

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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
Centro alti studi per la difesa (CASD)

Centro militare di studi strategici (CeMiSS)

NATO Office of Information and Press

Roma, 7-9/XI/1996

- a. Programma
- b. Lista dei partecipanti
 1. Address by Valdo Spini
 2. "NATO and the Mediterranean"/ Sergio Balanzino
 3. "Fattori di novità della sicurezza nel Mediterraneo"/ Carlo Jean
 4. "New dimensions of Mediterranean security"/ Ian O. Lesser
 5. "New dimensions of Mediterranean security [discussione]"
 6. "The Euro-Mediterranean partnership: the post-Barcelona agenda [discussione]"
 7. "Radicalism and political violence [discussione]"
 8. "Proliferation and weapons of mass destruction [discussione]"
 9. Speech by Giacomo Luciani
 10. "La proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa"/ Ahmed Abdel Halim
 11. "NATO and the Mediterranean [discussione]"
 12. "Perspectives of the dialogue countries [discussione]"



Venerdì novembre 1996

Preliminary Agenda

november 7-9 1996

Rome - Italy

New Security Challenges in the Mediterranean

Jointly organized by Rand and CeMiSS

with the support of the NATO office of information and press

- November 7
- Arrival of participants
- 8:00 PM
- Dinner
Speaker: Hon. Valdo Spini (Chairman of Parliamentary
Defense Commission - Italy)
- November 8
- 9:00
- Opening remarks by Conference Chairmen
Giuseppe Cucchi (CeMiSS -Italy)
Stephen Larrabee (RAND - USA)
- 9:00-10:30
- SESSION I
Chairman Giuseppe Cucchi (CeMiSS - Italy)
- New Dimensions of Mediterranean Security*
Presentations:
Carlo Jean, CASD (Italy)
Bruce George (GB)
Ian O.Lesser, RAND (USA)
- 10:30-11:00
- Coffee Break
- 11:00-12:30
- The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership:
the post-Barcelona Agenda*
Presentation:
J.P. Derisbourg (UE)
Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos
Internacionalis (IEEI), Lisbon
Khalid Alioua (Morocco)
- 12:30-02:00 PM
- Lunch
- 02:30-03:30
- SESSION II
Chairman Jerrold Green (RAND -USA)
- Radicalism and Political Violence*
Presentation:
Graham Fuller, RAND (USA)
George Joffé (Great Britain)

Venerdì novembre 1996

03:30-04:00 Coffee Break

04:00-05:30 *Proliferation and weapons of Mass Destruction*
Presentation:
Ahmed Abdel Halim (Egypt)
Shahram Chubin (Switzerland)

8:00-10:00 Dinner
Speech of Giacomo Luciani (ENI - Italy)

November 9 SESSION III
Chairman Stephen Larrabee (RAND -USA)

9:00-10:30 *NATO and the Mediterranean*
Presentations:
Roberto Aliboni (IAI - Italy)
Nicola De Santis (NATO)
Ibrahim Karawan (Egypt)

10:30-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00-12:30 *Perspectives of the Dialogue Countries*
Presentations:
Fadel ALi Fhaid (Jordan)
Mahmoud Vall (Mauritania)
Jerrold Green, RAND (USA)

12:30-02:00 pm Lunch
Speaker: Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez, CINCSOUTH,
NATO

02:00-03:20 pm SESSION IV
Chairman Maurizio Coccia (CeMiSS -Italy)

Security Perspectives in the Eastern Mediterranean
Presentations:
Thanos Veremis, Eliamep (Greece)
Mehmet Ali Birand, Sabah (Turkey)

03.30-05:30 Closing Address of Ambassador Sergio Balanzino,
NATO Deputy General Secretary

04:00-05:30 Wrap-up Session: *Priorities and Next Steps*
Stefano Silvestri, IAI (Italy)
Guido Lenzi (WEU)

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POSSIBLE QUESTIONS AND SUBJECTS FOR DEBATE
RAND - CeMISS CONFERENCE
(Rome, 7 - 9 November 1996)

- 1) How should the NATO dialogue, the WEU dialogue and the Barcelona PEM be coordinated?
- 2) How is the dialogue affected by the difficulties encountered in the Middle East peace process? And the PEM?
- 3) It is possible to shape up the PFM as an interface between the PEM and the US/NATO?
- 4) What are the objectives and concrete contents of NATO/WEU dialogues? What are those of the PFM?
- 5) Is it possible to deepen the PFM and PEM dialogues, namely the multilateral approaches, regardless of developments in the Middle East peace process? Or should we give up the multilateral approach for the time being and continue to develop bilateral relations only, or slow down these relations too?
- 6) Should we take account of the Gulf or consider only the Near East and North Africa? How should Barcelona and the MENA Economic Summit be coordinated?
- 7) What objectives a revitalized 5+5 dialogue could have? and the Mediterranean Forum at 11 proposed by Egypt?
- 8) What connection should exist between a dialogue between cultures and a dialogue on interests? Which one should prevail?
- 9) What fields should be taken into account in a "Euro-American pact" on the Mediterranean?
- 10) Which factors should be considered as a top priority in the cooperation between northern and southern Armed Forces? (civil defence? environment?)
- 11) Is it possible to envisage some CBMs in the field of "hard security" or should only a "soft security" be envisaged?
- 12) What relations and priorities are there between crisis prevention and crisis solution?
- 13) Is it possible to develop some form of cooperation for the OAU Pan African intervention force?
- 14) Does a Mediterranean culture exist? How should it be developed to improve the North-South cooperation?
- 15) Is it possible to envisage CSBMs? In which fields and areas?
- 16) How would the various possible configurations of NATO's reorganization (enlargement, HQ restructuring, etc.) affect the Europe-US and North-South cooperation?

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BIBLIOTECA	

7 Novembre 1996

Address by the Hon. Prof. Valdo Spini, Chairman Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

"New security challenges in the Mediterranean"

Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests,

It is a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to address the meeting organised by RAND, CEMISS and the NATO Information and Press Office on the outlook for security in the Mediterranean area.

Italy is a European country with a significant Mediterranean dimension dictated by geographic as well as cultural and historical factors.

Because of this Mediterranean dimension, both Italian public opinion and the Italian government are fully aware that the area is important to our prosperity and security. But, since Italy remains fundamentally a European country - strongly embedded politically, culturally and economically into the continent - our attention and policies towards the Mediterranean are closely linked to the policies towards the Mediterranean area of the European Union and its member states.

After the decisions made at the June 1995 Cannes European Council, which led to the successful organisation of the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, security in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe have become parts of a shared European foreign policy, which concerns

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Germany and the other Northern European countries no less than the Southern European members of the Union. All together we are 27 partners in the Barcelona follow-up.

In other words, the Mediterranean is an element of European cohesion and this is an important factor for Italy's national security. By the same token, Italy's Mediterranean policy is to be broadly understood as a pro-active component of the Mediterranean policy of the European Union.

But Italy also remains strongly convinced that security in the Mediterranean, from both an Italian and a European point of view, is linked to the presence of the United States.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the USA is still an essential element of Europe's political stability and prosperity. It is also an important element in securing the cooperation and integration of individual European states, i.e. European cohesion. Trans-Atlantic and Mediterranean relations both contribute to European cohesion. Trans-Atlantic relations are therefore as important as European relations in shaping Italy's Mediterranean policies and perceptions.

In the nineties, Italy has played a significant role in integrating the Mediterranean area into the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, but it has played an equally important role in including the Mediterranean among NATO's priorities. In January 1994, Mr. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the then Italian Prime Minister, contributed to having the Mediterranean area included in the final communiqué of the Brussels Summit as an issue of common concern. Italy is convinced that NATO has to undergo a transformation to become an element of a new

peaceful international order. And it is also convinced that this transformation also has to be reflected in the Mediterranean.

In October 1995, at the NATO Summit in Williamsburg, the then Italian Defence Minister, Domenico Corcione, proposed that NATO should act in the Mediterranean along the lines of the "*Partnership for peace*", that we have successfully implemented for Eastern Europe.

Against this political background, Italy is not just waiting for European and trans-Atlantic initiatives. Italy is actively contributing towards shaping these initiatives and sharing efforts and resources with its allies. NATO and the EU are important factors in Italian policy towards the Mediterranean, but at the same time Italy is actively helping to shape NATO and EU policies.

This Italian attitude stems from the fact that we share a number of concerns regarding the Mediterranean with our European and Trans-Atlantic allies.

The first concern relates to development. In a world of fierce economic competition and regional restructuring Europe needs effective regional partners on both its Eastern and Southern flanks. Furthermore, underdevelopment in the regions south of Europe generates social instability, political extremism and increased migration. Italy's bilateral aid is being reduced because of the country's poor economic performance since the beginning of the nineties and the need to restructure the Italian economy. However, Italy is playing its part in the great effort being made by the European Union within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Furthermore, although Italian bilateral aid has been reduced, what remains is mostly devoted to helping the Mediterranean countries.

A second concern is the cultural rift between North and South that seems to be arising in the region. In this respect, the Italian attitude has made it clear on many occasions that while we condemn violence, intolerance and extremism wherever they may arise, i.e. whether in the Muslim, Christian or Jewish worlds, we consider that religion can provide a means of democratic political expression. In the Mediterranean we have the three monotheistic religions, the three religions of the Book: the Torah, the Gospel, the Koran. We believe that everything must be done to foster religious and cultural dialogue between the three main components of the Mediterranean's historical setting and that this must be reflected in the management of the holy places such as Jerusalem.

A third concern is security, in particular the existence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the trend toward the proliferation of arms of mass destruction in the area. We are unhappy about the degree of compliance with international disarmament and arms limitation conventions in the Mediterranean and although we do not see any real military threat to our security for the time being, we must not ignore the risks of the present situation.

Italy is therefore participating to the Mediterranean defence initiatives such as EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR. The EUROFOR (French - Portuguese - Spanish -Italian Force) will be inaugurated on 9th November in Florence.

In order to attain a more positive attitude towards arms control and limitation, a key condition is that a fair political solution must be found to the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. And this is the fourth and probably most important concern today.

Unfortunately, negotiations have been less boldly conducted and internationally supported than they should be. They have lost momentum. We have to criticise ourselves on this. This has enabled conservative forces - Hamas, Iranian and Jewish extremists - to step in and almost reverse the peace process. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin was a turning point in this regard. The aftermath and the latest events are before our eyes. If the peace process is reversed, all the concerns I have listed will be seriously aggravated and everything that has been done to deal with them will be undermined, with serious risks for peace in the entire region.

It is true that the negotiations took place in Washington, but it is also true that Europe must participate more. Italy and Europe are ready and willing to help the Israel - Palestinian peace process, side by side and in a complementary role with the key role played by the U.S.A. and other countries in the region, such as Egypt or Jordan.

Nevertheless, I believe that the peace process will not be reversed in the end, and that the parties will manage to start it up again.

For this reason, I hope that your deliberations will make a step forward along the very long path to establishing peaceful and just conditions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and I wish you all success in this endeavour.

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership of 27 Mediterranean Countries represents the overall framework for North-South cooperation.

With the policy declaration signed at the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, a new global partnership model has been created based on three distinct but complementary pillars: a political and security pillar, an economic/financial pillar, and a socio-cultural pillar.

I recently learnt that the measures currently being examined in relation to prevention and security include two put forward by Italy that I consider to be particularly important: natural and man-made disaster prevention and management, which provides for the deployment of the armed services under the control of the civilian authorities for humanitarian purposes, and crisis prevention and management.

But, as the present Italian Defence Minister, Beniamino Andreatta has said, the Barcelona process is just the framework not the whole picture. It should underpin those initiatives taken by other security organizations or institutions such the OSCE, the WEU, the NATO or the Mediterranean Forum to foster and enhance North-South dialogue and commitment.

This dialogue is bound to continue and improve: the five countries defined by the OSCE as "*Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation*" (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia) have been invited to the preparatory meetings for the Lisbon Summit (2 - 3 December 1996). This demonstrates that the OSCE now accepts a linkage between strengthening security in Europe and improving stability in the adjacent Mediterranean area.

But, I want to come to the main subject of our meeting, that is NATO.

Nato has a potentially extremely important role to play in this context because of its features as a political/military organisation capable of guaranteeing security in an increasingly wider area, against the new international background following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Italy is particularly committed in this regard for obvious geopolitical reasons and feels a particular responsibility to advance proposals and requests in this connection.

What do we mean by the "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) for the Mediterranean, which is now defined as a "Partnership for the Mediterranean" (PfM)?

Our view is that a Mediterranean initiative is a means of preventing conflicts on the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance.

In other words, it is designed to prevent tensions arising in the Mediterranean, which can be in a latent state of controlled intensity, before they become all-out violent crises that can easily get out of hand, as has happened already in the Balkans.

It is therefore a question of preventive action to be implemented on the basis of mutual knowledge, understanding and exchange, all of which are particularly important in matters relating to security.

It is a question of developing confidence-building

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and transparency measures of the kind that has made it possible in the recent past to break down the barriers that formerly kept Europe divided.

Furthermore, a stable and secure Euro-Mediterranean zone would, in the medium- and long-term, provide an opportunity for expanding trade and giving an impetus to economic development.

To summarise the relations that ought to exist between the countries on the northern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean in a single sentence, I would like to recall the motto that the young Americans adopted in the Sixties, "I care". These words are written on the wall in Don Lorenzo Milania's school at Barbiana - a man who used to teach in a deprived mountain area in Tuscany.

Italy's position is well-known. It was recalled at Williamsburg by the then Defence Minister, Ciriaco.

I would therefore like to repeat it here.

"Initially the process of dialogue that has already begun could be immediately enhanced by including the "softer" aspects of military cooperation, namely, measures to enhance mutual knowledge and trust. This could be done by a clear and direct approach by Nato to encourage military visits and meetings appropriately using all the facilities that already exist in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe through the procedures

established in the CSBM Vienna document on two-way exchanges.

The invitations could then be extended to participation, as observers, in Nato's military exercises and once the climate is more mature, they could also begin to take part in joint exercises in such areas as search and rescue, peace-keeping, combating trafficking and unlawful activities, the joint control of maritime areas of economic interest, and so on.

In time, the PfM with the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries would increasingly come to resemble the Pfp, obviously without the same enlargement prospects that exist for the Alliance.

I realise that in reality this might be more difficult to achieve than it is to imagine or to propose.

For example, even though a number of friendly countries in North Africa and the Middle East might wish to establish military cooperation links with Nato, others, out of a concern for possible negative repercussions on their domestic public opinion, might be less keen and take their distance from it.

Naturally, great prudence and political sensitivity is needed here, but if an initiative of this kind were to be properly presented and pursued to complement the specifically political, economic and cultural initiatives

that have been taken by other institutions, these obstacles could, in my opinion, be easily overcome. Indeed, the PfM would become yet another instrument for boosting not only North-South relations but also South-South relations, and this would certainly be a significant achievement."

I hope, and indeed I am certain, that such a high-level seminar as this can provide an opportunity for us to reflect and make decisive proposals to push forward the "Partnership for the Mediterranean" (PfM). It is true that the situation is difficult but that should not discourage us.

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NATO and the Mediterranean
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BALANZINO

Europe and the Mediterranean are not two separate entities. For millennia the Mediterranean has been a fertile ground of ideas and concepts that guide us to this very day. The very notion of a "united Europe" is based on the precepts of humanism and dignity that took its roots from along the shores of the Mediterranean.

If the Mediterranean region is nevertheless viewed by many as a distinct area, this is because it has been less dramatically - and less beneficially - affected by the end of ideological dividing lines in Europe. Many strategic analysts looking at the Maghreb region still remain uncertain whether they describe an "arc of crisis" or - much less dramatically - an "arc of change".

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Clearly, the cultural, religious and political pluralism of the Mediterranean makes a uniform approach towards this region difficult to orchestrate. The Balkans are different from the Maghreb, which in turn is different from the ^{Eastern area} ~~Gulf region~~. But the need to act is obvious: the tragic events in the Former Yugoslavia have shown that regional conflicts in and around the Mediterranean can have potential reverberations far beyond their place of origin.

But something else should be obvious, too: as far as NATO's approach to the Mediterranean is concerned, the emphasis is on "change" rather than on "crisis", on "opportunity" rather than on "risks". The Alliance could have never moved towards becoming an agent of change in the Europe of the 1990s if it viewed the strategic environment through the lense of a siege mentality. And an Alliance that today serves as a key source of stability in Europe has an obligation to explore how it can contribute to a positive

evolution in the South as well.

In developing its approach to the Mediterranean, NATO has always been aware that the main challenges in that region are not so much military, as economic and political. Economic underdevelopment, coupled with growing demographic pressures remains the key challenge. In this regard, therefore, the European Union is the key "responsible". But NATO also has a clear role to play in dispelling mistrust and encouraging multilateral solutions to regional security.

The 1995 RAND Conference on Mediterranean Security ~~stated~~ stated that NATO has an "image problem" in the South. This is perhaps not entirely surprising. The role of the Alliance is not fully understood. Even amongst the population of our own member countries, the extent of NATO's far-reaching

transformation is not always seen, let alone appreciated. Some commentators still have difficulties in comprehending how an Alliance can exist without an enemy. As a result, there is often a misjudged suspicion that NATO is somehow looking for new enemies to replace the vanished Soviet threat.

As so often, these suspicions tell us less about NATO than about how much the East-West military competition has in the past determined our thinking. NATO does not need an enemy to exist. The Alliance remains as relevant today as it ever has. NATO's members work together in the Alliance because they can bring their combined energy to bear in shaping European security. NATO's key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less likely. This is what we mean when we speak about building a new European security architecture: building a set of political relationships where each

state feels secure and at ease. This - not the antagonism of the past - is the context in which NATO's approach to the Mediterranean must be viewed.

NATO's wider agenda reveals that our policies are in line with these objectives.

Consider, for example, NATO's crucial role in Bosnia. IFOR - a unique NATO-led coalition of 33 states - has made the difference between war and peace in that region. And it was only through NATO that such a complex military operation could have been orchestrated.

Consider, secondly, NATO's outreach to Central and Eastern Europe, initiated back in 1990. Through NATO's initiatives, particularly the Partnership for Peace, security is

increasingly seen as something to be achieved together. The 16 Allies and 27 Partners now cover virtually every aspect of security, from resource management to cooperation in peacekeeping, to civil emergency planning. Without this work, IFOR could not have been set up so rapidly and effectively.

There is, thirdly, NATO's enlargement. If the division of Europe is to be truly overcome, NATO cannot stay unchanged. We cannot turn a deaf ear to the desire of the new democracies to our East to be part of our Atlantic community. A democratic NATO has an obligation to accept new members. That process is well underway.

There is, furthermore, our policy of drawing Russia and Ukraine closer to the evolving new Euro-Atlantic architecture. Russia in particular has to be reassured that NATO's enlargement

is not directed against it. Progress is possible. Our successful cooperation in IFOR is a good start, for it shows that we can pursue common security interests in common. But more can and will be done. Our goal is a close consultative relationship between NATO and Russia, one that corresponds to the weight and importance of both, and one that gives further momentum to our vision of a European security architecture that includes, rather than excludes, Russia.

There is, finally, NATO's internal adaptation. We are working on a new military structure more in line with transatlantic priorities post-Cold War. It will be optimised for crisis management, so that in future Bosnia-type contingencies we would have a command system and forces ready to respond. NATO will have a built-in capacity for incorporating contributions from non-NATO countries, as is the case today in IFOR. And NATO could

support operations led by European Allies or by the Western European Union should it be so agreed.

All this should make clear why a NATO approach to the Mediterranean is both necessary and feasible. If the security of Europe is increasingly seen as indivisible, it makes no sense to set apart the Mediterranean as an area sui generis. NATO must look to the South as well as it must look to the East.

NATO's active policy of promoting dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the Mediterranean region can be traced to the January 1994 Summit in Brussels. There, NATO Heads of State and Government directed the Council to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the Mediterranean.

This commitment was given concrete shape by the end of that year, and by February 1995, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia were invited to participate in the initial round of the Mediterranean dialogue. Jordan joined in the dialogue in late 1995, bringing the number of dialogue countries up to six.

Meetings with Representatives of all 6 countries have focused on NATO's current activities as well as on the security concerns of the dialogue countries. We have looked at the scope for participation in specific activities in the fields of information, science and visits. Dialogue countries are participating in NATO-sponsored courses, for example on peacekeeping as well as on civil emergency planning.

In conducting its Mediterranean dialogue, NATO can build on a significant amount of expertise, generated both by

member states individually and by various Expert Working Groups which meet regularly within NATO. These meetings, which have taken place for many years, have now been opened to Co-operation Partners. They bring together key experts to exchange information and share analysis on regional trends. They promote a uniform understanding of the area among NATO members; which in turn has a very positive effect on national approaches to Mediterranean issues.

The Mediterranean Dialogue is still at an early phase, and it will continue to evolve. Our main goal at this stage is to achieve better mutual understanding and to correct any misperceptions of the Alliance's purpose. The old East-West matrix cannot and must not be transferred to a North-South setting. NATO does not see the world in terms of cultural clashes. Rather, it focuses on avoiding instability - the threat which all of us have to guard against.

How could the dialogue evolve? We are not talking a Southern version of "Partnership for Peace". PfP draws its momentum and significance from the unique and deep-rooted divisions which scarred Central Europe for so long. It cannot be applied wholesale to the Mediterranean region. In the Mediterranean we can learn from PfP, but we have to find and apply our own solutions.

There is much scope for activity, not least by expanding our level of contacts and information exchanges. Ideas will be discussed by Alliance Foreign Ministers at the NAC in December. The initiative has started well; and it will maintain its momentum.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in Europe, NATO has demonstrated over the last years its worth and success as a unifying force. With NATO's help, the remnants of Europe's past division

have been gradually removed, as the countries to our East have turned into Partners - and even into future Allies. The Mediterranean should be approached with the same open-mindedness. The good start we have made in our relations with countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue is a hopeful sign that our intentions are being understood and appreciated. That is why I ^{trust} ~~believe~~ this initiative will expand and intensify to the benefit of all those who share the same region. Thank you.

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BIBLIOTECA

1. Fattori di novità della sicurezza nel Mediterraneo

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I principali fattori di cambiamento dall'inizio degli anni ottanta nel quadro di sicurezza del Mediterraneo sono i seguenti:

- a) scomparsa della presenza e potenza sovietica che ha:
 - ristretto la libertà d'azione degli Stati MENA (Middle East and North Africa), non lasciando loro altra alternativa che la cooperazione con l'Occidente;
 - tolto significato al "non-allineamento".
- b) ingresso di Grecia, Spagna e Portogallo nella Comunità Europea, che rende difficile importazioni agricole, ma maggiore spessore della politica multilaterale europea verso il Mediterraneo (Barcellona con PEM, Partenariato Euro-Mediterraneo);
- c) processo di pace nel Medio Oriente con perdita del "nemico" da parte degli Stati arabi e tentativo fallito di sostituirlo con il radicalismo terrorismo islamico;
- d) tendenza alla "mediterraneizzazione" delle politiche dell'Egitto e di Israele, anche per l'assorbimento del REDWG nel MENA Economic Summit (inoltre Barcellona);

- e) frattura nel mondo arabo conseguente alla Guerra del Golfo e tendenze a sostituire il panarabismo con il panislamismo;
- f) maggiore presenza turca in Medio Oriente, Golfo e Caucaso-Asia Centrale;
- g) passaggio anche per gli Stati Uniti dalla concezione del Mediterraneo come fianco, fronte o via di comunicazione (base per il Golfo), ad una di regione geopolitica avente una propria specificità (anche se molto frammentata, instabile e in mutamento imprevedibile);
- h) tensioni almeno potenziali fra le politiche dell'Europa e degli Stati Uniti in Mediterraneo;
- i) perdurare della priorità europea all'Est, anche se il Mediterraneo acquista maggior importanza ;
 - per Est: approccio multilaterale coerente fra NATO e UE (e UEO), in vista integrazione;
 - per Sud: saranno integrati solo Malta e Cipro; barriere immigrazione (Schengen) e importazioni (agricole, tessili, ecc.; con l'Uruguay Round e WTO sono eliminati vantaggi UE per il Maghreb). Incidenza negativa specie su Turchia, che sarà aumentata se la NATO si allargherà ai soli paesi Visegrad.
- l) Sommarsi di iniziative globali (CSCM, Barcellona, MENA Economic Summit, dialogo OSCE) e parziali (5+5; REDWG; Forum; dialoghi NATO e UEO, ecc.)
- m) aumento dell'instabilità interna e della crisi economica anche in conseguenza delle politiche restrittive dell'UE e della dimensione degli aiuti americani e degli stati del Golfo.

2. Concetto di sicurezza in Mediterraneo e sue dimensioni

- a) Anche durante la guerra fredda la sicurezza nel Mediterraneo non era monodirezionale (Est-Ovest) né monodimensionale (militare). Il bacino è stato sempre multipolare, luogo

d'incrocio di linee di competizione/confitto e di coesistenza/collaborazione. La sicurezza non é mai stata solo militare, ma anche economica e sociale.

- b) data la frammentazione, la sicurezza in Mediterraneo non può essere collettiva tipo OSCE, ma solo cooperativa. Non esistono paradigmi comuni, per cui la cooperazione politica é ridotta. Tuttavia una visione globale e multilaterale deve costituire il quadro generale, se non altro per evitare divergenze fra le politiche subregionali, fra quelle specifiche (economiche, antiterrorismo, immigrazione, ecc.) e soprattutto fra US e Europa. L'eliminazione delle differenze fra i vari attori e settori é difficile, se non impossibile. Può aumentare sia la competizione sia le tendenze al disimpegno:
- c) quali sono gli interessi comuni fra Nord e Sud ? quali fra l'Europa e gli Stati Uniti ? Quali sono gli obiettivi da perseguire con i vari dialoghi (NATO, UEO, OSCE.)? Come influiscono gli avvenimenti subregionali (processo pace in Medio Oriente e Golfo) sulla sicurezza globale del bacino ? Che obiettivi debbono e possono prefiggersi (il dialogo non deve essere tanto fra le élites del Nord e del Sud, quanto fra le élites e le masse fra cui predominano stereotipi negativi). Comunque il Sud rifiuta, a differenza dell'Est europeo, l'omologazione culturale dell'Occidente.
- d) l'esigenza della globalità non é data da una minaccia da Sud, che di per sé non esiste, ma dall'interrelazione fra le varie dimensioni della sicurezza: stabilità interna, sviluppo economico, garanzia sicurezza cittadini occidentali; processo pace in Medio Oriente; immigrazione; terrorismo; proliferazione; espansione stabilità e conflitti locali (anche in Africa sub-sahariana data la riluttanza occidentale ad intervenire in Africa e il crescente profilo dell'OUA):
- e) il containment non é sostituibile con esclusione e separazione. Le frontiere non tengono. I territori europei rischiano di essere coinvolti in lotte del Sud (terrorismo fra immigrati). I confini non possono resistere alle immigrazioni, terrorismo e criminalità organizzata:
- f) non é possibile separare prevenzione (tramite sviluppo economico), da affidare prevalentemente all'Europa; da gestione crisi e risoluzione conflitti, da affidare soprattutto agli US.

Non è neppure più possibile separare bacino occidentale da quello orientale e il Mediterraneo dalle aree esterne (Mar Nero e Golfo). La divisione dei ruoli fra NATO e UE è molto difficile, anche se sarebbe logico riportare il dialogo NATO all'approccio olistico di Barcellona (è possibile ? occorre farlo ?);

- g) per il Sud la sicurezza è anche economica, politico-interna e identitaria; quella nazionale è diretta contro minacce del Sud, non del Nord (che è visto militarmente più come partner che come minaccia).

La teoria della dipendenza è stata superata. Il Sud è in crisi non perché dipende dal Nord, ma perché non dipende più dal Nord che ha altre priorità (Est europeo). I governi del Sud temono più l'esclusione che l'ingerenza occidentale. Le opposizioni, che mobilitano le masse contro i governi sono invece anti-occidentali. Le fortune politiche sull'Islam derivano sia da reazioni identitarie contro la globalizzazione e la complessità sia dal fallimento della modernizzazione, dello sviluppo e della democratizzazione (desiderio di ricolonizzazione ? ritorno ai mandati ?);

- h) il Sud non capisce decisioni occidentali STANAVFORMED, Euroforce: Euromarfor, che ritiene dirette contro un'ipotetica minaccia da Sud, che non esiste. È preoccupato più dal dialogo del Nord con gli islamici moderati, che dalla raffigurazione dell'Islam come pericolo (sarà interessante cosa capiterà in Turchia). Le richieste di democratizzazione, di rispetto dei diritti umani, di privatizzazione e di pluralismo politico e sociale sono stabilizzanti nel lungo periodo, ma destabilizzanti nel breve periodo. Inoltre, il Sud sospetta "double standard": l'Occidente vuole il pluralismo al Sud, ma si oppone all'integrazione degli immigrati al Nord; non è intervenuto a salvaguardia dei Bosniaci; appoggia (soprattutto US) indiscriminatamente Israele; vuole il disarmo del Sud non perché ne tema la minaccia, ma per poterlo dominare senza problemi (collegamento armi nucleari israeliane con disarmo chimico).

Infine, la proliferazione è sicuramente un pericolo. Però c'è il problema della non adesione israeliana al TNP e il fatto che tutto l'agitarsi dell'Occidente per la difesa antimissile sembra al Sud improprio. Se vi sarà impiego o minaccia d'impiego di armi di distruzione di massa contro il Nord sarà "covert" (tecnoterrorismo), non con missili la responsabilità del cui lancio è facilmente imputabile.

- i) i contenziosi territoriali al Sud sono limitati e hanno un'importanza decrescente. Molto più importante sono le sicurezze interna, economica e identitaria (somiglianze con "seguridad nacional" dell'America latina negli anni 1950-80 nelle elaborazioni degli studiosi MENA):
- l) solo Barcellona ha una visione di lungo periodo del bacino Mediterraneo e fissa obiettivi, anche se le misure di cooperazione previste sono ambigue e limitate. Si vuole costituire una zona di libero scambio, ma si bloccano prodotti agricoli e tessili. Si vuole intensificare i rapporti, ma si adottano misure restrittive per immigrazione. La cooperazione politica è limitata (Senior Officials Working Group). Comunque c'è obiettivo comune - quello della co-prosperità - e sostegno integrazione del Sud con grandi progetti infrastrutturali (medesimo approccio ha il MENA Economic Summit - ad esempio progetto Oriente dell'ENI) che però sembra bloccato, se non altro per il pericolo di predominio economico israeliano in Medio Oriente.
- m) gli strumenti militari occidentali sono configurati per crisi locali, non per stabilità globale del bacino. Quelli del Sud hanno compiti interni o compiti Sud-Sud. Mancano organi di raccordo politico per prevenzione, gestione e risoluzione conflitti. Le misure previste dal Senior Officials Working Group sono ridicole: trattare i problemi di sicurezza del Mediterraneo senza gli US è come parlare di frittata esorcizzando le uova.

3. Quale Mediterraneo ?

- a) da Gibilterra al Golfo (compreso Mar Nero e Corno d'Africa) ? oppure da Gibilterra a Suez ? oppure meglio considerarlo frazionato (occidentale, orientale, egeo, Mar Nero)? I Balcani non fanno parte del Mediterraneo, ma sempre più dell'Europa Centro-orientale. L'Adriatico è un mare interno fra l'Italia e il bacino danubiano-balcanico:
- b) la visione allargata ha contraddistinto la politica US più che quella dell'Europa. E' la visione della CSCM e del MENA Economic Summit. Per Barcellona, per il dialogo NATO, per quello UEO e per il Forum, domina visione ristretta del Mediterraneo. Il punto critico è questo: si deve distinguere un Near East da un Middle East? Sembra che

ci si avvii a questo con la costituzione della 5^a Flotta US e con il maggior impegno della Turchia nel Golfo e in Asia Centrale:

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- c) è opportuno che le visioni geopolitiche (allargata US e ristretta NATO, Barcellona, ecc) rimangano distinte per evitare contenziosi (derivanti ad esempio dall'impatto della politica USA nel Golfo su quella occidentale in Nord Africa e nel Near Est). Se l'unitarietà della coalizione del Golfo è stata favorevole al processo di pace in Medio Oriente, la sua crisi attuale può complicarla ulteriormente;
- d) cresce in taluni stati MENA (specie Egitto e Marocco) la consapevolezza di non essere solo arabi né solo mediterranei, ma anche africani. Si aprono possibilità di cooperazione con loro in ambito OUA (forza africana di peacekeeping ?), anche in relazione alla crescente riluttanza occidentale ad intervenire in Africa;
- e) mentre in economia si paga dopo, in politica si deve pagare in anticipo. Pertanto è difficile il coordinamento fra la politica e l'economia (si è visto in REDWG e in MENA Ec. Summit). Per farle avanzare conviene spesso tenerle separate e farle procedere parallelamente in modo flessibile. Più si parzializzano i problemi, più facile è risolverli, ma senza visione globale si rischia di determinare il caos: PFM, PEM e MENA Ec. Summit andrebbero coordinati.

4. Considerazioni conclusive

- a) Per essere efficace il "dialogo NATO" deve avere obiettivi chiari. La PFM può darglieli, purché sia coordinata con Barcellona. Per ora i paesi del Sud non capiscono che obiettivi hanno la NATO e l'UEO. Il dialogo fra culture o fra religioni può permettere convivenza, ma non crea di sicuro cooperazione. E' più serio parlare di interessi. Il dialogo fra culture, unito alla subordinazione degli aiuti economici a riforme strutturali politiche, viene considerato con sospetto. Per molti del Sud maschera la volontà di assimilazione, cioè di dominio culturale.
Fra il Nord e il Sud invece esistono interessi comuni. Lo stesso capita fra Europa e Stati Uniti. Gli interessi sono negoziabili. L'identità culturale o religiosa non lo è. Più che sul

“Dialogo” in sé occorre puntare sul confronto di interessi, pur tenendo conto delle sensibilità, stereotipi ed idiosincrasie reciproche;

- b) non bisogna proporsi obiettivi troppo ambiziosi. Occorre tener conto dei sospetti e rancori reciproci. Interessanti le collaborazioni fra gli istituti internazionalistici e di sicurezza e fra gli istituti di difesa.
Inoltre importante è la collaborazione fra le Forze Armate per aspetti non militari di sicurezza (protezione civile, ecologia, ecc.). Infine seminari e studi congiunti. Accordo CASD-Unesco-Egitto e corso al CASD di 2 settimane con partecipazione dei paesi UEO allargato e dei 12 mediterranei di Barcellona.
- c) La PFM può giocare ruolo di interfaccia fra NATO e Barcellona (UE-PEM), dando obiettivi più coerenti al dialogo NATO (limitato per ora a sei paesi);
- d) da Barcellona è stato escluso il processo di pace in Medio Oriente. L'UE dovrebbe entrarci. Occorre un nuovo patto transatlantico. In esso i problemi del Mediterraneo deve trovare adeguata composizione. Superare le diffidenze Israele verso presenza Europa in processo di pace. L'esclusione posta ad iniziative unilaterali (Francia), con conseguenti divergenze, confusioni e blocchi reciproci;
- e) possibile collaborazione in peacekeeping (Egitto, Giordania e Marocco sono in IFOR) anche per “forza africana d'intervento umanitario o peacekeeping” dell'OUA/ONU, o per Brigata/battaglione maghrebino d'intervento (da addestrare con Eurofor);
- f) data la mancanza di un'“architettura” di sicurezza panamediterranea è difficile “diplomazia di prevenzione crisi”. Si può fare qualcosa di più per gestione e risoluzione crisi, con geometria variabile e provvedimenti “ad hoc”. Occorre però raccordo istituzionale fra Barcellona (UE) e NATO. Il Piano d'Azione di Barcellona non è ancora inserito organicamente in PESC. Dovrebbe esserlo per facilitare coordinamento fra UE e NATO.

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NEW DIMENSIONS OF MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

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Introduction

The Mediterranean security environment is subject to influences from many quarters, both geographic and functional. Debate about Mediterranean security concerns has intensified over the past few years, and the EU's Barcelona process and NATO's dialogue with Mediterranean states have given these discussions a more substantive flavor. This paper assesses the character and durability of the Mediterranean as an area of strategic interest, and explores the new dimensions of Mediterranean security -- internal, regional, trans-regional, and extra-regional. In short, what are the key "drivers" in the emerging security environment, and what role will Mediterranean issues play in European, Middle Eastern and transatlantic affairs?

The Renaissance of Mediterranean Security?

For much of modern history, the Mediterranean has been at the center of European affairs, and international affairs generally.² The Mediterranean was the place where the political, economic and military fate of European and Middle Eastern societies was shaped. Over the last decades, many observers have been critical of the Cold War tendency to relegate Mediterranean affairs to the periphery in security terms. This Cold War marginalization was real enough, but also obscured the fact that the Mediterranean has, with a few exceptional periods, been declining steadily in geopolitical importance since the fifteenth century. The decline of the Mediterranean had many causes, but in geopolitical terms the most significant were the opening of the Cape route to the Indian Ocean, the shift of political and economic weight to the Atlantic "system", and the progressive expansion of land lines of communication on the European continent. The latter, in particular, had diverse effects spanning centuries, from the growth of trade within the European continent -- and the economic decline of Mediterranean Europe -- to the projection of

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²"Modern" in the Oxbridge sense, i.e., post-classical.

military power within and beyond Europe by road and rail, with little reference to sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean. Against this historical background, the Cold War contributed a further measure of political and strategic marginalization. Despite the role of events in the eastern Mediterranean in setting in train the Cold War policy of containment, from 1945 through the end of the 1980's the strategic center of gravity for East and West lay elsewhere.

Are we witnessing a post-Cold War renaissance in the strategic importance of the Mediterranean -- a movement from the center to the periphery, and back again? In grand historic terms, there is little to suggest that this is the case. The leading centers of international power and potential lie elsewhere, and there are no real candidates for "superpower" status around the Mediterranean. But power and potential are not the only measures of importance, and a good case can be made that the renaissance of the Mediterranean in security terms will be based on its growing importance in the strategic calculus of Europe, the United States and Middle East. Many developments could derail this trend toward greater interest in the Mediterranean over the next decade, including the rise of new tensions with Russia and insecurity in eastern Europe, not to mention adverse developments further afield. For the moment, however, Mediterranean issues are taking a more prominent place in security debates, and are imposing new intellectual and policy challenges on both sides of the Atlantic, and on both shores of the Mediterranean.³

The Meaning of Mediterranean Security

Can we speak meaningfully in terms of "Mediterranean" security, and if so, what does this concept embrace? Some Western observers have been openly skeptical of the notion of Mediterranean security, arguing that the Mediterranean is too diverse a region in security terms, with a wide range of serious but highly differentiated sub-regional problems. What, if anything, can the Western Sahara, the Levant, the Aegean and the Balkans have in common that might suggest a useful "Mediterranean" approach? Moreover, the traditional intellectual (and bureaucratic) divide between European and Middle Eastern affairs makes the development of a Mediterranean approach difficult, especially in the U.S.

Several responses can be offered to these critiques of the Mediterranean approach. First, the existence of distinctive sub-regional issues does not eliminate the importance of broader, regional -- indeed trans-regional -- approaches to

³For a recent discussion, see "Western Approaches to the Mediterranean" (several articles), *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 1, No.2, Autumn 1996.

security problems, many aspects of which cannot be adequately treated by viewing issues and crises in isolation. We have no difficulty in accepting that Baltic, Balkan and Central European issues belong within a European security framework, or that events in North Africa and the Persian Gulf contribute to a wider Middle Eastern security environment. Why not employ a Mediterranean lens when the issues and policy responses warrant? Second, and without losing sight of the specifics, it is clear that many of the security challenges around the Mediterranean basin spring from similar trends, from unresolved questions of political legitimacy, relentless urbanization and slow growth, to resurgent nationalism, religious radicalism, and the search for regional "weight." Third, and above all, the growing interdependence of traditionally separate security environments as a result of spillovers and the expanded reach of modern military and information systems is producing a significant gray area of problems that are neither strictly European nor Middle Eastern. The Mediterranean is at the center of this phenomenon, and Mediterranean security is likely to be an increasingly useful organizing principle for governments and institutions seeking to improve the overall security climate.

What does the Mediterranean security agenda comprise? Most discussion of the security environment in the region rightly encompasses both "hard" (e.g., military) as well as "soft" (political, economic, social) issues. Indeed, the expansion of the security agenda beyond defense questions narrowly defined has been a leading feature of the post-Cold War scene everywhere, and the Mediterranean is an exemplar of this trend. It has been argued, with some merit, that the definition of some "soft" issues, especially migration, as security challenges encourages an overheated treatment by publics and policymakers on both sides of the Mediterranean. Rightly or wrongly, however, migration has emerged as a security issue in European perceptions. At the same time, opinion in North Africa, as well as Turkey, is coming to regard the treatment of their compatriots in Europe as part of the foreign and security policy agenda in the broadest sense. Energy issues have more commonly appeared on "northern" agendas as a security concern, but with the growth of new lines of communication for energy around the Mediterranean, including important south-south links, the interest in energy security is now more broadly shared.

The softest part of the Mediterranean security agenda, but one arguably increasing in significance concerns what may be termed "security of identity."⁴ Security of identity, or cultural security is a highly charged issue in many Mediterranean societies, and has been prominent in the thinking of secular as well as religious observers in North Africa and the Middle East. It is also implicit in speculation about civilizational clashes, with the Mediterranean as a leading fault line between Islam and the West. The widespread availability of Western television and other media has heightened awareness of the identity issue. Migration from south to north has introduced another sort of concern about the meaning of immigration for the cultural security of recipient states. This anxiety has contributed to the politicized debate over immigration policy in Mediterranean Europe, reinforcing the economic and security aspects of the issue. Without judging the validity of cultural anxieties on both sides of the Mediterranean, it is likely that perceptions about security of identity will have a marked effect on the prospects for Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation on other fronts.

"Hard" security problems in the military and defense realm are similarly diverse. These range from spillovers of political violence and terrorism, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and longer-range delivery systems. Less fashionable, but still central to the Mediterranean security environment are the existence of sophisticated, large-scale conventional arsenals and the challenges these pose to the territorial status quo. Despite the looming exposure of Europe to longer-range weapons deployed around the Mediterranean periphery, the observation that direct military risks remain largely south-south rather than south-north still holds, especially in the western Mediterranean. In the eastern Mediterranean, the potential for large-scale armed conflict is more prominent in the strategic environment. The Arab-Israeli dispute continues to have an important military dimension, both conventional and unconventional, and the risk of conflict between Greece and Turkey remains high. If we include the Balkans and the Black Sea region in the Mediterranean equation, the issue of armed conflict is no longer theoretical.

Looking across the Mediterranean security agenda, one point that emerges very strongly is the extent to which individual crises (e.g., Bosnia, Algeria, the Aegean, Lebanon) can influence security perceptions across the region. It is also worth considering that a deterioration in the climate surrounding political,

⁴⁴See Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, "Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality," Chaillot Papers No. 25 (Western European Union Institute for Security Studies), September 1996, p. 5.

economic, even cultural issues, could produce an environment in which more direct security risks increase, and crises become more difficult to manage on a cooperative basis.

The Internal Dimension

For many societies around the Mediterranean, security continues to be, above all, a matter of *internal* security, and many foreign and security policy questions derive importance from their ability to affect the stability of existing regimes. Along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, political futures remain unresolved, with many regimes facing challenges to their legitimacy. The near civil war in Algeria provides the most dramatic example of internal insecurity and violent Islamist opposition to the political order. Whether or not the Algerian regime succeeds in containing the Islamic insurgency, the Algerian experience is likely to have a profound effect on the security of North Africa as a whole, and the overall perception of risk from the south in Mediterranean Europe.⁵ The Algerian crisis has thrown the question of political change and the role of Islam along the southern shores of the Mediterranean into sharp relief. In Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, even Libya, security perceptions will be driven by the need to preserve political legitimacy and hold violent (or potentially violent) opposition movements at bay.

The problem of political legitimacy and internal stability will be closely tied to demographic and economic trends across the region. The dilemmas posed by expanding and younger populations coupled with slow economic growth have been widely discussed. From Morocco to Turkey, attempts at economic reform and the emergence of a more dynamic private sector are widening the gap between "haves" and "have-nots," with potentially destabilizing consequences. Reforms aimed at promoting longer-term prosperity and encouraging foreign investment may well reinforce stability over the longer term, but the shorter-term political risks are substantial, especially where dissatisfaction with the existing political order is already widespread. Rising expectations will be difficult to meet, and can prove a powerful source of political change where the established political class proves incapable of promoting a better distribution of wealth and opportunity. In the eastern Mediterranean, the rise of Turkey's Islamist Refah Party provides a striking

⁵ See Graham E. Fuller, *Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State?* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996); and Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, *The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1996).

example of the political consequences of substantial but uneven increases in prosperity.

These political and economic stresses have been compounded by the relentless urbanization affecting virtually all Mediterranean societies. The southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean are among the most highly urbanized areas in the world, with cities such as Istanbul and Cairo experiencing extraordinary rates of growth over the last few decades. Urbanization has shaken traditional patterns of behavior and placed enormous new demands on already hard-pressed governments. The inability of governments to meet the needs of urban populations has led to an increasing tendency of urban citizens to organize their lives without reference to the state, and has provided an opening to Islamic movements with effective municipal organizations. In Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, urban dissatisfaction and the ability to provide services unavailable from the state have been significant sources of power for Islamic activists. In security terms, continued urbanization suggests an environment in which cities will be the focal point for instability and opposition, and leading stakes in political rivalries, both violent and non-violent. If security across much of the Mediterranean will be about internal security, cities will be the focus of insecurity within societies where insecurity is pervasive.

Much of the foregoing discussion has focused on the problems of the "south." But societies on both sides of the Mediterranean share in a growing perception of declining "personal security." In places as diverse as Algeria, Bosnia and southeastern Anatolia, the threats to personal security are direct and obvious. In Israel, the recent elections can be regarded less as a referendum on the peace process than on the question of personal security in the wake of terrorist actions. In southern Europe, and Europe as a whole, the concern about spillovers of political violence from crises across the Mediterranean compels the attention of political leaderships and public opinion because terrorist risks strike at personal security as well as the security of the state. In France and elsewhere, right-wing movements have used the personal security issue (crime, terrorism, drug trafficking), in addition to economic and identity arguments in support of their views on immigration policy.

A detailed discussion of the implications of the information revolution for security in the region is beyond the scope of this discussion, but three specific aspects are worth mentioning. First, the growing ease of telecommunications is likely to bolster the power and flexibility of opposition movements, both violent and

non-violent within Mediterranean states, and in "exile", with implications for the stability of regimes in North Africa and the Levant. Second, it will facilitate the growth of political networks, including terrorist and criminal networks around the Mediterranean and beyond.⁶ As a consequence, the potential for spillovers of political violence (e.g., Algerian GIA terrorism in France, PKK fundraising and violence in Germany) will increase and the decentralized and freelance behavior of "networked" groups will be difficult to monitor and counter. Finally, the widespread availability of European media around the Mediterranean has already had a marked effect on southern images of the "rich" societies to the north. Islamists as well as many Arab secularists have seized on this phenomenon as a threat to their security of identity, as noted earlier.

The pressures for political and economic change in Mediterranean societies will be accommodated in different ways and with different degrees of success. Given the experience of Algeria and the lower-level crises on-going elsewhere from the Western Sahara to the Caucasus, however, it is reasonable to expect that the future Mediterranean security environment will be characterized by multiple instances of turmoil within societies, with the attendant risk of spillovers. Whether demographic pressures and internal instability lead to the pattern of chaotic violence and failed states characterized by Robert Kaplan as "the coming anarchy", the Mediterranean basin certainly includes a number of societies where outcomes along these lines are possible.⁷

The Regional Dimension

The combination of internal political change and the continuing effects of the loss of Cold War moorings will have significant consequences for the strategic

⁶ The rise of Mediterranean networks will, of course, have a benign aspect as well. There is a striking parallel between the notion of a Mediterranean region in which like-minded groups, regardless of location, have more in common and more communication with each other than with dissimilar groups within their own societies, and Braudel's description of the traditional Mediterranean world. In his analysis, societies around the Mediterranean shore shared interests and behavior -- and had a greater degree of contact -- than such societies had with communities in the Mediterranean hinterland. Climate, ease of communications, and commercial interests were more significant than sheer proximity. Differences in altitude and the difficulty of overland travel made trans-Mediterranean communication easier and more attractive than communication with the nearby hinterland. In this environment, the Mediterranean served as a bridge rather than a barrier, and maritime networks flourished. See Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

⁷ See Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994; and Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996).

environment around the Mediterranean, and within key sub-regions. Some broad trends are worth noting in this context. First, unstable societies and changing political orientations will complicate crisis prevention and management. As an example, radical ideology and humanitarian strains in Sudan increase the likelihood of conflict with Egypt over substantive issues such as water. Similarly, the growing prominence of Islamic politics in Turkey tends to reinforce existing perceptions of a civilizational cleavage between Islam and Orthodoxy, further complicating relations with Greece and Russia, and fueling nationalist instincts on all sides. The advent of new Islamic regimes in Algeria or perhaps a post-Qadhafi Libya, would give an ideological edge to potential frictions with neighboring states over territorial and other issues.

Second, it has become fashionable to see political Islam as a key driver of internal and external challenges around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Islam is indeed likely to be a continuing and significant force in the political evolution of many states in the region, and a factor in foreign and security policy orientations. But it would also be unwise to dismiss the power of nationalism as a key motivating factor in the behavior of states, with or without an Islamist component. It is arguable that developments as disparate as the crisis in Algeria and the rise to power of Turkey's Refah Party have been driven as much by nationalism as Islam. Where Turkey's Muslim affinities are in tension with national security interests -- as in relations with Syria -- the nationalist impulse is likely to prove stronger. If the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla emerge as a flashpoint in Spanish-Moroccan relations in the future, the driving force is likely to be Moroccan nationalism. So too, Egyptian nationalism will inevitably be a significant force behind Cairo's attitude toward issues affecting the Mediterranean and the Middle East as a whole.

The potentially destabilizing effects of nationalism are not limited to the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The future security environments in the Balkans, the Aegean and on Russia's southern periphery will be shaped by the strength of nationalist impulses. Indeed, the character of European policy toward the Mediterranean, and the role of extra-Mediterranean powers such as the U.S. in Mediterranean security will be strongly influenced by the future balance between national and multilateral approaches. Growing unilateralism or the re-nationalization of foreign and security policies would surely complicate strategic dialogue and cooperation on Europe's southern periphery.

Third, much discussion about the emerging strategic environment in the Mediterranean and the Middle East focuses on "low" (terrorism, political violence) and "high" (weapons of mass destruction) threats. There is considerable merit in this approach, but it should not be allowed to obscure the continuing problem of the conventional defense of borders and the preservation of the territorial status quo. This problem -- and the tendency to be distracted by other risks -- is perhaps most acute in the Persian Gulf. But the Mediterranean basin also provides some important cases where conventional clashes over territory and resources are possible. Prominent examples include the Western Sahara, Spain-Morocco (over the enclaves), Morocco-Algeria, Libya-Tunisia, Egypt-Sudan, Israel-Syria, the West Bank and Gaza, Greece-Turkey, and Turkey-Syria. This suggests that quite apart from the important potential for cooperation on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, the Mediterranean is a place where future demands for conventional peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and security guarantees are likely to be high.

Fourth, the end of Cold War alignments and the changing character of the Arab-Israeli dispute has opened the way for new security alignments and "geometries." Examples of this new fluidity in regional geopolitics include more overt Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation, aimed largely at Syria, and the tendency of smaller Arab states, especially those in the Maghreb, to adopt a more independent line on security issues. Renewed progress in the Middle East peace process would facilitate strategic cooperation between Israel and Jordan, perhaps including Turkey in a trilateral alignment of status quo powers. In an extreme case, the advent of new Islamic regimes could drive secular but "revolutionary" Syria to make strategic common cause with the West, even if this requires a rapid disengagement with Israel.

Emerging links between Mediterranean non-member states and NATO also suggest the possibility of a future in which European or Mediterranean institutions provide an alternative to security arrangements centered on the Middle East.⁸ Whereas European security has an elaborate architecture, with multiple institutions (NATO, WEU, OSCE), North Africa and the Middle East lack effective security organizations. In the Mediterranean setting, at least, some states may prefer to develop ties with existing European or Atlantic institutions based on a sense of affinity or the need for tangible security guarantees.

⁸ The recent experience of multilateral frameworks to address Middle Eastern security problems has been mixed, at best. See Bruce Jentleson, *The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Talks: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, IGCC Policy Paper No. 26, September, 1996.

The Trans-Regional Dimension

Some of the most striking developments affecting the strategic outlook in the Mediterranean concern the steadily increasing interdependence of the European and Middle Eastern environments. In political, economic and military terms, futures on both sides of the Mediterranean will be interwoven to a substantial degree.

On the political front, public and official opinion in North Africa and the Levant will be influenced by events in the Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as within Western European societies, that affect the position of Muslim communities. The Bosnian experience has been a watershed in this respect, and has served -- rightly or wrongly -- to confirm widespread suspicions in North Africa and elsewhere about European policy toward its Muslim periphery. In the eastern Mediterranean, changes on the Turkish political scene will confirm in the minds of many Europeans longstanding perceptions of Turkey as a Middle Eastern rather than European state, complicating Turkey's future in European institutions. Indeed, as Europe continues to redefine itself in the wake of the Cold War, the perception of Turkish "otherness" is likely to grow. Yet, Turkey remains a member of the Atlantic Alliance, and risks on Turkey's borders will directly affect Turkey's European allies.

Even before the current stalemate -- even reversal -- in the Middle East peace process, European allies had pressed for a greater role in Arab-Israeli negotiations, and Middle East diplomacy more generally. Lack of progress will tend to encourage more active European efforts in this direction, not least because Europe has a great deal at stake, both economically and in terms of stability on the periphery of the continent.⁹ Similarly, much of the energy behind EU, NATO and other initiatives toward North Africa and the Mediterranean has come from southern European states with a special interest in North Africa and a comparative advantage in north-south diplomacy. This is likely to be an important and continuing factor in shaping a European agenda that might otherwise be devoted almost entirely to challenges in eastern and central Europe.

In economic terms, there are many critical trans-regional linkages. Southern Mediterranean states recognize the extraordinarily important role of economic relations with the EU for their future prosperity, even if they are often

⁹ See Gerald M. Steinberg, "European Security and the Middle East Peace Process", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 1996.

uncomfortable with the reality of economic dependence.¹⁰ The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in November 1995 flows from this recognition, coupled with Europe's understanding of the need to foster development and stability across the Mediterranean. New lines of communication, including important new energy routes, are another key point of interdependence. From the western Mediterranean to the Caspian, the expansion of lines of communication for oil and gas is creating new opportunities for cooperation and conflict, with implications for the security and prosperity of north and south. With new pipelines across the Maghreb and across the Mediterranean, and the potential for some part of future Caspian oil production to reach world markets via the eastern Mediterranean (in addition to existing pipelines from Iraq to the Turkish coast), the Mediterranean region is becoming a focal point for energy trade and energy security concerns. Balkan reconstruction, and the revival of ports such as Thesaloniki and Trieste, would further reinforce the importance of the Mediterranean as a conduit for oil shipments from the Middle East to eastern and central Europe. Further afield, the opening of new transport links between Turkey, Iran and Central Asia will offer the possibility of economic links to Europe via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, rather than through Russia.

In "hard" security terms, the era of European sanctuary with regard to instability and conflict across the Mediterranean and beyond is rapidly drawing to a close. As the activities of Palestinian, and more recently Kurdish and Algerian extremists demonstrate, European societies have long been exposed to the spillover effects of turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East.¹¹ In addition, Europe's greater Mediterranean periphery, from Algeria to Pakistan, displays a striking concentration of proliferation risks. The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- nuclear, biological and chemical -- coupled with the proliferation of ballistic missile systems of steadily increasing range, is transforming the strategic landscape around the Mediterranean. Southern Europe and Turkey will be the first within NATO to feel the existential effects of this exposure (major Turkish population centers are already within range of ballistic missiles deployed in Iraq,

¹⁰ See George Joffe, "Integration or Peripheral Dependence: The Dilemma Facing the Southern Mediterranean States", paper presented to Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean After Barcelona, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta, 22-23 March 1996.

¹¹ As the World Trade Center bombing demonstrated, the U.S. is also increasingly exposed to terrorism with roots in Middle Eastern problems.

Iran and Syria), but not long after the year 2000, it is likely that every European capitol will be within range of such systems.¹²

The mere existence of ballistic missile technology with ranges in excess of 1000km on world markets and available to proliferators around the Mediterranean basin would not necessarily pose serious strategic dilemmas for Europe. For the most part, the quest for regional prestige and "weight" rather than the desire to hold European targets at risk is driving the acquisition of longer-range weapons. Given the diversity of frictions along south-south lines, it is likely that the Middle Eastern and North African neighbors of proliferators will face the first and most direct threat from weapons of mass destruction.¹³ From a European perspective, the WMD and ballistic missile threat will acquire more serious dimensions where it is coupled with a revolutionary orientation on the part of the proliferator. Today, this is the case with regard to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and arguably Syria. But political circumstances could evolve in ways that would throw the WMD aspirations of other regional actors into sharper relief. Even short of dramatic changes in the political orientation of WMD-capable states, crises around the Mediterranean or in the Persian Gulf could raise the specter of WMD-related threats to European territory. Despite some initial concerns, risks from this quarter did not emerge during the Gulf War. But a future crisis involving Western intervention in the Middle East, if accompanied by more widespread WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, could end differently.¹⁴

As a result of proliferation trends, Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory consequences of U.S. and European actions around the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including the Balkans.¹⁵ Conventionally armed, ballistic missiles deployed on Europe's periphery are unlikely to possess the weight or accuracy to constitute a militarily significant threat. As a political threat and a weapon of terror capable of influencing the European calculus in crises, their significance could be considerable. Would the southern European allies have

¹²See Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), MR-742-A; and Yves Boyer et al., "Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation", *Chaillot Paper* No. 24 (Western European Union Institute for Security Studies), May 1996.

¹³The Iran-Iraq war, the civil War in Yemen, and the Gulf War provide examples along these lines. To date, the only concrete instance of ballistic missile attack against Western territory has been the ineffective Libyan Scud attack against Lampedusa in April 1986.

¹⁴ During the Gulf crisis, there was some concern that Iraq might have deployed ballistic missiles in Mauritania. There were also reports that Algeria may have accepted special nuclear materials transferred from Iraq.

¹⁵ The possibility of Serbia acquiring improved Scud missiles capable of threatening western Europe is discussed in Boyer et al., p.12.

offered the U.S. the same sort of access to facilities and military cooperation during the Gulf War if their population centers were exposed to a credible threat of retaliation? Perhaps, but the deliberations would have been far more difficult, and the demands for defensive arrangements far more serious. As NATO begins to address the challenges of proliferation, and to the extent that the management of crises beyond Europe becomes a more prominent feature of European and transatlantic security cooperation, the Mediterranean and the potential role of Mediterranean dialogue in containing proliferation risks will acquire additional significance.

The Extra-Regional Dimension

The consequences of trends in the Mediterranean security environment will reach well beyond Mediterranean shores. Under Cold War conditions, the Mediterranean derived its primary strategic significance as an arena for competition between extra-Mediterranean superpowers. The current environment has gone a considerable distance toward the visions of French (and many non-aligned) observers who called for a "Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans." Russia has withdrawn from the Mediterranean in security terms, although it retains a stake in maritime access and Mediterranean political developments, and could play a more active role in the Balkans and on Turkey's borders under certain circumstances. The U.S. remains an overwhelmingly important military and diplomatic presence, especially in the eastern Mediterranean. Challenges in the Aegean, the Balkans, Turkey and the Levant, not to mention the logistical tie to the Gulf, suggest that Washington's engagement in the Mediterranean will be durable. To the extent that NATO devotes more energy to the region, this too will tend to encourage a significant U.S. role. But the European involvement in Mediterranean security is substantial, and the critical economic and political relationships between north and south are, first and foremost, an EU responsibility. Militarily, European states possess a significant capacity for action, especially in the Western Mediterranean. In this respect, the situation in the Mediterranean is quite different from that in the Persian Gulf, where the U.S. plays a dominant and often unilateral role as security guarantor.

In broad terms, the concerns of Mediterranean states, both north and south, will be difficult to address without the engagement of key non-Mediterranean states and wider European and Atlantic institutions. The range of hard and soft security issues characteristic of the region, from proliferation to migration, favors

multilateral approaches, and many would be politically uncomfortable or too costly to address unilaterally. An effective NATO role in dialogue and security cooperation around the region will require a minimum consensus on the importance of the exercise within the alliance. Similarly, the EU's Euro-Mediterranean initiative competes for aid and investment resources with demands in central and eastern Europe (and in Mediterranean Europe itself), and requires continuing support from non-Mediterranean EU members. As Germany moves toward a more forward leaning approach to participation in military operations beyond its borders, contingencies on Europe's Mediterranean periphery may be the most likely setting for German involvement.¹⁶

Mediterranean security will also be influenced by actors beyond the European, Atlantic and Eurasian spheres. The arms and technology transfer practices of China, North Korea, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil will have a bearing on the character and pace of WMD proliferation around the region. Anarchy and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan and the Horn of Africa could produce refugee crises affecting North Africa and Egypt, along with potentially destabilizing spillovers of political violence. If Europe is increasingly concerned about the risks emanating from the southern Mediterranean, it should not be forgotten that states across the Mediterranean also face risks flowing from the even poorer and less stable regions to their "south."

Overall Observations and Conclusions

The growing interest in Mediterranean security is a fashion with a substantive foundation. Post-Cold War security challenges -- broadly defined--- have shifted from the center of Europe to the periphery. Although the Mediterranean comprises a variety of highly differentiated sub-regions, a *Mediterranean* approach has considerable merit as a means of identifying common sources of instability and conflict and capturing meaningful inter-relationships. Moreover, in security policy as in linguistic philosophy, naming an issue gives it substance. The complex of problems contributing to the Mediterranean security agenda would be more difficult

¹⁶ In this context, it is noteworthy that even during the Gulf War, a large part of the German navy was deployed to the Mediterranean, replacing allied surface combatants transferred to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

to address within governments and institutions if viewed in isolation. The most important characteristic of the emerging Mediterranean environment, and one of the virtues of a Mediterranean approach, is that it cuts across traditional geopolitical boundaries ("Europe", "Middle East") in a way that accurately reflects the interdependent nature of post-Cold War security problems.

- *Mediterranean security is, above all, a matter of internal security for states facing pressures for political, economic and social change.* These pressures will be especially pronounced in the Mediterranean's cities, where key political struggles, both violent and non-violent, will be decided. In this context, and on both sides of the Mediterranean, questions of "personal security" and "security of identity" will play an important role in public opinion and policymaking.
- *Nationalism and the search for regional power and prestige will compete with Islamic politics as a key driver in the security future of the region.* Substantial threats to the territorial status quo, driven by state-to-state frictions unburdened by Cold War constraints, will exist alongside threats from the spillover of political violence and weapons of mass destruction.
- *New security alignments are possible, even likely.* These may take the form of a search for more favorable "geometries" on the part of actors around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean interested in ties to a more stable European or Atlantic security order.
- *The trans-national dimension of Mediterranean security is becoming more prominent as Europe and the Middle East become more interdependent in political, economic and military terms.* Trends supporting this observation include the growing European stake in the Middle East peace process, expanding lines of communication for energy around the Mediterranean and its hinterlands, and the steadily growing "reach" of weapons systems around the Mediterranean basin and beyond. Europe will be increasingly exposed to the retaliatory and spillover consequences of developments on its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern periphery.
- *Extra-regional powers, above all the U.S., will retain a strong stake and role in Mediterranean security.* "Hard" and "soft" challenges facing the region will be difficult or impossible to address without the engagement of non-Mediterranean states and

wider European institutions. As tasks outside the European space narrowly defined become a more central feature of transatlantic security arrangements, the Mediterranean will be a natural sphere for enhanced cooperation, with direct relevance to European stability.

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n° Inv. 16747 3 NOV. 1996
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November 8, 1996 - Session I, first part
"New dimension of Mediterranean Security"

Maj.Gen. Cucchi

Welcome to all of you. In order to open the debate, I would only like to recall three issues which I consider among the most important in the discussion on Mediterranean security. 1) What is the actual extent of the Mediterranean area? Does it also include, for instance, the Black Sea and the Red Sea? 2) What can NATO do in order to favour dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean? 3) How can we harmonize the initiatives taken by States and international organization both on a bi-lateral and on a multi-lateral level?

Mr. Larabee

I will limit myself to a short remark. This meeting has been organized within the framework of a joint program between RAND Corporation and the Military Center for Strategic Studies. We believe that it can offer a valid contribution in determining the key security issues of the Mediterranean area and of all organizations, not only NATO. In this sense, I would like to thank the NATO Press Information Office which has sponsored this meeting.

Lt.Gen. Jean

I believe the most important issue of our discussion is to define our goals when establishing a dialogue with Mediterranean countries. In other words, we have to define kind of security we are looking for. On this regard, I would like to submit you a few remarks.

1) The end of the Cold War has changed the possible options for North African and Middle East countries. As USSR has collapsed, there is no longer room for a non-alignment policy. The only choice left for these countries is to cooperate with the West, and they are well aware of that.

2) Conflictuality in Middle East has also changed dramatically. A regional approach is no longer possible. As a matter of fact, Egypt has adopted a different approach in its policy by shifting the balance towards the Mediterranean Sea, and Israel has recently started to do the same.

3) The admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EU during the '80s has gradually moved the balance of Europe towards South. The Conference of Barcelona is a result of that process.

As regards the extent of the Mediterranean, there are roughly two different approaches. The US see the Mediterranean as a geopolitical unity, mainly as a base for their interests in the Gulf, while most European countries tend to distinguish among different parts of the area, often dividing the Mediterranean into sub-regions. It must be said that there is still no common European foreign policy concerning the Mediterranean.

It is clear that security in Mediterranean entails a convergence of interest between the North and the South. The common concept of security that existed during the Cold War, generally identified with the containment of Soviet power, has disappeared. The concept of security is now more complex and involves many non-military factors. This is especially true for the South of Mediterranean, where security is considered to involve economic and social factors. In many ways it may resemble the "seguridad nacional" conceived in Latin America during the '70s. I believe the only common elements of security may be found among those defined by the Barcelona Conference, that is, the interest in creating an area of co-prosperity. Besides, I believe that the only factor that may change our parameters of security is the proliferation of mass-destruction arms.

Mr. George

Only a few years ago we tended to forget the importance of Mediterranean, as we were much more focused on the problems of Central-Eastern regions. I think this

attitude has now much changed as many people , and especially politicians, realized how important is the Mediterranean area for our security.

The world has changed, and we have to adjust our attitude towards security issues. There are still many elements of risk, which are mostly non-military. As regards the threat of fundamentalism, I don't agree with those who compare it to the communist threat. Without minimizing it, I believe there is no risk of a "clash of civilization". Islam is not a homogeneous movement, thus we have to support the less radical branches. Biological and chemical terrorism is certainly a long-term threat that we have to prevent.

NATO involvement in the Mediterranean is fully justified, as risks are clear and present. Many steps and many initiatives should be taken. In this sense, I believe that OSCE can play a fundamental role in coordinating the initiatives, and it has already established many contact groups with Maghreb countries. There must be the political will to support OSCE in performing these activities, since it is true that NATO, EU and WEU initiatives can be mutually reinforcing - as it occurs now in Bosnia - but OSCE is indispensable for our security as it can cover practically all areas in the Mediterranean, and beyond.

Mr. Lesser

I will try to define an agenda for the security in the Mediterranean based on five major assertions.

1) It is clear that security involves more and more internal security of Southern countries, where societies are troubled and governments are not always able to offer solutions and to meet expectations of people. The phenomenon of relentless urbanization is often underestimated, but it is essential. Moreover, security involves control over crime, violence, drug and arms trade.

2) Traditional nationalism is a problem affecting many areas of the Mediterranean. This may affect our attitude towards security as it may entail the establishing of new confidence building measures or peace-keeping operations.

3) After the end of the Cold War security alliances are shifting. New arrangements are likely to occur in the future. Europe should lead such re-arrangement by means of a global security architecture which involve all countries.

4) Security issues in the Mediterranean are more and more global. What happens in the Balkans has consequences on the Middle East and vice-versa. Economic issues affect the relations between North and South and between South and South. As regards military security, it is important to underline that in a few years all European capitals will fall under the range of ballistic missiles of the South.

5) Security in the Mediterranean cannot ignore extra-Mediterranean partners and institution. As regards, in particular, the US, it must be said that US have no specific policy of Mediterranean, but certainly they have great interest in this area.

Amb. Badini

I would like to underline the importance of non-military factors of security, and especially the economic and social ones. The point is: are we willing to make efforts in order to help Southern countries to develop? I believe the Barcelona Conference goes in the right direction. In many aspects it goes towards a sort of "Partnership for Mediterranean", as it involves activities such as prevention of natural disaster, search and rescue operations, land-mines clearance, and so on.

Mr. Luttwak

Problems and solutions for security in Mediterranean are mainly non-military. But an overall strategy is needed and I believe that military people are among those who can elaborate such strategy. As regards economic problems, I would like to underline two facts: 1) in order to avoid a decrease of GNP per capita from Morocco to Iran, investment should amount to at least 500 bn dollars (but some say 800). We are certainly not prepared to give this sum, because we are too much engaged in reducing our balances in order to meet Maastricht parameters. As a result, foreign aids have decreased to ridiculous figures. 2) Money does exist in Middle East. Syrians, for

instance, hold as much as 40 bn dollars abroad. Thus the fundamental point is to favour political and constitutional stability in order to enhance investments in those countries.

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The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership:
the post-Barcellona Agenda

Draft Version

Mr. Derisbourg

Europe should devote attention to foster cooperation with Southern countries of the Mediterranean, also through association schemes. Europe is not concerned with interstate conflict: internal security in the region is the real issue. This is why the participation of 27 countries to the peace process is an important step toward stability in the region. This process is composed by two baskets. The political-security one is being developed through the current negotiations for drafting a stability pact, which is to be flexible in the sense that any agreement on confidence-building measures will be embodied in annexes. At the same time there are negotiations to set up another conference in Tunis or Rabat. In addition it is to be mentioned that a second network for military affairs has been proposed to be developed through meetings in France and Italy next year. The other basket has an economic-financial dimension, which has a major relevance because the economic gap between the North and the South of the Mediterranean has to be reduced to avoid social conflicts and massive migrations in the future.

An important point is the dichotomy bilateralism/multilateralism in the Mediterranean . The EU signed association agreements with Tunisia, Israel and Marocco), while it is finalizing agreements with Jordan and Lebanon and encountering some difficulties with Egypt with respect to agricultural products. However, the big challenge is to achieve a free-trade area for all sectors in 2010 in full compliance with WTO rules on international trade. Another basic step would be the signing of agreements among Southern countries (South-South) to encourage multilateralism. A final thought concerns the importance of these developments outside the government dimension. The real issue is that a part of the public opinion in the North and the South is not in favour of increasing cooperation between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

Mr. de Vasconcelos

The issues of proliferation and energy are not sources of major concern for Europeans. Energy will be available even with Islamic governments. A major general concern is represented by radical Islamic groups pursuing government power, even though political Islam *per se* is not a global threat. Economic cooperation and integration can provide a strong basis to develop democracy in the Southern countries, thus fostering security in the region. Crises in the Mediterranean (such as in the Middle East) can hinder this process. To deal with these crises 1) the US and the EU are necessary players; 2) the EU has to strengthen its political and foreign policy identity (the Europeanization of NATO could help this process); 3) *ad hoc* management of crises is to be considered the most efficient approach.

Mr. Alioua

Southern countries prefer bilateralism for five reasons. First, their political culture is based on the protection of the national interest. Second, each country is concerned with the assessments of its weight in the geopolitics of the region. Third, there is a strong tie between each country and immigrants communities across Europe. This element is an important bargaining chip for Southern governments when dealing with Northern ones. Fourth, Southern countries have different perception of security and stability in the region. Fifth, Southern countries have a clear perception of the role of the United States. They still have doubts about capacity of Europe to provide a coherent foreign policy. With respect to cultural and social issues, each European country claims its sovereignty and follows different immigration policies.

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November 8, 1996 - Session II, first part
"Radicalism and political violence"

Mr. Fuller

One of the most disturbing signs shown by Middle East is the deep suspicion that characterizes the reaction of masses to any form of Western intervention in that area. Thus it may be useful to ask ourselves what kind of intervention would enjoy popular support. My impression is that there remains a deep division between East and West on this subject. You all remember that Western intervention in the Gulf was condemned by almost everybody.

As a second point, there is a dilemma on whom the West is supporting, whether the regimes or the States or, above all, people. It is clear, for instance, that Saudi Arabia has a great strategic importance, and therefore Us is concerned about its internal security. Should this concern lead to protect the government from internal opposition? I think there is a great need of a more balanced policy, that privileges the establishing of a genuine security system instead of frequent interventions.

The nature of some regimes is also a reason for the lack of security. The fact that Western countries are pushing for political and economic reforms may open the door to an increase of radicalism, since such reforms may create more grievances among the population, especially among those who are not going to benefit from the reforms. As a matter of fact, fundamentalism is not a problem by itself, since it basically represents a vehicle for economic and social grievances. The root causes of fundamentalism are the real problem.

Thus there is a broad dilemma between reforms and stability, as one seems to exclude the other. But stability can be artificial, especially under a totalitarian regime. Maybe the best solution is to encourage slow and gradual reforms in order not to compromise stability.

As regards terrorism, I believe we may fall in a subtle trap if we exclusively concentrate on fighting against it without understanding the causes and without looking

at the whole situation. Algeria is a very important case: terrorism may also be caused by governments themselves. We do not know what could have happened if the Islamic movements had taken part to elections. But they had been successful and government prevented them to take power. I believe Algeria is a clear case of mismanagement of Islamic movements.

As a last point, I think military intervention is hardly a good solution and it is certainly unwelcomed at a mass level. The US presence in the Gulf, for example, has ambiguous results: it may prevent other Saddam Hussein to crop up, but it may also generate other tensions and other conflicts.

Mr. Joffé

I believe political violence has many sources and it is not exclusively an Islamic phenomenon. It originates from the presence of ethnic tensions among different groups. It has roots in international crime, such as drug trade. It may also be caused by migration.

As regards terrorism, I think it may be considered as a reaction to existing problems judged as insoluble. There is a sense of weakness and impotence behind it and there may be also an irrational component. Radicalism is often the last hope of many "losers" created by economic growth. The Barcelona Conference goes in the direction of supporting such growth, but along with a macroeconomic enrichment there might be a microeconomic impoverishment. We must not forget then that often terrorism is State-sponsored.

Western States often claim for political changes in Mediterranean countries. But how far are those people convinced by such perspective? Political changes often produce unexpected results. As an example, Israeli policy ended up encouraging terrorism. At the same time, Algerian internal restructuring may produce high tensions, especially because the legitimacy of the State itself is deeply contested.

I believe we should abandon the idea of a "clash of civilization", as Islam is not necessarily against the West. We need to rethink our strategy and focus more on

governmental legitimacy than on stability. For instance, it is clear than countries like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Turkey have great strategic importance and must be supported. But it would not be healthy to support regimes that do not enjoy a sufficient level of internal legitimacy.

The debate raised many issues. Some of them are shortly summarized below:

1) Although the root causes of terrorism are a key element, violence must be condemned in any case as it is always morally reprehensible.

2) There are different forms of terrorism, as they originate from rather different situations. Therefore, each case must be considered separately.

3) Turkey is often quoted as an example of democratic Islamic regime. But doubts have been expressed about its Islamic nature, as it is more precisely a coalition guided by an Islamic prime minister.

4) The case of Algeria is the most controversial, as it makes clear that there may be a clash between democratic principles and economic interests of the West. Has the West sufficiently supported the agreement signed under the aegis of the Community of St. Egidio? Many noted that all parties in Algeria had accepted normalization except for the government. It was generally agreed, however, that democracy should remain a key element in Western policy.

5) Radicalism does not belong only to Islam. All forms of radicalism must be taken into account and condemned with equal intensity.

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BIBLIOTECA

November 8, 1996. Session II, Second Part

Proliferation and Weapons of mass Destruction

Draft Version

Presentation:

Ahmed Abdel Halim (Egypt)
Shahram Chubin (Switzerland)

Mr. HALIM

The challenge that Egypt faces is to set Middle East free from nuclear weapons. A peace agreement between Arabs and Israel must be built, but we do not forget that, even if Israel eliminates nuclear weapons, it will maintain the know-how to build it again: this is a leverage it can use with Arabs. That is why confidence building measures are very important. All of these measures must put the countries upon the same level. During the process of building those measures, there must be a reduction of weapons, and controls must be implemented. Of course, arms control is difficult; it must be based on military symmetry, without superiority of one side, if we want to implement regional security. That because in Middle East only one country has nuclear power, so by a strategic point of view we must consider the chance that Israel use it.

If we can't eliminate the threat, the alternative is the balance. In this case the solution would be another nuclear party.

In conclusion, our will is to see the Middle East as a region of cooperation in all fields and free from mass destruction weapons.

Mr. CHUBIN

Regional issues are no longer only regional. The nature of weapons and of the alliances make them inter-regional. So, increasing collaboration between Europe and Maghreb can affect US-Europe

relations. The problems are mainly Europe's vulnerability in many fields and how US respond to crisis originated in this area.

Anyway, things changed and free hands exist no more: once a country has long range missiles (for example Iran), US and Israel cannot operate in the region without considering the danger of retaliation.

The policy implication would be: stop technology; destruct forces in the region; prepare countries to the attack to minimize the danger. But actually the best solution in the long period is the process of democratization in the Countries of The Mediterranean and Middle East, which, albeit with a destabilizing effect in the short run, dangerous for us, will surely give the best results in the future.

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BIBLIOTECA

Dott. Giacomo LUCIANI (ENI)

November 8 Speech

This presentation is concerned with the supply of gas, which has become more strategically important than the supply of oil. The map (see map n.1) of the major gas-producing countries highlights which of them have a particular importance for Italy (see graph n.2). Besides the home-production, and the supply coming from Holland which in recent years has had a constant level and which cannot rise in a substantial way in the future, others major suppliers are Russia, Algeria and Libya.

The evolution of gas-import indicates that the major planned increases are related to gas-import from Algeria (see graph n.3). It is important to underline that Italy and Algeria are mutually dependent. Algeria has a strong necessity to export to Italy.


In any case, the centrality of Algeria regards also Spain (see maps n.5-6). A key role could be played by Libya (the gas pipeline going from Zuwara to Capo Passero, resulting from the agreement reached last August, could become operational in a short time span, see map n.6).

Two alternatives are available to diversify the supply sources. The first one is Egypt which is already an important producer and could become an important intermediate channel, being in an optimal position to receive gas from the Gulf. The second one is Turkey which is already an important market and future intermediate channel for gas coming from the Gulf, Iran and Central Asia (see in graph 7 the different alternatives for the paece gas pipeline - Levante Gas (Eastern Gas) - which should channel the gas from the Gulf through Egypt to all countries in the area including Turkey).

European Gas Scenario


Possible suppliers, reserves and distance

(billion cm at end 1994)



Italia: fonti di approvvigionamento di gas naturale


(Miliardi di metri cubi)




■ Produzione Nazionale ■ Libia ■ Olanda ■ Russia ■ Algeria

Evoluzione dell'import capacity


(GAS CONTRACTS START-UP)



APPROVVIGIONAMENTI GAS ITALIA 1995 E GRANDI DORSALI DI TRASPORTO




Gas flow by sources: Natural Gas By pipeline



summa / mediter / med / med / gennaio 1996

EUROPEAN GAS SUPPLY PROJECTS

North Africa




Levante Gas Project

LEGEND

Peace Pipeline




Levante Gas Pipeline




Red-Med Interconnector



LNG






- GAZODUCS**
- En Service
 - - - - - Projeté
 - · - · - · Trans Afrique Du Noro

- REGION DE PRODUCTION**
- ▲ < 2 milliards of cubic m³ an
 - ▲ 2 to 10 milliards of cubic m³ an
 - ▲ > 10 milliards of cubic m³ an

- REGION DE CONSOMPTION**
- < 2 milliards of cubic m³ an
 - 2 to 7 milliards of cubic m³ an
 - > 7 milliards of cubic m³ an

Map: Gas Strategies, London



GAZODUCS TRANSMEDITERRANEENS

Map: Gas Strategies, London

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BIBLIOTECA

draft version

8 novembre - II sessione

La proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa

Ahmed Abdel Halim

Il problema della proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa può essere ricondotto all'atteggiamento israeliano in questo settore.

Si deve notare come la progressiva espansione dell'arsenale nucleare israeliano non trovi una sua giustificazione accettabile per i Paesi arabi.

In primo luogo, perché l'asserita vulnerabilità di Israele ad un attacco di sorpresa non trova un effettivo riscontro oggettivo. L'azione intrapresa da Sadat deve piuttosto considerarsi come finalizzata all'ottenimento di una pace nella regione.

In secondo luogo, perché da "ultima risorsa", destinata ad assicurare la sopravvivenza di Israele, il suo arsenale nucleare si è espanso fino a doversi ormai considerare una "opzione militare". Come tale, ne influenza direttamente la politica estera.

La via per una diminuzione dei rischi legati alle armi di distruzione di massa deve vedere allora una rinuncia, da parte israeliana, al possesso delle armi nucleari.

Occorre inoltre sviluppare tutte quelle misure utili a rafforzare la sicurezza reciproca: una maggiore trasparenza dei propri apparati militari; la creazione di "zone cuscinetto", con assetti militari minimi e puramente difensivi; la istituzione di comitati di collegamento ai diversi livelli.

In questo settore, si può dire che le relazioni fra Egitto ed Israele procedano ragionevolmente bene.

Si tratta di una evoluzione progressiva, paso dopo passo, in aderenza con le realtà strategiche e militari esistenti, e resa possibile dalla presenza di una Potenza garante .

Anche il difficile tema del controllo delle armi convenzionali non può essere eluso. Si tratta, evidentemente, di un problema complesso che richiede specifiche soluzioni al riguardo.

Tuttavia, potrà essere proficuamente avviato qualora ci sarà la piena comprensione della reciproca volontà di convivere in pace.

Si tratterà, naturalmente, di prendere in considerazione sia le forze militari che le industrie della difesa; di raggiungere quindi un equilibrio sia quantitativo che qualitativo.

Evidentemente però, gli accordi per un equilibrio militare non possono sopravvivere senza degli "accordi politici", che vedano la rinuncia alla acquisizione di una posizione dominante in ambito regionale.

Shahram Chubin

Gli elementi da considerare, nella trattazione del tema in questione, spaziano dagli aspetti socio - economici a quelli più propriamente militari.

Deve anzitutto rilevarsi come non sia più possibile continuare a trattare i problemi di stabilità come essenzialmente regionali.

L'evoluzione tecnica dei sistemi d'arma fa sì che un'area estremamente vasta possa considerarsi minacciata dallo scoppio di un conflitto.

Inoltre, per l'effetto delle Alleanze esistenti, vi può essere il coinvolgimento a catena di Paesi distanti in conflitti regionali.

Deve inoltre notarsi l'asimmetria fra il crescente "gap" economico tra Europa e Paesi della sponda meridionale del mediterraneo, e la riduzione della superiorità militare occidentale, dovuta alla diffusione di missili balistici ed armi di distruzione di massa.

A ciò deve aggiungersi il problema costituito dalla immigrazione, ed in particolare dalle comunità islamiche presenti nei Paesi europei.

Le misure per affrontare tali problemi devono vedere il ricorso contemporaneo a forme di deterrenza, alla restrizione verso l'esportazione di tecnologie critiche, ma anche alla preparazione delle società all'auto difesa.

In effetti, però, la migliore soluzione di lungo periodo è costituita dal processo di democratizzazione dei Paesi a noi limitrofi, che per quanto possa risultare "pericolosa" e destabilizzante nell'immediato, non mancherà di dare i suoi frutti in futuro.

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BIBLIOTECA

New version

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November 9, 1996 - Session III, first part

"NATO and the Mediterranean"

Mr. De Santis

I have noticed some confusion yesterday with regard to NATO's internal adaptation and the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative. The Mediterranean dialogue should first and foremost be seen as: a) a contribution to security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole; b) a tool to achieve a better mutual understanding through transparency and to correct any misunderstandings of the Alliance's purpose that could lead to a perception of a threat. In other words, to create a climate of trust and confidence in the region.

To this end NATO has extended its information efforts to the countries involved in the Mediterranean Initiative, providing a better understanding of NATO's current policies and new missions, towards opinion elites of dialogue countries. Cultural cooperation, through NATO Information activities by the organization of joint projects which will bring together opinion elites of NATO and non-NATO countries, can represent an important instrument to foster dialogue, mutual understanding and confidence building towards non-NATO nations in the Mediterranean, their informed elites and publics. It also shows the realization that the security of Europe cannot be divorced from countries of the Southern Mediterranean.

Mr. Aliboni

I think that one of the most important factor to be considered is that an active role of NATO in Mediterranean may strengthen the cohesion between Europe and US. Arab countries are looking for a role in the Mediterranean, as well as Europe. I believe that NATO presence in a future agreement between Israel and Syria may help to enhance security in the region. Also in Cyprus NATO can play an important role by establishing an IFOR-style peacekeeping operation.

CYPRUS



However, some doubts need to be clarified. There is still no clear-cut agreement between US and Europe on what to do in the Mediterranean. I think our approach still

suffer of an excessive unilateralism. It is necessary to work with a cooperative approach on security factors. NATO can take advantage of its military specialization in order to make available know-how and instruments for security.

In this sense, I believe that confidence building measures can be extremely important. They would be rather different from those established within the OSCE and from those established for Middle East. They may concern the interoperativity of armed forces, command, control and communication, common planning. They may be conducted on a multi-bilateral level. Cooperation in peacekeeping operations may also be involved, whereas joint action for peace-enforcement still remain difficult. All these initiatives should take place within the framework of a Partnership for Mediterranean similar to the Pfp.

Mr. Karawan

I think we have to go beyond the simple calculation of Egyptian government and set out broad parameters in which each State is forced to participate in the peace process. Egypt is generally willing to favour the peace process and it is trying to diversify the channels to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As regards the Mediterranean dialogue, there are still many doubts in Egypt about what may be the purpose of such initiative. Dialogue may be useful by itself, but not for too long. There is a need to set at least general guidelines. Also in the society there still remain objections to the establishment of such dialogue. There is a general feeling that US are still dominating the scene. As for confidence building measures, they are premature if they do not follow a settlement.

Many doubts remain also about the establishment of a dialogue with NATO concerning Islamic fundamentalism. People would ask why such initiatives have to take place under the umbrella of NATO, where Egypt may look like a puppet. Even the politicians that mostly oppose Islamic fundamentalism would have doubts on it.

I think Egypt is prepared to accept a dialogue on two main issues: the peace process in Middle East and the economic development, within the framework of a partnership with Europe.

Many issues have been raised during the discussion. Among them:

1) There is a lack of clarity about the role of NATO in the Mediterranean. The Alliance is undergoing fundamental changes, article 5 is becoming less relevant, new members are likely to enter. But the goals remain somewhat unclear, especially as far as the projection of stability is concerned: does it mean to extend the borders of the Alliance? Does it entail a forward deployment? To some, NATO should only act within the scope of the Washington Treaty, venturing out-of-area only for crisis management. False expectations or exaggerated fears should not be created, and at this regard it is very important to be careful when using terms such as "southern flank of NATO" or when speaking of a new Partnership for Mediterranean.

2) Some skepticism has been expressed about the proposal for a Partnership for Mediterranean, arguing that it would not be feasible and it would be too costly. Moreover, what consequences would it have on NATO capability to meet its obligations in other areas? Many European countries are not prepared to extend NATO borders to Southern Mediterranean countries.

3) Turkey does not feel protected anymore by NATO, especially because it does not understand in what direction it is heading and because it still feels the danger coming from Russia. Turkey is absolutely against the enlargement of NATO and it consider impossible for NATO to play a role in the Mediterranean.

4) The importance of Russia has been underlined. Russia is a permanent member of UN Security Council, it has great historical and economic links with Middle East, it is a correspondent in the peace process and it consider the whole area

as a market for further arm sales. NATO initiatives in the Mediterranean may worsen Russia-US relations, which are already in a secular decline.

5) It is not clear whether NATO seeks stability or control. Since any form of Western intervention is always seen with great suspicion in Southern countries, it would be far better that the region itself establish a collective security structure with the help of NATO.

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BIBLIOTECA

NOVEMBER 10, 1996 - Session III, Second part (11 PM)

Perspectives of the Dialogue Countries

presentations:

Fadel Ali Fhaid (Jordan)

Mahmoud Vall (Vall)

Jerrold Green (RAND -USA)

Mr. Green

The agreement between southern and Northern part of the Mediterranean is fundamental. In dialogue approach, what southern states want and what they do not want has particular relevance. They do not want security guarantees. They do not want to be treated down-on, as colonies; and they don't want to be judged. A particular position, even historically, in this area is held by Egypt: it is not going to be anyone's junior partner.

Anyway, those states don't want good will, but good actions. They don't want to be treated as a group. Mauritania is not Marocco, neither Tunisia. The risk is the Mediterraneanization. Instead, different countries have different interests: in Asia, in the Gulf, in Africa, etc.

By another side: what the South can do for the North? I recommend to remember this point, the South can intervene in terrorism, immigration and other problems: a partnership must be built by both sides.

Mr. Fadel Ali Fhaid

With regard with the cooperation in the Mediterranean, the approach must be global, involving economic, political, strategic, spiritual aspects. The new arms race, proliferation of non conventional weapons, disparity, religious rivalry, resurgence of terrorism and nationalism are all interrelated.

Our most important concern is building on the peace process. But another important concern relates to the economic imbalance between Europe and Southern Mediterranean. This, together with immigration is one of the main sources of tensions. The European emphasis on Islam as religion is exaggerated; Europeans must promote dialogue.

NATO can play a part in stabilizing North-South relations, even bringing its experience acquired with Arab-Israeli relations.

In the economic field, the establishment of a free trade zone in the Mediterranean can support the domestic transformation of the single countries.

When we talk about security this must be of everybody. Arab states think they are treated with injustice. Going back in history we find justification for their behaviour. So, a double standard, in security and in other fields, won't save our convivence. People in the region are looking for better life and future and they want someone that help them.

I think that there are many reasons to say that we have to listen to each other, to establish mutual understanding, to build peace and prosperity.

Amb. Vall

Les perspectives du dialogue ont été tracées à Madrid, puis à Barcelone ainsi qu'à l'occasion des autres rencontres qui nous aident à développer la compréhension mutuelle pour favoriser le processus de paix. Car l'essentiel c'est cet objectif là: la paix. Les conditions pour y parvenir ont été à peu près identifiées ici même à Rome lors de la dernière 5+5 (octobre 1990), à Bruxelles 5+12, en novembre 1990; mais les l'hypothèque des conflits du Golfe et du Moyen Orient perturbaient les vues.

Nous considérons que le partenariat qui est envisagé doit reposer sur une véritable reconnaissance des partenaires entre eux.

Les pays du Sud sont sous-développés en tant qu'ils sont sous-équipés et qu'ils ont besoin d'être aidés dans leurs efforts de développement institutionnel.

Nous avons pleine conscience de l'importance situation géostratégique, nous avons fait des progrès dans la voie des reformes politiques et économiques:

Nous avons pu mettre l'expérience acquise dans divers cercles de solidarité au service de l'UMA naissante et de la Ligue Arabe, dans leur dialogue avec leurs partenaires du Nord. Le dialogue doit être développe sur le plan bilatéral et multilatéral.

Nous sommes en rapport avec les diverses institutions basées à Bruxelles de même qu'avec les pays membres, qu'ils soient européens ou nord-américains.

Nous voulons apporter notre contribution au projets communs.

Une autre action significative de nombreux pays du Sud de la Méditerranée est le dialogue désormais permanent avec Israël. C'est à nos yeux le gage d'engagement résolu en faveur de la paix.

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