.

Besides the damage inflicted by World War II, when Yugoslavian communists took over, they inherited a backward country, where the rural world was dominant, and system of production and agrarian contracts were out of date. Thirty years later, the situation was radically different.

Migration from the countryside to cities, which had started during the '50s, increased gradually in the following decade. If in 1948 the 67.2% of population was still living in a rural environment, by 1971 the percentage had decreased to 38.2% (settling at 19.9% in 1981). On the other hand, population concentration in urban areas increased from 21.7% to 38.6% in the period from 1953 to 1971 (and increased further to 46.5% in 1981). During this period, the relationship between countryside and city remained a close one and it took advantage from the early abandoning (dating back to 1953) of collectivization and the consequent return to small land ownership which was established after the 1946 agrarian reform. Even though they migrated towards the cities, people tended to hold on to their land and cultivate it during weekends or to absent themselves from factories and offices during seeding and harvest-time, thus enabling them to have an income both from self-employment and from their regular jobs. This caused a rapid improvement in people's standards of living, while dynamic cooperatives of distribution purchased goods at the source and marketed them. Because of this, the agricultural work-force decreased from 68.3% in 1953 to 47.4% in 1971, whereas in the same period of time the industrial work-force increased from 7.5% to 18.5%. The incidence of agriculture on the GNP decreased from 30.1% to 17.8% whereas industry accounted for 44.6% of GNP in 1971.

The "difference" between Yugoslavian socialism and Sovietic socialism became more marked after 1965 when a radical economic and price system reform was passed. Even though it was only partially enforced at the time, some of its most important features survived and allowed the spreading of an entrepreneurial attitude in the bureaucratic context of the various administrative structures of the State, or rather, of the republican States, after a process of decentralization which took place in 1968 and 1974.

From 1965 to 1968 there was an average increase in consumption of 20% and the number of mass-consumption products like radios, cars, TV sets, refrigerators, washing-machines and HiFi sets started to increase. Second homes, sailing-boats and motor-boats, became accessible to more and more people, as average incomes increased by 18% from 1965 to 1968. Both heavy industry and light industry increased their production and the country started to trade with foreign countries and strengthened its contracts with the free world through tourism

and the spreading of Western press and culture. Moreover, from 1965 people were given passports and were allowed to travel freely.

In the meanwhile, the percentage of children going to schools increased by 42% in primary schools and by 31% in high schools. By 1981 illiteracy was down to 9.5%, even though there were still marked social and local differences: 4.1% of men and 14.7% of women was illiterate; 0.8% of Slovenians but 17.6% of Kosovars (9.4% men and 26.4% women). In 1981, 31% Yugoslavs had received high school education (a percentage which accounted for 40% in Slovenia and for 19% in Kosovo).

Nevertheless, the traditional socio-economic contrast between North and South became more serious, despite the improvement in general standards of living. The difference in per capita social product between Slovenia and Kosovo, which in 1947 was 1:3.31 for the former, in 1984 accounted for 1:7.66, despite the fact that Slovenia's social services expenses, energy consumption and average workers' salaries were 4.8, 2.2 and 1.8 times higher, respectively, if compared to Kosovo.

Thus, urbanization, industrialization, education, the welfare State and tourism had radically changed the country's social structure if compared to the period between the two World Wars and even though Yugoslavia was still regarded as a developing country, its remarkable improvement led many social classes to look at the future in an optimistic way. These changes produced, above all, a wide differentiation in social stratification, which contrasted with the substantial levelling characterising the period between the wars, when most of the population consisted of farmers and land workers and a small number of big landowners and bureaucrats, soldiers and entrepreneurs, whose social influence was marginal.

From 1950 to 1970 a radical change in social structure took place. This change was characterized by:

- retrenchment of the role of the countryside (agriculture);
- strengthening of industrial working classes;
- consolidation of a small but active intellectual class, aware of its role and attentive to the surrounding world;
- establishment of a group of dynamic executive managers thanks to the increase in trade relationships with the Third World and the convertible currency areas;
- expansion of the bureaucratic machinery as a result of the complexity of the self-managed system and the influence of Republics, Regions and Local Authorities;
- training of employees in the welfare State services;
- gradual increase in the number of craftsmen, tour-operators, hotel-operators who started an entrepreneurial tertiary sector, free from government control, which was new for a society where the communist party still monopolized the power.

This "social revolution" (a definition dear to many Western scholars and, in particular, to British and American scholars because it refers to society as a whole), reached its climax in 1970, and represented the completion of a cycle which should have led to inevitable changes both in the political system (and in its forms of representation) and in the economic system (both in technology and management). The power structure should have been re-organized and fiscal, financial and legislative systems should have been given a re-defined in accordance with the new circumstances.

However, despite the reforms of the period 1968-1974, this is precisely what has not been done. In certain cases, those reforms frustrated this process of modernization of society.

From the socio-economic point of view, the complex structure of the self-managed system which was launched in 1976, together with the strengthening of the power of Republics and the two Regions, created an institutionally decentralized and articulated society, lacking, however, -due to the drastic weakening of federal institutions - effective means capable of assuring a unitary recomposition of the interests that were emerging in society.

Therefore, while the 1973 energy crisis was looming and foreign debt was increasing, such a system of autonomies, with no democratic or central control, gave rise to an increase in investments and an irrational use of resources, and, with the 1980 crisis, a decrease in production and trade.

"Economic nationalism", as this phenomenon was defined at the beginning of the '80s, resulted in companies, municipalities and "self-governed" republics isolating themselves to safeguard their particular interests. Social differences and above all economic differences between Republics and Regions emphasized the isolation of the single unities making up the country and exacerbated the competition among them for the distribution of fewer and fewer resources. This phenomenon badly damaged the mobility of labour and the expansion of companies, employment being basically safeguarded through a non-definition of role responsibilities.

The huge debt that characterized the '80s forced the federal government to adopt restrictive policies which affected the importation of advanced technology and prevented Yugoslavia from taking part in the information technology process which was transforming the West. Isolation also had negative political effects. The cold war was still going on and Yugoslavia's relationship with one of the two blocs was weakening and the contrasts were growing. Therefore, frustrated technological innovation and internal problems weakened Yugoslavia's relationships with Western countries, thus jeopardizing that geopolitical location that had been usefully exploited by Tito since 1948. Whereas Slovenia suffered as a result of the decrease in the country's competitive strategy, at that time Yugoslavia was already starting to play a marginal role in the international scenario. This role would become even more marginal in the age of the *perestrojka* and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Europe and the rest of the world underestimated the tensions which were developing in Yugoslavian society and this may be one of the reasons.

Whatever the case, frustrated technological innovation together with constant bureaucratic interference and power decentralization hindered and then stopped improvements in production quality, which led to an autarkic trend and aggravated the country's governability, thus causing decision-making to become more and more difficult. In the meanwhile, inflation was increasing, whereas money supply was decreasing, a fact that adversely affected people's standards of living, in particular that of the emerging social classes.

The contrast between developed and underdeveloped areas --which many politicians have regarded as one of the most important sources of instability-- did not only include a differentiation between stronger and weaker republics, because developed republics themselves included backward regions and a more detailed analysis of the conditions of municipalities would underline even more marked

differences. Thus, social and territorial inequality did not necessarily follow ethnic distribution which displayed different characteristics. When Tito was in power, internal migration favoured the inter-relationship between different national populations; for example, between 1955 and 1981 the percentage of Slovenians in Slovenia decreased from 96.6% to 90.4%, the Serbs in Serbia from 73.8% to 66.4%, the Montenegrins in Montenegro from 85.7% to 66% and the Croats in Croatia from 79.6% to 75%. On the other hand, the Macedonians in Macedonia remained stable (from 66.2 to 67), while the Albanians in Kosovo increased from 64.2 to 77.8 and Muslims in Bosnia from 25.6 (datum of the year 1961) to 39.6. Such changes in ethnic composition were more strongly perceived in urban areas (where the socially "accepted" classes gathered) than in the country where homogeneity remained the basic characteristic of the village. Cities were thus juxtaposed to a rural world, ethnically fragmented but dominated by the homogeneity of the village. Rural localism remained alive, while the crisis increased the sense of insecurity of the urban people, in particular of those who had recently migrated and those living in the suburbs. An intense suffering built up during these years, hiding explosive tensions which were only restrained by the absence of a strong counterpart and recognizable from the fragmentariness of the political and entrepreneurial power.

In these conditions, the government, unable to boost economic development because of juxtaposed vetos, focused only on those problems connected with redistributing policy and all this had repercussions on the fight for power that gradually became the fight amongst republican, regional and sometimes local élites. The disarticulation of the economic system came to affect the political system, reinforcing the image of the Republics as a repository of national interest, which was questioned by recently arrived immigrants, by the other Republics and by the Federation itself. In the countryside this resulted in the juxtaposition of local settlements with different nationalities, and in the cities resulted in an interethnic tension which was at its strongest in the suburbs.

b) The representation

The social complexity in Yugoslavia which had come about as a consequence of the changes which took place between 1950 and 1970, had soon to face the inadequacy of the cultural and political changes.

Schooling and wide-spread elementary were not followed by the reinforcement of a wider and more vital culture with a recognizable identity and this was due to the fact that this step would have required a condition of democracy conditions that dictatorship would not allow. Despite some steps towards free thinking during the '60s, the government vetoed many publishing and university enterprises (for example "Praxis"). During the '80s, especially in Slovenia, there had been discussions concerning Gramsci's concept of civilized society, which might have had an influence on the process of transition from the shaping of values and their transmission to the interaction between the State and the Party that have paved the way for a more articulate political society. At the same time in Slovenia individuals or groups of people (especially young people) were trying to establish autonomous organizations and structures --mainly concerned with the environment and military service-- which however did not spread to the rest of the country. These were mainly urban phenomena because in the countryside and in the most backward regions, knowledge was still schematic

and simple. Changes in the country had sometimes come about as a result of a more general European development, like for example the 1968 student revolution, the feminist movement and the various debates on the role of the market, the State and employment.

However, the development of a certain degree of democracy also brought into the open nationalist tensions whose disruptive force had already manifested itself in Kosovo in 1968 and in Croatia in 1970-1971 (but also in Serbia, where secret services were run by Rankovje, and in Slovenia).

Problems connected to the democratic transformation of Yugoslav society and internal problems have been present in this country since World War II.

As a result of all the tensions which derived from the economic and cultural growth of the country and even though nationalism was ideally connected to "long-term" cultural aims, Tito's reaction to these kinds of social tensions was always repression, a reaction determined by different factors; his repression of nationalism was due to his fear that the U.S.S.R could take advantage of the problems in order to destabilize the country, whereas with respect to democratic claims that could affect Yugoslav social repression it was due to the political culture of the Third International and to an absolute faith in the principle of labour force dictatorship. The Dilas case in 1954 was a case in point.

This is the reason why, after the 1968-1972 crisis caused by democratic, national and nationalistic tensions, the 1974 Constitution established a reform of the State and of self-government based on a wide decentralization of power without democracy. The national issue was for Tito --an authoritarian with keen political intuition-- a special interest and as a theme result there was never any real political pluralism.

Due to the influence of communism on society and the predominant role of Tito, after 1974 Yugoslavia lived under a regime that was however committed to civil rights. The granting of the right of veto to Republics and Regions, the rotation of offices (causing confusion, however), the choice of the State and the Party élite which basically respected ethnic ratios, the recourse to plurality of languages in the country and to bilingualism in the areas where ethnic minorities lived, the presence of the press in the language of minorities were all aspects of this commitment to civil rights. This support of course had its limitations; for example in military circles only one language was spoken, freedom of religion was not allowed but Tito's Yugoslavia does not deserve the definition of "prison of the people".

The weight of the communist culture, and in particular its belief in the possibility of establishing a "self-governing socialist democracy" centered on group representation --in a context where the party preserved its leadership-- and led to organized political representation as the exclusive expression of general interests, which resulted in the establishment of assemblies and parliaments where citizens were represented according to territory (Republics and Regions, Municipalities and Districts), to jobs (those working in manufacturing industries, in the service industries or in non-productive activities like education, sport and justice), or according to authorized political organizations (party, labour unions, young people's associations similar to the League). Basically, citizens as individuals had no representation because decision-making depended on convergence among various groups or, in most important issues, on the unanimous agreement of the Republics and Regions.

When economic crisis started to worsen, many of these representations proved inadequate and unable to safeguard group interests; for example the labour unions --partly because of their relationships with the establishment and with the League, partly because of the fragmentary nature of business enterprises-- could only assure partial and discontinuous protection of workers' rights. Thus, inevitably, the representations of workers weakened while, the people viewed territorial representations, above all the Republics and Regions (within which group feeling of belonging appeared more stable), as being more efficient.

In the meanwhile, as a consequence of the radical changes brought about in the country by industrialization, urbanization and the development of the tertiary sector, the social and political "monolithism" of the end of the '40s had been substituted, on the social level, by a complex stratification, able to express plurality of interests but still only through a single party, which became the repository of the contrasting tensions that society was manifesting. Therefore, as soon as its charismatic leader died, the party proved unable to govern the (ethnic and social) "difference" determined by the rapid and tumultuous change that had taken place in 20-30 years, and it has ended up in internal struggles. Since Republics and Regions had more power, the divisions within the communist League became essentially territorial divisions, and since Republics took decisions according to unanimous consensus, collective representation, which granted them a single vote only, appeared superfluous.

In 1984, in his severely criticized book entitled "The system and the crisis", Jovan Miric had already underlined the fact that a rigid criterion of territorial representation meant that citizens no longer took any part in political life. During the decline of communism, which coincided with the economic crisis of the '80s, the consequences of that criterion were the change of the political system into a strait "jacket" where there was no room for efficient answers to the new situation. It was at that time that the League, unable to give up its leadership, started to regard inter-republican dialectics as the only possible democratic dialectics in society.

This attitude had disastrous effects on society because it forced the political élite to protect its source of consensus, not as an expression of different social and transnational interests but as an expression of the interests of a certain territory. Thus, a sort of territorial competition grew out of the traditional socio-economic, regional imbalances and the gap between strong and weak areas became wider. At the same time, the lack of debate on general issues --(self-government suited the ambivalent political attitude of *Zadruga*, regarded both as an expression of self-government with direct participation of the "bases" and as a form of isolation of one group) hindered the shaping of an idea of citizenship in which all tensions, ethnic tensions included, could find a role within the political system that would not end in a mere feudal negotiation and bargaining among the eight members of the federation.

For all these reasons the country abandoned the idea of unity which was then reduced to mere propaganda. Moreover, the absence of free debate capable of shaping public opinion, influencing associations and opinion and developing critical awareness led each ethnic group to believe that the difficulties were the consequence of the other nationalities "exploitation" of their own resources and entrepreneurial and administrative skills.

The responsibility assumed by many intellectuals, in particular Serbian academics, to write a Memorandum in 1986 led to the granting of "theoretical dignity" to such beliefs and their distortion through an improper interpretation of the history and the political reality of that moment. At the same time, they shaped a solid program for a politician (who turned out to be Slobodan Milosevic) who was ready to take it to its extreme consequences, thus paving the way to the conflicts with their tragical conclusions.

The passage to pluralism in 1990, besides being sudden and unexpected, was conditioned by these processes, also because the limitations of primary education and people's lack of awareness of the situation stimulated polarization. Tensions in the countryside and in the urban areas were not counterbalanced by a wide-spread, federal culture, because no culture of this kind had been promoted by Universities or other cultural centres. As a result of this, culture remained in the hands of a small number of intellectuals and of urban population, who were often conditioned by the local political circumstances. Such processes were so fragmented and so conditioned by specific situations that the effects they had were different in different places, thus characterizing the '80s as a contradictory decade.

For example, Belgrade's traditionally cosmopolitan attitude started to wane after 1985 as a consequence of the built up of a schematic and rough nationalism fed by the exasperation of the Serbs from Kosovo and by their instrumentalization by Milosevic. In Zagreb and in Croatia there had not been any tensions for twenty years as a result of the 1971 repression and local orthodox leaderships had remained passive as had the political élite in Bosnia-Herzegovina who had been overwhelmed by financial scandals after the Agrokomerc crash in 1987. Montenegro's leadership underwent a similar fate --determined, it seems, by the Serbian government-- because it had brought the Republic to the verge of economic and social collapse. On the other hand Slovenia owed its lively cultural and political life to the important role that its leadership had in Yugoslavia as well and to its attitude towards a dynamic debate of all the other issues concerning Yugoslavia. Ljubana became the " critical conscience " of the country and this prevented it from isolating itself in the provincialism which was encouraged by anti-southern racist tensions present in its society.

After the collapse of communism (and from 1987 in Serbia) the various religious communities could intervene politically both as forces capable of channelling consensus and as a group whose intervention was directed towards education and assistance. At the same time religions exerted a cohesive force on culture that favoured the establishment of distinct national identities, which if properly channeled, would have given nationalistic political forces the chance to achieve their goals. This convergence of interests resulted in a political instrumentalisation of religion, sometimes stimulated by Islamic and ecclesiastic organizations themselves, as they tended to base their leadership on politics, a fact that on the cultural level stressed contrasts which, for other reasons, were already present in Yugoslavia's national communities.

In conclusion, the interaction of various factors (the limited dialectics of communist politics, economic and social changes and the spreading of culture) including the conflicts between Serbia and Slovenia of the years 1987-1990, has emphasized the role of territory in the definition of group identity. In addition to this, the belief that the only possible dyalectics in a monoparty regime were inter-republican, led to an altered perception of democracy, which came to mean

freedom from federal ties. After the collapse of communism, freedom came to be identified with absolute self-assertion, which was not meant as expression of the rights of citizens but, once again, of a group. It soon became impossible to dissent for fear of being accused of being "traitors to the Nation" by the political forces which came to power in 1990 or by radical, extremist groups.

The authoritarian government of difference was thus substituted by attempts at imposing homogeneity in an authoritarian and even violent way, the idea of democracy being regarded as an expression of the freedom of individual national groups.

Changes in the idea of representation are a characteristic of any radical, political transition. Parallels can be drawn between some aspects of the French Revolution and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and it seems evident that Europe has to face the end of a regime and a change in the legitimate source of power, when conditions of development are also changing from a qualitative point of view. This means that, whereas in 1789 the divine right of kings was overthrown, now it is the political, ideological legitimacy of the communist party that has been done away with; if at that time the industrial revolution and the passage from the feudal system to private property was about to happen, now a new technological organization has to be faced, together with the collapse of a system of public intervention on economy that was so wide-spread that it controlled production, distribution and services.

In its delicate transition towards pluralism, in 1990 Yugoslavia witnessed the prevailing of an idea of representation based on ethnicity rather than citizenship. The attitude that post-communist governments could represent the Nation rather than citizens, in a pre-existing context of high ethnic integration, has estranged minorities from the real Constitution of States. People belonging to an ethnic group, by finding themselves with fewer rights than they had the past, started to regard themselves as minorities in the territory which they inhabited, whereas other groups felt they were doomed to vanish or to become stateless (as was the case of those who had declared themselves as "Yugoslav").

The short-lived peaceful transition to post-communism led to the shaping of a pluralism in which the traditional contrast between majorities and oppositions, typical of democracy, was very distorted; the organized juxtaposition of ideas gave way to an ethnic contrast, in which majorities and minorities depended on the demographic weight of each national community. When the Yugoslav federation still existed, this process, which should at least have safeguarded majorities, paradoxically had the opposite effect, because representation on an ethnic basis disillusioned the minorities, thus inducing the majority in each region to question the loyalty of its minorities. Any attempt at questioning the country's unity has only increased people's insecurity and has had tragic consequences.

3. Nation and Political Culture

Consequently, the collapse of time-honoured values and of previously recognized sources of legitimate power made the diffusion of old fears and long-standing hatreds inevitable. And this was supported by a concept of Nation strongly cultivated by all ethnic groups and by the Slav intelligentsia, and went hand in hand with the German anti-Enlightenment Romanticism of Herder and Von Schlozer.

It was Herder, of course, who developed the theory - mainly on philosophical and theological grounds - that the spiritual characteristics of a people can never be destroyed and, in the same context, that the mother tongue functions in the same way as "temperament" and "way of thinking" of a person. According to Herder, Nation and language are so closely linked that they become a "natural law", and this thesis is sharply in contrast with the "voluntaristic" interpretation of the idea of Nation which was taken up in Italy, for example. What was really basic to the Slavic ethnic groups was not the idea of a collectivity held together by a common culture, as Mazzini advocated, but the idea of a collectivity based on the fusion of language and Nation, which were a result of both "mystical" factors and "natural" heritage, as Herder maintained. This interpretation put the emphasis on the intrinsic characteristics of a group as an entity to resist contamination and, for this reason, capable of "winning" in time, adversity notwithstanding; furthermore, the same interpretation failed to relate this "national" characteristic to the European transnational context, in opposition to Mazzini's thesis.

In the peculiar situation of Yugoslavia, a multiethnic country, this idea became, in the long run, a source of cultural instability, all the more so seems the Romantic reinstatement of the Middle Ages entailed a restoration of a past, tradition of sovereignty and autonomy, even if only for a brief period, which had the power to legitimate the State-Nation within territorial borders and which, 700 years later, could only lead to endless controversies.

Finally, the Herderian belief - shared by Von Schlozer - , stating that each group was called by Providence to carry out its own "mission", acted as a compelling intellectual spur, but had the political effect of encouraging each group to re-write its own history in order to define all the features of the "mission" to be performed on the historical stage.

And it is here, at least on the political-cultural plane, that the sentimental and passionate relationship between Nation and Territory originated and the advocates of nationalism considered the two to be totally inseparable. It was a relationship which ended up in making minorities an endless source of irredentism, a sort of "Trojan Horse" ready to undermine the stability of the majority, a source of constant suspicion.

We are very far from the "integrated" cultures which existed, for example, in Dalmatia and in Croatia and which during the Renaissance, in the case of Dalmatia and between the XVIII and the XIX Century in the case of Croatia, developed a rich tradition in the arts and literature thanks to the Venetian-Slav and Greek-Slav syncretisms of those times. These syncretisms escaped the distorted ex-post revisions by the different nationalism (including the Italian case), which aimed at an exclusive appropriation of mixed cultures, and denying their individual peculiarities since they contrasted with the identification of the notions of Nation, Territory, Culture and Civilization.

Thus, strongly supported by their natural and biological idea of Nation, nationalism encouraged a distorted view of the past, although, since the second half of the XIX Century, it has proved capable of activating consciences and organizing consensus. This view managed to take advantage of an interpretation of history full of images of great immediacy, where the political myth of a bridge between collective consciousness and unconsciousness could find its way. The interpretation of the Serbian Nation as "having been nailed for centuries on the Golgota" is only one example, though a very effective one, of a political culture

which invites a collectivity - under actual or alleged pressure by other dominating ethnic groups - to stay together, to live in an ivory tower and to endure the hardest sacrifices in order to prepare for unification in an independent Territory and to be assured of a "bright" future.

All these ideas have shaped a political culture which has taken the national question to extremes and turned it into an ethnic question. Nonetheless, the modern idea of Nation has had an alluring, sentimental and, above all, positive role in that it tried to outline group identities. It all ended up in hegemonic aspirations in the name of the mother country. These aspirations are included in the "Great Projects" for a State, of which panserbianism and pancroatianism are only the most striking expressions of a more general urge to exert the right of each Nation to have its own State and the right of each Nation to inhabit that same State.

According to this interpretation, the National Territory becomes a sacred property in that it gives the Government autonomy and ethnic unity, as well as assuring cultural homogeneity between government and the governed people. This homogeneity is seen as an essential condition in order both to assure the "survival" of a people against the danger of assimilation, caused by the mere existence and/or the political action of a demographically bigger Nation, and to enable them to overcome backwardness and economic crisis. And to define this space one refers back to the previous geo-political situation: once again, history is brought in as the determining factor in attributing a region to this or that ethnic group.

But this is an improper use of history, using it as a source of legitimacy and, consequently, as a political weapon although it is an establish tendency shared by the communists as well. Today it is apparent how the official, dogmatic and distorted view of the past events, supported by the communist system, became a source of instability for the Yugoslav State. The long and unaccounted-for "silences" (the so-called "white pages of History") covering up awkward or unjustifiable events in order to support and legitimize the system, at the same time, caused the people to lose of faith in the Truth, even though many veils of secrecy were drawn away during the Eighties, when the communists still held the power and could have taken advantage of these disclosures to renew their role and improve their image. But their growing internal divisions and the effect of a devastating crisis in the country led to the failure of any weak attempt in this direction.

Post-communism brought with it the belief that "historical memory", distorted by the government, could be revived only through vivid individual recollection. But "historical memory" does not coincide with History. It is just the glorification of that part of the past praised in the present in order to sketch out a different future. Thus, "historical memory" and History have been confused once more and the result has been hatred.

Certainly, when all previously unifying forces fall apart, when the internationalist ideology of Marx and Lenin loses its validity and many certainties crumble, the need to remove all remnants of Communism becomes urgent until even the eradication of the existence of the regime from the collective memory is desired. Hymns, coats of arms and flags are modified, toponomastic changes - partly comprehensible, partly exaggerated, ridiculous or sometimes even grotesque - are made and streets and squares, even towns, are swiftly re-named; finally, old linguistic and literary disputes are re-opened. All this encouraged first of all a new emotional and irrational urge which gave rise to deep uneasiness and great social

uncertainty, and which has sharpened frictions and suspicions among the national Slav groups as well as encouraging populist and demagogic tendencies.

This helped to keep alive, as time went by, a deep-seated sense of instability, which combined with the aspiration towards a "nobler mission" experienced, albeit in different ways, by all Slav peoples. The defence of Christianity or Catholicism, as well as the ideas of "bastion" and of "protection of Europe" (for example against Islam) have permeated the identities of these groups, who have been living on a geo-political and cultural border since Diocletian times.

This is the border between East and West. A border which has proved to be movable in time and space, depending on the different meanings given to the definitions of "East" and "West". A border which, above all in the Slav territory, has changed so frequently as to modify all further delimitations within the two opposing camps. A quick consultation of a historical atlas will show to what extent the borders changed during the Middle Ages, during the Modern Age of the great transnational empires, and finally during the "Risorgimento" and the XIX Century.

Therefore, Yugoslav populations have always experienced an alteration of both cultural and territorial *boundaries* from the cultural point of view the feeling of being like a fragile "bridge" between different worlds has affected the perception of security of those populations. The fluctuation of boundaries, moreover, has encouraged opposing feelings of attraction and rejection with regard to the Western world, to which they feel they belong, but that they feel is uninterested in their historical functions.

Thus the populations of South-East Europe feel vulnerable. It is a cultural and psychological attitude that may be stimulated by economic, demographic, social, literary, military and political factors. In these conditions inter-ethnic and inter-cultural relationships play an ambivalent role, sometimes as exchange guarantees, sometimes as sources of instability and danger.

The Yugoslav populations, after World War II experienced radical changes in a period of time too short to allow them to take root. The economic and political crises (meant as the crisis of a representation incapable of legitimizing established powers) determined the conditions under which it was thought that redefinition of borders could ensure cultural homogeneity among the groups and a cultural relationship between governed and governors which was no longer mediated, and therefore guarantee more stability and development.

"Difference" has thus become a synonym for ingovernability whereas homogeneity has become a pre-requisite for future security and well-being, even though in a context characterized by "difference". In this respect, war could not be avoided.

Whatever Yugoslavia will be like in the future, the problem of the security of its populations will not be solved if it is the result only of diplomatic and military interventions, nor will it be sufficient to produce international norms that the people are expected to respect, under the supervision of local or world organizations. It will not be sufficient to count on economic interests, expecting that these will act "sooner or later" as catalyzers in the reorganization of the area. All these approaches may be useful but they will hardly provide an adequate solution to the "long-term" psychological and cultural tensions experienced by the Yugoslav populations and to their need to reorganize their historical memory which has been perturbed by the ruthlessness of the war that started 1991.

Consequently it is necessary to re-think the concept of security and reshape it into an articulated system of securities capable of facing up to political, military, diplomatic and legal problems as well as economic, social, demographic, religious and administrative ones. It is necessary to make a cultural effort because --to paraphrase Gerschenkron-- the attitudes of collectivities, with their conflictual and cultural tensions, greatly influence the processes of society especially when they turn into real government actions.

All this requires long-term strategies and reorganization, and this is the the only way to outline a general scenario in which political decisions can be made, according to the circumstances. The situation has so worsened on the Yugoslavian war fronts and in particular on the backlines (i.e. in the area from Karavanke to Devdelija) that war cannot be expected to come to an end in the immediate future and so let peace negotiations and political reorganization take place. The situation is taking rather the opposite direction. War will not come to an end if, by using a multi-directional attempt, Yugoslav populations, mediators and the international community do not have a clear idea of the foundation on which peace and reorganization can be built in that tormented area. In this case the results from the battlefields and ethnic supremacy will have to be accepted unconditionally. However, cultural and political consequences on European security will have to be evaluated.

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22 NOV. 1994

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