


**WEU'S ROLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP**

Istituto affari internazionali
Institut d'études de sécurité
Genova, 4-5/XII/1998

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
- 1. Progetto di discorso di Umberto Ranieri (12 p.)
- 2. Security co-operation in the Mediterranean: the institutional dynamic of the Western European Union / Roberto Aliboni (8 p.)
- 3. Intervention de Abdallah Riahi (6 p.)
- 4. WEU's role in the Mediterranean and Euro-Mediterranean dialogue / Alyson J.K. Bailes (7 p.)
- 5. WEU's role in the Mediterranean and the Euro-Med partnership / Jorge Montealegre Buire (9 p.)
- 6. Developing dialogue between WEU and Mediterranean countries: some proposals / Thanos Dokos (13 p.)
- 7. Some proposals about developing dialogue between WEU and Mediterranean countries / Martin Ortega (4 p.)
- 8. WEU and security in the Mediterranean: achievements and prospects / Guido Lenzi (6 p.)
- 9. Written briefing on WEU operational experience and its lessons (5 p.)
- 10. Confidence-building measures in the Mediterranean: Euro-mediterranean synergies / Claire Spencer (8 p.)



International Seminar on WEU's Role in the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

jointly organised by

**Istituto Affari Internazionali
(IAI)
Rome**

&

**WEU Institute for Security Studies
(WEU-ISS)
Paris**

under the auspices of the Italian Presidency of the Western European Union

*December 4-5, 1998
Genoa (Genova), Palazzo Ducale*

PROGRAMME

Friday 4 December

- 15.00 **Greetings of the Mayor of Genoa:** Prof. Giuseppe Pericu
- 15.10 **Welcoming address:** Prof. Natalino Ronzitti, IAI and Professor of International Law, Rome
- 15.20 **Opening address:** Hon. Umberto Ranieri, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

15.30 FIRST SESSION: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Chairman:

Mr. Jorge Montealegre Buire, Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the WEU, Brussels

- **Speaker:** Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, Head of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Studies, IAI, Rome

Respondents:

- 15.50 - Dr. Abdellah Riahi, Research-Fellow, Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques, ITES, Tunis
- 16.00 - Prof. Serge Sur, Professor of Law and International Relations, Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), former Deputy Director UNIDIR, Geneva

Comments:

- 16.10 Ambassador Halim Benattallah, Director General Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algiers
- 16.20 Discussion

16.50

Coffee-Break

17.05 **SECOND SESSION: WEU'S CONFLICT PREVENTION EXPERIENCE, AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP**

Chairman:

Mr. Antonio Badini, Ambassador in charge of the Barcelona Process, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

- **Speaker:** Ms. Alyson J.K. Bailes, Political Director, WEU, Secretariat General, Brussels

Respondents:

17.25 - Mr. Christian-Peter Hanelt, Head of Middle East Studies, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh

17.35 - Prof. Nora Sainz, Associate Professor of International Relations, Universitat Autònoma, Barcelona

Comments:

17.55 Ambassador Mohamed Fathy el Shazli, Assistant Minister for European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo

18.05 Discussion

20.15 Dinner

Chairman: Prof. Giuseppe Pericu, Mayor of Genoa

Guest speakers: Dr. Alexandre Zafiriou, Principal Administrator, CFSP Unit, EU Council Secretariat, Brussels - Speech on: "*Recent Evolutions in the first Chapter of the Barcelona Process*"

Saturday 5 December

9.15 **THIRD SESSION: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SYNERGIES**

Chairman:

Mr. Yves Delaunay, Department of Security and Desarmament Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

Speaker: Dr. Claire Spencer, Deputy Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London

Respondents:

9.35 - Dr. Rabah M'Rah, Head of International Relations Department, Institut National des Etudes de Stratégie Globale, Algiers

9.45 - Prof. Gülnur Aybet, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations, Ankara

Comments:

9.55 Ambassador Colette Avital, Co-ordinator of the Euro-Med Partnership,
Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

10.05 Discussion

10.35 Coffee-Break

10.50 **FOURTH SESSION: DEVELOPING DIALOGUE BETWEEN WEU AND
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: SOME PROPOSALS**

Chairman:

Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Bonn (requested)

- **Speaker:** Dr. Thanos Dokos, Strategic Analyst, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens

Respondents:

11.10 - Dr. Martin Ortega Carcelén, Research-Fellow, Institute for Security Studies-WEU, Paris

11.20 - Prof. Dr. Hans Peter Neuhold, Institute of International Law and International Relations, University of Vienna

11.30 Discussion

Comments:

12.00 H.E. Umayya Toukan, Ambassador Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the European Union, Brussels, and Co-ordinator of the Euro-Med Partnership

Conclusions:

12.15 Min. Guido Lenzi, Director, WEU-ISS, Paris

13.00 End of Seminar - Lunch

Simultaneous translation is provided in English, French and Italian

BIBLIOTECA
28 GEN. 1999
n° inv. 19250
ISTITUTO AFFARI
INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

- Commentaires:*
 9.55 Mme Colette Avital, Ambassadeur,
 Coordonnatrice du Partenariat Euro-Med,
 Vice-Directeur Général,
 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Jérusalem
- 10.05 Débat
- 10.35 Pause-café
- 10.50 **QUATRIEME SESSION:
 DEVELOPPEMENT DU DIALOGUE ENTRE
 L'UEO ET LES PAYS MEDITERRANEENS:
 QUELQUES PROPOSITIONS**
- Président:*
 Représentant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères,
 Bonn (à définir)
- Orateur:*
 M. Thanos Dokos
 Analyste stratégique, Hellenic Foundation for
 European and Foreign Policy, Athènes
- Rapporteurs:*
 11.10 M. Martin Ortega Carcelén
 Chercheur, Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'UEO,
 Paris
- 11.20 M. Hans Peter Neuhold
 Professeur, Institut de Droit International et de
 Relations Internationales, Université de Vienne
- 11.30 Débat
- Commentaires:*
 12.00 S.E. Umayya Toukan
 Ambassadeur, représentant du Royaume Hachémite
 de Jordanie à l'Union Européenne, Bruxelles,
 et Coordonnateur du Partenariat Euro-Med
- Conclusions:*
 12.15 M. Guido Lenzi
 Directeur, Institut de Sécurité de l'UEO, Paris
- 13.00 Fin du Séminaire - Buffet

*La traduction simultanée est prévue en anglais,
 français et italien.*

Segreteria Organizzativa:



Borgo S. Lazzaro, 17 - 00136 Roma
 Tel. 06/39725540-5 - Fax 06/39725541



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Western European Union
 Institute for Security Studies

Séminaire international sur le rôle de l'UEO dans la Méditerranée et le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen

*sous les auspices
 de la Présidence Italienne
 de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale*

4-5 Décembre 1998
 Gênes (Genova) - Palazzo Ducale

conjointement organisé par
 Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
 Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'UEO (IES-UEO), Paris

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF



PROGRAMME

VENDREDI 4 DECEMBRE

15.00 *Salutations du Maire de Gênes: M. Giuseppe Pericu*

15.10 *Discours de bienvenue:*
M. Natalino Ronzitti
Conseiller scientifique, IAI et Professeur de Droit international, Université LUISS G. Carli, Rome

15.20 *Discours d'ouverture:*
M. Umberto Ranieri
Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Rome

15.30 **PREMIERE SESSION:
LE PROFIL INSTITUTIONNEL**

Président:
M. Jorge Montealegre Buire
Représentant Permanent Adjoint de l'Espagne auprès de l'UEO, Bruxelles

Orateur:
M. Roberto Aliboni
Directeur des Recherches et Responsable des Etudes sur la Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient, IAI, Rome

15.50 *Rapporteurs:*
M. Abdellah Riahi
Chercheur, Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques, Tunis

16.00 M. Serge Sur
Professeur de Droit et Relations Internationales, Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) et ancien Sous-Directeur de l'UNIDIR, Genève

Commentaires:
16.10 M. Halim Benattallah
Ambassadeur, Directeur Général Europe, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Alger

16.20 Débat

16.50 Pause-café

17.05 **DEUXIEME SESSION:
L'EXPERIENCE DE L'UEO EN MATIERE DE
PREVENTION DES CONFLITS ET SON
IMPORTANCE POUR LE PARTENARIAT
EURO-MEDITERRANEEN**

Président:
M. Antonio Badini
Ambassadeur chargé du Processus de Barcelone, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Rome

Orateur:
Mme Alyson J.K. Bailes
Directeur Politique, UEO, Secrétariat Général, Bruxelles

Rapporteurs:
17.25 M. Christian-Peter Hanelt
Responsable des Etudes sur le Moyen-Orient, Fondation Bertelsmann, Gütersloh

17.35 Mme Nora Sainz
Professeur associé des Relations Internationales, Université Autonome, Barcelone

Commentaires:
17.55 M. Mohamed Fathy el Shazli
Ambassadeur, Assistant du Ministre des Affaires Européennes, Ministère des Affaires-Etrangères, Le Caire

18.05 Débat

20.15 Dîner

Président:
M. Giuseppe Pericu
Maire de Gênes

Invité:
M. Alexandre Zafiriou
Administrateur Principal, Unité PESC, Secrétariat du Conseil de l'UE, Bruxelles
Discours sur: "Les récentes évolutions dans le premier chapitre du processus de Barcelone"

SAMEDI 5 DECEMBRE

9.15 **TROISIEME SESSION:
LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE DANS LA
MEDITERRANEE: SYNERGIES
EURO-MEDITERRANEENNES**

Président:
M. Yves Delaunay
Direction des Affaires Stratégiques de Sécurité et du Désarmement, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

Orateur:
Mme Claire Spencer
Sous-Directeur, Centre d'Etudes de Défense, King's College, Londres

9.35 *Rapporteurs:*
M. Rabah M'Rah
Responsable du Département des Relations Internationales, Institut National des Etudes de Stratégie Globale, Alger

9.45 Mme Gülnur Aybet
Université Bilkent, Département des Relations Internationales, Ankara

**ELENCO PARTECIPANTI - INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON WEU'S ROLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP
DECEMBER 4-5, 1998 - GENOA**

	SURNAME/NAME	ORGANIZATION
1	AHMED-HESHMAT KHALED	Second Secretary - Embassy of Egypt- Rome
2	ALIBONI ROBERTO	Director of Studies, Head of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Studies - Istituto Affari Internazionali - Rome
3	AYBET GULNUR	Professor International Relations - Bilkent University - Ankara/Turkey
4	BACCIN MARCO	Consigliere d'Ambasciata - Ministero Affari Esteri - Roma
5	BADINI ANTONIO	Ambasciatore - Coordinatore Partenariato EuroMediterraneo - Ministero Affari Esteri - Roma
6	BAILES ALYSON	Political Director, General Secretariat WEU - Brussels
7	BENATTALAH HALIM	Ambassador - Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Algiers
8	BUHARALI CAN	Third Secretary - Turkish Delegation to WEU - Brussels
9	CARVALHO PEREIRA JOSE'	Ministry of Defence - Lisboa
10	CORNARO MARKUS	Minister - Austrian Embassy - Rome
11	DELAUNAY YVES	Department of Security and Desarmament - French Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Paris
12	DI GIOVINE ANTONIO	Prefetto di Genova
13	DOKOS THANOS	Strategic Analyst - Athens
14	FATHY EL SHAZLI MOHAMED	Ambassador - Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Cairo
15	HANELT CHRISTIAN PETER	Head of Middle East Studies - Bertelsmann Foundation - Gutersloh
16	KNEY-TAL HARRY	Ambassador - Embassy of Israel - Brussels
17	KORKOS TAMAS	Embassy of Hungary - Rome
18	KOUMUTSAKOS GEORGIOS	Greek Delegation to WEU - Brussels
19	KUBICEK JIRI	Consul General of Czech Rep. - Milan
20	ISRIG MOHAND SALAH	Ministry of Defence - Algeri
21	LENZI GUIDO	Director WEU Institute for Security Studies - Paris

22	M'RAH RABAH	Institut National des Etudes de Stratégie Globale - Algiers
23	MEZGHANI MOHAMED	Chargé d'Affaires - Embassy of Tunis - Brussels
24	MONTEALEGRE BUIRE JORGE	Permanent Deputy Representative of Spain to WEU - Brussels
25	NEUHOLD HANS PETER	Professor - Institute International Law and International Relations - University of Wien - Austria
26	ORKOWSKI TOMASZ	Embassy of Poland
27	ORTEGA CARCELEN MARTIN	Research Fellow - WEU Institute for Security Studies - Paris
28	PERICU GIUSEPPE	Sindaco di Genova e Professore di Diritto Amministrativo
29	RANIERI UMBERTO	Sottosegretario di Stato - Ministero Affari Esteri - Roma
30	RIAH ABDELLAH	Research Fellow - Institute Tunisien des Etudes Strategiques - Tunisi
31	RONZITTI NATALINO	Professore Diritto Internazionale Università LUISS "G. Carli" e IAI - Roma
32	SAAD RAOUF	Ambassador - Embassy of Egypt - Brussels
33	SAINZ NORA	Professor International Relations - Universitat Autònoma, Barcelona
34	SAUERTEIG HANS	Console - Consolato di Germania- Genova
35	SPENCER CLAIRE	Deputy Director, Centre for Defence Studies - King's College - London
36	SUMBERAZZI BARBARA	Istituto Affari Internazionali - Roma
37	SUR SERGE	Professor Law and International Relations - University Paris II - Panthéon - Assas - Paris
38	TABACIK ANDREJ	Embassy of Slovak Republic - Rome
39	TOUKAN UMACYA	Ambassador - Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the EU - Brussels
40	TROIANI LUIGI	Segretario Generale Euro-Med TDS - Roma
41	VRATISLAV JANDA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic - Prague
42	ZAFIRIOU ALEXANDRE	EU Council Secretariat - CFSP Unit - Principal Administrator - Brussels



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**Progetto di discorso del Sottosegretario di Stato agli Affari Esteri, On.
Umberto Ranieri, al Seminario Internazionale sul "Ruolo dell'UEO nel
Mediterraneo e il partenariato Euro-Mediterraneo".
(Genova, Palazzo Ducale 4-5 dicembre 1998)**

Desidero rivolgere a tutti gli intervenuti il più cordiale saluto del Governo italiano e mio personale nonché un sincero ringraziamento per aver aderito a questo Seminario, organizzato dall'Istituto Affari Internazionali di Roma congiuntamente con l'Istituto per gli Studi sulla Sicurezza dell'UEO. Il Seminario si tiene sotto gli auspici della Presidenza Italiana dell'UEO ed è stato portato - in occasione della riunione tenutasi a Roma il 16-17 novembre scorso - all'attenzione dei Ministri dell'UEO che hanno valutato positivamente l'iniziativa.

Sono certo che la vostra partecipazione consentirà un fruttuoso scambio di valutazioni, utile alla riflessione in corso sul ruolo dell'UEO nel Mediterraneo e sul suo possibile, futuro contributo all'avanzamento del capitolo politico e di sicurezza del partenariato Euro-mediterraneo.

Vorrei da parte mia, quale stimolo alla discussione, indicare un metodo ed un approccio utili a dare concretezza al concetto della indivisibilità della sicurezza nella Regione. Approccio e metodo che potremmo definire "stepping stone" per significare il carattere modulare dell'azione da sviluppare. Due, credo, siano le condizioni di base per sorreggere il proposito enunciato. La prima, è l'esistenza di obiettivi chiari e condivisi miranti ad accrescere sicurezza e stabilità, da definire entrambe sulla base di riflessioni e analisi congiunte. La seconda, è costituita dalla



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elaborazione di uno o più piani di lavoro commisurati alla complessità dell'opera. Dico più piani di lavoro poiché i soggetti e gli Organismi multilaterali interessati e disposti a offrire il proprio apporto sono plurimi, ciascuno agente conformemente ai suoi fini istituzionali e alla esperienze e competenze maturate. Cito, per quanto riguarda il mondo occidentale, l'UE, l'UEO, la NATO e l'OSCE.

Si tratta di Istituzioni che hanno sviluppato una politica e un dialogo con i partners mediterranei, che operano secondo mandati e con prospettive diverse ma tutte in direzione di una stabilità rafforzata. Queste Istituzioni, comunemente definite "interlocking", - per sottolinearne il carattere di interdipendenza e di reciproco rafforzamento, non rispondono ad una entità sovraordinata né ad una regia in grado di stabilire una vera e propria divisione del lavoro. La differenziazione nasce dalla diversità dei fini istituzionali e dalla specificità delle rispettive esperienze e competenze. Sebbene tali Organizzazioni siano complementari, non si può tuttavia oggi affermare che esse configurino un quadro di responsabilità congiunta.

Faccio questa affermazione per una esigenza di chiarezza e per evidenziare la complessità dell'assetto istituzionale occidentale in materia di sicurezza. In realtà, specie dopo la fine della contrapposizione Est-Ovest, è stato avviato un profondo processo di ripensamento che, pur procedendo lentamente, è destinato a introdurre cambiamenti di sostanza nel modo di essere non tanto della sicurezza comune euro-atlantica, quanto piuttosto della politica di difesa e sicurezza.

Si tratta di cambiamenti che ruotano sostanzialmente attorno all'affermazione della responsabilità dell'Europa non solo per le sue



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esigenze di difesa ma ancora di più per un suo ruolo accresciuto diretto al mantenimento della pace e della sicurezza nel mondo. E' noto che è in corso lo sviluppo all'interno dell'Alleanza Atlantica della Identità Europea di Sicurezza e Difesa (IESD) ed il ruolo che vi esercita l'UEO rispetto in particolare agli aspetti operativi. Fra questi rientra in primo luogo l'attuazione del concetto della combinazione, per finalità precise e individuate, di Task Forces congiunte (CJTF), specie quando esse siano chiamate ad operare sotto la guida UEO.

Più in generale, il processo di ripensamento postula una più pregnante convergenza delle Istituzioni rispetto ai fini condivisi ma anche una progressiva armonizzazione delle procedure e delle intese metodologiche per l'approfondimento delle sinergie d'azione. Come ho potuto accennare, non esiste oggi un quadro generale di riferimento, né una istanza unica nel cui seno ricondurre questo processo. Esso in realtà investe ciascuna Istituzione dal suo interno e tende a promuovere arrangiamenti ad hoc laddove le convergenze di azione appaiono maggiormente sorrette dalla compatibilità di funzioni e metodi. L'UEO, che pur assolve missioni eventualmente richieste dall'OSCE come è accaduto per la regione dei Balcani, sta elaborando con la NATO una serie di procedure decisionali (le cd "Flow Charts"). Esse definiscono i rapporti e i comportamenti reciproci in funzione di interventi congiunti da realizzare nell'assolvimento di compiti al servizio della pace o della stabilità. L'UEO vanta tuttavia un quadro privilegiato di azione, di carattere più organico, con l'UE. Va detto anzi che nel caso dell'UEO e dell'UE, le "Flow Charts" rispondono ad un imperativo istituzionale. La definizione delle modalità operative fra i due Organismi è



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infatti prevista dagli artt. J.4.2 del Trattato di Maastricht sull'Unione Europea e J.7.3 del Trattato di Amsterdam. Quest'ultimo Trattato, come è noto, rinalda il nesso organico istituito dal Trattato di Maastricht tra l'Unione Europea e la UEO.

Vorrei ricordare al riguardo che il Protocollo sull'articolo J.7 del Trattato di Amsterdam statuisce che entro un anno dall'entrata in vigore del Trattato, l'UE, in collaborazione con l'UEO, elaborerà disposizioni miranti al rafforzamento della cooperazione reciproca con lo scopo di attribuire all'UEO, quale parte integrante dello sviluppo dell'UE, un appropriato ed efficace contesto organizzativo.

Si situa in questa prospettiva il lavoro iniziato all'interno dell'UE per redigere una lista iniziale di "profili illustrativi", di situazioni cioè in cui l'UE potrebbe desiderare di avvalersi dell'UEO, della sua esperienza, delle sue strutture e dei suoi meccanismi operativi. Al momento il "profili illustrativi" riguardano situazioni non ancorate a determinati perimetri geografici. Sono state al momento individuate operazioni umanitarie, a seguito di disastri naturali o di origine umana, ovvero forme di assistenza ai rifugiati o profughi nonché operazioni volte al ripristino della legge e dell'ordine in aree colpite da conflitti. I "profili illustrativi", che al momento non sono ancora stati ufficialmente trasmessi all'UEO, prefigurano operazioni che presuppongono richieste di Governi locali.

Merita rilevare che l'esigenza di rafforzare la cooperazione con l'UE è stata riaffermata dalla Dichiarazione di Roma approvata dai Ministri degli Esteri e della Difesa dell'UEO del 17 novembre. In quell'occasione i Ministri hanno confermato l'impegno dell'UEO a contribuire ulteriormente,



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nell'ambito dell'art. J.7 del Trattato sull'UE, alla graduale elaborazione di una Politica di Difesa Comune Europea. Aggiungo al riguardo che proprio grazie al ravvicinamento delle "culture" e degli approcci alle sfide poste alla sicurezza, la Dichiarazione di Roma conferisce enfasi al compito di definire, da parte delle due Organizzazioni, le procedure per azioni relative a specifiche emergenze.

Non è, quindi, senza significato che l'Italia abbia promosso nel semestre di sua Presidenza l'organizzazione di due Convegni, entrambi curati con competenza dallo IAI (Istituto di Affari Internazionali di Roma) in stretta concertazione e con l'efficace sostegno dell'Istituto per gli Studi Strategici della UEO.

Il primo Convegno aveva lo scopo di analizzare le forme e i modi di una cooperazione rafforzata fra i due Organismi e di incoraggiare, in particolare, una più stretta cooperazione fra l'Assemblea della UEO ed il Parlamento Europeo. Il secondo, che si svolge oggi e domani in questo suggestivo scenario del Palazzo Ducale di Genova, ha un obiettivo più mirato e per noi stimolante. Si tratta di dibattere infatti il ruolo dell'UEO nel Mediterraneo ed in particolare le modalità con le quali l'UE potrà avvalersi dell'esperienza e degli strumenti dell'UEO per la realizzazione del modello del partenariato politico e di sicurezza, deciso a Barcellona il 28 novembre 1995. Perché abbiamo scelto questo specifico tema anche in assenza, al momento, di una richiesta formale dell'UE?

Il Mediterraneo costituisce, nel giudizio italiano, uno degli scacchieri che maggiormente sollecitano un'opera di pacificazione e sviluppo. E' una regione emblematica dei nuovi rischi di confronto che, dopo la caduta del



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Muro di Berlino, minacciano la stabilità mondiale. Quello che oggi maggiormente emerge non è più la lotta per conquistare una egemonia ideologica e di sistema ma piuttosto un grande impegno per comporre gli inquietanti dissidi fra il Nord e il Sud nell'interesse di una crescita morale e materiale, più solidale delle nazioni e dei popoli.

L'Italia per la sua geo-politica non può non avvertire questa nuova centralità del Mediterraneo e si adopera conseguentemente per tradurla in una accresciuta capacità di iniziativa sul piano sia bilaterale, con i Paesi della riva sud, che multilaterale, contribuendo a dare contenuto e prospettiva alla cooperazione con i Paesi dell'area nelle Organizzazioni competenti, in particolare nell'UE e nell'UEO.

In questa azione noi scorgiamo segnali nuovi, frutto a nostro avviso, del clima di maggiore fiducia che si sta instaurando e che è fondato sul raffronto delle aspettative reciproche. Un segnale importante è la maggiore attenzione a conseguire un più elevato livello di sicurezza non già con la corsa agli armamenti ma intensificando la cooperazione. Noi vorremmo che questa concertazione tra le due rive del Mediterraneo si approfondisse per trovare soluzioni condivise alle sfide comuni relative ad uno sviluppo meno ineguale e connesse con i fenomeni perturbatori legati al terrorismo, al traffico di droga, ai massicci movimenti di persone ed alla criminalità organizzata, creatasi attorno ad essi, ed ai flussi di profughi e rifugiati.

Siamo lieti che l'UEO abbia assicurato il suo concorso allo sviluppo del dialogo della Regione che si estende al momento a sette partners e che può essere considerato generatore di misure di fiducia e strumento di trasparenza.



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I punti di forza del dialogo sono, oltre all'informazione sulle attività della UEO, il confronto delle esperienze nazionali dei Paesi UEO con quelle dei partners mediterranei, con l'obiettivo di arrivare ad una possibile e graduale definizione degli ambiti di cooperazione (le operazioni di tipo Petersberg, la prevenzione e gestione delle crisi, la trasparenza militare).

La convinta e più volte ribadita determinazione della UEO di dare sempre più sostanza al dialogo mediterraneo ha portato alla decisione del Consiglio dei Ministri di Ostenda (1996) e di Parigi (1997) di esaminare con quali modalità far fronte ad una eventuale richiesta dell'UE per un contributo di esperienza all'iniziativa del partenariato politico e di sicurezza euro-mediterraneo.

Consideriamo che l'UEO, con l'esperienza acquisita e lo sviluppo della sua dimensione mediterranea, sia nelle migliori condizioni per funzionare da Foro di riflessione, e se si vuole, da "battistrada" per la individuazione di iniziative che apportino valore aggiunto al dialogo sulla sicurezza e stabilità nel Mediterraneo, di cui il Processo di Barcellona rappresenta la principale e più comprensiva istanza.

Siamo convinti che l'avanzamento del dialogo mediterraneo trovi beneficio dal coinvolgimento della UEO negli aspetti di sicurezza del Processo di Barcellona.

Nell'attività della UEO già esistono misure concrete che possono essere interessanti ai fini del partenariato politico e di sicurezza euromediterraneo. Esse sono costituite da: una serie di studi e di analisi delle problematiche e prospettive del Mediterraneo; periodici scambi di informazioni, su base bilaterale, con ognuno dei 7 partners mediterranei; partecipazione dei



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partners mediterranei, in qualità di osservatori, alle esercitazioni CRISEX; visite a scopi conoscitivi sulle strutture e organizzazione della UEO; seminari nel settore della sicurezza con la partecipazione di funzionari e militari provenienti dalle Capitali dei 7 partners mediterranei. *A 210*

Ci sono, d'altra parte, varie iniziative su cui riflettere per estendere ed approfondire il senso e lo scopo del dialogo mediterraneo. In materia è in corso una riflessione nell'ambito del Gruppo Mediterraneo dell'UEO, sulla base di un documento elaborato dal Gruppo stesso. Di tale sforzo si sono felicitati i Ministri degli Esteri e della Difesa con la Dichiarazione di Roma del 17 novembre scorso.

La cooperazione su base paritaria, creando fiducia, accresce la sicurezza. Il dialogo dovrà fungere nella regione sempre più da antidoto alla minaccia, fugando incomprensioni e correggendo le percezioni errate. Ma il dialogo a sua volta dovrà essere sorretto dalla trasparenza e dalla coerenza dei comportamenti. L'Italia intende perseguire tale principio facendosi carico dell'esigenza di assicurare una previa consultazione su questioni che potrebbero dare adito a errate interpretazioni. Vorrei cogliere questa occasione per riaffermare le opportunità di cooperazione che offre l'EUROMARFOR, che pure ha suscitato interrogativi in alcuni partners della riva sud, interrogativi che noi vogliamo dissipare con la massima chiarezza sulla realtà dei fatti.

L'EMF è stata lanciata da Spagna, Francia, Italia e Portogallo quale contributo allo sviluppo dell'Identità di Difesa e Sicurezza Europea e per partecipare, in conformità con la Dichiarazione UEO di Petersberg del 9 maggio 1992, in iniziative assunte dalle Organizzazioni Internazionali nel



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campo umanitario e del mantenimento della pace. A varie riprese l'EMF ha espresso il desiderio di sviluppare azioni di cooperazione con i partners mediterranei dirette alla promozione della stabilità. Si è pronti ad iniziative comprendenti la partecipazione agli esercizi in mare, lo scambio degli osservatori, attività dimostrative, invito al Quartier Generale, ecc. Iniziative che, sviluppando il dialogo e la trasparenza, mirano a migliorare la reciproca conoscenza a creare la consuetudine al lavoro comune, allo scambio di esperienze, senza escludere il compimento di attività comuni previste dalla Dichiarazione di Petersberg.

Vorrei ora soffermarmi sull'azione dell'UE nel Mediterraneo, disegnata dalla Dichiarazione di Barcellona. Il perseguimento di una più stretta cooperazione e il consolidamento di rapporti di amicizia in un quadro di co-responsabilità, che essa postula, devono condurre ad una progressiva riduzione della minaccia ed alla conseguente diminuzione degli armamenti. Se il dialogo deve essere sempre più l'antidoto alla minaccia, la sicurezza politica potrà rappresentare lo strumento per combattere la proliferazione delle armi a distruzione di massa.

L'Italia valuta molto positivamente il risultato della riunione di metà percorso tenutasi il 3-4 giugno scorso a Palermo. Lo scenario più promettente che essa ha offerto è costituito a nostro avviso dall'approccio integrato alla stabilità. Ho accennato un momento fa ai nuovi rischi, quali ad esempio il terrorismo, che si cumulano agli effetti negativi prodotti dalle tensioni e dalle crisi aperte, a cominciare da quella arabo-israeliana. Non possiamo d'altra parte trascurare le conseguenze sulla stabilità derivanti dal divario di ricchezza che separa le due rive e gli squilibri sociali ed economici



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che travagliano i Paesi della riva sud. E' al quadro complessivo delle sfide alla stabilità cui occorrerà riferirsi ed è indubbio che l'UE, in virtù del modello di partenariato, sia l'Istituzione meglio collocata per svolgere un ruolo di guida.

La Carta per la Pace e la Stabilità, che l'Italia sostiene con convinzione, contribuirebbe all'efficace assolvimento di tale ruolo, rafforzando il quadro politico-istituzionale del partenariato, soprattutto prevedendo un dialogo più strutturato. Sembra a noi ragionevole che un progetto così complesso e di carattere strategico, come quello previsto dalla Dichiarazione di Barcellona, debba prevedere una forte capacità di orientamento ed impulso, e quindi di indirizzo politico, che non può che emanare dai Ministri degli Esteri. Sarebbe certamente sorprendente se l'Unione, a fronte del suo crescente coinvolgimento nel sostegno ai processi di trasformazione economica, rischiasse di rimanere spettatrice di situazioni ed emergenze che dovessero mettere a repentaglio la stabilità dell'area e quindi, in ultima analisi, il successo stesso delle riforme economiche e di mercato.

Siamo naturalmente consapevoli degli ostacoli che si frappongono ad una sollecita conclusione della "Carta", in particolar modo l'irrisolta crisi arabo-israeliana. Le intese di Wye River hanno indubbiamente restituito movimento al processo di pace. Resta tuttavia importante che i comportamenti siano coerenti per rafforzare la speranza e aprire nuovi spazi al negoziato, compresi i binari libanese e siriano.

Dobbiamo guardare avanti con fiducia e cogliere le occasioni propizie per rafforzare il quadro della sicurezza nella Regione. Il dibattito di questi



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due giorni è molto utile poiché esso affronta possibili sinergie dell'UE e dell'UEO che certamente giocheranno positivamente rispetto all'obiettivo condiviso. Nella ricordata riunione di Roma, i Ministri, così come emerge dalla Dichiarazione finale, hanno sottolineato l'importanza che essi annettono alla cooperazione dell'UEO con le istituende unità dell'UE di pianificazione politica e di allerta precoce ed hanno incaricato il Consiglio Permanente di avviare, non appena possibile e in consultazione con l'UE, i lavori necessari per assicurare il pieno e tempestivo contributo dell'UEO a tale riguardo.

Credo che, nel momento in cui prende forma e sostanza la Politica Estera di Sicurezza Comune dell'UE, sia importante chiedersi quali apporti concreti l'UEO - che dispone di specifici strumenti quali la Cellula di Pianificazione, il Centro Situazionale, il Centro Satellitare ed il Quartier Generale - potrà fornire al comune obiettivo di rafforzare la pace e la stabilità. Così come potrà, credo, risultare utile porsi il quesito di quale possa essere lo spazio e il rilievo del partenariato politico e di sicurezza euro-mediterraneo sulla complessiva architettura di sicurezza dell'Unione Europea, specialmente per quanto concerne la prevenzione dei conflitti.

Naturalmente la Carta per la stabilità e la pace costituisce il riferimento più importante per la riflessione in seno all'UEO, ma non esclusivo, dato che gli strumenti e le competenze della UEO potrebbero tornare di grande ausilio nella concezione e realizzazione delle misure di fiducia.

Sono questi i quesiti e queste opportunità di azioni sinergiche che lascio al vostro dibattito, certo che gli elementi che emergeranno potranno



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concorrere ad arricchire la riflessione in corso. E' chiaro infatti che in nessun modo le opzioni desiderabili e utili potranno prescindere dall'espressa volontà dei nostri partners, né essere portate avanti fuori da un'analisi congiunta e da decisioni concordate, in ossequio a quello spirito di autentico partenariato che noi vogliamo preservare e valorizzare

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“ ISTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK “

*Dr. Roberto Aliboni
Director of Studies, Head of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Studies
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome*

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF



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Italian Presidency of the Western European Union



COMUNE DI GENOVA

**SECURITY CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMIC OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

*Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome*

**International Seminar on "WEU's Role in the Mediterranean and the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership"
jointly organised by IAI and WEU-ISS
under the auspices of the Italian Presidency of the WEU**

The transformations entailed by the end of the East-West confrontation have created two different strategic theatres in Europe's southern approaches: on the one hand, the Middle East and North Africa; on the other hand, South-eastern Europe.

The former (on which this paper is focused) has been targeted by a multiplicity of Western and European initiatives aimed at achieving the means and common frameworks for security co-operation. It must be noted that these attempts at building security co-operation in the Middle East and North Africa do not amount to a co-ordinated Western-European initiative (as is the case in Central-eastern and to some extent even South-eastern Europe) but to a process which involves different actors, aims, instruments and notions.

The Western European Union [WEU] is one of the Western and European security institutions that has undertaken a "Mediterranean" initiative of security co-operation¹ (pursuant to the ministerial mandate provided by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration).

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the institutional factors affecting the WEU's mandate to play a role to promote security co-operation in the Mediterranean. This involves two dimensions: (a) the institutional development and capacities of the WEU proper, i.e., of the WEU as a distinctive institution with its specific goals and instruments; (b) the institutional development and potential of the WEU as a component of wider ongoing institutional processes, i.e. (i) the process of reform and adjustment of the Western and European security system itself, as well as (ii) the process of different Western and European initiatives (such as the WEU's Mediterranean Dialogue or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership promoted by the European Union) geared to establishing security co-operation with non-EU parties.

From the point of view of the various Western institutions involved, the fragmented and blurred second dimension is no less important than the first. This is particularly true with respect to the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa, where the unifying ideological and political factors currently underlying the construction of the security architecture in Europe are simply lacking. From the point of view of the WEU, in particular, the ongoing processes of institutional adjustment are of special relevance, given that the

WEU happens to be an institution in transition. As is well known, the "Declaration of WEU on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" (approved by WEU Ministers on 22 July 1997 and adopted by the November 1997 Inter-Governmental Conference leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam) states that

WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks and is an essential element of the development of the ESDI [European Security and Defence Identity] within the Atlantic Alliance ...

As a consequence, there is no doubt that the WEU is destined to become part of the European Union [EU] and, according to the character of its role in the EU, have an impact on the relations between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO]. The discussion about the role of the WEU in the Mediterranean security institutional network - as well as its role in and of itself - is considerably complicated by this transition. It can hardly be neglected, though.

In order to elaborate on the WEU's institutional profile and perspectives with respect to Mediterranean security co-operation, this paper explores three points: (1) the institutional potential of the WEU as such with a view to security co-operation in the Mediterranean (that is: the instruments available to the WEU to achieve security co-operation in the areas concerned); (2) the decision-making perspective within the framework of the enhanced co-operation with the EU and NATO prescribed for the WEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam; (3) the decision-making perspective within the framework of possible co-operation between the WEU and the EMP in the Mediterranean area, as contemplated by the latter.

1. WEU's institutional role in a Mediterranean perspective

The Mediterranean perspective - in its Middle-East-extended notion - is not new to the WEU. In the second half of the eighties, a set of European missions to these areas co-ordinated by the WEU were part and parcel of the attempts at reviving the organisation. In the nineties, the Mediterranean Dialogue set out by the Ministers in 1992 constitutes an even more systemic and ambitious policy. The substantive institutional difference between the eighties and the nineties is given by the tasks listed by the Petersberg Declaration in addition to that of common defence established by the early Treaties. According to the Declaration: "military units of the WEU member States ... could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

To be sure, WEU interventions in the Gulf area during the eighties were also geared to the management of international crises. In a sense they anticipated the Petersberg Declaration. The latter however has the merit of construing WEU military tasks in a more explicit and convincing co-operative setting. The Petersberg Declaration means for the WEU what the Rome 1991 Strategic Concept has meant for NATO: a decisive institutional turning point adapting the early purposes of the organisation to post-Cold War international security requirements.

It is the Petersberg Declaration that makes it possible to look at WEU military capacities, facilities and potential from a co-operative point of view, that is as instruments geared to contributing to international collective or co-operative security and to making inter-state security co-operation possible. Indeed, military instruments are not *per se* co-operative or conducive to co-operation. What turns them into instruments of co-operation is the new "Petersberg" political framework of co-operation in which they can be employed.

In the light of the co-operative purposes impressed by the Petersberg Declaration on the WEU's tasks, besides the possible organisation of military units for preventing or managing conflicts or carrying out humanitarian and rescue tasks, even the institutional military tasks regularly accomplished by the WEU may acquire a confidence-building dimension. In other words, regular WEU tasks can be used to build-up or increase confidence, thus opening the way to structural measures of arms limitation or control.

In this sense, security co-operation is an institutional task of the WEU which can be pursued through a variety of confidence-building measures [CBMs] and confidence- and security-building measures [CSBMs] in the wake of the experience of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace. The WEU is institutionally capable of negotiating and implementing such measures, be they aimed at (a) improving information and transparency; (b) making operational co-operation possible and improving inter-operability; or (c) preparing arms limitation or control, or making them feasible.

It must be stressed that the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre give the WEU a considerable potential for introducing and implementing CBMs and CSBMs in the Mediterranean area. Recently, the WEU German Presidency implemented a CBM by organising a visit of the non-WEU Mediterranean countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue to the Torrejón Satellite Centre (December 1997). The visit of representatives of the same countries to the Planning Cell in Brussels (May 1998), organised under the Greek Presidency, achieved the same result. Needless to say, both the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre amplify WEU's potential to implement CBMs and CSBMs of an operational and structural character as well, such as interventions during or after natural and man-made disasters and monitoring and verifications in relation to arms control and limitation.

Let's very briefly recall the most important classes of CBMs and CSBMs that may be employed in the WEU's ordinary capacities. The first category of CBMs (those improving information and transparency) may provide the WEU with a number of opportunities:

- meetings at the varying levels of Chiefs of staff and commissioned officers;
- information on respective military doctrines, operational methods and experiences, as well as strategic concepts (by means of joint seminars at various levels, including civil staff and experts);
- training at different levels and exchanges of personnel, in particular for operational purposes;
- information on exercises, participation of observers in exercises (as in the case of CRISEX '98 in November 1998) and open skies co-ordination.

In the second category of CBMs, the following measures can be taken into consideration:

- joint exercises;

- implementation of inter-operability (including C-3) and co-ordination of logistics;
- planning methodologies and joint analyses of risk and threat assessment; conflict prevention and early warning methods;
- the intervention of military units for humanitarian and rescue purposes fits well with this category; e.g., in the framework of the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue de-mining actions have been requested (by Egypt); also, WEU support should fit with the implementation of the CBMs approved within the EMP in relation to the use of military units during and after natural and man-made disasters;
- CBMs related to maritime activities, such as joint naval exercises; prevention of naval incidents; air-sea search and rescue operations, can also be included in the operational field.

Structural CBMs and CSBMs, including verification, could also be conducted or assisted by the WEU. While a list of general classes of CBMs or CSBMs of a structural character can hardly be formulated due to the specificity required by these measures, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in both the narrower and the greater Mediterranean sphere is a major problem that the WEU can help solve.

It is worth recalling that the implementation of CBMs belonging to the first and second category have the collateral merit of preparing for the possibility of joint interventions - i.e. interventions by WEU and partner Mediterranean countries - in the Mediterranean as well as in other areas (sub-Saharan Africa, Indian Ocean, etc.).

In sum, thanks to the introduction of the Petersberg tasks and the recent improvements of its facilities and its operational capabilities, the WEU must be considered an institution with considerable potential for implementing security co-operation. In principle, this potential can be applied to any area. Due to weaknesses in European logistics, communications and transport facilities, the Mediterranean appears to be the most immediate area in which WEU's security co-operation capacities can be applied.

2. WEU in transition between EU and NATO

In order to become operational, however, WEU's basic institutional inclination to security co-operation must be predicated on a political mandate. In the current situation, there is no doubt that this mandate is as weak or as lacking as the political will to promote it. This emerged clearly during the crises in Rwanda and Albania, in which WEU intervention – both desirable and possible - failed to materialise. It is also evident in the standstill to which the Mediterranean Dialogue has been brought by the WEU members' failure to respond to the requests coming from southern Mediterranean countries for implementation of concrete CBMs. Can this reluctance be explained by the state of transition in which the WEU finds itself today as a consequence of the ESDI building process? Let's look briefly at WEU institutional transition and its tendencies.

As pointed out by the passage of the 22 July 1997 WEU's Ministers Declaration quoted above, two parallel processes of institutional interlocking are taking place: they are between the EU and the WEU, on one hand, and between NATO and the WEU, on the other.

The Treaty of Amsterdam - well noted by the WEU - says that the EU will "avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications" (Art. J7, 3) and, in particular, to accomplish the Petersberg tasks (Art. J7, 2).

Within common strategies approved unanimously by the European Council (Art. J3), the EU Council of Ministers approves common actions as well as common positions aimed at implementing the strategies approved previously by the European Council. When these common actions and positions pertain to “decisions having military or defence implications” they also have to be approved unanimously (Art. J13, 2).

The Treaty has charged the EU and the WEU with working out a detailed procedure to establish sound operational links between the two organisations: in fact, to secure EU political control on the implementation of the tasks assigned. According to the Rhodes and Rome Ministerial Declarations, in the course of 1998 these links have been satisfactorily developed. They consist of a set of decision-making procedures, contemplated by a standardised flow-chart in which EU political control is secured by means of approximately 30-40 checks.

On the other hand, the Amsterdam Treaty has engaged the WEU to work out a parallel procedure with NATO, which has also been done in 1998. By mean of its flow-chart, NATO retains full, protracted and extensive military (and political) control in the process geared to assign resources to the WEU for accomplishing a Petersberg-like task to which NATO may decide to contribute (either upon WEU/EU or its own request).

In both cases, WEU is subjected to penetrating political control. However, it must be noted that there is a key difference between the two processes: while the intrusive control of the EU on WEU is explained by the political and institutional convergence towards the creation of the ESDI established by the Treaty of Amsterdam, to date the same cannot be said for NATO’s intrusive control of the WEU. In order to make its operational capabilities available eventually to WEU, NATO expresses a political evaluation to which European institutions cannot contribute. In the event that a Petersberg task is requested by NATO to WEU, the EU is involved institutionally. In the event that such a task is assigned to WEU by the EU Council and NATO support is also required, the Atlantic Council and NATO Commands intrude *ex lege* into the European decision-making process.

All in all, the key question is whether and how ESDI will become a factor in the political decision-making of NATO. But it is not a question to be tackled in this paper. Yet, the institutional and political asymmetry in decision-making which exists today with respect to crises management with NATO, on the one hand, and with European institutions, on the other, has implications for WEU, and more generally speaking, for European policies towards the Mediterranean that are worth mentioning.

There is no doubt that such asymmetry tends to complicate the European task of establishing credible security co-operation with the southern Mediterranean countries. In the nineties, an important obstacle to European attempts at including a military dimension in their Mediterranean security co-operation has been a lack of credibility. This lack of credibility stems first of all from the weakness and fragmentation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP], but it also stems from the suspicion that the European military and security institutions do not have a distinctive role with respect to NATO or do not have a convincing say within the Western security decision-making process.

This European military and security “invisibility” or “ambiguity” is detrimental to Europe’s role in the Mediterranean and thus to EU/WEU attempts to start up forms of security co-operation in the area.

A solution to the ESDI dilemma will perhaps not be found tomorrow. The European institutions may still have to cohabit in the Mediterranean (and elsewhere) with an ambiguous

military and security identity and with its implications for some time. Yet, this situation does not entirely justify the WEU members' reluctance to develop the WEU's potential for security co-operation stressed at the beginning of this section. The state of transition of the WEU in the framework of the European and Western security system may explain, to some extent, the reluctance of the WEU/EU members to mandate the organisation to intervene with military units to pursue so-called Petersberg tasks; it cannot explain the inhibition of the WEU's broader institutional capacities to implement CBMs and CSBMs.

3. WEU and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In initiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership [EMP], the EU did not want to involve the WEU, probably out of a desire to stress the prevailingly non-military character of the factors that are supposed to shape security in Euro-Med relations.

After three years of existence, it seems clear that the eventual implementation of the "area of peace and stability" envisaged in the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration is not expected to establish concretely measures of defence sufficiency, arms limitation or control or to pursue policies of crisis management. It is expected to act as a catalyst of such measures and policies (maybe, to be carried out by somebody else) by gradually establishing common attitudes to co-operative security and conflict prevention among its members. To that end, the central question of EMP development today is not the implementation of arms control and limitation or the establishment of structural CBMs/CSBMs, but consolidating a strong mechanism of political dialogue and establishing confidence by mean of partnership-building measures. Such measures, stressed by the *ad hoc* ministerial meeting of Palermo in June 1998, are expected to be less of a military than of a socio-economic and cultural character (though, some transparency or operational military-related CBMs are not to be excluded and, in fact, are being implemented).

This strong correction of the more ambitious course of action anticipated by many in the EU in Barcelona is due to the structural difficulty in applying a multilateral regime to a group that is characterised by deep asymmetries in security conditions and institutions. While in South-South relations security conditions are dominated by actual military threats, the same is not true in North-South relations. On the other hand, in the Euro-Med framework a security-structured South faces a security-overstructured North. This situation makes it difficult to work out and implement common security policies, especially in the military and defence realm.

This can explain the fact that WEU's availability to "contribute its expertise to the Barcelona Process in response to requests from the European Union" (regularly appearing in the Ministerial Declarations since the November 1996 WEU Council of Ostend) has gone totally unheeded so far. But this inertia can also be explained by existing differences among the EU members with respect to the future direction of the European security architecture, as seen in the previous section. However, there are also institutional difficulties.

The Political and Security Partnership in the EMP is run by an inter-governmental Committee of Senior Officials. It is this Committee that must work out proposals and prepare the implementation of security measures like CBMs/CSBMs or actions to prevent conflicts or manage humanitarian or political crises. The Committee's proposals have to be approved by the Conference of Ministers. How would the WEU be involved in the case its contribution were required?

A request for a WEU contribution can in principle arise in two different ways: in one, a proposal is submitted to and approved by the Ministers (e.g., a procedure for humanitarian intervention); in the other, the Senior Officials proceed on the basis of guidelines or procedures already approved by the Ministers (e.g., a specific humanitarian intervention based on broad procedures previously approved). In both cases the follow-up is secured by the EU Council secretariat. The Council secretariat will ask the EU Council of Ministers to take a (unanimous) decision and, once taken, it will address the WEU and start the procedure mentioned in the previous section on the basis of the appropriate flow-chart: it is a cumbersome process. It must be added that, if the action in question were to require support from NATO, WEU would have to negotiate such support with the transatlantic organisation, making the procedure even more cumbersome and increasing its political costs.

In sum, the current institutional setting is far from making an EMP request for support or expertise to the WEU impossible. It does, however, make it very cumbersome, time-consuming and therefore more easily exposed to incidents of various kinds. If what has been requested is timely intervention, this state of affairs would certainly not be very helpful.

One way to speed up the procedure might be to get a decision from the EU Council in the form of a "common action", noting that the EMP is broadly interested in collaboration with the WEU or listing specific cases in which such interest is anticipated (e.g.: the implementation and/or the consideration of military or military-related CBMs/CSBMs; or humanitarian and rescue interventions; etc.) and giving the secretariat a mandate to formalise and speed up the necessary procedures by keeping in touch with the WEU (in practice: an *ad hoc* flow-chart approved once and forever).

Such a common action would be related less to a specific action than to a frame for a certain kind of action. In this sense, it would be midway between the usually more detailed common actions assigned by the Treaty of Amsterdam to the EU Council of Ministers and the broader common strategies the same Treaty assigns to the European Council. In fact, either the European Council or the Council of Ministers might proceed to establish the policy in question on the basis of their institutional instruments. The problem, however, is that - as surprising as it may be - the EMP has never been approved as a strategy by the European Council, a fact which prevents it, for the moment, from approving the kind of sub-strategy suggested here. Furthermore, in the absence of a common strategy, the EU Council of Ministers could hardly approve the common action in question.

Given the intrusive role played by the EU in the EMP, the fact that the latter is not recognised as a common strategy and - consequently - as a common action raises serious problems in relation to WEU-EMP relations and to the Barcelona Process as a whole. The first step to be taken should be, therefore, to construe the EMP within the CFSP framework as a common strategy/action, thus speeding up the decision-making process in both the EU and the EMP.

Conclusions

Adding the Petersberg tasks to the early institutional tasks of the WEU has considerably broadened its institutional potential and capacities. More importantly, the Petersberg tasks have provided the WEU with a high co-operative profile and adapted it to the needs and objectives of current international security co-operation.

The WEU could be of use not only in cases of crisis management and humanitarian and rescue tasks; its "expertise" regards the preparation and implementation of any task of

military or military-related security co-operation, especially with respect to CBMs and CSBMs.

The menu of capacities provided by the WEU, sketched out in the first section of this paper, largely matches the objectives of the security co-operation listed in the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration or, more generally, the objectives the EU, its members and other Western security organisations may wish to attain in the Mediterranean area.

The concrete use of WEU potentialities and capacities in the Mediterranean (and elsewhere) are presently constrained, however, by the institutional transition this organisation is undergoing with respect to NATO and, above all, the European Union. At the same time, its potential is strongly constrained by the political uncertainties involved in the transition itself. The current under-utilisation of the WEU stems less from the hardships of its institutional transition than from lack of political will of and the political differences among its members.

With regard to the most important case of European security co-operation policy in the Mediterranean area, i.e. the EMP, the transition to ESDI and its uncertain prospects, especially in relation to NATO, detracts from EU/WEU credibility. Meanwhile, possible co-operation between the WEU and the EMP is hindered less by the cumbersome procedures required by the European institutional transition than by the EMP's undefined role within the CFSP as well as by the EU's intrusive institutional role in the EMP. A reconsideration of these two points may open the way to a more effective functioning of the EMP and a more fruitful relationship between the EMP and the WEU.

¹ As just pointed out, Western Mediterranean initiatives are related to different areas and predicated on different strategic concepts. Broadly speaking, while Western institutions, especially NATO, are directed by the notion of the Middle East and North Africa (in its greater extension, i.e. including the Persian Gulf area), the European institution tends to stick to the notion of Mediterranean as it stems from the EU *acquis*, namely including North Africa and only the Near East. There is a "Mediterranean Group" in the WEU with a Mediterranean perspective closer to - though not necessarily coincidental with - that of the EU than that of NATO. This Group's mandate to develop a Mediterranean Dialogue, originally related to the Maghreb countries and Mauritania only, has gradually encompassed Egypt, Israel and Jordan, thus remaining within the range of the EU's Mediterranean notion.

ISTITUTO AFFARI
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Séminaire International sur
le Rôle de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale
et le Partenariat Euro Méditerranéen

Intervention de Mr Abdallah RIAHI
Institut Tunisien d'Etudes Stratégiques

Mmes & Mrs,

C'est pour moi un honneur et un privilège de prendre la parole après l'éminente intervention du Professeur Roberto Aliboni, que je remercie vivement pour la pertinence des idées qu'il a développées et des analyses qu'il vient d'exposer. ~~Ne s'est-il pas attaché, en sa qualité de directeur d'Etudes, responsable des Etudes Méditerranéennes et Moyen Orientales à l'Instituto Affari Internazionali, à développer et à promouvoir des visions prospectives sur la paix et la stabilité en méditerranée, objectifs communs à nous tous.~~

Présidence Méditerranéenne

Mes remerciements s'adressent également à l'IAI et au WEU Security studies Institute qui, ~~sous les auspices de la Présidence Italienne de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale,~~ nous ont donné l'occasion de nous recontrer dans le cadre de ce séminaire.

et important.

sur les aspects institutionnels du rôle de l'UEO

Sur le sujet qui nous intéresse, je voudrais rappeler qu'il y a trois ans en 1995, le processus de Barcelone a été engagé par nos pays respectifs dans une vision dynamique, orientée vers un partenariat global et intégral basé sur la paix, la sécurité et la coopération .

Aussi, à la logique de compétition, voire de confrontation, la région a pu substituer une logique de construction politique et économique à même d'induire une coopération sécuritaire et de défense dès lors qu'il s'agit d'un espace de stabilité devenu commun ~~à cette région et par conséquent de l'avenir de notre région Euro-Med.~~

Les progrès notables déjà accomplis autorisent de réfléchir aux aspects institutionnels qui permettront d'asseoir et de garantir la continuité du dialogue Euro Med et de parachever la construction mise en chantier ~~de cet espace méditerranéen qui fut, naguère, le berceau des civilisations et qui~~ devrait demeurer le cœur battant d'un monde qui se veut global.

Aujourd'hui

Mais l'émergence d'une institution, quelle qu'elle soit ou, le cas échéant, le recentrage de son rôle, nous paraît traduire d'abord une volonté politique communément partagée et viser, également, la réalisation d'objectifs ~~clairement~~ clairement définis.

A ce sujet, le processus de Barcelone a bel et bien engagé une dynamique d'intégration et de coopération régionales prometteuses. Les déclarations déjà adoptées et les documents en cours de négociation, constituent les éléments essentiels de ce qui pourrait constituer une ^{véritable} charte pour le PEM. Un effort remarquable vers la transformation de la région en un marché intégré a déjà donné ses premiers fruits. Sur le plan sécuritaire, des institutions communes et des mesures de vérification et de contrôle se mettent en place. Enfin des mécanismes de concertation et d'impulsion politique supérieurs fonctionnent déjà (comités d'association, réunions ministérielles, réunions de haut fonctionnaires et d'experts, etc...).

Voilà, donc, évoqués, les ingrédients nécessaires et les préalables indispensables à la création et la consolidation d'institutions régionales qui ne manqueront pas d'impulser la construction entreprise et qui continueront de s'affermir à la faveur des progrès réalisés, préservant par là même, notre idéal commun.

Cette construction institutionnelle graduelle, et progressive, nous semble tributaire des progrès à réaliser à la fois sur les plans de l'édification et de la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité régionales et, bien sûr, de la coopération et du partenariat économiques favorisés par une société civile que nous voulons agissante, ~~équivalente~~ et efficace procédant d'un "système de coopération libre et équilibrée propre à assurer la paix et le progrès pour tous", ainsi que l'a affirmé le Président de la République Tunisienne Zine El Abidine BEN ALI le 22 juin 1993 à Strasbourg devant le parlement Européen.

L'institutionnalisation du partenariat Euro Méditerranéen, qu'elle soit politique, parlementaire et militaire ou économique, financière et culturelle est, nécessairement, une oeuvre de longue haleine. Elle doit, en même temps, trouver des solutions appropriées à la réalité des problèmes actuels et futurs de la région et, également, assurer l'interface avec les autres partenaires de la région dans son ensemble qu'il s'agisse des Etats Unis ou des pays d'extrême Orient.

ELLE se doit d'être concertée et consensuelle. A défaut, elle aurait pour les pays du Sud-Med, des répercussions de guerre froide, ne manquant pas de rappeler une ère

L'essence même du PEM nous ~~pourrait~~ intimement lier les aspects *révoquer* sécuritaires et économiques dans la mesure où le développement économique constitue un facteur de promotion de la paix et de la sécurité lesquels sont en eux-mêmes un facteur de développement. Cette nouvelle situation en

méditerranée constitue un élément fondamental qu'il y a lieu de prendre en considération dans toute réflexion sur le rôle des nouvelles institutions à créer ou sur le nouveau rôle des institutions sécuritaires préexistantes et dont la création fût dictée par la II^{ème} Guerre Mondiale ou par la guerre froide.

par des circonstances et des objectifs tout à fait différents.

En outre, tout effort d'institutionnalisation qui se veut promoteur de PEM devrait avoir pour objectif ultime de promouvoir la sécurité pour tous, basée sur une lutte commune contre les nouvelles menaces auxquelles nos sociétés sont désormais confrontées, à savoir les intégrismes de diverses natures, en ce qu'ils font peser sur nos pays démocratiques une réelle menace de déstabilisation et minent les fondements mêmes de nos sociétés basées sur la tolérance et l'acceptation de l'autre dans sa différence et dans son identité culturelle.

Paix, sécurité et coopération : cette trilogie -que je souhaiterais d'ailleurs reformuler en "coopération, stabilité et sécurité pour la paix- me semble capable de hâter la construction institutionnelle devant présider aux destinées de l'espace euromed ou, au contraire, de la freiner. Il est difficile de réaliser des progrès sur les volets "paix" et "sécurité" sans avoir, préalablement, jeté les bases d'un développement économique, social et humain à même de permettre à la région de relever les défis majeurs auxquels nous la savons confrontée et qui en menaceraient les équilibres fondamentaux si un effort commun de redressement et de promotion économique globale n'est pas entamé rapidement. Est-il besoin de rappeler, à cet égard, que l'Europe, ruinée par la II^{ème} guerre Mondiale, a pu se reconstruire à la faveur d'une aide américaine massive (dans le cadre du plan Marshall) ou qu'un pays comme le Portugal a réussi à se mettre à niveau pour intégrer la communauté Européenne grâce à une aide appropriée et décisive de la Communauté Européenne elle-même. Une intervention similaire de la part de l'Europe est aujourd'hui nécessaire pour permettre à ceux parmi les partenaires de la construction

Euro Med en cours - à peine sortis de la colonisation et des premières expériences de modernisation de leurs structures socio-économiques - de se hisser au rang de partenaires économiques à part entière et de réussir une mise à niveau globale, condition *sine qua non*, ~~à notre avis~~, de la création d'un espace Euro Med économiquement intégré, ^{et prospère} socialement homogène, politiquement solidaire et institutionnellement structuré.

Nous sommes tentés d'évoquer ici la question du recyclage de la dette qui pourrait permettre une nouvelle approche du partenariat financier et donnerait une nouvelle dimension à la solidarité régionale ^{ce} qui ferait de cet handicap majeur des fragiles économies du Sud, ^{à ce est le remb. de la dette} un important facteur de développement. Nous pourrions également évoquer l'importance de l'instauration d'un véritable transfert de technologie, qui, de toute évidence, est différent de la simple transposition mécanique et marchande des technologies mises au point en Europe, pour répondre à des besoins propres. ^{ces efforts} ~~deja entrepris~~ ^{pour assurer un développement de la région} ~~pour assurer un développement de la région~~ ^{par satellite} ~~Le transfert de technologie est générateur de savoir faire et inducteur~~ de croissance ; le simple recours aux technologies importées est un handicap sérieux à la compétitivité des économies du Sud. ^{sur un autre plan,} Nous pouvons, ~~par ailleurs,~~ évoquer le volet de l'information et des médias : est-ce que les images télédiffusées ^{par satellite} dans le Sud de la Méditerranée participent bien à une meilleure compréhension entre les peuples et contribuent à un meilleur dialogue entre les civilisations, ou, au contraire nourrissent-elles les extrémismes et les fondamentalismes ?

~~Quant à l'accès aux institutions de la Communauté Européenne et la circulation de l'information, il faudra nous assurer qu'elles préparent déjà, aux rendez-vous de 2010.~~

Enfin, sommes nous sûrs que les accords d'association vont effectivement induire la croissance attendue des pays du Sud ? ^{celui passe l'autre} n'y aurait-il ^{en fait pas} pas, au cours, de la période de transition, des crises qu'il faut prévoir pour ^{le} ~~les~~ ^{l'éc. m.} mieux ~~les~~ prévenir ou mieux ~~les~~ gérer. ^{Y a-t-il eu des études sur le coût de cette transition? Quelles sont les mesures envisagées par l'Union Européenne pour éviter les secousses et les dérives qui risquent de nous ramener trente ans en arrière, avec ce que cela entraînerait comme pessimismes et comme doutes sur la pertinence du processus de Barcelone.}

des choses

Toutes ces questions et beaucoup d'autres devront être présentes dans tout effort de conception institutionnelle ou d'adaptation d'institutions déjà existantes. Lors de la mise en marche des institutions communes, il y aura lieu d'établir des urgences et des priorités que nous définirons ensemble et d'un commun accord. ~~Mais nous pouvons déjà évoquer la question de l'emploi et ses relations avec l'immigration, question fondamentale pour les uns et pour les autres. L'éducation, la santé, l'environnement sont également des questions essentielles. Ne faudrait-il pas renoncer à envisager une institutionnalisation formelle et rigide pour favoriser, au contraire, une institutionnalisation progressive, souple, horizontale et verticale, voire à plusieurs vitesses, impliquant différemment tels ou tels acteurs et tenant compte de leurs situations respectives, de leurs priorités, de leur disponibilité. Cette institutionnalisation pourrait même être envisagée comme un support à une coopération décentralisée faisant appel au génie de la société civile qui, elle, a toujours sa propre perception des besoins et des solutions appropriées.~~

Je vous remercie vivement pour votre amable attention

~~L'essence même du DEM nous paraît intimement lier les aspects sécuritaires et économiques dans la mesure où le développement économique constitue un facteur de promotion de la paix et de la sécurité lesquels sont en~~

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*International Seminar on WEU's role
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Palazzo Ducale
Genova, 4-5 December 1998

WEU MEDITERRANEAN SEMINAR, GENOA, 4-5 DECEMBER 1998
**"WEU's ROLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EURO-MEDITERRANEAN
DIALOGUE"**

Statement by Alyson J.K. Bailes, WEU Political Director

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF



Ministero degli Affari Esteri



Italian Presidency of the Western European Union



COMUNE DI GENOVA

WEU MEDITERRANEAN SEMINAR, GENOA, 4-5 DECEMBER 1998
"WEU'S ROLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE"

Statement by Alyson J.K. Bailes, WEU Political Director

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am pleased and privileged to have the chance to address you today at this seminar, which can truly be called a pioneering occasion, and I am particularly grateful to the Italian Presidency of WEU for giving me this opportunity. My task is to talk to you about WEU's philosophy and experiences in the fields of conflict prevention and management, and I will spend most of my time in this statement on that theme, in the hope of hearing your own reactions and perhaps discussing ways in which we might work together to improve our contributions in future. But to put this in the right perspective, I want to say just a few words first about how WEU as an institution has tried to define its place in the general European security architecture related to crisis management since the end of the European Cold War.

In the late 1980's and 1990's, WEU went through a political and operational revival after a long period of virtual inactivity. Its members had the opportunity, which is rather rare in the institutional field, more or less to re-build the institution from scratch. They decided to do so following three main principles:

first, WEU should focus its efforts in future on military contributions to crisis management - that is, on actions in support of the international community rather than on actions taken for our own defence, which is practice would remain the responsibility of NATO. WEU's new tasks were set out in the so-called Petersberg Declaration adopted by Ministers in 1992, which talked about humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, and other possible military contributions to crisis management. In the years that followed we were able to build up new military doctrines and politico-military structures designed specifically for these roles,

taking advantage of all the latest lessons of successful and unsuccessful crisis management missions carried out in real life;

- second, we decided not just to avoid duplication with the work of larger organizations like the EU and NATO, but to seek an active complementarity and synergy with them. For its own work in crisis management, WEU can get valuable political inspiration, guidance and support from the European Union which has a much wider range of instruments – diplomatic, political, economic and functional – for helping in the prevention and solution of complex crises and the subsequent work of reconstruction. WEU can also get practical help from NATO if NATO agrees (as it has already done in general principle) to lend us some of the European military units and assets organized within its own structure, to be used under our political control for a purely European mission. We have been working especially hard during the last year to set up practical arrangements for exploiting both these possible partnerships: and from WEU's point of view, there would be nothing to stop us drawing on the help of both the EU and NATO for the same specific operation;

- thirdly and lastly, we decided that since crisis management is something that concerns the whole international community, WEU should work with as many national partners and as many international institutions as possible in a spirit of maximum openness and solidarity. Our own membership structure has developed to embrace all the European members of both the EU and NATO and also ten of the new democracies of Central Europe, a total of 28 countries, all of whom are welcome to take part in our operations. We also have a wide range of partnerships and dialogue relationships, which of course include all your own countries but also for example Russia and Ukraine. And last but not least, we are willing to offer our services for missions mandated by the OSCE and UN which might be suited to our capacities. We are interested in developing links with other groups of countries who wish to organize themselves to help with peacekeeping missions in the same spirit: and in this context I might mention that WEU has a policy to liaise with and support the group of African countries who are working together on initiatives for regional peacekeeping, as well as the regional and sub-regional organizations,

notably the OAU and SADC, who are supporting these initiatives within the wider UN framework.

Mr Chairman,

I will turn now to my main subject for today and here I would like to divide my remarks into three parts:

- WEU's general philosophy of crisis prevention and management
- our system of decision-taking, organization and control for carrying out such missions
- and the practical lessons we have learned about problems that can arise and the good and bad ways of handling them.

As to our philosophy, I can sum it up quite simply. We do not see military action as an end in itself but as an instrument that can and should be used in the service of human welfare and human security, international peace and stability. Another way of expressing this idea is "military assistance for the civil community", and if we put it this way we can realize that such assistance can be given in many ways and at many times, even if there is no violent crisis going on. Military personnel can help for instance in responding to natural disasters, in mine clearance, in search and rescue missions, and in some cases with major economic tasks like harvesting and infrastructure work. However, when military and defence forces do have to be used to help preempt, resolve or clear up after an actual crisis, it is essential that we see them only as a means to an end and as one instrument among others to be used for the desired result. We all know that most conflicts today do not belong to the traditional category of war between sovereign states, but rather arise from a wide range of problems within countries and an equally wide range of global problems including for instance international crime, drugs, terrorism and ecological pressures and disasters. WEU believes that the solutions need to be equally complex and up-to-date, and that the final aim must always be a political settlement which alone can provide the basis for lasting peace and progress. To put it another way, if we believe the use of force that started or aggravated a particular conflict was wrong, we should not ourselves rely only on the use of force to solve the problem. It seems to me particularly important that those countries and organizations who do possess considerable military power, and particularly

those who have a so-called "global reach", should bear these principles in mind and make sure that their military instruments are used only when justified and necessary to achieve a higher result. That is certainly the philosophy which WEU believes in and which we try out best to reflect in all our actions.

Let me come now to my second question: what system of organization and decision-making has WEU developed for putting its principles into practice? I do not want to go into institutional details since these are to some extent the result of WEU's particular history and circumstances and I certainly would not want to recommend or impose them as a model on anyone else. But I can tell you what are the general aims we try to achieve and the first one of them is political control and responsibility. The highest organ in WEU is our Council, which meets twice a year at the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers and every week at the level of civilian Ambassadors. It is they who speak for their national governments and it is they who take the decisions, collectively, on any operations we may launch. Of course our military staff give their advice and recommendations and they do so very effectively, but the decisions made are political decisions and it is the political authorities who keep responsibility – as we put it – for the "control and strategic direction" of all military actions. Secondly and in the same spirit, our military and civilian staffs at WEU headquarters work very closely together at all levels every single day and our normal approach to handling new problems is to tackle them through team-work involving both military and civilian experts.

Thirdly, we try to give the greatest possibility to all the 28 nations in our system to take part in the development of our operational policies, in our exercises and joint exercises with other institutions, in planning individual operations and in carrying them out. We do actually need the practical help of all of them and in my view, this liberal approach brings us two big extra political benefits as well. First, the support of a range of Central European countries who have no colonial past and indeed have suffered from a kind of colonialism themselves can give our actions an important extra element of political credibility. Second (and this brings us back to the very heart of our discussion), the habit of working together for these shared European goals on a voluntary, equal and responsible basis builds human ties and understanding among the politico-military establishments of the 28 WEU nations which play a very real part in avoiding conflicts that might otherwise break out among the 28 themselves. In short, an institution like ours can serve the cause of

conflict prevention within the family at the same time – and by exactly the same means – that it works to create a capacity for helping others.

The operations which WEU has actually carried out so far have not included any major military interventions, though we have practiced for such cases with a whole series of exercises including one held at WEU HQ just last week. I have distributed separately a factual paper listing our experiences over the years since 1998 and indicating some of the lessons we learned from them. Here I would like to sum up our findings in a more general way, going through each stage of a possible crisis in turn. The first lesson is a pretty obvious one: try to get maximum early warning and focus the attention of the institution on a crisis as soon as possible, to give maximum time both for planning and for reaching consensus on the best form of European action. WEU has some specialized instruments for assessing the development of a crisis, notably our independent Satellite Centre: but to arrive at a general assessment and a broader European crisis strategy we would expect to work together with other institutions, notably the European Union which will shortly be setting up a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of its own. One of the main values of such an early assessment is of course to open up the possibility of preventive action, and here our organization might have a number of possible roles to play. Working with other organizations and supporting their political efforts, we might be able to provide services that would help relieve the practical strains and human tensions liable to lead towards a conflict. For instance, our help in the delivery of humanitarian aid could ease distress and pressures for migration and lessen the risk of violence over control of scarce resources. Or we could provide services in the field of law and order, border control or blockade enforcement which would check the spreading of harmful influences and materials. At the stronger end of the spectrum, our planning does allow for the use of our military forces as a preventive deployment of the more classic kind, to deter possible aggressors or to interpose between two possible adversaries or to guarantee de-militarized or special security zones. I would only make the obvious point that all such deployments should be planned as strictly temporary and kept at the most modest realistic level, so that our main energy can be devoted to non-military ways of calming the situation down. We all know how dangerous it can be if the international community simply takes security measures which relieve the violent people from some of the natural consequences of their actions, while doing nothing to deter or persuade them from following the path of violence in the first place.

But if such preventive efforts are not possible or if they fail, what roles could WEU play in containing, resolving or tidying up from an actual conflict? Here again our military and other specialized resources could be used in a wide variety of ways, ranging from logistic support such as aid delivery and disaster relief, through monitoring, patrolling, mine clearance, blockade enforcement and the disarming and reorganization of previously hostile forces as well as all the familiar types of peace support. We have tried several of these more specialized roles and we have realized that they are far from being soft options: they often place the individual soldier in more exposed situations, they certainly draw on a wider range of his skills and test his self-disciplines, and they often demand equipment that is not part of the forces' normal issue, which makes the problems of budgeting and planning much more complicated.

The other, more general point to remember is that while armed forces can meet a wide range of needs besides plain fighting they are not necessarily always the best way of meeting them. Their advantages of speed, discipline and robustness are obvious but they almost always cost more in purely cash terms than civilian methods of fulfilling corresponding tasks. The other risk they carry is that they may dramatize and polarize a situation by their mere presence, for instance because some of the local players may see them as a provocation. If we do decide to use military methods, therefore, we need to be alive to these problems and be prepared to monitor the situation flexibly and react quickly to any negative turn. Getting the command and control arrangements right for a crisis management mission is actually quite a tricky business. Because the aim is political there will be a temptation for politicians at home to stay too close to the implementation and to try to second-guess the local commander, especially when things get difficult. But experience suggests that this often leads to bad decisions or to delays which can be just as bad in a fast-moving situation. Good political control does not consist in this kind of micro-management but rather in setting clear aims and rules at the outset; establishing clear lines of command and delegation to commanders who can be trusted; and above all, thinking from the very beginning about a good exit strategy. Good civil-military cooperation is where the civilians and military understand and respect each others' expertise too well to want to interfere with it: and this understanding can only come from systematic civil-military contact even at the earliest stages of planning, training and preparation.

These are the general lines of WEU's thinking about crisis management, but we realize that they will need to be adapted and applied afresh for each specific case. That is why WEU's advance planning is only done in general, generic terms and even when we decide on an action we normally ask our military staff to produce several different options for carrying it out. I believe this flexibility is one of our advantages and one of the benefits we draw from being able to focus full-time on action for the international community rather than on self-defence. Another benefit is the fact that we can take action – when the situation demands this - under purely European leadership and on purely European political responsibility, in solidarity among a wide range of nations including many who belong in this Mediterranean region, and with a completely open mind about other non-member countries who might be able and suitable to join us for specific tasks. Finally, if I may repeat here at the end a point I have perhaps already stressed too much, we can guarantee to follow the most modern principles of civil-military cooperation and political control both at the level of framing an overall crisis strategy, and at the stage of actually carrying out an operation. There is, as you will know, a great deal of debate going on now about institutional changes in European defence and about the possibility of phasing out WEU so that its functions can be taken over by the EU or NATO or both. If this should turn out to be the right way for the future, I can only hope that the lessons of European crisis management I have tried to outline today can be inherited by and prove useful to those who will come after us as well.

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JORGE MONTEALEGRE BUIRE

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"WEU'S ROLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN & THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP"

GENOVA, 4 & 5 DICEMBRE 1998

SESSION I: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS IN WHICH THE INITIATIVES THAT ARE UNDERTAKEN IN ORDER TO FURTHER EURO-MED COLABORATION ARE DIVERSE AND THEY INCLUDE THE EU'S EUROMEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE WHICH IS ALSO CALLED THE "BARCELONA PROCESS", NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE, THE MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION OF THE OSCE, THE MEDITERRANEAN FORUM AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE.

I WILL NOW CARRY OUT A QUICK REVIEW OF THE EU'S AND NATO'S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS, AND LATER ON, I WILL DWELVE MORE EXTENSIVELY ON THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEMINAR: WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE. AS REGARDS THE INITIATIVES COMING FROM THE OSCE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN FORUM, I WILL NOT COMMENT ON THEM , ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IMPORTANT, DUE TO LACK OF TIME.

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: THE BARCELONA PROCESS:

THIS IS THE BASIC AND LARGER FRAMEWORK. IT WAS STARTED IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE WHICH GATHERED, FROM THE 27TH TO THE 28TH OF NOVEMBER 1995, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE COUNTRIES

OF THE EU AND THOSE OF THE 12 MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE INSTITUTIONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE EU (MORROCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, EGYPT, ISRAEL, PALESTINE AUTONOMOUS AUTHORITY, SYRIA, JORDAN, LEBANON, TURKEY, MALTA AND CYPRUS). THE CONFERENCE ALLOWS FOR AN IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION ON EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS, TOUCHING ON ALL THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES, TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR NEXT CENTURY'S EURO-MED COOPERATION AND ESTABLISHING A REGULAR AND PERMANENT DIALOGUE ON COMMON INTEREST ISSUES.

THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZES ITS WORK IN THREE MAIN CHAPTERS:

1) THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: IT ESTABLISHES A GROUP TO GROUP DIALOGUE STARTING WITH A LIST OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND A LIST OF PRINCIPLES INCLUDING RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

2) THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: IT DEVELOPS THE FREE TRADE AREA FOR ESTABLISHMENT BY 2010 THROUGH A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION OF BILATERAL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS ENCOURAGING THE RIGHT CLIMATE FOR INVESTMENT, AND CO-OPERATION ON SHARED PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE USE OF ENERGY RESOURCES.

3) THE PARTNERSHIP IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN AFFAIRS.

IN MY OPINION, THE IMPORTANT INNOVATION OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS IS THE ADMISSION THAT THE STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IS CLOSELY LINKED TO ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

INITIALLY THE SECURITY ASPECT DID NOT HAVE ITS OWN SPECIFIC DIMENSION IN THE CONFERENCE, AND AT PRESENT IT IS STILL LIMITED

AT ESTABLISHING, IN THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP CHAPTER, SOME GENERAL COMPROMISES FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL STABILITY, QUOTING IN THIS REGARD THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALSO SOME OTHER PRINCIPLES OF A MORE MEDITERRANEAN NATURE (I.E. THE EXISTENCE OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM AND OF DRUG TRAFFIKING, OR THE SECURITY PRINCIPLES DEFINED BY WEU FOR THIS REGION: TRANSPARENCY, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, NON PROLIFERATION ETC...).

WITHOUT A DOUBT, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS CONTINUES TO EXERT A GREAT INFLUENCE ON THE SECURITY RELATED QUESTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE (WHICH EXPLAINS THE DELAYS THAT THESE QUESTIONS ARE EXPERIENCING), EVEN THOUGH SEVERAL ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO TRY AND SEPARATE BOTH ISSUES.

THE CONTINUITY OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS IS GUARANTEED THANKS TO THE DIFFERENT SECTORIAL MEETINGS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE ON EACH ONE OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED CHAPTERS, ALTHOUGH WE MUST BE ON THE LOOK OUT SO THAT THE SECURITY ASPECT DOES NOT LANGUISH. AS REGARDS THIS POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHAPTER, TWO PROJECTS WHICH WERE MENTIONED IN THE BARCELONA DECLARATION ARE STILL BEING DISCUSSED NOWADAYS: THE FIRST ONE IS A FRENCH PROPOSAL THAT ENDEAVOURS TO PUT INTO PLACE A "STABILITY CHARTER", WHICH WOULD BE APPLIED GRADUALLY AND WHICH WOULD IMPLY THE SETTING-UP OF A SECURITY RELATED DIALOGUE WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, DIALOGUE THROUGH WHICH, ISSUES SUCH AS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, POLITICAL MECHANISMS THAT COULD PREVENT CONFLICTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS THAT COULD BOOST THE AIMS

OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ASSOCIATION IN THIS FIELD, WOULD BE DISCUSSED. THE SECOND ONE IS AN "ACTION PLAN" WHICH MUST ESTABLISH CONCRETE COOPERATION MEASURES IN THE SECURITY FIELD BETWEEN THE 27 COUNTRIES.

MAY I JUST ADD THAT MR. ALEXANDRE ZAFIRIOU, PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATOR, CFSP UNIT, EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, WILL BRIEF US, DURING TONIGHT'S DINNER, ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS.

NATO'S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:

IN DECEMBER 1994 NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS "TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS, ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE AND MEDITERRANEAN NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES WITH A VIEW TO CONTRIBUTING TO THE STRENGTHENING OF REGIONAL STABILITY". ON 8 FEBRUARY 1995, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL INVITED EGYPT, ISRAEL, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INITIAL ROUND OF DIALOGUE, IN NOVEMBER 1995 JORDAN WAS ALSO INVITED TO JOIN. THE DIALOGUE IS CONDUCTED BILATERALLY.

THE DIALOGUE CONSISTS OF TWO DIMENSIONS: A POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND PARTICIPATION IN SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE CONSISTS OF REGULAR BILATERAL POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON NATO ACTIVITIES AND AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

ON THE BASIS OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN SINTRA, PORTUGAL, IN MAY 1997, THE HEADS OF STATE AND

GOVERNMENT MEETING IN MADRID DURING JULY 1997 AGREED TO ESTABLISH A NEW COMMITTEE TO HAVE OVERALL RESPONSABILITY FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE AND TO BOTH WIDEN THE SCOPE AND ENHANCE THE DIALOGUE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION GROUP (MCG) WAS CREATED AT THE MADRID SUMMIT AND HAS OVERALL RESPONSABILITY FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

THE MGC CONDUCTS THE DIALOGUE IN A 16+1 FORMAT WITH THIRD PARTIES: WITH WHOM DISCUSSIONS ARE ENVISAGED AS TAKING PLACE ONCE A YEAR BUT WITH ADDITIONAL MEETINGS POSSIBLE ON AN AD HOC BASIS. THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES OPEN TO NON-NATO DIALOGUE PARTNERS ALLOW FOR PARTICIPATION IN SCIENCE, INFORMATION, CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND ATTENDANCE OF COURSES AT NATO SCHOOLS. MORE RECENTLY CO-OPERATION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN ADDED IN THE MILITARY DOMAIN. LASTLY, IT SHOULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT THAT NATO HAS APPROVED AN INITIATIVE CALLED THE "CONTACT POINT EMBASSIES" BY WHICH THE EMBASSIES OF ALLIED NATIONS CAN PERFORM AS NATO'S PERMANENT INFORMATION OFFICE IN THE CORRESPONDING MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE COUNTRIES.

WEU'S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

WEU HAS ALSO WISHED TO FURTHER THE DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN ITS NATIONS AND THE SOUTHERN LITORAL MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES. DUE TO THIS WISH, WEU BEGAN IN 92 TO DEVELOP AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON WEU MEDITERRANEAN GROUP.

THIS GROUP HAS THE TASK OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE STABILITY IN THE

MEDITERRANEAN AREA BY MAINTAINING DIRECT CONTACTS WHICH ALLOW FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND OF OPINIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND TO COMPLEMENT IN THIS FRAMEWORK, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WEU'S FUTURE CONDITION AS THE DEFENCE COMPONENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RELATIONS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE EU AND THOSE COUNTRIES ON MATTERS RELATED TO POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL AND OTHER QUESTIONS. THIS GROUP CONTINUES TO DEVELOP POLITICAL EXCHANGES WITH THE 7 NATIONS WHICH FORM PART OF "WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE" (ALGERIA, EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN, MOROCCO, MAURITANIA AND TUNISIA) AND COORDINATES AND PROMOTES THE FORESEEABLE COOPERATION ACTIVITIES. THE GROUP MEETINGS ARE ATTENDED BY THE 28 COUNTRIES OF WEU, THAT IS TO SAY IT INCLUDES FULL MEMBER COUNTRIES, ASSOCIATE MEMBERS, OBSERVERS AND ASSOCIATE PARTNERS.

ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT MANDATE, MANDATE WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN MAY 1994, THIS DIALOGUE IS UNDERATKEN THROUGH INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS WITH EACH ONE OF THE 7 ABOVE MENTIONED COUNTRIES. THESE CONTACTS TAKE PLACE ONCE EVERY SIX MONTHS AND AT DIFFERENT LEVELS: AT THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL (MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY PLUS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE AMBASSADOR OF EACH ONE OF THOSE NATIONS), AT GOVERNMENT EXPERTS LEVEL (WEU MEDITERRANEAN GROUP MEETINGS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE OF THOSE COUNTRIES: THIS PRACTICE HAS ALL BUT BEEN FORGOTTEN AT THE PRESENT TIME) AND AT THE ACADEMIC LEVEL (INVITATION TO SEMINARS AT THE WEU'S INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES - PARIS).

IN CONTRAST TO WHAT HAPPENS IN NATO, THE 28 WEU NATIONS DO NOT

MEET (~~ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS~~) WITH THOSE COUNTRIES (29+1).

THIS DIALOGUE BASICALLY CONTAINS INFORMATION ON WEU'S ACTIVITIES AND THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, ALWAYS TAKING CARE THAT THE LATTER ARE INCLUDED IN WEU'S FIELD OF TASKINGS AND MANDATES.

LOGICALLY WEU'S DOMAIN LIES IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE MATTERS, BUT THE EMPHASIS MUST NOT BE PURELY MILITARY AND MUST NOT ADDRESS, IN ANY WAY, A CONFRONTATIONAL STRATEGY IN THE FACE OF SUPPOSED THREATS COMING FROM THE SOUTHERN LITORAL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. ON THE CONTRARY, THE BEST WAY OF MAINTAINING GENERAL SECURITY IN THE AREA IS ACHIEVABLE ONLY THROUGH AN OPEN DIALOGUE THAT ALLOWS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFERENT NATIONS, REDUCING, IN THIS WAY, THE POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND FALSE PERCEPTION OF THREATS, CONTRIBUTING IN THIS WAY TO THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE REGION.

MOREOVER, WEU ENDEAVOURS THAT THIS DIALOGUE SERVES TO PROMOTE, AMONG OUR MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE PARTNERS, THOSE PRINCIPLES, WHICH WE CONSIDER ARE CAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE WHOLE REGION, IN PARTICULAR : THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF CONFLICTS; THE TRANSPARENCY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND DOCTRINES; THE NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND OF THE MEANS TO USE THEM; AND THE NEED TO AVOID THE STOCKPILING OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS BEYOND WHAT IS REASONABLE FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES.

FOR THE TIME BEING, WE MUST CONCENTRATE IN FULLY DEVELOPING THE PRESENT CONTACTS. NEVERTHELESS, AND IN VIEW OF THE FUTURE IT IS CONVENIENT THAT WEU PREPARES ITSELF IN ORDER TO BE CAPABLE OF COMPLETING IN THE DEFENSE ASPECT, IF THE EU SO REQUIRES IT, THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY DIALOGUE ESTABLISHED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BARCELONA EUROMEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE.

IN THIS RESPECT, MY COUNTRY PROPOSED THAT THE WEU SHOULD ANTICIPATE THE POSSIBLE REQUESTS COMING FROM THE EU, INITIATING AN IN DEPTH STUDY OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF CHAPTER I OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS. AS A RESULT OF THIS PROPOSAL, WEU HAS INITIATED A PROCESS OF REFLECTION ON HOW IT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SAID CHAPTER OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS, A GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHICH IS THE PRESENT SEMINAR IN GENOA.

IN COMPARISON TO THE EXTENSIVE LIST OF COOPERATION ACTIVITIES ALREADY APPROVED BY NATO, WEU HAS MORE LIMITATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AS IT DOES NOT HAVE ITS OWN FORCES, OR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND ACADEMIES TO WHICH IT CAN INVITE VISITORS. NEVERTHELESS, THE WEU HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL (NOT ASSIGNED TO IT) A SERIES OF EUROPEAN FORCES, THE SO CALLED FAWEU, AMONG WHICH SOME HAVE A MULTILATERAL CHARACTER AND ARE MANNED AND STAFFED BY TROOPS COMING FROM EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: THESE ARE THE EUROFOR AND THE EUROMARFOR. THESE EUROFORCES ARE PAYING ATTENTION TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE AND THEY CAN MANTAIN (AS OPPOSED TO WHAT THE WEU CAN DO) A COOPERATION PROGRAM WITH THEM, WHICH COULD INCLUDE AMONG OTHER INITIATIVES, AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY NAVAL UNITS AND OF OBSERVERS TO THE DIFFERENT EXERCISES THAT MIGHT BE

UNDERTAKEN.

THE NATIONS OF WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE HAVE RECEIVED BRIEFINGS AFTER EVERY IMPORTANT DECISION TAKEN AT WEU AND AFTER EACH MINISTERIAL MEETING. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE VISITED WEU'S MILITARY STAFF IN BRUSSELS, WEU'S SATELLITE CENTRE IN TORREJÓN DE ARDOZ-MADRID, THE SITUATION CENTRE, AND HAVE RECEIVED EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ON THE LATEST CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISE, THE SO CALLED CRISEX 98.

IN THE SAME WAY, WEU'S INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, ALSO ORGANIZES ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES WITH PARTICIPATION OF COUNTRIES FROM THE SOUTHERN LITORAL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THEIR PRESENCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO THIS SEMINAR AND TO THE INFORMATION SEMINAR FOR HIGH RANKING OFFICERS FROM MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES WHICH TOOK PLACE LAST SEPTEMBER IN PARIS ON THE SUBJECT "EUROPEAN COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN"

AT PRESENT WEU IS TRYING TO REACTIVATE THE MEETINGS WHICH USED TO TAKE PLACE WITH EXPERTS ON A SPECIFIC SUBJECT, LOOKING AT DIFFERENT OPTIONS, WHICH WOULD ALLOW MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON A TOPIC OF COMMON INTEREST.

CONCLUSION:


THIS IS THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THE FIRST SESSION OF THIS SEMINAR. I BELIEVE THAT ONE OF OUR MAIN OBJECTIVES WILL BE TO STUDY HOW WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE COULD BE BROUGHT NEARER TO THE BARCELONA PROCESS.

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
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BIBLIOTECA



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*International Seminar on WEU's role
in the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

Palazzo Ducale
Genova, 4-5 December 1998

DRAFT PAPER on

***DEVELOPING DIALOGUE BETWEEN WEU AND
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: SOME PROPOSALS***

Dr. Thanos Dokos
Strategic Analyst Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF



Ministero degli Affari Esteri



Italian Presidency of the Western European Union



COMUNE DI GENOVA

DEVELOPING DIALOGUE BETWEEN WEU AND MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES: SOME PROPOSALS

International seminar of WEU's Role on the Mediterranean and
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership organized by IAI and WEU-
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Dr. Thanos Dokos

Strategic Analyst

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens

From a British-dominated region in the 19th century, the Mediterranean became an area of superpower competition in the 20th century. On the eve of the 21st century, the Mediterranean is evolving to a fault-line between the prosperous North (the "haves") and an impoverished South (the "have-nots").

After the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean is being perceived as a security region on its own merit for all European and Euro-Atlantic institutions as a result of a growing realisation that European and Mediterranean security are closely linked. The following characteristics of the -still fluid and evolving- Mediterranean security environment could be identified:

- (1) The traditional definition of security in military terms is inadequate. Economic, social, demographic and environmental factors have a considerable impact on security. A broader, more comprehensive concept of security should be adopted to encompass not only the *stricto sensu* military aspects (the so-called "high politics"), but also other aspects such as economic, social, demographic, environmental, etc. ("low politics"). In this context, the Mediterranean region constitutes a "security complex" characterised by high interdependence, which makes close co-operation among Mediterranean countries absolutely vital for the solution of various common problems;

- (2) It would be difficult and misleading to examine the Mediterranean, from a security perspective, in complete isolation from the surrounding regions of Transcaucasus/Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. The factor of geography is very important, as linkage with other regions and conflicts may impede efforts for conflict resolution and regional co-operation;
- (3) Despite the alarmist predictions of some analysts, there is no direct military threat (in the form of "clash of civilisations") from the South towards the North, in the Mediterranean region. Most security challenges and problems in the Mediterranean are of a non-military nature and therefore cannot be dealt with military means.
- (4) The factors of instability, and therefore of vulnerability and conflict, are multidimensional. Some of them are mainly of a domestic nature and affect the very fabric of individual states and societies. Other security problems in the Mediterranean will be largely transnational, in the sense that they will affect the security of many states and their resolution will require the cooperation of all states involved.¹

REGIONAL COOPERATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The end of the Cold War has lifted many of the constraints on regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. There are several diplomatic initiatives under way, including the Mediterranean Dialogues of WEU and NATO² and, of course, the Barcelona process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/EMP). The large number of initiatives raises the issue of cooperation between organisations.

The relative lack of success in efforts for regional co-operation in the Mediterranean can be attributed to the following factors:

- (1) The existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict (and to a much lesser extent other conflicts such as the Greek-Turkish one) frustrate efforts to explore cooperative arrangements in CSBM and arms control fields;

¹ Thanos Dokos, "Security Problems in the Mediterranean", Occasional paper 97.4, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens, 1997, p. 1-2.

² On NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue see for instance: Nicola de Santis, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", NATO Review, no.1, Spring 1998; Larrabee, Green, Lesser & Zanini, "NATO's Mediterranean Initiative. Policy Issues and Dilemmas", Santa Monica, RAND, 1998; Alberto Bin, "Strengthening Cooperation in the Mediterranean: The Contribution of the Atlantic Alliance".

- (2) Some of the rivalries and conflicts in the region are overlapping with out-of-region antagonisms and conflicts, complicating even more the efforts for conflict resolution and co-operation);
- (3) The lack of homogeneity between the North and the South and of shared values (like in the case of the CSCE), where states despite their ideological differences had strong historical and cultural links. In addition, there are great differences in the level of development, in the size of states and their military capabilities;³
- (4) The relative lack of south-south relations;
- (5) The lack of territorial contiguity among the two shores of the Mediterranean (at least by land), although this can be seen as an advantage in some cases;
- (6) Colonial memories in the south of the Mediterranean.⁴

Of course, not all of the above factors weigh equally.

EUROPE AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

In the not-so-distant future, as the U.S. will be shifting their attention more and more to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, the rest of the Mediterranean will become an EU sphere of influence, provided the EU develops a common foreign and security policy.⁵ Indeed, the fluid nature of contemporary

³ According to Stephen Calleya, "The three sub-regions encompassing the Mediterranean are southern Europe, the Maghreb, and the Mashreq. Each of the sub-regions continues to follow different evolutionary patterns and there is very little to indicate that any of them will integrate with their counterparts across the Mediterranean any time soon. Relations across Southern Europe are largely co-operative dominant, with this group of countries increasing their intergovernmental and transnational ties with the rest of Europe on a continuous basis. In contrast, conflictual relations have consistently hindered closer co-operation between countries in both North Africa and the Levant. Relations in these two sub-regions of the Mediterranean remain primarily limited at an intergovernmental level, with cross-border types of interaction limited to the energy sector and Islam. (Stephen Calleya, "Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean". Paper presented at a conference on the Barcelona Process. Athens, April 1998, p. 7)

⁴ Thanos Dokos, "Sub-Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean: Current Issues and Future Prospects" in "Sub-Regional Cooperation in the New Europe: Current Issues and Future Prospects". Institute for East-West Studies (IEWS) (forthcoming, January 1999).

⁵ In the interim, the EU will continue to contain instability that may emerge along its southern periphery. In the short-term its priority will be to achieve internal cohesiveness through the successful introduction of economic and monetary union. In the medium term, the EU's objective will be to integrate as many central and eastern European countries as is feasible. (Calleya, p. 10)

international relations in the Middle East certainly offers the EU the opportunity to upgrade its role in this important region.⁶

The main instrument will continue to be the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. One of the three basic tasks of the Barcelona process is the creation of a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability. Top of the agenda was the endorsement, or at least elaboration, of a security chapter that will lay the foundations for the peaceful resolution of crisis situations and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area.⁷ Such a charter would enable the partners to identify the factors of friction. So far, there hasn't been much progress toward this objective.

It is argued that the Barcelona partnership is "still a Commission-driven and not a CFSP-driven process; WEU is therefore still kept out of it, even as CSBMs are being slowly developed. Yet, with respect to countries where geopolitics still prevail over geo-economics, the economic and financial leverage of EU is marginal, at times confined only to post-conflict rehabilitation".⁸

It should be emphasised that WEU's Mediterranean Dialogue is not a reaction to a particular event but rather a part of WEU's overall cooperative approach to security, especially towards neighbouring countries. A major shortcoming in this dialogue would appear to be the lack of consensus between the EU and WEU over a division of their various responsibilities in relation to Mediterranean developments as well as an overall political strategy.⁹

⁶ Europe cannot just be a provider of economic assistance. Many Arab countries are anxious for Europe to play a major role in the peace negotiations, which are marked by far too much domination by the US. A prerequisite for this is agreement among the European countries on a common policy towards the region.

⁷ The underlying philosophy of Barcelona Declaration points to a comprehensive security conception, giving a low profile to military issues, although emphasising in the first chapter arms control, the non-proliferation of WMD, the prevention of excessive accumulation of conventional arms, the principle of sufficiency for defence requirements, equal security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry. (Antonio Marquina, "Experiences, Institutions and Instruments for Conflict Prevention in the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference", EUROMESCO Working Group on Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control, p. 7)

⁸ Guido Lenzi, "Cooperative Security in the Mediterranean". Paper presented at a Conference on the "Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", Rome, November 1997, p. 2.

⁹ Martin Lipkowski, "Security in the Mediterranean Region". Working Paper, Political Committee, Assembly of the WEU, October 1996, p. 27.

However, as argued by the Director of WEU's Institute for Security Studies, Dr. Guido Lenzi, after Amsterdam, the EU and WEU "can jointly operate essentially in crisis-prevention and peace-building contingencies, rather than with the peace-enforcement aspects. WEU's comparative advantage with respect to NATO lies in the fact that it is the security instrument at disposal of both EU and NATO".¹⁰

PROMOTING NEW IDEAS FOR COOPERATION: **SOME PRE-CONDITIONS & CAVEATS**

A number of systemic, domestic and institutional constraints hinder the development of a comprehensive security regime. Therefore, for any EU/WEU effort to build confidence and increase stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region to have a realistic chance for success, a number of pre-conditions should exist and some factors should be taken under consideration:

- The Mediterranean is a region with its own specific dynamics and security challenges. The European model of cooperative security (with all its conditionalities) can be proposed, but not imposed to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership area.¹¹ For instance, whereas some elements of NATO's PfP initiative (which was quite successful in Central and Eastern Europe) may be applicable to the Mediterranean, the relative heterogeneity of the region would require specifically tailored solutions;
- It would be unrealistic to approach the region as a single entity. Consequently, the same solutions cannot be applied wholesale to the entire region;
- The interests and priorities of the EU countries and those of the southern Mediterranean countries are, in most instances, not the same. Dialogue should show that Europe long ago discarded the sombre remnants of imperialism and that it is not seeking to impose solutions inspired by its own systems on its neighbours in the south. On the economic front, more care must be taken not to impose an economic model with a worldwide perspective that does not take into account of local situations in such countries. They can only adapt gradually to a market economy and will wish to maintain state control in some sectors;

¹⁰ Lenzi, p. 3.

¹¹ Lenzi, p. 4.

- Topics for cooperation should, of course, be acceptable to the partners as well as practically feasible;
- If we set the lower common denominator as our objective, then we risk ending up with very insignificant activities; If on the other hand we set very high expectations, subsequent failure could endanger the whole initiative. Finding the right balance is a very delicate and difficult process;
- No progress can be achieved without the active participation and contribution of WEU's Mediterranean partners.

THE ARMS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT

The Mediterranean region is not a vacuum with regard to multilateral or bilateral commitments in the fields of arms control and CSBMs. Security regimes, either in operation or as agreed blueprints cover various parts of the Mediterranean area.¹²

The Mediterranean states are signatories of a number of arms control agreements. NATO member states have signed the CFE Treaty and the Wassenaar Arrangement (which replaced COCOM), most states in the region have signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (some, such as Egypt, Syria and Libya have not signed, linking the issue with Israel's nuclear capability), the Biological Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Treaty, and of course, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some states are also participating to the UN Register for Conventional Arms.

Regional arms control efforts (such as the ongoing ACRS talks in the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and discussions for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone [NWFZ] in the M. East) have not been successful so far. It is becoming more and more apparent that in the Mediterranean and the M. East, arms control can only follow the resolution of security problems. There seem to be better prospects for confidence- and security building measures (CSBMs). However, the issue of CSBMs will be discussed only peripherally in this paper, as it will be the focal point of another study. It would suffice to stress here that

¹² Fred Tanner, "The Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership: Prospects for Conventional Arms Limitations and Confidence-Building". EUROMESCO Working Group on Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control, Rome, July 1997, p. 12.

confidence-building in the Mediterranean would be a gradual process and that ill-prepared efforts or unwarranted optimism would probably be counter-productive.

For any CSBM or arms control agreement in the Mediterranean region, there would be two major issues:

- (a) Verification procedures;
- (b) Area of application: What kind of format should be found for CBMs or negotiations for any arms control proposal in the Mediterranean? Options include (i) the 12 Mediterranean partner states (ii) all of the Euro-Med community (12+15), or (iii) a smaller number of willing states on a sub-regional basis.¹³

PROPOSALS

The complementary role of WEU Mediterranean Dialogue should be kept in mind and the WEU should concentrate its efforts on fields where it has a clear comparative advantage and something constructive to offer as a contribution to the solution of the problems in the Mediterranean region. In other words, we should look for the “added value”.

What –if anything– can the WEU do better than other organisations to promote stability in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership area? The question is especially pertinent at a time when there are calls even for dissolution of the WEU and when the organisation is trying to define its role in the context of the European security architecture.

According to Dr. Lenzi, “WEU deficiencies may prove to be its advantages: it involves many European countries in a differentiated and looser (and therefore more flexible) relationship; it will follow in the wake of EU (in the words of the Ostend Communiqué: “[WEU] will contribute its expertise to the Barcelona process, in response to the requests from EU”); for the moment, it consists in exchanges of information on crisis management, early warning and training in peacekeeping operations or humanitarian missions”.¹⁴

¹³ It is argued that politically the most appropriate format seems to be the 12+15 option, as the larger framework may be helpful to overcome sub-regional rivalries, which threaten to stalemate the Barcelona process. The principle of indivisibility of security is supporting that option. The threat assessment of some partner states from the Middle East may, however, break the areas of applications of security commitments. Israel, Turkey and some Arab states include in their military planning any threats coming from outside the EMP area, such as Iran, Iraq or Libya. (Tanner, p. 31)

¹⁴ Lenzi, p. 3.

In the eyes of European and Mediterranean non-member states, NATO is perceived as militarily more powerful and efficient than the WEU. However, the WEU is perceived as less "aggressive", perhaps because of its membership. In fact, U.S.'s non-membership to the WEU may in some cases be a disadvantage, but in other cases may be an advantage. Finally, the linkage between the WEU and the EU is a clear advantage, since Mediterranean partners perceive the latter not only as their main trading partner, but also as the only credible source of developmental aid.

At the same time, factors "obstructing" the development of the Mediterranean Dialogue include the following:

- Desire of some countries not simply to link but to actually subordinate the Dialogue to the Barcelona process;
- An effort to avoid duplication of efforts with NATO's initiative;
- Direct initiatives of the four countries participating in EUROFOR & EUROMARFOR;
- The misperceptions between the northern and the southern Mediterranean countries (as demonstrated, for instance, by the reactions to EUROFOR & EUROMARFOR).¹⁵

Some of the proposals that will be outlined below may fall under the category of CSBMs, but in many cases the distinction is difficult and, anyway, CSBMs are an integral part of security cooperation.

Euro-Mediterranean partners' major objective should be the creation of favourable conditions for future negotiations on arms control and disarmament and the development of a culture of dialogue and cooperation in the politico-military sector.¹⁶ The main emphasis should be on the continuation of the search

¹⁵ An urgent task for the WEU to provide detailed, constantly updated information on the reasons for establishing forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) –such as EUROFOR & EUROMARFOR, formed by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the framework of the WEU— which continue to be a source of concern to the countries in the south. As argued in a 1996 WEU Assembly Report, "If these forces are to carry out Petersberg-type missions (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions, prevention of armed conflict, etc.) without excluding military operations under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, the southern countries may well speculate as to whether such missions are in anticipation of possible conflict between North and South or, on the contrary, whether the southern countries could benefit from the assistance of these forces should the need arise and even take part in their activities". (Lipkowski, p. 28)

¹⁶ Tanner, p. 20.

for a charter for stability, where a cautious approach is necessary. Only a cautious European approach will bring success and would seem to be the most appropriate course of action in a first phase that could consist of:

- “Low cost” confidence-building and transparency measures whose application would be voluntary;
- The notification of future military activities (discussion of a code of conduct for military activities);
- An exchange of information among military staff.

Potential activities in the context of the WEU might include discussion – through the reactivation of multilateral meetings– of national perceptions on a number of issues including de-mining operations, crisis management (such as observation, and eventual participation to CRISEX), non-proliferation and military doctrines, military contacts and visits, joint exercises, maritime CSBMs and, at a later stage, creation of Regional Security Centres/Conflict Prevention Centres.¹⁷ Furthermore, since the WEU does not have schools like NATO’s in Oberammergau (SHAPE) and Rome (NADEFCOL), the WEU-Institute for Security Studies should continue and even intensify its successful seminar activities with increased participation of Mediterranean partners (with emphasis on information seminars). Finally, the WEU should contemplate port visits of EUROMARFOR to Mediterranean partners (following the example of NATO’s STANAVFORMED).

A number of other measures have been suggested:

- ◆ Encyclopaedia of security and defence terminology;
- ◆ Euro-Mediterranean network of institutes of defence studies;
- ◆ Euro-Mediterranean security yearbook;
- ◆ Information seminars held in the Mediterranean partners’ territory.¹⁸

It is also argued that cooperation between the armed forces of Mediterranean countries for non-traditional military purposes should now be promoted. Potential areas of cooperation would include natural disasters, control of sea-lanes, illicit traffic of all kinds, intelligence cooperation against terrorism,

¹⁷ Lipkowski, p. 28 & 31-32.

¹⁸ Reflection Paper by the WEU Institute for Security Studies on “A Possible WEU Contribution to the Barcelona Process”. ISS (98) 23 E, 20 October 1998.

police cooperation against transnational crime¹⁹, civil reconstruction and eventually crisis management and peace support operations.²⁰

In this context, an interesting idea was put forward by Stephen Calleya: the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard, which would be mandated to carry out stop and search exercises in four principal areas: maritime safety, maritime pollution, narcotics trafficking and the transport of illegal migrants (“3rd Pillar” issues).²¹ Calleya takes this idea further by suggesting that, in the longer term, “the creation of a flexible security framework that is already addressing soft security issues as those outlined earlier will set the stage for tackling more sensitive security challenges which include intolerant fundamentalism, demographic expansion and outright conflict”.²²

Another possible area of cooperation was suggested by Dr. Guido Lenzi. It could involve a common European and Arab assistance to sub-Saharan countries, for conflict prevention and crisis management under the aegis of OAU.²³ Indeed, in the last few years, we witnessed several conflicts (mainly civil wars) in the Sub-Saharan Africa (in Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc). What is more, new worrying tendencies are making themselves felt which will affect both sides of the Mediterranean: migration from sub-Saharan Africa of economic, political and environmental refugees.²⁴

An Arab peacekeeping force or a mixed Arab-African peacekeeping force would probably be more acceptable than a European or European-led force. Already three Mediterranean Dialogue countries –Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco— have experience in cooperation in peacekeeping operations through their

¹⁹ See for instance the study by Alessandro Politi on “European Security: The New Transnational Risks”, Chaillot Papers 29, October 1997. Paris, WEU-ISS.

²⁰ Lenzi, p. 3.

²¹ Calleya, p. 14.

²² In order to ensure that such a security model can become operational in the shortest period possible, it is envisaged that the EMMC should consist of sectoral types of soft security cooperation. For example, any two or more EMP members can formulate cooperative alliances in specific sectors without having to wait until all partners are in a position to introduce such actions. (Calleya, p. 14)

²³ Lenzi, p. 3.

²⁴ Nadji Safir, “The Question of Migration” in John Holmes (ed.), *Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges of the Mediterranean*, Cambridge, Mass., 1995, p. 74.

participation in NATO-led IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia. The WEU could provide additional training for peacekeeping operations to military units from Mediterranean partner countries or even create multinational European-Arab peacekeeping units. The establishment of a peacekeeping training centre could be contemplated, perhaps in the model of the recently established Balkan Peacekeeping Force. The peacekeeping force could under certain circumstances be deployed in other regions.

Such cooperation would serve a dual target: (a) deal with Sub-Saharan conflicts through peacekeeping/peace-support operations; (b) increase confidence between northern and southern Mediterranean states.

Finally, the WEU should consider the extent to which it might use its good offices to resuscitate the activities of the ACRS Working Group, which has continued, since the Madrid peace conference, to bring together the countries involved in the conflict in the Middle East. The group, boycotted by Syria from the outset, has reached a stalemate since the change of government in Israel.²⁵ Any substantive discussions in the ACRS context progress would be unlikely, however, unless there is real and irreversible progress in the implementation of the peace agreement.

CONCLUSION

We appear to be approaching a rather critical point concerning the future development of the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue. Despite opposition in some circles, this author is cautiously optimistic about the evolutionary potential of the Mediterranean Dialogue. However, there continues to be uncertainty over the direction of the Dialogue. Behind this uncertainty lies an essential question mark over the role WEU and the European Union wish and should play in the Mediterranean region. Even after the initial period of implementation of the Barcelona Process, there is no clear answer to the question of whether and to what extent Europe should give greater priority to the Mediterranean.

There is an evolving debate on "expansion first" or "deepening first". In principle, expansion should be given priority in order to alleviate some of the membership problems of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Barcelona process. However, in practice there are very few if any candidates that meet the criteria.

²⁵ Lipkowski, p. 27.

Therefore, the emphasis should be on deepening the Dialogue, while, at the same time, keeping the door open for new partners.

The scope and depth of the WEU's Mediterranean Dialogue will be influenced to a large extent by developments taking place within the framework of two other important initiatives, namely the EU Barcelona process and the Middle East peace process.

This paper will conclude by urging all interested parties to address security challenges in the Mediterranean as quickly as possible. Especially concerning problems of a socio-economic nature, time is a luxury we may not have. Indeed, it would be rather fitting to quote David McTaggart, founder of Greenpeace:

"The dinosaurs might have been as intelligent as ourselves, and decided like ourselves to set up sub-committees, which would set up working groups to submit reports on the possibilities of examining the situation further."

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INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON WEU'S ROLE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND
THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP
Genova, 4-5 December 1998

Communication to the fourth session
**Some proposals about developing dialogue between WEU and Mediterranean
countries**

Martin Ortega
WEU Institute for Security Studies
Paris

DRAFT ONLY - NOT FOR QUOTATION

Since its institutionalization in 1992, WEU's Mediterranean dialogue has constituted a unique multilateral Euro-Mediterranean exchange in security and military matters. Concrete measures within this dialogue are not perhaps sufficiently well-known, but they represent an interesting experience in information sharing and confidence building. Even in its present format, WEU's Mediterranean dialogue may prove to be very useful as a supplement to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched at Barcelona in 1995, when the time comes to give a more substantial content to its political and security chapter.

Further development of WEU's Mediterranean dialogue may consist in its broadening (introducing more Mediterranean partners) and/or its deepening (envisaging new measures). This is a decision that the WEU Council would have to consider in the light of the evolution of two external variables.

First, the political and security aspects of the Barcelona process may not see any substantive progress, or alternatively they may see some meaningful advances, especially through the drafting of a Mediterranean Charter. If some kind of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in military issues is foreseen within the Barcelona process, it is evident that WEU will be called upon to contribute to its realization. As stated in the Treaty on

European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty, WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union, providing the EU with access to an operational capability, which is well known to the EU's Mediterranean partners. To the extent that the integration of WEU in EU proceeds, every aspect of the EU's CFSP, including the Barcelona process, will consequently be supplemented by WEU's expertise and capabilities.

Second, although WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union, the final status of WEU has not been yet sorted out, since the Amsterdam Treaty stipulates that integration into EU has to be decided by the European Council, and ratified by member states. A renewed debate about the possible integration of WEU into EU has just started among the members of the EU.

At any given moment, the evolution of these two variables will inevitably influence the WEU Council's decision about the development of WEU's Mediterranean dialogue. The Council will have to make a balanced assessment of both of these external factors in order to define the next steps in the dialogue and to allocate the appropriate financial and human resources.

In any case, the development of WEU's Mediterranean dialogue might encounter three practical difficulties. The definition of concrete topics for cooperation will be the first one. These topics must be acceptable to the Mediterranean partners, in the sense that they must represent an added value for them, and at the same time they must constitute feasible measures. Among the topics suggested for organizing academic seminars, multilateral diplomatic meetings, or for starting other kinds of more down to earth contacts are: conflict prevention, peace support operations, control of illicit maritime traffic, and natural disasters and civil emergencies.

The second difficulty would be the different membership of the Barcelona process and of WEU's Mediterranean dialogue. The well-known compositions of both schemes (15 + 12, and 28 + 7) do not coincide, which hampers an expedient rapprochement between them. One way out of this difficulty would be to consider WEU's Mediterranean dialogue as a more specific initiative on security and military issues that will be carried forward by the limited number of states who have opted in. Another alternative is

gradually to incorporate every EU Mediterranean partner into WEU's dialogue.

Thirdly, WEU's Mediterranean dialogue should be better coordinated with NATO's Mediterranean initiative and with OSCE's activities in the Mediterranean region. In particular, NATO's Mediterranean initiative and WEU's Mediterranean dialogue are absolutely compatible and consistent. At present, there are fluid contacts between those responsible for these dialogues in both organizations, in line with the general excellent operational relationships which are being established between NATO and WEU. Both Mediterranean initiatives are going to continue in the near future, each one having its specificities. The maintenance of NATO's and WEU's dialogues is a consequence of the current institutional relationship between EU, WEU, and NATO.

Against this background, a number of new practical measures could be envisaged in order both to consolidate WEU's Mediterranean dialogue, and to prepare better this dialogue to complement the political and security chapter of the Barcelona process. The following new measures could be considered.

- Reactivation of multilateral meetings with diplomatic and military experts from WEU countries and Mediterranean partners, on topics of mutual interest.

- Following the briefings and information sessions with WEU Military Staff which have already taken place, WEU's Mediterranean Group could consider whether and how WEU's operational capabilities would be of use and support in the political and security dialogue of the Barcelona Process.

- The Institute for Security Studies organized seminars on Confidence-Building Measures in the Mediterranean in 1996, and on approaches to peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean countries in 1997. Another type of meeting was held in September 1998: an information seminar for high-ranking military officers as a new measure of transparency. The Institute could organize more seminars, including information seminars in the capitals of the Mediterranean partners, if they so wish.

- The Barcelona process has supported networking in the Mediterranean region among very different sectors of society. WEU could explore the possibilities of creating networks concerned with security and defence issues.

- WEU can offer a useful multilateral framework for cataloguing and coordinating the various unilateral and bilateral initiatives and expertise of its member countries in areas which are of interest to its Mediterranean partners (for instance, demining for humanitarian purposes).

- The CSCE/OSCE documents offer a wide range of "softer" and "harder" CBMs, such as annual, more specific exchanges of information, improvement of communications, observation, compliance and verification, points of contact, etc. These CBMs have not been exploited in WEU's Mediterranean dialogue, which has so far pursued confidence-building basically through its own unilateral information. However, more traditional CBMs might be relevant to the future evolution of the political and security partnership of the Barcelona process, particularly if the work of a Mediterranean Charter continues with this in mind. WEU could start exploratory work on CBMs in the Mediterranean region.

- Having invited representatives from its Mediterranean partners to observe exercises it has conducted so far, WEU could study the possibility, in the medium term, of planning joint exercises with non-WEU Mediterranean countries. In fact, some bilateral Euro-Mediterranean exercises with limited aims have already been carried out successfully. It will only be at a more advanced stage of the Barcelona process, that cooperation amongst Euro-Mediterranean armed forces may lead to joint planning of military exercises, in which WEU could play a leading role.

**Contribution to the Second Regional Symposium
for the Navies of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Area Countries**

Venice, 13-16 October 1998

WEU AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN : ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS

by

Guido Lenzi

International relations have changed radically. We are all well aware of it by now, not only decision-makers and their advisors such as ourselves, but even the man in the street, i.e. the electorate. The essential issue facing an increasing number of institutions, nowadays, is how to cope with the implications of globalisation: not necessarily accepting or conforming to it, but relating and adjusting in the many different ways that the respective historic traditions suggest. The immediate reaction, at the inter-State level, was to increase and multilateralise connections, breaking free from the constrictions of bloc-to-bloc confrontation. The other result, at the sub-State level, was to open up societies, taking advantage of the many more opportunities and the increased communications available.

This takes much of the burden of responsibility off state structures, the function of which is not anymore to take care of every international occurrence, but to establish and manage a network of solidarities and co-operative projects to deal with the many transnational and multifaceted challenges of today. Opening up markets, investment and trade has its advantages and disadvantages, many of them yet unexplored, but the effects are in any case hardly controllable by individual states, as recent events have demonstrated. Interdependence is both a fact of life and an instrument to deal with it. A broader concept of cooperative security, dealing with both the causes and the consequences of tension and conflict has thus developed.

The role of the international community, as imagined and organised by the founding fathers of the UN, is not to come up with a world government, strictly

structured and hierarchical, which is but a utopian goal, but to establish instead broadly shared convictions and develop thereby general conditions conducive to stability, security and prosperity. Each nation will participate in it, in the convergence of the many different contributions that respective traditions and civilisations suggest. The essential result should be that the overall "playing field" is broadened, and therefore leveled, thus allowing the many national ambitions and reservations to even out, and every society to profit from it.

Europe, the "whole and free" Europe that President Bush evoked when the Berlin wall fell, has long ago embarked in this enterprise, in which the benefits that one gets out of it are related to the amount that one invests in it. The gradual integration of Europe is a demand-driven process: Central and Eastern European countries seek increased involvement and participation, to which EU and WEU respond; other countries, particularly in South-eastern Europe are less responsive, which accounts for some of the effects that are there for all to deplore.

The concern, expressed by Mediterranean partners from the moment that the Cold War ended, that, in its Eastward drive, Western Europe would neglect its Southern neighbours, is unfounded. The fact is that the opportunities and challenges that Europe has created for itself and, by implication, for others do not elicit yet a comprehensive response from the Mediterranean partners. The reasons are of course objective as well as subjective, ranging from security concerns and institutional inadequacies to political misunderstandings and socio-economic imbalances. The multilateral process established in Barcelona was designed to allow for progress in the Euro-mediterranean partnership across the full spectrum of political, economic, social and cultural issues. This should have allowed co-operation and exchanges to develop in a multiplicity of ways, through governments but also directly between the many strands of the respective civil societies, a broad process that was designed to circumvent individual sticking points, or even major stumbling blocks, occurring in some areas. This approach is no different than the method that Europe has adopted for itself ever since the Rome Treaty of 1957, a method that Barcelona has now put at the disposal of all the countries bordering the Mediterranean.

Disappointingly, however, WEU has so far been kept out of the Barcelona process. It did not attend the original meeting in the Catalan city. It is still waiting to know, from the EU and its Mediterranean partners, if and to what extent it can contribute to it. It is ready to do so, having lately developed its political and operational capabilities to an adequate level of readiness. Member countries intend to increase WEU's operational role in humanitarian, crisis prevention and peacekeeping missions. Yet, ministerial communiques state that, with respect to the Mediterranean, WEU will act "in response to requests from the EU". This corresponds to the position of WEU as the operational arm of EU, from which the political impulse must originate, especially in the light shed by the Amsterdam treaty. But the Mediterranean partners are equally called upon to contribute to the extension of the Barcelona partnership to the cooperative security and stability fields.

Waiting for a specific role to be entrusted to it, WEU's Mediterranean Group develops information exchanges and promotes a comparison of national experiences, individually, with the seven Mediterranean countries involved in a structured dialogue. Similarly to EU's European enlargement, the dialogue is inherently incremental. Hopefully, mutual confidence in security matters will build up, and with it a capital of trust conducive to the co-operative endeavours that circumstances will suggest, on a case by case basis.

The Mediterranean region as a whole, not only the North African and Middle Eastern parts of it, is still very politicised, fragmented, often confrontational. Geo-economics still find it hard to break the mould of some long-standing factors of tension and strife. And the cause-and-effect vicious circle has yet to be loosened. What remains to be achieved on every shore of the Mediterranean is a sense of common purpose in multilateral co-operative endeavours, moving away from the traditional balance-of-power attitudes that recent history has so decisively discredited. Here again, the European integration process has conclusively contributed to national and international stabilisation and security, in ways that tend to prevent using military means or, if needed, to use them for non-military purposes. As a « civilian power », contrary to NATO, Europe (i.e. W/EU) is best able to deal with the causes of

instability and crisis, or with the post-conflict rehabilitation phase of things. Its DNA throughout these forty years is about prevention, persuasion, involvement, not deterrence or enforcement. The political conditionalities it holds out to countries aspiring to EU accession are a form of persuasion to converge, rather than a straight-jacket.

Confidence-building measures is what the Mediterranean needs, all around its shores. For the moment, some prefer to speak of partnership-building measures, only to refuse an extension of the partnership-for-peace model. So be it: it's the process that counts, not the terminology, provided that transparency about each other's intentions, predictability (the mother of security), convergence and compatibility are sought. They will not in themselves solve existing problems, but they will help identify their many components, familiarise the many actors with them and thereby promote co-operative arrangements, bilaterally and multilaterally. A common denominator of common interests, in a longer term vision, will gradually be restored in our common sea.

WEU has already very successfully embarked in this very process, among European countries, regardless of their present conditions. According to the Amsterdam Treaty (art. J.7) WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union providing it with « access to an operational capability ». It « supports the European Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy », with a view to the possible eventual integration of the two organizations. Its ten full members (members both of the EU and NATO) have gradually involved eighteen other European countries (members of either the EU or NATO, or having established a Euro agreement), and set-up systematic dialogues with many others, in a web of co-operative security arrangements. Their involvement extends to participation in common planning of peace support operations that WEU may be asked to undertake, not only by the EU or NATO, but also the UN or the OSCE. For them all, WEU stands as a possible operational instrument to organise directly or co-ordinate the use of national military forces, also for non strictly military purposes. Their exact configuration will depend on the willingness of individual countries to participate, and

on the consensus of the country or countries that would benefit from such an international contribution.

The missions carried out to control the ex-Yugoslavian arms embargo are a demonstration of WEU's practical utility, as is the support activity still underway with regard to Albanian police. Furthermore, WEU's operative capacity has reached a standard that would allow the EU to carry out significant military missions. In addition, a number of member countries have made available some particularly qualified military units for WEU's purposes, such as, for example, the multinational task forces EUROFOR (army) and EUROMARFOR (navy) in which France, Italy, Portugal and Spain participate.

Some misunderstandings have developed about these Euroforces. No priority areas have been decided for their use, but they are certainly not intended specifically for the Mediterranean area. Had they been in operational readiness at the time, they might even have been deployed in a Bosnian type scenario, or for humanitarian aid distribution operations in situations such as the Ruandan crisis. It should also be noted that these two formations are not permanent forces, nor do they have a predetermined composition or size. It has been decided that they shall be formed on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the particular needs and missions, choosing the components from units which have only been pre-identified, earmarked by each of the participating countries.

Some Euro-Mediterranean initiatives useful for « broad security » purposes could already be considered and enacted pragmatically, within established institutional frameworks or on the basis of existing multi-bilateral links. Navies naturally solidarise on the high seas; the military structures are the only ones that can speedily and efficiently provide materiel for civil emergencies, wrought by natural or man-made disasters; illicit trafficking of all kinds (drugs, arms, people) which evade the control of individual states are another area where exchange of information, and whenever needed common interdiction, could be inobtrusive and yet effective. Political consultations and expert discussions could look at more ambitious cooperative projects for arms control or conflict prevention purposes. And yet, in a broader regional

context. the Euro-mediterranean partners could act together: conflict prevention and crisis management are formally inscribed in the ambitions of the Organisation for African Unity. Its North African members have been very active in calling for early warning and subregional crisis management projects. This is a most appropriate field where European and Arab states could act together, in advisory, training and logistical supportive capacity, in what is "out of area" for both, who could therefore hardly be accused of ganging up against sub-Saharan Africans.

In the end, the Common Foreign and Security Policy established by the Maastricht Treaty, and refined by the Amsterdam Treaty, will be essentially shaped by how EU deals with neighbouring areas and third countries, by how it responds to their needs. By its very experience, Europe is best equipped to promote, encourage, support. As one of its operational instruments, WEU will ensure the involvement of the twenty-eight countries connected to it. No contradiction will result between the Eastern and the Mediterranean policies of either the EU or WEU, provided that the nations which may benefit from it converge and share a common purpose. It could even be argued, given the track-record of the EU, that CFSP can only be defined, adjusted and developed together with the recipient countries.

Western Europe has been for years involved in the very same co-operative process that challenges today the world at large. Europe is and will become an ever more effective international actor to the extent that its interlocutors engage with it and contribute to its progression. The great French historian Fernand Braudel reminded us that "in the concert of the Mediterranean, the Western man must not listen only to the voices that are familiar to him: there are always the other voices, the foreign ones; and the keyboard needs two hands". An Italian sociologist, Franco Cassano, in book just published about the Mediterranean, exhorts the countries that belong to it to reacquire their ancient dignity of thinking positively, breaking the long historical sequence of self-consciousness and mutual criticism, Europe cannot by itself provide the common denominator, let alone substitute, for co-operative ventures between Mediterranean partners, be it in North Africa, the Balkans, the Aegean. It acts not by imposition, but by aggregation. It must speak up clearly and listen carefully. WEU will be at its side, as needed.

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*International Seminar on WEU's role
in the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

Palazzo Ducale
Genova, 4-5 December 1998

**WRITTEN BRIEFING ON WEU OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND
ITS LESSONS**

UNDER THE AUSPICES OF



Ministero degli Affari Esteri



Italian Presidency of the Western European Union



COMUNE DI GENOVA

**WRITTEN BRIEFING
ON
WEU OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND ITS LESSONS**

1. JOINT WEU ACTIONS IN THE GULF (1988 – 1990)

In 1987 and 1988, following the laying of mines in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, WEU Member States reacted together to this threat to freedom of navigation. Minesweepers despatched by WEU countries helped secure free movement in international waters. "Operation Cleansweep" thus contributed to the clearance of a 300-mile sea-lane running from the Strait of Hormuz, and was the first instance of a concerted action in WEU.

During the Gulf War, WEU Ministers decided to coordinate their operations, with the aim of implementing and enforcing United Nations Resolution 661. At their meeting in Paris on 21 August 1990, Ministers stressed that coordination within WEU should facilitate cooperation with the forces of other countries in the region, including those of the United States.

The coordination mechanisms approved by WEU Member States in 1988 were reactivated and extended. An ad hoc group of representatives of Foreign and Defence Ministers was made responsible for coordination in the capitals and in the operational zone. A meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS) was held with the aim of coordinating naval operations to enforce the embargo on goods. The Permanent Council, sitting in London, monitored developments in the situation and met as required.

Various lessons learned and experience gained for WEU in the decision making process as well as in command and control architecture from the execution of those Joint Actions. Also WEU realised the importance of coordination with other contributing organisations and countries.

2. WEU/NATO OPERATION "SHARP GUARD" IN THE ADRIATIC (1992-1996)

In July 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council decided that WEU naval forces would participate in monitoring the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. NATO was also conducting its own operation at the time. In June 1993, the WEU and NATO Councils met to approve a combined concept for a joint operation in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 820. The agreement established a unified command for "Operation SHARP GUARD", which was the first WEU/NATO combined operation.

In the course of that operation, WEU permanently deployed four ships and WEU nations additionally provided maritime patrol and airborne early warning aircraft to operate jointly with NATO. Thus WEU contributed approximately one third of maritime assets to the operation. A small WEU staff controlled one of the joint task groups while the other was detached to NATO Naval Command South Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) HQ in Naples. Sharp Guard activity led to the challenging of some 74,000 ships. Over 5000 were inspected at sea and more than 1200 were diverted and inspected in port. The embargo proved an effective deterrent as only six ships were caught while attempting to break it.

The combined operation with NATO proved that both organisations could work together effectively, but from the military and administrative points of view, the nature of the involvement of both organisations in Operation Sharp Guard unnecessarily complicated the smooth execution of the operation and demanded extra resources. The mechanisms and procedures used in this operation were created to meet the specific requirements of the

operation and cannot therefore provide a model for the future. Cooperation between NATO and WEU would rather lead to a WEU led operation using NATO assets and capabilities as NATO Defence Ministers decided during their meeting in Berlin in June 1996, and reaffirmed by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid in July 1997.

3. WEU DANUBE OPERATION (1993-1996)

On 5th April 1993 the WEU Council of Ministers agreed that WEU Member States would provide assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions on the Danube. In June the three riparian states accepted this offer and agreed with WEU on the setting-up of a police and customs operation. The WEU mission was deployed on the Danube River and was conducting the embargo activities from 21 June 1993 to 24 September 1996.

A total of about 250 personnel from seven WEU countries were involved when the operation was at its height. They manned a coordination and support centre and three control areas (Mohacs-Hungary; Calafat-Romania; Ruse-Bulgaria). Equipped with eight patrol boats and 48 vehicles, WEU personnel carried out more than 6,000 inspections and monitoring operations on the river resulting in the discovery of more than 400 infringements.

For WEU the mission was a valuable experience since it provided the first opportunity for concrete practical cooperation between WEU and Associate Partners. It was also a good example of WEU-OSCE coordination, through the WEU Presidency delegation to the OSCE Sanctions Coordination Committee in Vienna. The need for close cooperation with the local states including legal provisions was recognised. This operation is considered as a success for WEU; main lessons learned were in the fields of structure, finance, equipment, and support for non military deployments was addressed during the operation.

4. WEU IN MOSTAR (1993-1996)

In October 1993 the Ministers of the EC Member States requested WEU to examine the contribution WEU could provide to the planned EU Administration of the town of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result, WEU established a police contingent at the EU Administration of Mostar, in July 1994. The aim of the WEU Police Force was to set up a reliable unified local police force by bringing police contingents from both the East (Bosnian) side and the West (Croat) side together. The Permanent Council accepted the offer of contributions of WEU observer countries, which enabled it to reach its maximum strength of 182 personnel during the summer. The operation was led by a WEU Police Commissioner subordinate to the EU Administrator. This WEU operation represented the first example of practical cooperation between EU and WEU.

The WEU police operation in Mostar successfully established the nucleus of a unified police force. It was a challenging operation undertaken in difficult circumstances, given the local political situation. The operation was exceptional in the sense that it formed part of wider EU mission. In certain situations (i.e. extension of mandate, termination of mandate), the WEU decision-making process was dependent on EU decisions. This was an additional dimension to take into account in WEU's planning work which had to be carried out in advance of a given decision. The operation identified various legal, organisational, and practical problems of a multinational police deployment.

5. CRISEX 95-96

CRISEX 95-96 was the WEU's first crisis management exercise, which was intended to put into practice the mechanisms and procedures that have gradually been worked out since WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers took the decision at Maastricht on WEU's operational development. The exercise was a CPX-type exercise within the framework of peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and pursuant to the Petersberg Declaration. The general mission of the WEU Force, under a UN mandate, was to re-establish conditions in which humanitarian aid can be provided.

The exercise was conducted as a three phase exercise over 18 months, implementing the full span of political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The aim of the exercise was to implement the set of WEU operational mechanism and procedures in all phases of the management of a simulated crisis.

CRISEX 95-96 has provided WEU bodies with important practical experience in the field of exercising crisis management and of scheduling, planning and conducting an exercise. It has acted as catalyst in a number of fields and has undoubtedly inspired much of the work being done in WEU. Furthermore, it provided the first opportunity for representatives of the Multinational Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) and of NATO forces to participate in a WEU operational activity, as observers.

MISSION IN ALBANIA

In May 1997, the WEU Council decided to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) to Albania, as part of the efforts undertaken in that country by the international community, notably the OSCE and the EU. The primary aim of the MAPE is to provide advice and train instructors to the Albanian police. The MAPE is thus acting as advisor to the Albanian authorities on public order, border policing, and the reconstituting of the Tirana Police Academy. It is also introducing training modules. Its mission relies on the continuing cooperation and support of the Albanian authorities and their determination to rebuild and modernise the Albanian police force.

The first training center opened in Tirana in November 1997. A second training centre in Durres is expected to become available this month. During the period from May to October 1997, about 250 Albanian police officers were trained as instructors in public order and border policing. Support was also provided for the Police Academy in the form of a teaching programme.

In September 1997, the WEU Council concluded that planning should start for a longer-term programme. On this basis, the mandate was extended until April 1998. This was associated with a significant increase in MAPE personnel to a provisional total of approximately 60. It could if necessary be further increased to 90. A new budget for the second phase of MAPE was also approved amounting to some \$680,000. The focus of MAPE's work shifted to basic training, delivered directly to Albanian police personnel at all levels.¹ The courses were developed along well-established principles adopted by the UN as police training guidance, and on OSCE norms for human rights and individual dignity.

¹ Basic training was to be conducted in cycles of three months. Eventually, 5 classes of approximately 30 students were designed to be run in parallel enabling about 300 policemen to be trained over a six-month period. Albanian participants were selected according to a screening process conducted by the Albanian authorities in cooperation with MAPE personnel.

WEU has worked closely with the European Commission as the latter developed a PHARE programme allocating funds for the reform of the police in Albania. These funds will finance the urgent short-term equipment needs of the Albanian police. Longer-term PHARE projects over a 2-3 year period will concentrate on the rehabilitation of police infrastructure (training centres, police stations). Intense cooperation has been developed with the European Commission in the framework of the PHARE programme on Public Administration Reform in Albania. This programme, approved in December 1997, allocates 4.8 MECU for EC support to the Albanian police.

The WEU MAPE and the Council of Europe work in close coordination in the field. Although their respective activities do not overlap, they are closely related and converge more specifically in the field of human rights. Council of Europe experts are involved in the police training on human rights issues. A Council of Europe legal/human rights advisor to the Ministry of the Interior works in close co-ordination with MAPE advisers. WEU has also coordinated closely with other international organizations active in Albania. Reinforcing information exchange at politico-military level in Brussels, liaison on the ground is also established between MAPE and the principal bilateral missions in Albania.

At the beginning of April, the WEU Council extended MAPE's mandate for an additional year. This extension was associated with an increase in personnel, which will bring MAPE's total to approximately 107. This decision responds to the wishes of the Albanian authorities and reflects a longer-term commitment of WEU nations to assist Albania in establishing a police force according to European norms and standards. The ultimate goal of MAPE's activity is to arrive at a point where the training of the Albanian police force to internationally accepted standards can be maintained under the Albanians' own responsibility.

This mission in Albania is thus contributing to the further development of the relations between WEU and the EU. It is also the first WEU operation to be effectively directed by the Council with the support of the Secretariat and the Military Staff. WEU is putting into practice for the first time the mechanisms and procedures established in the course of the past few years, with certain adjustments rendered necessary by the non-military nature of the mission.

6. CRISEX 98

WEU CRISEX 98 is a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) on procedures. The Exercise play will take place from 20 to 26 November 1998. The aim is to practise agreed WEU crisis management mechanisms and procedures, including the interaction between WEU HQ and WEU nations in order to maintain and improve the WEU ability to manage crises. EU, NATO, OSCE, UN and several non-WEU nations are invited to observe.

The exercise is set out in the beginning of the WEU crisis management spectrum. It depicts a situation where the delivery of humanitarian aid within a fictitious country is endangered by deterioration of central government authority, an unstable internal security situation and a natural disaster. The OSCE established a presence in country, in cooperation with local authorities, with a mission of good offices. Taking into account discussions in the UN and the OSCE, the EU asked the WEU to examine as a matter of urgency how it could, for its part, contribute to the safe delivery of the humanitarian aid, in particular in cooperation with the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

Based on the above concept, the WEU CRISEX scenario comprises:

- A major disaster event in form of an earthquake with a epicentre North of ELKLAND
- The internal security situation is such that the delivery of humanitarian aid is hampered by violent actions by elements opposing government authority.
- An OSCE declaration showing their intentions to provide coordination for international efforts.
- An EU decision in which it asks WEU to examine as a matter of urgency how it could, for its part, contribute to the safe delivery of the humanitarian aid.

Decisions and actions taken during the exercise by any participating party are based on the above generic scenario and events, and are therefore not to be regarded as real life decisions or actions or to be considered as establishing any type of precedent. All 28 WEU nations are invited to participate or observe the exercise. WEU Headquarters will participate with its permanent groups and bodies.

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WEU MEDITERRANEAN SEMINAR, GENOA, 4-5 DECEMBER 1998
'CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SYNERGIES'

**Dr. Claire Spencer, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College
University of London**

Introduction

The approach adopted by the WEU and the European Union (EU) towards elaborating confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the Mediterranean has been similar since the WEU first launched bilateral dialogues with a number of Mediterranean partners in 1992. This similarity lies in the fact that the process of engaging in dialogues and of exchanging information about security matters has assumed more importance than the precise content of these exchanges or of any specific end results. In a first phase, this exploration of instruments which have yielded results in other contexts has provided a useful point of entry into a debate about how to create cooperative or joint security measures where few have existed before in the Mediterranean region. However, the challenge of sustaining this process without more attention being given to content and end results may serve to underline the weaknesses rather than the strengths of CBMs in the diverse security conditions which pertain to the Mediterranean Basin as a whole.

Given the multifaceted history of Europe's relations with its southern neighbours, the kind of CBMs envisaged to date have necessarily fallen short of the highly evolved, military CBMs which emerged over the last 10-15 years of the Cold War. There have been none of the 'bloc-to-bloc' antagonisms which characterized relations across (or rather, divided by) the Iron Curtain, but rather a series of disparate sources of instability, which need addressing in a variety of ways. The structured nature of CBMs, with pre-negotiated and built-in verification and advance warning systems, as well as interim targets (for example in force strengths or missile capabilities) have not been readily adaptable to an arena, such as the Mediterranean, where the potential for conflict or threat perceptions is based on asymmetries in military strength as well as economic power. These asymmetries are particularly marked between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, where mutual threat perceptions are also weakest in the military sphere. At the end of the Cold War, in fact, Europe's southward focus needed developing from a low basis of integration and mutual understanding with its Mediterranean neighbours, and it is this historical deficit that the building of confidence has essentially been seeking to address.

In the absence of clear military threats - unless the build-up of a chemical, biological and ballistic missile capability in Libya proves to be a genuine threat¹ - to what are new forms of CBMs to apply? The question hinges essentially on the interrelationship between the content, structure and nature of the process, where as noted, the importance of establishing security links where few existed before has initially taken precedence over structure and content. As the initiatives of the early 1990s have come under review in the late 1990s, attention has begun to be paid to structure, where the nature of the forum or meeting place for exchanges has had a bearing on the perceived utility of the process. In this evolving situation, only the future content of CBMs remains in abeyance, in the sense that little progress has been made

from exchanges of information and the exploration of potential areas for joint action to the development of more focused CBMs, conceived as instruments for the containment and management of crises or conflict situations, and the prevention of conflict where possible.

The adaptation of CBMs to the Mediterranean context has been complicated by the variety of sources of regional instability, where conflict, or the potential for conflict, has tended to have bilateral or domestic roots, rather than 'bloc-to-bloc', 'north-south' or ideological causes. The definition of core problems to address is, moreover, often difficult to pin down where different perspectives on national and regional interests allow little scope for a region wide consensus. Are the arms build-ups in the region due to the unresolved Middle East conflict alone, or to other more localised causes, for example? To what extent can the localised roots of regional tensions be separated from their broader causes? Pending the solution of the Middle East conflict, or persistent tensions between Greece and Turkey, on what basis can an environment of mutual trust be built up?

Specific conflicts apart, these difficulties have not entirely impeded progress in the sphere of cooperative action across the Mediterranean, where the contribution of military forces by Morocco, Egypt and Jordan to NATO's IFOR and SFOR missions in the Balkans, for example, has been significant. However, these have arisen on the fringes of the Mediterranean processes under discussion, where cooperation has depended more on national initiatives than on multilateral, region wide coordination. As far as initiatives on the part of southern Mediterranean partners are concerned, this will necessarily remain the case where cross-regional (or 'south-south') cooperation over security issues remains limited. For the development of meaningful regional CBMs, however, it remains the case that objectives need to be set in order for them to have much operational utility at all. Is greater mutual understanding over security concerns in fact sufficient to address the kind of issues - such as arms control, the resolution of existing conflicts and the prevention of others - which most threaten the stability of the Mediterranean? Or is more substance and detail required to address specific cases, which may or may not concern all states within the region?

The WEU and EU approaches compared

In the WEU's approach to these issues, bilateral contacts take place between a WEU 'Mediterranean group' formed of civilian and military representatives of WEU member states and selected Mediterranean partners (Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania from 1992; Egypt from 1994, Israel from 1995 and Jordan from 1998). The aim has been to establish a stronger basis for cooperation in spheres such as the peaceful resolution of conflicts, of conflict prevention, crisis management and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, most notably from 1995 when the EU Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was formed, this approach has suffered from a number of weaknesses. One is that bilateral contacts have proved to be time-consuming for the WEU Mediterranean group, where a certain amount of repetition, overlap or even contradiction may occur in the separate fora convened for each southern partner. The second is that the regional security goals of the process have not necessarily been best addressed through bilateral channels in a region whose southern partners have little history of horizontal ('south-south') cooperation over security issues of mutual interest in general. In the context of the broader debate over the future of the WEU within the evolving network or framework of European security institutions, the

question of moving the WEU's Mediterranean dialogue on to a multilateral basis has been raised, but not yet resolved².

The EU's approach, on the other hand, has been multilateral from the inception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in November 1995. Its scope has also been implicitly cross-sectoral, and not just military, or military- and defence-related, in reflection of the EMP's ambition to create integrated approaches to the security and development challenges of the southern Mediterranean. Unfortunately, the mechanisms for the realization of such an integration are still in their infancy, within as well as beyond the EU. The three chapters of the EMP's founding document, the Barcelona Declaration, divide the envisaged work programme among the related, but still functionally separate goals of strengthening regional political and security partnerships, economic and financial partnerships, and social, human and cultural partnerships. The focus of the follow-up meetings convened by Senior Officials on Political and Security affairs thus, almost of necessity, covers much of the same areas as the WEU dialogue, the main difference - which is both a strength and a weakness - being that all 27 partners of the EMP (the EU 15, plus 12 Mediterranean partners) meet simultaneously around the table.

Fully aware of the pre-existence of the WEU Mediterranean dialogues, as well as those of the parallel NATO Mediterranean initiative (convened, like the WEU dialogues on a bilateral basis), the EU has explicitly sought not to duplicate the work of other fora. In doing so, however, it has sought to broaden its ambitions in the sphere of elaborating CBMs, moving away from their mainly military to their political, and one might even argue, psychological potential. In June 1998, the term 'partnership building measures' was adopted at the *ad hoc* inter-ministerial meeting of EMP partners, with a view to putting some meat on the bones of the Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean. The envisaged Charter is itself a redesignation of the 'pact' for peace and stability outlined in the Barcelona Declaration, the term 'pact' being deemed to have more negative than positive connotations, above all for those cognisant of the history of the 'Baghdad pact' in the Middle East. However, what changes have been wrought by the change in vocabulary? It remains unclear, albeit still in relatively early days, not only what elements of security cooperation the Charter is to comprise, but what the venture aims to achieve in terms of both structure and process. Is it to consolidate a kind of OSCE process for the Mediterranean? To establish a set of guiding principles for current or future cooperation? Or merely to deepen EMP's political network, with few specific goals in mind?

The tensions inherent in such questions are not without consequence beyond the parameters of the Barcelona process, as the EMP has come to be termed. One of the welcome outcomes of the Palermo meeting in June 1998 has been the acceptance that issues relating to the Middle East peace process may be included in discussions under the 'political and security' chapter of the EMP. It remains the case, however, that the Barcelona process brings no direct influence to bear on what is essentially a pre-existing and parallel process. This is dominated, at least politically, by the core bilateral tack of negotiations and 'on/off' relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the one hand, and by US brokerage of and influence over this bilateral track on the other. Where the EU has contributed to and supported this process has been through economic means, in a measure disproportionate to Europe's political weight in pursuing the goals of Middle East peace. What will be interesting to observe in the evolution of

the Barcelona process is the extent to which more limited interactions may succeed in building confidence in less direct or tangible ways, rather than focusing on the specific issues which divide the members of EMP. If the EMP does not in fact achieve positive benefits within the broader Mediterranean 'hinterland' of the Middle East, for what else, in fact, will the future Charter stand?

In pursuing this goal, there may also be a place for synergies to be created with the WEU process, whose role has likewise been to facilitate and create an atmosphere for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, rather than to move towards any concrete action designed to resolve or prevent the conflicts in question. However, while the WEU has been open to bringing its experience to bear on the newer, but potentially more ambitious Barcelona process, the EU has been reluctant to make this linkage an open part of its *modus operandi*. This is partly in response to the still unresolved place of the WEU in Europe's security architecture and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within Europe. Although this is a problem unrelated to the Mediterranean per se, the lack of any direct cohesion between the WEU and EU approaches imposes considerable constraints on what may be contemplated from the European side under the Barcelona umbrella.

This is reflected in the uncomfortable role the EU as an institution still plays in the management of security issues. In principle, it might be argued that the EU's greater expertise and competence in promoting external trade, aid and economic relations should form the nexus for its activities in this sphere. Paradoxically, however, it is the very innovation of the EMP, in recognizing that the promotion of security in the Mediterranean can only be achieved through an inclusive, multisectoral and holistic approach which has inspired its forays (perhaps Common and Foreign and Security (CFSP)-inspired?) into traditional or 'hard' security questions. Pending a fully-fledged CFSP, however, is arms control, for example, really the concern of the EU, where the Barcelona Declaration admits that other fora, mechanisms, treaty negotiations, international accords and regimes already exist to address these questions? Should the EMP perhaps link the economic roots of the arms race to its approaches towards security, in order to add a new dimension to the debate on cause and effect in this sphere? It would seem that few are prepared yet for such a step, and for a number of reasons associated with the peripheral role still attributed to economics and trade relations as instruments for security promotion. Arms sales and arms control, for example, are still functionally separate fields for many security analysts and practitioners. Until the necessary linkages are made - most immediately between domestic ministries of defence, foreign affairs, trade and industry - CBMs, or 'partnership building measures' are proposed as a means of establishing the kind of context which might be sympathetic to such moves in future.

What is in a CBM (PBM)?

Without wishing to duplicate the areas explored by the WEU and NATO dialogues, the EMP has already examined areas where it might draw on the economic, trade and human resource strengths in its 'non-security' chapters, in preparing joint initiatives to respond to and manage natural and man-made disasters in the Mediterranean Basin, for example. This was the main area to be cited by UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook at the conclusion of the Palermo ministerial meeting as an example of the 'Partnership Building Measures' (PBMs) under consideration³. The Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme

(SMAP) to which he refers is in many ways an extension of the preparatory work undertaken in the sphere of environmental cooperation under the Mediterranean Chapter of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) throughout the 1980s. SMAP is not specifically designed as a security measure, but its trans-national and cross-sectoral emphasis has the potential to create positive - or 'partnership building' - synergies in other policy areas⁴. As in the CSCE experience, however, one might suppose that such broad-reaching ambitions as the elaboration of 'Good Practice Guidelines for Integrated Coastal Zones Management' are likely to meet with only partial operational success in the short to medium term, not least while the state with the longest Mediterranean coastline - namely, Libya - remains outside the EMP.

As the broader experience of implementing the international agreements reached at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 has demonstrated, trans-national environmental cooperation requires considerable commitments in terms of technology and financial transfers from the stronger to weaker partners. EMP has yet to contemplate the scale of transfers or technical assistance that a fully-fledged environmental programme would require. The rationale for seeking to build confidence from this type of base, however, is not wholly without its strengths. In steering away from the most politically sensitive issues from the start, the EMP 'Charter' might arguably develop and encapsulate PBMs on the strength of what regional actors have in common, or in areas - exemplified by the environment - where they cannot act alone to combat or contain damage wrought across national borders. However, this approach argues in favour of reducing the substance of discussions to the lowest levels of agreement or consensus, rather than building in sign-posts, or pointers for progress within the original agreement or 'measure'. An example of this has arisen where the exchange of information about human rights instruments has served the initial purpose of encouraging mutual familiarity about each partner's undertakings in respect of the protection of human rights. Beyond this, however, there appears to be little scope within EMP for all 27 partners to agree to provisions of scrutiny or adherence to these instruments within the national boundaries of individual partners, operating as each national government and administration does from very different bases of internal security, political openness and public accountability.

Unlike exchanges of information with no foreseeable operational goal, military CBMs, as envisaged by the WEU, have the advantage of increasing mutual familiarity through action. The invitation of non-participant observers to WEU exercises, ambassadorial visits to WEU facilities, such as the Torrejón satellite centre, and meetings held between military staff at various levels of command, have all increased the potential for moving on to more concrete activities. These could include the direct or indirect involvement of Mediterranean partners in joint planning or joint risk assessments in the Mediterranean region, or even the contribution of forces to operations falling under the heading of the 'Petersberg tasks' (such as joint peace-keeping and humanitarian missions). So far, however, WEU's operational capacities in these spheres have been overshadowed by those of NATO, and where interest has been expressed in concrete cooperation, the member-states of the WEU and NATO have been slow to provide either responses or the kind of financial assistance required to train Mediterranean military personnel in these functions.

Another key problem with joint cooperative ventures is that the kind of proposals floated from the European side rarely address existing conflicts, nor envisage 'northern' cooperation to

resolve conflicts arising in the 'south'. They take the form, mainly, of a European demonstration to southern partners of the level of preparedness of northern security alliances to address their participation in such eventualities, broadly conceived in hypothetical rather than current terms. This in itself, creates the potential for unease in southern partners where the objectives of rapid reaction forces, or the purposes for which the multinational 'call-up' forces of EUROFOR or EUROMARFOR have been conceived, become mired in the imprecisions almost necessarily attendant on their hypothetical end-use. The division of competences between the control of national authorities over the deployment of national forces and the organizational responsibilities of alliance structures in multinational operations also causes a certain amount of confusion, despite the explanatory function of dialogues. An appeal made by the Egyptian government to the WEU in December 1997 to assist in demining activities, for example, received the response that provision for this sort of cooperation fell within the competence of national governments not the WEU Secretariat, and was thus better addressed at the bilateral, government-to-government level⁵.

The process of exchanging information can nevertheless assist in directing requests and initiatives for action through the appropriate channels. Partnership building on a cross-cutting or bilateral basis is not alien to the multifaceted (but not necessarily multilateral) conceptualisation of confidence building taking shape under the envisaged EMP Charter. The problem remains, however, that there are few channels ^{through which} to address existing security challenges in the Mediterranean, except through oblique and tangential means. It is one thing, in other words, to build confidence over less controversial issues, but another to avoid sensitive issues altogether, or to have no strategy to address them in the longer term. Despite moves towards discussing the relationship between EMP and the Middle East peace process within the EMP process itself, other politically sensitive issues remain outside the scope of EMP. The simmering and unresolved tensions in Cyprus, the death toll of civilians in Algeria, and the contested status of the Western Sahara have all slipped through the net of the EMP's envisaged security cooperation, in favour of sovereign state reservations about international involvement (Algeria), UN-sponsored missions (namely, MINURSO in the Western Sahara) or ad hoc 'trouble-shooting' arrangements (namely, the US/UK envoy approach in Cyprus).

Associated with this is the assumed complementarity of EMP with existing approaches to conflict management or resolution, where it is supposed that other institutions or agencies have taken the lead in conflict resolution or crisis management. In reality, a number of issues slip between the gaps of the respective competences assumed by NATO, WEU or UN processes, particularly at the bilateral or national level. This is where, paradoxically, the development of CBMs might be most fruitfully applied, to counteract the mutual threat perceptions between Greece and Turkey, to cite but one example. Where external influence has successfully fostered the peaceful resolution of differences, as in the recent Egyptian diplomatic mission to diffuse tensions between Turkey and Syria, for example, it has arisen outside the context of the EMP. This would not in itself be injurious to the EMP process, if alternative or complementary goals of conflict resolution or prevention were to be clearly inscribed within the EMP's vision of confidence or partnership building measures. However, through the avoidance of difficult issues, which by their nature affect some partners more than others, greater strains may become apparent in EMP's search for issues of substance with which to sustain the confidence-building process over the longer term.

The maintenance of open channels of communication for dialogue and the airing of views may continue to have a utility, if greater mutual familiarity breeds the kind of atmosphere required to progress towards more concrete goals across the Mediterranean as a whole. The inclusive structure of the EMP, encompassing all 27 members, nevertheless acts itself as a potential brake to tackling the more varied dimensions of security cooperation. This is particularly true where the asymmetries referred to above have a direct bearing on the identification, as well as interpretation, of areas susceptible to cooperative action. The question of combatting terrorism, for example, is an issue of concern to both northern and southern partners in EMP. Yet, removed from the particular political context in which violent activist groups have arisen, the question of who or what constitutes a 'terrorist', and under what legal or other criteria individuals or groups are to be so defined, is not easily resolved across 27 jurisdictions.

Asymmetries also exist in terms of the kind of initiatives which are forthcoming to address existing or potential sources of regional instability; if the northern partners of EMP have provided few models or templates for reducing tensions between Greece and Turkey, for example, it is also the case that southern partners have offered few approaches to the reduction of tensions in their midst, not least in moving towards the greater 'south-south' or sub-regional security cooperation explicitly encouraged under EMP. Where sub-regional security initiatives have arisen, as in the defence and security cooperation embarked on by Israel and Turkey, they have tended more towards engendering wariness in their Arab neighbours more than towards stimulating parallel or extended forms of cooperation. This also argues in favour of addressing the causes of existing conflicts as a priority, in that Arab cooperation with Israel cannot be envisaged while substantial progress is not made in the Middle East peace process. There are, however, other areas in which the Arab states of the Mediterranean could cooperate or devise initiatives which do not directly depend on the actions or policies of Israel alone. One of these is in seeking a peaceful outcome to the violence in Algeria, in which respect, the precedent set by international intervention to protect civilians and prevent further casualties in Kosovo might provide a useful model for the Mediterranean region.

Future Considerations

The history of CBMs has been built on addressing real issues, albeit in an incremental and often checkered fashion, but with incentives - as well as potential penalties - built in to their conceptualisation. For the evolving concept of Partnership Building Measures (PBM) to take its place in the panoply of cooperative security instruments available to states and alliances in the Mediterranean region, attention will need to be paid to the long-term as well as short-term goals of the PBM process. One of the dangers inherent in an initiative as ambitious and encompassing as the Barcelona process is that it will raise expectations which cannot be matched either by the resources available for its realization, or by the kind of results which ensure peace and stability for all the people and states of the region.

Confidence, it might be argued, is most solidly inspired through examples of what one is prepared to do, rather than what is merely said or planned for in the abstract. For this reason, more consideration may need to be given to the kind of structure required for PBM-type initiatives to achieve concrete ends. Without sacrificing the overall Mediterranean security umbrella of EMP, more progress might be made towards resolving, combatting or minimizing

individual threats to regional peace and stability by forming sub-regional fora. These could be roughly consonant with the east and west of the Mediterranean Basin, and designed to include only the parties most directly concerned to address concrete or outstanding security issues contained within these sub-divisions. Lower level, bilateral CBMs/PBMs, as a result of being designed for specific circumstances and desired end results, stand more chance of reaching the root causes of conflict, as well as being self-sustaining, than umbrella and inclusive PBMs. The latter may enjoy the advantage of encompassing all parties to the EMP, but this will usually be at the expense of their ability to address the real security concerns of regional partners or sustain any kind of dynamism beyond an agreement reached over guiding principles.

In one concrete way, the Mediterranean is a fertile region for the transmission of positive experience from one set of EMP partners to another. The lessons learnt by the twenty-year old transition to democracy of Europe's southernmost states - notably Greece, Spain and Portugal - might usefully be brought to bear on the evolving debates about civil-military relations and security sector reform in southern Mediterranean states. The accountability of armed forces within states governed under the rule of law has been a core requirement for the adhesion of eastern and central European states to the growing array of European cooperative security regimes (whether NATO, the OSCE, WEU, or the EU, perceived as the key economic and political anchor for stable future development). For genuine and balanced partnerships to evolve in the Mediterranean, the same kind of transition towards openness and accountability will be required across the region. The realization of the high aims and goals of the EMPs' founding Barcelona Declaration, and above all its Political and Security chapter, will in fact depend upon it.

Notes

1. See Joshua Sinai 'Ghaddafi's Libya: the patient proliferator' in *Jane's Intelligence Review* Vol 10, No. 10, December 1998, pp. 27-30
2. See Arnaud Jacomet 'Séminaire d'information à l'intention des officiers militaires méditerranéens: La coopération européenne en matière de sécurité et la Méditerranée - La dialogue méditerranéen de l'UEO' (Seminar paper, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 28-29 September 1998)
3. Concluding statement by Robin Cook, UK Presidency, Ad Hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting Palermo, 3-4 June 1998.
4. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership *Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP)* European Commission D XI SMAP Programme text.
5. Arnaud Jacomet (seminar paper, see above), p. 8

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Firmato un patto anglo-francese per la gestione delle crisi

"Un esercito europeo" Parigi e Londra insieme

di FRANCO FABIANI

PARIGI - La Francia e la Gran Bretagna hanno sottoscritto ieri una dichiarazione nella quale i due paesi affermano insieme non solo la necessità per l'Unione Europea di dotarsi di una propria capacità militare, ma anche l'intenzione di intervenire insieme nelle aree di crisi "con la Nato" o "fuori della Nato". Per Parigi e Londra il documento sottoscritto ieri da Blair, Chirac e Jospin al termine del vertice franco-britannico di Saint-Malo, l'Unione Europa deve avere una capacità autonoma d'azione, basata su forze militari credibili, pronte a rispondere alle crisi internazionali.

I ministri della Difesa dei due paesi, hanno firmato una dichiarazione di intenzioni che definisce le condizioni della cooperazione tra Londra e Parigi nella gestione delle crisi. Il documento formalizza una cooperazione già messa alla prova dai due paesi in Bosnia e nel Kosovo.

Tony Blair ha parlato ieri di "documento storico". In effetti ci si trova di fronte a una svolta decisiva della posizione britannica su una questione che Londra aveva sempre affrontato con la preoccupazione di mantenere la supremazia dell'Alleanza atlantica. Il ricorso a "mezzi militari europei" vuoi "nella Nato" che "fuori della Nato", dà la misura del passo compiuto dal primo ministro laburista. A un mese dal lancio dell'Euro, che si farà senza Londra, Tony Blair, si è visto offrire da Chirac l'occasione meno costosa per lui sul piano interno, per confermare che il suo governo non intende restare ai margini dell'Unione europea. L'accordo franco britannico non lascia indifferenti gli altri partner, in particolare Bonn. Esso infatti rende ancor più evanescenti le intese che c'erano state tra francesi e tedeschi e sembra escludere le altre contorsioni europee su questo terreno. Inoltre sembra tagliar fuori l'Ueo (Unione europea occidentale) l'organizzazione militare che doveva essere il trait d'union tra l'Unione europea e la Nato. Alla sessione parlamentare dell'Ueo, riunita alla vigilia del vertice franco-britannico, regnava un evidente nervosismo per le voci secondo cui ci sarebbe una intesa tra Londra e Parigi sul trasferimento dell'Ueo all'Unione europea e la sparizione programmata dell'organizzazione. Parigi ha tentato di calmare gli animi affermando che la soppressione dell'Ueo è "una delle opzioni".

in discussione, aggiungendo tuttavia che la Francia preferirebbe "una integrazione di quella organizzazione all'Unione europea". Chirac avrebbe proposto la creazione di una Agenzia tecnica cui sarebbe affidato il compito di preparare i piani di intervento militare. A questo concetto dell'Agenzia si era dichiarato favorevole il ministro Dini, ricordando i precedenti della Ceca (carbone e acciaio) e dell'Euratom. Un "passo intermedio", a suo avviso, che "va nella direzione della fusione dell'Ueo nell'Unione europea". E comunque certo che il problema, accanto a quello dell'occupazione sarà al centro del prossimo vertice europeo di Vienna dell'11 e 12 dicembre.



INIZIO PAGINA