THE RONALD W. BURKLE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mideast Regional Security Dilemmas: Searching for Solutions

Bruges, Belgium
July 13-16, 2002

Hosted By
The UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations (BCIR)
and
The United Nations University's Center for Comparative
Regional Integration Studies (CRIS)

MIDEAST REGIONAL SECURITY DILEMMAS:
SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS
UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations (BCIR)
United Nations University - Center for Comparative Regional Integration Studies (CRIS)
Bruges, 13-16/VII/2002

a. Agenda
b. List of participants
1. Section "Regional security": Peter Jones, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, Meliha Altunisik, Sinasi Demir, Fereshteh Etefaghfar, Hassan Issa, Shmuel Limone, Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Efraim Inbar, Ramin Jahanbegloo, Judith Yaphe, Gerald M. Steinberg, Sadiq Zibakalam, Amin Tarzi, Jalil Roshandel
2. Section "Economics": Munther S. Dajani, Hassan El-Hayawan, Habibollah Abolhassan Shirazi, Rachid Tlemcani, Dina Khayat
3. Section "Israeli-Palestinian conflict": Tamar Hermann, Abdel Monem Said Aly, Ahmed Abdel Halim, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Mark A. Heller, Shmuel Limone, Akiva Eldar, Galia Golan, Jamal Tahat, Jamal Tahat, David Newman
4. Section "Palestinian reform": Taher Shaah, Nizar Ammar, Nathan J. Brown, Mohammed S. Dajani
5. Section "Public opinion peace process": Kamal Ben Younes, Nathan J. Brown, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, David Newmann

"Mideast Regional Security Dilemmas: Searching for Solutions"
Bruges, Belgium
July 13 – 16, 2002

Co-Hosted by
The UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations (BCIR)
And
The United Nations University (UNU)

<u>*Friday, July 12, 2002*</u>

7:30PM   Dinner: Crowne Plaza Hotel   (OPTIONAL)

<u>*Saturday, July 13, 2002*</u>

7:00- 10:30   Breakfast at leisure – Buffet at the restaurant De Linde

1:00 PM   Lunch (optional) - Buffet

7:30PM   Cocktails and Dinner: Welcome Remarks from Professor Luk Van
                                    Lagenhove, Director of Center for Comparative Regional Integration
                                    Studies., PLEASE MEET AT THE SINT. DONAAS AT
                                    THE CROWNE PLAZA.

<u>*Sunday, July 14, 2002*</u>
7:00-9:00AM   Breakfast at Leisure at the – Buffet at the restaurant De Linde

9:00-9:15AM   Opening Remarks and Introductions
                                    Dr. Steven Spiegel, UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations

9:15-9:45 AM   Peter Jones and Janice Stein – Internet Briefing

9:45-11:00 AM   Keynote Address: General Anthony C. Zinni (ret.)

11:00-11:30   Coffee Break

11:30-1:00   Working Group Meetings Begin (rooms to be announced)

1:00-2:15 PM   Lunch - Buffet

2:15-4:00 PM   Break

4:00-5:15 PM   Working Groups

5:15-5:30 PM   Coffee Break

5:30-7:00PM   Working Groups

7:30 PM   Meet at the Lobby for Walking to the Restaurant

7:45 PM   Provincial Government, Market Square with Governor of Bruges

Monday, July 15, 2002

7:00-9:00AM	Breakfast at Leisure – Buffet at the restaurant De Linde
9:00-10:45AM	Working Groups Continue
10:45-11:15AM	Coffee Break
11:15AM-1:00 PM	Working Groups
1:00-2:15PM	Lunch – Buffet
2:15-3:45PM	Break
3:45-5:15PM	Working Groups
5:15-5:30	Coffee Break
5:30-6:45 PM	Working Groups
~~7:15 PM~~ 7.00 PM	Bus Departs for Dinner
7:45 PM	Thermae Palace Hotel in Oostende

Tuesday, July 16, 2002

7:00-9:00AM	Breakfast at Leisure – Buffet at the restaurant De Linde
9:00-10:45AM	Working Groups
10:45-11:15AM	Coffee Break
11:15AM-12:45PM	Working Groups; Last Session
12:45-2:00PM	Lunch - Buffet
2:00-4:00PM	Plenary: Working Group Reports (for those who prefer not to hear the reports, there will be a special breakout group to be announced)
4:00-4:15 PM	Coffee Break
4:15-5:15PM	Evaluation and discussion of the future
7:30PM	Dinner: Crowne Plaza Hotel

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Mideast Regional Security Dilemmas: Searching for Solutions
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Establishing a Middle East Regional Security Studies Centre: Practical Considerations and Interim Steps

UCLA/CRIS Workshop
Mideast Regional Security Dilemmas: Searching for Solutions

Bruges, Belgium
13-16 July, 2002

Peter Jones, Ph.D.[1]

Introduction

At our last meeting in London, we achieved agreement to explore the establishment of a Middle East centre for the promotion of peace and stability; sometimes referred to as a Middle East Regional Security Studies Centre. Two things were asked of the co-chairs in preparation for the Bruges meeting: to draft a "strawman" Charter for such a centre; and to prepare background material for a discussion of what interim measures and activities could be undertaken in the lead up to the formal establishment of the centre. This second request is the purpose of this paper.

Also in London we had a preliminary discussion on how such a centre might initially be structured, organized, funded and what types of activities it would engage in. As to the location and structure, the key points made were:

- it would need to be in a place accessible to all (preferably in the region), with a Director, a staff and an Advisory Board acceptable to all;
- it would require modest physical facilities, perhaps provided by the host country;

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[1]The author participates in this process on behalf of the Munk Centre for International Relations at the University of Toronto. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

- it would be established on the premise that all are able to use its facilities, even from states which do not yet recognize each other, so long as the projects they seek to work on are consistent with the principles espoused in the Code of Conduct which this group completed at earlier meeting; and
- it would need secure and stable funding to establish itself as an independent entity, including funding from the region, extra-regional governments and possibly private foundations. Funding for select activities by the centre also could be secured from a variety of sources, including the United Nations.

As to the activities the centre might undertake, the points made were:

- serving as an informal clearinghouse to provide information about the plethora of Track Two activities under way so that Track Two organizers are better able to co-ordinate their activities with one another;
- providing a venue for Track Two initiatives;
- providing an information repository and communications facility;
- serving as a possible training facility, including on issues related to threats that require a regional response and consequence management;
- serving as a place to discuss perceptions of threat and security concerns and to revisit these issues periodically; and
- identifying and integrating new faces for participation in Track Two.

Key Points

It was noted in London that our intention is to complete the process of establishing this centre within two years. This is an ambitious agenda. If we are to move forward quickly, the time has come to identify and address a variety of key issues (in addition to the Charter, which is the subject of a separate paper). These include:

- the need for an interim committee;
- identifying the outlines of an initial research agenda;
- other functions for the Centre;
- building regional support;
- location, location, location; and
- money.

Considerations for Discussion

The Interim Committee. Clearly, any progress will depend upon striking a committee of committed and active people with the ability to mobilize regional support for this initiative. Ultimately, this committee would likely become the embryo of the Advisory Board of the Centre once it was established. But, in the formative stages, this committee would have a more organizational role. Such a committee will have to strike the appropriate balances of regional and extra-regional representation. It will also have to include persons of sufficient experience and gravitas to lend credibility to the enterprise. Some combination of academic, private sector and governmental representatives is likely to be optimum, but what should that be? Clearly, many of those who took part in the London discussion could serve on such a committee. But should we not also widen the net and seek to approach others who can lend support to this initiative? Can we identify people, or at least types of people we would seek to interest in this initiative? If so, could they be invited to our next meeting?

The Initial Research Agenda. It is likely that any Centre will begin with a limited research agenda. It will take time to build up expertise and capability. Ideally, the initial agenda should be one which makes the Centre relevant to the region's concerns, and therefore a place of intellectual ferment and focus. But the region has many concerns. Which ones should be the initial focus of this Centre? Should it look at the issues surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute? Should it look at regional arms control? How about economic development in the Middle East? Or perhaps the identification of longer-term regional security issues? All of these, and more, are intensely relevant to the region's current dilemmas. In selecting one or two of these topics to be the initial focus it seems to me that we should look at where the Centre can make a difference and have a unique niche. For example, there are many institutes looking at the Arab-Israeli dispute. If we are to select that as an area of focus, the question becomes how would our Centre be different? In my own experience, there are few, if any, Centres that are looking at the longer-term security issues which will affect the region. These could include such things as the creation of a regional security regime and the impact of non-traditional security issues on the region's stability.

Other Functions. As we said in London, this proposed Centre could have other functions beyond its own research. For example, it could serve as a regional clearinghouse for Track Two. It could take it upon itself to promote "new faces" and assist in developing the next generation of regional scholars and researchers. It could serve as a place where Track Two meetings could take place. It could serve as an information repository and communications centre. All of these are worthy objectives and would, in themselves, give the Centre a unique niche beyond its research agenda. But how much can it do right away? Practically speaking, which of these functions, or any others, should we identify as things we will do immediately, and which should we identify as interim and longer term functions to be developed as the Centre is established over time?

Building Regional Support. This will be key to any success. Unless regional governments, and other regional research institutes, support this initiative it may not succeed. Obviously, the composition of the Interim Committee becomes critical here. What activities need to be undertaken by the Committee to ensure that the Centre proposal gets the support it needs? How can we link into other existing regional centres to work with and gain from their experiences and contacts?

Location, Location, Location. As they say in the real estate game; "location is everything." This new Centre will be no exception. We agreed in London that the Centre should be in the region. This is a critical factor in truly establishing it as a regional enterprise and sending the signal to potential funders that this is a serious development. Beyond that, certain key considerations come into play. For example, the Centre will need to be in place where it can be accessed by all. This obviously requires a host country with good relations throughout the region and to which all can travel relatively freely for meetings and workshops. The Centre will require modest facilities, either its own or those of a university or institute with which it can be co-located. Given the trans-regional nature of this Centre, and the fact that its staff will likely come from several countries, it may require some kind of a agreement with the host government as to its status and that of its employees. Such an agreement with the host country could also have provisions to ensure that participants in the activities of the Centre will receive some kind of preferential treatment as regards the granting of visas for travel to the host country. These are issues that any future sub-committee established to find

the proper location will have to consider in detail. As a general point, it seems to me that the correct way to approach this issue is not to look for a place right away, but rather to identify the characteristics of the ideal location and then see which regional countries come closest to meeting them. In effect, to develop the criteria and then let them be the guide.

Money. As always, the crux of the issue. Speaking from hard experience, raising funds is a very difficult aspect of establishing a new academic enterprise. Once again, the composition of the Interim Committee, and the willingness of its members to commit themselves to the initiative, plays a very important role here. Also, the selection of initial research topics and other functions is critical - we have to select things that others are willing to fund. Beyond that, we need to establish certain principles. For example, how much of the Centre's budget will need to come from an endowment, and how much can we put out to fund-raising? Can we realistically expect a host government to provide an endowment, or free access to facilities? Are there extra-regional governments or entities we can look to for founding grants and sustaining funds? As a general point, it was agreed at our London meeting that at least some of the money for this Centre should come from regional states and interests. Ideally, a good chunk of the start-up expenses should come from the region. This is important in that it sends a critical signal to others whom we would approach to support this idea; that the region is behind the Centre and wants it to succeed. Nothing will send a stronger signal to potential funders and supporters outside the Middle East than evident support from within the region.

Conclusion

These questions are difficult ones. They require much thought and discussion. In parallel with our efforts to develop a Charter, we must consider and address them. Otherwise the Charter, critical though it may be, will be a piece of paper. Use can be made of the sub-page on the Network as a means to explore these ideas and exchange views between meetings.

Perhaps most importantly, we should be moving towards the creation of a formal Interim Committee. This Committee could be comprised of those who are presently taking part in these discussions, but we should also be trying to develop ideas as to others who could be invited to join in support of this

initiative. We should also set out an agenda of work that this Committee can begin to address. Ideally, we should be moving to the creation of a series of sub-committees to address these issues and report back to the larger body.

We said in London that we wanted to do all of this in two years. That will be tight, but it can be done.

Turkey's Changing Security Concerns in the Middle East

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Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East went through a drastic change in early 1990s. The shifts in security policy towards the region were very much influenced by the new strategic environment that emerged in the region in the 1990s. The consequent perception of insecurity was further aggravated by the domestic threat perceptions of the Turkish foreign and security policy elites, namely Kurdish nationalism and Islamic radicalism. The disillusionment with post-Gulf War developments led to a strategic shift in Ankara. The new strategy identified the Middle East as the number one source of threat to Turkey. In the meantime the post-Cold War international system also paved the way for regional powers like Turkey to tackle their own security problems independently.

The developments in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War exacerbated Turkey's security concerns. As a result of this increased sense of threat from the Middle East, early 1990s witnessed the "securitization"[1] of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. Strategic ties with Israel, October 1998 crisis with Syria, Turkey's policies

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towards Iraq all signaled a departure from earlier policy of caution and disinterest in the Middle East.

Post-Gulf War developments in Iraq greatly exacerbated Turkey's security concerns. Turkish officials argued that the power vacuum in northern Iraq constituted a safe haven for the PKK to launch its cross-border raids to Turkey. At the same time Turkey viewed the disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state there as unacceptable, since such developments would give a new momentum to the PKK. Finally, the embargo imposed on Iraq led to an economic loss over 35 billion dollar which contributed to the general weakening of the economy, as well as aggravating the already existing security problems in the border areas. The situation in Iraq presented the most complex challenge to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Ankara on the one hand acted with its Western allies in the War and in the post-War developments in the Iraqi issue. Yet some groups within the state continued to have suspicions about the intentions of its allies as regards to Iraq and even as regards to Turkey. These concerns were also reflected in the debates about the extension of the mandate of the Operation Provide Comfort (later renamed Northern Watch in 1997)[2], which was labeled by some political groups as the "new Sevres."

Meanwhile, Turkey's relations with Syria also deteriorated steadily, again mostly due to the Kurdish issue. Negative historical legacy and longstanding disagreements over regional and international policy had already marred Turkish-Syrian relations. However, the changing regional and international landscape in the 1990s led to the emergence of

already existing problems between the two countries in a more conflictual way. The existence of mutual distrust did not help to ease these tensions. From Syria's perspective the dispute over the use of the waters of Euphrates River was at the center of the problematic relationship between the two countries. From Turkey's perspective, on the other hand, relations with this country were tied to Syria's support to the PKK. What is interesting is that as in the case of Iraq, Turkish policy vis-à-vis Syria differed from its allies. From the Turkish perspective, for instance, the US, eager to achieve progress in Syrian-Israeli negotiations was very accommodating towards Syria. Finally, relations with Iran increasingly became problematic in the early 1990s. Turkey accused Iran of interfering in its domestic affairs, especially of training radical Islamist militants allegedly involved in assassinations of pro-secular intellectuals. In return Iran accused Turkey for intervening in its domestic affairs through letting some *Mujahedeen Halq* members to remain in Turkey. These tensions were culminated in a serious diplomatic crisis when in February 1997 the Iranian ambassador to Ankara was asked to leave the country because of a speech he made during the celebrations of Jerusalem day organized by the Islamist Welfare Party Mayor of the town of Sincan near Ankara. This incident that occurred during the tenure of the Welfare government, once again demonstrated the extent to which Turkey's relations with Iran were intermingled with the domestic disputes. The military, which had already been quite disturbed by the policies of the government, responded to this incident in a very harsh way. In the next morning the army tanks were on a parade in Sincan and the mayor was relieved of his post and taken in for questioning at the State Security Court. In addition, Ankara also from time to time claimed that Iran was supplying the PKK with logistical and financial support and

training. On the other hand, Turkey's cross-border incursions into Iraq disturbed Iran and led to tensions especially when some Iranian citizens were claimed to be hurt.[3]

One response given by Ankara to increasing threats coming from its immediate Middle Eastern neighbors was to emphasize the security aspect of Turkish-Israeli relations that had been normalizing since the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Turkey, which had been reluctant to involve in open security cooperation with Israel, began to reconsider this policy in the mid-1990s. As a result, Turkey and Israel established close ties in security related matters and signed two agreements to further their relations in this area.

A related consideration was the desire of the Turkish military to obtain military hardware and technology from Israel. Turkey, in fact, announced a very ambitious defense expansion and modernization program, which planned to spend about 150 billion dollars on armaments over 20 to 25 years.[4] However, at that time it was becoming more and more difficult to obtain this technology and hardware from its Western allies because of concern over human rights and Ankara's poor relations with Greece. Israel, on the other hand, had the technology and the arms and unlike the Europeans and the US was ready to share them with Turkey. Finally, the Turkish political elite was quite interested in getting the support of the pro-Israeli lobby in the US This factor had become more important in post-Cold War era where Turkey was trying to find itself a new place in the emerging order. Furthermore, the increasing role of the US Congress in foreign policy making also made enlisting the support of this lobby especially valuable in order to

balance out some ethnic lobbies that were generally working against Turkey. The burgeoning ties with Israel represented a bold initiative on the part of Turkey. For the first time in the republican history Turkey openly engaged in a strategic alignment with Israel and felt no restraint to publicize this.

However, under close scrutiny the new Middle East policy showed some nuances. Ankara was trying to make it clear that it was not really taking sides in the Arab-Israeli issues, but yet aiming to defend itself from the threats coming from the region. Therefore, during this period Turkey made sure to have good relations with Jordan and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). With Jordan Turkey also developed military relations, however, especially because of Jordanian sensitivities, these relations were not advertised. Furthermore, Ankara placed a lot of emphasis on explaining its new policy to Egypt. High level contacts between presidents Süleyman Demirel and Husni Mubarak became a vehicle of this approach. Turkey made the point that it did not treat all Arab countries as a monolith and, in fact, countries like Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and the Gulf countries had good relations with Turkey. Although this was true, because of inter-Arab balances, Syria, which led the opposition towards Turkey, swayed the Arab world. Interestingly Turkey had good relations bilaterally with several Arab countries, and yet its relations with the Arab world in general remained problematic. This was reflected most in the Arab League meetings where Turkey was frequently criticized for its ties with Israel, its water problems with Syria and Iraq, and its Iraq policy. The strong sense of Arab regional identity was a factor that limited Turkey's efforts to develop better relations with the Arab countries.

Therefore, the Middle East, which had occupied a minor position in Turkey's strategic thinking, became the number one priority for the political and security elite in the early 1990s. This was due to the heightened sense domestic insecurity felt as a result of increasing domestic challenges to the Republican regime concurrent with external uncertainty due to the transformations in the post-Cold War era. In response Ankara developed a new strategic policy vis-à-vis the Middle East based on the redefinition of threat perception. This new policy could no longer be defined only as an extension of Turkey's relations with the West. As such Turkey's policy became more independent of its ties with the West and constructed in a manner that directly build around the principles of the maintenance of the regime and the territorial integrity of the country as defined by the political and the military elite.

In addition to the perception of "existential security threats", Turkey continued to have broader security concerns related to the Middle East. One such issue has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Ankara perceived this conflict as a source of instability in the region, there was an open support for the Arab-Israeli peace process that started at the Madrid Conference in 1991. Particularly Turkey also took part in multilateral tracks of the peace process and especially chaired a sub-committee of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) multinational working group up until its suspension in 1996.[5] The continuing problems in the process and its final breakdown were considered as challenges to regional security and Turkey's security perceptions of the region.

Turkey also has specific security issues pertaining to the Middle East. The increasing militarization in the region, especially in the form of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was considered as an important security threat by the Turkish political and military elite as Turkey does not possess such a capability. Finally, there have been non-traditional security issues for Turkey in the Middle East. Among them the most significant has been Turkey's dependence on the region for its energy needs. The Middle East provides most of Turkey's crude oil imports. The recently completed natural gas pipeline from Iran with will soon make Iran a significant supplier of energy together with its supply of electricity.

Limited "Desecuritization": Easing of Tensions

At the end of the 1990s there appeared some signs of easing of tensions in Turkey's Middle East policy. The most important development in that respect was the October 1998 crisis with Syria, resolving of which created a thaw in Turkey's Middle East policy.

Turkish-Syrian relations had been escalating for some time. On January 23, 1996 Turkish Foreign Ministry send a memorandum to Damascus asking Syria to cease its support to the PKK and if not, declaring Turkey's "right to respond with any measure it deems appropriate at an appropriate time." The Syrian regime did not respond and Turkey froze all its relations with Syria.[6] The two consecutive governments that came to power between 1996 and 1998, however, made last digit efforts to solve the issue

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diplomatically. The Welfare Party, the senior coalition partner of the government from July 1996 to June 1997, put the improvement of Turkey's relations with Syria, together with Iran and Iraq, on the list of priorities.[7] Similarly, the government under Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the Motherland (*Anavatan*) Party, made an effort to solve Turkey's problems with Syria diplomatically through especially the initiatives of Foreign Minister Ismail Cem[8] However, these efforts also failed. As a result, the tension between Turkey and Syria quickly escalated in late 1998 when Ankara issued an ultimatum and reinforced its troops in its Syrian border. The crisis was finally resolved as Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, left Damascus and the representatives of the two countries met in Adana, Turkey, and signed an agreement in which Damascus agreed to cut all its support to the PKK. This agreement was different from the earlier agreement that was signed between the two countries in 1992. First of all, the Adana Agreement used more comprehensive and specific language in terms of both Syrian relations with the PKK and its commitments to cut its support. Second, unlike the 1992 Agreement, Adana Agreement was solely on the issue of Syrian support to the PKK and, thus, did not make any reference to other issues that exist between the two countries, such as the water issue. This was due to Ankara's insistence to de-link and prioritize these issues and to deal with what Turkish policymakers perceived as an existential problem separately. Finally, Adana Agreement called for specific security mechanisms to be established between the two countries and therefore was much more comprehensive in terms of implementation.

Since the Adana Agreement Turkish-Syrian relations have improved considerably. There were immediate developments in several areas. First of all, in security issues the

measures that were called for in the Adana Agreement, such as regular security meetings, hotline, the appointment of four special security officials to each others' diplomatic missions were put into place. As a result of this security cooperation PKK's training camps in Syria were closed and the logistical support to the organization stopped.[9] There was even a discussion about signing a military cooperation agreement that will be based on mutual exchange of military personnel, mutual invitations for monitoring the war games and military training.[10] Political and diplomatic relations have also flourished. The Turkish-Syrian Parliamentary Friendship Group is the most populous in the Turkish parliament having around 150 members. In the meantime there were positive developments in economic and cultural relations as well.[11] The volume of trade reached to seven million US dollars in 2000. The two countries are soon to sign an Education, Technical and Scientific Cooperation Agreement. Turkey's new President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's attendance to Syrian President Hafiz Asad's funeral represented another turning point. Syrian vice-president Abdul-Halim Khaddam's visit to Turkey followed it in November. Since then working groups were established to prepare a Declaration of Principles to be signed between the two countries in order to establish a new framework for relationship.[12] Despite improving ties between Damascus and Ankara there are still difficulties. The water issue, which is of number one priority for Syria, has not been resolved yet. In fact, Syria recently called for the resumption of meetings of the trilateral committee. Although it seems like water became such a problem because of general lack of distrust,[13] the fact that the improvement in relations are still limited can make the water issue a bottleneck in further developing ties between the two countries. Syrian claims –at least on paper- on Hatay province are another issue that can limit normalization.[14] As to

the development of economic relations it is clear that the existing potential has not been used to its fullest extent. Recent increase in trade volume is largely due to increased Turkish imports from Syria. Further improvement of economic ties will largely depend on changes in Syrian economy, which is happening in a very slow pace.

The Adana agreement and later the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in February 1999 after a long odyssey largely freed Turkey's policy towards the Arab world from being a hostage to this issue. Since the resolution of the crisis with Syria new possibilities of normalizing relations with the region as a whole have appeared. For instance, relations with Egypt improved after 1998. President Demirel's visit to Cairo on July 1999 was a turning point in that respect. During that visit for the first time since the signing of Turkish-Israeli agreement in February 1996, there was no mention of Turkish-Israeli relations. Since then the two countries have escalated their efforts to look for ways to increase cooperation and dialogue. Turkey also added a new element to its Iraq policy; that is to improve its relations with Baghdad. This policy was specifically justified by increasing losses of Turkey from the embargo and consequently rising criticism of the UN sanctions regime in Turkey. Being aware of the financial difficulties the embargo imposed on the already weak economy of southeastern Turkey and thus its impact on rising Kurdish nationalism, for many years Turkey and the UN turned a blind eye to the illegal trade based on export of cheap crude oil from Iraq through tankers to Turkey. However, due to increasing oil company protests this trade became limited in the late 1990s. In response local interest groups, such as the Turkish-Iraqi Friendship Association, started to increase their pressure on Ankara for the lifting of sanctions.

There was in general increasing criticism of the UN sanctions regime also because of its negative political and strategic implications. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit has long been uneasy about the US policy towards Iraq and its implications for Turkey. Finally, the fact that more and more countries began to challenge the US policy on Iraq both inside and outside the region gave Turkey an opportunity to make some changes in its Iraq policy. After the easing of the food-for-oil program for Iraq in December 1999 with UN Resolution 1284, Turkey as well began to seek opportunities for improving economic relations with that country. State Minister's visit to Iraq with 100 exporters was touted as "a new page" in Turkish-Iraqi relations; several Turkish humanitarian aid planes were sent to Baghdad; and Turkey restored the diplomatic ties with Baghdad to an ambassadorial level in January. There was also talk of opening a second border with Iraq and to build a natural gas pipeline from Iraq to Turkey. In the meantime, the rail link between the two countries was reopened in April. These developments were also significant in terms of the general thaw in Turkey's relations with Arab countries since Turkey's Iraq policy had been one of the most criticized in the Arab world. The use of Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey by the US and the British warplanes to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel and Turkey's frequent military incursions into northern Iraq have been two points of criticism voiced against Turkey. Although Turkey's concerns about the PKK in northern Iraq have been somewhat understood to justify Turkey's incursions, the use of the Incirlik airbase became a sore issue in relations between the Arab world and Turkey.

There were also improvements in Turkish-Iranian relations during this period. The election of Muhammed Khatami and the fall of the Welfare Party government put an end to the crisis between the two countries and led to a gradual improvement. The two countries started a process of security cooperation against the PKK which eventually led to the signing of a memorandum of understanding in January 2000. Economic relations have improved since the late 1990s. The volume of trade between the two countries reached to 1.2 billion US dollars in 2001. However, there are limitations to relations between Turkey and Iran. The last few years showed that despite their strong showing in the polls, the reformists still have limited control over the radical elements in the security establishment, which has the ability to create crisis in relations between the two countries. In addition, the problems between Iran and the US are reflected upon Turkey as a close ally of the US in the region. Finally, the uncertainty and instability surrounding Iraq continue to produce tensions as Iran and Turkey, two major powers in the region, are closely following each others' move in the area.

In addition to the changing nature of relations with Syria that brought a general thaw in Turkey's relations with the Middle East, there were other factors that led to the relative "desecuritization" of Turkey's policy towards the region.

First of all, there were some developments in the region itself that paved the way for a slight shift in Turkey's policy. One was the coming of power of Ehud Barak government in Israel. Barak's declared commitment to sign peace treaties in all tracks seemed to force Turkey to prepare itself for a post-peace environment. In such an

environment it was clear that Turkey could not just rely on its ties with Israel. On the Arab front too there were changes. Egypt seemed to be concerned about the post-peace order in the Middle East and in that environment those who argued for including Turkey rather than alienating it gained an upper hand. Some Egyptian analysts even began to consider Turkey as one of the core countries in the future establishment of a Middle Eastern security cooperation framework.[15] Syria also wanted to strengthen its hand against Israel and thus engaging Turkey in cooperation rather than in conflict after October 1998 crisis. In the case of Iran the strengthening of the reformists in Iranian politics paved the way for normalization in relations between the two countries.

More importantly, however, there were some domestic changes in Turkey that brought a new approach in Turkey's Middle East policy: The resolution of the main problem with Syria gave the *Demokratik Sol* (Democratic Left) Party, the main coalition partner which also held the Foreign Ministry, to implement its program of "regionally-based foreign policy". Such an approach was based on the argument that Turkey should develop good relations in all its regions and thus play an important role in these regions independent of its ties with the West. In fact, in line with this argument, even during the height of Turkish-Israeli relations the Foreign Ministry was thought to warn for caution and advocated a slower pace in improving relations with Israel. The ill-fated attempts of the coalition government, that came to power in June 1997 and in which DSP again held the foreign ministry, to build bridges with the Arab world, including Syria, can be considered as an example of a desire to institute some balance to Turkey's policy towards the region. The other senior coalition partner, ultra-nationalist National Action (*Milliyetçi*

Hareket) Party, also was an advocate of improving relations especially with Baghdad to be able to control the negative implications of the developments in Iraq for Turkey. Nevertheless, the most important development that led to a limited "desecuritization" was decreasing sense of insecurity in Ankara during this period. Some developments in the domestic front eased the urgency of "internal threats" and thus created a possibility of easing of tensions in Turkey's Middle East policy. The capture and subsequently the trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK's decision to call off its 15-year war and the military victory over the PKK on the one hand, and the closure of the Welfare Party and the weak showing in the elections of the Virtue (*Fazilet*) Party, on the other hand, decreased the sense of insecurity and also weakened the coalition built around "the threats of irredentism and political Islam". The new battle lines in Turkey started to emerge especially on the issue of EU membership and its meaning, and this debate reconstituted the earlier alliance to a large extent. Turkey's increased military strength by the late 1990s was another factor that led to confidence and thus eased the concerns about the threats. In fact, the Turkish military modernization began to give Turkey capabilities that far outstrip those of its Middle Eastern neighbors. As a result, same analyst began to consider Turkey as becoming an independent security actor.[16]

Challenges to the New Policy

However, Turkey's new policy soon faced important challenges. The first challenge came from the collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The *Al-Aqsa intifada* erupted in a period during which Turkey was trying to reinstitute some balance to its relations in the Middle East and aiming to play a role in the soon-to-be-emerged post-

peace environment. The *intifada*, however, changed all these considerations dramatically. Turkey started its diplomatic efforts right from the beginning and became one of the first countries to respond. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister engaged in telephone diplomacy to end the hostilities immediately. Yet the government was careful to define its role not as a mediator but a facilitator. For instance, Ankara tried and succeeded in making the proposal for an international fact-finding mission acceptable to the parties, especially to Israel, which was reluctant to accept the idea.[17] The former President Süleyman Demirel was selected to become a member of the so-called Mitchell Commission that was established to investigate the underlying reasons, showing the trust Turkey enjoyed in both sides.

On the other hand, the government tried to respond to the sympathy among the Turkish public towards the Palestinians, increased especially as a result of televised images of the *intifada*. Urgent aid of 500 thousand dollars was sent to the PNA and some wounded Palestinians were brought to Ankara for medical care. In the UN General Assembly on October 20, 2000, Ankara voted for the condemnation of Israel for using excessive force against Palestinian civilians. Few days later on 25 October, Turkey's President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in his opening speech at the 16th session of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC) of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in Istanbul criticized Israel and stated that nothing could justify the use of force at holy sites and that excessive use of force by Israel resulted in high casualties.[18] These developments led to increasing concerns on the part of the Israeli political and military elite. Israeli Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs visited Ankara in

October 2000 and conveyed the message that they were disappointed by Turkey's recent reactions to the crisis in the Middle East.[19] Later on Turkey's request Israeli Chief of Staff's visit was postponed. It was obvious that Turkey was trying to keep a low profile of its relations with Israel when the crisis was deepening in the region.[20] The deterioration of the Palestinian conflict, therefore, is considered as a security challenge to Turkey as it increased instability in the region, led to radicalization, and limited Turkey's options in the region.

Secondly, and more importantly, the uncertainty surrounding Iraq puts further constraints on Turkey's Middle East policy. George W. Bush Administration's policy of getting though on Iraq limits Turkey's opening up to Baghdad. Furthermore, the scenarios about the future of Iraq entail different problems for Turkey. Ankara has already identified the possible division of Iraq as a major security threat. However, the reintegration of that country under the current regime may also present challenges. Ankara already had several problems with Baghdad before the Gulf War and concerned about facing a more hostile one in the future. The Turkish government has already accused Iraq for harboring the PKK since 1998.[21] Therefore, the Iraqi issue is full of minefields for Turkey.

The developments after the attacks of September 11 increased concerns in Ankara that the US may try to ratchet up its confrontation with Baghdad as part of the war on terrorism. Turkey's experience during the Gulf War of 1991 to some extent colored the current reaction in Turkey. The public opinion was similarly uneasy about Turkey's involvement, albeit indirectly, in the 1991 Gulf War. Part of this hesitancy came from the

Turkish Republic's long standing prejudice against intervening into regional disputes. However, some others most notably the late President Turgut Ozal were advocating a more active policy and leaning towards the opening of a second front against Saddam regime in northern Iraq. These plans could not be realized eventually because of the opposition from the military and most of the political parties. Current debates are both similar and different from the debates in 1991. The similarity is in public opinion's concern over engaging in a war. However, unlike in the Gulf Crisis political and military elite seem to coalesce around the idea that Turkey could no longer stand aside if an attack against Iraq occurs. There is also a common concern about military, strategic, and economic repercussions that an invasion of Iraq might bring. Finally, there is not clear conviction that the US administration has thought through a sound military strategy for ousting Saddam Hussein regime, much less a practical plan for an acceptable post-Saddam regime. Some Turkish officials have in the past criticized Washington's policy as "a non-policy". There again seems to be a fear that the toppling of the current regime in Iraq might lead to the fracture of Iraqi territory. Such a development, not only in the north but also in the south is viewed as a major security threat for Turkey. There is also concern about the possible negative consequences of such an operation on the already fragile Turkish economy.

There are divisions among the political and military elite, however, as to the extent of Turkey's involvement in a possible US operation in Iraq. Some advocate limiting Turkey's participation as far as possible. Whereas others argue that Turkey should participate fully in the US operation and thus should exploit opportunities to limit any

harm to Turkish security. There are also similarities as to a desired outcome of such an operation: An Iraq under a new regime with political and territorial integrity remaining intact. Within this context all the interested parties seem to stress the importance of close consultations with Washington and the importance of reassurance from the US for its commitment to a unified Iraq. Without an agreement on strategic and military modalities Turkey's support for such an operation seems highly unlikely.

Notes

[1] This conceptualization belongs to Barry Buzan et.al. where "securitization" is defined as the presentation of an issue "as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure." Conversely, "desecuritization" is referred to as moving issues out of "threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere." Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998): especially 23-24 and 29.

[2] Right after the Gulf War a refugee crisis of major proportions emerged when Saddam regime launched a military campaign to suppress the Kurdish rebellion in the north of the country. About half-a-million Iraqi Kurds escaped to the Turkish-Iraqi border. Ankara's appeal for assistance was met by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 688, which created a safe-haven in northern Iraq to be protected by international forces headed by the US. Thus in 1991 Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was established to conduct humanitarian operation and to return refugees to their homes. Later the operation continued (OPC II) to deter new Iraqi attack on the Kurds and to enforce the northern no-fly zone. The Turkish Grand National Assembly extended the mandate for the OPC in every six months.

[3] *Milliyet*, 7 January 1996.

[8] *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 6 January 1998.

[5] Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," SAIS Review (1999), at (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/alansais.htm)

[6] Şükrü Elekdağ, "Suriye'ye karşı strateji yokluğu", (Lack of strategy against Syria) from "Dünyaya Bakış" (A Glimpse at the World) column, *Milliyet*, 21 September 1998.

[7] *Hürriyet*, 1 July 1996.

[8] *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 18 March 1998.

[9] Sami Kohen, "Apo neden (baştan) Suriye'den istenmedi?" (Why didn't Turkey ask for Apo's extradition at the beginning?) from "Yorum" (Comment) column, *Milliyet*, 5 December 1998.

[10] "Military agreement on agenda with Syria", *TDN*, 18 April 2001.

[11] *Radikal*, 30 October 2001.

[12]Erdal Güven, "Türkiye ve Suriye sessiz ve derinden", (Turkey and Syria: without a fuss) *Radikal*, 10 December 2000.

[13]In fact, improvement of relations between the two countries was immediately reflected in the water issue. For instance, when due to some technical reasons there was a reduction in the amount of water to Syria, Damascus, very much unlike its previous attitude, did not even make this an issue. *Al Safir*, 18 June 2001.

[14]In an editorial for *al-Bayan* (UAE) Syrian journalist, Muhammad Jamal Barout argued that Turkey is trying to sign with Syria a 'declaration of principles' in which the two sides undertake a commitment to respect international borders. According to the writer, through this Ankara 'intends to obtain Damascus' legal recognition of Turkey's annexation of Alexandretta'. Barout argues that this insistence led to the postponement of Bashar Asad's visit to Turkey. *Arabic News*, 19 July 2001, http://www.arabicnews.com

[15]Personal contact, October 2000.

[16]Michael Robert Hickok, "Hegemon Rising: The Gap between Turkish Strategy and Military Modernization", *Parameters: US Army War College*, 30: 2 (2000) 105-110.

[17]Sami Kohen, "Türkiye aktif, ama..." (Turkey is active, but...), from "Yorum" (Comment) column, *Milliyet*, 13 October 2000.

[18]*Turkish Daily News* (thereafter *TDN*), 26 October 2000.

[19] Interview with Israeli Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Alon Liel, *TDN*, 26 October 2000.

[20]This was in some ways similar to the Israeli government's attitude during the October 1998 crisis between Turkey and Syria. At that time the Israeli government kept a low profile and cancelled a planned military exercise in the Golan Heights and redeployed some of its troops in the area.

[21]*Radikal*, 16 February 1999.

CAN THE AFGHANISTAN MODEL BE USED IN AN INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAQ?
WOULD SUCH AN INTERVENTION BE APPROPRIATE IN THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM?

ŞİNASİ DEMİR
BGEN. (R)TU.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the symbols of power on September 11 2001, almost everyone involved concluded that it was the beginning of a new era. We may also refer to this period as the 'period of asymmetric war'. We may define asymmetric war as striking an asymmetric opponent at their weakest point at the time when they least expect it and causing damage incomparable to the force used. Before these attacks, there was a ten-year period of post cold war transition.

The USA made a decision to neutralize Usame Bin Laden, his Al Qaeda network, and the controlling power in Afghanistan, the pro 'Bin Laden, Taliban regime, all of whom were seen as responsible for the attacks of September 11. This was the first step taken in the fight against global terrorism. The operation involved many political, strategic, economic, psychological and social factors.

According to the established concept, a coalition was formed with the nations in the region with the aim of combating terrorism. Almost all the countries in the region joined the coalition. After this the military dimension was put into action. In this respect, the opposition to Afghanistan was united as The Northern Alliance. Differences, to a certain degree, were put to one side. These forces were trained and supplied with materials, equipment and weapons. Briefly, the plan was to annihilate the Taliban and Al Qaeda, with the use of heavy air strikes supporting Special Forces and the Northern Alliance on the ground.

Firstly, the area was put under fire using Tomahawk missiles fired from battleships, along with B-1 and B-52 bombers coming from bases in the Indian Ocean.

With the effective targeting of the Special Forces, the air force and the AC-130 Gunship planes equipped with special weapons, the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network collapsed, dispersed and was annihilated.

This method by which the USA achieved success, simply, with low risk and virtually no losses, has been named 'The Afghanistan Model'.

Could this method be used against Iraq, who was on the agenda to be attacked just prior to the events of Afghanistan? Within this paper I'm going to try to compare a possible intervention on Iraq with the Afghanistan model.

The USA established legitimate grounds for the operation against Usame Bin Laden, the Al Qaeda network and the supporting Taliban regime. With the exception of a few radical Arab, Islamic states and some social groups, the operation had the support of the whole world.

Article 5 of the U.N Treaty laid the operation on legal foundations. (UN, Charter Article 51 Self Defense)

For the first time in it's history, article 5 of the NATO treaty stating: "any attack on one member, shall be considered as an attack on all NATO countries / states" was put into practice, and strong support was gathered. This decision ensured legal grounds for NATO member states to assist.

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Having briefly explained the Afghanistan Model, we can now examine an intervention against Iraq. Would a similar intervention against Iraq gather full support from countries in the region? On this issue I am very skeptical.

Firstly, any evidence that Saddam has been involved with terrorism or the Al Qaeda Network has yet to be established. Iraq is also a secular Muslim country. Unlike with Afghanistan, it seems like it would be very difficult to establish legal grounds for such an intervention at this conjuncture.

However, Iraq's refusal to allow U.N weapons inspectors may to some degree form the basis for an intervention.

The USA built its strategy in Afghanistan using the opposition to the Taliban. The opposing groups, under the name of the Northern Alliance, played an important part in the results achieved in a short period of time. With the USA at the helm, Russia, England, Turkey and the regional nations of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan supported these groups. The Northern Alliance had years of battle experience. A major factor in the group was Uzbek General Rashid Dostum who had been in control of important areas of land for years in the north of the country.

In Iraq, there is token opposition. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq has a very strong central power. The Baas regime and its ideology make the infrastructure, and therefore Saddam, even more powerful. Alongside the ideological infrastructure, unlike the Taliban, Iraq's ethnic and religious structure makes it more difficult to divide and disperse in a short period of time.

Iraqi opposition powers were formed under the title of the Iraqi National Congress, the INC in 1992. Shiite opposition in the south, Barzani in the north and Kurdish opposition Talabani along with all anti-Saddam sections are present in this organization. With Ahmet Çelebi as their president, the organization consisting of approximately 70 sub opposition groups does not have any unity.

The Shiite opposition in the north has close ties with Iran; they are trained in Iran and it is known that there leader lives there. The Sunni opposition does not trust the Shiites. Hence they are concerned that should Saddam be deposed, the Shiites will form a separate government in the south and a more powerful Iran may take control of the Basra Gulf. The Sunni opposition while hoping Saddam can be toppled on the one hand, also defends the unity of the country.

The opposition in Iraq is not a force at the current time and has no battle capabilities. The Kurdish groups in northern Iraq however are a different matter. The Kurds in the area number approximately 3 million. Half of this population inhabits the area controlled by Mesut Barzani in the north, the other half inhabit the southern area controlled by Celal Talabani. The area is also inhabited by approximately 1.5 million Turkic (Turkmen). There is no solidarity within the Kurdish groups. Within the two groups mentioned, there are many tribes and each tribe acts towards achieving its' own aims. Powerful conflicts of personal interest are rife.

The most obvious choice of group to lead an armed battle against Saddam would be the Kurds. However promises made over the years have never been kept. There is a strong feeling of anger and betrayal felt towards George Bush Sr .The Kurds always put their trust in others, but in the end have learned to live with the realities of the area and Saddam. The only time we may realistically expect action from this group against Saddam, is at a time close to his complete deposal.

Within Saddam's Iraq and its population of 22 million, he has put together an army of 400,000 and a Republican guard of 100,000 to defend the country. There is no serious internal opposition, with external support capable of maintaining a successful operation to depose Saddam at the present time, as was the case with Afghanistan.

Iraq has managed to replenish basic weapons systems such as tanks, cannons and warplanes within the last 10 years, and has reached a strong position. Also it has a powerful anti-aircraft missile system. It also possesses biological and chemical weapons. If necessary, Saddam will not hesitate to use such weaponry. Hence these weapons were employed when 5000 people were killed in Halepçe. It is common knowledge that Saddam does not possess a healthy nor stable personality. Therefore there hangs a question mark over how he may react to any situation.

In any operation against Iraq, the danger exists that these weapons may be used against US forces. In addition, they may target civilians within Israel, Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi Arabia with these Biological and Chemical weapons. They even target the USA and Europe.

It is not known for sure whether or not Saddam possesses nuclear weapons, but it is a distinct possibility that such weapons may have been smuggled into the country during the break up period of the former Soviet Union.

If we except that since Saddam gained power in 1979 he has constantly been involved in war, and maintained these battles with breaks of 10 year periods, it becomes more easier to see that Saddam is a difficult and uncooperative personality.

It can be maintained without question that nothing would please Saddam more than an attack on his country. This would be Saddam's last opportunity to prolong his reign for another 10 years.

Let us analyze the last Arab summit, which took place in the Lebanon.

The Iraqi Delegation Minister Izzet Ibrahim hugged the heir to the Saudi throne, Prince Abdullah and shook hands with Kuwait Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah el Ahmed el Sabah. The final statement of the summit reads, "Iraq, respects the independence, sovereignty and security of Kuwait, and this is a guarantee that the events of 1990 will never occur again". Even though the losses suffered and certain other issues remained unspoken, the Arab world had in this way, acquitted Saddam.

Despite certain optimistic scenarios suggesting that starting an operation against Iraq would lead to an immediate uprising of the opposition and the people in a revolt against Saddam, this not very realistic. It must be remembered that the Iraqi army would plan for any worst-case scenario. It is a reality that any probable operation against Iraq, would not be as easy and pass without losses, as was the case with Afghanistan. Any operation here would require the definite deployment of ground forces.

The force of 500,000 was used up in the Gulf War. It is thought that a force of 150,000-200,000 would be adequate against Iraq.Also, It would not be difficult to establish such a force.

The problem would be at the start of the operation. We can safely assume that there would be more losses than was suffered during Afghanistan and the Gulf War. Especially considering that when Saddam realizes he is going to lose, he would not hesitate to use his biological, chemical and perhaps even nuclear weapons, adding even more to the probable losses. In such an event, we can assume definite retaliation from the USA and this would only lead the area into chaos.

However either way, the invasion of Iraq, losses considered, would not be a difficult mission to complete.

The real problem would begin after the invasion. The battle against Iraqi and Arab soldiers, who would probably employ asymmetric war methods, would not be a short one. It may even be harder than the Palestine-Israeli battles.

The USA suffered approximately 30,000 losses in Vietnam. In all operations it has carried out or been involved with in since, (The Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan), minimal losses of personnel has been accepted as the fundamental strategy.

After a victory in Iraq, there will be a necessity for a large military presence to control the area. 40 – 50,000 NATO troops were required to protect the peace in the beginning in Bosnia. Iraq is 8 times larger than Bosnia in terms of land, and has a population 6 times as large. It is incomparable in terms of geography, and is suitable for a gerilla war. We can assume that troops in excess of 300,00 would be necessary for control of Iraq in the beginning.

Let us assume positive results from all the scenarios happened.

According to this, Iraq will be divided into a federal state made up of Central, Northern and Southern Iraq. This is a widespread, probable solution that has been put forward. According to this scenario, a federal, united Iraqi state will be formed with Kurds in the north, Sunni Arabs in central Iraq with Shiite Arabs sovereignty in the south. This solution would actually lead to dissolution and would turn upside down

geopolitics in the region. Regional nations such as Turkey, Iran and Syria would be seriously affected in the medium and long term under such an settlement.When Saddam realizes that defeat is inevitable,He would attack Israel with chemical and biological weapons.These attacks on Israel would pushIsraelis patience and resistance to the limit. Israel would probably not react to such attacks at first. But the involvement of Israel in any battle would lead the region into chaos, with the Arabs forming as an opposing union a very realistic assumption.

A question mark hangs over what stance How Iran would react in this situation. However the involvement of Iran in this operation, would take the problem from being an Arab one, to becoming one of a Muslim – Christian battle.

While no serious problems arosed from the war in Afghanistan, the probable results from an operation against Iraq are frightening.

During the operation against Iraq, China and Russia included, there was almost total global support. Iran kept silent while the remaining Arab nations didn't raise any serious issues.

An intervention can be made against Iraq, and Saddam may even be deposed, however the fight against terrorism would have lost an important basis. The international support needed in the fight against terrorism would be weakened.

In conclusion, an operation against Iraq will be very different to that carried out against Afghanistan.

The reasoning for an operation against Iraq, the foundation for legitimacy, the character of opposition operations, the structure of their armed forces, the political situation along with the probable international dynamics, is very different from the Afghanistan Model. If the same strategies are employed, there is very little chance of success.

I would like to come to a question posed by an American General friend and former US ANKARA Ambassador Mark Parris during a meeting at which I was a panelist. "We understand what problemswould be happened. But.how are we going to solve the Iraq problem?" I would like to repeat the answer I gave them here.

The damage that Saddam is doing to his country and the neighboring countries is clear. It is obvious that as soon as he is powerful enough he will threaten his neighbors. The number of Iraqi children that have died since 1990 is more than 500,000. Poverty in the country is widespread. The people in Saddam City in the country's northeast are on the verge of starvation.

Almost everyone agrees that Saddam is of no use to his own country, or to the region. The problem is when and how He will be toppeled. Perfect results require time and details. The best way for Saddam to be toppled is of natural causes.

The majority of the population dying of starvation holds the U.N and it's resolutions responsible. In other words there is a vicious circle. This has to be broken.

Finally I would like to quote Peter SENGE from his book "The 5th Discipline". "Two people in a raft go over the edge of a waterfall. The first person expends so much energy trying to survive that he dies of exhaustion. The second person holds his breath during the fall and after a while, rises to the surface due to the natural lift of the water".

Let us view the situation from a more discerning angle. Let us be patient and wait for the problem to be resolved by its natural course. During this period of transition let us aid in the education and improvement of the affluence of plainIraqi citizens, and also provide assistance to Iraq in trying to improve and build stronger ties with its' regional neighbors. We will all see that the result will be much more successful. Though we make it every day, we are unable to change history. But it is possible to learn from it.

Had the US implemented a more neutral stance in the region and taken certain economic and social measures prior to the attacks of September 11, and played a more serious part in trying to improve the democratic process as well as education activities in the regional nations, today they would possess a stronger credibility in the area.

The Strategy Of The "Political Deterrence" And The Future Of The Relations Between Iran And The U.S.

By: F. Etefaghfar[1]*

After more than two decades of the Islamic Revolution, the tension between Iran and the U.S. Still poses as the most important issue in Iran's foreign policy. The tension between Tehran and Washington not only affects Iran but on a larger scale effects the peace, security and stability of the region.

Recently there has been an important development in that respect. Behzad Nabavi, the deputy speaker of the Iranian parliament and the leader of a radical left wing Islamic group spoke of reducing the current tension between Iran and the U.S. His comments created a lot of reactions. Some supported him whilst others accused him of treason. This paper examines Nabavi's political background and the significant of the latest development in the current deadlock between the U.S. and Iran.

A heated debate has emerged in Iran between the two main political camps, the reformists and the conservatives. The debate is about the so-called "political deterrence" policy. The term was first introduced by Behzadeh Nabavi the leader of the Sazman Mojahedin Engelabe Islami (SMEI). (The Islamic warriors of the Islamic Revolution). Behzad Nabavi, one of the principal leaders of the SMEI used this term during a speech in Iranian parliament in June 12, 2002.

Soon the term was employed by the newspapers. The reformists or the supporters of president Khatami tended to support the idea behind the term, whilst the conservatives immediately dismissed it. What was so significant about this term and why did the two camps take such a contrasting view vis-à-vis the idea of political deterrence.

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The term "political deterrence" which was used by Behzad Nabavi actually meant reducing the tension between Iran and the U.S. In his speech Nabavi went further and stated that Iran must conduct such a policy towards the U.S to prevent future escalations of hostility between the two countries. He concluded that a prudent diplomatic course from Iran towards the U.S is a policy that avoids any possible confrontation between the two countries.

No sooner than the speech was delivered that it caused a political storm in Tehran. The issue is still being heatedly debated in Iran and there are no sign of it being cooled off. There are several important reasons why that speech and the notion of political deterrence turned into such a deeply controversial issue.

The first reason concerns the speaker himself, Behzad Nabavi. He is one of key leaders and founders of SMEI. The SMEI is one of the main constituents of the so-called "Second Khordad" groups. "Second of Khordad" refers actually to May 23, 1996 when president Khatami was the first time elected as the president. The SMEI not only supports president Khatami and is one the main "reformist" parties, it is well known as a deeply leftist organization.

The SMEI was formed in 1978 from merger of half a dozen smaller guerrilla organizations. They were radical, involved in armed struggle against the Shah and aimed at over throwing it. Their ideology and political outlook was in many ways similar to those of the Mujahedin Khalq or the People's Mujahedin.[2] Like the Mujahedin, it believed in an armed struggle to overthrow the Shah's regime. It regarded the Shah as a puppet of the U.S, and like the Mujahedin it regarded the

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[2]-The People's Mujahedin or Mujahedin Khalq was a radical Islamic movement which was formed in 1965. Whilst its founders were dedicated Muslims, the future leaders of the movement turned increasingly towards Marxism. Eventually in 1964 the leadership of the organization admitted publicly that they had abandoned Islam and embraced Marxism. After the Islamic Revolution in 1978, the Mujahedin turned against the Islamic regime. They currently live in Iraq.

struggle against the Iranian regime as part of a worldwide struggle against the world imperialism headed by the U.S.

Similar to those of the Mujahedin Khalq, the SMEI was influenced heavily by a mixture of third world revolutionary ideas, radical nationalism slogans and Marxian theories. The SMEI came out with an Islamic perspectives which was very radical, left wing, revolutionary, anti-western and anti-capitalism.

It charged the world economical order as being unfair to the third world countries. It further saw the World Bank, International Monitory Funds and other international financial institutions as the apparatus for multinational companies which plundered the undeveloped nations. In practice what differentiated between the SMEI and the Mujahedin was their affinity towards Marxism. Whereas the Mujahedin, heavily borrowed from Marxism and described it as a "scientific ideology which served the poor and down trodden", the SMEI did not go that far and tended to draw a line between Islam and Marxism. In fact, a number of founders and leading members of the SMEI were ex Mujahedin members who had become disappointed with their organization's strong support for Marxism.

Support for Marxism was not the only issue which differentiated between the Mujahedin and the SMEI. Whereas the Mujahedin became increasingly critical of the Islamic regime and eventually declared armed rebellious against it, the SMEI on the contrary became an important ally of the regime. As can be expected however, they constituted a radical and leftist ally of the Islamic regime. Immediately after the Revolution, Behzad Nabavi was involved with armed militia groups. Several of it's the key figures such as Javad Mansuri and others joined the newly established Revolutionary Guards and formed its leadership. Along with the radical clergy who dominated the Revolutionary Council, the SMEI became increasingly critical of the

Provisional Revolutionary government of Mohandes Mehdi Bazargan and its moderate policies. One area where the SMEI was in particular critical of Mohandes Bazargan policy was over the latter's conciliatory policy towards the U.S. In conjunction with the other radical groups such as the Marxist Fedaiian Khalq, the Mujahedin, some of the clerical leaders, the Islamic Republic Party, the Marxist Tudeh Party, and most important of all, the late Imam Khomeini himself, the SMEI too adopted an ever increasing anti-American stand. When the U.S Embassy was occupied by the radical Islamic students movement in November 1979, the SMEI was amongst the first Islamic political parties which gave its unequivocal support for the embassy seizure. In a lengthy statement, the SMEI explained that since the end of the world war II the U.S had acted against the interests of Iranian people. The 1953 military coup during which Mosadegh's nationalist government was overthrown in favour of the Shah was the start of a dark period in the U.S. Iran relationship. Following the coup and re-installing of the Shah, during the next 25 years the U.S. pursued policies which were detrimental to Iran's national interests. It accused the U.S. for turning the Shah as the gendarme of the Persian Gulf. A policy which coasted Iran bilious of dollars which were mainly used to purchase arms from the U.S. Rather than resulting in peace, security and stability in the region, the policy led into an expensive arms-race in the Persian Gulf making it one of the least secure places in the world.

Next the SMEI accused the U.S. of commanding the Shah to embark on a development strategy which prevented Iran from genuine socio-economical development.

The SMEI next charged the U.S. government under the Carter administration during which the Islamic Revolution took place, of assisting the Shah and thus opposing

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Iranian people in their just struggle against a corrupt and despotic regime. It accused Washington of being responsible for ordering the Shah to kill the Iranians who had risen against his tyrannical rule. Since the Revolution, the SMEI stated that the Americans had tried to oppose the Islamic Revolution by helping and colluding with counter-revolutionary elements. The U.S. last move against Iranian people was providing sanctuary for the Shah. It therefore gave its full support to the heroic action of the Islamic students.

In fact a number of the students who had taken part in the Embassy seizure were either members of the organization or were its supporters.

As the power struggle between the moderate Islamists one hand, and the radical Islamist led by the militant clergy who had gathered in the Islamic Republic Party on the other hand, intensified the SMEI rallied behind the hardliners and openly advocated the removal of the moderates from the government. Like most of the other militant groups, the fall of the first Islamic president, Bani Sadr, in May 1980, proved to be a turning point in the SMEI rise to power.

Mohammad Ali Rajaii who was elected as the second Iranian Islamic president in May 1981, was a close associate of Behzad Nabavi. Both Nabavi and Rajaii had spent many years in prison under the Shah. They had started their political lives with the Mujahedin and as the later had shifted toward Marxism they both had turned away from it.

Rajaii who had replaced the moderate Bani Sadr was a strongly dedicated Islamists. Unlike Bani Sadr, he had strong ties with the militant clergy and was widely supported by virtually all the radical Islamic groups. Nabavi's rise to power was indeed swift. He became the right hand man of the president. However, Rejaii's presidency did not last very long.

In a carefully designed assassination plot carried out by the Mujahedin in August 1981, Rajaii together with his premier Mohammad Javad Bahoonar was instantly killed as a result of a powerful explosion in the presidential palace. Nabavi was not present at the time of the explosion. There were however some rumors trying to implicate him in that plot.

In the cabinat of Mir Husein Mosavi which came to power after the assassination of Rejaii, Nabavi still held a key position. One of the important tasks which were assigned to Nabavi was negotiation with the U.S. for the release of the American hostages through mediation of the Algerian government. The Algerian Accord which was signed between Iran the U.S., ended the so-called Hostage crisis. A crisis which ran for 444 days and created much hostilities and mistrust between the two countries. The death of Ayatullah Khomeini in 1989 marked the beginning of the fall of the Islamic left from the power. The end of the war with Iran in 1988, too, acted against the left.

In contrast to the early years 1980s which marked the rise of the Islamic left in Iran, the concluding years of that decade witnessed the demise of the left. Nabavi along with the other prominent leftist Islamic figures went into "early retirement. He was rejected for the nomination of the Majles election by the Guardian Council in 1990. During the first decade of the Islamic Revolution, Nabavi and his organization became to be known as the most radical and leftist components of the Islamic regime. One area where the SMEI's political views became to be widely recognized was its attitude towards the U.S. Nabavi along with the other SMEI leader emphatically opposed any rapprochement with the U.S.

During the 1980s and 1990s the SMEI media particularly its main weekly "Asrema" wrote many articles, essays and analysis explaining the reasons why it was important

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to follow Iran Khomeini's guideline on the U.S. and not to have any dialogue with the Americans. Even when president Khatami embarked on its "detent" foreign policy, the SMEI cautioned that Iran's new foreign policy should exclude normalization with the U.S.

It was against this background that when Nabavi made his conciliatory remarks towards the U.S. it fell like a bombshell in Tehran. Nabavi's speech was unexpected, sudden and caught every one by surprise. He did not propose negotiation between Iran and the U.S. instead he suggested that Iran must adopt a "deterrent" policy towards the U.S. so as not provide the anti-Iranian elements in Washington with excuses to attack Iran.

The hardliners reaction to the speech was swift and strong. They dismissed it as naïve and foolish. Nabavi was accused of political stupidity, ignorance and cowardice. In the past when liberal minded Iranians criticized the hostility between Iran and the U.S., and were attacked by the hardliners they became quite. But Nabavi retorted to the hardliners and accused certain political quarters of deliberately conducting an anti U.S. policy in order to bring about a showdown between the two countries. He said they were seeking a confrontation with the U.S. so as to create a political crisis as a resolute of which they would benefit politically. When such a crisis is prevailed in Iran, Nabavi explained, the hardliners would use it as a pretext to clamp down the reformists and to further curtail the political freedom. During the next few weeks there were a numbers articles some defending Nabavi and others attacking him. It is still a heated debate amongst political circles in Iran. It would be to early to make any concrete conclusion about the new twist in the long running dispute between Iran and the U.S., but it cab be stated that the new development makes a water shed in future relations between Iran and the U.S.

TURKISH THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC DYNAMICS

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TURKISH THREAT PERCEPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC DYNAMICS

INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War years have radically revised Turkey's threat perceptions. For nearly half a century the Soviet Union stood at the core of Turkish threat perceptions—hence Turkey's NATO membership and security alliance with the United States. In essence Greece ranked higher than the Soviet Union as a source of threat to Turkish security due to the gravity of the dispute over the Aegean, but Moscow's control over half of Europe, its claim to be the vanguard of proleterian internationalism, and its mammoth military power that overhung in Turkey's north made Greece pale somewhat as a source of threat in Turkish eyes throughout the Cold War.

Today Turkey and Turks do not see Russia as a threat. This is not only because of the latter's strategic retrenchment but equally because of the increase in the scope and channels of bilateral and multilateral exchanges. Several million Russian tourists have visited Turkey over the last decade. Turkish goods worth billions of dollars entered the Russian market while Russian natural gas worth several times more will continue to heat Turkish homes over the next thirty years. Major Turkish construction companies helped in the face-lifting of post-Soviet Moscow in the 1990s. There are areas where the two compete, but the dominant element in this competition is trade, not military security.

Turkish-Greek threat perceptions have also undergone change but not as deeply as in the case with Russia. While a new era of Turkish-Greek dialogue

was initiated by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Greek foreign Minister Yorgo Papandreau in Summer 1999 at about the same time when earthquakes hit both Istanbul and Athens, there has been no progress towards a resolution of the substantive issues. On the other hand, the prospect of Turkey's accession to the EU has persuaded Turkey to do its utmost to desist from confrontation and brinkmanship in the Aegean—the traditional form of bilateral interaction since roughly mid-1970s—while Athens' new foreign policy objective of being perceived as the leading force for peace and stability in Southeastern Europe has demanded similarly cautious behavior on the part of Greece.

In contrast to the greatly relaxed security environment in Turkey's European hinterland, the Middle East and Gulf region to her south and southeast have inspired a deep sense of anxiety and insecurity for a range of different reasons. This is another major difference with the Cold War period when Turkey in general did not feel threatened from the south. This did not mean that there were no problems. On the contrary, relations with Soviet-ally Syria in particular and the Arab world in general were far from friendly. Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy in general and membership in the NATO alliance in particular were not found acceptable by a a majority of Arab countries. Yet, if one discounted the heavy Soviet connection, the Middle East/Gulf region did not confront Turkey with any serious security threat.

II. MIDDLE EASTERNISATION" OF TURKEY'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS

The general shift in the regional focus and content of Turkey's threat perceptions towards the Middle East against the background of the positive transformation of the security landscape in Europe is the product of the confluence of several new external and internal developments. External developments that are unique to the post-Cold War Middle East/Gulf region with impact on Turkish threat perceptions will be summarised below. (This study will not include an analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a security threat to Turkey. Though Turkey is only indirectly affected by the conflict in strict territorial and military terms, its negative political impact on Turkish foreign policy and domestic politics has been highly negative. Like all regional actors, Turkey has to cope with a volatile, combustible and hence uncomfortable regional environment generated by the shocks, tremors and instabilities ensuing from the conflict. Turkey is significantly engaged on the diplomatic and moral plane, extending full recognition and support to the Palestinian State since it was first declared in 1988, and later to the peace process and the Palestinian Authority. It has condemned terrorism conducted against innocent civilians, by whichever side and whatever means.)

Next we shall explore the nature of Turkish security concerns in the south and the possible reasons behind them.

III. NEW INSECURITIES IN THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

While the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains the predominant security problem, issues of more recent origin have added grave new tensions and instabilities, with direct impact on Turkish security. Three of these stand out as

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the most acute: the future political status and role of Iraq in the region, the growing risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and proliferation of terrorism. Needless to say, while the three are interrelated and interactive, they are at the same time intimately interconnected to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Iraq

Since its defeat by coalition forces in 1991, Iraq's sovereignty has been subjected to various forms of restrictions, purportedly legitimized on a combination of legal and humanitarian grounds. Today the future of Iraq hangs in the air at two levels: Baghdad's claim to territorial sovereignty over the entire land has seriously eroded, with the country having been *de facto* divided into three self-governing regions, and second, the ability of President Saddam Hussein's regime to survive is very much in question given the declared determination of the Bush Administration to topple him at a time and by means of its own choosing.

The question of Iraq is inherently very complicated also because it is not entirely certain that Baghdad has been disarmed of its WMD capability—ashas been mandated by the United Nations. The risk that Iraq continues to pursue and in fact possess WMD capability becomes all the more threatening for the region when one recalls Iraq's unacceptably bad behaviour in the past towards some of its neighbors and citizens. It started two wars in the time span of one decade, occupying and annexing a small and peaceful country. It used chemical weapons not only against combatants in the war with Iran, but against its own people.

In short, therefore, Iraq has been a major source of insecurity and instability in the Middle East/Gulf region since the 1980s and 1990s, and continues to be one today. A reformed, better-behaved Iraq would very much serve the purposes of regional peace and stability. The challenge for the Middle East/Gulf region is to help bring about such an Iraq without causing further suffering to the people of Iraq and without further destablising the region. Yet, nobody in the region seems prepared to advance proposals on how to bring about such an Iraq. The Bush Administration seems to be the only power center among the world's other leading centers to be absolutely certain that the ultimate solution lies in one single course of action: the removal of Saddam Hussein and his replacement by a new, "democratic government." While the end seems clear, however, confusion and discord seem to prevail the question of the means.

Turkey is one of those regional actors most outspoken on the question, insisting that the preservation of Iraq intact is imperative for overall regional security and stability as well as for Turkey's own security.

Turkish concerns operate at two levels, regional and national.

At the regional level, Turks are extremely concerned about the negative repercussions of a possible break-up of Iraq on the region. Would it open a new chapter in regional competition among Iraq's neighbors? Would it invite more intervention by external powers? Would it encourage and intensify terrorism of all sorts? These are some of the many questions that will surface if and when Iraq disintegrates. Similar questions would be equally valid if and when Saddam is removed. All the unknowns about the successor regime's capacity to govern in line with the wish of all Iraqis give one cause for deep worry.

At the national level, Turkish concerns are built around a single scenario: the federalisation of Iraq along ethnic lines -Kurds in the north, Arabs in the middle, Shiites in the south- which, Turkey suspects, ultimately would pave the way to separation, and declaration of independence by the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south, leaving a dismembered Arab state centered around Baghdad.

A new Kurdish entity in Turkey's south would, Turkey fears, present a highly attractive alternative to Turkey's own Kurdish population concentrated in the country's southeast directly adjacent to the presently-hypothetical Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

In short, therefore, the problem of Iraq and how it is resolved raises a more fundamental question: Are current developments around Iraq laying the groundwork for redrawing the political map of the Middle East/Gulf region, thus ushering in a whole new phase in an already unstable region?.

WMD Proliferation

The two gulf wars, coming in quick succession, provided a crude awakening to many in the international community about how real the threat of the proliferation of WMDs in the region had become.

Notwithstanding the Turkish insistence on the imperative of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq, the possibility of a WMD-capable Iraq is very much on the list of risks perceived by the Turkish security policy community. Accordingly Turkey tries to bring pressure on Baghdad for it to cooperate with UNMOVIC. The importance of cooperating with UN arms inspectors lies not only in the expectation that Iraq would thus be prevented from acquiring WMD

capability, but also in the anticipation that such cooperation would deprive Washington of an excuse to strike at Saddam's Iraq.

Iran's fast improving ballistic missile capability, and American and Israeli-based charges of its intention to acquire nuclear weapons capability through the development, with Russian assistance, of a 1000- megawatt nuclear reactor at Busher are a new element in the region's security landscape. The interesting thing about these programs is the fact that in Iran there is solid popular and elite support behind them. While the Iranian political system seems to be softening on several fronts, on questions of security and nuclear policy the conservatives and the reformists, as well as their respective constituencies, are united in support of the present policies and programs.

Though not at all comparable to Iraq, Iran continues to present a difficult case regional security and stability. For several years now Iran has been engaged in a peace offensive above all else towards its Gulf neighbors. At the same time, however, it has not reneged from programs that are charged by many knowledgeable circles in the world —not exclusively by those in the U.S. and Israel either- as being connected to a future WMD capability. Moreover, it has continued to support anti-Israeli terrorism, thus contributing to the deepening of the conflict. For these two reasons, in particular, it has earned the "axis of evil" label from President Bush—despite its positive contribution to the initial anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. Iran's new peaceful face on the one hand, and its identification with WMD programs and international terrorism on the other inevitably turn Iran into a risky regional player about whose future plans and intentions about the region one may never be confident about.

Terrorism.

Clearly terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. What is relatively new is the greater incidence of state-sponsored terrorism. Providing sanctuary to terrorists is one form of state-sponsored terrorism. An important example here is the behavior of Syria in the case of the PKK, the terrorist organisation led by Abdullah Ocalan until his capture in 1999. Completely disregarding repeated Turkish pleas, Syria protected and supported Ocalan for years, supplying and training his guerrillas at Bekaa Valley until late 1998 when the threat of use of force by Turkey convinced Damascus of the wisdom of sending Ocalan out of the country. Turkish authorities have for years pleaded with Iran, too, but to no avail. PKK guerillas are still known to be operating on Iranian soil.

IV. DOMESTIC SOURCES OF THREAT

The domestic situation in the post-Cold war era has confronted turkey with a very important challenge to its territorial integrity: the Kurdish insurgency. The PKK resorted to terrorism to bend the will of the Turkish state, and in the end to defeat it, in order to set up an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. Since this is an internationally well-known development, it is mentioned here only briefly just to set the record straight.

A second major domestic source of insecurity for Turkey recently has been the crisis that hit the economy about two years ago. the crisis has hit and impoverished Turkey largely as a result of gross mismanagement –called "bad governance" in IMF/World Bank terminalogy- both in the public sector and in the Turkish corporate world. The negative impact of the dark side of

globalisation such as the volatility of markets has also had its share in fuelling the crisis.

These domestic developments inevitably constrain the room for maneuver that foreign and security policy makers would normally enjoy in developing a particular set of policies to a particular set of problems, depriving them of alternative instruments that they may wish to employ when approaching the outside world.

V. CONCLUSION

From the Turkish perspective, if the number one security issue in the Middle East/Gulf region is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the second one is the fate of Iraq. An Iraq eventually dismembered would be very destabilising development for the whole region in general and for Turkey. But, a WMD-capable Iraq is almost equally problematic for the region. The challenge is to find the right answer to this two-pronged "Iraq dilemma" without once more making this country a target of American-British air power, and perhaps even of ground forces. Needless to say, the WMD capability that Iran is suspected of perceiving, and its growing ballistic missile capability are seen as potential forces of threat in the region.

The expected U.S. attack
On Iraq
And the emergance of Iran
As the main Regional power   by Hassan Issa

Days before president Bush's trip to Europe – a U.S. site on internet- specialized in terrorism and security – displayed countdown for the expected U.S. attack on Iraq – showing that the invasion will take place in 198 days and 9 hours – (in about seven months)

After which president Bush set off on his trip to meet with the leaders of: Russia-Germany-France-Italy in an effort to convince them to support his anti-terrorism campaign – where as – his main objective was to secure their support to his intended campaign on Iraq.

Knowing their reservations towards his intention to extend his anti-terrorism campaign – unlimited in time or extent – and in particular against Iraq – he concentrated his efforts to convince them by assuring that:

   a. He had no ready military plan – either for the invasion or for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime.

   b. Reassuring them of his intention to consult with them – prior to the attack.

   c. Expressing possible readiness to resort to the Security Council to obtain approval on the basis that Iraq violated UN. Resolutions.

* Bush's stance against Iraq:-

   1. Bush's hate to Saddam is defined in the Middle East as "Hysterical Hate" – which makes his position towards Iraq un-objective – and in a sense – destructive.

2. Bush has definitely reached a decision to overthrow Saddam and his regime – and do not accept his son "Kasey" as his successor.

3. Bush will not resort again to the policy of "Containment" – or "Dual Containment" – or even "Box" Saddam (as was done with Castro)

4. Bush bases this decision on his belief that: Iraq (despite almost eight years of U.N. inspection) still passes W.M.D. which threatens the U.S. and its friends – and also – does not submit to UN Resolutions – which justifies collective International action against Iraq.

5. Bush – therebor – went off to rally support – by possible trying to :

   <u>- Convince Russia – by:</u>

   a. Promising to expedite – badly needed – loans from International Organizations.

   b. Waving the possibility of its membership to NATO

   c. Reminding of an eight Billion U.S. Dollars debt – that would be returned to Russia by the new Iraqi regime.

   d. Promising not to revoke any previous oil Agreements between Russia and Iraq.

   <u>-Convince Germany – France – Italy – by :</u>

   a. Promising them a share in the "New Iraq"

   b. Relieving them of their fears of the partition of Iraq as a result of the attack.

   c. Reminding them of Iraq's possession of W.M.D and its definite dangers on Europe and its interests.

* Main problems hindering the attack on Iraq :-

According to the countdown – on Internet – the imminent attack on Iraq was delayed until the beginning of the year 2003 – this delay is believed not to be a reassessment period – nor is it a result of the deteriorating situation between Israelis and Palestinians – nor is it mainly because of expectations of the future of the VS campaign in Afghanistan – But is believed to be – mainly because that President Bush – actually – has no final plan for the overthrow of Saddam and his Regime- .

He has no plan – for several reasons – most important are:

(1) Differences inside the American Administration that became so acute between political, Security and Military agencies – over vital issues such as :-

> 1st- Size and effectiveness of any attack forces – specially in the absence of a regional partner (other them possibly Turkey and Qatar) that would extend effective logistical support.

B-General / Dawning's plan of attack, is considered almost a carbon copy of the plan applied in Afghanistan (Arial bombing – limited commando ground attack – Local Militias assistance) is criticized on the basis that :-

1) Iraq is not Afghanistan – and the Iraqi army (despite the loss of two thirds of its forces) is not Talban.

2) W.M.D. that are possibly still in Saddam's arsenal – will not hesitate to use if cornered by the attacking forces.

3) The Presidential Guard -which is still intact and highly trained and armed- can not be compared with Talban. And costly combat that will take place in inhabited and populated cities,

towns and streets of Iraq is different than combat in barren mountains of Afghanistan.

4) Consequently this still leads to the necessity to deploy more infantry forces, primarily estimated to be over one Hundred and fifty Thousand – and more equipment (planes – tanks – Armored Carriers etc) to cope with street – and as expected – door to door fighting.

2- Extent of Saddam's readiness:

A. He Reorganized his "Administration" to be in three levels – the highest and closest to him includes his son "Kasey" and his personal secretary the second level consists of the highest level officials (Tarek Aziz – Taha Yassin Ramadan – Aly Almagid – his son "Kasey"- General / Abed Hamoud, Saddam's personal secretary) – the third level consists of all Cabinet Ministers – Army Generals – Directors of security organizations – Party Leaders – All assigned to execute measures to protect the regime

B. He developed new stringent plans and tactics to protect himself and his family (secret and alternate residences that are changed daily – steel lined underground bunters – Redeployment of Rocket Launchers etc …) –

C. Consolidated his personal relations with tribal Leaders and Army Generals and popular Leaders etc.. – lavishly sending them gifts and money (similar to what he did before his invasion of Kuwait) .

D. To ensure the non reoccurrence of the 1991 uprising (Intifada) in Iraq (which he most brutally crushed), he assigned his son

"Kasey" to be responsible of organizing special Militias trained specially to crush similar probable popular uprisings and his cousin "Fatek Karim Al – Majeed" to be responsible for the Presidential Guard and the Security of all Presidential residences.

E. Forming new suicidal units that would act upon direct orders from him – these units were formed mainly from dissidents from Iranian "Mujahidi Khalk" and some Palestinian extreme organizations

F. Nevertheless – the Iraqi people – frustrated, exhausted, provoked, oppressed, hungry and most of all humiliated – would, despite all Saddam's preparations, explode in a popular uprising if it sees evident and serious signs that this uprising will not be crushed by Saddam the same brutal way he did in 1991 – (only this time it will be even more brutal)- .

3 – Problems of Succession for both Saddam and his regime:-

A. The probable successor to the present Iraqi regime and Saddam, would have naturally been the Iraqi opposition group in exile – calling them selves "The Iraqi National Congress" headed by "Ahmad Al-Gilbi" proved to be almost useless and powerless :

   1) Has no supporters – or followers inside Iraq – contrary to what they claimed

   2) They received what is said to be twenty Million Dollars during the last few years – that went mostly to their pockets – while conducting their "opposition from Hotel lobbies" in England, France and the U.S.

3) Contrary to the Afghani "Northern Coalition" – (which had thousands of armed and trained fighters) the Iraqi opposition has none – inside or outside Iraq –

4) The Afghani example of "Karazai", so for, did not prove to be as successful as expected (Internal chaos – Tribal frictions – No secure effective government etc…) to the extent that "Karazai" and his government are requesting UN intervention with a peace – keeping force – urgently – to maintain law and order – The same example applied in Iraq – would be a complete failure (due to the nature of Iraq's composition)- therefore, it is imperative to prepare appropriate substitutes before contemplating the thought of overthrowing Saddam and his regime otherwise – the alternative would be total chaos – that would ultimately spill over across the boarders to the extremely sensitive oil producing Arab Gull-countries - .

* Probable Alternatives to Saddam and his Regime

(1) Since Iraqi opposition has lost its credibility – and even its authenticity – the only possible local force that would help the attacking force – from the inside of Iraq – would logically be the Kurds in the North of Iraq. (They have the necessary armed and trained forces – they have the motives to overthrow Saddam – like the "Northern Coalition" in Afghanistan, they are almost inside Iraq) their main drawback was the fact that for years they were fighting each other (Talbany and Barazani lost almost three thousand dead during their war with each other) - . So before employing their services, it is imperative that an effective peace would prevail among them before involving them in that endeavor -

Probably that is the reason why the U.S. brought "Galal Talbany" leader of the "National Kurdistani Union" and "Masoud Barzani" leader of the "Kurdistani National Party"- to sign a pact in Washington in 1998 – and again in Berlin in the presence of George Tenet – which also explains why the US – managed to secure its contact with all four Kurdish organizations – called the "Group of Four" – which includes also the other two main organizations "the Reconciliation movement" and the "Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution"-

(2) During Saddam's rule, several Iraqi Generals managed to escape his Dictatorship , others who still are in Iraq but were either expelled from the army or retired – are mostly reputed and in many cases, tribally well connected or popularly respected for their nationalism and opposition – secretly – to Saddam's rule – All, are would – be supporters to any serious well organized campaign, Internationally supervised and supported -.

(3) A "Shadow Government" would be in formation – now – if a campaign is scheduled by early 2003 – A government that would include top level civil-servants in all major fields (oil – media – Infrastructure specially civil works like water, electricity, bridges etc...) – to avoid probable chaos and sabotage. (Saddam's son "Kasey" was quoted saying that "what Ben- Laden did would look like child's play compared to what would happen if "Saddam" was angry (probably true).

(4) Assassination of Saddam, although extremely difficult – under the local and security circumstances -but not impossible – except that, the after – effects, would be devastating – internally and regionally -.

* Probable results of the downfall of Saddam and his Regime

1) The most probable result would be the separation of Iraq into three mini Iraqs :

      A. A Kurdish Iraq in the North – supported by Turkey

      B. A Shiite Iraq in the South – supported by Iran .

      C. A Sunni Iraq in the center – supported by neighboring Sunni Arab countries –

2) This separation would – in turn – have the following probable results :-

      A. Unrest, if not armed feuds, between the three parts of Iraq – that would eventually spill over to neighboring countries.

      B. A direct and serious threat to the production and flow of oil in the area.

      C. The Balance of Power in the area would be fatally disrupted – since, in the absence of Iraq, Iran will remain as the only regional power – a fact that would constitute an imminent danger to main Arab oil – producing countries in the area (Emirates – Kuwait – Saudi Arabia)

* The emergence of Iran as the main Regional power

1. The result would be that Iran's historical claims and aspirations in the Arab (or Persian) Gulf – would ultimately be consolidated – Since the early sixties, Iran had already established effective presence in the area :

      A. Before the "Seven Trucial States of Oman" became the United Arab Emirates, Iranian infiltrators swarmed the "

Seven Trucial States" – and what has been noticed then that the majority of them were of a certain age-group (18-30 years old)- and mostly completed their military service in the Iranian Army – It was also noticed, then, that crates, supposedly containing medicines for the Iranian School in Dubai or Containing medicines for the Iranian Hospital in Sharjah – proved to be containing guns and ammunition that were found – later - stored in the basement of the Iranian School – which clearly meant, then, that Iran managed to secure a small army in the Gulf Emirates – (De – Facto occupation).

B. Since the Sixties, Iran considered Bahrain an Iranian province. And based on the fact that the majority of inhabitants in Bahrain were Shiites, Iran, in consolidation of its claims on Bahrain and in defiance of opposite claims, asked the United Nations to conduct a Public Referendum in which Bahrainis would decide either independence or unity with Iran. In the mean time, there was an Iranian Representative for Bahrain in the Iranian parliament -.

C. Iranian Gun Boats chased Saudis out of two Saudi islands on which they were drilling for oil – on the basis that it was Iranian territory and waters.

D. A sizeable number of Kuwaitis are of Iranian origin. But more important, the economy of Kuwait is mostly in their hands, which in turn gives them political and actual power in Kuwait. As a show of power, Iranians in Kuwait completely covered the asphalt road from the airport to the Royal guest's palace, with Persian carpets, so that the Shah, who

was on a state visit to Kuwait, would not be driven on a normal road.

Iran is still as powerful and influential – if not more – politically, economically and specially as a main exporter of religious Shiite revolutionary thought – Alone, as a regional power, its aspirations in oil producing countries in the area, can be materialized-

2. Would enable Iranian intervention in :-

    A. Lebanon – in support of "Hezbollah"

    B. West Bank and Gaza – in support of Jihad

    C. The north of Israel to support Israeli Arabs- and as Israel said – Iran already established contact.

3. With alleged capabilities to produce the A- Bomb by the year 2005 (with Russian and/ or Chinese help) and considering the fact that Iran has already developed "Shihab" Missiles –

A Total reassessment of the Balance of Power in the area would be definitely conducted – which would entail action (Political and / or Military).

Ambassador Hassan Issa

Transparency and Confidence Building Measures: An Israeli View

Prepared for the

Regional Security Panel
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by
Shmuel Limone

The International Experience

1. Transparency is a relatively young term in the vocabulary of international relations, or – in a narrower and more specific definition – in the reservoir of confidence measures designed to promote stability and trust amongst nations. The basic idea underlying the concept of transparency is, of course, not new. But in its present form transparency owes its origin to the post-war European reality.

2. Transparency denotes a readiness of government to disclose information on military matters to foreign parties. In its most typical form, transparency has been expressed in those arms control conventions which allow each State Party to verify by itself the status of weapons systems slated for dismantlement by another State Party. Nevertheless, even in a less intrusive environment transparency presupposes a disclosure of hitherto undisclosed matters and hence – an inevitable molting of the secrecy that typically cloaks national security matters.

3. The experience gathered from the application of the principle of transparency in military affairs may be summarized in the following observations:

a. Transparency concerns a sovereign, voluntary and in most cases, an irreversible decision. As a means to increasing mutual confidence, a demonstration of transparency must, therefore, be based, first and foremost, on self confidence. Any attempt to require, let alone compel a free country to exercise transparency in areas it deems sensitive, would, therefore, erode the very foundation and purpose of the concept.

b. Transparency may be practiced more easily and naturally in democratic surroundings. Israel would argue that the nature of its regime makes it already abundantly transparent also to unfriendly observers. Any additional investment in military transparency would thus exacerbate an already unfavorable "transparency balance" between Israel and transparency demanding, often autocratic, Arab countries. Put it in another way:

    (1) A culture that encourages open public debate, accountability and the rule of law is more naturally suited to the idea of transparency. At the same time, the conceptual world of democratic societies places them in an a-priori vulnerable position vis a vis insulated societies. The practices of free speech, free opinions and free media that characterize an open society allows outsiders to observe and study its strengths and weaknesses with relative ease. The liberal use of the freedom of expression, so prevalent in Israel also in central national security matters, contrasts sharply with that which exists in most Arab countries.

    (2) A genuine transparency in national security matters cannot endure in an environment of

societal closeness. It is not surprising that in the cold war context, inter-state transparency was preceded by a necessary *glasnost* in the relations of the Soviet government and its citizenry. Israel does not link military transparency to societal transparency. But it would maintain that the main lesson to be drawn from the international experience in this matter is that a process of military openness cannot begin, let alone last, without a strong prior demonstration of domestic tolerance. In other words, countries that preach military transparency to others ought first to practice internal transparency themselves.

c.   A far reaching transparency in a depth and scope can prosper only in a climate of trust and peaceful relations between countries. In this respect it should be noted that:

(1)   Transparency did not occur in the context of antagonistic relations between East and West even when both superpowers agreed on curtailing the arms race between them. Indeed, rather than serving as a catalyst to the evolution of confidence between formerly hostile nations, transparency has come to symbolize the result of such confidence. The foundations of the process of openness, which were ultimately to chart a new course for East-West relations, were laid down in the '75 Helsinki Final Act that recognized the borders and the territorial integrity of all the European states.

(2)   Such a mandatory recognition does not exist, and is still not possible, in the Middle East. Even the Stockholm Document of '86, which

instituted transparency in military affairs (especially through the introduction of aerial and on-site inspection of certain, defined military activities) was agreed by **all** the states in Europe. The Middle East lacks any forum, let alone a security organ, in which all rival parties participate. Moreover, not only are key Mideastern states not parties to a peace with Israel, they do not even take part in any dialogue with her.

d. Transparency is, necessarily, an experimental, gradual and incremental process. It requires patience and time; demands getting accustomed to and assumes a progression from the relatively easy to the more difficult. Israel's experience teaches that those, who in the name of transparency have demanded that it disclose information on vital security assets, have consistently refused to respond much more elementary and modest suggestions themselves. The record shows that a large Arab county which insisted that Israel exhibit transparency in specified cases of advanced military technology, balked at providing basic data on its defense budget or at furnishing even plain CV's of its most senior officers.

e. By its very nature a voluntary, proactive policy of transparency creates new risks to the side which practices it. As mentioned above, it requires that the sides benefiting from it offer reciprocal steps. This is not to say that unilateral steps of transparency, or even unilateral arms control measures, are not feasible. But, over time, preserving and developing such measures would be possible only if all the relevant parties partake in their execution. Transparency must, therefore, be pursued in a

systemic, systematic and multilateral approach, and evolve on an agreed, verifiable and reciprocal basis.

Israel's position

3. With the view of the threats directed against it and of the international experience in transparency measures, Israel has an interest in instituting steps that would reduce tensions, increase predictability and, in general, alleviate apprehensions of hostile intents. Promoting transparency in military affairs in the Middle East would, therefore, serve this Israeli interest.

4. At the same time, Israel's position on transparency also reflects the constraints of the political and security reality in which it lives and operates. Israel's expectations and policy on this matter may, therefore, be described as follows:

    a. Israel recognizes the deep changes that have occurred in its relations with Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries in the Middle East. It has demonstrated its desire to contribute to the development of peaceful relations with these countries by offering a number of openness and transparency measures also in military matters. These included inviting Mideastern military officers and defense officials to visit training camps, defense production facilities, the Soreq Atomic research reactor, exchange of information on defense budgets and on senior officers, early notifications on military manouvers and an offer to discuss military doctrines. It is worthy to note that military transparency measures were recommended in an openly discussed planning staff work that prepared Israel's position in advance of the peace negotiations with Syria.

b. Israel is convinced that the current – real and potential – threats it faces, do not warrant the disclosure of large segments of its national security assets. Transparency does not lend itself to selectivity. Any attempt to apply transparency to a select few would inevitably mean a transparency for all. National security considerations mandate that Israel treats as classified even matters which it would have been ready to disclose to those Arab countries which opted to live in peace with it. From an Israeli perspective, the multi-rival environment characteristic of the Middle-East, requires that transparency be practiced by every relevant player in the region. Absent an all-azimuth reciprocity, transparent measures demanded of Israel could thus be perceived by it as constricting, rather than enhancing, confidence.

c. Israel does not believe, and has not been swayed by arguments raised in this respect, that opaqueness in certain defense areas weakens the security of those Mideastern states wishing to maintain good neighborly relations with it. To a large extent, the deterrence image Israel believes it must uphold is based, among other things, on the uncertainty that surrounds the full scope of its defense capabilities (and which is directed against those who define themselves as its enemies, not its friends). Viewed from this perspective, military over-exposure is liable to accentuate vulnerabilities in Israel's security posture. It might encourage aggression and thus could undermine stability in the Mideast region.

d. Israel believes that transparency in defense matters ought to be associated with social and regime openness. At present, the information publicly available in Israel on security and foreign policy

matters is much broader, clearer and more accessible than that existing in the majority of Arab countries. A voluntary release of information in additional security areas, as required by certain Arab states, would, therefore, be more easily accepted if accompanied by the development of a more open and tolerant public ambiance in these countries.

e. An expansion of the peace circle between Israel and Mid-Eastern countries would allow Israel to apply the practice of transparency to other, more secluded areas of its security. Indeed, Israel is not reluctant to admit that it considers the benefit of transparency as an added incentive for the establishment of peaceful relations with it. As seen from Israel, transparency should not necessarily be viewed as a precurser to but the natural outcome of peace and arms control agreements in the Middle East.

f. And lastly, as long as this does not jeopardize its vital security interests, Israel is ready to contribute its part to strengthen transparency in the international arena. It is for this reason that Israel fulfills, in a conspicuous contrast to its neighbors, the reporting requirements to the UN Register, both as regards import and export of major conventional weapon systems.

Conclusion

5. With its special security circumstances in mind, Israel views favorably the expansion of the regional transparency concept in the military domain. As a first and preferred policy choice Israel would advocate the institution of openness in military matters. The gist of such policy would be the establishment of a regular and ongoing discourse between the defense establishments of Arab countries and Israel. Such discourse would aim at

inculcating habits of dialogues between the civilian and military echelons of the countries in the region and at exposing each side to the concerns, interests intentions and general conduct of the other side. A Regional Security Center (or a Conflict Prevention Center) would be a suitable venue in which to develop ideas, on a multilateral basis, also on practical aspects of transparency.

6. Transparency alone can not make up for a lack of basic trust between nations. In point of fact, in conditions of hostility an incautious decision to deepen transparency may rather serve to heighten a sense of insecurity, especially in an unstable environment. Honesty does not require one to strip oneself of one's cloths, nor does "due diligence" demand that a business organization reveal competitive confidential information. Likewise, a state can not be expected to voluntarily compromise its security interests in the name of transparency simply in order to satisfy claims of insecurity of another state.

7. In view of the geopolitical reality obtaining in the Middle East, Israel's position would be that "deep" transparency, as opposed to the above advocated incremental and gradual approach to transparency, is desirable but often not feasible. In its essence transparency is a politically dependant move which can be anchored only in selfish, not altruistic, motives. Though neutral by nature, transparency may be viewed in an offensive or defensive mode. Under conditions of active hostilities, Israel would tend to subscribe to the latter interpretation. A realistic evaluation of the issue, as expressed both in an Israeli policy decision and foreign expectations, should, therefore, recognize that in Israel, the imperative of confidentiality still outweighs the ideals of transparency and universality.

Regional Threat Perceptions and Security Requirements[*]

Haykel Ben Mahfoudh[**]

Regional security implies the determination of the terms of an equation which are regional threats and security requirements. A brief definition of the key concepts is methodologically required.

The concept of security starts with an overwhelming emphasis on the military dimensions, and tends to introduce an emerging trend in favour to non-military issues. The idea of common security is emerging. The call for a new concept of security that transcend the narrow notions of military defence and look more towards the logic of a broader interdependence, is without any doubt the right approach for enhancing international or regional security[1].

As a result, the emergence of a new common security conception, has enlarged threat perceptions to the extent that, even a less common or autonomous threats, could be included and taken into consideration while shaping the Government policies. As far as the interests of both individuals and States are concerned, any non-military phenomena such as environmental degradation, migration, narcotics trafficking, AIDS and global population growth would be to count.

Any answer to the security issues has to be shaped on the basis of some preliminary remarks. Our proposed approach is to give a clear indication of the degrees of interactions between regional or national threats and States security

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[1] See our paper on "Security *vs.* Terrorism", presented at the London meeting, May 2002.

policies. In order that the following statements do not remain pure speculation, we will put an emphasis on three issues: environmental security, cultural frustration, failure of the democratic process.

1- First of all, there are no published official studies on the matter of regional threat perception and security requirements. At least, the following perceptions were raised by an individual and subjective analysis of the national context, policies or through the discussions hold within the academic and informal frames. Of course, official perceptions do exist. But, they rather deal with the social, economic, cultural, environmental, etc. strategies, than they reflect any national threat perception or security requirements. They are issues which are solely discussed within the public forums.

2- In order to list some of the major threat to the national and regional security, we may consider the following concerns:

a- Natural threats and environmental scarcity :

Tow factors are at the origin of the environmental security theory: the increasing acuity of the environmental menace and the precariousness of the international mechanisms dealing with the environmental management[2].

Environmental degradation is a new force shaping governmental policies, both in a negative sense (tensions over resource depletion or degradation) and a positive sense (the necessity of new forms of co-operation- rules and institutions- to address common dangers)[3].

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[2] FREDERICK (M.), « La sécurité environnementale : éléments de définition », *Etudes Internationales*, vol. XXVI, N° 4, 1993, p. 755.

[3] RENNER (M.), PIANTA (M.) & FRANCHI (C.), "International Conflict and Environmental Degradation", *in* Raimo Väyrynen (Ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, International Social Science Council, SAGE Publications, London- Newbury Park – New Delhi, 1991, p. 108.

While the inclusion of an environmental dimension to the concept of security may generate concern at the top level for the threats to the global, it can lead, on the other hand, to an extension of the unilateral use of force[4]. Therefore, environmental conflict is in nexus with the ecological security.

Although acknowledging that the environment represents only one of many causal factors in the complex circumstances of conflicts, it has been asserted that with intensifying environmental decline, violent conflict involving environmental components has been noticeably increasing[5].

Six types of environmental change are to be identified as possible causes of violent regional or inter-group conflict: greenhouse-induced climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, degradation and loss of good agricultural land, degradation and removal of forests, depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies and depletion of fisheries[6].

In an attempt to synthesise the major arguments associated with environmental degradation as a potential cause of Third World violence, scientists has summarised environmental threats in tow major categories: alteration of natural support system upon which humanity's livelihood depends (air, water and soil pollution) and the overuse of resources.

Three perspectives of conflicts are likely to emerge from the above-mentioned threats: 1) Frustration-aggression reaction (civil war, strikes, riots, coups d'Etats, revolutions and guerrilla wars). 2) Conflicts involving nationalism, ethnicity and religion. 3) Conflicts which may affect the interstate relations and co-operation (trans-boundary conflicts as a result of trans-boundary pollution).

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[4] SANTERRE (F.), *Conflict, Security and the Environment*, I.U.H.E.I., Geneva, 1996, p. 21.
[5] LEE (S-W.), "Not a One -Time Event : Environmental Change, Ethnic Rivalry, and Violent Conflict in the Third World", *Journal of Environment and Development*, vol. 6, N° 4, December 1997, 365, 367.
[6] HOMER-DIXON (T.F.), "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict : Evidence from Cases", *International Security*, vol. 19, N°1, Summer 1994, pp. 5-40.

In spite of the serious challenges that the global environment offers to both national and international decision-makers, there is an opportunity for an unprecedented regional and international co-operation in this field. A reflection of a much greater emphasis on precautionary policies and a systematic rather than segmented approach to environmental resources management, must not be the exclusive task of international law. Domestic rules, as well as regional agreements, have to reflect high-level concern for the protection of the environment as a component in the security dynamic and process.

The interplay of local, regional and global environmental standard-settings, would heighten the awareness of international environmental interdependence and transform local threats to global shared concerns. This trend would affect the nature and the scope of State entitlement to the use of environmental resources, either by redefining its sovereignty (not only in terms of natural resources, but also while shaping of its own national security perception: trans-boundary risk, precautionary principle, etc.), or through the rise of an increasingly complex matrix of mutual rights and obligations bearing on the protection of the interest of environmental resources[7], for the benefit of the entire humanity.

The latter proposal would give rise to a comprehensive mechanism of States responsibility, not only for damages resulting from illegal activities, but interestingly for any negligence of the interplay functions of the environmental concerns.

  b- Resource inequities (failure of political control ; distribution disorder ; unequal access to resources).

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[7] HANDL (G.), "Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law", *in* LANG (W.), NEUHOLD (H.) and ZEMANEK (K.) Editors, *International Environmental Law and Policy, Environmental Protection and International Law*, Graham and Trotman, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, pp. 59-87.

c- Urbanisation[8].

d- Immigration ; migration.

e- Social disintegration (disruption of institutions and social norms).

f- Cultural frustration :

Culture has not yet reached that level of autonomy in the States policies to be considered as a matter of security or, at least, as a factor of the State's stability and prosperity. Unfortunately, culture is reduced to it's basic forms, as its existence is still episodic. And even when we try to be more ambitious in our analysis, we can't extract culture from the other dimensions of the social life. Culture is hardly recognised as a determinant project which may affect the entire behaviour of the society, and by the same way the major equilibrium's of the social spheres.

What is interesting to prospect with respect to the cultural requirements of the state policy perception, is to find how far the cultural interests are taken into account in the States understanding of the actual threats. The links between culture an security might be proved through a set of examples.

A recent study conducted by a group of journalists working for a French artistic magazine[9], has revealed the widening effects of the cultural projects. A sort of an added security value was deemed towards the cultural perceptions and proposals of the policy-making. Rather than detailing the classical functions such as education and entertainment, they have viewed, in addition, the issue in terms of identity, stability and interestingly in terms of security. It was clearly stated that a strong cultural policy may contributes in the prevention of the

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[8] NAGAPAUL (H.), « Urban-Rural Relationships and Social Conflicts in India », *in* Raimo Väyrynen (Ed.), *op. cit.*, 180 ; PEÑALVA (S.), "Urbanization, Urban-Rural Cleavages and Conflicts in Latin America, *Ibid.*, 203.
[9] *Beaux Arts*, 215 (April 2002), 102, 111.

social inequalities, be helpful for the power's insecurity fight and, in any case, it's a gage for the improvement of the individuals fundamental freedoms.

Frustrations often arise from the incapacity of the individuals to achieve their desires, passions and aspirations through any available cultural channel or medium. More than a feeling, frustration is at the base of the emergence and the increasing of the protesting and contesting waves within the groups. Some of them would argue their cultural difference and diversity to justify violence against the establishment, other social groups or nations. Historically, as a matter of fact, we have moved toward the cultural variant of the genocide through the cultural or ethnic conflicts.

It's not excluded that those who strongly suffer from exclusion, disinterest and lack of framing would sink into despair. As getting more and more exasperated from the disengagement of politics from their cultural requests, upset because the failure of the cultural democratisation, unsatisfied due to the unequal access to the required cultural system or pattern and bothered by the standardisation of the cultural patterns, end by using force and violence.

Its relevant that even the culture project carries its own security implications and threats perceptions. We have to bear in mind that cultural systems interact between them, and the dynamic could conducts contradictory effects across the countries. Culture is an universal vehicle of moral values. Thus, it has a valuable role in the peace processes, normalisation of social relations and reconciliation. The reverse of the medal is that the withdrawal of the cultural interests and the abandonment of the cultural field is necessarily exploited by the subversive actions and the diffusion and legitimisation of a culture of violence. Mediums such as music, cinema, painting would support that non peaceful messages.

The Kabyle's Conflict, which is still affecting Algeria, is basically rooted in the cultural differences that this entity is claiming and struggling for. Even the

recent measures taken toward the Kabyle population were unsuccessful for the boost or revival of the ongoing reconciliation process. Neither the constitutional recognition of the Kabyle as an official language nor the other political reforms were judged sufficient by the local population to reintegrate the democratic process (the most important political parties representing the Kabyle had called for the boycott of the last legislative elections), give up the violence or resume the dialogue for the national reconciliation.

Ever since the cultural diversity has not been totally recognised, there would be no dialogue with the State power. Cultural assimilation is strongly contested and fought. On the other hand, it's the autonomy which would be sought. What both parties are loosing in terms of security is invaluable. The relief relies upon a global cultural answer for concerns of the same nature.

g- *Failure of democratic process (declining regime legitimacy ; external and internal pressures for democratisation):*

The experiences reveal a high levelled vulnerability of societies struggling for freedom and pluralism. The premature failure of the majority of the democratic reforms before their experimentation and the Governments use's up all kinds of legitimacy; are the real threats for the survival of settled powers.

Popular expectations added to political pressures gather all the necessary components for the outbreak of riots and disturbances. Here comes again the dilemma, but here rests also the fragile compromise that our societies are, until now, unable to preserve. The stability of the regime is preferred to the values of participation and popular sovereignty.

Actually, the threat comes from either the manipulation of the democratic techniques (elections, referendums, popular consultations, pluralism, etc.) to strengthen or rebuild the weakened legitimacy of the governments, or from the increasing pressure that opponents or external actors (Democracies, N.G.O.'s, International Organisations, etc.) are keeping on those Governments.

Threats do not exclusively reach the stability of the political regime. At least, there is no danger if, by the democratic rule we can reach a stage of alternance logic. The extreme threat rests, however, in the systematic rejection of any political project coming from the Governments, because of the surrounding suspicion. The reaction would be unavoidably violent, and so the consequences on the national security. The scenarios would vary from isolate cases of violence and oppression to the anarchy and the collapse of the state.

Thus, it is upon the success or the failure of the democratic process that rely the security requirements in this case.

h- Growing of religious extremist groups.

i- Illegal trafficking (narcotic, arms) and money laundering.

j- trans-national crimes.

k- Regional conflicts (Algeria, Middle East, Iraq).

3- Security conceptions rest on classical understandings. It means that policy priorities deal with the military aspect of the security (stability of the country, control of the population) rather with the economic or environmental issues. As a consequence, some of the above-mentioned issues would not be deemed as much important for the security of the state as they other issues are. (For example: democratic process, religious group, terrorism, and whatever else threat tied to the immediate security interests (security of the country, stability of the regime, etc.)).

Nevertheless, we have to take into account some of the domestic or regional problems that may forge or shape the ongoing security conceptions. Within an area such as the Maghreb, or Africa, the environmental dimension of the security seems to be fundamental. We always refer to the regional conflicts and tragedies that have environmental roots (genocide in Rwanda and the other conflicts in the area of the Great Lakes).

The same pattern would be available for Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, because we are facing some of the most serious ecological challenges, as our natural resources (water) are decreasing or being depleted, and the desert is seriously overtaking the arable lands, which entail problems of stabilisation of the population, forced migration and an increasing social pressure.

There is no a unique strategy in shaping the security policy in the region, for the only reason that threats and interests are evolving and cyclic (some threats may come back even though they were correctly addressed and resolved). Some of them are urgent, other are, for the moment, of a less actuality. It doesn't mean that there is no immediate need in shaping policies in those "non urgent fields". However, the intervention of the Governments comes basically to respond to the listed priorities. But, the nowadays priorities are not, necessarily, going to be, those of the coming years.

Moreover, we have to consider some specific threats that the region is facing. They are more of an external character than an internal one. Migration combined to/with the counter effects of immigration, represent one of the most important security issues in the region. At this level, it's worth to analyse how fare does this phenomena shape the policies, not only of the migrations States, but also immigration policies within the hosting countries. This is one of the major issues in the area which entails social, economic, military, humanitarian, domestic, bilateral and multilateral responses.

4- Because they proceed from misconceptions, some of the non regional issues are unduly considered of a major importance. For the instance, some occidental, and even Middle eastern conceptions, think that the Arab-Israeli conflict or the war against the terrorism are one of the major threats for the stability and security in the region of the Maghreb.

In my point of view, the trans-border effects of this conflict are over estimated, even though the violence had, in the past, reached our countries. But,

those acts remain isolated in a context dominated by other concerns. What may affect the area, is the decreasing of tourist activity incomes, due to the boycott of the area by the European clients who are, generally, alarmed by the expansion of the violence. There are so many confusions. But, we have to admit that there is still some part of truth in this dread.

5- Definitely, the peace process would build the security policies of the State of the region upon new and more integrative purposes. Co-operation as well as integration would allow a shaping of a broader security policy for the region. The autonomy of each State's security policy would not be anymore the major obstacle for the construction of a global and comprehensive security system or policy between the States which used to ignore, fight or denigrate each other.

In this prospect, two threats could be resolved, or at least monitored. Religious extremism and security implications of immigration would receive more appropriate policies which would tend to resorb the risks by the integrative solutions rather than the use of force. Exclusion is still the highest threat. In addition, an integrative neighbouring would positively affect the democratic process in the region (especially for the regimes which are still hostile for this experience) and makes some threats obsolete by themselves.

6- The globalization of the security concerns would identify the interests that should be shared by all the nations. The identification of the domestic solutions or approaches would, on the other hand, enrich the comprehension of threats' sources and the phenomena of importation/ exportation of new forms of threats (computing terrorism, immigration, ecological terrorism). Isolated actions or self-initiatives are not enough concentrated on the determination of the main sources of alike dangers.

For the State of the south Mediterranean river, they are not necessarily aware of the high level interest that the northern States are giving for the above

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cited new concerns. Responses, policies and solutions that those countries are seeking and conceiving may imply the out-border use of force, which remains a partial approach of the trans-border threats. The recent European summit on the measures for the control of the illegal immigration is one of that narrow-unilateral policies. The failure of the prospected policies, as well as, the divergence of the perceptions among the European States show how implication of the suspected States in the security policy conception is important for the stability of the region.

Of course there is an individual responsibility of each Government to protect its people from any threat. However, a collective responsibility is due to those populations, and in such case, responses have to guaranty the equality of all the parties and the fundamental and inalienable rights of the individuals.

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Israel's Threat Perceptions and Options for Action
Efraim Inbar

Introduction
This paper surveys Israel's current security concerns. The main security challenges are the Palestinian terror, the possibility of a regional conventional large-scale conventional escalation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to Iraq and Iran -- self declared mortal enemies of the Jewish State. The second part analyzes the options available to Israel to deal with its predicament.

The Main Security Challenges
Palestinian Terror
Israel is largely obssessed with the Palestinian terror campaign started in September 2000. The terrorist acts and Israel's counter-terror policy dominate the news, the headlines of the newspapers, and the intra-Israeli discourse.

Since September 2000, Israel has suffered about 500 casualties. Moreover, its economy was hurt primarily in the area of tourism and foreign investment. Though, there is widespread fear, the Israeli society has so far withstood the terrorist pressure remarkably well. First, the figure of 500 casualties is comparable to the Israeli loss of life due to road accidents per year. Second, the Israeli economy – a GNP of $100 billion per year – is robust enough to carry the defense burden, paarticularly if the government adopts stringent steps to cut goverment spending. Third, the social mechanisms established over the many years of protracted conflcit are successful in cushioning the social effects of the terrorist campaign. Fourth, the existence of the national unity government assures a large national consensus on two issues:
   a) the need to subdue Palestinian terror;
   b) skepticism concerning any diplomatic initiatives in absence of a prior end to terror.
The Israeli public is largely convinced the Palestinian Authority, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, is a terror-supporting bureaucracy. A national unity government is also conducive to great social cohesion in combatting the Palestinian enemy. The main indicator for the widespread consensus and the strong social cohesion is the extremely high proportion of reservists reporting to reserve duty. The miniscule number of draft dodgers has caught many headlines, but has not reflected so far a trend of growing dissent.

The September 11 events made it easier for Israel to portray its war against the Palestinian Authority as a counter-terror campaign. Palestinian behavior, primarily the suicide bombers, the accumulated evidence from Karine-A and the many documents collected by the IDF during the Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002) facilitated the acceptance of the Israeli claim that it faces a terror campaign. Indeed, the Israeli public, as well as the international community, have shown greater understanding for military actions against Palestinian targets in Area A, whose sanctuary status has been totally eroded.

Israeli public has become generally more hawkish. For example, the support for the so called "transfer" option has doubled in the past two years. As of June 2002 a majority of Israelis is also ready to support the temporary conquest of the the whole West Bank to clean it of the terrorist infrastructure. Part of the defense establishment and security analysts in the academia also support such a step.

The terror theme obfuscates, however, the fact that the struggle against the Palestinians is beyond terror, basically the weapon of the weak, and in the long range

a mere strategic nuisance. The protracted conflict is actually over high political stakes as far as Israel is concerned. It is about the marking of Israel's Eastern border and about the type of neighbor it will evolve beyond this border. Israel's eastern border is more important than its southern or northern because it is situated closer to its strategic heartland of the Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv-Haifa triangle. The geographic expanse of the Palestinian emerging entity and its political nature could prove fatal for Israel. This is why Israel has a vital interest in affecting the future of the Palestiain entity. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon probably understands this point, as well as few others in government and in the military, although it was not explicitly made by Israeli spokesmen. Many of the Israeli spokesmen are handicapped by the Oslo prism, they still adher to. Therefore, the counter-terror prism is prevalent in Israel's statements.

Regional Escalation
Israel has no interest in a large-scale conventional military escalation. If needed, it has the capacity to defeat each of its neighbors or any Arab coalition. It prefers, however, to maintain its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Moreover, the status quo on the Golan Heights and along the Lebanon-Israel border is satisfactory. In short, rocking the boat is inimmical to Israel's interests.

Jerusalem is fully aware of the potential for escalation found in the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. Moreover, the Palestinians play on this potential and desire for a greater Arab involvement on their side. The apprehensions about regional escalation have been one important constraint on Israel's military reactions to Palestinian terror. Israel understands well that Arab countries have difficulties watching some of the pictures broadcasted from the West Bank. The linkages of the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation to the domestic politics in neighboring states are also taken into consideration. With the exception of few politicians on the far right that actually welcome an escalation hoping to administer a decisive defeat to the Palestinians, the Syrians and their proxies in Lebanon -- most of the political spectrum advocates caution.

Israel's current assessment is that, like in the past, neighboring Arab states will pay lip service to the Palestinian cause, but will be reluctant to take military actions to back Palestinian terror. The US support for Israel and the international environment after September 11 also places limitations on Arab states' actions against Israel. Indeed, countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have shown a degree of understanding for Israel's military riposte, fearing that current Palestinian terror could elicit military escalation with far-reaching regional repercussions. Their American foreign policy orientation also places limits on their military options against Israel.

In contrast to Israeli policy makers, the public at large displays little sensitivity to the escalation scenario and has little understanding of the dilemmas faced by policy makers in Cairo or Amman. Generally, the majority of the Israelis demand of their government harsher measures against the Palestinians ignoring the potential for escalation.

Spread of WMD to Iraq and Iran
Long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, and the Mullahs in Iran elicit great fears among policy makers and the public at large. Israel was subject in 1991 to an unprovoked Iraqi missile attack. The rethoric coming from Baghdad and Tehran is extremely hostile to Israel and includes many threats including nuclear threats. The recent successful tests of the long-range Iranian Sheehab-3 missile caused grave concern throughout the Middle

East. A plethora of articles in the Israeli press and many Israeli politicians addressed the issue of WMD in the hands of a radical Islamic regime.

Threats emmanating from these states are very concrete also becasue Iraq and Iran are actively supporting the actions of Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Hizballah in Lebanon. Threat perception is amplified by the rethoric of the Bush administration. The Americans have included these countries in the "Axis of Evil." Israel that follows the US on many issues is very receptive to such messages which strike a responsive chord in Israeli attitudes.

After September 2000, the existential fears, which were eased in the 1993-2000 period, re-emerged. This was particularly true of the Israeli left and part of the center of the Israeli political map that argued that the WMD issue can be be addressed satisfactorily only after an Israeli-Palestinian entente. Therefore, the explosion of Palestinian violence made the WMD issue more threatening for them.

Israeli strategists are generally skeptic of the possibility of establishing a stable deterrence in a nuclearized Middle East. The general wisdom is that the US-Soviet Union mutual deterrence cannot be easily emulated in the Middle East. This assessment reinforces the high threat perception resulting of the spread of WMD to [Iran and Iraq.

Diplomatic and Military Options for Israel

Israel's array of policy options is determined by several factors: the changing perception of the nature of the conflict with the Palestinians and the suitable strategy, domestic politics, and the international envelope.

The New Paradigm on Relations with the Palestinians

While the conflict with the Palestinians is mostly viewed within a counter-terror prism, a perceptive analysis of Israeli politics detects a paradigmatic change in Israel's thinking concerning the Palestinians. With the exception of the far left (no more than 10% of the Israeli Jews) that is increasingly marginalized politically, the Palestinians are no longer viewed as a potential partner for peaceful coexistence. The IDF no longer expects the PA to cooperate in the struggle against terror and prefers unilateral measures. The great support of Israelis for unilateral separation, whatever that means, is another clear indication of the despair of the attempt to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. For the time being, the Palestinians are viewed as politically and culturally unfit for coexistence. Therefore, it is argued that a "Chinese Wall" could protect Israel from the barbarians on the east. Political and cultural integration in the Middle East – the dream of the Peres New Middle East – has become impossible as well as undesirable.

The new emerging paradigm is of a Palestinian society bent on destroying the Jewish state. Such a society produces hatred, suicide bombers, tyranny and corruption. Such perceptions blend well with the popular view of the inability of Islamic and Arab societies to cope with modernization, unleashing frustration, hatred and violence. The old-new paradigm postulates a multi-faceted protracted struggle between two societies. Israel largely returns to see the Palestinians as an existential threat because of their perceived inability to reach a compromise with the Zionist movement. This narrative has been reinforced by Palestinian intransigence at Camp David and Taba and the moral abhorrence toward the terror perpetrated, particularly the suicide bombers.

The Strategy

Such a view of the conflict obviously regards attempts for comprehensive solutions as too idealistic and removed from the harsh reality on the ground. The Palestinian

society must change and this might take generations. Accordingly, Israel faces a long protracted conflict. The preferred strategy for dealing with the conflict that has gradually been adopted by the Israeli government (including Peres) is conflict management. It reminds the Kissingerean step-by-step approach that Yitzhak Rabin employed in the Intifada (1987-90).

This strategy has a military and a diplomatic dimension. The job of the military is to reduce the level of terrorism. Operation Defensive Shield is a good example for the use of limited force in the never-ending counter-terror campaign. Beyond the arrest of many terrorists, the capture of substantial military materiel, and the partial destruction of the terrorist infrastructure, the Israeli military response affected the consciousness of the Palestinians -- the main arena of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. For the first time many Palestinians got a taste of Israel's awesome military might. Although the IDF did its utmost to limit damage to innocent non-combatants, its ability to reach any hiding place -- and the amount of destruction caused in the process -- left a potent message about the level of pain that can be inflicted on the Palestinians, and about Israel's determination in this long-term struggle. Despite its premature end, Defensive Shield also communicated to the Palestinians and to the rest of the world that there are limits to the Israeli restraint where Palestinian terror is concerned.

The use of military force is designed also to bring the other side to the negotiating table on Israeli terms. Nowadays, the diplomatic horizon offered is a long-term interim agreement. As the Palestinians failed the Oslo test to become a good neighbors they are required to reform their society, leadership and strategy. Such change takes time, however. The resulting calls for reform in the PA now being voiced in the Palestinian cities and around the world reflect a criticism of the role played by the historic leader of the Palestinian national movement. The international community -- including supporters of the Palestinian cause in Europe and in the Arab world -- has also joined the chorus demanding reform. They have accepted, albeit tacitly, Israel's argument that Arafat, as a builder of a terrorist entity, is part of the problem and his capacity to transform himself into part of the solution is dismal. In many Israeli eyes, the removal of Arafat and his corrupt and authoritarian colleagues is a precondition for any progress in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

From an Israeli perspective, the much-discussed international conference can be an avenue for progress only if it adopts an incremental approach to the Israeli-Palestinian track. Any other approach is doomed to rejection by any Israeli government in the near future.

The increased willingness to explore various kinds of international involvement in the conflict is not seen as conducive to Israeli interests. Israel's long experience even with well-intentioned foreigners (usually displaying little understanding of Middle East realities) who interfere in Arab-Israeli relations is mostly negative. As the chances for some Israeli-Palestinian understandings to calm the situation are slim, particularly with Arafat still around, pressure for such involvement will only grow. But internationalizing the conflict -- a Palestinian goal -- can only enhance Palestinian reluctance to achieve an agreement with Israel. Therefore, Israel will continue to oppose the internationalization of the conflict and the deployment of foreign troops in Palestinian territories in a peace-keeping mode.

Domestic Constraints
Domestic politics in Israel foreclose the choice of a strategy different from the one outlined above. Sharon is the linchpin of the national unity government. Most of its

components, including Labor, are reluctant to cause trouble and risk early elections. This assures the continuation of the diplomatic course chosen by Sharon. Moreover, the Likud party is expected to increase its parliamentary power in the next elections, although it is not clear yet whether its leader will be Sharon or Netanyahu. In any case, the Likud will certainly be the main component of the emerging government following the next elections. Labor is politically in trouble and the so-called peace camp is generally discredited. The preference for progress via a long interim agreement, and for delaying the timetable for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the reluctance to see greater international involvement – the positions of the Likud party -- seem to continue be the guiding lines of Israeli governments in the near future.

The International Environment
The ascendance of the Bush admisntratio has generally been benefitial to Israel, as its foreign policy prefers democratic states (Israel versus the non-democratic Arab states). The events of September 11, 2001, reinforced this tendency, as several Arb states were seen belonging to the "bed guys" for their supprot for terror. The Palestinians, the Syrians, the Saudis, the Iraqis seem to be in that category.

The American plans to attack Saddam Hussein's regime were similarly welcomed in Jerusalem. Israel hopes that the US will once again relieve it of an existential threat.

Generally, the American policies on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute suited well the preferences of Jerusalem. Washington has shown releuctance to involve itself intensively in the dispute and gradually allowed Israel to use increasing doses of force agaisnt Palestinian terrorism.

Western Europe has continued to be critical of Israel, but in other part of the world Israel eleicited great understanding. States situated in Eastern Europe, South and East Asia, Central Asia, Latin America adopted policies more conguous with American and Israeli positions. This reflected to a great extent the diminishing leverage of the Arab bloc in international politics.

Having said that, Israel was constrained in the past; as a small state, it will continue to experience limitations on its freedom of action. For example, international pressures stopped Operation Defensive Shield from achieving all its counter-terror aims. The largely impatient world is thirsty for a quick fix to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or at least some diplomatic route, which holds a promise for broadcasting nicer pictures from the Holy Land. This factor will push for Israeli diplomatic fexiblity.

Policy Options
Taking into consideration the domestic and international and the unlikely change in thse parameters in the near fuutre, inputs the following set of Israeli policies are probable:

1) Continuous military pressure on the PA to destroy terrorist infrastructure and limit capabilities to hurt Israel. Military activities of low signature wil be tolerable by the international community and will prevent a regional escalation.

2) The political goal of the military activity is to weaken the PA to the point it serves in a civilian-administrative mode only.

3) Display diplomatic flexibility and maneuvering to assure a high level of US-Israeli coordination, a high degree of understanding for Israel in many other

important capitals of the world, and a high level of national consensus for the continuous struggle against the Palestininians.

4) Attempt to convince Washington that the right strategy to deal with the Middle East is to go after Saddam first and only afterwards to divert attention to the Levante. The strategy of 1991 when the Madrid peace conference was preceded by a war against Iraq is the model. In the 21st Century, however, there is less of an Americna need to assemble a wide Arab coalition.

5) Continuous attempts to curtail the Iranian nuclear program by attempts to limit outside support for the Iranian program. An Israeli preemptive strike is unnlikely in the near future.

6) Further strengthening the strategic reach of the IDF primarily in the air and the naval arenas to deal with the WMD challenge.

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September 11 and Prospects for Democracy in Iran

By Ramin Jahanbegloo

That the September 11 terrorist attacks changed the world has been a common refrain for the past 10 months. But how exactly the world has been transformed is still unclear. But maybe one thing changed. The North American media became obsessed with something called "Islam", which in their poor and uninformed lexicon has acquired ever since only one meaning: a menace for the democratic order in the Western world. Along with this attempt to define Islam, there have been several attempts for minimizing the democratic process in Muslim countries such as Iran. The context of relations between the United States and Iran changed significantly with the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. From the US perspective, Iran will now be judged mainly by the extent to which it is either "with us or against us" in combating terrorism. Such a US response intensified by the "axis of evil" speech has resulted in promoting hard-line policies and slowing down the democratization process in Iran. America's threats and accusations are providing the Iranian conservatives with a good opportunity to argue against the reformists that America would never have ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is quite disconcerting, because the Iranian civil society has the potential to becoming easily the most liberal in the region. One may say that the Bush administration is not out there to liberalize Iranian society but to prevent terrorism. Such a notion ignores the point that liberalizing Iranian civil society would likely moderate Iran's

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foreign policy. Today, Iran is a country in a painful transition to democracy, and the only Muslim country where people are rapidly moving away from radical Islam. Despite all the pressures coming from inside and outside and the onslaught of the religious right, the democratic movement survives. Iran is likely to be a very different country in five to ten years from now. Islam will likely become less important as a governing principle and the society will become more pluralistic. What makes Iran so interesting is that it's not a real democracy, but it's not a real Islamic theocracy either.

To those of us whose mental construct of a democracy is a society peopled by truly equal citizens, who are politically engaged, tolerant of different opinions and ways of life, and have an equal voice in choosing their rulers and holding them accountable, Islamic Republic of Iran appears to be a poor candidate for a democratic transition. By far Islamic Republic of Iran has not achieved a relative well-functioning transition to the process of democratization and does not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever democratic progress. Yet we can say that the Islamic Republic of Iran has entered a political gray zone without having any attributes of democratic political life. It is true that the notion that achieving regular, genuine elections will not only confer democratic vitality but continuously deepen political participation and democratic accountability, has often come up short in the past few years in Iran. Despite the two landslide victories of Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 and June 2001 , the win of the reformist movement in the municipal elections of February 1999 and in the

parliamentary contest of February 2000 the democratization process remains very shallow in Iran and governmental accountability remains weak. As a result of that, the reform movement which sprang out of the frustrations of the Iranian youth, is itself frustrated. There is a wide gulf in Iran today between the action of the political elites and the will of the ordinary citizens. People are tired of the inactivity of the reformers and it seems as if the struggle for power between the two camps is getting nowhere. The power struggle between the conservatives and the reformists has reached an impasse and yet there is a demand from the Iranian youth for political, economic and social reforms in Iran. Despite all the pressures coming from inside and outside and the onslaught of the religious right, Iranian civil society survives as a cultural space for the development of democratic values such as tolerance, moderation and a willingness to create channels other than political parties for the articulation , aggregation and representation of different interests. It is true that there has been some confusion, during the past several years about the true essence of the Iranian civil society. Well, unlike Latin America, where civil society is used overwhelmingly to designate popular social movements and the organizations of the excluded and the poor, Iranian civil society is of a great resemblance to that of the east and Central Europe in the 1980s where the projects are strongly identified with the intellectual movements. I think, that as in Eastern Europe, the new generation of Iranian intellectuals have played an important role in the formation and the strengthening of the Iranian civil society. Actually, in the

case of the new generation of Iranian intellectuals, the disillusion with the given boundaries of traditional politics and traditional religious thought and with the restrictions of ideological politics provoked interest in civil society as a means of rejuvenating Iranian public life and preparing the democratic transition thought in Iran. This was mainly accompanied by the collapse of the intellectual models that dominated post-Second World War understandings of politics and modernity. This collapse gave a new currency to the idea of democracy and democratization against ideology and ideologization of the tradition. The very notion of "ideology" has lost much of its coherence among the new generation of Iranian intellectuals and it has accompanied the crisis of political legitimacy in Iran. This crisis was felt in Iran as a vacuum which was left by the ontological and political failure of creeds such as Marxist-Leninism and Islamic Fundamentalism. This vacuum is filled today by the category of "civil society" which I think that could serve as a conceptual and practical key to the democratic transition in Iran. The concept of civil society is used today in the literature of the Fourth Generation of Iranian intellectuals not only as an institutional package but mainly as a particular mode of thinking and a special mode of political conduct. As a matter of fact I think that the category of civil society has a true significance for the new generation of Iranian intellectuals both as a critical tool and as a regulative principle for the democratization in Iran. Taken at this level, the idea of civil society as it is discussed by the Iranian intellectuals today embodies the debate on Western modernity and raises the

question about the significance of the historical experience of Western politics. The point is not here about the replicability of democratic practices and institutions, but about the possibility of identifying a common set of goals and purposes best described by the Iranian intellectuals by the idea of accountability and responsibility. The two concepts of "accountability" and "responsibility" can introduce a new complexity and sharpness to assessments of the difficulties facing the process of democratic transition in Iran, both in establishing preconditions and dealing with its consolidation. It is true that globalization could lead to the empowerment of civil society in many countries including Iran and the new generation of Iranian intellectuals can influence the Iranian youth by helping them to understand how the world is changing. But the process of democratization is not fully dependent upon the progress of globalization, but it does depend on the idea of "globality" which is linked to the idea of "responsibility". As we can see from their writings, the new generation of Iranian intellectuals do not identify their role as that of engaging in ideological politics, but of expressing critical views concerning the antidemocratic and authoritarian aspects of Iranian political and social traditions.

The shock of the revolution and the reevaluation of political ideals have been part of a learning process that has generated a collective sense of responsibility among the younger generation of intellectuals in Iran and led them to opt for political pragmatism rather than ideological dogmatism. As a result, journals run by the fourth generation of Iranian intellectuals have

become avenues of expression for those who think that the main task is not only to choose between systems of political ideologies but also to create an intellectual community with a well-developed understanding of such questions. The incessant attack on Iran's secular cultural producers is today ironically indicative of the fact that the new generation of intellectuals in Iran are validators of philosophical work and true democracy promoters. A whole generation of democracy promoters among the Iranian intellectuals base their arguments on the democratic transition in order to move to new intellectual frameworks, new debates and eventually a new paradigm of political change. Today the new generation of Iranian intellectuals represent the "Third Culture". The strength of the third culture is precisely that it is also a culture of horizontal accountability which is marked by the emergence of critical uncertainty, where solid traditions of authoritarianism give way to fragile traditions of authoritarianism. As a result of that, concerned with the political implications of uncertainty, the new generation of Iranian intellectuals have been critically defining the inner boundaries of democratization (the threshold between critical thinking and democratic transition) as well as its outer boundaries (the onset of democratic transition and its institutional formation through a permanent dialogical process between the tradition and the modern in Iran).

Today Iran is going through a cycle of erratic oscillations in which moments of democratic hope alternate with times of great despair. Yet this erratic situation of uncertainty is accompanied by the absence of a romantic view of the Iranian intellectual as an avant-garde guardian of an ideology and

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the demonizing traditionalist view of the intellectual as obstructer of national and religious traditions. Twenty years after the revolution, the distinctive contribution of the new generation of Iranian intellectuals to the Iranian democratic debate is not how to choose between morality and politics in a society where cynicism and confusion cover the voices of common sense and civility, but how to forge a politics of responsibility in the in the absence of which democracy would become a void concept.

Regional Threat Assessments and Security Requirements

Prepared for Bruges, Belgium, 13-16 July 2002

In preparation for our July meeting in Bruges, Belgium, participants in the Regional Security Seminar, and indeed all attendees at the Conference, were asked to submit memos, papers, or notes outlining their country's perception of the threats to its security and its security requirements. The views were to reflect the official as well as the unofficial (that is, popular or so-called "street" perception of risks to their security and well-being). The responses submitted offered a broad range of views characteristic of the region's diversity. The observations are described below; the lists do not reflect priority in importance or nor are they meant to be inclusive. They represent views from participants across the region as I understand and interpellate them. The opinions, comments, and perceptions described and analyzed here are mine. They do not reflect necessarily the sum of the views of the respondents (although I hope they are an accurate reflection) and should not be attributed to any one individual. Some will be expanded into longer papers.

Iran: Iranians are as concerned about the impact of external security threats on their internal political debate as they are about the threats themselves. In the ongoing debate between reformists and conservatives (called hard-liners by some), official and non-official Iranians, three issues appear paramount: the impact of the U.S.-orchestrated war on terrorism and the risk of confrontation with U.S.; still unresolved issues from the 8-year with Iraq; and the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iranians in public and private debate are examining prospects for dialogue with the U.S., appropriateness of supporting Palestinian causes to the exclusion of more direct issues; and relations with Iraq. In my view and in the views of Iranian scholars, the events of September 11, U.S. criticism of Iranian actions in Afghanistan during the military campaign, and U.S. labeling of Iran as part of an Axis of Evil have assisted the hard-liners in Iran to oppose any dialogue with the U.S. If efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts fail, it will be of immense political benefits to the hard-liners.

Iranians see many risks to their security and sense of national well-being. These include the risk of military confrontations with the United States, Israel, or Iraq; Iraqi efforts to rebuild their weapons of mass destruction; unresolved territorial and economic issues in the Caspian Sea region; and real or potential instability in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The risks may be all around Iran, but the solution lies within the state itself.

Jordan: In addition to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Jordanians see other potential causes of conflict that pose a threat to regional stability now and in the future. The causes include debt, economic disparities, population movements (birth rates and refugees), energy, water, ethnic conflicts, religious rivalries, nationalism, arms race, and international terrorism. For Jordan, the most critical threats are:

1. *Geo-strategic realities:* Location, as real estate agents say, is everything and so are defined borders. Jordan is surrounded by four states with abundant resources and larger standing forces. These states enjoy a qualitative edge over Jordan militarily and in some cases,

economically. Jordan's lack of strategic depth and advanced warning systems leave it extremely vulnerable to surprise attacks, in particular from the north and west.

2. **Regional arms race:** Jordan cannot compete in sophisticated and expensive arms races that include the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapon systems and their delivery system including missiles.

3. *Unresolved Israeli–Palestine dispute:* This dispute, for Jordan, is the main course of regional unrest and instability. If unresolved, it will affect Jordan directly with workers or refugees moving into Jordan and with border crossings that will create an un-favorable security situation between Israel and Jordan.

4. *The refugee problem:* Jordan hosts more than 1.5 million Palestinian refugees from the Arab-Israeli wars and the 1991 Gulf War. Most live in extreme poverty in camps, dependent on Jordanian and international aid. Jordan supports their right to return to the West Bank.

5. *Water:* Any act affecting supply, diversion or drying up of water resources is considered a vital security issue.

6. *Violence and terrorism by extremists:* Jordan is a target for extremists determined to undermine the "rule of law" and its stability.

Jordan believes there is a need for a comprehensive and holistic approach to regional security. This will best be achieved by constructing regional dialogue structures that can pre-empt the build up of tensions, manage crises, and absorb pressures generated by changes in the strategic environment. Included in the structure would be a code of conduct; a regional security regime; confidence building measures; transparency of intention and action; and a Middle East WMD-free zone.

The Maghreb: Most Maghrebian security assessments take into account broader issues than the Middle East peace process and WMD proliferation. Some threats are urgent while others are, for the moment, not. Governments respond to the immediate priorities and crises and tend to ignore or dismiss more difficult long-term threats that have no military solution. Regional security concepts may start with an overwhelming emphasis on military issues but they soon move to non-military issues. In this way, a common security concept is one that transcends the narrow notions of military defense and looks more towards the logic of regional interdependence. Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco face serious challenges that transcend individual borders—the depletion of natural resources (water); environmental degradation; desertification (the process of desert overtaking arable lands); problems of population stabilization (forced migration, migrant labor, narcotics trafficking, AIDS and population growth). These threats to national security assume a higher priority for many governments than do demands for political reform, actions by religious groups, and terrorism.

Today's priorities, however, are not necessarily going to be those of the coming years. Some in the West and the Middle East perceive the Arab-Israeli conflict or the war against terrorism to be the major threats for the stability and security in the Maghreb. For many in the Maghreb, these are misconceptions. Threats to Maghrebian security come more from external factors than internal ones. For example, migration and European policies aimed at cutting off labor flows represent more important security issues for these countries than does terrorist violence intended to highlight the Arab-Israel conflict. A decrease in tourism due to a boycott by European travelers and traders alarmed by the expansion of violence does far greater harm to the region.

Maghrebians identify three issues for special concern: environmental security, cultural frustration, and failure of the democratic process.

1. *Natural threats and environmental scarcity:* Two factors are central here—the increasing acuity of the environmental menace and the precariousness of international mechanisms dealing with the environmental management. Environmental degradation—meaning the alteration of the natural support system upon which humanity's livelihood depends (air, water and soil pollution) and the overuse and depletion of non-renewable resources—is a new force shaping governmental policies, both in a negative sense (tensions over resource depletion or degradation) and a positive sense (the necessity of new forms of co-operation, rules, and institutions to address common dangers). As environmental decline increases, so to does violent conflict involving environmental components. Six types of environmental change are potential causés of violent regional conflict: greenhouse-induced climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, degradation and loss of good agricultural land, degradation and removal of forests, depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, and depletion of fisheries. Conflicts over these issues could take several forms, including internal conflict (civil war, strikes, riots, coups, revolutions and guerrilla wars); conflicts involving nationalism, ethnicity and religion; or conflicts affecting interstate relations and co-operation (trans-boundary conflicts as a result of trans-boundary pollution).

   Regional and international co-operation on these issues is possible, although unprecedented. Cooperation could come in the form of greater emphasis on precautionary policies and a systematic rather than segmented approach to environmental resources management. Domestic rules, as well as regional agreements, have to reflect high-level concern for the protection of the environment as a component in the security dynamic and process. States have a responsibility to work together on determining resource inequities, as well as problems of urbanization, immigration, migration, and social disintegration (disruption of institutions and social norms).

2. *Cultural frustration:* Culture has not yet reached that level of autonomy in state policies to be considered as a matter of security or, at least, as a factor that could challenge state stability and prosperity. Culture is hardly recognized as a determinant that may affect a society's behavior. Yet, there are clearly links between culture and perceptions of national identity, security, and well-being. Frustrations often arise from the inability of individuals to achieve their desires, passions and aspirations through available political or social channels. Some argue that cultural difference and diversity justifies violence against the establishment, other social groups, or nations. Those who believe they suffer from political or social exclusion by a disinterested state, or who are upset because of the failure (or success) of cultural democratization, or who resent unequal access to the required cultural system, or who oppose standardization of the cultural patterns, often end by using force and violence.

3. *Failure of the political process due to pressures for reform that result in declining regime legitimacy:* Regional societies are vulnerable in varying degrees to struggles for freedom, for and against the adaption of democratic institutions, and pluralism. Failure of governments to initiate political and economic reforms and their ability to use instruments of state power and legitimacy to ignore or combat popular expectations can become serious threats to regime survival. For most regimes, their continued rule is preferable to the values of political participation and popular sovereignty. Regimes manipulate democratic techniques (constitutions, elections, referendums, popular consultations) to strengthen or

rebuild their weakened legitimacy and counter increasing pressure from opponents or external actors to change their ways of governance.

Opposition challenges do not always result in threats to regime stability. The real threat rests in the government's systematic rejection of any political project because of suspicion. The reaction could be unavoidably violent with serious consequences for national security. The scenarios would vary from isolated cases of violence and oppression to anarchy and the collapse of the state. The success or failure of the democratic process relies on careful monitoring of the following security requirements: the growth of religious extremist groups; illegal trafficking in narcotic or arms; and money laundering; trans-national crimes; and regional conflicts (Algeria, the Middle East, Iraq).

What are security requirements for the Maghreb states? Resolution of the peace process would improve regional security. Interstate co-operation and integration would allow shaping of broader security policies for the region. Individual state autonomy need not impede construction of a regional, comprehensive security system or policies between states that used to ignore, fight or denigrate each other. In this way, two threats could be resolved, or at least monitored: religious extremism and security implications of labor migration. Policies would absorb the risks through integrative solutions rather than the use of force. Integration could positively affect the democratic process in the region (especially for regimes still hostile or uncertain about the need for reform. Of course, governments have the responsibility to protect their people from any threat. However, collective responsibility and responses can guarantee the equality of all the parties and the fundamental and inalienable rights of the individuals.

Egypt. In spite of its peace treaty with Israel, Egyptians perceive a threat emanating from an ultra-right government in Israel and the two-thirds of Israel's military that faces Egypt's Eastern front. Egyptians acknowledge that their government, like many Arab regimes, uses the Arab-Israeli conflict as a pretext to stall the introduction of democratic political and economic reforms, and isolate human right activists and supporters of peace movements. he direct result is socio-economic stagnation.

Most Egyptians see the Palestinian-Israeli *intifada* as a legitimate liberation struggle that must be supported. There is a gap between the government and part of the intelligentsia, who reject suicide bombing, and a sizable public opinion, which considers it as the only available weapon in the hands of the Palestinians. Some believe the *intifada,* and in particular the role of Hamas and Jihad, is being exploited by opponents of the Arab regimes to attract supporters and destabilize the regimes. To Egyptians, most of this opposition comes from the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, and they see extremists on the Arab and Israeli side profiting from the situation.

What are Egyptian security requirements? Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a comprehensive peace, and full normalization of relations with Israel should enhance Egypt's security. Egyptians prefer an international conference as the main vehicle for a final settlement and will blame Israel with American support if it is rejected. Other security issues needing resolution are the impact of extremist ideologies on both Arabs and Israelis, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the lack of conventional arms and missile control. Iraq, however, is not perceived as a security threat. In the view of many Egyptians, the war on terrorism, which could lead to an attack on Iraq or any other Arab country, will only play into the hands of Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden, and their supporters.

Israel: The events of the past two years (from the failure of the Camp David summit and the beginning of violent conflict two months later) have reinforced the centrality of regional security interdependence. Although the direct violence is largely confined to the Israeli-Palestinian dimension (with some outbursts along the Lebanese border), Israelis see the implications and potential spillover as regional. No country in the region—from North Africa to the Persian Gulf— is unaffected by these events and developments. The potential for a chain reaction and massive spillover into a regional conflagration involving Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, and others is a constant and worrying element of the current conflict. September 11 and the global reach of mega-terrorist attacks mounted by groups such as al-Qaida, have only increased the danger of regional instability. These groups function in many of these countries, seeking recruits, funds, and training facilities, and they also target many of the regimes. Without intelligence sharing, anti-terrorist operational coordination, and other forms of cooperation among the stabilizing forces in the region and with the U.S., NATO and other global powers, the dangers to each country and regime individually will grow. The possibility (however slim) of Israeli-Palestinian political engagement, based on the Arab League (Saudi-Egyptian) initiative, the Bush Administration's framework (perhaps including a regional or international conference), and extensive Palestinian political reform also presents the foundation for regional security cooperation. Indeed, the systematic and thorough review of options, and the rapid implementation of measures to strengthen regional security and prevent regional escalation are absolutely fundamental for survival.

For many Israelis, the primary threats to their security (in order of importance according to IDF studies) are WMD attack, terrorism, and large-scale multi-front conventional attacks. These priorities also determine the relative importance and budgetary share of the different conflict scenarios in government planning, acquisition, and training. The lack of emphasis on conventional war scenarios reflects the combined impact of the Egyptian peace treaty, the decline in the conventional threat from Syria following the end of the Cold War, and the difficultly Syria has in acquiring and maintaining its forces. At the same time, the perceived WMD and ballistic missile threat has increased steadily over the past decade, both in terms of capabilities and intentions.

The following are considered serious threats:

- *Palestinian Islamic Extremists.* Israel is a high priority target for Islamic terror groups. In response, Israel emphasizes intelligence, interdiction, and deterrence directed at terrorists and their support structures. The September 11 attacks and the revelations regarding al-Qaida's efforts to acquire WMD capabilities threat reinforced the threat.

- *Iraq.* In terms of conventional capabilities, Israel believes the threat from Iraq (a major participant in previous Arab-Israeli wars) has been reduced significantly due to the 1991 Gulf War and continuing weapons embargo. Israel assumes, incorrectly in my view, that Iraq is no longer a threat because it no longer has the capabilities of moving large numbers of tanks through Jordan to the Israeli border in a short period of time. Israel is concerned about Iraq's non-conventional capabilities, believing that its nuclear weapons team is intact and that it has significant amounts of chemical and biological weapons despite UN Security Council resolutions and UNSCOM inspections. Israeli decision makers expect that these weapons could be used in any war scenario involving Iraq.

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- *Iran.* Iran represents two kinds of threat to Israel. The first is its increasing potential as a possessor of WMD. Evidence indicates steady Iranian pursuit of WMD capabilities—chemical weapons, biological weapons and toxins, and the development of a nuclear weapons infrastructure. The testing and manufacture of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile is an important part of the developing threat. Iran's growing profile in various global arms limitation regimes, including the OPCW, IAEA and through the UN Panel of Experts on Missiles is viewed as part of a broad approach to present the image of responsible behavior while benefiting from the close knowledge of verification and inspection systems in order to maintain these capabilities. The consistent emphasis by Iranian representatives on access to dual-use technology and the opposition to the restrictions embodied in supplier regimes such as the Australia group and MTCR, are also viewed with concern.

  The second threat to Israel's security comes from threats of destruction and denial of Israeli legitimacy issued by hard-line leaders (headed by Supreme Leader Khameni) and the provision of weapons to terrorist groups such as Hizbollah, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and to Arafat's Fatah organization.

If Israel has a security doctrine, then it is that deterrence works, and more deterrence works even better. Israeli officials emphasize the responsibility of state supporters and hosts for terror groups and believe their heavy-handed (my words) responses have been successful in deterring additional attacks. At the same time, the collapse of the Oslo process and the intensity of the Palestinian terror attacks that have taken the lives of hundreds of civilians in Israeli cities has served to strengthen the role of deterrence in Israeli military and security doctrine. Some Israeli critics argue that traditional deterrence was undermined by Israel's failure to respond to the Iraqi missile attacks in 1991, its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, and its "ineffective" responses to Palestinian terror attacks. They argue that the large scale IDF operation (Defensive Shield) in April 2002, and the battle in the Jenin refugee camp, in particular, restored Israel's deterrence image, both vis-a-vis the Palestinians and on a regional basis. **In my own view, both Israelis and Arabs deliberately misinterpreted the motivation behind the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and its reluctant willingness to forgo retaliatory attacks on Iraq. Both refused to recognize the legitimacy of the "other," and Israelis assumed they could control the terms of withdrawal; they were wrong. The Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinians saw Israel's withdrawal as a sign of weakness that could be repeated by the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and even Israel itself, and they were wrong; they did not want to understand that for Israel, Lebanon was irrelevant but the land of Israel and the territories is not.**

The consensus view in Israel is that the failure of the Oslo process and permanent status negotiations at Camp David demonstrated ultimate Palestinian rejection of Israel's right to exist, and that the existential threats throughout the Arab and Islamic world continue to be dominant. This perception, reinforced by the rhetoric of hatred and incitement, has reinforced the view that Israeli security and survival will continue to require the ability to inflict massive retaliation in the event of attack. Thus, any measures that might weaken strategic deterrence, particularly with respect to the NPT and inspection of Israeli nuclear facilities, are now even more anathema than was the case previously.

Israel believes Iraqi and Iranian WMD programs are likely to lead to the growth of existing CW and BW capabilities and the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the region, including Syria,

Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. Israel's response is to develop responses based on a combination of defensive systems, such as the Arrow, second-strike deterrence systems, and increased interest in regional crisis management and limitation arrangements, such as a code of conduct regarding ballistic missiles. Foreswearing future WMD development and support for any proposal declaring the region a nuclear-free zone are not options for Israel.

In considering potential regional security options, Israelis distinguish between short-term requirements and longer-term possibilities. The immediate need focuses on crisis management, risk containment, and the creation of fire-breaks to avoid the danger of a wider war. Channels for direct communication among leader, the development of de-escalation procedures, and effective (that is U.S.-led) mediation are also security requirements. Crisis situations, increased force deployments, and higher levels of alert generally create additional instability resulting from mutual fear of surprise attack. In order to prevent escalation resulting from misperception, appropriate crisis management mechanisms must be developed in advanced. In addition, the development of regional stability would be enhanced through cooperation in the area of human security. Coordination regarding measures to prevent illegal transfer of small arms and explosives could provide a key element in the establishment of a regional human security framework.

Strategic systems related to WMD capabilities form the basis of longer term regional security cooperation. Among the CBMs that have been suggested and discussed recently, discussions of the potential for a regional code of conduct related to missile development, testing, and deployment might be useful. If and when these measures bear fruit, and the Middle East becomes a more benign environment, the regional security framework can be extended to include WMD arms control.

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"Islam and Pakistan"

The Dynamics of Religion and Nationalism

By: S. Zibakalam[1]

11 of September and its aftermath have created a new alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan. Historically of course, Pakistan has been a traditional ally of the U.S. in the region. Whereas India has been an ally of the ex-Soviet Union. Islamabad in contrast has had long bond with Washington. 11 of September and the U.S. led war against terrorism has further pushed the two countries closer together. But the new alliance is not without its opponents. Islamic militants in Pakistan are openly against this alliance. The hurge car-bomb explosion in front of the U.S. consulate in Karachi in May was the latest manifestation of the militants opposition to the U.S. as well as Parvis Mosharraf.

This article examines the deeper relationship between Islam and nationalism in state of Pakistan in order to judge the effectiveness of Islamic groups and the threat which they pose against the current Washington and Islamabad alliance.

Islam and nationalism has had a complex relationship. In the West, nationalism was a modern force. It was a direct product of the nation-state which dominated Europe throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centauries and reached its peak during the first decades of the

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twentieth century. With the breaking up of large and more or less Feudalistic European Empires, new nations were born. Nationalism was on the whole a modern and secular force in Europe.

As a modern political force, nationalism soon reached the Islamic world. One area where it first manifested itself was in the Indian subcontinent There is a general consensus that Islam played a significant role against The British rule in India. The general nationalist movement against the British in India was predominantly secular in nature. That is to say, Muslims wanted independent from the British and their struggle was not to establish a religious or a Hindu state. For the great majority of Indian Hindus the struggle against the British rule was a just struggle which would create an independent India. A country, or a nation, which would be ruled by Indian themselves, regardless of their race, cast or religion. But for Muslims the movement against the British was somewhat different.

It was as much to free themselves from the British as it was for creating an "Islamic State". The new independent state took a new name: Pakistan, 'land of the pure'. The new state which was formed in 1947 defined itself as a state 'wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collecting spheres in accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna'(1). In strict accordance to the Islamic Sharia principles, part of the Pakistan

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independent declaration stated that, sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone', and that therefore authority would be exercised by the people of Pakistan only 'within the limits prescribed by Him'(2) .But being an Islamic state to be governed by the rule of God rather than the rule of man whilst in theory was in accordance with the Islamic principles, it did however confronted the new state with a number of practical issues (3). The first and foremost amongst them was how the new Islamic state ought to be governed?

Historically the Islamic state or empire was ruled by a Caliph. But the nominal Caliph who had been ruling from Constantinople since fifteenth centaury, was abolished in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal the new leader of what was left of the Ottoman Empire after the end of the first world war in 1918(4). Before Pakistan was created there were two attempts to resurrect the Caliphate . Both of which interestingly enough had taken place in India amongst her Muslim inhabitants. The Western incursion into the Islamic world took a serious turn for the worse during the first world war. After the war the conformation between Islam and the west was exacerbated by the Anglo-French occupation of the Islamic world. The Muslims in India too were becoming opposed to the British rule. In the famous Amritsa massacre of April 19199 in which nearly too Indians were killed many of whom were Muslims(5). It was in such an atmosphere that the Caliphate movement amongst Indian Muslims was

unfolded. The movement was as much a Pan-Islamic movement as much as it was a pro-independent movement. To the extend that it was an anti British movement it received the support of the Hindu nationalists as well. Mahatma Gandhi attended the first Caliphate Conference, held at Delhi in November 1919 and urged the Muslims to launch a non-co operation movement to force the British to maintain the Caliphate in Turkey and respect its rights. But rather than exerting any pressure on the British, the movement created a lot of pressure for the neighboring Afghanistan. The Muslims perceived India under the British rule no longer part of the ' house of Islam ' , but as part of the' house of war' from which good and faithful Muslims should emigrate. Thousands of Muslims did not so and flocked into Muslim Afghanistan from the neighboring Indian province of Sind and North-West frontier.

Two years later in July 1921 a second Caliphate conference was held in Karachi. The Indian Muslims attending the conference declared 'allegiance of the Muslim population to His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, the Commander of the Faithful'. However, this movement too failed to reinstall Caliphate.

Lack of a head of state or a Caliphate was not the only problem which Pakistan was confronting. Another, more serious and practical, problem was the opposition of some of the nationalist Muslim leaders with the notion of creating a separate state for Indian Muslims. One such figure

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was Abul Kalam Azad . a leading Muslim Indian nationalists, and something of a fundamentalist Muslim and yet opposed the notion of creating an Islamic state. Azad supported the idea that Muslims wherever they were, belonged to the' House of Islam'. Moreover, along with other Muslim nationalists, Azad believed that what mattered for Muslims was The suzerainty over the holy places. As long as the sovereignty of the Holy places can remain ever nominally at the hand of Sultan Abdulhamid (and not Arab sheikhs and notables), it was sufficient. Azad became a prominent figure in the Indian National Congress and bitterly opposed the separatism movement by his fellow Indian Muslims.

Another figure who did not support the creation of the new state was ironically Maulana Abul A'la Maududi, who has been described as the most systematic thinker of modern Islam (6). Maududi who has been described by a number of writers one of the modern God-Father of Islamic fundamentalism, had an strange political background (8). Born in 1903, Maududi was very much disappointed by the Caliphate movements of the early 1920s. Although initially the increasing hostility between Hindu and Muslims presented him to change his mind(9). Maududi along with many other clerical leaders came to see the influence of Western ideas and customs as a greater danger than the more political domination of the British. He further argued that nationalism was an un-Islamic idea to be opposed by Muslim throughout the world.(10). In

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that sense, Mandudi and his party, the Jama'at-i-Islami (Islamic

Society) which became a political pillar of Pakistan, not only opposed

Himdu as well as other forms of nationalism, they

even went against the Islamic-Nationalism of the early founders of

Pakistan. Maududi shrewdly realized that the nationalism of the founders

of Pakistan was essentially secular. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Mohammad

Iqbal along with the Muslim League spoke of Islam as a cultural heritage

and a source of national

identity rather than as a living ideal that ought to be put into practice.(11).

The dichotomy which emerged between the founders of Pakistan from the

beginning has lasted until now. One group, secular nationalists, tend to

see Pakistan essentially as an state like other states. A state , where

Muslims can live in it and practice their religion. In other words, the term

'Islamic" to them simply implies a state in which Muslims can freely

practice their religion. To the second group however, the term Islamic is

much more fundamental. It implies an Islamic state, that is to say a

segment of the ' House of Islam' . In this perspective, Pakistan must do its

outmost to assist other Muslims in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and anywhere

else in the world. The present struggle between president Parviz

Musharraf and other secular inclined Pakistani leaders on the other hand,

is essentially the same argument which ran between Jinnah, Iqbal and

other founding fathers of Pakistan with the fundamentalist leaders like

Maududi. The key to the present dilemma a is probably a re-definition of

Islam and nationalism.

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ISRAELI THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

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The events of the past two years (from the failure of the Camp David summit and the beginning of violent conflict two months later) have reinforced the importance of developing an interdependent approach to regional security and stability. Although the direct violence has been largely confined to the Israeli-Palestinian dimension (with some outbursts along the Lebanese border), the implications and potential spillover are regional. No country in the region – from North Africa to the Persian Gulf -- is unaffected by these events and developments. The potential for a chain reaction and massive spillover into a regional conflagration involving Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, and others is a constant and worrying element of the current conflict.

The events of September 11 and the global reach of "mega-terrorist" attacks mounted by groups such as al-Qaeda, have increased the dangers of instability in the region to an even greater degree. These groups function in many of these countries, seeking recruits, funds, training facilities, etc. and they also target many of the regimes. Without intelligence sharing, operational anti-terrorist coordination, and other forms of cooperation among the stabilizing forces in the region, and with the U.S., NATO and other global powers, the dangers to each country and regime individually will magnify quickly.

As a result of this situation, the development and implementation of regional security cooperation and stability arrangements, in various forms, are again a major priority. The efforts to develop these structures began with the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) discussions and negotiations following the 1991 Madrid conference. Although these talks became most intensive during the high-point of the Oslo process, they ended after a few years (1994/5) without significant progress, due to a variety of factors and emphases, (which are reflected in the differing analysis of the outcome).

Now, given the current instabilities in the region, none of the countries and peoples in the region can afford to go through a repetition of the mistakes that led to the earlier failures in this arena. The possibility (however slim) of Israeli-Palestinian political engagement, based on the Arab League (Saudi-Egyptian) initiative, the Bush Administration's framework (perhaps eventually including a regional or international conference), and extensive Palestinian political reform also presents the foundation for regional security cooperation. Indeed, the systematic and thorough review of options, and the rapid implementation of measures to strengthen regional security and prevent regional escalation are absolutely fundamental for survival.

ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES[1]

In many ways, the Israeli threat perceptions and policy analyses that drove decision-making during the ACRS process and related issues and arenas (such as in various international arms limitation and non-proliferation regimes such as the NPT, IAEA, CWC, OPCW, MTCR, etc.) have not changed much, other than to become far more acute. In the past two years, the annual official IDF threat assessments changed the order of priorities in assessing these threats, putting WMD attack first, terrorism second, and moving the evaluation of possible large-scale multi-front conventional attacks to the third position. This change in priorities, which also determines the relative importance and budgetary share of the different conflict scenarios in IDF and MOD planning, acquisition, and training, reflects the culmination of a fundamental but relatively steady shift in the external environment.

The de-emphasis of conventional war scenarios reflects the combined impact of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the decline in the conventional threat from Syria following the end of the Cold War, and the difficultly Syria has in acquiring and maintaining its forces. In addition, in terms of conventional capabilities, the role of Iraq (which had been a major military participant in previous Arab-Israeli wars, beginning in 1948) has been reduced significantly due to the 1991 Gulf War and continuing weapons embargo. Although still formidable, Iraq is probably no longer has the capabilities of moving large numbers of modern tanks through Jordan and to the Israeli border in a short period of time.

At the same time, the perceived WMD and ballistic missile threat has increased steadily over the past decade, both in terms of capabilities and intentions. Despite the Gulf War, UNSCR 687, the activities of UNSCOM, etc., Iraq has maintained substantial capabilities. Its nuclear weapons team is intact, large amounts of chemical weapons remain unaccounted for, and biological weapons materials are also believed to be available. In any war scenario involving Iraq, Israeli decision makers expect that these weapons could be used.

In the case of Iran, while the official Israeli policy seeks to avoid escalation or a direct clash (by defining Iran as a source of concern but not an enemy), the offensive potential is increasing. From an Israeli perspective, the evidence points to accelerating Iranian pursuit of WMD capabilities – chemical weapons, biological weapons and toxins, and the development of a nuclear infrastructure for the manufacture of weapons. The testing and manufacture of the Shahab 3 ballistic missile is also viewed as an important part of the developing threat. Iran's growing profile in various global arms limitation regimes, including the OPCW, IAEA, BWC protocol negotiations, and through the UN Panel of Experts on Missiles is viewed as part of a broad approach to present the image of responsible behavior while benefiting from the close knowledge of verification and inspection systems in order to maintain these capabilities. The consistent emphasis by Iranian representatives on access to dual-use technology and the opposition to the restrictions embodied in

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[1] Note that I am presenting a private Israeli perspective. It is neither official, nor should it be considered to be "the" Israeli perspective, as there are undoubtedly others. However, I believe that the perceptions and options presented in this paper are consensus views, reflecting the policies of the Israeli "security community".

supplier regimes such as the Australia group and MTCR, are also viewed with concern.

In addition, Iranian intentions are discerned through the threats of destruction and denial of Israeli legitimacy issued by the "hard-line" leadership (headed by Supreme Leader Khameni) that controls Iranian policy. In addition, the active support and weapons supplied to terrorist groups such as Hizbollah and also for Palestinians (both Hamas and Arafat, as seen in the Karine-A affair) are seen by Israel as contributing to the potential for a direct clash. Thus, the combination of Iranian capability and intentions are a growing part of the Israeli threat perception.

The extensive Iraqi and Iranian WMD programs are likely to lead to the growth of existing CW and BW capabilities and the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the region, including Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. As a result, Israeli policy makers are considering and developing policies designed to provide adequate responses to these developments, based on the combination of defensive systems such as the Arrow, second-strike deterrence systems, and also increased interest in regional crisis management and limitation arrangements, such as a code of conduct regarding ballistic missiles (as discussed in detail below).

The proliferation of WMD and missile capabilities in other countries in the region adds to the Israeli threat perception. Syria, Egypt, and Libya all possess chemical and/ or biological weapons as well ballistic missile delivery systems, and in all three cases, these capabilities are growing. In each of these cases, as in the cases of Iraq and Iran, the global arms limitation regimes are seen as inadequate to address the specific regional environment.

The centrality of the WMD threat was reinforced by the September 11 attacks and the revelations regarding al-Qaeda's efforts to acquire these capabilities. For those who tended to dismiss the threats of massive terror attacks with thousands of casualties as unrealistic, the destruction of the World Trade Center and the other planned attacks led to a fundamental reassessment. Israel is generally a high priority for Islamic radical terror groups, and while this threat was recognized many years ago, the magnitude has increased significantly. In response, the emphasis on intelligence, interdiction, and deterrence directed at terrorists and their support structures has also grown. Israeli officials have repeatedly emphasized the responsibility of state supporters and hosts for terror groups. (For example, following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, cross-border attacks by Hizbollah have triggered Israeli military responses against Syrian targets in Lebanon. These responses in the past two years are viewed as largely successful, although in need of periodic reinforcement.)

At the same time, the sudden collapse of the Oslo process and the intensity of the Palestinian terror attacks that have taken the lives of hundreds of civilians in Israeli cities has strengthened the centrality of deterrence in Israeli military doctrine. Israeli critics argued that traditional deterrence was undermined by the policy of restraint in response to the Iraqi missile attacks in 1991, as well as the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, and the ineffective responses to Palestinian terror attacks. In contrast, the large scale IDF operation (Defensive Shield) in April 2002, and the battle in the Jenin refugee camp, in particular, are seen as having been central in beginning the

restoration of Israel's deterrence image, both vis-a-vis the Palestinians, and on a regional basis.

These developments have also highlighted the emphasis on maintaining and strengthening Israel's strategic deterrence image. The consensus view in Israel is that the failure of the Oslo process and permanent status negotiations at Camp David demonstrated ultimate Palestinian rejection of Israel's right to exist, and that the existential threats, throughout the Arab and Islamic world, continue to be dominant. This perception, reinforced by the rhetoric of hatred and incitement, has reinforced the view that Israeli security and survival will continue to require the ability to inflict massive retaliation in the event of attack. Thus, any measures that might weaken strategic deterrence, particularly with respect to the NPT and inspection of Israeli nuclear facilities, are now even more anathema than was the case previously.

POLICY OPTIONS

In considering potential regional security options, it is important to distinguish between short-term requirements and longer-term possibilities. As noted above, the potential for the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation to "spillover" to the regional level has been and remains very high, and the immediate need focuses on **crisis management, risk containment, and the creation of fire-breaks** precisely to avoid this danger. Previous experience in the Middle East, as well as crisis management in the India-Pakistan case has illustrated the need for **channels for direct communication among the leadership**, the development of **de-escalation procedures**, and effective (ie, U.S.-led) **mediation**. Crisis situations, increased force deployments, and higher levels of alert generally create additional instability resulting from mutual fear of surprise attack. In order to address these issues and prevent escalation resulting from misperception, appropriate crisis management mechanisms must be developed in advanced. These requirements provide an important example of short-term regional security cooperation.

In addition, the development of regional stability would be enhanced through cooperation in the area of "human security". Coordination regarding measures to prevent **illegal transfer of small arms and explosives** (responsible for the casualties in the terror attacks of the past two years) can provide an important element in the establishment of a **regional human security framework**.

Strategic systems related to WMD capabilities form the basis of longer-term regional security cooperation. Among the CBMs that have been suggested and discussed recently, discussions of the potential for a regional code of conduct related to missile development, testing, and deployment might be useful. (This effort could be based on the framework developed in talks on an International Code of Conduct initiated under the Missile Technology Control Regime -- MTCR.)

At the same time, the development of significant regional security and arms control frameworks in the Middle East is a particularly complex and daunting task, and the difficulties should not be underestimated. The multipolar nature of this region, with many competing centers of power, and

the number of cross-cutting, mutually reinforcing, and deeply seated ethno-national and religious conflicts, have plagued the Middle East for decades. Instability was often the general rule, rather than the exception, and violent warfare and terrorism were and remain all too common.

Nevertheless, and for the reasons discussed above, survival in requires greater efforts to implement regional security requirements than have been made in the past. The disproportionately high level of military spending, even among countries that do not face a major external threat, and major weapons acquisitions, divert resources from urgently needed economic development. Regional cooperation could also create the conditions in which these expenditures can be reduced.

If and when these measures bear fruit, and the Middle East becomes a more benign environment, the regional security framework can be extended to include WMD arms control. The old discussions on Israeli participation in a Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone as well as full Arab and Iranian participation in a regional WMD-Free Zone, with mutual inspection, etc. can then resume. However, before the other conditions are met, such discussions are even less likely to produce useful results than in the past.

Iran, the U.S. and the Islamic Revolution

S. Zibakalam*[1]

Summary

The history of Iran and the U.S. since Islamic Revolution in 1978 consists of a catalogue of misperception, suspicions and mistrust.

One such misconception which is widely shared by Iranians the role of the Americans during the Revolution. According to Iranian (reformists as well as conservatives, moderates as well as hard liners, educated and articulated as well as rural and the and the less educated), during the Islamic Revolution (1977-78) the U.S. pursued an active pro Shah policy and supported his regime until the last minute. The U.S., according to Iranians,

did everything that was possible in order to save the Shah committed trying to suppress the Iranian uprising against his rule.

This paper intends to examine the basis of this theory. Contrary intends to examine the basis of this theory. Contrary to this widely held view, the U.S. did not have any clear policy towards the regime of the Shah. Much as many sound unrealistic and unbelievable, but the Americans simply lacked a coherent policy the Iranian crisis. Iranian simply

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assume that given the close ties which existed between successive U.S. government and the Shah for more than three decades, the Americans rallied behind the Shah when his regime underwent the crisis of 1978. But their support for the Shah could not save his regime. The reality is however far from this.

To any close observer of Iranian politics, neither the existence of opposition to the Shah's regime nor its magnitude came as a surprise in the 1970s. Shah, however, was far from the case for many Western analysis and governments as well on the Shah and his top officials. To his list, one can also add the Israeli officials both in Iran and in Israel .

While the analysts tended to come up with academic explanations, the governments particularly that of the U.S. had to confront the rapidly changing political crisis in Iran from a more practical point to view. It is more than just an academic exercise to examine the roots of the west's and particularly Americans bewilderment in the face of the Iranian upheavals in 1977-78. because of the Shah's sensitivity towards the west, the latter's perception very often had important repercussions in Iran. How did then the West see the Shah on the eve of the start of the Islamic revolution around 1978?

For more than two decades the Shah was perceived by successive U.S. administration as a benevolent ruler. A reformer who was modernizing his otherwise backward country. His opposition, as far Washington was concerned, tended to oppose his modernization drive and thus did not account for much. In the words of Gary Sick, a senior figure in the Carter administration:

"So deeply ingrain ad was the conviction that the Shah was the master in his own house and that the opposition constituted little more than a nuisance that even a year later [1978], when the revolution was raging almost out a control, issues relating to internal dissension in Iran continued to receive little attention (by Washington)". (1)

the U.S. administration summed up the Shah's opposition as "an aged cleric who had fulminated against the Shah from exile for fourteen years to no avail and a congeries of aging Mossadeghists, village ecclesiastics and disgruntled job seekers".(2) They were accordingly no match for the powerful monarch whop "commanded wealth a superbly equipped military force of some 4oooo men, and a security force whose sinister reputation was legendary. He had powerful friends in nearly every major capital of the world and a compliant legislature". (3) Washington further perceived the Shah to have a strong character. (4) Jimmy Carter believed that the Shah was a strong ruler who after all had thirty seven years experience on the throne and had survived crises which, outwardly, were no less severe than the riots of 1978. (5)

Why had U.S. and the West as a whole developed such an uncritical and almost reverential view of the Shah? Part of the answer lies with the Shah and the image which he had successfully manufactured for himself. But there was also an underlying and more fundamental reason.

As a regional ally of the U.S., Iran occupied a key geopolitical position in the Cold War era. The Shah was deeply embroiled with the West, and increasingly he came to be looked upon as the custodian of its global interests in a strategically important region. In the worlds of a senior White House Official "Washington had based its entire strategic concept for the Persian Gulf region on the strength and stability of the Shah, and the White House was irrevocably wedded to that approach". (6)

In short, a combination of geopolitical consideration, coupled with an unrealistic picture of the Shah had led the U.S. to Barbour misconception about him which had serious practical implications that gradually emerged as the Islamic revolution began to unravel. It was therefore neither accidental nor a result of merely bureaucratic incompetence when the CIA concluded in 1978 that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-Revolutionary". (7) Nor for that matter was President Carter's famous speech in praise of the Shah, during his state visit to Iran (in January 1978) less than a year before the Islamic revolution, out of context when he stated "Iran is an island of stability in one of the more troubled water of the world. This is a great tribute to you Your Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect, admiration, love which your people give to you.(8)

The misunderstanding, or to be more realistic, the misconception had important practical implications for events in Iran. The Islamists and supporters of the late Ayatullah Khomeini accused the U.S. of assisting the Shah throughout the crisis. The monarch and the royalists, on the other hand, felt bitter about the Shah's western allies, particularly the U.S. for failing to support him. In an interview after he

left Iran in January 1979, the Shah actually accused the U.S. of "overthrowing him from the power".(9)

as can be seen, Iranian people accuse the U.S. of assisting and giving every help and support to save the regime and to keep the Shah in power, whilst the monarch himself and his supporters accuse the U.S. for failing to help him. What did or did not the U.S. do? Did Washington give every support to the Shah in order to prevent his fall, as many Iranian and the Islamic Regime claim, or did the U.S. on the contrary, stab the Shah in the back and overthrew him, as the opponents of the revolution claim? The simple answer was that the U.S. did neither. It neither stood by the Shah to the

last minute and helped him, as claimed by the Islamists, nor it stabbed the Shah in the back and colluded clandestinely with his opponents as claimed by the monarch's supporters. Washington actually was so confused and shocked by the events in Iran that it was unable to formulate a coherent, realistic and practical policy towards the Iranian crisis. The truth is that the West was so out of touch with the realities of the Shah's rule that every aspect of the crisis came as news. The depth of the Shah's unpopularity the weakness of his personality and more significantly that of his regime, the wide range of the opposition, the dynamic of religion and particularly the fundamentalist development that Islam had underwent in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s, all caught the U.S. by surprise and bewilderment and went against its expectations. It was William Sullivan the new U.S. ambassador to Tehran in 1976 who for the first time noticed that the realities in the streets of Tehran were somewhat different to what the U.S. officials believed.

It was therefore not so much the question of the U.S. not wanting to assist the Shah, but rather, just what could be done. Washington primarily failed to appreciate the crisis which the Shah was gradually facing. When it finally did, the U.S. assumed that the Shah would see out the crisis. By the time the West and U.S. in particular, realized the gravity of the situation, the crisis had developed into a full fledged revolution. Washington at that stage could not do anything even if the Administration wanted to. An ironic reality that many Iranians have failed to appreciate for more than twenty three years.

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2) Ibid

3) Ibid.

4) Brzezinski, Zbigniew. <u>Power and Principle: Memories of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981</u>. U.S., 1983, p. 366.

5) Leenden, Michael and Willian Lewis. <u>Debacle: The American Failure in Iran</u>, U.S. 1980, pp. 31-33.

6) Ibid

7) Stemplel, D. John. <u>Inside the Iranian Revolution</u>, Indian University press, U.S., 1984, p. 10.

8) Newsweek, 8 January, 1978.

9) Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. <u>Answer to History</u>, Stein and Day, U.s., 1980 pp. 10-5.

10) Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza "how the American Overthrew Me" Now, December 7, 1979; pp. 21-34.

11) Sullivan, William H. <u>Mission to Iran</u>, U.S., 1981. See the first Chapter of his memoir.

Iran's Changing Threat Perceptions

The impacts of "the War on Terror"

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Introduction

If one were to hypothetically chart a graph between American and Iranian relations throughout the 1990's, it would probably be fairly flat, or horizontal. However, the moment that the first American Airlines flight crashed into the World Trade Center, Iran was quick to offer expressions of sympathy and revisions of its political stance toward America. Between September 11, 2001 and February 6, 2002 roughly seven to eight interactions of this sort took place. The paper will focus on the significance of each event and how they were described in their official and unofficial bilateral positions as well as the evident split within the two governments. Finally and based on the above events an analysis of current concerns and threat perception will be provided.

The significance of these events can be summed up in the words of CNN correspondent Christian Amanpour during a CNN broadcast with President Khatami. "Iran was one of the first countries to send condolences to the United States after September 11. There is food distribution going to Afghanistan that will come through Iran's port on the Persian Gulf. Iran has said that it will meet its international obligation to assist U.S. pilots, should they find themselves in trouble during this situation. This is quite incredible for so-called sworn enemies."[1] Indeed, this is why the hypothetical graph mentioned in the opening of this section suddenly shot up and has indicated a high level of activity ever since.

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[1] "Iranian President Condemns September 11 Attacks" November 12, 2001, CNN/ World. http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/11/12/khatami.interview.cnna/index.html

Condemnation of Attacks by the Iranian Government

President Mohammad Khatami was one of the first world leaders to condemn and

offer his condolences to the United States after the terrorists' attacks on September 11.

Later, on November 11, in a New York symposium, President Khatami said, "The

horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States were perpetrated by a

cult of fanatics who had self-mutilated their ears and tongues, and could only

communicate with perceived opponents through carnage and devastation."[2] Meanwhile,

as Khatami was predictably diplomatic about American-Iranian relations, he did not

mention anything new regarding the issue of rapprochement nor did he condemn future

American acts. The reason for Khatami's pragmatic approach to this line of questioning

is probably because Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei assumes the role of "bad cop,"

while Khatami plays the "good cop." Even though the Supreme Leader condemned the

terrorist attack on September 11, and called for a global campaign against terrorism, he

also denounced U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan.[3] This is where the fault line inside Iran

becomes evident. This "split" will be further explored in the next section.

Halted Chants of "Death to America"

The second interaction that occurred is when Iranian officials halted the historic

chants of "marg bar Amrica," or "death to America." For approximately four weeks after

September 11, 2001 the Iranian government halted chants of "Death to America," which

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[2] "Khatami Suggests Iran Might Eventually Recognize Israel". November 11, 2001, Ha'aretz Service.
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=93165&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&
sbSubContrassID=0

[3] Kassman, Laurie. "Has Time Come for a U.S.-Iranian Rapprochement?" 9 November 2001, Voice of America.
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=2161F0DF694E4318AD144CEF2E988501&Title=Has%2
0Time%20Come%20for%20a%20U.S.%2DIranian%20Rapprochement%3F

typically occur during Friday sermons and other public events. They also discouraged the most militant aspects of the regime, i.e. the Basij or Islamic Militia from cursing America.[4] This official verbal attack was adopted just after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and has been continuous ever since as a crowd-rallying method. This was the first time the practice had ever been discouraged. However, Iran, like most countries, never speaks with only one voice. The next event appears to be more in line with traditional Iranian perspectives on America's foreign policy —when Iran condemned both what happened to America, but also condemned what America was doing to the rest of the world.

Iran Denounces U.S. War in Afghanistan

The third interaction where Iran denounced the U.S. war in Afghanistan was, as we mentioned, more in line with traditional Iranian foreign policy. While addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 2001, President Khatami condemned the attacks on America, but at the same time refused to join a U.S. led coalition. He argued for a UN driven fight against global terrorism based on a clear and internationally accepted definition. He said the following:

> We should reach an appropriate definition for terrorism and make [a] distinction between blind criminal terrorism and the legitimate defense against occupation, violence and arid suppression. Based on collective wisdom and international will, we should stand for a deep-rooted continuous struggle against the causes and manifestations of terrorism as well as its bases anywhere in the world. We should be vigilant to avoid the pitfall of fueling rather than suppressing terrorism through unilateral practices stemming from pride and rage. We should avoid expanding terrorism throughout the world in an attempt to suppress one of its bases.[5]

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[4] "Saying One Thing, Meaning Another" October 11, 2001, The Economist Online.
http://www.economist.com/library/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=814175&subject=Iran
[5] "Full Text of Khatami's Address to the UN General Assembly". November 11, 2001, IranMania.com.
http://www.iranmania.com/news/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=7540&NewsKind=Current+Affairs

The difference between the Iranian view of American foreign policy and that of many of America's closest allies or even minor supporters is not that great. In fact, it has been reported that Russia and several of America's allies have made it clear that they would not support a widening of the campaign against terrorism from Afghanistan to other countries.[6] In fact, even NATO which invoked Article Five of its treaty which says "an attack on one member is an attack on all" warned the U.S. that it will have to provide evidence to justify any (further) action.[7]

Therefore, President Khatami's request to the United Nations that it should provide a clear definition of the term "international terrorism" should not be dismissed by the Bush administration. Nonetheless, because Iran's domestic political scene is split between reformers and hard-liners, it is difficult for analysts to pin point any one specific reason why Iran would not join a U.S. led coalition. However, in a conservative American journal, Ray Takeyh explains Iran's political thinking the way Washington sees it. He explains,

For an entire generation of Iran's clerics, relations with the U.S. have been mired in visceral emotion. From Tehran's perspective, the U.S. is more than another great power with which Iran must deal; it embodies a whole range of political and cultural grievances. America's culture of pluralism and materialism threatens the foundations of an Islamic republic; furthermore, its economic and geopolitical preeminence works to block Iranian ambitions to lead a coalition of Gulf and Caspian states. Successive Persian empires have dreamt of becoming the dominant power in Islamdom, only to be thwarted by other claimants to that status.. Arab dynasties, Ottoman rulers, and British imperialists all denied Iran its historic mandate of shaping the region in its own image; the U.S. is just the latest obstacle to Iran's hegemonic ambitions.[8]

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[6] "EU Irritated by Bush's Speech." February 5, 2002, DAWN, the Internet Edition. http://www.dawn.com/2002/02/05/top15.htm
[7] "Bush's "Evil Axis" Comment Stirs Critics". February 2, 2002, The BBC World Service. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1796000/1796034.stm
[8] Ray Takeyh, "Ayatollah Attitude: Iran's Place in the New War" November 5, 2001 *The National Review*

This description of Iranian disengagement from America's war seems fitting. After all, the American victory against Iraq in 1991 meant a significant American presence on Iran's western and southern borders with Turkey, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Now, with an American victory in Afghanistan, the U.S. has significant troop presence on its eastern border as well. Of course Iran cannot sustain a long intrusion from U.S. forces on either one of its borders, and therefore President Khatami's diplomacy makes sense; he proposed a UN led war and an internationally recognized definition of the term "international terrorism." The course of U.S.-Iranian relations at the end of 2001 seemed to fall from its post-9/11 high. This is, of course, because of Iran's disapproval of American forces in Afghanistan and the probability of American expansion in the region. That is why Iran's fourth interaction was the harshest yet.

Iran Warns U.S. Not to Violate Airspace:

In reports made in early October 2001, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani warned the United States not to violate its airspace. While he claimed that a few airplanes crossing the border would probably not be a problem, he warned that more than a few would constitute violation of sovereign territory airspace.[9] William Samii, editor of "Iran Report", a Radio Free Europe publication, said that, "though Iran announced U.S. warplanes on bombing missions to Afghanistan were barred from crossing its airspace, officials may have chosen not to notice if any did. He said Iran set the precedent when it looked the other way during the 1991 Gulf war, when U.S. planes occasionally crossed Iran to bomb Iraq."[10] Samii went on to explain that warplanes flying from land bases in Kuwait would have difficulty reaching Afghanistan from that Persian Gulf state without crossing Iran. The apparent discrepancy between what is said by official sources and what appears to be the reality have caused many analyst to speculate. One such

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[9] "Iran Clinches Arms Deal with Russia." October 2, 2001, the BBC World Service.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1574000/1574721.stm
[10] Donna Bryson. "Watchers: Iran Had Motive to Help U.S.". November 15, 2001, Associated Press.
http://news.excite.com/news/ap/011115/14/int-iran-U.S.-attacks

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discrepancy between the harsh warning the Defense Minister gave and the reality was confirmed by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld when he appeared on CBS's "Face the Nation" on Sunday November 11, 2001. He said that "the Iranian government has people in Afghanistan who are working with some of the elements of Afghan opposition on the ground. Indeed, we also have people working with those same elements." [11] The positive steps taken by the Iranians somehow managed not to breach the negative rhetoric. This, of course, is part of the division within both governments, even more evident on the Iranian side. Iran could have used this opportunity in a better and more constructive way to gain credit. The following subsection moves closer to showing the degree of the schism on the part of Iran.

Promised to Help American Troops in Distress

As we saw, while one side of Iran's government "warns" about the negative impact of using Iranian airspace, for example, another side, which is usually hard-line and harshly anti-American, extends a friendly hand momentarily. It was reported on the Voice of America Website that although "they (Iranian leaders) rejected joining a U.S. coalition… Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei's government offered help for search and rescue missions if needed." [12] Such offers of goodwill, even if they are representative of international norms, contradict assertions of Iranian hostility. This is apparent in the Karine A Affair of early January 2002.

Karine A: Iran and the Ship Carrying Arms for Palestinians in the Red Sea.

On January 3, 2002 Israeli commandos raided a Palestinian Authority freighter-ship in the Red Sea en route to the Occupied Territories. Almost immediately, Iran was accused of having provided approximately fifty tons of weapons and munitions. Several questions arose over the next few days. First, why would Iran supply Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority? This is an interesting question because Arafat and the Islamic

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[11] "U.S., Iran Military Advisors Side by Side in Afghanistan". November 12, 2001, Agence France-Presse. http://www.iranmania.com/news/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=7559&NewsKind=Current+Affairs

[12] Kassman, Laurie. "Has Time Come for a U.S.-Iranian Rapprochement?"

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regime in Iran have not been on "friendly" terms for several years. Throughout the past two decades of the Islamic Republic's existence, their relationship has been marred with adversity. Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) chairman Arafat and Iran's Islamic regime started out on a good footing during the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. Arafat was handed the former Israeli embassy in Tehran, and he raised the Palestinian flag in its place. However, when Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the PLO sided with Iraq and thus forfeited Iran's support.[13] That is one of the main reasons why Iran has so enthusiastically supported Hezbollah in both Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, Iranian-PLO relations turned even bitterer when Arafat recognized Israeli's right to exist and started the peace process. After the Wye Memorandum in Washington in November 1998, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei launched a harsh personal attack against Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. He said "Arafat is an Israeli lackey, after signing this agreement he has replaced Israel as the jailer of the Palestinians."[14] In light of the historical relationship between Iran and the PLO, Israel's claim that Iran was involved in armaments shipment seized on board the freighter-ship Karine A is rather strange. Why would Iran and the Palestinian Authority (PA) create an alliance? Iran has no "need" for the PA to influence what happens in its own or PA-controlled territory. Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah are already under Iran's influence. To understand why Arafat may have formed an alliance may provide some clarification. Perhaps Arafat was simply desperate for something to happen. Iranian supported Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah are now reportedly increasing the pressure on Arafat's authority within the Palestinian Territories.[15] According to Dr. Shaul Shay, a research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, "Although Iran has provided weapons to groups in the territories before, its abilities, once it connects directly to the ruling power, are tremendous... In the long term, the country may manage to scuttle the peace process. What they are essentially offering the Palestinians is the Lebanonization of the territories. They used Hezbollah to oust U.S. from Lebanon, but even after we left, the matter was

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[13] Miriam Shaviv. "A chill wind from Tehran." January 20, 2002, The Jerusalem Post. http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2002/01/20/Features/Features.41957.html
[14] Ibid
[15] Ibid

not settled for them. They want to free Jerusalem."[16] This possible explanation leads U.S. to a second question: why would the Iranian government endanger its newfound détente with the United States and make itself a target in the "war on terrorism?" According to Gerald Steinberg, a *Jerusalem Post* columnist and director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and Negotiation at Bar-Ilan University, "if the arms shipment did originate in Iran, it may have been organized by one of the quasi-military organizations associated with the country's more conservative elements." Furthermore, "it is possible that Iranian President Khatami's whole government knew nothing about the arms shipment." Steinberg puts the alliance, "in the context of the ongoing power struggle between the reformists, led by President Khatami, and the revolutionary die-hards, led by Ayatollah Khamenei."[17]

He is not the only academic that believes in the concept of a dual-regime in Iran. This idea has been advanced since January 3rd 2002. A third question arises even if Iran did provide weapons and munitions, why did it do so through sea lanes? In reference to a Ha'aretz newspaper article which was reprinted in the *Guardian Unlimited* "suggests that the arms shipment cannot have had full backing from the Iranian authorities. If it were officially approved, the Karine A would not have picked up the weapons at night from another ship near Kish: it would have gone straight to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and loaded its cargo openly."[18] This, of course, suggests the Iranians do not have a problem with overtly supporting the war against Israel.

The entire scenario of the events that happened between September 11, 2001 and January 3, 2002 seem to indicate one or two possible directions. First, it is gravely apparent that Iran's foreign policy, while officially sanctioned by Ayatollah Khamenei, has several voices. This "split" has confused politicians in Washington and is itself the cause for America's perspective "split" on Iran. As Brian Whitaker of *the Guardian Unlimited* said "The trouble with Iran, is that it has two governments and 10,000 leaders. If you are going to pin blame, you have to determine which one is responsible." [19] The

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[16] Ibid
[17] Ibid
[18] Whitaker, Brian. "The Strange Affair of Karine A."
[19] Ibid

second possibility, and another part of the cause for America's "split", is based on the Israeli policy towards Iran.

According to Zalman Shoval, former ambassador to Washington and a foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, "By cooperating with the Palestinian Authority, the Iranians have become an immediate threat." He goes on to say that "Israel must counteract Iran in two ways. First, by continuing to carry out preventative operations to stop Iran from delivering weapons to the Palestinian Territories, and by targeting terror centers in the territories which might attract pro-Iranian activity. Second, and most importantly, by pushing the U.S. and Europe to isolate Iran until it puts an end to its involvement in terror. The U.S. must lead this effort, and Israel's role will be more in the realm of intelligence."[20] Mr. Shoval makes my point in his second suggestion that some aspects of America's foreign policy in the region is dominated by what is in the best interest of the Israeli regime.

Several interactions that took place in the period immediately after September 11 did not necessarily destroy the foundations of American-Iranian relations, but they did jolt them. This hypothetical chart, regardless of whether it has negative or positive connotations, shows that Iran has had a role in America's War on Terror. Some aspects of its role have even been positive and Useful for the United States, for example Iran's promise to help any downed American pilot. Although the likelihood of the Taliban shooting down an F-14 was not very high, it was the thought that counted. Even the harshest Iranian criticism denouncing America's involvement in Afghanistan was nothing out of the ordinary for the Iranian regime.

Changing Perceptions

A list of traditionally existing threats for Iran would include the followings:

- The instability of the regional environment. Iran is situated in the Middle East where along with fifteen neighbors it occupies the land basin around the waters of

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[20] Shaviv, Miriam. "A Chill Wind from Tehran."

the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, where most of the world's known oil and gas reserves are located. Not one of the countries in this region can be considered a stable, developed, democratic regime. They all have plenty of internal problems and long and complicated history of conflicts with each other. Even the United States, given its military presence in the Persian Gulf, has to be considered a regional threat for Iran..

- The collapse of the Soviet Union introduced a whole new set of threats emanating from the newly-independent former Soviet republics which border Iran to the north. Their problems of state formation increase prospect of armed conflict, and any political and economic instability could "spillover" and negatively impact Iran.

- -There are also unsettled issues such as who owns what with respect to the unexploited oil reserves presumed to exist in the Caspian Sea basin. Conflicts over oil exploitation rights could become deadly. There was already a military show-down between Azerbaijan (Britain oil companies were involved) and Iran in July of 2001 related to this issue. On July 23, 2001 the British Petroleum (BP) suspended oil exploration activities at the Araz hydrocarbon deposit southwest of Baku following the threats made to two of its vessels the day before by an Iranian aircraft and naval vessel in the Caspian Sea. Following the incident, the British Ambassador to Tehran, Nick Brown, in a meeting with Iran's Secretary of Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani, assured him that British oil firms would not conduct any operations against the interests of the Islamic Republic.

- Iran has a longstanding dispute with the United Arab Emirates over the three islands in the Persian Gulf. The United Arab Emirates has the support of the United States.

- Iraq represents a perpetual threat under the leadership of Saddam Hussein though the border conflict goes beyond him and is about five hundred years old.

- Turkey's military alliance with Iran's avowed enemy, Israel, is another threat. Turkey also threatens Iran to the extent that it competes for hegemony in the

region and disseminates secularism. Iran and Turkey are in a race to form strategic alliances with the newly independent former Soviet Republics.

- Economic sanctions imposed by the United States continue to threaten Iran's economic viability.

- A fear from Israel on any type of preemptive attack over Bushehr nuclear power plants, (similar to what they did in Iraq in 1981). Iran is well aware that the Israelis might also provide highly important assistance to the U.S in any military operation in the region.

- Israel is also perceived a creeping threat approaching from Turkey, Central Asia and even Arab States of the Persian Gulf (through secret deals with the Arab States), while United States is creeping from all directions particularly from Afghanistan, Arab neighbors of Iran as well as Iraq.

- Any changes in Iraq fomented by the U.S. may create an American supported regime like Afghanistan, thus could be a threat to the "Islamic" nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran. So the whole thing is seen within a creeping conspiracy theory and it is exactly to address these types of threats that Iran is enhancing its weapon system, attempting to reach self-sufficiency and increase domestic production and procuring new weapons and military technology.

Conclusion

Iran does not possess required capabilities for offensive operation across the Persian Gulf, but its maritime program, which includes three diesel-powered submarines, warrants some concern. Iran's navy appears to be able to increase the costs of any probable attacks. With the platforms and weaponry Iran has acquired, it has practically established a capable navy that can intervene in regional issues and cannot be easily ignored. A recent U.S. Defense Intelligence evaluation is of the opinion that "the United States could not immediately neutralize Iran's ability to disrupt shipping to and from the region. Currently, 86 warships out of 132, stationed in the Persian Gulf belong to the United States.

On the Iranian side this is confirmed by Ali Fadavi [a senior commander of the Naval Forces of the Islamic Republic Guards Corps (IRGC)] who said on Tuesday July 9, that "On defense of Iran's Persian Gulf coast, when Iran did not have anything like speed vessels, U.S. forces were terrified at the sight of Iranian speedboats, but today Iran possesses speed vessels. When the forces of the IRGC Navy entered the Persian Gulf fifteen years ago, they were not well organized or well trained and did not possess the advanced equipment, but now they are fully prepared and equipped to defend the country and the national and Islamic honor of the nation. They are ready to give unimaginable answers to any invasion by the U.S. or other countries' forces."[21]

Preoccupied with the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, enhanced by their strong military presence in Afghanistan and political support for the Afghan government, the current situation has created controversial situation in Iran.

-To some, it is a golden window of opportunity that can mend the broken ties with the U.S. and help Iran to create better international relations with the world. For instance some believe that if the United States decides to enter into a war against Iraq, then Iran should either facilitate such an operation and cooperate with the U.S. or remain a positive neutral. This position is supported by those who believe Iraq and Iran are in a ceasefire and have not signed a peace treaty; therefore Iran should use all possible means to guarantee its national interest change the current balance of weakness to a new regional balance in which Iran may revive its traditional role of a regional power.

-To others, the U.S. "War on Terror" is a context under which "the Islamic nature" of the regime is targeted and secularization sponsored. Therefore the Islamic Republic views any movement that displays secularization --either at the domestic or at the regional level- an existential threat to the system. In this context it is easy to see how any domestic reform movement – even the one led by the President Khatami– would be viewed as a threat to the Islamic hard-liners.

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[21] Tehran Times, Internet Edition, (www.Tehrantimes.com) IRGC Navy Fully Prepared to Defend Nation: Fadavi, Tuesday July 9, 2002

Recently several top Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have portrayed the U.S. as a threat to Iran. Deputy IRGC commander Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr (May 16), Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Movahedi-Kermani, the supreme leader's representative to the IRGC, (May 16) and IRGC commander Yahya Rahim-Safavi (May 10). Safavi addressing a group of IRGC commanders and Basij volunteers said: "We regard America as a serious threat to the Islamic System."

For this group of people, the "War on Terror" and the probable attack on Iraq is to bring a pro American state in Iraq (similar to the one in Afghanistan) that can eventually be a major threat to Iran thus a creeping conspiracy.

Though the nature of such threats is well understood, but they are occasionally the subject of open discussions by Iranian authorities. It seems that they prefer intentionally not to open it to the public beyond its rhetorical level, because they do not want to enter into any open debate on the idea of "secularization". The Islamic regime introduces Israel and the U.S as a threat to *Islam* rather than to *Iran* and expects this would get adequate support either from people on a domestic level or from the Islamic world in case Iran is engaged in a war.

What About Iraq?

Discussion Paper for "Mideast Regional Security Dilemmas: Searching for Solutions" Meeting,
Bruges, Belgium, 13-16 July 2002

Amin Tarzi[1]

If there is one foreign policy issue that most of the Arab statesmen do not wish to
discuss with their American counterparts, it concerns Iraq. Most link any discussion
of the future of Iraq, especially the fate of the Iraqi president Saddam Husayn, to the
resumption of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Others claim that Iraq simply does not
represent a threat to regional stability in the Middle East. While the majority of Arab
states in the region have recently fostered better relations with Baghdad and have openly
supported the lifting of economic sanctions being enforced on Iraq by the United Nations
since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, few Middle Eastern officials have good words to
bestow on the Iraqi leader. Smaller Arab states of the Persian Gulf have indicated that if
requested, they will cooperate with the United States to remove the regime of Mr. Husayn
by force. In the "Arab street," the Iraqi leader has gathered significant support among
those who are either enraged at the United States for not supporting the Palestinians or
for "killing the Iraqi children," or at their own governments and leaders for not doing
enough to better the lives of ordinary citizens and for clamping down on various
freedoms. In any case, any discussion on Iraq is either postponed or linked to other
issues in the Middle East. Unfortunately this unwillingness to discuss the problems
posed by Iraq with regard to Middle East security is also pervasive in Track II and other
unofficial gatherings—which are by nature typically forums for discussion of contentious
subjects.

However, burying one's head in the sand and pretending that issue will resolve itself is a
very dangerous position to take at this juncture of Middle East politics. The issue of
Iraq—and not *just* the removal of President Husayn through an invasion or other
means—is a reality for the Middle East and beyond. Discussion of this sensitive yet
significant subject, both in formal forums and, especially for the purpose of this
discussion paper, Track II meetings, may result in a better understanding of the
sensitivities of Arab and Iranian representatives by decision-makers in Washington. In
turn, such an understanding could lead to the formulation of a more balanced and
regional-sensitive U.S. (and by extension, its allies') policy on Iraq. The mention here of
U.S. allies is important, because there are allies who *will* jump on the military campaign
bandwagon against Iraq if it becomes obvious that a new regime will emerge in Baghdad.

Here I offer some points for discussion on the future course of events regarding Iraq. I
believe that the status quo of that country will most likely change in the near future,
though in my view no unalterable plan of action has been formulated by the United States
or, sadly for that matter, by the international community at large. Moreover, I posit that
the course of events that could take shape in Iraq will have a direct and central impact on

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[1] Views expressed in this paper are the author's alone and do not represent views of the Monterey Institute
of International Studies or any other entity.

security arrangements in most parts of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, including Iran and Turkey. In addition, they will impact any possible solutions for a just and durable peace between Arab states, in particular Palestine and Israel.

Before any discussion on Iraq, it is important to pause a minute and recall the sequence of events in that country since the late 1970s. If we move beyond the conspiracy theories that somehow one or another country "encouraged" Mr. Husayn to invade Iran in 1980 or Kuwait a decade later, to use chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Iraqi civilians, or to launch ballistic missiles indiscriminately against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel, it is evident that there is a danger posed to the region and beyond by the current government in Iraq. There is, let us remember, an internationally sanctioned policy on how to address this danger. The policy is described in various United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR), starting with UNSCR 687 of 3 April 1991, which attempted to remove Saddam Husayn's ability to endanger regional security. The tools Iraq has used to expand its influence and its territory (to go as far as occupying Kuwait and designating it the 19th province of Iraq, for example) and for which Mr. Husayn squandered hundreds of millions of Iraqi money, were chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems—collectively known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The United Nations established a Special Commission, UNSCOM, with the task of "destruction, removal or rendering harmless" Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, and all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km. The task of denying Iraq its nuclear program was assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Later in 1991, UNSCR 715 approved plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV), as requested and submitted by the UN secretary-general.

From the very beginning, however, cooperation with UNSCOM was perceived by the Iraqi leader as a continuation of the Gulf War and not as part of an obligation to which he agreed, albeit under duress. Iraq was determined to fight UNSCOM, and not to cooperate. Even with all the hurdles thrown at UNSCOM by Iraq, some by the very states that voted in favor of the Special Commission's creation, this program proved to be a successful system of eliminating a dangerous *and utilized* WMD program. It stands to date as the most intrusive and far-reaching OMV regime initiated and voted in by the United Nations to confront an aggressor regime with WMD capabilities. As an example, UNSCOM destroyed or made harmless about 50 Scud missiles, 40,000 chemical munitions, some 700 tons of chemical agents, and much more. The IAEA discovered and dismantled an Iraqi nuclear program which, had it not been for the Gulf War, would have allowed Saddam Husayn to build a nuclear weapon by 1992 or 1993. In addition, he would have had the means to deliver nuclear warheads to most of the Persian Gulf states, Israel, Turkey, and perhaps beyond.

On 31 October 1998, Iraq announced that it would cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM and halt all UNSCOM activities inside Iraq, including monitoring. Iraq's persistent refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM prompted a military bombing campaign known as Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998), in which U.S. and U.K. military aircraft took part. Since then, Iraq has refused to allow any inspection to take place.

Instead Mr. Husayn cleverly and with much success turned international attention and opinion away from Iraq's aggressive policies and WMD programs to the sanctions inflicted upon his country.

The unanimous adoption on 14 May 2002 of UNSCR 1409 was an attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to redirect the international attention away from the sanctions to the reason for their existence. This resolution, if implemented true to the letter, would give the people of Iraq more access to "civilian needs." Unless, that is, the regime of Saddam Husayn decided to either divert the available funds away from purchasing food and medicine to other projects (i.e., weapons procurement) or simply withhold the distribution of humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people, in order to continue portraying his country as a victim of UN sanctions. With the new resolution, the permanent five members of the Security Council were finally speaking with one voice, and, most importantly, the burden of proof falls upon the Iraqi president.

The issue of sanctions is tied, at least in the view of the United States, to the fulfillment by Baghdad of other relevant UNSCRs, notably 687 or 1284, which in 1999 established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission a successor inspection regime to UNSCOM. Washington and London's success in forging unanimity in resolution 1409 could be used to recreate the international commitment needed to implement the unfinished task of assuring that Iraq does not again pose a WMD threat.

Criticism against U.S. policy on Iraq stems from the fact that no UN resolution on Iraq addresses the issue of regime change in Baghdad, whereas the U.S. government has made no secrets of its intention to remove Saddam Husayn from power. This U.S. policy, articulated in the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, gained further domestic currency after the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, the focus of the international community more generally has been on the UN sanctions regime, which is widely believed to have caused unnecessary suffering to the Iraqi people. Whether drawing a direct correlation between sanctions and the humanitarian crisis in Iraq is made for genuine concerns for the Iraqis or rather for economic and political reasons, there is international acceptance that sanctions have not worked, and that the United States lost the propaganda war. Resolution 1409 could potentially remedy justified concerns for the Iraqis and even contribute to more social mobility in the Iraqi society at large, which could in the future give rise to viable political alternatives to Saddam's regime.

The main concern of the United States remains Saddam Husayn's track record regarding the use of WMD, coupled with his support for terrorism. Indeed, doomsday scenarios involving his direct or indirect WMD support to terrorists for use against American targets are frightening and not completely out of question. Most countries wish to see the threat posed by Iraq eliminated, and the Bush administration has been especially vocal about its opposition to Saddam's regime. But despite the fact that U.S. strategic thinking is currently focused on prevention more than reaction, there has of late been apprehension in the U.S. government about launching an immediate military campaign against Iraq.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powel expressed the view that a solid international coalition is needed to ensure the long-term success of a post-Saddam Iraq, and the United States has far from succeeded in forming such a coalition for military action against Husayn's regime. In addition, there have been reports of recent concerns by some American military officers, who doubt that U.S. forces are ready to engage Iraq militarily in the next few months. At this time, diplomacy appears to be the most suitable option. Through resolution 1409, there is an opportunity for the United States to work with its international partners to try and resolve the Iraq problem.

The text of resolution 1409 clearly stipulates a direct link between it and the two disarmament resolutions mentioned above. As pointed out by Secretary of State Powell, under the new export control system that simplifies the exportation of civilian goods to Iraq, "there can be no excuse for any country to evade the focused controls aimed at preventing the Iraqi regime's re-armament." There also should not be any excuse for any state to prevent the reintroduction of weapons inspectors to Iraq.

If the inspection regime is allowed to recommence in Iraq under the mandates established for UNMOVIC, the WMD programs and stockpiles of Saddam Husayn will be rendered less dangerous. While no inspection regime is absolutely foolproof, producing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons will be very hard with intrusive inspections. Moreover, the mandate of UNMOVIC calls for a "reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification," indicating that the inspections are to continue as long as Saddam Husayn tries to produce WMD.

Mr. Husayn understands this well, hence his refusal to allow the inspectors back. So far, he has had the tacit support of major states, including three members of the Security Council. However, if the international community truly believes that Iraq has WMD programs, it is time—with the civilian victims card out of the game—for it to pressure Baghdad to cooperate fully with UNMOVIC.

Given Saddam Husayn's past record, it is unlikely that he will allow weapons inspectors to deprive him of his most valued possessions. He demonstrated this by refusing to cooperate with the UN in meetings held last week in Vienna, aimed at establishing the resumption of weapon inspections in Iraq. The failure of the Vienna talks only gives more impetus to a U.S. policy of forcefully changing the regime in Baghdad. Indeed, plans for such a military action were allegedly leaked to the *New York Times* after the failed meetings in Vienna, and the paper published them on 4 July, U.S. Independence Day.

So what can we do here, gathering to discuss security issues in the Middle East? I suggest we open a discussion concerning Iraq and its impact on Middle East security. I believe it would be useful to debate the modalities through which Saddam Husayn might be persuaded to accept UN inspectors back to his country. This may be the only way to avert direct military or covert efforts to forcefully remove the regime of Saddam Husayn. The next question, perhaps not popular outside the United States yet entertained in many Arab and other Middle Eastern capitals, is what sort of Iraq will emerge in the post-

Saddam Husayn era? There are endless security questions tied to the future course of events regarding Iraq, and our forum may be the most ideal place to tackle some of them.

I hope for a challenging and creative debate.

The Palestinian Economy Under Siege:
An overview

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July 2002

At present, the Palestinian economy is an "economy under siege." In my view, this is caused by three major actors adopting three specific policies that are hindering economic development in Palestine - on the international level there is the Donors and their Funding Policy; on the regional level there is the Israelis and their Closure Policy; and on the domestic level there is the Palestinians and their Investment Policy.

First: Donors Funding Policy

In a meeting held in Washington in 1993, the Donor Nations pledged to contribute 3,840 million dollars to the PNA. However, Donors transferred only 1,557 million dollars so far. In 1997, Donors have contributed nearly 107.5 million dollars only out of a total of 483.5 million dollars committed to be transferred by them to the PNA for that year.

In 2002, the donors are hesitant to transfer any funds for any development projects and ironically speaking disbursements has risen almost 93% although they still accuse the PNA of corruption and the absence of accountability and transparency.

Israel here, is claiming that it has acquired evidence that PNA funds are used to finance terrorism. No doubt, this policy of delays on delivery cripples PNA ability to plan and to implement economic development projects. (Israel is holding funds due to PNA NIS 2.1 Billion equaling US$ 0.5 Billion)

Second: Israeli Closure Policy

During the period of its military occupation of Palestinian Territories since 1967, Israel linked the Palestinian economy to the Israeli economy, making it a dependent economy. The Israeli policy of employing Palestinian workers aimed at pulling the Palestinian working force away from the Palestinian economy. In 1993, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel reached more than 120,000 workers. In 1996, the Palestinian labor working in Israel reached 157,000. In 2002, this number dropped to zero. While Israel maintains that the closure imposed on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is for security reasons, the Palestinian view it as collective punishment against a people aiming at creating impossible living conditions to facilitate Palestinian evacuation from their homeland, particularly since there is no indication that

Palestinian workers were involved in any of the suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilian targets.

The first major Israeli closure of the Palestinian Territories was implemented following the 1973 October War when Palestinian workers were not allowed to cross to Israel for work. This measure was followed within Israel by a heated debate on the need to replace Palestinian workers either with foreign workers or with increasing mechanization.

At the outbreak of the first *Intifada* in late 1987, more than 170,000 Palestinian workers were working in Israel at the time. However, the outbreak of violence and feelings of hostility prevented them from working in Israel. This caused Israel to increase the numbers of imported foreign workers. Later, Palestinian workers returned to work in Israel when they could not find work in the Palestinian Territories but at a much reduced rate. The Second Gulf War of 1991 led Israel to close the Palestinian Territories for nearly seven weeks. In the second Intifada which began in September 2000, the Israeli Government began Draconian measures against the Palestinian population not only by preventing them from working in Israel, but prohibiting them from movement even within the Palestinian Territories.

The days of closure since the PNA took over in July 1994 till July 1997 totaled 335 days. In 1996, the days of closure reached 180 days at a loss of nearly 471 million dollars. In 1997, the days of closure reached 55 days and the estimated loss was 144 million dollars.

In July 2002, the days of closure reached 545 days so far, coupled with military retaliatory operations which almost destroyed the Palestinian infra-structure completely.

The Israeli closure policy resulted in the following negative effects on the Palestinian economy:

1. It dealt a serious blow to PNA hopes of improving Palestinian economic performance and the rate of economic growth for 1997, and perhaps for the first quarter of 1998. In 2002, experts testify that the Palestinian economy is in shambles in the sense it's on the verge of collapse. No objective statistics except what some is available from Palestinian sources and International Organizations such as The World Bank, UNRWA and IMF.

The daily Palestinian losses accumulating as a result of the closure amounted to anywhere from 13.6 million dollars daily to 17 million: exports 3.1 to 5; industry 1.8 to 3; agriculture 2.0 to 5; transportation 1.0

to 3; wages of workers in Israel 2.4 to 4; wages of workers in Palestinian Territories 1.3 to 2.

2. It resulted in a decline in the National Palestinian Income and the share of individuals from the total real Gross National Income.

3. It caused nearly 155,000 Palestinian workers to lose their jobs. At the rate of an average of 50 dollars per day, this meant an average loss of 7.75 million dollars daily. The Palestinian work force is estimated at 734,000 workers in September 2000. UNSCO report states that number of permits issued during the last quarter of 2000, was 8500 compared to an average level of approximately 55,000 prior to the crisis.

Under normal conditions, unemployment in the Palestinian Territories reached nearly 18 % with the percentage of workers within the "Green Line" reaching nearly 60 %; however, under the closure, the percentage of unemployment among Palestinian working force rose to more than 95 %. This was due to the following main reasons:

a. Not only Preventing Palestinian workers from going to
   their work sights inside the "Green Line" in Israel;
but
   also paralyzing there movement between Palestinian
   towns and villages.
b. Forbidding entry of essential building materials to the
   Palestinian Territories which led to a total standstill in
   the construction sector.
c. Forbidding movement of farmers from reaching there
   farms and markets within the Palestinian Territories
   which led to a total standstill in the agricultural
sector.

The Palestinian Ministry of Labor estimated that the total number of those unemployed as a result of the closure reached 285,000 workers from a total of 554,000 workers which constituted the working force in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, that is 51.5 %. (Note the difference between World Bank estimates of 734,000 workers)

There were nearly 155,000 Palestinian workers working in Israel before the recent closure. Their number was expected even to rise to 170,000 workers including workers who commute to Israel without proper permissions.

According to a World Bank report, the total closure Israel imposed on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the beginning of 1997 had prevented the entry of goods and people to the Palestinian Territories. The percentage of working days lost as a result of the closure was 24.6 %, and the total closure days since January 1997 amounted to 144 days. The report indicated that the loss to the families of workers as a result of the closure amounted to 1.32 million dollars daily, and that the financial loss resulting from preventing exports of Palestinian goods during one month amounted to 39 million dollars. In July 2002, the closure is 100% where no one is permitted not only to enter Israel and all permits and passes are revoked, but also they are completely immobile between Palestinian towns and villages..

4. This complete closure which has lasted so far for 18 months, it hurt other sectors such as construction, fishing, agriculture, industry, trade, etc.

5. It prevented Palestinians living in the rural areas from getting to their working places in the cities.

6. It caused daily losses to the PNA of revenues generated from income taxes, and medical insurance charged to work permits inside Israel which normally reached a monthly average of 4 to 5 million dollars (conservative estimate).

7. It resulted in the rise of PNA budget deficit anywhere from USD120 million to $150 million.

8. It obliged the PNA to seek financial assistance from the Arab summit meeting in Amman, Jordan which pledged $45 million to pay the salaries of its employees. This was revised in the Beirut summit and increased to $55 million. The PNA also borrowed from local banks to meet this obligation, a step which added interest to its financial burdens.

9. It hit hard the Palestinian banking sector whose activities usually center on deposits, loans, and transfer of funds. At present, there are 20 banks with 80 branches operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While there was a rush by Palestinian to withdraw from their accounts and savings to meet their daily obligations, at the same time, deposit operations ceased. Such a one-way flow resulted in the following:

1. It obliged Palestinian banks to run short on liquidity
causing them to withdraw their deposits from other

banks to cover withdrawal demands by their clients.
2. It caused a shortage in loaning facilities provided
   to individuals and establishments.
3. It resulted in a decline of transfer of funds from abroad
   as it arose anxiety among businessmen
   and investors from the uncertain economic
   environment it had created. Many foreign as well as
   Palestinian investors became hesitant to proceed with
   their investment schemes due to the rise in the
   rate of risk factor resulting from the closure.

10. It prevented the World Bank as well as other Donors and international organizations from implementing their development projects in the Palestinian Territories due to the lack of security and lack of materials, rising costs, and difficulties in transportation. The World Bank estimates that 21 % of the Palestinian population was poor in September 2000, and that this ratio had risen to 33% by January, 2001.

In addition to its economic effects, the closure has had also social and psychological repercussions. It created a state of depression among many Palestinians. There is no doubt that this feeling of isolation affected the psychological, behavioral and emotional state of mind among Palestinians. The head of a family cannot sit at home and face the demands of his family for their daily needs, resulting in frustration and anxiety within society.

In addition, by the end of July 1997, the unpaid tax money accumulated with Israel which belonged to the PNA amounted to more than 65 million dollars. In 2002, the Sharon government is withholding close to two billion Sheckels (USD 400 million). The NIS lost twenty per cent of its value in the last two years from USD 1 worth 4.NIS to USD 1 equals NIS 4.99 in June 2002. The PNA estimates overall Economic losses from US$_6.9 Billion (Min of Fin estimate to PNA General estimate US$ 7.5 Billion.

Since 22 August 1997, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination condemned the closure and Israeli refusal to refund the tax and customs revenues collected on behalf of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). It considered those economic measures as collective punishment which is contrary to international law as stipulated by Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Committee maintained that the closure had tragic consequences on the life of the Palestinians and their welfare in the Palestinian Territories. It considered such measures to constitute a major obstacle to the peace process and demanded that they be lifted. In 2002, these demands were

repeated over and over, and Israel is still refusing to abide and is claiming that the funds are used to finance terrorism.

On 13 January, 2002, Bank of Israel reported that the *intifada* cost Israel NIS 13 Billion, or close to 4% of Israel's GDP.

Third: Palestinian Investment Policy

The PNA investment policy had so far lacked the vision and dynamics needed to create the proper environment for attracting Palestinian, Arab, and international investors. The Palestinian Legislative Council still needs to issue a more up-to-date comprehensive investment laws necessary to create a legal framework that would make investors feel secure about their investment projects in the Palestinian Territories.

Conclusion

The economic and political situation in the Palestinian Territory currently is in a mess by any standard. The infra-structure in most of the Palestinian Territories has been destroyed completely or partially damaged. The need for security in Israel now is more than ever before. And on the other hand, the Palestinian Territories is on the brink of total economic, social and political disaster. Israel being the super power in this case, should take immediate action to begin a number of measures to start a process of Confidence Building Measures. Such as an immediate lift of the complete closure imposed on the Palestinian cities, towns and villages. The Palestinian must take reciprocal measures and stop the suicide bombings inside Israel immediately. Both should renew there pledge and commitment to the Peace Process and hopefully go back to the negotiating table. This would lead to open new channels for a renewed peace process based on new accepted fact that neither side is going to annihilate the other side nor either side is going to disappear from the region. They must accept to learn to co-exist.

Word of caution:

All the numbers are estimates based on reports published by the World Bank in an assessment study entitled Fifteen Months- Intifada, Closures, and Palestinian Economic Crisis (March 2002), PCBS which was ravished by the Israeli incursion to Ramallah, and PECDAR's Director public and published statements.
(Their data is officially unavailable because it is at the publishers to be printed in a book soon.)

Nevertheless, one has to take into consideration that mobility is hampered and almost completely impossible to researchers. Thus, collecting accurate data in such political environment is very difficult in this complete closure which has lasted almost eighteen months so far.

Missing Opportunities

By
Dr. Hassan El - Hayawan
Cairo - Egypt

Background

Since March 26, 1979 and the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, hopes of the people were sky-high. Although it took some Arab leaders some time to realize the benefits of negotiations in resolving regional conflicts.
Economic cooperation between Egypt and Israel was setting an example of the fruits of peace. (Some set backs were noticed due to tensions between Palestinians and Israelis)

Madrid peace conference on October 30, 1990 was a step forward gathering all the concerned parties to discuss future peace plans.
From that time on with consistent help from the International Community, specially The US, USSR (at that time), and Europe Peace was moving on the right track
The years 1993, 1994 and 1995 witnessed a positive track, and a PLO/ Israeli recognition, Jordan / Israeli peace treaty and hope was building up. (Annex 1)
The major outcome of the Madrid Conference was the initiation of Multilateral negotiation in 1992 dealing with Economic cooperation and development, Environment, Water, Refugees and Arms control & Regional security. Moscow hosted another Multilateral Negotiation conference in 1992, covering the same issues.
Piles of reports, discussion papers and recommendations were accumulating, all directed toward future regional cooperation.
Middle East / North Africa Region (MENA) was witnessing active and promising yearly regional cooperation conferences, Casablanca (Morocco), Amman (Jordan), Cairo (Egypt) and finally Doha (Qatar). Quite a few business opportunities emerged from these meetings and hopes for constructive regional cooperation was building up. Israel participation in these meetings was well noticed, although the World Bank classification of countries by region does not count Israel as a member of MENA region!

World Bank statistics of MENA countries (16 states) and Israel reveals interesting observations. 9 states falls in the category of lower- middle income economies, 5 in upper- middle-income, 2 in high-income economies and Israel falls in the latter set. !
Indebtedness, in the region varies. Three countries are severely indebted (Jordan, Syria & Iraq), four moderately indebted (Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia & Yemen) and Eight countries are classified less indebted. Only Kuwait and Israel are not classified.
Another observation regarding the comparison between MENA countries and Israel, reveals interesting findings; (tables 1 & 2)
a) Total population in MENA 295.2 mill. In Israel 6.2 mill.
b) GDP (current US$) 617.5 bill. MENA, 104.1 bill. In Israel
c) Direct foreign investment to MENA, 1.2 bill. To Israel 4.4 bill.
d) Aid per capita (current US$) 15.6 to MENA, 128.3 to Israel.
In 1999-2000 the growth of output per capita was only 2 %. With only 1,427 cubic meters of fresh water recourses available per capita, the MENA countries rank well below the average of other regions .The region has the highest military expenditure in the developing world! 7 % of GNI. Aside from these observation – One – need not to neglect the negative impact of September 28, 2000 upheaval in the Palestinian territories, and 9 / 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the USA, on future prospects of economic development in the region.
On the other hand antipeace camps on both sides were working hard on the opposite direction using any opportunity to build a wall of mistrust to slow down the regional cooperation process.

Where are the opportunities?
Regardless of who was responsible for the recent confrontation, which started in September 2000, peoples of the region are still striving for peace and stability. It is the only way for social and economic development in the Middle East; prosperity cannot prevail without them.

Hypothetical scenario

After president Bush proposed plan is unveiled, in coordination with the Arab initiative all the parties involved get serious and committed to achieve just and comprehensive peace in the region, withdrawal from all territories occupied during 1967 war, recognizing the legitimate rights of all Arab states and Israel of existence in secure boarders. What kind of regional cooperation is expected? What areas of cooperation that can build rapid confidence and trust among peoples of the region? What areas of long term cooperation that can build common interest among the peoples of the region, which safeguard the area from any future crisis? Is there a role for NGO in this process? On the shelves of all governments of the MENA region, projects of all sorts and kinds, covering a wide economic and infrastructure spectrum.

- *Electricity*
- *Agriculture*
- *Roads*
- *Industrial Parks*
- *Tourism ,etc ...*

* *Water*
* *Railways*
* *Natural Gas*
* *Telecommunications*

Availability of finance for these projects are secured through the participation of Private / Public resources by creating special development funds for reconstruction (e.g. Lazard proposing one) beside other international financial institutions.

In the area of electricity, connecting electricity power plants of the region would secure providing the area with cheap sources of power and countries with power surplus will benefit from selling it. On the other hand regional power connections would create long-term interdependence among the countries of the region which could Safeguard peace.

Water in the coming two decades will represent an acute problem in the region! Especially for Jordan, Palestine, Syria and, Israel. Serious cooperation in this area is a mater of life and death. Several projects are proposed for water desalination in the area of the Dead Sea, which can benefit these countries.

Egypt and Israel started agricultural cooperation as a symbol of how the two states can exchange experience in this important area, and benefit each other. Egyptian engineers and farmers were trained in Israel on modern techniques in irrigation and farming, trade of produce of the two countries was smooth and increasing. Regrettably, the recent tension between the Palestinians and the Israelis slowed down this promising area of cooperation.

Rails and Roads, both are crucial in facilitating free movements of the People of the region, beside the flow of interregional trade, specially when trade barriers are lifted between countries of the region.

Excessive discoveries of natural gas in some countries of the region, and the huge reserves yet to be explored (Egypt and Qatar) create a massive opportunity for regional cooperation in this field. Mega joint petrochemical projects could be developed; pipelines transferring natural gas to neighboring countries could be installed securing cheap and continuos supply.

Industrial Parks, is a concept of cooperation that should be encouraged in the region, joint boarders of
(Jordan / Israel, / Palestine), (Egypt / Palestine / Israel) and
Later (Syria / Israel / Lebanon), are perfect sites for joint industrial parks that can compete in future world trade, and represent regional blocks facing expected competition from already existing blocks.

One of the most important areas of future cooperation is Telecommunications & Information Technology, MENA Region has a vast number of well-educated young generations willing to participate in the Telecom. and IT revolution.

The region could be a host for substantial Direct Foreign Investments, which can help modernize the lives of the peoples of the region. This area of regional cooperation in particular would help bridge existing economic and social development gaps between the nations of the region.

Tourism represent a vital vehicle for economic development, each of the MENA states has its distinct touristic attraction, which creates diversified packages for tourists from all over. On the other hand tourism help people to communicate and create tolerance and acceptance among different peoples and cultures.

One example - to name a few - of tourism opportunities is the Golden Triangle (Taba / Aquaba / Eilat) coasts, this area is considered one of the best resorts destinations in the world, ideal investments in hotels and touristic facilities are waiting for utilization.

Cultural cooperation should also be considered a promising area, due to the diversified nature of the MENA countries.

Meanwhile we should encourage the NGOs and the civil society agencies to participate in building confidence through joint humanitarian and social activities.

To continue with this optimistic hypothetical scenario, governments and business community in the region should be ready for immediate actions to capitalize on the opportunities mentioned earlier.

Final Word, now we have on our hands two solid peace proposals, the Arab initiative of the Arab summit in Beirut, March 2002 and President Bush's plan, June 2002.

Building on these two plans requires honest, serious and, objective actions from the international community and the parties involved.

The coming few months will show whether we are moving seriously toward peace, and grab the opportunities, or we are moving toward total chaos, and the missing opportunities will be missed forever.

Annex (1)

The Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917

The Mandate for Palestine, July 24, 1922
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan) November 29, 1947
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, December 11, 1948
Protection of Holy Places Law, June 27, 1967
The Khartoum Resolutions, September 1, 1967
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967
Palestinian National Charter, July 17, 1968
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, October 22, 1973
Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, May 31, 1974
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 (Withdrawal from Lebanon), March 19, 1978
Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978
March 26, 1979 ,Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt

Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, July 30, 1980
US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation, November 30, 1981
The Golan Heights Law, December 14, 1981
Israel's Peace Initiative, May 14, 1989
Invitation to Madrid Peace Conference, October 30, 1991
Israel-PLO Recognition, September 9-10, 1993
Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, September 13, 1993
Israel-Jordan Common Agenda, September 14, 1993
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994 - Preamble and Articles
Annex I - Security Arrangements
Annex II - Civil Affairs
Annex III - Legal Matters
Annex IV - Protocol on Economic Relations, April 29, 1994
Maps
Rabin-Arafat - Exchange of Letters
The Washington Declaration (Israel-Jordan-US), July 25, 1994
Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Israel-PLO), August 29, 1994
Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, October 26, 1994 - Preamble and Articles

President Bush Peace Plan– June 25,2002

mena.lnk

Country Profile table.url

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN IRAN

Dr. H. A. Shirazi

Bruges, Belgium

July 13-16, 2002

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Before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, there was an abundant flow of foreign capital in the country. In fact, it was a lot more convenient for foreigners to invest in Iranian undertakings back then as the former monarchical system was extremely dependent on the West. The only accomplishment of the foreign investment ventures of those days was the speedy progress of the oil sector. This is while revenues gained from such ventures were spent for importing myriads of Western goods, the net result of which was that our industrial sector eventually become paralyzed.

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the terminology of foreign investments found a place in the macro economic plans of the country for the first time. We immediately realize that our current perception of 'foreign investments' essentially dates back to the time when the third Development Plan was being complied. At that time, the shortage of national resources was a serious concern and economic decision-makers gradually developed the notion that we would not have a robust economy without foreign investments.

The idea was further expanded when the economics of Southeast Asia experienced a significant level of prosperity. However, our economic pundits sadly ignored all other parameters needed to ensure tranquility and prosperity. This narrow-minded mentality became more evident when the governing laws merely facilitated the flow of foreign

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capital into the Islamic system without paying any heed to the vital issue of efficient utilization of the capital in various sectors.

One can dare say that with the exception of the oil sector there are no documented laws for foreign investments. Such a poor planning can entail adverse consequences on the state of economy as a whole in the near future. The very first rule of economics is that potential investors must primarily be in position to make reasonable profits before they become involved any meaningfully in any investments.

Countries all over the world are in stiff competition over attracting foreign investments to expand their economy.

Iran, however, has acted very poorly in this respect that out of 60 countries, we ranked 59th, the Persian daily Azad reported.[1]

There were two main arguments between Iranian lawmakers in Parliament and the Guardian council regarding to foreign investment. The argument was raised when economic analysts and parliament members mentioned that strict state supervision over almost all-economic activities is also a drawback. "The rate of investment risk in our country is high, while tariffs are totally unfair. Under such circumstances, how could we expect foreign businessmen and companies to invest their money in Iranian markets?"

Factors such as border insecurity, brain drain, and outflow of capital and manpower as well as certain post-revolution developments have made both domestic and foreign investors more willing to engage in economic projects in neighboring countries.

Also, constant changes in economic laws and regulations, lack of efficient facilities such as banking, insurance... services and high production costs are among the factors responsible for high investment risk rate in Iran. For some reasons _not completely

political_ Iran faces difficulties in obtaining cutting-edge technological and scientific knowledge and attraction of foreign investments.

"This mostly stems from macro policies endorsed at the international level rather than realities prevailing in the country."

Iran's failure to secure a place in the process towards global development has deprived it of the opportunity to successfully transfer technology and foreign capital inside its markets.

After a year of intense debate, Iran has passed its first foreign investment law since the 1950s as part of a package of reforms intended to open up the economy and reduce dependence on oil revenues.

Analysts said the passage of the law had done nothing to improve investor sentiment toward the Islamic Republic, but that the final version approved last week was important step in the right direction.

Parliament first approved the legislation a year ago but the Guardian Council, who argued the bill would "pave the way for foreign domination of the economy", rejected it.[2]

Finally, the Expediency Council resolved the conflict. According to the State Expediency Council, the total foreign investment in the economic sector must not exceed 25 percent. However, in specific fields, the figure could go up to 35 percent. It also authorized the government to specify the areas in which foreign entities can invest.[3]

It means that foreign companies as a whole would not be allowed to take more than 25 percent market share in sectors of the economy, such as agriculture or tourism, and no more than 35 percent in individual industries. No ceilings apply to investment that generates exports, however.

Foreign investors in Iran have also been encouraged by recent reductions in corporate and income taxes, and moves to liberalize the Tehran Stock Exchange. But given a heightened sense of political risk in the region investor's say Iran needs to go much further to attract business.

For attracting foreign President Khatami said that the country needs foreign assistance and investment for its development. He also said that "Utilizing foreign potentials is not a sign of dependence and misery and we must use all possible means available in the world for the development and progress of our society and solving the problems"[4].

In order to understand foreign investment rules in Iran, we better examine this subject into two different historical periods as follows:

1. Foreign Investment Rules in Pre-Revolutionary Era

The idea of industrial development, beginning with imports substitution industrialization, was uppermost in the minds of planners. This called for a fresh look at the subject of industrial development and the place of foreign contribution to it. Thus was born the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment Act of 1955. The Act offered a satisfactory definition of direct foreign investment by including finance, machinery, know-how, and the like which could "develop...productive capacity in industrial, agricultural and transport industries" of Iran.

According to the Law, the foreign investor had to be a private individual or corporate person. Apparently, with the trouble over nationalization of the oil sector in 1951-1953 period still fresh in everyone's mind, the fear was that the national government might again face a challenge in its jurisdiction over sectors of the economy. Any foreign state participation had to be of a specific duration and be terminated when this expired.[5]

The Act meant to combine two apparently contradictory objectives into one. The first was to counter Iranians' historical suspicion of unregulated foreign participation in the economy. The second, to allay the fear of potential investors that nationalization of foreign assets might have been habit-forming after the oil nationalization episode in which foreign control over the sector was ended by the state.

It is important to note that the Attraction and Protection of foreign Investment Act of 1955 was not addressing what is named "joint investment" in the technical sense of the world and as one type of foreign investment. Rather, the Law, who is still valid, dealt with the subject in its more general form.

Equipped with the outlines of the Law, in October 1956 the Parliament formed a special committee to draw up the Executive Order containing the mode of implementation of the Law. The order offered foreign companies set up under the auspices of the Act the same business facilities open to Iranian corporate bodies. It emphasized the private nature of foreign investment once more. On repatriation, the Order made no restrictions apart from the usual *proviso* that profits earned had to pay before leaving the country.

Other section of the Law and its companion Order deal with various contingencies, which might arise, in the process of investing in Iran and repatriating the profit. At the same time, they reflected the general state of the economy in that particular point in time.

After the oil nationalization crisis was resolved in 1953, the economy received a temporary respite through the belated inflow of quantities of foreign aid and loans. But despite improvements in macro-economic indicators, it was clear that structure of the economy and social system has remained relatively unchanged. This was, perhaps instinctively, sensed by both Iranian experts and potential foreign investors. A

comparison between available figures for foreign investment in two periods before and after the passage of the Act seems to vindicate this. Foreign investment inflow for the period 1949-1956 was around US$80m. [6]

The legal status of foreign investment was again mentioned in 1960 when the Parliament legislated the Banking and Money Act. The change was, however, only about the administrative arrangements. The 1955-1956 package had created an investment investigating Council composed of several ministers and high ranking officials chaired by the Minister of Finance. The new Act transferred the chairmanship to the Governor of the newly established Central Bank.

Though of little economic importance, the change had to do with different economic circumstances. In 1960, the country was facing a severe recession which tightened exchange and savings bottlenecks. As a result, attentions were focused on the cash inflow part of foreign investment, which, on the whole, is an unhealthy attitude to adopt. The recession came to an abrupt end through certain changes in Iran's foreign standing, consequently, in 1961, the Council went to a more appropriate organization and was placed under the Ministry of Economy with the Minister, or his chief deputy, as chairman.

Both the 1955-1956 and 1960-1961 developments had their roots in the general state of the economy. With differing intensities, both periods witnessed the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class, which was still too weak to undertake major industrial projects. The private sector was entrusted with the task of catering for the light consumers industrial sector, while the state took upon itself larger, heavy industrial projects. In the middle, foreign investors were expected to inject into the economy the needed exchange and know-how required for a smoother, more balanced course of

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industrial development. In this, the planners seem to have been quite successful at least in terms of the quantity of investment received. Compared with 1956-1963, foreign investment inflow increased several folds to the phenomenal figure of over $2.5bn.[7]

2.Foreign Investment Laws in Post-Revolutionary Era

Article 81 of the Islamic Republic Constitution dealt with the subject of foreign participation. The Article proscribed granting of any "concessions" to non-nationals to enter various sectors of the domestic economy.

At the time the Constitution was prepared, the country was passing the aftermath of the revolution and the process of fundamental change was still in progress. Thus, the opinion of the "Mother of all Laws" about the issue of foreign participation did not receive the full attention of the public. The experts, however, seemed to be satisfied.

Soon after the approval of the Law, an occasion arose to put Article 81 to a practical test. That was in 1981 when the head of the government appealed to the Custodian Council for ruling over joint venture participation side was a state entity. In his reply, the Secretary of the Council assured the government that the project could go ahead and did not "require legislation by the Parliament". Then, in 1985, the premier, probably after being questioned about the subject and having investigated the legal grounds, issued a circular to government departments in which the same sentiment was expressed. In the same year, the Direct Taxation Act, passed by the Parliament and endorsed by the Custodian Council, contained a specific reference to taxes levied on incomes of foreign corporate bodies.

Of course, these legal statements were not of much interests during the decade following the revolution of 1979. The revolution was followed by an external war, which drained the economic, political and diplomatic resources of the country for eight

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long years. Yet, although the general conditions of the country were hardly conducive to appearance of foreign investment, foreign economic participation continued in a low key. The most popular and feasible context at the time was the buy-back method. Though criticized for its trade diversion results, the policy proved one point at least. That it was not the intention of the Islamic government to ban foreign investment.

More earnest pursuit of this, and other economic objectives, was left to the conclusion of hostilities in 1988 and the declaration of the political will to attend to the economy with the publication of the text of the Plan Bill the following year. The Bill, and the resultant Act, contained specific references to the subject of foreign capital. Dealing with state investment programs, the Act allowed foreign participation of up to $10 bn. in five years.

At the same time, it was made clear that the government was keen to promote economic growth by reconstruction and restructuring of the economy. The main proposal was revival of the private sector, dormant for a decade, as an important agent of development. Naturally, foreign participation, up to then mainly confine to the public sector, was now opened to all interested businessmen in and outside the country. In support of this notion, high-ranking officials made it clear that the IRI was interested in appropriate types of foreign investment and would offer legal facilities for their promotion.[8]

Conclusion:

Iran's investment climate is now quite favorable. The country has political stability, and active population, free market structure, abundant natural resources, including oil, gas

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and minerals, agriculture and industrial prospects, among other positive considerations. Its legal framework is comparable to that of many countries.

Foreign investment is compatible with Iran's Constitution and there is no inconsistency between the Islamic Republic Constitution (Article 81) and the 1955 Law on Attracting and Protecting Foreign Investment. No legal limit exists on foreign shareholding and the government will present any legal possibility of making use of preferential shares and encourages foreign investment in Iran.

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[1] Iran Daily, April 22, 2002, p.3.

[2] Tehran Times, June 8, 2002, p.4.

[3] Iran Daily, May 20, 2002, P.3.

[4] Iran Daily, May 18, 2002, p.3.

[5] "Iran and Foreign Investment", *Iran Commerce,* Vol. 2, No.3-4, 1994, pp.5-10.

[6] "Foreign Investment Is Compatible with Iran's Constitution", *Iran Commerce*, Vol.2, No. 3-4, p. 19.

[7] Ibid, p.8.

[8] Iran Business Monitor, Vol.1, No. 1, pp. 5-6.

Mideast Regional Security Dilemmas: Searching for Solutions
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Yes, I will be able to attend the meeting

Best Regards,

Boaz Tamir

**Economic Under-Development as a Source of Islamism
and Terrorism: A need for a Strategic Approach**
by
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In the aftermath of September 11, Americans were shocked and incredulous about what could have caused people to commit such horrors. Pundits pointed to Islam as the source of the hatred which drove the terrorists; others blamed US foreign policy in the MENA region. In this paper, I will argue that economic development that has been waged in the region for the past three decades has played an important role in the rise of violence and terrorism.

The Politics of neo-authoritarianism

At the economic level, the politics of authoritarianism refer to a braod set of policies that are designed to promote total deregulation , including the reduction of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports, the chaotic allocation of public capital to individuals, the elimination of subsidies and prices supports, the removal of price controls, cutbacks in public spending, and the devaluation of currencies.

While some economists have so presciently pointed out the links between growth, poverty and inequality, this is not merely an economic phenomenon. To the contrary, where virtuous cycles of development occur, there is a complementarily between equity and economic growth, on the one hand, and democracy and social justice, on the other.

The Arab world is not really an unlucky region. Fatly endowed with oil and gas, and with its people sharing a rich cultural, religious and linguistic heritage, it is faced neither with endemic poverty nor with ethnic conflict. It shook off its colonial legacies long ago, and the countries that had revolutions should have had time to recover from them. But, with barely an exception, its autocratic rulers, be they presidents or kings, give up their authority only when they die and its elections are a sick joke.

The Arab world is the most unequal region in the world. This acute inequality affects virtually all aspects of economic, social and political life; it is fundamental for explaining why the results of the past two decades of development have been so disappointing in this area of the world. Economic growth has been surprisingly low despite having embraced liberal economic models, which succeeded almost everywhere in cutting inflation to single digits, reducing budget deficits, and generally lowering public external debt during the 1990s. The quality of services remains poor, unemployment is high, and a sharp rise in crime and violence threatens daily life

The Arab world is taken to mean the 22 members of the Arab League, accounting at present for 280m people, or roughly the same as the United States. The region has the largest number of young people in the world 38% of Arabs are under 14 and its population will top 400m in 20 years time.

Over the past twenty years, growth in per capita income was the lowest in the world except in sub-Saharan Africa. One in five Arabs still lives on less than $ 2 a day. And, over the past 20 years, growth in income per head, at an annual rate of 0.5%, was lower than anywhere else in the world, except for sub-Saharan Africa. At this rate, it will take the average Arab 140 years to double his income, a target that some regions are set to reach in less than 10 years. Stagnant growth, together with rapid population rise, means vanishing jobs.

Labour productivity

Total factor productivity declined at an annual average of 0.2% during 1960 1990, while it rapidly accelerated in other parts of the world. Compared to the Asian Tigers, per capita output was higher than the average of this group in 1960. Now it is half that in Korea. The productivity of Arab industrial labour in 1960 was 32% that of the North American level. By 1990, it had fallen to 19%.

The decline in workers productivity has been accompanied by deterioration in real wages, which has accentuated poverty. It is evident that in both quantitative and qualitative terms, Arab countries have not developed as quickly or as fully as other comparable regions. From a human development perspective, the state of human development in the Arab world is a cause for concern.

As a result, around 20 m people, or 20 % of the labour force, are already unemployed, and on present trends the number could rise to 40 m by 2010.

Shortage of freedom

The barrier to better Arab performance is not a lack of resources, but the lamentable shortage of two essentials: freedom, knowledge and woman power. It is these deficits that hold the frustrated Arabs back from reaching their potential and allow the rest of the world both to despise and to fear a deadly combination of wealth and backwardness. The area is rich in all the outward trappings of democracy. Elections are held and human-rights conventions are signed. But the great wave of democratisation that has opened up so much of the world over the past 15 years seems to have left the Arabs untouched. Democracy is occasionally offered, but as a concession, not as a right.

Knowledge and education

The knowledge deficit is just as bad. Although the Arabs spend a higher percentage of GDP on education than any other developing region, it does not seem to be well-spent. The quality of education has deteriorated pitifully, and there is a severe mismatch between the labour market and the education system. Adult illiteracy rates have declined but are still very high: 65 m adults are illiterate, almost two-thirds of them women. Some 10 m children still have no schooling at all. Investment in research and development is less than one-seventh of the world average, and only 0.6% of the population uses the Internet. The personal computer penetration rate is a tiny 1.2%.

Woman issue

The poor treatment of women is rightly is always noted by experts, as an awful waste: how can a society prosper when it stifles half its productive potential? After all, half of Arab women still can neither read nor write. Their participation in their countries political and economic life is the lowest in the world. Governments and societies vary in the degrees of bad

treatment to women but in nearly all Arab countries, women suffer from unequal citizenship and legal entitlements.

Southeast Asian countries manage to prosper without offering much freedom and democracy. It is when a country or a region suffers from all three deficits that it is in such a bad way and economic growth is very low.

The need for a strategic approach

The strategic approach that helps to reach high economic growth lies on a key factors that Arab countries will need to address. This economic growth is seen as a prerequisite if Arab governments are going to realize the opportunities and negotiate the challenges posed by globalization. This approach also outlines some broad practical measures that would help improve the economic situation with regards with these factors.

Globalization and the Arab world

The globalization of the world economy is perhaps the most important trend that affects the current environment for economic development. It offers great opportunities for poor countries to accelerate management.

Within this context, there are been tendency to contrast Arab s growth tragedy over

the last three decades with the economic miracle of East Asia. There are certainly l to be lessons from the East Asian experiences that policy-makers in Arab region could adapt to their owns situations. Lessons can be learned both from the era of rapid growth in East, as from the ongoing economic crisis.

. Souheast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and MENA had similar levels of income in the 1960s and 1970s.The two regions also had relatively similar social and political conditions at that times.

One of the most obvious differences in the performances and economic structures between the two regions has been the extent of participation in the global economy. The decline in Arab world s share of world exports, its continued concentration in primary commodities and its inability to attract inward investment have led to widespread concern in the increasing economic marginalization of the Arab region. In contrast, countries in Southeast Asia have not only accelerated the process of integration in the world economy but also upgraded their linkages

There are a variety of factors that have contributed to the marginalization of the Arab world. These include : (1) geographical conditions such as weather, climate, and landlockdness, (2) policy factors and related variables such as human and physical capital, fiscal and monetary policy, saving and investment , exchange rate competitiveness, and trade regimes; and (3) institutional factors, political commitment and credibility, law and order. However, as governments cannot change the geographical conditions, we can change the policy and institutional realms.

The institutional foundations

There is an increasing understanding of the importance of institutional factors for development in general. Institutions are defined as the systems of incentives and restraints that govern agents behaviour and their interactions. These comprise formal rules and laws as well as informal conventions, and norms behaviour. Institutions set the rules of the game.. Institutions affect economic performance because they provide the structure of exchange that determines the cost of transactions. They can improve the levels of investment and growth by processing information, reducing uncertainly and reducing transaction costs.

A useful way of thinking about institutions and their economic effects is to distinguish between different levels where institutions form the basis of interactions between artioes:

- The political level: institutions that regulate government attitudes towards the development process. Desirable outcomes would be commitment and credibility.

- The public level : institutions that align incentives within state agencies within sate agencies, particularly, the bureaucracy. The desirable outcome is an efficient and no- .

corrupt public service.

- The Public Private level: institutions that regulate the interactions between the state agencies and the private sector. The desirable outcome is a bureaucracy that understands the needs of the private sector and that is responsive to the business community but still independent.

These general areas of institutional analysis can also used to assess the impact of institutions on eternal performance. For example, at the political level, the desirable outcome would be political commitment In increasing export .Research indicates that institutional factors significantly affect eternal performance. This indicates that enhancing institutional quality is one way of improving external performance.

The political level

The key issues are (i) a commitment to developmental policy in general and towards an outward-oriented strategy in particular and (ii) how credible that commitment is. Leaders can indicate their commitment is credible through two mechanisms: reputation and accountability. First, they could establish a reputation for carrying out their development promises. The desire to retain the reputation then provide an incentive to maintain developmental policies. Leaders can also their commitment by establishing mechanisms that make them accountable for their actions. Accepting a democratic political power system is one way to try to ensure governments are held accountable for their actions.

The public level

Governments administrative competence is one of the single most important factors for explaining the differences in growth among developing countries. The quality of institutional at the public level determines how efficient and non corrupt public service is less likely to use its powers to allocate rents to special interests and friends.

The Arab world has been found to have particularly low levels of bureaucratic efficiency in cross-regional comparisons. The poor economic management capacity and cumbersome administrative and bureaucratic structures of Arab bureaucratise have limited the successful formulation and implementation of economic policies and posed a central obstacle to market-oriented reforms; Arab governments often have been more preoccupied with securing public employment that with promoting the quality of the civil service positions in public sector institutions, including many monitoring and regulatory agencies, have been made ineffective due to political appointments, politically controlled funding and multiple objectives. Transparency and accountability of these public institutions have been minimal. There is near-universal agreement on the great need to improve the management of Arab economies.

The key issue is capacity utilisation, indicating a need to align material conditions and incentive structures so that they favour professionalism and quality in the performance of public officials. Some of the key eras that might help build efficient and non-corrupt bureaucracy include:

-       Merit-based recruitment and promotion

-       Appropriate wages

-       limits on political appointments

-       internal control and restraints, such as anti-corruption commissions.

In particular, corruption has been identified as the most significant obstacle to doing business. Some measures in combating corruption are:

- instituting free press. It can play a great role in reinforcing the rule of the law.

- instituting external mechanisms for accountability

- publicity for anti-corruption efforts and involvement of the institutions of civil society

- punishing high-level offenders

The public-private level

The state and the market are two key players in the development process. The importance of a complementary and positive relationship between them is crucial. In this regard, it is important to have a bureaucracy that is responsive to the business community but is still independent.

In the MENA region, the relationship between the government and the private sector has been much more adversarial that in the other regional blocs;, both in general and with specific reference to transnational corporations. There are signs, however, that the relationship between the private and the public sector is changing in a number of arab countries.

One way of improving the relationship between governments and business is through business councils. The council's main functions is to gain information needed to

formulate policies that will enhance the performance of private sector. If they are to be successful, such deliberation councils need to be embedded in a climate of utrust and co-operation between governments and the private sector. They also need a substantial capacity if they are to effectively use the information supplied.

The level of private agents

In order to enhance economic performance, the institutional framework must guarantee property and contract rights between private agents. Markets cannot develop without effective property rights, and property rights are only effective when two conditions are fulfilled. The first is protection from theft; violence and other acts of predation. They also need a substantial technical capability if they are to effectively use the information supplied.

In terms of rule of law, many countries in the MENA have certainly lacked the conditions for private sector development.

The fact is that much private sector interaction is based on informal rules. Informal institutions in the private sector, particularly linkages and networks, can help policy and institutional measures that would be conducive to the upgrading of informal institutions and arrangements to formal and stable ones.

Supportive measures from developed countries

Transform aid.

It is increasingly clear that aid will have to be massively transformed if it is to serve as a major instrument for mediating Arabs future relationship with the world The impact of official development assistance (ODA) is constrained by procurement restrictions and conditions unrelated to development , high transaction costs and poor donor coordination.

There is strong evidence that aid is more effective in countries with sound economic policy and institutional foundations. This implies that donors should be more selective in concentrating their aid towards countries that demonstrate ownership and commitment.

Reducing the debt burden

The implications of the debt burden for development in Arab world are far-reaching. Many countries have to allocate considerable amounts of budgetary expenditure to external debt servicing.

External debt has been a heavy burden for many MENA countries. Overall, 14 percent of

regional export earnings go to debt service. In Lebanon, debt service accounts for 47 percent of the government's budget. Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey all spend more on debt service than they do on education; all spend twice as much on debt service than they do on health care. Sudan and Yemen are among the 41 countries identified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries [HIPCs] by the World Bank; Morocco is among the 11 countries identified by Jubilee 2000-UK as urgently in need of debt cancellation.

Easing the burden of unsustainable debt would free government resources for more productive developmental activities, reduce transactions costs and help restore macro-economic stability and investor confidence. A dollar of reduced debt is therefore likely to be more valuable than an additional dollar of conventional aid.

Today the social state in the MENA region is a time bomb waiting to explode. September 11 was a staggering reminder of that. If the West does not engage and encourage a structural approach to economic development, in the long run it would have to deal with catastrophic results caused by an extremely violent fringe of political Islamic organizations. The United States must not ignore the social state in the Arab world and should engage it in a dialogue. with groups and people which are willing to work within a system of freedom of speech, political participation and tolerance.

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How to assit Arab governments in efforts to strengthen their participation in the global economy in ways that bring widespread and sustainable benefits to their people? The answer stems from two issues. First, the forces of globalization are perhaps the most important factors that affect the current environments for economic development. Secound, there are lessons from Southeast Asian experiences that policy-makers in the MENA region could adapt to their own contexts. Theses lessons stem from Southeast Asia s era of rapid growth as from the current economic crisis.

It has been shown by the success of countries with an outward-oriented strategy that participating in the global economy provides immense opportunities. By contrast, inward-looking development strategies lead to marginalization and condemn countries t slow growth. Pursuing an outward-oriented strategy is even more crucial for Arab countries because their domestic markets are particularly small.

As a super power, the United States must not ignore the social state in the Arab world and should engage it in a dialogue. This includes nonviolent Islamic movements, which are willing to work within a system of pluralism and tolerance. Today the social state in the Arab world is a time bomb waiting to explode. September 11 was a staggering reminder of that. If the West does not engage and encourage alternative power to authoritarianism and in the long run it would have to deal with catastrophic results caused by an extremely violent fringe of political Islamic organizations and others.

Two Concepts – One Region – One Goal

Long-term, sustained stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved without addressing the Palestinian issue. A halt to the hostilities and the tension in the region is only the first part of the equation. The second stage of the challenge, the reconstruction, will require massive assistance in which the United States, Canada, European Union and Japan as well as regional countries (Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other GCC states) fund and support the process.

The Palestinians' pressing needs must be addressed immediately. Reconstruction is only one goal. Instilling hope and the rapid creation of jobs are equally vital at this stage in order to create new facts on the ground. Collaboration of this kind could also act as a catalyst for future regional Middle East economic cooperation.

Lazard wants to participate in the development process by proposing a conceptual idea that acts on two separate fronts. One is the immediate establishment of a Palestinian reconstruction fund, led and sponsored by the US in cooperation with the above-mentioned countries. The fund would focus on the establishment of projects within the sectors of power, water, roads, and telecommunications, to name a few.

In parallel, the second goal would be the establishment of a regional fund that would integrate the region's economic interests. Regional development and stability will only be cemented with common economic interests. The focus will be on industrial companies as well as selectively chosen infrastructure projects. Placing economic benefits aside, the fund will be an opportunity to advance peace and regional integration by facilitating and financing intra-regional partnerships, where "political" return goes hand in hand with economic return.

It is not too early to work toward a peaceful future. The Arabs and Israelis in conjunction with the US, EU, Canada and Japan have a role to play and a responsibility towards jointly instilling hope as well as articulating and implementing a common vision for the region.

The key to success will be the presence of private sector management to ensure the proper allocation of resources and efficient professional project management. This will allow for better governance, proper allocation of funds, timely strategies and will correct the mistakes of other similar concepts that have failed. Additionally, government and private sector entrepreneurial support should increase and improve deal flow as well as ensure that funds are channeled into economically feasible projects.

The Palestinian Reconstruction Fund

Concept

A long-term government sponsored growth fund with a minimum target size of US$300 million, which will focus on target investments in Palestinian start-ups and existing companies. The focus will be on industrial companies as well as selectively chosen infrastructure projects and joint Palestinian and Israeli industrial parks.

The Case for the Fund

The fund will seek to:

1. Rebuild, virtually from scratch, Palestinian infrastructure, while ensuring that funds are channeled into economically feasible projects.

2. Rapidly initiate the creation of jobs leading to overall economic stability, using government funding, as private sector funding may be scarce in the early stages of deployment.

3. Attract and encourage foreign and local private sector participation, leveraging the initial capital up to a level in excess of US$ 1.2 billion.

The Fund's Resources

It is the intention of the manager to raise the bulk of the funds from government funding. The manager believes that after initially using government funding to launch the Fund, the probability of attracting foreign and local private sector participation will increase, enabling the Fund to leverage the initial capital.

The Fund's Objective

The objectives of the Fund are as follows:

❑ Creating and financing industrial facilities and other profitable infrastructure projects in virtually any sustainable industrial and economic sector, including telecommunications, technology, transportation, construction, energy and general industrial companies in the Palestinian Territories.

❑ Investing in and facilitating start-ups in all areas, where a strong management team and validated business plan exist.

❑ Encouraging MENA region and Palestinian partnerships and work opportunities.

Corporate Structure and Management

The Fund will be a closed-end limited investment company. The company will have a life of 10 years, with the possibility of extensions for another 5 one-year periods. Lazard Kato will be the manager. Lazard Kato is an Egyptian joint stock company owned by Lazard Asset Management Egypt (a wholly owned subsidiary of Lazard Freres, 51%), Kato Investment (39%) and Dr. Ibrahim Kamel (10%).

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Management Structure

In *reverse* hierarchy, the management structure will be as follows:

- ❑ Lazard Kato will manage the Fund, subject to the general supervision and direction of the Advisory Board and Investment Committee. The manager will be responsible for identifying potential investments and for conducting initial reviews. Once the manager has identified suitable opportunities, it will produce a proposal for review by the Investment Committee and the Advisory Board.

- ❑ The Investment Committee will be comprised of prominent private sector business entrepreneurs from various MENA region countries, inclusive of Palestinians and will be under the purview of the Advisory Board. All decisions regarding the acquisition, restructuring or liquidation of the investments of the Fund will be subject to the unanimous approval of the Investment Committee and further review of the Advisory Board.

- ❑ The Advisory Board will be comprised of government representatives and charged with overall oversight of the operations of the fund.

Exit Strategies

At the inception of every investment decision, a clearly identified exit strategy will be determined. These strategies will include the following:

- ❑ Businesses can be completely or partially sold to an outside third party or strategic industry co-investor. In addition to co-investing with the Fund, multinationals can look to acquire larger stakes in projects after they have matured.

- ❑ The businesses can be taken public in initial offerings as the region's securities markets continue to evolve.

- ❑ Businesses can be sold in their entirety or partially to management.

❑ Businesses with substantial cash flows and/or assets may allow the fund to exit through changes/restructuring of their capital structure.

The MENA Peace Fund

Concept

A long-term growth fund with a minimum target size of US$500 million, which will focus on target investments in MENA region start-ups and existing companies. The focus will be on industrial companies as well as selectively chosen infrastructure projects.

The Case for the Fund

The Fund's concept is founded on the following principles:

☐ Partnerships between MENA businessmen will be mutually profitable for all parties concerned; workers, entrepreneurs and governments. The Fund is intended to be good business as well as a force for "peace" profits. The Fund's founders and management team believes that political "return" will go hand in hand with healthy financial returns.

☐ Placing economic benefits aside, the Fund sees an opportunity to advance regional stability by facilitating and more importantly financing partnerships between MENA Countries. Politically, the manager believes that the use of government funding (as private sector funding may be scarce in the early stages), to create stable infrastructure, provide job opportunities, promote industry and trade, in order to alleviate the feeling of hopelessness, can combat regional instability.

☐ Relative to infrastructure development, the Middle East has the greatest development needs but the least access to development capital. In accordance to a World Bank study, only 2 per cent of the foreign direct investment directed at emerging markets finds its way to the Middle East and North Africa. It is estimated that the region's infrastructure investment needs will exceed US$ 300 billion in the next 10-year period.

☐ Venture financing in the MENA region is still in its infancy. Entrepreneurial activity in the region exists but has no natural partner in the regional finance world, which is ultra-conservative. There have been a few attempts at initiating venture funds for the MENA region but these have largely failed due to the fact that they were not privately managed and more importantly, the management teams lacked operational experience that entrepreneurs have, while deal flow was also inadequate.

☐ As has been witnessed in many economic geographical areas around the world, there is a symbiotic relationship between the availability of venture financing and successful entrepreneurial activity. A major attestation to this is the case of Israel, which today has a healthy start-up culture that has given birth to multi-billion dollar companies such as Checkpoint, Mercury, Amdocs, and Comverse, to name a few. These companies employ tens of thousands of highly skilled

workers, which was not the case 20 years ago, when venture financing practically did not exist in Israel.

❑ MENA region countries are in a similar position. They have a labor force that is highly educated, globally oriented and governments that are very supportive of economic reform and deregulation. The Fund's management team and advisors believe that now is the time to create a public/private vehicle to spark successful entrepreneurial activity in the MENA region, strengthening regional ties as well as the ties with the United States, Canada, the European Union and Japan.

The Fund's Resources

It is the intention of the manager to raise the bulk of the funds from government funding. The manager believes that after initially using government funding to launch the Fund, the probability of attracting foreign and local private sector participation will increase, enabling the Fund to leverage the initial capital up to a level in excess of US$ 2 billion.

The Fund's Objective

The objectives of the Fund are as follows:

❑ Creating and financing industrial facilities and other profitable infrastructure projects in virtually any sustainable industrial and economic sector, including telecommunications, industrial parks, technology, transportation, construction, energy and general industrial companies in the MENA region.

❑ Investing in and facilitating start-ups in all areas, where a strong management team and validated business plan exist.

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THE CURRENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES: CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN SOCIETIES AND THEIR POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

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Despite the huge, blatant differences between them in terms of military power, political status, and economic conditions, it is argued here that the Israeli Jewish society and the Palestinian one have since October 2000 been experiencing certain similar sociopolitical processes, which may hold far-reaching implications for their future. These processes amount to a substantial change in each side's political structure of opportunities (PSO), which could potentially lead to a dramatic shift in the relations between them. Should the PSO indeed change and the foundations of the status quo be shaken, the new situation could foster the emergence of unprecedented, grassroots, organized pressures on the elites to resume the peace talks, though probably under different parameters than those of the Oslo process. Alternatively, it could produce bottom-up pressures in both societies to opt for a full-fledged confrontation. If that happens, we will probably witness the empowerment of radical, populist movements and leaders on both sides, which could result, on the Palestinian side, in increased violent actions against Israelis and, on the Israeli side, in a strong momentum toward expelling large numbers of Palestinians from the territories. It goes without saying that the developments on both sides are interrelated and interdependent, such that no peace campaign can emerge on one side simultaneously with the rise of an aggressive trend on the other.

The change in the PSO experienced by the two societies has three main similar components: (1) a general sharp deterioration in personal security and individual economic well-being; (2) a severe crisis of governability, involving an upsurge of internal criticism of the respective administrations' efficacy in dealing with a variety of sociopolitical problems, and (3) a change in the domestic structure of opinion about the conflict and the prospects for peace.

1. After almost a decade of ongoing—albeit often interrupted—peace talks, both sides' hopes, nourished by their national leaderships, for a successful resolution of the conflict along the lines of the Oslo formula have been totally shattered. The collapse of the formal negotiations was not a remote or abstract matter for the man in the street, Palestinian or Israeli. It was followed almost instantaneously by, on one side, the first limited retribution strikes, then

short-term and limited incursions, and finally reoccupation of parts and eventually almost all of the Palestinian-controlled areas (Areas A and B) by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); on the other, by the upsurge in Palestinian suicide bombings and other violent attacks on Israeli civilians. Thus, for individuals on both sides personal security has sharply diminished, and ordinary activities such as shopping, going to the office or school and back, moving from one town to the other by car or public transportation, or drinking coffee in a café now entail high risks. Particularly on the Palestinian side, the last twenty months have seen the virtual collapse of basic service-providing systems such as medical care, education, and so on, not to mention the decline in the PNA's ability to provide minimal security to its citizens.

The escalation of personal insecurity and spread of violence throughout the territory west of the Jordan River has also brought a gradual deterioration in both sides' already failing economies, also affecting almost every Israeli and Palestinian household. Cut off from their sources of income, many on the Palestinian side have reached the brink of starvation as, on top of the prolonged closure that prevents them from working in Israel, the IDF's reoccupation of the territories has brought new impediments to traffic within the West Bank and Gaza as well as the eradication of large parts of the land used for agriculture. On a less existential though also extremely troublesome level, the drying up of external investment—due to the high financial risks entailed by the escalating violence, the lack of a political horizon, and the increasing security expenditures—many Israelis have recently lost their jobs while having to cope with skyrocketing mortgages or rents and rising costs of basic products because of the economic recession.

To put it somewhat differently, the multifaceted and extensive nature of the present hostilities has meant that for almost all inhabitants of the area, notwithstanding their class, location of residence, or political views, the option of "internal exit" has not been feasible. Turning a blind eye to the developments in the public sphere has been impossible because they have deeply penetrated the private one. The collapse of the peace process has immediately affected everyday life for the members of both societies, making the Palestinian and Israeli grassroots even more politically conscious and attentive than they had been in the past.

2. This greater political awareness brought about by the extensive war fatigue is intertwined with a growing disillusionment with the incumbent leaderships' ability to operate effectively, and mainly, though not only, to find a way out of the political impasse. On the Palestinian side, one hears stronger and stronger complaints against the corruption and malfunctioning of the PNA in almost every realm of activity. The ability of the people on top, particularly Chairman Arafat, to remain in power is largely attributed to Israel and America's recurrent demands to replace them. Similarly, on the Israeli side it is clearly the escalation in Palestinian violence and the prevalent, collective need for retribution that account for the ailing, internally divided, and ineffective Sharon coalition's ability to stay in power and for the prime minister's stable popularity.

Both the Israeli and Palestinian societies, then, seem to have reached a nadir in terms of confidence in their national leaderships' competence and professional conduct.[1] In times of war nations tend to rally around the flag, and on the face of it, that seems to be the case here with no clear-cut opposition to the incumbent leaders emerging on either side. Yet, despite that lack, recent opinion polls on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides, the Israeli and Palestinian written and electronic media reports, and even a cursory look at various internet sites and discussion groups indicate severe problems in trust and satisfaction with the upper echelons. A governability crisis, then, presently characterizes both Palestinian and Israeli politics, and the violence exerted by the other is the only reason a massive, grassroots protest movement does not gather force. Aware of their fragile public status close to the edge of legitimacy, and motivated by their desire for political survival, neither side's leaders have a real interest in terminating the bloodshed. The people, on the other hand, almost collapsing under the hardships, seem far more amenable to mobilizing to seek a way out of the ongoing, unbearable status quo—be it a full confrontation or a new peace initiative.

3. In light of all this, there has been a recent change in the structure of Palestinian and Israeli Jewish public attitudes. The escalating confrontation has fostered a process of amalgamation on both sides as they reestablish their pre-Oslo, unidimensionally negative image of the "other"—whether of the cruel Israeli occupier or the fanatic Palestinian terrorist. It must be stressed that desirable as it has been, the peace process was highly costly to both sides in terms of their internal unity. Throughout the 1990s the Palestinian collective was rent by bitter disagreement, sometimes mounting into physical aggression, between the official PLO/PNA position and the stance of the Islamic and other components of the "rejection front." The former maintained that under the overall circumstances, political negotiations could achieve more than aarmed struggle in terms of obtaining a Palestinian state as well as international recognition as an independent nation. The rejectionists, however, argued that the conflict could not be politically resolved in a manner consistent with the Palestinian national interest. With the collapse of the peace talks, this rift was bridged by the common cause of promoting the Palestinians' interests by force and resisting the Israeli measures.

On the Israeli side a bitter debate between Left and Right has also been waged since the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1993, reaching its peak with the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995. The Left and the Right have put forward contrasting interpretations of the "real" intentions of the Palestinians in opting for a political course of action after so many years of a clear preference for an armed struggle. Another disputed issue was the rationale and right to make far-reaching territorial concessions in return for a peace agreement,

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[1] Thus in the Israeli Peace Index of December 2001 only 37% expressed some or much confidence in the government and 29% said they had some or much confidence in the Knesset (the parliament), while the most recent JMCC [Jerusalem Medoa and Communication Center] poll found only 25% saying they trusted Yasser Arafat most (next came Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin at 8.8%).

even for one reached by both sides in good faith. However, similarly to the developments on the Palestinian side, the Camp David fiasco of July 2000 has considerably blurred the differences between the Israeli Left and Right, with the majority now taking the position that there is no one to talk peace with on the Palestinian side. The fatal suicide bombings and other violent incidents in Israeli towns and cities have strengthened a sense of shared destiny between those living within the 1967 borders and the settlers (this despite the growing awareness within Israel that to deal more effectively with the separation/security issue, certain settlements must be dismantled)[2]. Indeed, in Israel today a large majority believes that the present crisis has had positive results so far as strengthening internal unity is concerned[3].

Paradoxical as it may seem, then, the eruption of violence has had some "positive" effects on the two collectives' internal state of affairs and sense of unity, which was severely impaired while the peace talks were going on. The shift from the highly controversial political negotiations to the highly familiar situation of an armed confrontation—for which each protagonist blames the other side—has removed some very painful thorns from both collectives' flesh. Thus even the few Israeli Jews who strongly oppose the Sharon government's policy of deep military incursions into the Palestinian territories, and those on the Palestinian side who oppose the suicide bombings, have not dared to side openly with each other but instead have clung to their respective primordial loyalties, basing their criticism of their own leaders on the damage their policies allegedly inflict on their respective national interests, while almost no one argues for a shared, Israeli-Palestinian interest.

The crucial question today, then, is where these changes in the PSO lead and what determines which alternative will be chosen, whether a full-fledged confrontation or a new, bottom-up propeace initiative. It is suggested here that two main factors will determine the future course of events: (1) the absence or emergence of alternative leaderships on the two sides, and the path such leaders will take if they step forward; and (2) the level and direction of involvement of external actors, mainly the United States, the European Union and, most probably, Egypt. This points to three possible scenarios.

The first scenario will occur if, for domestic reasons that cannot be thoroughly analyzed here, no alternative leadership emerges on the Palestinian or Israeli side. If Sharon and Arafat remain the leaders by default, then the vicious cycle of violence will continue and may escalate even further. Nevertheless, the chances of deterioration into an all-out confrontation will not be very high because the fate of the two incumbent leaders is virtually intertwined. As mentioned above, despite their mutual resentment they practically owe each other their present ability to forestall any real opposition from within. Escalation would probably also be somewhat mitigated by the balance created by the U.S. siding with Israel and the EU with the Palestinian side.

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[2] See Peace Index, May 202, Q. 26
[3] See Peace Index, April 202, Q. 45

Should a new, popular leadership emerge both in the PNA and in Israel and effectively challenge the present leadership, then the situation could radically change according to two antithetical scenarios. The first would be the strengthening of both the Palestinian Islamic opposition and the Israeli radical Right by either a legitimate process of elections—which are due on both sides in 2003—or a wave of mass protest. This would most likely lead to an unbuffered, unprecedented, ferocious clash. As in the Balkans, such a scenario would leave the international community no choice but to physically intervene in the conflict by, for example, sending an armed peacekeeping force. This would certainly limit Israel's room to maneuver and undermine the effectiveness of its military superiority but would also destroy, at least for the near future, the fragile buds of Palestinian sovereignty.

In the third scenario, a grassroots campaign based on a new peace plan emerges on both sides. This is possible only if those leading the respective campaigns cooperate with each other and openly present an innovative peace plan that tackles right from the start the most difficult issues such as settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem that caused the collapse of the Oslo process. This means no more interim agreements, no more loose ends. The plan should also publicly address the two sides' deepest fears and grievances. Furthermore, the leaders on both sides should be individuals whom the public in no way identifies with the Oslo process and are trusted by their people as mainstream "patriots" and political realists, not exponents of some great global or even regional vision nor advocates of lofty moral injunctions. Such leaders will have to get the U.S. and the EU involved in the process, obtaining in advance their commitment to guarantee both sides' security and economic well-being.

For obvious reasons, such new leaderships will not be welcomed by the incumbent ones. Yet this may prove an asset rather than a liability in terms of mobilizing the public's support, in light of the prevailing lack of confidence in the present administrations, the profound war fatigue, and the economic hardships. If such leaders emerge and put forward a joint plan, then the recently reestablished internal unity may act not as an impediment but as a vehicle.

What are the three scenarios' respective chances of materializing? The calculation is very difficult. The first scenario entails the least radical changes in terms of international decisions and the emergence of new leaders. At the same time, the heavy economic and security costs of the status quo make its continuation quite unbearable for both peoples. The scenario of an all-out clash requires both the emergence of new, fundamentalist leaderships and a willingness by both peoples, who in fact are already weary of the bloodshed, to engage in such a massive struggle. The third scenario of a new peace initiative is clearly, then, the least costly, yet is highly dependent on obtaining international commitments without the external actors' direct involvement, on arriving at a new, agreed peace plan and, last and most important, on the emergence of resolute Israeli and Palestinian figures who would shoulder the challenge of confronting and overcoming their respective publics' mistrust of the practical possibility of peacemaking.

The Middle East: Where are we now? How did we get here? Where are we going? Where should we go?
By
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I.   I. Introduction: where are we now?

There are two ways to evaluate the situation in the Middle East at the post March 29th situation in the Palestinian – Israeli interactions:
a) The immediate direct present.
b) The long term prospects if the present situation continued.

One) The immediate present can be described as a state of nature conflict where the parties of a decolonization ׀process failed to come to grips with the realities of history and power capabilities. Nature took its course in the Palestinian – Israeli interactions when both sides decided to rely on force to achieve their national objectives. The reasons for this sad state of affair is not of concern at this point. What is more important is to know that the leaders on both sides have decided that the use of massive military force, on the Israeli side, and the use of suicide bombing, on the Palestinian side, will continue the Israeli occupation for Israel and achieve the de-occupation for the Palestinians. Both got the smell of victory, total victory, if the Israelis or the Palestinians utilized a bit of more violence. One more suicide bombing, or a few more of them, will make the Israelis withdraw unilaterally, as they have done before in Lebanon and one more Israeli swamping of the Palestinian territories will end Palestinian violence and relinquish their demands.

Of course none of this could be realized, both parties should know that one more suicide bombing or one more sweeping operation will not achieve their goals. So the Israelis started the talk about transfer of Palestinians and 46% of the Israelis agree. Some of them will not only transfer the Palestinians in the West Bank but also those inside Israel. (Some of the transfer is taking place. It is estimated that 150,000 Palestinians left since the Intifada).

On the Palestinian side another wicked dream will emerge which is also to transfer the Israelis not to the Sea but to the USA or the West. Hamas people refer proudly to the fact that 1 million Israelis have left Israel because of the resistance and suicide bombing. (With the exception of few thousands rich Israelis, 15% of the Israelis are always abroad for work in Western countries or family attachments).

More important still, the state of nature prevailed over the state of reason. Look at the current situation where violence and nature are on the initiating side. Suicide bombing has delayed until June 24th the American long waited for initiative. It took the Arab side a year and a half to act and come up with an initiative, a positive one indeed but its credibility was taken over by a suicide bombing operation in NATANIA and the Israeli sweeping operation on March 29th, and so on.

Nature took over reason, and violence took over negotiations. The definition of victory has been reduced from achieving national goals (secure and safe homeland for the Jews and an independent State for the Palestinians) to how much pain the other side is feeling. The more statistics show the human and physical loss of the other side, the more is the satisfaction of getting closer to the goal of national vendetta. Instincts come to the fore and politics disappear.

Two)The long term prospects of the present

The cost for both sides in Israel and Palestine is unbelievably high. It is very high indeed if psychological and emotional plus the lost opportunity costs are calculated. Let us get back to history and see the dynamics of similar colonial disengagement.

1-when the British failed to grant the Wafd party independence for Egypt and the deoccupation of Egypt from 1923 to 1952, they produced Nasser and the radicalization of the country and the region for the next three decades, still until now in some ways.

2-Doing the opposite in India and giving in to the Conference Party gave the world a democratic and secular India.

The failure of the Palesinians to deal with Barak and the failure of the Israelis and the US to deal with Arafat took us to Sharon as a leader of the mainstream in Israel, and who knows will be the successor of Arafat in Palestinian territories. In fact both sides have gone after the forces of moderation on the other side. Suicide bombing was heavily directed towards civilians who are the bread and butter of peace. Sharon's efforts were not against the infrastructure of Hamas and Islamic Gehad, which remained intact, but against the Palestinian authority.

This systemic destruction of moderation led the Palestinians and Israelis to a state of nature. This will have a wide and long term impact in the region. It took four years between 1948 and the coming of Nasser. The eradication of confidence in the moderate regimes will lead to radicalization in the region for decades to come. Iranian regime before the revolution was accused of corruption and not living up to the standards of democratic systems, the regime was discredited and we have now three decades of revolutionary upheavals, a long war in the Gulf, destabilization of the Middle East, and the possibility of producing weapons of mass destruction .

II- How did we get here?

There are three ways to look at the present situation in the Palestinian – Israeli interactions.

First is that the state of nature in the Israeli – Palestinian interactions is part of the Middle East state of nature in which a region that hase 8% of world population has known 25% of world conflicts since the end of Worl War II. The region has not matured to follow global developments of globalization, democracy, and in short, progress. In a way, the Middle East is still living in a state of nature in which power is the defining factor for politics. The history of the region will attest to this reality. In no other region in the world, a peace process like the one in the Middle East with all the investments of global and regional powers could fade away with losses to all concerned parties. Only, the Middle East with its lack of progress could remain in a state of prolonged conflict where original sins will remain unforgiven.

Second, the present crisis in the Middle East is a byproduct of recent developments in the post Camp David II summit in July 2000, and major deficiencies in the Oslo peace process. A resolution of the current crisis should address both.

The deficiencies of the process are:

1- the philosophy of the process is based on gradualism and the mutual learning of the honest intentions of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples to peacefully coexist with each other. Although this philosophy might have certain merits, it gave those who oppose the process on religious or historical grounds the opportunity to sabotage it through settlement policies or violence. This will be even truer when dates and timetables are not respected.

2- the frame of reference for the entire process, which is resolution 242 and land for peace, was often ignored in the negotiations to reach agreements, the negotiations to implement

agreements, and the negotiations to implement every item in the agenda for implementation.

3- there has been a structural imbalance in the negotiations. Israel has secured itself a position of superiority in conventional and non-conventional weapons that led to a negotiation for peace in the Middle East under the threat of use of massive military power. Under such condition, any Israeli concession is considered to be very generous even if it is far less than what the Palestinian side could accept.

4- there is an obsession of the present leadership and élites of the region of geo- politics over geo- economics. For them history is defined in terms of the past not in terms of the future. There is no parallel in the Middle East for the founding fathers of the European Union.

5- the peace process was always a government to government business while people were absent altogether. Even when normalization was envisioned, it was so in terms of economic gains that may inspire Arabs and Israelis to accept each other. However, both peoples are not merely economic animals that look for gains in the open market of global capitalism. Nor are they indulgent only in the pursuit of happiness to the degree of overlooking historical and cultural complexes that controls their lives.

6- the US has been the major, if not the only, player to mediate the peace process. The US, because of domestic politics, could not be a fair player as a mediator should be. The Presidential cycle also added a complicating factor to the sustainability of American efforts. The events of September 11th have added a highly complicating factor to the US role in the Middle East. If the Cold War was the prism through which USA looked at the Middle East conflict in the past, now the war on terrorism is having the same negative impacts.

These deficiencies have prolonged the peace process and created a diplomatic fatigue for all the parties. The conditions under which the Palestinian people has to live have become intolerable with no light at the end of the tunnel, particularly

after the Camp David II summit ended without concluding an agreement. The blame of the US administration of the Palestinian leadership for the lack of success has made the Palestinians feel that they face the hard choice of either to live in isolation or to accept what they can not accept regarding their basic values in Jerusalem and the refugees issue. The blame for the Palestinians, on the other hand, made the Israelis feel that their 'generosity' in the negotiations was not reciprocated. Sharon's visit to the Islamic holy cites in Jerusalem sparked the current crisis that led to the Palestinian uprising and the corresponding rage in the Arab World. The Israeli people, on the other hand, elected in February 2001 Sharon to form a center – far right government.

Third, instead of looking at the Middle East as a region still living in a state of nature, or as region that is living in a post peace process failure, the area can be looked at as living through a process in which the parties to the conflict are bargaining not only in the negotiating table but also in the battle field to improve their positions. In spite of the recent crisis in the Middle East, the general deterioration of the peace process in the last few years, and the freeze on the activities of the multilateral negotiations that came out from the Madrid conference, the Middle East conflict has witnessed noticeable progress that could not be imagined a few decades ago.

The conflict has been transformed from an existential conflict to a conflict about how the Arabs and Israelis could live with each other. Even the thorny Palestinian track has achieved some progress in most of the issues in the Camp David II summit and in the last negotiations that was held in Taba- Egypt in the last week of January 2001. Both parties have recognized being close to an agreement more than any time before. In fact, the current crisis could be perceived as an attempt by both parties to improve their bargaining position in the final mile of the negotiations. Allowing this crisis to deteriorate and turn the clock back in the Middle East will be a historical mistake that all

the parties to the conflict, in and outside the region, will pay a heavy price for.

II.   III. Where are we going? The Bush's speech

For good or bad, President Bush speech of June 24th has become the defining framework for politics and diplomacy in the Middle East in the near future. The acceptance of Israel and the Arab states of the American initiative has put it on the table for bargaining and, hopefully, for implementation. However, from an Arab perspective the speech has suffered major conceptual problems:

First, the main problem of the peace process is envisaged in the speech to be the corruption and inefficacy of the Palestinian authority and not the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Hence, change and reform of the Palestinian authority becomes the key to changing the current stalemate in the Middle East.

Second, The victim of the current situation is defined as the Israeli population, who cannot live safely because of terrorism, whereas Palestinian suffering becomes a result of the Palestinian leadership's inability to achieve peace and democracy.

Third, resolving the conflict in the Middle East entails establishing the Palestinian State, but this is dependent on the capacity of the Palestinian people to choose leaderships 'non compromised by terror.'

Fourth, the settlement will be a gradual process over three years, through which the Palestinians are under consistent testing, so if the violence stops throughout that period, they get a temporary state, and if cease fire persists longer, they could get a permanent state. The peace process again will be hostage to every fanatic in the region.

Fifth, ignoring the historical background and the evolution of the conflict in the Middle East, and dealing with the conflict on the grounds of the current war on terror by the US and its allies. Thus, no matter how just the Palestinian cause might be, promoting the cause with violent means, or resistance in any form, is unacceptable.

All these five concepts could be criticized on the moral grounds of justice, history, and factual grounds of the recent developments of the conflict, since the beginning of the second Intifada. These concepts could be criticized as well on practical grounds; hence the return to the gradualism in resolving the Palestinian cause in a manner that puts only one side - the Palestinian people - under scrutiny is highly impractical. Who could guarantee that Palestinian radical movements would be tolerant for such a long and gradual process in the face of the Israeli provocation and with very little incremental progress? It, moreover, puts the radical movements on both sides, in the driving seat for deciding over the future of the process, which would probably lead to its collapse in the same fashion of the collapse of the Oslo agreements.

The operational side of the speech is, however, no less problematic. It has maintained the two-state solution, negotiations to complete the Oslo process to the final status agreement in three years; it kept the Israeli withdrawal from "the occupied Palestinian territories" in exchange for peace. It has envisioned more specific roles to the international community, the Quartette in particular and moderate Arab states, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The road map and the timetable were left to the diplomatic and political efforts to formulate. In reality, as expected, the removal of Arafat has overshadowed the rest of the American initiative. In a way it could disintegrate the initiative and cause its final collapse. Israel did not waste time and has gone into re- occupying the Palestinian held territories, and dismantling the infrastructure of moderation, political as well as economic. For the Palestinians, Bush speech has become not part of the solution of the Palestinian problem, but rather a cover up for taking it back to where it was in 1993. Exactly where the state of nature was most prevailing.

IV.   IV. Where Should We Go?

We know where we will go if nature will continue having the upper hand over reason. Continuation of a deadly violence with far reaching consequences and radicalization of the region plus compounded failures of reform and the globalization of the Middle East.

A different future could be drawn if there is leadership. Imagine what would have happened if the US did not come up with a policy of containment for communism, or did not work for the recovery of Europe in the post World War II period? Or what would have happened in the Middle East if Egypt under President Sadat did not launch the peace process? The fate of the world and the Middle East would have been much worse, much more terrible and infested with wars, revolutions, and upheavals of all sorts in magnitudes that was not known in the history of humanity.

If that is the case, interested parties should actively work harder to restore calm and bring the parties from the brink of war to the possibilities of peace. The continuation of the state of nature is not inevitable. Political and human choice is still possible. What is needed is to build a coalition of moderation to substitute violence with negotiations. Bush's speech has referred to the composition of this coalition, the quartette and moderate Arab states. This coalition has got the following assets to utilize:

The first asset is the Egyptian and Jordanian peace processes which give a living proof of the long lasting rewards of peace; namely the return of occupied territories, and the commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Thus, all kinds of instigation to a more confrontational stance by radical Israelis and Arabs have not succeeded to make Egypt or Jordan announce a diplomatic boycott or open its borders for suicide bombers against Israel. Moreover, both Sharon and Hizbollah have failed to open a new war front in Syria, and cease fire has persisted since the Collin Powell's visit to Israel, Lebanon, and Syria last April. The lesson is that there are limitations for the

expansion of the current state of nature at least in the near future.

The second asset for the coalition of moderates is the Palestinian and the Israeli citizens who want to live in peace. Despite the bloodshed since Sept. 2000, public opinion polls in Palestine and Israel all indicate that the majority of the population on both sides still favors the peace process. Israeli polls have shown increasing acknowledgement of the impossibility of a military imposed resolution of the conflict. On the Palestinian side also there is more acknowledgement of the futility of suicide bombing targeting civilians, as a means to advance the national interest.

The third asset is an emerging consensus over a historical compromise which responds to the minimum requirements of both parties; i.e. Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, equal exchange of 3% of the land, and establishing the Palestinian state with East Jerusalem minus the Jewish quarter and the wailing wall as its capital, whereas West Jerusalem plus the Jewish quarter and the wailing wall becomes the capital of Israel, and a just settlement of the refugee problem that does not deny the right of return, while preserving the Israeli demographic balance at the same time.

The fourth asset for such a coalition of moderates is the international support for a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. This support which has become more institutionalized through the quartette; the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN.

The fifth asset for the moderate coalition is the Arab initiative supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia who are in fact the backbone of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has informed the US that it will be willing to implement the normalization process with Israel upon signing a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel could have normal relations with the

majority of Arab states upon accepting withdrawal from the Arab occupied territories in 1967.

The sixth asset is the nightmare scenario, as mentioned above, if the current developments persist to the future. Hence, radical Israelis could adopt transfer policies, and if worst comes to worst, they could consider using tactical nuclear bombs, whereas internal developments in the Arab countries could not be controlled giving rise to radical movements.

For the moderate coalition these assets are not bad to start with in order to change the current events. What is needed is will and courage and a better utilization of time. The anti peace forces are determined, well organized, and have so far emotions, history, and religious interpretations on their side. This needs to be changed by a sustained effort from the US and its moderate partners to do the following:

First, It is highly needed a starting point from the international community to make what will follow as an international initiative led by a concert of powers that is ready to exert rewards and punishments. The long waited for international conference is due now and as early as possible. The conference should chart the road to peace and create mechanisms for monitoring the process. It is also possible that this conference can resume what the 1996 Sharm El – Shiekh anti – terror conference had left. The conference can be one of the tools to fight terror through international and regional cooperation. It is essential not only to fight terrorism but also to de-legitimize it.

1- Second, it is highly needed to create moderate partners among the Palestinians and the Israelis. Moderation will not be the result of removing Arafat. Most likely extremism will prevail. Arafat nationalist credentials are also important for the future completion of a peace treaty. However, change is possible in two tracks: the ruling

team in the Palestinian territories and the constitutional reforms that will give Arafat nominal powers. Of no less importance is the need for change in Israel. Sharon will not make peace. A break of the Government is necessary. An alternative should be created. The key to such an alternative is the international insistence on an immediate halt on Israeli settlements and the start of negotiations.

Third, an Arab more detailed plan is needed to be announced and defended in the Arab Media. De-legitimating suicide bombing particularly those inside the Green line. The issue is not condemning the suicide operations, which have already taken place, but de-legitimating them as being against the Palestinian cause.

V.   V. Conclusion

There are moments in history that are more important than others are. They come usually after defining times that make what is after significantly different from what was before. These defining moments came to the world and the Middle East after World War II, the end of the Cold War, and now after September 11TH. Now is the time to act to change the course of history in the Middle East, and the world. The failure to do so will be a submission to the will of nature. And when nature takes its course all parties lose. The beginnings of the loss is already there. Palestinians are deprived not only of their national goals but also form the basic needs of life. In fact life has become not much rewarding than death. Israelis are no much better. Walls now surround the national dream of a safe and accepted homeland. Israel increasingly is becoming the largest ever-Jewish ghetto in history. Other regional powers are totally entangled in a conflict that so far resisted solutions, their national agendas are delayed and extremism is ready for attack. It is a dim future indeed. Now is the time to change this future. It is a time for a long-term vision not a short time management

of events. It is the time for strategy not tactics. It is the time to deal with history in terms of the future not in terms of the past.

A New Approach to a Chronic Problem

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The situation in the Middle East is on the brink of chaos. With Palestinian and Israeli actions inflicting ever greater suffering on the other party and a rising death toll in both camps the region is threatened with an all out armed conflict, a possibility causing alarm both in the region and across the world. Moderate Arab regimes caught in the cross fire, such as Egypt, are issuing pleas to the world, and the United States in particular, to use its influence in diffusing tension and assume a role as mediator between belligerent parties. Egypt is ready to take whatever steps are required to end hostilities and advance a just and final peace agreement ending the historical conflict once and for all and, to this end, relies on a network of relations with all interested parties and its potential to act alongside the United States as a mediator bringing the two sides together and assisting them in overcoming obstacles which may arise on the path towards a settlement.

The only way to break the current impasse is through increasing the mediation efforts of the United States assisted by the E.U. and U.N. and supported by key Arab States such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Such efforts must address both the security and political issues that lie at the root of the conflict and produce a final deal accommodating the

aspirations of the Palestinians and Israelis equally. There is of course a danger of attaching too much importance to the role of mediator since the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East is ultimately down to the parties directly involved. Nevertheless is it worth examining the strengths and limitations of the role in order to ensure that no avenue is left unexplored in an effort to achieve peace in the region and so that where there is an opportunity for the mediator to make a positive contribution to the cause it is exploited to the full.

Indeed, the need for a mediator has long been at the forefront of the Palestinian agenda but until recently was spurned by the Israeli government and ignored by the United States. The U.S. and E.U. are now seriously considering the form this role might take and leading Arab states, including Egypt, have expressed their support for third party intervention, President Mubarak ranking it among the key objectives of his latest missions to the U.S. and Europe.

However, since the concept of mediation can be interpreted in various ways and can operate at various levels, it is crucial that a definition of the role of mediator acceptable to all interested parties is arrived at before advancing any further along the path towards achieving a solution to the conflict in the Middle East. The gravity of the current situation stipulates that the role must have the full backing of the international community and address itself wholeheartedly to dealing specifically with the political dimension of the conflict. In view of this, it is clear that Egypt cannot act alone but requires the support of the U.S., U.N., E.U. and international community as a whole. With the necessary backing

Egypt could voice the opinions of these bodies and exploit its unique position in the Middle East to unite the parties in a just and comprehensive peace agreement bringing an end to the conflict and preparing the ground for future cooperation in all aspects of political and social life. However, the steady erosion in mutual trust among interested parties has thus far hindered any such effort and, unless Egypt gains the confidence of the belligerents and the appropriate backing, there is little hope the peace process will advance.

The present situation is further complicated by the fact that amidst the ongoing cross fire between Israel and the Palestinians, hardliners seek to exploit opportunities to open a new front on the Israeli-Lebanese border thereby hampering efforts to resume negotiations with Syria. Such actions would naturally have grave humanitarian, political and strategic consequences for the entire region and sheds a somewhat pessimist light over the ability of the mediator to make headway.

With this in mind, it is clear that the mandate, role and function of the mediator must be finely tuned with the aims and objectives of the both Israel and the Palestinians, must adapt to changing circumstances and must evolve as the peace process advances. The mediator must provide protection for both sides, prevent political stagnation and alleviate the pressure hindering progress in negotiations. Partiality and bias must be avoided at all costs and the mediator must have the ability to detect and monitor psychological and political changes in all parties and exploit such developments for the advancement of peace in the region.

Failure to respond to developments in the psyche of the parties concerned coupled with any hint of weakness in the support of the international community would have adverse consequences on the efficacy of the mediator. His mission must be clearly defined and limited to realistic achievable goals since shortfalls in either the clarity or support of the mediator's position gives leverage to those advocating continued occupation of Palestinian territories and/or those who favour a prolonged war of attrition threatening the entire region with all out war.

Thus far, Egypt has had partial success in its role as mediator defusing many crises, preventing certain incidents from becoming armed struggles and bringing the two parties to the negotiating table along with President Clinton in Taba in January 2001. Egypt believes it can work hand in hand with the United States as a mediator and is ready to expend all efforts to this end provided it has the support of regional governments and the international community.

Relations between the two camps had, however, come under considerable strain after the visit of the Israeli opposition leader to Haram al-Sherif marking the beginning of the Palestinian uprising, or 'intifada', which broke out on 28 September 2000. It should be noted here that the 'intifada' was a direct and spontaneous reaction to Sharon's intrusion into the holy Muslim places in Jerusalem.

Having progressed some way along the path to peace, the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians reached its peak during the Arab Summit and Beirut Declaration of 28th March 2002 when Sharon initiated military operations against the Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli military tightened its grip on Palestinian areas, placed Arafat under virtual house arrest and undertook a series of operations in Palestinian-controlled towns and refugee camps. During this time, the conflict grew from a relatively static confrontation limited to certain fixed points into a more mobile and deadly military campaign in which both sides made use of all available resources against one another.

The collapse of the Camp David Summit and subsequent peace efforts, as well as the ensuing 18 months of violence, naturally accentuated and accelerated political developments on both sides. The Palestinians' faith in a negotiated solution rapidly disintegrated and was replaced by a conviction that no arms should be laid down until Israel agrees to end occupation and withdraws from the land occupied since 1967. Israel, on its part, doubts Palestinians will ever agree to disarm and wavers between a harsh military response and the need for a peace agreement to end the historical conflict

As relations between the two sides deteriorate further, the need for external mediators is increasingly apparent. The situation is aggravated by the inconsistent engagement of Western powers, and in particular the United States, as well as the virtual collapse of the Palestinian Authority and the continuing Israeli assaults on Palestinian Security engines. The possibility of rebuilding confidence or of Palestinian co-operation with Israel

becomes ever more remote and it is clear that without intervention from a third party, or mediator, there is little hope that the two parties will resume negotiations.

Due to its influence, the obvious mediator is of course the United States. However, it is imperative that the U.S. take the matter seriously for, although the Palestinian crisis is directly addressed in the Mitchell Committee Report, the Bush administration has not yet demonstrated the political will necessary to implement this report, its position characterised by fluctuations between disengagement and reengagement. C.I.A. director George Tenet's report advocates a ceasefire plan as the first step towards the implementation of the Mitchell Report, endorses the creation of a Palestinian state and even sponsors a United Nations Security Council Resolution to that effect (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1397, 12 March 2002), yet the U.S.'s commitment remains questionable and, until it is guaranteed, the United States does not offer much hope as a mediator. Moreover, by the time the U.S. does put her weight behind a peace initiative, the impact will have been seriously eroded.

Another well qualified candidate for mediator is the European Union, either alone or within the Quartet (an informal group consisting of the E.U., U.S., U.N. and Russian Federation). Indeed, the emergence of the Quartet as a political force represents a significant development insofar as it sets a precedent for concerted action on the part of major international players and has been acknowledged by several international bodies. The E.U., long held at arms length by the United States, is now frequently consulted by the American administration and the two work hand in hand on many fronts. Eager to

maintain this new found role, the E.U. strives to accommodate American interests though is often uneasy with the U.S. line concerning the Middle East and has initiated a series of high-level official visits to the region independent of its counterpart across the Atlantic, its approach being to entice Palestinians, Israelis and Americans alike to the negotiating table without confrontation or pressure.

The Arab World, for its part, has sought to advance the peace effort, in particular Jordan and Egypt who on 19 April took the unusual step of presenting their own initiative to end violence and resume the political process interrupted after Taba. More recently, the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Saudi initiative (Beirut Declaration of 28 March 2002) offering normal relations between Arabs and Israelis in exchange for a withdrawal from the land occupied since 1967, the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital and a just solution to the refugee problem agreed on by all parties in accordance with United National General Assembly Resolution 194. To this end the Arab States sought the backing of the United States.

Egypt continues to move frantically towards securing a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians urging the United States to support its efforts and return all parties to peaceful negotiations. President Mubarak's frequent visits to Europe and the United States, his meetings in Cairo with U.S. and other delegations and his constant communication with key Arab leaders testify to Egypt's commitment to its role as regional moderator in the Middle East.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the above facts including the need to recognise the shortfalls of past peace efforts and the need for an understanding of the mindsets of the principal players, in particular the United States.

The first lesson to learn is that the step-by-step 'security first' approach inherent in the Zinni mission and Tenet's plan no longer has the capacity to alone bring about a lasting ceasefire since the conflict has entered a new stage and the players have changed. Secondly, the Oslo Agreement and its aftermath suggest that an offer of another interim agreement is unlikely to be accepted since decisions that once would have made a profound effect on the political dynamics of the region have now must lost their lustre and past proposals and solutions are no longer relevant. Thirdly, a far more vigorous initiative is now required combining strong security measures with a clear political articulation of the form the final settlement should take. Neither the present vision of the international community for the future shape of the region nor the promise of resumed negotiations are sufficient; the objective now must be to seize this moment of crisis and turmoil and move for a final agreement immediately.

In view of its influence and special relationship with Israel, the United States naturally must play a leading role in the Middle East problem. However, other international and regional players, including Egypt, must also be closely engaged. Taking lessons from Oslo, the need for a third party mediator to ensure steady progress in negotiations and prevent sticking points to lead to a total break down in relations cannot be ignored. The third party must be aware of the problems that arose when international mediators

intervened in negotiations in the past and deal sensitively and sensibly with the fears both parties feel at the prospect of allowing any outsider to play a role in its destiny.

The introduction of a new plan for mediation in the midst of an ongoing conflict is an inherently political act requiring acute sensitivity to the underlying political context of the situation. This is especially true in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian situation in view of the divergent attitudes towards the very notion of international involvement and the asymmetrical nature of the current conflict where one side relies on conventional military operations while the other resorts to a variety of unconventional and unpredictable tactics. The role of the mediator of course must not be exaggerated since it is ultimately up to the two parties directly involved to reach a compromise, but the importance of the mediator in facilitating interaction between hostile camps must be recognised and complied with if an advance towards a settlement is to be made.

Two points of view dominate the current political scene concerning mediation. Aware of the tremendous power imbalance, Palestinians have requested greater involvement on the part of the international and regional community while, for precisely the same reason, Israel has repeatedly resisted outside intervention claiming that peace can only be achieved by the parties directly involved. Recent developments, however, have led to a shift in the Israeli consensus and an almost universal sense of despair means that most Israelis now welcome outside intervention. Moreover, the multitude of precedents for a third party role in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations forms a backdrop to current discussions over regional and international mediation and contains lessons for all interested parties.

The speed with which the situation on the ground has deteriorated makes it difficult to prescribe a fixed solution and, in view of the fluidity of events, what appeared viable yesterday is unlikely to hold water tomorrow. Also, much of the discussion surrounding a possible third party mediator presupposes the existence of a functioning Palestinian Authority, the absence of which requires a complete re-examination of the idea.

To be effective and assuming the two sides have agreed to a ceasefire, the introduction of a third party as mediator cannot take place in a political vacuum. Therefore, the only viable sustainable way out of the current impasse requires the international community to provide a clear description of what form a just, comprehensive and final settlement will take and which the mediator will strive to have accepted by both parties. The primary role of the mediator in this context must then be to enhance confidence between Israel and the Palestinians, to act as a vehicle for international involvement in peace negotiations and ensure steady progress towards a final settlement. Over time, the role of mediator must evolve and take on new responsibilities responding and reacting to developments in the political and security situation.

In the light of recent developments, a new initiative imposing a new mediator onto the scene must amount to more than its predecessors and must mark a new departure for U.S. policy committing it to a final political settlement rather than to a process which might produce one. The first step is that such a plan to be presented to the international community and a broad coalition consisting of the United States supported by the E.U.,

U.N. and key Arab states, including Egypt, to be built around it. This would cut through the paralysing distrust and deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians and provide the sort of pressure which would see the plan carried beyond the initial stages.

The second step is to achieve a lasting ceasefire. Any form of commitment to this is worthwhile and efforts to achieve it should not be allowed to waver but, again, without the full weight of the international community and a just and final settlement in view serving as an incentive for both sides promises of a ceasefire are unlikely to be honoured.

The third step is that both sides accept the mediation of a third party. Here, Egypt must play a major role alongside the United States both in the current Israeli-Palestinian dispute and in the wider context of historical Middle East conflicts in particular with regard to Syria and Lebanon. The success third party intervention requires the mediator to adapt to the complex realities of the political situation and be in tune with the fears the parties feel at surrendering any control over its destiny to an outsider.

All this means that the mandate, role and function of any prospective mediator cannot be fully and precisely defined in advance and must evolve as circumstances change and as the settlement moves forward. Nevertheless, mediation is an important element in the equation and deserves more attention than it has been awarded in the past. The hardening of positions on both sides and the toll of 18 months of escalating violence severely diminishes the prospect for success of any initiative and mediation at this point in time. But without a sustained and concerted political effort on the part of the international

community, with the United States and other mediators playing their role, further escalation of violence and spread of terror beyond the immediately affected region is a certainty. This reality alone should bring the parties to their senses and force them to work together with the help of a third party to reach a common goal of lasting peace and stability in the region.

The mediator must not play a static role serving merely as go-between for the two sides but rather must represent a flexible and mobile body enjoying close links with all protagonists. Indeed, in view of the current political situation the mediator must reach out broadly to a host of constituencies on both sides including political officials, military leaders, non-governmental organisations and so on. The mediator must play an important role in helping both parties ensure respect for the new rules of the game and must know in advance about political Israeli-Palestinian flashpoints. The intensity of recent political events together with the level of mistrust and anger means that the mediator must intercede far more significantly than originally envisaged.

One of the key functions of the mediator will be to explain his strengths and limitations in clear terms to avoid heightened expectations and undue optimism of the role. Such an explanation must reach and be understood by a broad constituency including the media whose ability to communicate and influence the general public is immense. Good relations with the media backed by a steady flow of information and explanation between the mediator and media is crucial in projecting an image of the mediator's neutrality,

rationality and efficacy, and the need to refrain from inflammatory public messages must be stressed on all parties.

Much recent debate has focused on whether the international community in general, and the United States in particular, is sufficiently committed to solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the problems of the Middle East in general. The real issue is not, however, the degree of intensity of foreign engagement but rather its purpose and direction. Unfortunately, concentrating on step-by-step political actions and interim agreements, the course followed in the past, is no longer relevant for the immediate political reality. What is needed now is an active and efficient mediator to bring all parties to the negotiating table coupled with a general reorientation whereby the international community, spearheaded by the United States and backed by regional mediators of whom Egypt represents a leading player, throws its full weight behind a realistic and permanent settlement and provides the necessary political momentum to see a peace process carried through to a conclusion.

Endnote:

The paper is an extract of an article written by the author. The full text will be published in the fall issue of the Washington Quarterly

A Vision for Peace

By Benjamin Ben-Eliezer

Nearly two horrific years into the latest round in the seemingly interminable conflict between Israel and the Palestinians-- and from the perspective of my own longstanding involvement in Israel's military defense-- I have never been more convinced that there is no military solution to the conflict. As we work to defend ourselves against terror, we must also strive to return to a political process whose goal is to provide security today and hope for tomorrow for both Israelis and Palestinians. President Bush's speech yesterday, calling for fundamental change within the Palestinian Authority, is a positive step in that direction.

Instead of futile interim agreements and unilateral plans, Israel must focus on two dimensions: security separation and a political horizon for peace. For Israel, achieving separation from the Palestinians is of utmost importance, enabling a shift away from confrontation , towards a renewal of dialogue and diplomacy.

While a full separation should be part of a political settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, the security separation is designed to make it as difficult as possible for suicide bombers and other terrorists to enter from the West Bank into Israel proper. Such separation will not only provide greater safety for Israeli citizens, but will also reduce friction and the risk of escalation between Palestinians and Israelis.

Ultimately, we will need a continuous system combining a physical barrier with technological means, armed personnel and monitors. It must be emphasized that this kind of separation is not meant to demarcate a border, or disrupt the economic life and movements of the Palestinians, but rather to thwart terror while leaving all political options open.

At the same time, a genuine political horizon, both substantial and credible, must be set forth. The vision must be founded on the notion of two states for two peoples-- Israel and Palestine-- living side by side in peaceful coexistence.

Striving toward this horizon must begin-- as President Bush suggested yesterday-- in a renunciation of the use of terror by Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian leadership and dismantling of all the terror organizations thriving in the Palestinian Authority. Only a full abandoning of the terror policy will pave a way to a solution.

To realize this vision, both sides will have to make painful concessions and give up part of their historical dreams. Yet before the journey toward this realization begins, leadership on both sides must adopt the basic understanding that the solution to our plight will only be reached at the negotiating table and not in the battlefield.

United Nations Security Resolutions 242, 338, and 1397 can provide the basis for a settlement. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal should also be given due

consideration, as it points the way to a comprehensive all-Arab settlement with Israel, based on the concept of land for peace and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A Palestinian state should enjoy territorial continuity in the West Bank, with special passage arrangements between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel will evacuate the settlements in the Gaza Strip and the isolated settlements in the West Bank. Most settlers be able to move to areas adjacent to Israel, which will become part of Israel in the proposed agreement. Israel will have to ensure that construction of new settlements is frozen during the interim period. The Palestinians, for their part, must pledge that their state will be demilitarized.

Regarding Jerusalem, we seek its international recognition as the capital of Israel. However, it is in Israel's interests to ensure separation of Jewish areas from the distinctly Arab neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city. As for the Old City and holy sites, a governing body should be created to oversee these areas, acknowledging each side's special ties without defining final sovereignty over the Temple Mount.

A solution must also be found to the Palestinian refugee problem. However this solution cannot be based on what the Palestinians call the "right of return" to Israel proper. An agreement by Israel to such an arrangement would undermine its fundamental character as the homeland of the Jewish people.

The Saudi initiative provides the basis for a pragmatic solution of the refugee problem: a solution that is just and agreed upon by both sides. In practice, the solution will largely be achieved by rehabilitating and settling the refugees in Palestine, with assistance provided by an international fund in which Israel will participate.

Strong security arrangements must be an integral part of this agreement. International supervision can be implemented for some of these security measures.

In addition to diplomatic support, the role of the international community must extend to improving the socioeconomic conditions of the Palestinians. Likewise, development of the Palestinian state as a democratic political entity, with an educational system that enriches its youth and does not promote incitement and martyrdom, is essential to the long-term stability of the agreement.

Today, this vision seems far away, almost impossibly remote. Yet we will keep the door to negotiations open until a responsible Palestinian leadership is prepared to walk through it with us. This is manifestly not an easy path to take. But it is our duty to seek and bring about light and hope in the midst of the darkness, for the sake of both peoples.

Mr. Ben Eliezer is Israel's minister of defense and chairman of the Labor Party.

Democracy, Civil Society, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
Is Bush Smarter Than His Critics?

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In his widely-anticipated declaration on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S.

President George W. Bush laid out a vision of two states living side-by-side in peace

and prosperity but added that it would be impossible to realize this vision unless the

Palestinians first carried out a thorough reform of their political system. Reform, he

argued, could not be merely cosmetic but required entirely new political and

economic institutions based on democracy, market economics and action against

terrorism. More precisely, Bush insisted that the current Palestinian leadership is

irretrievably damaged and that the ouster of Yasir Arafat and regime change in the

Palestinian Authority are conditions for revival of the peace process.

Partisans of the Palestinian cause harshly condemned Bush's statement for

appearing to embrace the position of an Israeli government that shows little

enthusiasm for serious negotiations with the Palestinians, even after the terrorism

stops and certainly before. But even less engaged observers tended to dismiss the

speech (and the speaker) as intellectually light-weight and impossibly naïve. Bush's

thesis boils down to "first democratization, then peace," and critics objected to it on a

variety of grounds: that there is no necessary connection between the one and the

other, that if there is a connection, it is the other way round ("first peace, then

democratization") because serious reform is impossible under occupation, that there

is little reason to expect Palestinian democratization under any circumstances and

even less reason to expect autocracies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to help

promote it, and that it is all, anyway, an internal Palestinian matter that is nobody

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else's business.

It is easy enough to make light of Bush's intellectual gifts. Except for a brief respite after September 11, that has been the favorite pastime of pundits around the world, and even inside the United States, ever since he emerged onto the national political scene. But with this argument, the President actually finds himself on solid ground. The theory of the "democratic peace" essentially argues that democracies do not fight one another, and that democracy is therefore a major facilitating (if not indispensable) factor in the ability of adversaries or belligerents to make and sustain peace. Although theoretically rich and nuanced, it proceeds, in its simplest form, from Immanuel Kant's first definitive article for perpetual peace – "The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican"– to argue that democratic states are far more likely to pursue peaceful foreign policies, especially with respect to other democratic states. Since Kant, the idea has inspired many other thinkers and statesmen. It has been most associated with idealists like Woodrow Wilson, who foresaw the spread of democracy as a substitute to balance-of-power politics. But it also captivated realists like James Baker, who believed that shared democratic values rather than just converging interests would cement the peace with Russia after the fall of Communism, just as they cemented the peace with Germany and Japan after the Second World War. More recently, the "democratic peace" has come closer than anything else to an "iron law" in the imprecise academic science of international relations. So whether or not he knows it, President Bush, at least on this point, is actually in pretty good intellectual company.

Secondly, there a lots of precedents for the development of participatory political systems and open economies before the achievement of full independence,

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that is, in conditions of autonomy. That happened in many of the British Dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), in Germany and Japan before the end of Allied occupation, and in the Jewish community (the *Yishuv*) under the British Mandate in Palestine. Whether or not it can happen elsewhere depends on how much civic space the ruling authority leaves to society and on what society does with that space.

Thirdly, while the long-term triumph of Palestinian democracy cannot be automatically assumed, neither can it be automatically precluded. Since the mid-1970s, a wave of democratization and marketization has washed over southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. This gave rise to optimistic expectations that the process would soon encompass the entire globe and lead, in ideological terms, to "The End of History." But the wave somehow bypassed the Middle East (except for growing demands for reform in Iran), giving rise, in some academic circles, to a theory of Islamic or Arab "exceptionalism." Among social scientists, this theory is highly controversial, but even those who grudgingly accepted it nevertheless believed that the Palestinians, in view of their unique historical circumstances, were immune to it. In other words, they argued that there was "Palestinian exceptionalism" to "Arab exceptionalism." The argument was based on the existence of a vigorous Palestinian civil society under Israeli occupation. When the Palestinian Authority arrived on the scene in 1994 following the Oslo Agreement, it repressed this civil society and cut short what appeared to be the potential for Palestinian democratization. If that is the basis for Bush's demand for regime-change, then it is not as divorced from reality as many of his critics charge.

Finally, what happens in Palestinian society and politics is other people's business – that of Israel, because it has to make the concessions that will lead to

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Palestinian independence and to live next to what emerges from that eventuality; and that of the United States and Europe, because they have to underwrite the process and deal with its consequences.

Conflict and Civil Society

In a few rare cases, democracy springs full-blown out of autocracy. More often, it evolves gradually and unevenly over time, and the intervening variable or midwife of this evolution is usually civil society. Developed civil society is not coterminous with stable democracy, but it is generally assumed to be a prerequisite or essential component of democracy.[1]

In his analysis of Turkish democracy, Bernard Lewis defines civil society as "that which exists between the family and the state; those institutions, organisations, loyalties, and associations that exist above the level of the family, and below the level of the state".[2] One of the presumed virtues of civil society is that it permits the pursuit of objectives unattainable by the family acting alone. If individuals are unable to act together for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the family, that is, if the prevailing ethos is one of "amoral familism", then the result will be poverty and stagnation.[3] And if individuals are unable to develop any loyalties apart from their family (or other extended "involuntary" affinity groups – tribe, clan,

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[1] See, for example, Jillian Schwedler, "Introduction: Civil Society and the Study of Middle East Politics," in Schwedler (ed.) *Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? A Primer* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 1-3. This volume also contains an extensive bibliography on the subject of civil society, on pp. 89-121.

[2] "Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy," *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1994, p. 47. For a more detailed discussion of the term "civil society" in classical and contemporary political theory, see Schwedler, "Introduction," pp. 3-7.

[3] Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958) pp. 9-10.

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ethnic group, religious community), then society as a whole will overwhelm the state, and the result will be continuous strife and insecurity. Civil society facilitates the development of a middle ground between affinity groups and the state that helps avoid these outcomes.

At the same time, it forestalls the extreme alternative: a state so strong that it overwhelms society. In other words, civil society underlies democracy by constraining the arbitrary authority of the state. In this sense, it is important that the various bodies comprising civil society be truly voluntary, free and autonomous. If this condition is not met, the formal existence of such bodies will not disguise their control by and subordination to the state and their potential transformation into part of the totalitarian bureaucracy.[4]

Palestinian Civil Society

Under the British Mandate, the Palestinians did not make extensive use of the civil space left by the authorities, for reasons probably related to overall levels of social-economic modernization. In any event, there were relatively few voluntary social, economic or political associations, and Palestinians generally made do with the modest educational, social welfare and medical services offered by the Government (or by foreign missionaries). During the period of Jordanian rule (1949-1967), there was some increase in civil society activity, but it normally took place within a Jordanian (or pan-Arab) context. Only after the revival of Palestinian national consciousness in the mid-1960s, and especially after Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, did Palestinians begin to build a plethora of

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[4] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autocracy*, 2d edition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) p. 205.

organisations and institutions associated with civil society, both in the occupied

territories and in the diaspora.[5] However, it is not altogether clear whether the

Palestinians did this despite the existence of the conflict, or because of it – as a

necessary substitute for the state they did not have. It may be the case that the

national struggle encouraged voluntarism, but it is also true that absence of a

Palestinian state facilitated it. The authorities under whom Palestinians found

themselves operating were not always sympathetic to voluntarism. But the more

important fact is that there was no central Palestinian authority to compete with those

organisations and institutions that stand between the family and the state, no

government intent on subordinating, co-opting and absorbing civil society for the

alleged purpose of better promoting an overarching national goal. Thus, for almost

twenty years after 1967, the Israeli occupation left considerable space for Palestinians

to operate or set up new civil society institutions (municipal councils, chambers of

commerce, professional associations, labour unions, universities, student

organisations, women's organisations, newspapers, etc.).

Even before the creation of the Palestinian Authority, most of these

associations were emptied by the PLO of all functions other than mobilization of

support for the diaspora leadership of the Palestinian national movement.[6] But after

1994, the creation of a quasi-state – the Palestinian Authority – with direct civil

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[5] There is an extensive literature on the organizational base of Palestinian civil
society. See, for example, S. Nusseibeh, "Addendum: The Building Blocks of a
Palestinian State", in Mark A. Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, *No Trumpets, No Drums: A
Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Hill & Wang,
1991); and Muhammad Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," *Middle East Journal*,
vol. 47, no.2, 1993.

[6] Hillel Frisch, *Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West
Bank and Gaza* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), especially
Chap. 3: "Territorializing the PLO: The PLO and Mass Mobilization."

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jurisdiction over the bulk of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza significantly expanded "the state" from the Palestinian point of view. This did not prevent the continued growth of institutions, organizations and other groupings associated with civil society. By the end of the 1990s, hundreds of such bodies were operating in the West Bank and Gaza, and 65 of them were members of a Palestinian Non-Governmental Network.[7] But the creation of a Palestinian governmental structure has ironically meant the contraction of civil society, in the form of constrained autonomy for most of these institutions.[8]

This has happened in a number of ways. The first relates to the character of the political system. In theory, the Palestinian Authority conformed to the structural model of democracy: an elected executive and legislature and an independent judiciary. Indeed, the elections of January 1996, despite some irregularities, were widely perceived to be as free and fair as any that have ever taken place in the Arab world. In practice, however, Arafat applied the same methods he had used for 25 years in the PLO to establish a regime of personal authoritarianism in the PA. The most important of these was the creation of competing bureaucracies (including security bureaucracies) with overlapping or ill-defined areas of responsibility, all headed by loyalists forced to compete for his favourable arbitration. In addition, Arafat retained personal control of PA finances, most of which came from outside

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[7] The Network's activities are described on its website, http://www.pngo.net. An extensive list of educational, cultural, sports, human rights and women's organizations and other NGOs is available in *PASSIA Diary 2000* (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 2000).

[8] For more on the shrinking of civil society under PA rule, see, Glenn E. Robinson, "The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime," *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 2, 1997, pp. 42-56; and M. Kamrava, "What Stands between the Palestinians and Democracy?" *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1999, pp. 3-7.

sources rather than from taxes. As a result, Arafat could ignore the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), which lapsed into impotence. For more than five years, he refused to approve the Basic Law (Constitution) that defined the separation of powers in the PA, and he evaded PLC demands, especially in 1997 and 1998, for government reforms or investigations of widespread corruption.[9] He also forestalled the emergence of intermediate levels of authority by postponing municipal elections, personally appointing mayors, and simultaneously appointing District Governors while leaving the division of responsibility between districts and municipalities undefined, i.e., subject to his own determination. At the same time, he crushed any judicial independence by simply ignoring the civilian courts, dismissing judges whose behavior he didn't like, or transferring proceedings to state security courts operating under military rules.

The Palestinian Authority's governing methods contributed directly to the shrinking of the space left for civil society. Semi-independent newspapers that existed before it came into being were mobilized to exalt the regime or suppressed on grounds of insufficiently sympathetic (or sycophantic) coverage, and the new electronic media (radio and TV) became vehicles for pro-Arafat propaganda and anti-Israel incitement. Dissidents, even non-violent ones, were subjected to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and physical maltreatment. And instruments of economic centralization and patronage (licenses, monopolies, exclusive distributorships) squeezed the space left for market forces and the private sector (except for those in

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[9] The PA's overall performance, including the executive's problematic relationship with the Legislative Council, are extensively reviewed in Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki (principal authors), *Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by The Council of Foreign Relations* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

favor with the regime), as did the "informal" collection of taxes from businessmen by various security agencies.

The indirect impact of the creation of the PA on civil society was almost as profound. Before 1994, many Palestinian municipalities, as well as universities and other NGOs, were sustained by direct contributions from foreign donors. After 1994, the bulk of foreign economic assistance was channelled to the PA, i.e., Arafat, and these institutions (apart from those with an Islamist orientation) had to rely on him, financially as well as politically, for their continued operation. These relations make it doubtful whether many of these institutions can still be accurately described as "non-government organisations."

The Role of Third Parties

If it is true that democracy contributes to the peaceful management and resolution of international conflicts, then third parties have a compelling reason, apart from the intrinsic value of democracy, to promote Palestinian democratization. Of course, there is no tested recipe for doing that, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, and the potential impact of third parties, should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the task may not be as hopeless as it sometimes seems if it is understood, more modestly, as one of promoting the democratizing impulses that already exist. This means encouraging the growth of existing pluralism in public life, that is, of the institutional components of civil society that underlie the evolution of a full-fledged democratic polity, while discouraging the authority from squeezing the civil space. In other words, they can revert to their pre-1994 practice of providing direct assistance to elements of Palestinian civil society committed to democracy and

peaceful resolution of the conflict with Israel, while simultaneously trying to restrain the power of the Palestinian state (and of voluntary associations with terrorist connections and/or anti-democratic agendas). Of course, in some areas (e.g., national infrastructure, law enforcement), civil society cannot offer an alternative to a national governing authority. But even here, if "government-to-government" cooperation and assistance are made conditional on avoidance of policies that contribute to an inordinately strong state and weak civil society -- such as the excessive allocation of national resources to the security services, maintenance of state monopolies or unreasonable regulation of the movement of goods and capital, and incitement in media and educational systems – they can contribute to the objectives of democracy, market economics, and determined action against terrorism, all of which are necessary, even if not sufficient, for serious progress toward peace.

President Bush has apparently already concluded that there is no longer any point pursuing these objectives with Yasir Arafat. Europe does not yet share that conclusion, but if wants to try to prove Bush wrong, it needs to be far more serious effort about conditionality than it has been up till now.

President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership
The Rose Garden

3:47 P.M.

THE PRESIDENT: For too long, the citizens of
the Middle East have lived in the midst of death
and fear. The hatred of a few holds the hopes
of many hostage. The forces of extremism and
terror are attempting to kill progress and peace
by killing the innocent. And this casts a dark
shadow over an entire region. For the sake of
all humanity, things must change in the Middle
East.

It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror. It is untenable for Palestinians to
live in squalor and occupation. And the current situation offers no prospect that life
will improve. Israeli citizens will continue to be victimized by terrorists, and so Israel
will continue to defend herself.

In the situation the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable. My vision
is two states, living side by side in peace and security. There is simply no way to
achieve that peace until all parties fight terror. Yet, at this critical moment, if all
parties will break with the past and set out on a new path, we can overcome the
darkness with the light of hope. Peace requires
a new and different Palestinian leadership, so
that a Palestinian state can be born.

I call on the Palestinian people to elect new
leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I
call upon them to build a practicing democracy,
based on tolerance and liberty. If the
Palestinian people actively pursue these goals,
America and the world will actively support
their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet
these goals, they will be able to reach
agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for
independence.

And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security
arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the
creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty
will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East.

In the work ahead, we all have responsibilities. The Palestinian people are gifted and
capable, and I am confident they can achieve a new birth for their nation. A
Palestinian state will never be created by terror -- it will be built through reform. And
reform must be more than cosmetic change, or veiled attempt to preserve the status
quo. True reform will require entirely new political and economic institutions, based
on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism.

Today, the elected Palestinian legislature has no authority, and power is concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable few. A Palestinian state can only serve its citizens with a new constitution which separates the powers of government. The Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body. Local officials and government ministers need authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively.

The United States, along with the European Union and Arab states, will work with Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework, and a working democracy for the Palestinian people. And the United States, along with others in the international community will help the Palestinians organize and monitor fair, multi-party local elections by the end of the year, with national elections to follow.

Today, the Palestinian people live in economic stagnation, made worse by official corruption. A Palestinian state will require a vibrant economy, where honest enterprise is encouraged by honest government. The United States, the international donor community and the World Bank stand ready to work with Palestinians on a major project of economic reform and development. The United States, the EU, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund are willing to oversee reforms in Palestinian finances, encouraging transparency and independent auditing.

And the United States, along with our partners in the developed world, will increase our humanitarian assistance to relieve Palestinian suffering. Today, the Palestinian people lack effective courts of law and have no means to defend and vindicate their rights. A Palestinian state will require a system of reliable justice to punish those who prey on the innocent. The United States and members of the international community stand ready to work with Palestinian leaders to establish finance -- establish finance and monitor a truly independent judiciary.

Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing, terrorism. This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. This will require an externally supervised effort to rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services. The security system must have clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.

America is pursuing this reform along with key regional states. The world is prepared to help, yet ultimately these steps toward statehood depend on the Palestinian people and their leaders. If they energetically take the path of reform, the rewards can come quickly. If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine.

With a dedicated effort, this state could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues, such as security. The final borders, the capital and other aspects of this state's sovereignty will be negotiated between the parties, as part of a final settlement. Arab states have offered their help in this process, and their help is needed.

I've said in the past that nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror. To be counted on the side of peace, nations must act. Every leader actually committed to peace will end incitement to violence in official media, and publicly

denounce homicide bombings. Every nation actually committed to peace will stop the flow of money, equipment and recruits to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel -- including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. Every nation actually committed to peace must block the shipment of Iranian supplies to these groups, and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq. And Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations.

Leaders who want to be included in the peace process must show by their deeds an undivided support for peace. And as we move toward a peaceful solution, Arab states will be expected to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel, leading to full normalization of relations between Israel and the entire Arab world.

Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. A stable, peaceful Palestinian state is necessary to achieve the security that Israel longs for. So I challenge Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state.

As we make progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.

The Palestinian economy must be allowed to develop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. Palestinian legislators and officials, humanitarian and international workers, must be allowed to go about the business of building a better future. And Israel should release frozen Palestinian revenues into honest, accountable hands.

I've asked Secretary Powell to work intensively with Middle Eastern and international leaders to realize the vision of a Palestinian state, focusing them on a comprehensive plan to support Palestinian reform and institution-building.

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them if there is to be a real peace, resolving all claims and ending the conflict between them. This means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognize borders.

We must also resolve questions concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian refugees, and a final peace between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a Syria that supports peace and fights terror.

All who are familiar with the history of the Middle East realize that there may be setbacks in this process. Trained and determined killers, as we have seen, want to stop it. Yet the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties with Israel remind us that with determined and responsible leadership progress can come quickly.

As new Palestinian institutions and new leaders emerge, demonstrating real performance on security and reform, I expect Israel to respond and work toward a

final status agreement. With intensive effort by all, this agreement could be reached within three years from now. And I and my country will actively lead toward that goal.

I can understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people. You've lived too long with fear and funerals, having to avoid markets and public transportation, and forced to put armed guards in kindergarten classrooms. The Palestinian Authority has rejected your offer at hand, and trafficked with terrorists. You have a right to a normal life; you have a right to security; and I deeply believe that you need a reformed, responsible Palestinian partner to achieve that security.

I can understand the deep anger and despair of the Palestinian people. For decades you've been treated as pawns in the Middle East conflict. Your interests have been held hostage to a comprehensive peace agreement that never seems to come, as your lives get worse year by year. You deserve democracy and the rule of law. You deserve an open society and a thriving economy. You deserve a life of hope for your children. An end to occupation and a peaceful democratic Palestinian state may seem distant, but America and our partners throughout the world stand ready to help, help you make them possible as soon as possible.

If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government.

I have a hope for the people of Muslim countries. Your commitments to morality, and learning, and tolerance led to great historical achievements. And those values are alive in the Islamic world today. You have a rich culture, and you share the aspirations of men and women in every culture. Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just American hopes, or Western hopes. They are universal, human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives and nations.

This moment is both an opportunity and a test for all parties in the Middle East: an opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace; a test to show who is serious about peace and who is not. The choice here is stark and simple. The Bible says, "I have set before you life and death; therefore, choose life." The time has arrived for everyone in this conflict to choose peace, and hope, and life.

Thank you very much.

END 4:04 P.M. EDT

President Bush's Rose Garden Speech in Perspective

Prepared for the

Israeli – Palestinian Conflict Panel
Middle East Track II Conference
Bruges, Belgium
14-16 June 2002

by

Shmuel Limone

By all accounts President Bush's last speech on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict marked a dramatic departure from previous American policy statements on this issue. Rather than elaborate on **what** should be done to settle the conflict, the President chose to focus his strong remarks on **who** among the Palestinians qualify to do it and **which** necessary preconditions must be met before substantive negotiations can be resumed. Coming in the wake of an escalating crisis, high expectations and intensive diplomatic proddings by important Arab parties, Bush's speech left them, understandably, with a sense of failure, frustration and bewilderment. Official Israel, of course, perceived the content and context of the speech as a resounding affirmation and success of strongly held Israeli views. The discreditation of chairman Arafat is probably the most conspicuous case in point.

The watershed nature of Bush's speech may be better understood if one reviews previous policy statements made on the Middle East by him and by Secretary of State, Powell. **This is the purpose of this paper.** The attached table compares the different issues addressed in Bush's recent speech with parallel references made in earlier occasions. Relevant passages from President Clinton's famous "parameters' address" are also quoted for comparison.

To recall, Bush's speech (the bulk which is devoted to demands from the Palestinians), puts the cessation of terrorism, the institution of sweeping constitutional, administrative and security reforms and the election of a

new Palestinian leadership, as preconditions for political movement and, in effect, for a military disengagement by Israel. True, Bush has directed very specific demands to Israel as well. Palestinians could find solace in those portions in his speech that called for the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state, an end of occupation and an Israeli return to the Sep 28, 2000 lines. Still, all these were linked to a clearly defined Palestinian performance. While offering a much broader American involvement in Palestinian affairs, Bush nevertheless left many questions still open:

a. How to proceed once his demands were met? What, if any, should be the specific suggestions for a political road map for moving forward?

b. Is the previously advocated international or regional conference still on the agenda? If so, how and when will it convene?

c. What is the role of the Arab peace plan, and the Saudi ideas that prompted it?

d. What happens if elections are held and Arafat is reelected, or if extreme Palestinian factions win? In other words, how to cope with a possible post-elections radicalized Palestinian Authority, not to say with an ostensibly democratically resulted anarchy?

e. What should the contours and powers of a provisional Palestinian state be?

f. Can reforms be sustained if they are perceived as imposed from the outside?

g. Should Israeli, on the ground steps, be carried out subsequent to or in parallel with the moves demanded of the Palestinians?

h. What specific role should outside parties (Arab, European, American, the "Quartet") assume in the reform process?

i. And last, although not least: How does the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fit in the grander scheme of current and expected Mideastern developments, beginning with the local

dimension of the construction of a fence to prevent armed Palestinian inflitrations to Israel and ending with the contemplated American military campaign against Iraq.

Again, to gain a perspective on the development and changes in the American position, the reader is invited to browse through the following table.

to: David Kimche

Room 606

THERE IS STILL HOPE

DAVID KIMCHE

The pessimists reign supreme. On the face of it, there does not seem to be any possible reason for anything but black pessimism when reviewing the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire. The landmarks of pessimism are plain for all to see:

- the vicious circle of occupation - violence -- occupation shows no sign of being broken

- despite meetings of Foreign Minister Peres with newly-appointed Palestinian Ministers there are no signs that the Sharon Government will be willing to renew a meaningful political dialogue with the Palestinians or be willing to do so as long as Chairman Arafat continues to be more than a symbolic head of the Palestinian Authority

- there are no signs of any real change in the Palestinian leadership, despite the fact that large sections of the Palestinian people -- as well as the international community and the Arab world -- have come to realize that the policy of encouraging violence has been devastating for the Palestinians.

In such a situation how can one be anything but pessimistic, how can one in all honesty offer papers with solutions when the combined rule of Sharon and Arafat negate all hope for a better future?

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And yet, in the dismal darkness of despair there do exist seeds of hope that need to be nurtured by perseverance and hard work by those who still believe in a true peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

On the Israeli scene there are a number of factors which might possibly work for a change, not in the near future but towards the end of the year, and especially as the next general elections draw nearer:

- the economic factor: Israel's economy is in crisis, some would say near collapse. There is, of course, a clear relationship between the economy and the security and political situation. The demand of the Finance Ministry to reduce drastically the military budget has brought home to the public at large the fact that the policy of indefinite occupation by the army of the Palestinian towns is exacting a heavy price. The Government is hoping that it will not be burdened with civil administration in the newly occupied areas, that it can have an occupation *de luxe* . Continued occupation, however, could bring about a final demise of the Palestinian Authority with concomitant chaos as the entire edifice of civil administration collapses – it may even be in the interest of the Palestinians to hasten such a situation by means of a mass resignation of Palestinian Ministers if the occupation of the towns is prolonged. If that happens the Israeli Government will either have to take responsibility for the civilian population, which would entail a tremendous expense which it cannot afford, or end the occupation. Thus the economic factor is bound to have a direct bearing on the continued military policy of the Government.

- The economic factor, moreover, can lessen the support by the Israeli population for the present Government, and this can become significant when Israel nears the next elections. Opinion polls show that well over 70% of the public believe that Sharon

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has failed in the economic field. This dissatisfaction will grow as the spiral of unemployment and poverty climbs to new heights.

* Within the ranks of the Labour Party there is a growing groundswell of rebellion against the continued presence of Labour Ministers within the Government and against the policy of the Government. The new General Secretary of the party is known to represent the views of the rebels. At a recent meeting of Foreign Minister Peres with some of his closest supporters the demand was unanimous: leave the Government immediately. Labour Ministers are saying behind closed doors that they intend to leave the Government by the end of this year in order to prepare for the coming elections which, if this Government will complete its full term of office, will be held in November 2003. On the other hand, Peres continues to resist the demands of his supporters, claiming that his presence in the Government prevents more extreme policies; it is still a mute question whether the Defense Minister, 'Fuad' Ben Eliezer, will agree to take the plunge into opposition before the year is out.

* Beneath the surface there is a great deal of activity among those who have not yet despaired of peace. One of the most interesting efforts is an attempt to reach a joint declaration of Israelis and Palestinians – a roadmap for a peace agreement – which would then be widely propagated among Israelis and Palestinians to show that peace is possible and that there are partners for peace. A similar effort is being made by the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace (known also as the Copenhagen Group) who are meeting to revise their Copenhagen Declaration and bring it up to date. This effort encompasses not only Israelis and Palestinians, but includes also Egyptians and Jordanians. The Alliance is planning to hold a peace conference before the end of the year with the participation of contingents of Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis, as well as observers from various countries. A fast-growing group called 'Hammema' is calling for a return to the 1967 boundaries and disbandment of

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settlements, if possible by agreement with the Palestinians, but if that proves to be impossible, then by unilateral decision. The Council for Peace and Security, in which some 1500 largely ex-security personnel are members – generals, Police officers, Intelligence and Security chiefs etc – are similarly calling for unilateral disengagement and disbandment of settlements, and have begun a nation-wide campaign to collect one million signatures in support for their stand. New Movements have sprung up like forest mushrooms after a deluge. "The Seventh Day", "A Different Israel", "Building a New Future", "Hope", "Herz", "The Green Line", "The Peace Forum", "The Fifth Mother", "Disengagement" are just a few of the Movements in which Israelis search for a way out of the present impasse. Most of them agree with the "Hammeina" group in calling for a return to 1967 without settlements, or, at most, with the two concentrations of settlements appearing in the Clinton formula and with an exchange of territory. All of them oppose the return of refugees to Israel.

* These movements have not yet surfaced to public cognizance. Nor has the rebellion in the Labour Party. It may well be that there will be no impact on the public at large, and that all this activity will only serve to satisfy the craving to be active do-gooders. It may well be that there will be no real opposition to prevent the Government of Israel from continuing its present policy of relying on military suppression on the one hand and on the Palestinians to keep up enough violence to justify the military action on the other hand.

Yet the seeds of hope are there, waiting to blossom under the caring hands of "Hammeina", the Peace Forum and all the other groups whose members are sick and tired of the present destructive policy of the Sharon Government and of the Palestinians who continue to play into the hands of the most extreme elements of the Israeli political

scene. The Labour Party leaders have proven themselves to be impotent, unable to prevent the extremists from having their way, a fact that has added to the frustration of these groups and to their determination to bring about change.

It is the belief of many of these activists that if they succeed in reaching a common platform for peace with Palestinians, if the Labour Party rebels will succeed in taking their party out of the Government, if the party adopts the joint Israeli-Palestinians peace plan as a basis for their election challenge, if the Palestinians will decide to effectively act to reduce terror attacks to a minimum, then there could be a chance for change. One party – Labour – would be offering a platform of hope, of a way to end the impasse, the other – Likud – would be offering more military operations to suppress violence without proposing any concrete constructive way to move forward to a better future. And in the background lies the economic factor – which could be the joker in the pack – and could swing public opinion to support change, away from the Likud panacea of more military operations, more occupation.

There are many 'ifs' involved in this scenario. It may all be 'castles in the sky'. But there is a real possibility to create public pressure for change, and this is what the peace activists are trying to do.

Could there be a similar trend among the Palestinians? As an Israeli, I naturally find it difficult to analyze developments among the Palestinians. Yet there have been some interesting indications that something similar is happening there. Suffice to give one or two examples: a Palestinian interviewed on BBC's Hard Talk program speaks openly about the need for Palestinians to start a new Intifada "this time against Arafat"; a full-page advertisement appearing in a Jordanian weekly in the name of a Palestinian group

calling for the removal of Arafat, for a two-state solution which could eventually become a confederation with Israel; full-page advertisements in a Palestinian newspaper calling for an end to suicide bombing and signed by dozens of Palestinian intellectuals; open disagreement with Arafat over the sacking of the head of the Security Service, etc.

These are, I believe, indications of a real change beginning to occur in Palestinian society. It remains, however, to be seen whether they will have an impact on the Palestinian leadership and on the extremists who are intent on continuing terror attacks on Israelis.

Thus, both on the Israeli and the Palestinian sides of the divide there are indications that a possible change might occur. Perhaps nothing will come of them, but the indications are there and should, therefore, encourage Israelis and Palestinians, Arabs, Americans and Europeans to continue working for change.

Without such indications for change no outside initiatives, or even pressures, can be effective. However, with such indications outside help for change is sorely needed. It must be made clear to the Palestinians that their efforts to end violence and to 'clean up' their house' will be rewarded by the international community. It must be the Americans, the Europeans, the Arab states and others who will decide whether the Palestinians have fulfilled the conditions of the Bush plan for the future. It must not be the Sharon Government.

On the other hand, as long as violence persists, and as long as there are not clear indications of real change in the Palestinian support for terrorism, the international community must continue to support Israeli efforts to bring such violence to an end. It

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should, however, condemn in the strongest possible manner suppressive acts by Israel that have nothing to do with fighting terrorism, such as, for example, the police raid on the offices of the Al-Quds University and their subsequent closure.

The cessation of violence thus has become the key factor. It must, by now, have become plain to all that continued Palestinian attacks have become supremely counter-productive for the Palestinians. Those attacks seemingly justify the policies of the most extreme elements in Israel's Government, and negate the possibilities of the Israeli 'peace camp' to oppose them. Those attacks neutralize international efforts to help in moving the peace process forward, as could be seen by the effect the violence had on President Bush's policy speech.

We are left with many question marks. Can moderate Palestinians and Israeli 'peaceniks' find common ground — and language — for a roadmap for peace? Can the Palestinians — suffering as they are under a stifling occupation — succeed in making the changes so needed in order to go forward? Can the Israeli Labour Party pull itself together and become a real alternative in the coming elections? These are critical times in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are great challenges to be faced and we must pull together to overcome them.

Ramat Hasharon, 10/7/02

PIECES OF PEACE PLANS IN PIECES
By Akiva Eldar mailto:eldar@haaretz.co.il

When the Palestinian peace plan was born, ministers and advisors all rushed
to claim paternity - so much so that Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabo
shouted at Abu Mazen for not letting him in on the secret. Abu Mazen lost
his temper and threw a bottle of mineral water at Abed Rabo.

Dr. Saeb Erekat, who headed the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks
with Israel, and was a partner to the preparation of the Palestinian peace
plan, also kept it close to his chest. Dr. Nabil Sha'ath, Erekat's colleague
in the inner circle where the stew was cooked, was chosen to deliver the
dish to the American administration two weeks ago. He was accompanied by Dr.
Halil Shkaki, the Ramallah public opinion researcher, who has lately been
getting attentive ears in the White House.

The word from the Muqa'ata in Ramallah was delivered by Yasser Arafat
himself a few days before Bush's speech - and it almost drove the chairman's
emissaries in Washington to pull their hair out. Arafat said he was ready to
accept the Clinton Framework. The envoys were aware of the joke saying the
only television network Bush watches is ABC - Anything But Clinton - and
they had worked so hard to circumvent everything that emerged from Camp
David, to excise Clinton's ideas, to eclipse Taba. And now, this was all
they needed - Arafat adopting the Clinton plan.

When the interview with Arafat came to light, the new Palestinian document
was already on the desks of Secretary of State Colin Powell and National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. When Sha'ath and Shkaki handed it over
they nurtured a hope that the plan bearing Arafat's name might at least
merit a line or two in Bush's speech. Instead, they got Bush's clear message
that even if Arafat were to stand up and sing Hatikva, Bush would not be
interested - and even less so with the press reporting that Arafat was now
committed to the Clinton plan.

Yossi Beilin was among those Israelis who closely followed the birth pangs
of the first Palestinian peace plan that proposed an end to the conflict
with Israel - Ehud Barak's dream. He says this is a new opening position for
the Palestinians and now that it has been presented to the Americans, it
should not be written off. "There is an explicit reference to a democratic
Palestinian state, an end to the conflict, and an end to demands. All this
turns the paper into something that it would be a mistake to turn into
another missed opportunity."

Beilin, who was at Taba for the negotiations that were based on the Clinton
framework, confirmed that the Palestinian plan absorbs the Clinton ideas.
"There's an explicit readiness to change the 1967 borders, have Jerusalem as

an open city and Israeli sovereignty over parts of the Old City, and a readiness for security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians, which is the key to security stability."

Beilin was in charge of the negotiations on the refugee issue at Taba and says the new Palestinian plan, while not offering a solution to the problem, does refer to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which he interprets as not including the right of return. There is also no reference to later UN resolutions on the right of return. He believes the emphasis in the proposal on agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on whatever solution is found for the refugee issue, contradicts the right of return, since as a right, it could never be limited.

In background conversations, the Palestinians and their American consultants who framed the document explain that it is an opening position, which can be clarified and negotiated. Thus, for example, while UN GA Resolution 194 is mentioned for the refugee issue, they are not guaranteeing yet that they will drop the demand for return. On the other hand, adding the word "agreed" gives Israel the right to veto return and leaves the Palestinians with the other option named in 194 - financial compensation.

The Palestinian document leaves other issues open:

l The price Israel will be asked to pay for the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem (Ramot, Gilo, East Talpiot, etc.,) as well as the Mount of Olives cemetery.

l The size of the area at the Western Wall that would be under Israeli sovereignty

l How to divide the Armenian Quarter

l The nature of the territories the Palestinians would get in return for the settlement blocs that would be annexed to Israel

l On security arrangements, Israel is demanding control over the border passages to Jordan and Egypt, and the air space over the West Bank and Gaza. Mutual prohibitions of military alliances with third countries could, for example, require Palestinian approval of an alliance with the U.S. against Saddam Hussein and the positioning of U.S. anti-missile missiles for use against Iraqi threats to Israel

Bush's speech returned the Palestinian speech to the womb, accompanied by wishful thinking about what would have happened to the plan - and all of us - if it had been born in June 2000 at Camp David. Now, there's not much that can be done except to find some comfort in the fact that in the midst of

violence, terror, incursions,invasions, closures and curfews, there are still Palestinian leaders willing to fight to get the credit for a paper that delineates the 1967 borders as the final line, proposes a veto to Israel on the right of refugee return, and declares an eventual end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The Bush Plan: An Inadvertent Way Out?

Professor Galia Golan

June 2002

There have been a plethora of plans and proposals for ending the present crisis and even

for resolving the conflict itself. The Mitchell Committee Recommendations and the

Tenet proposal were had and to some degree still have serious potential were they

interpreted in a single fashion, and, of course, implemented. There is some ambiguity as

to whether or not Israel actually the Mitchell recommendations. The right-wing members

of the Israeli Government claim that the recommendation for a freeze on building in the

settlements has not been put to a government vote, the implication being that when and if

it does this clause will be rejected. More to the point, the implication is that Israel has a

particular interpretation of the Mitchell recommendations whereby the various

recommendations are viewed as sequential – an interpretation which is not accepted by

the Palestinians nor substantiated by the Mitchell Committee report itself. The Tenet

proposal was, of course, purely technical, intended to provide concrete steps to enable the initiation of implementation of the Mitchell recommendations. Tenet, like Mitchell, have all but disappeared from the current discourse, although in theory both remain feasible and even relevant, despite (or because) of the escalation of the violence and terror attacks and Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank.

Of a less operative nature than the Mitchell and Tenet proposals, the Saudi-Arab League Plan also remains in limbo. In many ways a far more significant and promising proposal, the Saudi Initiative was presumably intended to jump-start a negotiating process by virtue of its unprecedented (for the Arab League) offer of normal relations with Israel in exchange for withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. In deference to the need for something a bit more specific, the refugee issue was added but the formulation chosen by Arab League calls for a return of refugees subject to agreement with Israel...a qualification indicating the realization that no government in Israel could accept UN resolution 194 on its own. There is not reason to believe that the Sharon Government would accept the Saudi Initiative, namely a return to the 1967 lines, but even the public in Israel gave scant attention to the proposal due to the wave of terrorist attacks that engulfed the country in March 2002. Although, as noted, the Saudi Initiative-Arab League proposal was intended to jump-start negotiation, it will remain in the background as the generally understood basis for any talks that do emerge in the future.

The more current "proposal" if it can be called such, is the speech of President Bush of 24 June 2002. There was an element of a vision in the speech – positive or negative

depending upon one's political position with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Palestinians could find a basis for optimism in the American President's repeated

references to US support for the creation of a Palestinian state and his stipulation that the

Israeli occupation "that began in 1967" would be ended. In addition Bush reiterated the

American demand that Israeli "settlement activity in the occupied territories stop," as

"consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee." More concretely,

Bush called on Israel to withdraw its forces to the pre-Intifada positions held 28

September 2000 and to release the funds owed the Palestine Authority, with the issues of

the Palestinian state's permanent border, the refugees and the status of Jerusalem to be

decided in the negotiations for a permanent settlement. All of this should have alarmed

the Sharon Government in Israel, but the American President conditioned all of these

clauses upon the end of Palestinian terrorism, destruction of the infrastructure of

terrorism, end of incitement – not new demands, but also a new and different Palestinian

leadership and a total reform of the Palestine Authority and the emergence of a (western-

type) democratic administration (specifically, a constitution, which Israel itself does not

have, separation of powers, independent local authorities, etc.). Indeed the bulk of the

President's speech was dedicated to these instructions for the Palestinians.

Palestinians themselves have been demanding democratic reforms, including an

independent judiciary and the like. Coming as a demand from outside, however, and

especially as a pre-condition for any progress toward negotiations and an end of the

occupation, the President's conditions look more like a stumbling bloc to prevent any

move forward than an incentive to act. The claim that peace can only be negotiated with

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a western-style democratic regime was raised in the past by right-wing Israeli politicians (Netanyahu, for one), and generally interpreted to mean that Israel would never have to negotiate with the Palestinians. It was (and remains, apparently, for the US) a moot point as to whether such a condition should have held for Israeli peace negotiations with the Kingdom of Jordan or Egypt (or the negotiations begun with Syria) or, for that matter, American relations with any number of countries around the world.

Still more problematic is President Bush's demand for a new and different Palestinian leader. Aside from the fact that a "new and different" leader might big be one with a more militant even fundamentalist ideology, the demand itself can be perceived as American "bullying", illegitimate and, probably, counter-productive. Just as Israel's siege on Arafat bolstered what had been his flagging popularity among his population, so too Bush's speech serves to weaken the voice of internal opposition to Arafat and further ensure his reelection (which was not much in doubt in any case). The Bush demand to replace the Palestinian leadership has the perhaps more serious effect of affirming the policy and tactics of Prime Minister Sharon. The speech has been interpreted as full American support for the position taken by Sharon, his attempt not just to discredit the Palestinian leader but actually to oust him, as well as place all responsibility for the conflict and current violence on Arafat's shoulders. The immediate result is that the Israeli military moves back into Area A, those areas ostensibly under Palestinian control, can proceed slowly and methodically -- and possibly semi-permanently -- without any concern over American pressures of the type asserted during the earlier reoccupation move in March-April.

The net result of the speech, therefore, would appear to be continuation of the stalemate regarding any attempt to renew negotiations. And indeed the President made no mention of a regional or international conference nor of any mechanism for moving forward beyond the pre-conditions placed before the Palestinians. The conclusion of many commentators in Israel is that nothing more can be expected from the Americans in the way of concrete steps toward a peace agreement (a view that may be worth investigating further, in view of US plans to send an envoy back into the region in the near future), or that nothing more can be expected at all, except further violence.

It may be possible, however, to find a path even through the new conditions placed by the Americans and Israel. There are reforms being conducted by the Palestine Authority and elections are going to be held in the winter (January 2003?). Preparations are in fact already underway for the elections. Ignoring for the moment the relative certainty that Arafat will be reelected (and not as merely a figurehead), the elections themselves may offer a means of changing the situation on the ground. In view of the Americans' penchant for western-style democracy, it is difficult to believe that they would resist the claim that democratic elections cannot be held under the gun, i.e., in the presence of an army. It was the presence of the Red Army (and Tito's own army) that helped impede free elections in Eastern Europe after the war – a factor that the United States protested officially at the time. Even in the period leading up to the elections themselves, namely the period of campaigning, must be free of military interference, including the possibility of for the candidates and population to move about freely, to assembling, distribute

material and the like. Thus, if free, democratic elections are indeed to be held, it is perfectly in order to demand a withdrawal of Israeli forces from area A, a return to the 28 September 2000 positions, and freedom of movement for the population within the West Bank. If these measures cannot be instigated because of Israeli security concerns, an international force under the Americans can assume positions throughout the territories. International observers were present in the 1996 elections to the Palestine Authority; it may be argued that a far larger observer contingent in the form of an observer force is necessary today.

Whereas the American plan posits the end of terrorism as a first step before an Israeli draw-back, a prior Israeli draw-back with international observers could be the first step and a factor toward ending the terrorism. Elections cannot be held in the absence of order and security any more than they can be held in the absence of freedom of movement and freedom to assemble. It will thus be in the interests of the Palestinians as well as the Israelis to ensure all of these elements—and it may be the case that such assurance can only come from a third party, namely, an international observer or monitoring force.

While there have been suggestions that such a force become permanent. There is the possibility that the territories be placed under international trusteeship or mandate which would ensure security until a Palestinian state were to rise. Such a proposal would require a total Israeli withdrawal from the territories, implying unilateral withdrawal in the absence of a negotiated settlement. There is some support for this idea in the Israeli

public, even majority support when the matter is posed as a separation from the territories with Israel drawing its own separation line – irrespective of who or what would police the territories after Israeli withdrawal. Support for separation derives from the wish on the part of the public to be rid of the conflict with the Palestinians (in the belief that a fence or border would halt terrorism inside Israel) and a belief that there is no partner for a negotiated settlement at least at this time. Unilateral withdrawal, however, namely any form of separation that also removes the IDF and the settlers – to any line, cannot be expected from the present Israeli government. Given this, a trusteeship or mandate would appear to be out of the question. A temporary international force, linked to the elections that the Americans demand, without evacuation of settlements or total withdrawal of the IDF might be acceptable (under pressure) to the government of Israel. At the least, the connection with the American-demanded elections might provide the leverage needed to gain Israeli agreement. The temporary nature of the observer force is important, probably crucial for Israeli agreement, but if such a force coupled with elections could serve the purpose of reducing or eliminating the violence, the way would then presumably be cleared for the implementation of the Mitchell recommendations or some form of negotiations. Worth a try.

Applying the concept of Common Security on the Middle East Dilemma:
Jamal Tahat

Abstract: *The bi-state security arrangements, and the axis approach exclude other regional players, which increase the uncertainty in the region. Dealing with regional anarchy is a task that requires Creating new regional security body represents all states and ethnic groups in the region, and extending the concept of security to include all non-military aspects.*

Introduction:

Kenneth Watlz argued that anarchy makes security "the highest end of the states". In fact anarchy influences the states conception of security. And the starting step to overcome anarchy is changing the state conception of security. Building up a regional body over Middle Eastern states is not possible without new security approach from these states; it is unlikely to be inserted by force but by new way of thinking.

The theoretical efforts to explain and construct a collective vision to seek common ends in the Middle East are not up to the challenges. The shortage of this efforts enables the (modus operandi) in the Middle East to dominated its interaction in the post-colonial era. Other obstinate problems stem from the role of the sub-regional identities in shaping security concepts in the region. However, the Middle East could be re-formulated by inserting new operative concepts into its current dynamics. Concepts have great influence on political dynamics, regardless of immediate response to them. Being controversial or not does not affect the value of new concepts.

However, the concept of the common security belongs to the different experience; I think it is applicable as an operative approach to re-formulate the relations between the Middle Eastern

states/ and non-state actors. This concept will provide a new approach in dealing with the major factors of instability in the region; the axis politics, which enhances the excluding attitude in the region, and the cross-levels relations (state and ethnic/communal levels).

The Middle East witnessed different kinds of wars and conflicts. These wars and conflicts involved different parties and states. All states and ethnic groups have engaged in at least one major conflict. In fact conflicts were the dynamic of shaping the Middle Eastern contemporary political identities. Identity has been the major factor in identifying threats, enemies, and allies. As same as it is the major factor in building up the concept of security.

The traditional security policies have been applied by different parties in the Middle East are provocative and pose threats to the others. Middle East could be a model to explain John Herz's idea of the security dilemma. No exaggeration in saying that the Middle East has undergone, since its contemporary formulation, a state of anarchy. Regional bodies like the Arab league have not provided the required umbrella to the entire region; rather it enhances the sense of exclusion of other regional players. More over, the political influence of the great powers in the region has done nothing but to enhance the provocative defense policies.

The end of Cold War gives opportunity to insert new concepts and dynamics to contain the provocative factors and tendencies in the region: the Israeli security concept, the bi-state security arrangement and the axis politics, the sub/supra-state identities, and the absence of a unified body organize the relations between all regional players. Take the advantages of the end of the Cold War will end the American failure in providing security umbrella to the entire region.

Inserting a new concept in the regional political thinking needs extraordinary efforts. Facing the inertia of the current concepts with determination is the only way to make real shift in the ways of thinking. I guess the legacy of mistrust will be the

major barrier of the efforts in that direction. I would like to emphasize that the current dominant ways of thinking is the major source of inertia that complicates the regional security dilemma.

Many Concepts for Security:

Palme Commission efforts to insert new concepts of security simplify Middle Eastern security re-conception. However, the cooperative security, as been developed by Palme Commission designed to deal with bi-polar conflict. By contrast Middle Eastern conflict has involved to many players. Arranging new interaction between two enemies is not a workable approach. This approach neglects the problem of axis politics in the region. Middle East needs special extension to the concept of security to include its on-military aspects: Economic cultural/identity and military. In addition to that the Middle East needs a peculiar arrangement to include all regional state and non-state actors.

Co-operative security, as envisaged by Palme commission, is a dynamic for confidence building measure, *"it represents a significant shift from more traditional conception stressing arms racing, deterrence, and secrecy"*[1]. It is workable if the focus is a bi-state conflict.

Common security is a direct reflection for the supra state bodies. Its start was with the defunct League of Nations, and it had a new post by the United Nation. In fact, its theory belong to the need to overcome anarchy by creating a supra state body. By contrast collective defense is *"based on narrower notions of national- rather than international – interests"*[2].

The concept of common security as stated by Palme commission seems applicable on the Middle East dilemma. This concept consists of three major aspects, which are: non-offensive defense, include the non-military elements of security, and *"focus on the safety of people rather than states"*[3].

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[1] The Internet site of the Palme Commission, A paper published on the Internet written by Andrew Butfoy, titled "New Security Agendas" chapter five from. "Changing Western Conception of Global Security".

[2] Same source

[3] Same source. For a more detailed discussion of the relationships between these concepts, see Andrew Butfoy, *Common Security and Strategic Reform.*

Operational definition dominates the attempts to provide any identification for security. Therefore a new conception of the regional security requires well operational identification for the major aspect of any regional security arrangements. Palme Commission is a well-made and neat constructed effort to re-build the concept of security. By these efforts, a new measures and dynamics become attainable. This attempt, with others' efforts, creates a positive atmosphere to venture the risk of dealing with this conceptual issue.

The Current Obstacles and the Sources of Hope:

The dominant aspect of the security perception in the Middle East since the Second World War has been dominated by the military security; arms racing, provocative defense, coalition, strategy of axis, and bi-state security arrangements. This is reflected clearly in the history of the relation between the states, and the relations between the states and the ethnic groups. This approach has fueled the sense of uncertainty, and increases the level of mistrust between the Middle Eastern players. Most of these arrangements, justified, and perceived within the traditional concept of security.

The duality of covert/overt politics makes the mutual trust unattainable, via the current regional dynamics. The confidence building measures paralyzed and sometimes counter productive. All states adopted covert/overt approach to deal with the high level of uncertainty, and it participates in making the uncertainty a dominant aspect of the region, which makes the differentiation between the lip service and the actual policies one of the major tasks of the observers.

The contradiction between Israel's behavior and its announced objectives creates series doubts between Arabs about the true Israeli objectives, is the occupying policy to make peace or to make it impossible. Is the Israelis occupation of the West Bank and the Golan heights a mean to make peace, or it reflects a

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conquerous tendency in Israel? Is the rhetoric a bout the new Middle East genuine and reflects deep tendency in Israel to become part of the region or they want to prevent any step in that direction. There are many theories about these issues, all of it starts from the assumption that Israel has hidden (or unannounced) goal. On the other hand, Israel has its fears about the ultimate goal of Arabs, are they accepting Israel, and they are sincere in their call of regionalizing Israel or they are maneuvering to get red of it when they can. The Arabs announcements of their different goals over the last five decades justify the Israeli doubts. On the other hand, the public statement by many Arab leaders and activists denouncing the suicidal attacks seems not genuine, other Arabs have sidetrack to support the attackers. The same applies to the other side, public statement by many Israeli intellectuals and activists denouncing the occupation seems futile, the majority voting for radical right politicians, this situation makes the Arabs doubts reasonable. However, genuine peace groups on both sides are emerging in the current political maps, and providing hope and supporting optimism.

The Major Problem:

One of the major provocative factors in the region is the exclusive approach in most of the security arrangements. Axis approach, and dual security arrangement in addition to the sub regional organizations all exclude some other parties, and imply the possibility of been against the excluded party/ies.

The Middle East suffers from different security/threat perceptions. This stems from the great impact of identity factor in the security issue. The need of all states to seek its security as its been perceived without any regional reference creates a new factor in the complicated Middle Eastern structure, which is (the unleashed international coalition behavior). Many of the Middle Eastern states have engaged in different sorts of international coalitions. This approach intensifies the uncertainty about the other abilities and goals. The unclear ultimate goals of the international powers, and the vagueness of the goals of the regional powers

make the international presence in the region via bi-state coalitions a destabilizing factor. It provokes different states to seek counter coalitions to balance the power structure.

The Dilemma:

It is possible to identify three factors formulate the security dilemma in the Middle East. The first one is the ethnic structure of the Middle Eastern societies and the ill-identification between states and political identities. The second factor is the domination of identity factor over security perception. The third is the very structure of security as "*a relational phenomenon*". These factors make the uneven natural distribution of power; a serious barrier prevents the region from establishing a spontaneous regional interdependence. The external factor needs the traditional approach to join the regional dynamic. This approach reproduces the current dynamics; it is not helpful to transform the current dynamics into a new full-integrated one.

The Solution Profile:

Dealing with the problem of exclusiveness requires new concept of the region includes all Arab countries, and all related states: Israel, Turky, Iran, the Horn of Africa, and perhaps some sub-Saharan states, in addition to the ethnic groups. This will reduce to minimum the influence of the identity factor in the security arrangements. Supra state bodies are helpful in building up a new common security perception for the entire region.

I can only point to two ways to insert the mentioned approach and concepts. Gradual way, by starting with selected group of states. This will bring the region back to the problem of axis, which creates new problems not different from the current ones. The second way is the one that start from inviting all states and ethnic groups, to design a well program starting from conceptual formulation and ending by signing the pact of the regional security council. Dynamics include representative from all states, political parties, and ethnic groups, will participate in the first step. This will drag the entire region into a new mode, and prepare for the coming steps.

Starting up with a new concept of the region and the regional security enhances the possibility of posting the idea of international coalition for peace and progress. To deal with this issue, the proposed arrangement will take into account all different operative factors according to importance. .

Identify the concept of common security may come about by taking into consideration two factors, geographical, to include all sates and ethnic groups in the new extended region, and qualitative, to include all new aspects of non-military factors of common security.

Bearing in mind that, refrain from threatening others is not a measure to be taken by any state, the required approach is to identify the new code of conduct by well-identified steps. The required steps should concentrate on both tracks; trust building measures, as has been tried and succeeded by other countries. Moreover, the engagement of the Middle Eastern states and non-state actors in the new dynamics will work as a starting step in confidence building process.

Starting Up Step:

Establishing a consultancy body by initiative from the UN Secretary General or the Security Council, to work as a reference to the regional security issues. This body consists of participants from all Middle Eastern players; states, regional organizations and ethnic groups. The participants should be on both levels, formal and informal levels. Engaged states nominate the members from the formal level. The UN Secretary General nominates the members from the informal level.

Gradual progress will be on the level and the mandate of this body, or by creating new bodies, to reach the EU like arrangement. But by all means this approach should not exclude any state or ethnic group in the region. And it should reflect a new concept of the region includes states and ethnic groups, in addition to a broader concept of security includes the identity factor in security and all non-military aspects of security.

The Function and Mandate:

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1- Re-Identify the security problems in the region.
2- Re-Identify the security factors that affecting the security perception and the security measures.   :
3- Re-Identify the range of the regional security.
4- Create a channel for continuous dialogue between the regional factor
5- Help in regulate the international presence in the region, and make this presence less provocative.
6- Bridge the gap between the regional and the international perception of security and threat. This means to minimize the Identity factor in the security and threat perception

Preparing Measures:

Arrange an international conference on the Middle Easter. This conference should be organized by the UN, and inaugurated by the UN Secretary General. The level of the conference should be the States leader. The presence of American and European officials is vital for the success of the conference. This conference should endorse the idea of creating Regional Security Council, and ask the UN Secretary General to implement it. It is first task to act as a consultancy body, and to formulate plans fro the future. The preparation for this conference should begin soon.

A Perspective for the Proposed Middle East Conference
Jamal Tahat

The proposed conference on the Middle East endures a conceptual hardship. What is the conference about? What is the target of this conference? What are the expected outcomes of this conference? What are the issues to be tackled in the conference? What is the level of this conference, states leaders, foreign ministers, or informal gathering? Who is the patron of this conference? And who are the participants? The coming two papers try to answer some of these questions and give indications to answer the others.

If the proposed conference will reflect the traditional perspective of the region it is doomed to failure. The targeted objectives, and the formula of the conference as well as the expected outcomes should be well identified. Announcing a new perspective of the region before convening the conference might be counter-productive. However, this perspective should be aware of during the planning and implementing the conference.

The title of the conference should not be of the style: regional cooperation, or any like title. It should reflect the concept of preparation for peace, breaking the deadlock, or creating peace dynamics in the region, or any similar titles. These kinds of titles will help to avoid the negative experience of the MENA, which deemed as Trojan horse for Israel to help her avoid paying the cost of peace. In fact MENA failed because it was a premature attempt to create economic cooperation while ignoring creation a ripe political environment. The region needs new sort of cooperation more than the security arrangement to enhance mutual trust and make comprehensive, just and lasting peace attainable. MENA, it could argue, represented desired goals for all parties, but people involved failed to create the proper channels that could take us to

such an end. The region needs peace to facilitate cooperation, and needs cooperation to consolidate and perpetuate peace. Peace supporters failed to appreciate this logic. They tried un-successfully to use the peace process as a substitute to a complete peace to establish new dynamics of regional cooperation. One cannot escape but to conclude that people involved opted for conflict management rather than resolution.

This makes cooperation depending on the progress or breakdown in the peace process rather than a supporting tool. The failure of the peace process freezes the regional cooperative plans and projects. Admitting the unimplemented target (the just and comprehensive peace) is the right starting point. It is a non-provocative approach for all potential participants in the peace process. This starting point enables the peace supporters to speak about preparations, creating progressive dynamics and so forth. In fact admitting the incompleteness of the peace makes the peace, as a cumulative result of gradual approach, rational and consistent. Accumulative approach is the soft belly of the peace process, which enables all peace enemies able to veto its progress. Therefore, the un-noticed gape in the entire peace process that this attempt claims to fill, by proposing a new insert to protect the gradual structure of the peace process.

The major contribution of the proposed conference is to establish and support an alternative conception of the Middle East. The conference itself will not lead to direct solutions of the regional problems. Its goal is to establish a new mechanism and dynamics to deal with these problems on the long run. The mission of the conference is: to formulate special regional bodies as part of the UN system, which should include all states and ethnic and political groups in the region. The conference should reflect the need for institution to deal with the non-Westphalian approach of the US in the region.

International Intervention From Imperialism to Regulations

Jamal Tahat

Abstract: The Middle East needs an institution to alleviate the negative impact of the non-Westphalian approach that pursued by the US in the region. To avoid the colonial legacy, the Middle East needs special regional organization represents all state and non-state actors in the region. This organization covers four major issues: Media (including culture and education), economic, political, and security.

Introduction:

The international intervention used to reflect the direct interests of the interveners, which used to be empires seek their own interests regardless of other's interests. Post-Cold War era requires a new approach in the international intervention. Many events laid the ground to Dayton agreement, as watershed in the history of the international intervention, which makes imposing a solution on both parties, possible and a practical approach. This agreement provides new principles in the international intervention. It reflects a new international understanding of the responsibility of the belligerents toward the international community. The International Criminal Court creates new spectrum of possibilities in the international intervention, and draws new boundaries for the potential international intervention in any conflict. The crimes against humanity will be prevented by "*acts and deeds*" not only by words.

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Both developments in addition the President Bush 24th of June speech enhance the concept of peace making intervention. Peace in the region should reflect the international grand principles not the actual balance of power between belligerents. The international community should act as a factor to prevent the balance of power dynamic from creating new conflicts or imposing destabilizing arrangements.

In fact these developments have brought the domestic Middle Eastern politics to the international domain. September 11 catastrophe proves that malaise internal politics in the region pose a real threat to the international security. All together create unprecedented situation in the world politics, which we can call a non-Westphalian approach. Assuring that the intervention will not provoke the memory of colonialism needs new regular bodies, that make the intervention not a against the interests of its subject. This required full consent from the states and governments of the region.

The Middle Eastern Stalemate:

Despite the fact that America monopolizes the international intervention in the Middle East and dominates its steps and directions, American's Middle Eastern Policy is bounded by two factors:

1- The American internal political dynamics minimizes the room for any administration to maneuver and pressurize Israel, let alone imposing a solution on it.

2- America's interests with the Arab World, prevent America from giving Israel free hand.

In fact, the pro-Israel forces in Washington, fueled by the 11th of September catastrophe, make the Middle Eastern conflict and many other regional issues parts of the American domestic politics. American intervention and its role in the region reflect domestic political factors as well as international laws and regulations. This situation makes American policies in the Middle East illusive, and far from crystal clear application of the international principles, which makes accusing American policy in the region as "double

standard policy" easy and provable from both perspectives. In fact America's administrations have been forced to twist the application of the international principles on regional political crisises, and prevent also independent international intervention in the region.

To detach ourselves from the ideological evaluation to the American policy in the Middle East, which is a very clear and dominant aspect of the regional politics, we need to identify the possible and useful intervention, and the appropriate conditions of the best possible international role in the region.

In fact the US needs to find a policy satisfies both parties to the conflict is impossible without changing the internal political dynamics for both of them. Intervening in internal political dynamics in the region requires a new approach that deals with both state and non-state actors in the region. A Direct American and international intervention in the regional domestic politics will create oppositions from all sides and lead the region back to the colonial era. However, impacting the domestic politics in the region is vital to make the process of regionalizing Israel possible. The major barrier against this step is not only the refusal of many in the Arab World, but this process is not appealing for many Israelis either. For them the region is not tempting to belong to.

(The International intervention Dilemma):

Benjamin Miller, a well-respected Israeli scholar states that: *"the greater the local actors dependence, and the more vulnerable they are (that is, the lesser the availability of alternative suppliers and the more costly other sources), the more influential great power suppliers will be"*. The size of the influence of superpower is a function of dependency of regional powers on the external and international support. This situation creates the dilemma of the international intervention, which might be accepted during the Cold War. The September 11 catastrophe proves that feeble states are not against the interests of its people, put it is a source of threat to the international security. The dilemma is that: the international society has only state to deal with the societies, and the more

compliant the state to external influence, is the less efficient the state in dealing with domestic problems. To avoid direct involvement, and to save the world from state failure in the region, and to deal with the dominant problems, the international society needs a mediator to deal with societies directly. To bring the Middle Eastern societies to the world logic, or to penetrate the shells around these societies we need special regional institution.

The Possible Intervention:

A non-provocative approach for the international intervention in the regional domestic politics is required. The convolution between state and sub-state in the Middle Eastern political atmosphere makes the prolonged confinement of the international intervention on the state level of power in the region a disastrous approach. However, penetrating the state level recklessly will not be less disastrous.

Both the international intervention without regional partners and the regional spontaneous development without international intervention are doomed. Saving the region needs a full integration between domestic factors in the regional politics and the international intervention. The conflict makes the spontaneous power dynamics on both sides in favor of hardheaded groups, and marginalizes the peace supporters. The direct role of the intervention is to create a new regional dynamics oriented to peaceful solution to the current crisis.

The international intervention should be concentrated on two major tracks for the time being. The first one is curbing the current situation and preventing it from escalation on both vertical and horizontal directions. The second is to give direct support to new political rational groups in the region.

Preventing the crisis escalation puts all parties in stalemate and pressurizes hardheaded to find a solution. It encircles the hardheaded groups by not being able to provide a solution via conflictual or coercive approach. On the other hand the international intervention should focus on creating a new regional

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dynamics to mediate the interaction between sub-national factors and international atmosphere.

The first step (containing the conflict) is required in all cases. The second one is delicate and it requires special non-provocative approach. This step is attainable by special regional bodies (vast in size and the number of participants). Creating (formal/informal and state/sub-state) bodies requires international umbrella. This umbrella needs to be equipped with a clear concept for the region.

A lot of work is needed to change the people's perception of the function of the state. Historically the state is perceived as a mediator between people and the outside world, in addition to its function as a mediator between the people themselves. However, given the evolution of history there is a need to add another function of the state, which is coordinator between its people and the outside world. The legacy of the last decade is very useful in this regard. Although the region needs revision to what have been done on the European/Middle Eastern track, this track diluted the old concept of the region and made its hard core re-constructible.

Actual Steps:

Establishing a regional council or regional assembly. This council or assembly should take its legitimacy from the UN and the international community. This council should consist of four regional bodies or arms: Media (culture and education), Economic, politics, and security. The proposed bodies are: Regional body for media, this to create media code of conduct and to coordinate between regional and international similar institutes. The second body is the economic body to plan and implement special projects and ideas. The third one is a regional body for political parties and political groups to bridge the gape between the regional political dynamics. The fourth one is about security issue, to drag all states in the region in an international coalition for peace and minimize their opposition to the other bodies. The preparation for the council should involve state level participants and non-state actors.

The umbrella of these bodies should be the core of the international intervention in the coming weeks. The UN Secretary

General initiative will provide the cover, and the European and American participation will make the initiative viable and applicable.

The justification for this goal will be: the Arab initiative of March, the call for international peace coalition, and the President Bush speech of 24th of June. These three events will definitely work as a catalyst for some extra-parliamentary groups in Israel to put more efforts in that direction.

All participants in these bodies will benefit from direct and indirect support. Financial support, training, national and regional exposure, and international acknowledgement, will be provided for these bodies. The major condition on these bodies is not to exclude any state or ethnic group in the region that meet the criteria of participation. The proposed council and its bodies will function as a vehicle to transform the good will into applicable plans. The major tasks of the council are: to mobilize regional and domestic actors in a unified peace making process, and to break the monopoly of the corrupt officialdom over modernization, democratization and peace making processes.

Starting Up:

Arrange for international conference to reformulate the mentioned regional council. The title of the proposed conference is: shaping a new mechanism for regional cooperation.

THE PRACTICALITIES OF SETTLEMENT REMOVAL

David Newman

If, and when, the boundaries of the Palestinian State are demarcated and implemented on the ground as part of a final phase Agreement, the time will come for the issue of Israeli settlement removal to be dealt with at a practical level. Until now, the settlement issue has been the subject of much discussion and public polemics, but the practicalities of how the process of evacuation can be carried out, especially given the expected opposition, perhaps even violent opposition, on the part of the settlers themselves, has been pushed aside. Over and beyond the general acceptance that no settlements can remain on the Palestinian side of whichever boundary is eventually demarcated, little thought or attention has been given to just how this can be carried out.

This paper is based around three basic assumptions:

1.   Any form of territorial agreement will necessitate, by definition, the removal of a large number of Israeli settlements.

2.   The issue of settlement removal is an Israeli problem – it cannot be dealt with by either the Palestinians or the Americans.

3.   The Israeli public must be prepared in advance to deal with the issue of settlement removal so that it will be as non-traumatic experience as possible.

1. How Many Settlements Will have to be Evacuated?

The number of settlements to be evacuated will be determined by the line of the eventual boundary. Based on the pre-camp David negotiations, it appears that the final line will not include a return to the precise course of the "green line" which separates Israel from the West Bank, but will take into account Israeli demands for territorial changes in such a way as to include a significant number of the settlements inside Israel. Such a solution is based on an Israeli acknowledgement that territorial compensation will have to be offered to the Palestinian state equal to the amount of land which is ceded to

Israel. Most of the proposals for territorial compensation to date have focused on a combination of two options: either redrawing the boundary in favour of the Palestinian State in other parts of the green line, especially in areas where there are strong concentrations of Palestinian population such as the Umm el Fahm or Triangle regions, and/or through the expansion of the land base of the Gaza Strip in the relatively unpopulated parts of the Negev desert in direct proximity with the Egyptian border. Each of these compensation solutions have their relative costs and benefits and will probably not be decided until negotiations aimed at reaching a truly final Agreement are taking place.

For the purposes of this paper, we can therefore divide the Israeli settlements into three major groups:

a)   Settlements in the Gaza Strip, all of which will have to be evacuated.

b)   Settlements in close proximity to the Green Line and/or around Jerusalem and the Gush Etzion regions which will be annexed to Israel as part of boundary redrawing.

c)   West Bank settlements which are located inside the Palestinian State territory and which will all have to be evacuated.

(We are assuming that the possibility of Israeli settlements remaining under Palestinian sovereignty is not an option for either of the sides).

The Gaza Strip settlements contain no more than 3,000 inhabitants at the most. The settlements in close proximity to the Green Line, the suburban settlements, account for approximately 65 percent of the West Bank settler population (excluding East Jerusalem which is not part of the discussion here) which numbers approximately 200,000 people (many of whom are young children) at this point in time. The remaining settlements, around 35 percent of the settler population (the figures can only be approximate until the precise course of the line is decided – although the construction of the so-called security fence by the Sharon government has helped to make this unknown more tangible) will have to evacuate their current homes – a not insignificant figure of some 60-70,000 people – 12-15,000 households.

One of the problems to be addressed is the fact that the geographic dispersion of the settlements reflects different population groups. There are those who came to settle in the West Bank out of ideological, often religious, reasons, while there are others who came

because of the economic incentives offered to them (cheap land, low interest mortgages, lower tax rates etc;). Clearly, no one who is ideologically opposed to settling in the West Bank or Gaza would have relocated to this region even if they were offered economic incentives, but there were many people who, while not amongst the ideologically motivated adherents of a Greater Israel policy, were not against the idea in principle, and for whom the economic carrot was sufficient to influence them to make the move. The latter are mostly concentrated in the settlements, many of them small townships, near the Green Line and near their workplaces in Tel Aviv and Gush Dan, while the former (the ideologically motivated) are located throughout the region but with a strong concentration in the interior regions, namely those regions which under any future territorial solution will be part of the Palestinian state and will have to be evacuated. For these latter, economic compensation will not provide any form of counter carrot to influence them to leave their homes and return to Israel proper. Thus, while this may only represent about a third of the overall settler population, they will, at least initially, refuse to give up their settlements and could, foreseeably, come into direct physical confrontation with the Israeli authorities or Army who are sent in to supervise the evacuation.

2. The Responsibility of the Israeli Government for Settlement Removal / Evacuation.

Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were established and supported by all Israeli governments since 1967, and it is the responsibility of the Israeli government – whether it be a left or right wing government – to oversee the orderly and safe evacuation of the settler population. While the right wing governments actively promoted settlement activity as part of its attempt to retain control over the West Bank, the left wing governments enabled the expansion and consolidation of existing settlements (including the periods of the Rabin and Barak Oslo governments) and even saw the settlements as territorial pawns which should remain in situ until the final stages of negotiations, so that they could be bartered for concessions to be made by the Palestinians. This may be in direct contrast with their public position on the issue of settlements, namely that they are an obstacle to peace and must be removed, but they are nevertheless responsible, no less than any right wing government, of taking on the responsibility of orderly settlement evacuation. The idea that a government could announce that all settlers must voluntarily

get up and leave at a certain point in time and that whoever refuses to leave will have to be responsible for their own safety and future, is NOT an option which any Israeli government can take.

The options for settlement evacuation are varied but must include some, or all, of the following factors:

a)   Sufficient time lead between the details of the final Agreement and the eventual evacuation for settlers who are prepared to go peacefully, to arrange their own affairs.

b)   Israeli government planning for alternative residential solutions inside Israel, be it through the construction of new settlements or new neighbourhoods in existing towns, to absorb the evacuees in permanent housing conditions.

c)   The establishment of a public agency which will deal with the wide range of relocation problems, especially those relating to housing, education for children and, where necessary, employment for those settlers (of which there are many) who are employed in the public and municipal networks which exist in the West Bank and Gaza to enable the efficient administration of these settlements.

d)   The establishment of consultancy and psychological services for those settlers who are traumatically affected by their forced evacuation, especially those who perceive such evacuation as being the shattering of their political and religious aspirations. The need for this became all the more apparent in the wake of the evacuation of the settlements in Northern Sinai which took place as part of the implementation of the Camp David Peace Agreement with Egypt in the early 1980's.

e)   Adequate financial compensation for settler families to help them get a new life in order. Unlike the Sinai experience, this should be worked out in a advance and should not be subject to a long period of negotiation between settler leaders and government officials. In the Sinai case, this only served to cheapen the process in the public eye and it made the settlers out as a group of economic opportunists who were prepared to eventually sacrifice all their political beliefs for the sake of an inflated compensation package.

f)   As far as possible, settler leaders and activists should be involved, either publically or privately, in the detailed stages of planned evacuation, especially in cases where relocation may take place to new settlements which will be constructed for them inside Israel. While many of the settler leaders will refuse to undertake what they see as

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an act of "collaboration", it is reasonable to assume that once the reality sinks in, there will be second level leaders and activists who will be prepared to become involved (even with the secret blessing of the political leaders) so as to ensure the least possible long term disruption to the normal life pattern of the average family.

g)   As much settlement relocation as possible should occur during the summer months when children are on vacation, so that they can be in place for the start of the new school year, and in order that no school be disrupted by a sudden closure or a gradual loss of students over an extended time period.

h)   No settlements should be destroyed or razed to the ground as happened in Sinai, especially in the Yamit region. The settlements can either be sold, or handed over, to the Palestinian State/Authority and can serve as potential housing solutions for some of the refugee population. Should the Palestinians State decide, for political and emotional reasons, to destroy these settlements because they remind them of the occupation era, this will be for them to decide. But it is up to outside powers (especially the United States) to bring pressure to bear on the Palestinian side that this should not happen, if only because of the short term economic implications of erasing a potential housing stock which can serve an important objective in the resettling of Palestinian refugees.

i)   Nothing should be done to drive a wedge between different sectors of the settler population. While this may work with those settlers who are prepared to receive their compensation and relocate, this will only make the other settlers more determined in their opposition to any such moves. At the same time, the agreement of some to move is expected to have a snowball effect, gradually drawing in wider and wider circles of people who were previously not prepared to leave their homes. This therefore requires a very sophisticated policy and will be closely tied in with the gradual raising of public awareness and the creation of a public discourse around the issue of settlement removal (see next section).

j)   Settlements which will remain in situ as a result of boundary redrawing should be encouraged to adopt settlements which have to be evacuated – perhaps even to absorb some of the evacuated settlers into their own communities. In this way, the settlers population would feel a limited sense of common fate with people who originally moved to the West Bank for the same reasons and, but for the quirk of the cartographers pen, would have shared the same fate and who, we would assume, have the greatest sympathy for those who are forced to relocate.

3. Preparing the Israeli Public for Settlement Removal.

Settlement removal can not take place overnight. If it is to be an orderly and, hopefully, relatively non-violent process, there must be sufficient lead time in creating an awareness amongst the settlers affected that they have no alternative but to go along with the decisions of the Israeli government. This requires a process of public awareness creation through which the following messages are disseminated and become part of the public discourse:

a)   That the longer term benefit of peace, or at least an end to violence and conflict, is a greater goal to be sought, and that this will benefit the whole of the Israeli population and not just one specific sector who may be forced to give up on their ideological objectives and aspirations of a Greater Israel.

b)   That the Israeli population – left and right wing alike – understand the political sacrifice which will be made by the settlers forced to evacuate, and that they will welcome them, go out of their way to assist and help them, in relocating to new communities and neighborhoods inside the new boundaries of the State of Israel.

c)   At the same time, a public debate concerning the role of the settlements in the wider security discourse must take place, to show that while settlement activity in the early part of the twentieth century played a distinct part in the creation of the State of Israel and also contributed to the security posture of the pre-Sate and early-State years, this is not the case with West Bank settlements. Settlers must come to grips with the reality that in today's political and military climate, the settlers are perceived by most Israelis as being a security burden rather than a security asset and that their own lives (and those of their children) are threatened by remaining in these dangerous locations.

d)   Surveys of public opinion need to be undertaken as a means of demonstrating to the settler population that the majority of Israelis do not support the continued existence of the settlements if they are once again perceived as being the major obstacle in the way of implementing a tangible peace agreement. This does not mean that the public does not sympathise with their plight when faced with violence and terror attacks, or that they do not identify with the trauma of families being forced to evacuate their homes against their will, but that sympathy will rapidly fade away if the settlers hold up,

or even endanger, the implementation of a peace Accord which will potentially bring an end to violence and warfare.

e) That many new challenges face the State of Israel in a pro-conflict era, challenges in the fields of education, welfare and health policies, challenges in developing the country's peripheral regions – especially the Negev south of the country – and that the settler population are ideally suited, due to their ideological fervour and commitment to the State, to meet many of these new challenges for the benefit of the whole Israeli society.

f) That settlement evacuation does not have to be a traumatic and violent experience – that it can be carried out peacefully and orderly and, where necessary, as far away as possible from the eye of the media and the public (although this may not be so easy to implement).

g) That groups of young committed religious students – those who normally act as the political vanguard for the right wing in demonstrations and the construction of new settlement outposts – have a role to play in doing precisely the opposite, namely assisting families in their move, in bridging over the gaps between different sectors of society who are in favour of, or opposed to, settlement activity. The role of religion as a potential peacemaker, especially amongst so many of the settler population whose nationalist ideology is founded in specific religious interpretations of the political reality, needs to be harnessed as part of the public discourse so that it can be used in a positive fashion. This requires the co-option of religious leaders who command respect amongst the settler population. They can only be co-opted if they are made to understand the consequences, both for the peace process as a whole, but also for the internal structure and unity of Israeli society, should the process break down around the inability to undertake orderly settlement removal.

It is essential that operational plans for potential settlement evacuation be worked on now, rather than later. Israeli governments have continually pushed this issue off the agenda, both because it did not appear realistic given the worsening political and defensive climate, and also because the political lobby of the settler movement and their supporters throughout Israel and in the Israeli Parliament were always sufficient to scare others away. This is all the more the case where one of their major champions and builders, Ariel Sharon, is now Prime Minister. At the same time, it must not be forgotten

that it was the same Ariel Sharon who, as the then Minister of defense, supervised the forced evacuation of the settler population from their homes in northern Sinai.

Failure to deal adequately with this issue can lead to two major crises – one relating to the peace process as a whole, the other to Israeli society. Should sufficient settlers refuse to leave their homes, this could significantly hold up the implementation of any peace agreement, even after it is signed, and cause a return to conflict – clearly this is what the settlers would like to happen in the first instance, but it would largely be dependent on whether it is just a small group of "fanatics" or a wider group of settler families who resist the move. As far as Israeli society is concerned, the greater the physical resistance and scenes of violence, the greater the trauma for Israelis (especially if there were to be injuries or fatalities) and the greater the long term stereotyping and dislike of "those settlers" who caused us all those problems. This is an outcome which will have to be weighed up by the settler leaders in determining their strategy – holding out for their ideological cause could potentially do them long term harm in term of their normal integration back into Israel.

While it is improbable that any settlements (excluding the outposts which are created one day in order to be formally removed the next day) will be evacuated prior to the signing of a final Peace Agreement, the program for public awareness of the options available should be put into operation as soon as possible. The greater the familiarity with the practical mechanics of settlement evacuation, the greater the chance that it can actually take place in a relatively calm and orderly atmosphere. This would be to the long term benefit of both the peace process and for Israeli society.

How the Settler Suburbs Grew

Jordan Is

By David Newman

BEER SHEVA, Israel here is nothing that causes as much heated debate in Israel as the future of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. It is now clear to most Israelis that if there is ever going to be a final political agreement with the Palestinians, it will require that some, if not necessarily all, of the settlements be dislodged and evacuated. A permanent plan would have to create a Palestinian state that is compact and continuous — unlike the disconnected wedges and enclaves of Palestinian autonomy areas that were created by the Oslo accord and that have left the settlements in place. Although this reality is undeniable, the practicality of settlement removal has largely been avoided by all Israeli governments, including those of the left, even as that avoidance makes the eventual uprooting of the growing settler population more difficult.

There are today approximately 200,000 Jewish settlers living in a variety of West Bank and Gaza communities. They have arrived in those areas continually over the past 35 years, ever since Israel's occupation of the region after its victory in the 1967 war. For the first 10 years, settlement was limited to the eastern edges of the Jordan Valley by the Labor governments of Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. They did not allow settlements in the densely populated Palestinian upland areas, assuming that this area would eventually become an autonomous Palestinian region linked to Jordan.

It was only after the Yom Kippur war of 1973 and, more important, the rise of Israel's first right-wing Likud governments, led by Menachem Begin from 1977 to 1983, that settlement policy was extended to include the whole of the West Bank region. Spurred on by the religious settler movement Gush Emunim, settlements began to sprout up throughout the mountainous interior as well as in

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close proximity to the "green line" boundary between Israel and the West Bank, with their inhabitants hoping to prevent any future Israeli withdrawal from those areas. Gush Emunim supporters believed that the land conquered in 1967 had been returned to its rightful owners as promised to their biblical ancestors by God. Hence, they were not interested in such practical problems as demography, security or the political rights of another people. And they set out to make it as difficult as possible for any government to relinquish the land in a future political agreement.

From 1984 onward, Israel was governed by several national coalition governments — perhaps more adequately described as governments of national paralysis — consisting of the left-wing Labor and right-wing Likud parties. In each instance, the coalition agreements included a clause freezing all further settlement activity. And yet from 1984 to 2002 the

200,000 Israelis live on captured land. They can't all stay.

settler population increased from a mere 30,000 to approximately 200,000 (not including another 200,000 living in East Jerusalem, which Israelis do not consider part of the West Bank).

Even under Labor governments, settlement activity did not cease. Few new settlements were constructed, but all the existing settlements underwent consolidation and expansion as new neighborhoods were built, new settlers arrived, and a second generation of settler families grew up and made their homes in these places.

In fact, the so-called settlement freeze proved to be a lifesaver for the many small communities that had been established under the Likud governments. Preventing the construction of additional settlements allowed small ones to grow to sizes that made them viable as functioning communities.

The Likud governments, eager to keep the West Bank as part of Israel,

actively promoted the growth of the settler population through large subsidies — cheap land, low- interest mortgages and lower income tax rates for individuals, as well as subsidies to local government councils. (Labor governments attempted to cut back on these subsidies but often met with political opposition from their coalition partners.) Israelis moving to the West Bank side of the green line could exchange a small three- or four-room apartment in a crowded Israeli town for a bigger house in a low-density community, with government benefits not available to people living just a few miles away inside Israel proper. It was basically a case of suburban colonization.

The settlements, like communities inside Israel, are governed by municipal and regional councils that provide public services and control land use planning and development. A recent study by B'tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, shows that while the built-up areas of the settlements take up only 1.7 percent of the land in the West Bank, the area encompassed within the municipal boundaries of the settlements takes up 6.8 percent of the land. Regional councils, which provide services to smaller, scattered communities through a regional authority, govern an additional 35.1 percent. Together, these settlement councils effectively control 41.9 percent of the area in the West Bank.

After decades of growth, these settlements have created a completely new landscape. They are no longer outposts on exposed hills, but are fully developed communities with schools, commercial centers, industrial zones and municipal services all created for the settler population — needless to say, the Palestinian neighbors who occupy the same geographical space do not share in these benefits.

The very solidity of these planned developments makes it almost impossible to remove all of the settler population. Instead, the debate, even among left-wing Israelis who oppose the settlements, is over how to redraw the future border between Israel and a Palestinian state in such a way as to retain as large a number of settlers and settlements on as little territory as possible. This would probably require transfer of an equal amount of territory from within Isra-

el itself — some have suggested the expansion of the Gaza Strip region — as compensation for the settlement territory that would be formally annexed to Israel.

But even if such a territorial solution were to be acceptable to both sides, this still leaves around 35 percent to 40 percent of the settler population living in areas farther east into the West Bank, who would have to be evacuated. Israelis left and right already fear a day when the government will have to send the army in to move these settlements ii the settlers refuse to go. Even the best outcome would probably mean violent demonstrations of the type seen in the early 1980's when the Northern Sinai settlements were dismantled as part of the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement; a worst case would involve armed confrontation between soldiers and settlers. This is a major reason why even the Labor governments that negotiated and supported the Oslo accords did not stop settlement growth, and instead allowed population expansion even at the cost of creating further resentment among the Palestinians. Now, however, public support of the settlements is declining. Recent surveys show that a majority of Israelis believe that eventually there will be a Palestinian state and that the settlements will have to move (and this regardless of the recent vote by the Likud Party to oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state). Early in the development of the settlements, settlers argued that their towns contributed to Israel's security. That is not accepted by most Israelis now, and in fact the settlements are seen for what they are, namely a security burden. Public support is likely to decline further if they are also perceived as the main obstacle on the way to a final peace agreement.

Unlike other matters that will need to be negotiated with the Palestinians, the settlement problem, created and expanded by successive Israeli governments, will have to be resolved by Israel itself. For Israelis who have lived in the West Bank for more than 25 years, for those who were born there, there will be heartbreak, even if the government can give them housing elsewhere. That is one price they and Israeli society will have to pay for a stable peace. □

NON-PAPER

Palestinian Vision for the Outcome of Permanent Status Negotiations Based on the Arab Peace Plan

At this critical time when the international community is seeking to formulate a comprehensive policy regarding the Middle East, the Palestinian Authority ("PA") believes that it is important to convey the Palestinian vision for ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This vision is based on the Arab initiative declared by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and adopted unanimously by the Arab summit in Beirut. While many creative and constructive ideas regarding ending the current crisis are being presented, we believe that these ideas will not succeed if they are not accompanied by a clear political horizon that will rekindle hope in a permanent peace based on a negotiated solution.

The Palestinian clarifications described below had been discussed with our Arab friends, in particular Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, all of whom share our opinion regarding the centrality of a vision of peace to the success of any efforts.

The Arab Peace Initiative of March 2002 forms our basic terms of reference. This initiative along with the vision of President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech of November 2001, and UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, are the bases of the Palestinian vision for a permanent status agreement between Palestine and Israel. According to these bases, the following are the main elements of our vision:

- The borders between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel will be the June 4th 1967 Armistice Line, though the two sides may agree to minor, reciprocal, and equal boundary rectifications that do not affect, among other things, territorial contiguity. The Palestinian and Israeli sides shall have no territorial claims beyond the June 4, 1967 borders. These borders will be the permanent boundaries between the two states.

- There will be a permanent territorial corridor established between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip sections of the state of Palestine.

- East Jerusalem will become the capital of the state of Palestine and West Jerusalem will become the capital of the State of Israel.

- Jerusalem, which is venerated by the three monotheistic religions, will remain open to all peoples.

- The Palestinian side will transfer sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall section of the Western Wall in East Jerusalem to Israel, while retaining sovereignty over the remainder of the Old City.

- Palestine and Israel will establish security cooperation arrangements that preserve the integrity and sovereignty of each state. International forces will play a central role in these arrangements. In addition, the two sides will strive to establish a regional security regime.

NON-PAPER

- Neither Palestine nor Israel will participate in military alliances against each other, or allow their territory to be used as a military base of operation against each other or against other neighbors. No foreign troops may be stationed in the territory of either state unless otherwise specified in the permanent status agreement or subsequently agreed to by the two parties. Palestine and Israel's respective sovereignty and independence will be guaranteed by formal agreements with members of the international community.

- In accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative of March 2002, there will be a just and *agreed* solution to the Palestinian refugee problem based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

- The issue of water will be resolved in a just and equitable manner in accordance with international treaties and norms.

- Palestine and Israel will be democratic states with free market economies.

- The comprehensive permanent status agreement will mark the end of conflict between Palestine and Israel, and its complete implementation will mark the end of claims between them.

Naturally, the realization of this vision requires a parallel process that will create concrete and positive developments on the ground. These will require a policy of de-escalation, de-occupation, ensuring the protection of Palestinian and Israeli peoples in accordance with the rule of law, and the gradual introduction of attributes of sovereignty to buttress and prepare the ground for a permanent status agreement.

There should be a fixed timeline for this process with guaranteed diplomatic involvement in order to ensure that the process does not stall. Part of preparing for eventual Palestinian statehood requires internal Palestinian restructuring, which we have already embarked on in the political, financial, and security fields. In the security realm, the ideas suggested by CIA Director George Tenet will be the basis for our efforts.

12/06/2002

Press Statement

President Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian leadership welcome President Bush's articulation of U.S. policy aimed at ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We believe that this is a serious contribution toward peace and agree that there can only be a *political* solution to this conflict. In the coming days, we will be working closely with the United States, the Quartet and our Arab brothers to assist us in translating President Bush's vision into a full plan for peace.

We welcome President Bush's call for the establishment of an independent state of Palestine as the important end result of this peace process. We understand that the borders of State of Palestine will be the June 4, 1967 Armistice Line, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

For peace to be created in the Middle East, now is the time for us to focus on the permanent solution, not on temporary ones. It is therefore imperative that we set out a clear timeline for the resolution of this conflict and not leave the process of achieving peace to those who are not interested in peace. We appreciate the President's sense of urgency and his call for the resolution of this

conflict within three years. We too, feel that sense of urgency and believe that this conflict can be finally resolved within two years.

The Palestinians are prepared to begin negotiations immediately and we recognize that for negotiations to be successful in the short term, we must simultaneously address our concerns for our independence and freedom as well as Israel's security concerns. For this to be done, Israel must understand that its' settlement activities, reoccupation and siege pose the greatest threat to peace, security and stability in the region. As highlighted by President Bush and by all previous U.S. Presidents, Israel's settlement activity must stop. So must its revolving door occupation and devastating siege. Continued settlement activity and occupation will only serve to highlight to Palestinians that Israel is more interested in keeping their land than it is in peace.

What the past years have taught both Palestinians and Israelis is that we cannot make peace alone – we need the help of the United States and the international community. We look to the international community to continue to support us in our struggle for peace. We need their economic support and political action. Above all, we need their guarantee that the Palestinians will, within two years, see an end to Israel's occupation and live in freedom and independence on their land that has been occupied by Israel for thirty-five years.

President Bush's call for reform and renewal in the Palestinian Authority must be based on the free choice of the Palestinian people as expressed through free and internationally-monitored elections. Local, parliamentary and presidential elections have already been called for January. We are satisfied that the statements made by American officials following President Bush's speech clearly indicate that only the Palestinian people can elect their own leaders. The process of reform has already begun and will be continued in order to achieve all of the objectives of the Palestinian people. Palestinian want a competent and democratic government and the reform process aims to achieve this. Democracy and citizenship go hand-in-hand. Yet, the only obstacle to exercise of that citizenship is Israel's occupation. Palestinian reform should never be a pre-condition to ending Israel's occupation; it should be a supporting factor for the creation of a Palestinian state.

To the Israeli people, on behalf of the Palestinian people, we say this: The entire Arab world has extended its hand in peace with you. We invite you to accept our extended hand by finally choosing peace over land. Today's statement by President Bush provides both of us with an opportunity to exercise that proper choice.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Return to Negotiations

By: Ambassador Taher Shash (Egypt)

I- Introduction

1. The Madrid Conference, which was held on 30 October 1991, aroused hopes all over the world. For the first time Arabs and Israelis were sitting face to face to make peace and put an end to their conflict that had lasted almost a century.

2. The results of the peace-process are, however, meager. Only Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty. Syria, Lebanon and Palestine on one side and the Israelis on the other failed to reach a final settlement.

3. The situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is exploding, with Israel waging an intensive war of killing and guerrillas carrying out human bombing attacks against Israelis.

4. Only 18 months ago, Palestinians and Israelis were sitting at the negotiating table in Taba (Egypt) to resolve their problems and conclude a final settlement to their very long conflict. In a joint communiqué they declared that they were very close to reaching an agreement and expressed their belief that they would be able to fill the remaining gaps when they resumed negotiations following the Israeli elections.

5. What happened since then is well known. Ariel Sharon made his provocative visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. A Palestinian uprising flared up, Sharon was elected Prime Minister and waged his war to fight what he considered terrorism.

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6. What went wrong with the Peace Process that
was launched in Madrid in 1991? Why did
Israel, Syria and Lebanon, after lengthy
negotiations in Washington and elsewhere, fail
to reach an agreement? Why did the Oslo
Agreements between the Israelis and the
Palestinians not lead to a final settlement,
and were virtually abrogated? And finally,
what needs to be done to return the conflicting
parties to negotiations, which might,
hopefully, restore peace in the region?

II. Evaluation of the Peace Process

7. Until President George Bush, the father,
launched his initiative on the Peace Process,
Arabs had been rejecting direct face-to-face
negotiations with Israel. The UN, taking this
attitude into consideration, designated Gunnar
Jarrang to promote agreement between the
parties in application of Security Council (SC)
Resolution 242. SC Resolution 338 provided for
negotiations under appropriate auspices.
8. In fact, Arab countries, realizing that the
balance of power with Israel was not in their
favor, were seeking an international role to
redress the imbalance in negotiations.
9. They demanded the convocation of an
international conference under the auspices of
the United Nations, where the permanent member
states of the Security Council participated
with all parties. Such a conference would
ensure international legitimacy and the great
powers would play a positive role and promote
agreement between the conflicting parties.
10. The Madrid Conference was different. It was
no more than an umbrella for direct face-to-
face negotiations without the participation of
a third party. It had neither the power nor
the authority to make decisions for the
parties.
11. For a long time, the US was reluctant to
play a role to assist the parties, and the

round of negotiations was conducted in Washington without any progress. When the Americans played a more active role in negotiations between Israel and Syria, a great progress was made and the parties were close to agreement. However, negotiations were suspended because Ihud Barak, then Israeli Prime Minister, had rejected Syria's demand of complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, in spite of Late Rabin's commitment to do so. Syrians claimed that they had been informed by the US Secretary of State of Rabin's undertaking (the so-called deposit), and the Americans kept silent. It is regrettable that the US was unable to persuade Israel to withdraw completely from the Golan as it had done in Sinai.

12. *Negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians have always been conducted in an unfavorable atmosphere.*

13. *The Oslo agreements stirred up the opposition of many Palestinians and Israelis. Driven by their religions, ideological and political attachment to the Holy Land, extremists on both sides restored the force in order to hinder the implementation of the agreements. The transitional period, far from promoting co-existence between the two peoples, intensified mutual mistrust. The Israeli governments continued the creation of faits accomplis in the Palestinian territories through confiscation of lands building of settlements, and subjected Palestinians to drastic security measures.*

14. *The main defect of the Oslo agreements was their lack of a mechanism, such as conciliation and arbitration, to settle disputes arising from the application or interpretation of the agreements.*

15. *The US mediation was often considered by Palestinians as biased to Israel. However, former US President, Bill Clinton played an important role in bringing about agreement between the parties (such as Hebron, Wye River*

and Sharm El-Sheikh agreements). He ultimately presented a set of principles that helped them to make rapid progress in the Taba negotiations.

16.   The present US Administration's attitude towards Palestinians has been unfriendly from the outset due to its firm conviction that Arafat is responsible for the failure of the negotiations and of the violence. This attitude has stiffened since the 11 September attacks against the US. The attacks has given green light to Sharon to continue his war against Palestinians until he succeeded in destroying the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority as well as the infrastructure of the Palestinian territories. All that was achieved under the Oslo Agreements was destroyed and the Peace Process went back to square one.

17.   To conclude, the Peace Process, which had begun in 1991, met many difficulties and obstacles that resulted in the suspension of negotiations on all tracks.

Among the negative factors, one can cite the following:

a) The so-called constructive ambiguity of the terms of reference, especially SC Resolution 242, opened the door for an unending conflict between the parties regarding their interpretation. The unclear language of the Oslo Agreements caused the same problem and enabled Israel to interpret the provisions and implement them to its liking.

b) Negotiations were conducted between Israel, an occupying power, and Arab countries, whose territories were occupied. To redress this imbalance, the international community should have played a more effective role between the parties and ensure their respect of international legitimacy.

c) The evolution of the domestic situation in Israel with the emergence to power of the right

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wing and religious fundamentalism has been a major factor in undermining the peace process. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suspended the application of the Oslo Agreements and Sharon tore them up.

d) Both Israeli governments on one side and the Palestinian Authority on the other, failed in creating conditions for co-existence between the two peoples. On the contrary, they had been under the pressure of extremists on both sides.

III. The Bush Plan

In his Statement of June 24, 2002, President Bush outlined his plan for peace in the Middle East. He reiterated his "vision" in two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. He estimated that a Palestinian State could be established in three years, but should be preceded by a Provisional State to be created after the fulfillment of certain conditions by Palestinians, Israelis and the Arab countries.

The Palestinian people are required to elect a new and different leadership, adopt a new constitution and build new institutions. Palestinians must carry out political, financial and economic reforms and make new security arrangements with their neighbors. Above all, Palestinian leaders must engage in a sustained fight against terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure.

Israel is called upon to withdraw its forces to positions they held prior to September 2000, stop settlement activity in occupied territories and lift restrictions on Palestinians and the Palestinian economy.

Arab states are expected to build closer ties with Israel, leading to full normalization of

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relations with it. Incitement to violence and assistance of terrorist groups must stop.

Once the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled, a Provisional Palestinian State would be created.

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must negotiate a settlement to resolve all problems, including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and borders. Negotiations are to be based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The settlement must lead to ending the Israeli occupation and withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.

Bush's statement triggered a chain of different reactions. Israelis expressed satisfaction and considered it to be in line with their position. The Arab states saw in the statement some positive and other negative aspects. Together with the Europeans, they particularly claimed that changing the Palestinian leadership is a decision that belongs to the Palestinian people who had elected Arafat. Many commentators found the statement ambiguous and the plan lacking a mechanism and a timetable for implementation.

I would like to make some few personal observations on President Bush's proposal as follows:
1) The statement ignores the fact that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the atrocities committed by Israeli forces against the Palestinian people are those which perpetuate violence and trigger terrorist acts.
2) The pre-condition of changing the Palestinian leadership constitutes interference in domestic affairs, which is considered a violation of principles of democracy and a dangerous precedent in international relations. It may also cause disorder and instability in the Palestinian territories.
3) Reform of the Palestinian land cannot be imposed. It should emanate from the

Palestinian people assisted, if necessary, by other countries.

4) The statement does not mention a mechanism for implementing of the plan. It is not clear on the reciprocal obligations and does not mention a timetable for putting the plan into action.

5) The concept of a "provisional state" is rather an innovation unknown in international law. There is real concern that "provisional" may become permanent.

6) Terms of reference for negotiations on final settlement do not include the Arab Initiative and omits any reference to previous negotiations. Thus the plan takes the parties back to square one.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

18. Obviously, the Bush statement does not constitute a workable plan, but contains some general ideas which may be interpreted into a detailed program

19. Such a program should determine the mechanism and fix a timetable for its implementation. It should outline the obligations of the two parties and fix a time limit for their reciprocal and parallel implementation step by step. The withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-September 2000 should be the first step in order to ensure free Palestinian elections. The program should be adopted by an international conference, with the participation of all the parties, the Quartet and some Arab states.

20. Negotiations should be resumed on all tracks (Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese) simultaneously.

21. The roles of the Quartet and the Arab states are very important. They should participate in the elaboration of the program, assist Palestinians in rebuilding their institutions

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and supervise the implementation of the said program.

22. *Terms of reference of negotiations should include the Arab Summit Initiative and the principles proposed by President Clinton for resolving problems of final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.*

Palestinian Reform. (Potential context, Regional impact.)

Palestinian-Israeli working group.

Bruges Meeting, 13th to 16th of July 2002.

Prepared by: B.G. Nizar Ammar.

First: Towards a democratic system

It is important for the Palestinian reform to contain a replacement of the electoral systems, starting from presidential elections, to legislative elections, and ending with municipal elections. The decision to depend on parliamentary blocks, through the list system elections, on a national level, will make the basic change in the shape of future political leadership. Electing the parliamentary block that has the majority is the best mean to isolate opposing blocks to the peace process (Islamic and left wing trends).

A democratic change requires from supporting blocks and the ones seeking peace (on top of them specifically Fattah movement the biggest Palestinian faction and the parliament independents) to re-plan and reorganize its movement from within by returning to adopt the democratic means. Those means are accomplished through commitment to periodical internal elections, specifying the supreme frameworks, vitalizing party work, establishing bases for peace culture awareness and rejecting violence. That is the start. And if that did not take place, then the opposition organizations, and the Islamic groups specifically, will invest the public support that it won during the years of Intifada to capture municipalities through municipal elections, then to form a opposing parliamentary block that is strong and effective in threatening serious efforts towards peace.

It is a must to say that what the Palestinian Authority is suffering from at the moment is a mixture between national unity perception and its limits, and the perception of political diversity and its limits. The present Palestinian political powers struggle, each in its own way, to reach what is thought to be the national goal. The result is the destruction of the Authority's unity, and so there are several powers in the Palestinian street. Each Palestinian faction is practicing "under the cover of national unity" its own agenda as if the national Authority does not exist. It is also essential to create democratic change in this peace trend and the rise of a block that represent the majority, which is the block that will support peace. Establishing limits to the means of expression, used by the political opposition, means the ban of the opposition into utilizing violence and military actions by its entire means and in the way that contradicts with the signed agreements.

As a whole, this reflects a worry to the probability that Islamic powers gain control - which might not be complete – over the Authority through parliamentary elections. These powers are very disciplined and organized parties, keeping in mind that this worry could still occur in the absence of a careful organization of peace powers. It is certain now and for the near future, that Islamic powers will stop their boycott of municipal elections, a boycott practiced since the beginnings of the Palestinian Authority, to make them now ready to participate in the coming parliamentary elections. They consider municipal elections to be outside the Authority's framework and not under the Authority's agreements with Israel. There are, however, doubts that Islamic powers will participate in the legislative elections, since such elections were mentioned in the Oslo agreement which they oppose. But it is expected that Islamic powers push their members of the Islamic trend – Islamic independents – to form a parliamentary block under the

name of " The Islamic block in the parliamentary council ". This block is now present in the parliamentary council, but it is, however, representing a minority since a ban has been taken by the Islamic trend from participating in the previous parliament elections, a fact that might not happen in the coming elections.

Second: Establishing the free economic system:

The economic system in the Authority does not suffer from corruption as much as it suffers from monopoly, the monopoly of importing basic goods and monopolizing internal construction projects. That resulted in blocking Palestinian investments from the outside after the monopoly group demanded to be a shareholder in any project. This monopoly group participated in making the investments to quit, at the same time the Israeli occupation procedures did not help these investments to stay.

In order for legislative systems to protect the economy from monopoly, it should be established along with legislation for free competition, the adoption of the free economic system transparently and giving the chance for the private sector to be the basic pillar for that system.

The economic system is demanded to create urgent solutions for the matter of employing Palestinian labor. We are talking about a labor block exceeding 300.000 workers that should be distributed on three areas: projects in Palestinian territories, working in Israel, and working abroad. This while taking in consideration that the allocated percentages in the past for working within Israel will not be repeated or returned to its previous status before several years. The Palestinian labor, in addition to being a basic economic factor, presents a security factor from several dangerous angels

on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The unemployment caused by the Israeli refusal to employ the Palestinian labor in Israel not only results in a sharp decline in the living standard for a large portion of Palestinians, but it also pushes them to walk in violent directions and to join terrorist groups, who would choose from them the suicide bombers.

Establishing a monetary system that includes unifying monetary sources (national income resources) into one box under the authority of the Ministry of Finance that specifies the income resources and spending means, in addition to a monitoring authority is important in order to avoid repeating what happened in the past.

The economic Palestinian-Israeli agreement (Paris agreement) that has been designed for an interim period not exceeding five years has now become a major obstacle in the development of the Palestinian economy. That agreement is not fair for the Palestinians and basic modifications should be done on that agreement.

It is important to form a regional economic system that is based on joint projects like oil, gas, water and tourism, in which the Palestinian economy would be one of its joints. This economic system should reflect an interest and benefit for the development and enhancement of the living standards for the people of the region.

Third: The Security system:

The "political perception" for the Authority is what produced a multi-security agencies system. The aim of this system is to establish balance and competition. This political perception is based on: "utilizing armed operations in Israel that is being done by the Palestinian opposition" as a political paper for pressure every time negotiations fail, or every time Israel refuses to implement the agreements, or disrespect time-tables, or

became harder in its security measures of collective punishment, siege and destruction.

In the beginning, all these agencies have been assigned for the task of security co-ordination and co-operation with Israel. In a certain time they have been assigned to apprehend the executing elements of military operations in addition to apprehend the leaderships of Islamic opposition. The agencies have put them in camps that exceeded all "human rights" rules, and then an Israeli-Palestinian-American triangular co-operation took place in the security field. The important transformation happened in the years of the Intifada (27th of September 2000). The security agencies have transformed from agencies of protection, security, security co-operation, and preventing operations against Israel and security co-operation into anti-Israel agencies where some of its units facilitate and execute operations against the Israelis. This change happened after Israel has destroyed the bases of Palestinian agencies in all cities, killed and injured their members in several locations, ceased their weapons and limited their movement or their task as an agency for policing, security or protection. The Israeli forces have caused deep humiliation for the forces and the leaders of these agencies while Israel is aware of the armament's decrease level and the imbalance of power between the Israeli and the Palestinian soldier. After the Israeli fighters destroyed most of the headquarters and the branches for the Palestinian security institution. It is important to confess that these security agencies became totally unworkable for a coming period in which security stability and the state are presumably to be achieved. That is not only applicable to the leaders but to the main body of soldiers and officers. This means re-selection of the good elements, re-train and rehabilitate them in morale and militarily way in which their new tasks necessitates. From my point of view, several of the security leaderships, unfortunately, were not up to the historical task

and did not work with a political mind but with a self-interested mind.

Re-structuring the Palestinian security agency is to be done through forming a new security body with new security perceptions. A new generation should be re-selected that would need political and morale rehabilitation for new tasks, for a new era. The crisis of the security agency is not only the re-structuring of it, but in choosing new leaderships that have professionalism and the ability to fulfill the needs of the political level.

The regional security regime should be established to include Palestine, Israel, Egypt and Jordan in order to discuss threats and security dangers within this framework as well as the security arrangements in a regional manner.

The connection between reforms and the political solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Palestinian reform steps must be linked parallel to a group of Israeli procedures and policies within a simultaneous program. The reforms are a comprehensive change in perceptions and understandings while monitoring its impact on policies in different fields specifically security. Steps of change are linked periodically with each other and necessitate the environment, which the Israeli policies make.

If we try to count the Israeli procedures and policies in a short list it will be as follows:

1. The importance of Israeli recognition of the Palestinian elected legitimacy through legislative frames, and not abusing the imbalance of power between the two parties for the sake of control and domination over the Palestinian legitimacy, and making it a "permanent hostage."

2. The importance of Israeli recognition that is similar to the American declaration of the establishment of the Palestinian state as a political frontier <u>for starting negotiations immediately.</u>

3. Undertaking a chain of confidence building measures:

   - The release of the young under arrested Palestinians that have been detained in the last invasion of the West Bank who have not been proven guilty (the number is almost 5000).

   - Immediate cessation of settlement expansion.

   - Transferring the held money to the Palestinian Authority.

   - Ending the closure status between cities and allowing the freedom of movement between the West Bank and Gaza strip.

   - Respecting the freedom of movement for security forces and facilitating its tasks in order for it to be able to fulfill it's agreed upon tasks.

   - Reopening the airport as a vital vein for the free movement of goods and people.

   - Reviving the work of security co-ordination committees within new rules and bases (G.C.O.).

4. Establishing new pillars for field and strategic Israeli-Palestinian security work. The previous frameworks are not being adopted after proven unpractical. The re-occupation of the Palestinian villages and cities is a tactic that must be totally abolished after the declaration of the Palestinian State. The Palestinians must be given regional and international guarantees as well as defensive military capabilities within the Palestinian security theory to prevent the return of occupation to the Palestinian

territories in long or short terms.

5. All legislative and economic systems are unpractical or pointless as long as the Israeli security procedures over Palestinian agricultural exports continue, and if the destruction of Palestinian farms along the narrow borders surrounding Gaza strip and preventing the freedom of fishermen in regional waters continue.

Features of reforms.

1. Inclusiveness.

   Reforms should be basic and complete, meaning restructuring the institutions. Such reforms are supposed to include legislative, executive, security and economic institutions as well as free elections as the basis of expressing people's paths.

2. Transparency.

   Reforms are required to be transparent for the sake of people through high efficiency and the feeling of responsibility. People should feel also that the reforms are for their own sake so they can express their wills in absolute freedom.

3. Security.

   The security side of the reforms is an important and essential one. The goal of reforms in the security field must be clear and specific. This goal is represented in the immediate stop for any military operation from both sides, to stop the circle of violence, the full believe that the military option is not the solution, and that negotiations are the only way to solve the conflict.

4. International supervision.

The International supervision represents essential sides in specifying and applying the reforms through its different faces, regional committees, as well as censorship. That should be parallel with the free will of the Palestinian people and their freedom in choosing and specifying their path.

(Note: The paper was translated from Arabic.)

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
NATHAN J. BROWN*

Those who speak in Palestine's name have declared it to be an independent state twice (1948 and 1988). They have declared their firm intention to do so more times and their fervent wish to do so more times still. On five occasions (1948, 1988, 1996, 1999, and 2002) their efforts have actually progressed to the stage of beginning to draft constitutional documents for the new state. Yet Palestine remains without a recognized constitutional framework and its leadership has exhibited ambivalence about pursuing efforts further.

HISTORY Palestinians have been governed by formal constitutions in the past, but they have written none of them. The Ottoman constitution was in effect briefly in the 1870s and after 1908, leaving memories but no permanent institutional traces. When Palestine was created as a distinct political entity under the League of Nations mandate system, the British authorities issued some documents that contained hints of popular participation in government but left all effective authority with the British high commissioner. The end of the mandate saw the first Palestinian effort to write a constitution, when, in October 1948, a new body called the Palestinian National Council (PNC) met in Gaza. The PNC declared independence and issued a provisional constitution providing for an interim parliamentary regime. This document was largely forgotten when Egypt asserted control over Gaza in the wake of the 1948 war. Egypt issued two constitutional documents for Gaza (in 1955 and 1962), and, after annexing the West Bank, Jordan issued a new constitution in 1952. The Egyptian documents were friendlier to Palestinian national identity, because they were explicitly temporary pending the creation of a Palestinian state. And they allowed for a Palestinian Legislative Council, though almost all authority was kept in the hands of Egyptian officials. The Jordanian annexation of the West Bank was predicated on the denial of Palestinian national identity, but it had a liberalizing constitutional effect: in 1951, Palestinian deputies in the Jordanian parliament helped pass a series of constitutional amendments involving significant concessions to parliamentary prerogatives.

In 1967, Gaza and the West Bank came under Israeli rule, and Israel immediately transferred all public authority to the military governor who ruled by fiat. This ended the effective life of the Egyptian-era and Jordanian constitutions and transferred attention for such matters to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The PLO initially resisted steps toward statehood, but in November 1988 the PNC declared Palestinian independence, promising a democratic government and a constitution. Despite some pressure to translate this declaration into practical preparations, the provisions regarding governance were largely forgotten until the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles with Israel on 13 September 1993. The prospect of creating the Palestinian Authority (PA) prompted the PLO's legal committee to begin drafting a Basic Law, an interim document to govern the new entity until a permanent constitution was written. This effort, however, proceeded slowly. Yet the effort became increasingly public, as Palestinians began to debate what constitutional arrangements should govern the interim phase. Progressive drafts of the Basic Law showed some evolution in a liberal direction under the influence of such public discussions.

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THE BASIC LAW   In September 1995, Israel and the PLO concluded an agreement covering issues related to Palestinian self-governance, including an elected Palestinian council with the authority to issue the Basic Law.   Three months later, Yasir 'Arafat issued by decree a law for elections to the council (Law 13 or 1995), specifically authorizing it to approve the Basic Law. In 1996, that body—the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)—debated the draft of the PLO's legal committee. Some Palestinians, including PA President Yasir 'Arafat, objected, stating that because of the significance of the subject, Palestinians in the diaspora should be consulted before the PLC acted. But for most PLC members, this was their most significant task and they proceeded to work on the Basic Law.

With each iteration, the Palestinian Basic Law progressively changed from a skeletal and extremely provisional document into a more extensive and potentially more permanent basis for political life. The draft finally passed by the Council represents one of the most liberal constitutional documents in Arab history. It allows for a mixed presidential-parliamentary system not uncommon in Arab republics. More unusual is the strength of its rights provisions as well as the attempt to close loopholes that exist in many other Arab constitutions (involving emergency powers, constitutional interpretation, and the independence of the judiciary). Indeed, it is in this respect that the prolonged and public drafting process had real effects as vague provisions gradually gave way to carefully-crafted limits on governmental authority.

In October 1997, the PLC passed the Basic Law and referred it to 'Arafat for approval. It took close to five years for 'Arafat to respond.   His inaction was never explained.   Much speculation centered on the succession provisions for the presidency in the Basic Law.   However, since these were virtually identical to those in Law 13 that 'Arafat had issued and put into effect in 1995, this seems unlikely. (While few noticed the succession provisions in Law 13, they are very clear and give the presidency on a provisional basis to the PLC speaker. The Basic Law introduced only minor changes in wording.) A more persuasive explanation probably lies in 'Arafat's general aversion to entrenching any institutional forms and insistence on keeping procedures and chains of command vague. Regardless of 'Arafat's motivations, repeated calls from the PLC and Palestinian reformers for approval of the Basic Law went unanswered.

In May 2002, after many had forgotten the document, 'Arafat finally announced he had signed the Basic Law. While the step is important, in fact he actually seems to have stopped short of putting it into effect. The Basic Law has still not been published in the *Official Gazette*, a necessary step for it to become effective. And when 'Arafat appointed a new cabinet in June 2002, his decree did not cite the Basic Law (as would be expected) for its authority. Further, the cabinet contained one more minister than the Basic Law would allow. Widespread speculation that 'Arafat had amended the Basic Law before signing it would explain such odd steps.   Indeed, in one way the Basic Law conflicts with a provision of the judicial law (signed by 'Arafat shortly before the Basic Law but actually published and now theoretically in effect): the Basic Law provides for a PLC role in the appointment of the Prosecutor-General but the judicial law removed a similar provision at 'Arafat's insistence.

If such speculation is accurate, then the PLC will presumably have to act on 'Arafat's changes before the Basic Law can go into effect. None of the rumored changes are major, but PLC members must fear that even if they make the changes and send the Basic Law back to 'Arafat he may again delay for a considerable period before taking final action. Perhaps seeking to assuage reformers, the Palestinian cabinet has produced a program calling for the Basic Law to go into effect by 15 July 2002.

CONSTITUTION FOR STATEHOOD The Basic Law began as a constitution for an interim period rather than for statehood. In April 1999, the Central Committee of the PLO quietly moved

the focus of Palestinian constitutionalism in a new direction emphasizing internationally-recognized sovereignty. Meeting shortly before the target date for a final status agreement, the Central Committee gained international attention by deciding against an immediate declaration of statehood. Much less noticed by international observers was its decision to move ahead with preparations for statehood. First, the Central Committee authorized a new target date for declaring a state, September 2000. Second, it authorized the necessary preparations. One particular effort was singled out for explicit mention: the Committee welcomed the decision of the secretary-general of the Arab League to appoint a committee to assist the Palestinians in drafting a constitution.

The effect of the Central Committee's statement was to transfer constitution writing from the PNA back to the PLO, without even acknowledging the Basic Law. Perhaps more frustrating for those who had invested their hopes in the Basic Law, the new effort got off to an extremely slow start. The purpose seemed to be to assure Palestinian and Arab audiences that appropriate preparations were being made without actually making them. An Arab League advisory committee was formed on paper but showed no sign of life and eventually faded. A second Palestinian committee was formed under the leadership of Nabil Sha'th, but even some of its members were initially unaware of what the committee was supposed to do and who was on it. The committee members received little guidance and no budget (financing their limited expenses personally).

Slowly—and largely out of the public eye—the committee formed a clearer sense of mission, generally acting on its own initiative. It began meeting in the fall of 1999. In February 2000, the Central Committee of the PLO met again to hear how the work it had commissioned the previous April was proceeding. Little attention was given to the constitutional committee, however, which had at that point only engaged in preliminary debates. In July 2000, the central committee met again, affirmed its support for democratic and liberal principles, but did not even mention the constitutional effort or the committee. As a result, the committee had to proceed with very little guidance over constitutional issues. Frustrated by the lack of guidance and support from the Palestinian leadership, some members of the committee began drawing up their own drafts. By the summer of 2000, they began to circulate these drafts and hold public workshops to discuss them.

The eruption of the second intifada in late September 2000 disrupted and further confused the process of drafting a constitution, but it did not bring it to a halt. The committee managed to continue its work, and, in February 2001, it produced its complete draft. The document makes clear that it is to be adopted according to a democratic procedure, but no body—either from the PLO or the PNA—has yet drawn up plans on how to proceed with the document. The draft document produced by the constitutional committee provides—much like the Basic Law—an unrealized but powerful vision of a different kind of Palestine. Any subsequent drafting efforts will probably have to begin with the draft as a starting point, produced as it was by a committee loosely authorized by the PLO.

The draft constitution follows much of the spirit of the Basic Law, but it made three significant changes. First, the Basic Law was explicitly temporary and was to govern only the PNA, itself authorized by the PLO. The draft constitution, by contrast, implicitly poses the state of Palestine as a successor to the PLO by assimilating the body's ties to the Palestinian diaspora. The draft provides for a parliament with two chambers. One is to be the Legislative Council, elected by those in the state of Palestine. The second is to be a Palestinian National Council, representing Palestinian refugees abroad and having a far more restricted legislative role than the Legislative Council. The National Council of the constitution seem to be the same as the already existing PNC (often referred to as the "Palestinian parliament in exile," the PNC was the body that established the PLO and made pronouncements of basic policy in the name of the Palestinian people). In short, the state of Palestine would absorb the constituting body of the PLO, transforming it into a chamber of the Palestinian parliament. While Palestinian refugees abroad are to be represented in the upper house,

this does not imply that the Palestinian state could negotiate their right to return. The drafters of the constitution not only asserted a right of refugees to return to their original domicile (and not merely homeland) but also described it as an individual right that could not be delegated. While the state of Palestine was therefore to represent all Palestinians, it would be constitutionally barred from negotiating away the right of each Palestinian to return to the pre-1948 home of his or her ancestors.

The second major structural change involved the executive: while the PNA had a strong president with an elected (and self-proclaimed legislative) council, the state of Palestine was to have a prime minister. The decision to separate the head of state from the head of government would bring Palestine into line with prevailing Arab constitutional practice. But its effects might be somewhat different than elsewhere in the Arab world. Throughout the Arab world, the concentration of authority in the head of state is generally only loosely constrained by an elected council. A prime minister effectively answers only to the head of state. (Technically, most, but not all, Arab prime ministers can only serve with the confidence of the parliament. But Arab parliaments do not refuse the head of state's choice, nor do they remove confidence once they have granted it.) Yet the Palestinian parliament might be a more assertive-body. Certainly the Palestinian Legislative Council came closer in its short life to bringing down a government than most Arab parliaments with far longer histories have ever done.

Third, the draft clearly was designed to correct some of the flaws that had developed under the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) since its creation in 1994, especially in confronting perceived presidential abuses. For instance, fiscal provisions were unusually detailed in reaction to the annual tussles between 'Arafat and the PLC on the budget. Some of the corrective provisions were not obvious except on a very close reading. For instance, laws may go into effect even if the *Official Gazette* failed to publish the law. This represents a clear response to the PLC's frustration: not only has the president failed to act on many pieces of legislation passed by the PLC, but the *Official Gazette* has not published laws that the PLC was convinced should have gone into effect. (This was the case with the Basic Law, which PLC members felt should go into effect after the president failed to reject it, and the labor law, which the president signed but failed to have published for a considerable period, rendering its effectiveness in doubt).

Most of the very recent debate over the constitution (as opposed to the discussion of the Basic Law) has remained far out of the public view, obscured by its technical nature, the disinterest of the senior leadership, and the drama of the daily violence of the second intifada. Yet those who had participated in this debate must have been startled when, in May 2002, the topic of Palestinian constitution attract the attention of the president of the United States. Palestinian constitutional specialists who had trouble attracting the attention of their own public and leadership heard George W. Bush proclaim, "The Palestinians need to develop a constitution, rule of law, transparency." Suddenly Palestinian constitutional issues were a matter of international attention.

CURRENT SITUATION At present, the PNA would seem to be in constitutional limbo. The Basic Law has been signed but not in a way that is legally effective. The draft constitution was prepared only for statehood and bears only a committee's imprimatur at this point in any case. Yet there is not a total constitutional vacuum. Although most domestic and international debate on constitutional issues has focused on the Basic Law, the PNA worked quietly from the beginning to establish a legal framework for governance largely separate from that effort. From the first days of the PNA, the leadership developed a basis for subsequent legislative action that included construction of a makeshift but effective constitutional order that enabled the development of a more comprehensive legislative framework.

The unacknowledged (but very much written) constitutional order of the PNA was created in a series of steps, all issued directly by Yasir 'Arafat in his dual capacity as president of the PNA and

chair of the executive committee of the PLO. The first came in May 1994, in Tunis, while the PNA was still being established. In a brief decree, Yasir 'Arafat proclaimed that all laws, regulations and orders in effect before the 1967 war in the West Bank and Gaza would continue in effect until their unification had been completed. This decree made no immediate change in the legal framework then prevailing in the West Bank and Gaza. But it had an important constitutional component: the source of authority for those laws now derived not from the previous powers which had issued them but from 'Arafat in his dual capacity as PLO and PNA leader. In short, the source of law for the West Bank and Gaza was now the PLO and the body it authorized, the PNA, and 'Arafat had the authority to act in the name of both. The next steps in the construction of the constitutional order of the PNA were taken in April 1995. First, in a law issued by decree, President 'Arafat transferred all authorities under all laws, decrees, circulars and regulations in force to the PNA. This step resembled those taken by previous authorities upon assuming control (the British, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Israelis). The law went beyond merely taking over from previous authorities, however: 'Arafat assigned both legislative and executive authority to himself and the Palestinian Council (which at that point referred to his cabinet). On the same day, therefore, 'Arafat issued a second, far more detailed law establishing the process for making new laws in the PNA. What was notable about the procedure was that the entire process was contained within the executive branch.

These legal steps formed the basis for most subsequent legal action taken by the PNA. Subsequent laws and decrees routinely cited them as the basis for their authority. And the constitutional order thus created was unmistakably an unbounded and completely circular autocracy. The final step in the creation of a Palestinian constitutional order robbed some of the circularity from this system. Law 13 of 1995, the election law mentioned above, was one of the most complex pieces of legislation produced by the PNA. Most of its provisions concerned the process of conducting elections for the presidency and for the Legislative Council, but two unmistakably constitutional elements were introduced. First, the very fact that elections would be held introduced a new source of authority, the Palestinian people living only in the West Bank and Gaza. Second, and of far more practical importance, the law assigned some tasks to the Legislative Council: it was to draw up a constitutional order, assume undefined legislative authority, and approve the cabinet. No longer was authority totally circular and contained within the presidency. But the election law did not offer effective limitations on presidential authority either. First, as described above, the Council was free to draft the Basic Law but found it could not impose it on an uninterested president. Second, the authority of the Council to approve (or, by implication) dismiss the cabinet was firmly grounded in law but extremely difficult to exercise in a way that provided for genuine accountability.

Thus the oft-repeated complaint of Palestinians that they remain without any constitutional framework, based as it is on the 'Arafat's failure to bring the Basic Law into effect, misses much of the groundwork that had been laid. It is true that some fundamental questions—chiefly relating to relations between the Council and the executive branch, but also involving the judiciary as well as fundamental rights—remain unresolved. But the legal and constitutional framework existed for an extreme concentration of authority in the hands of the president.

Both the Basic Law and draft constitution are well designed to check presidential autocracy. But recently a third shadowy effort seems to have been initiated. A group of Palestinian reformers has begun to propose a constitution that would be designed to be even more restrictive of presidential authority than either of the documents already on the table. To date they have presented neither their identities nor their plans in public. But they have apparently apprised American officials of their intentions: President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have both referred to the need for "a new constitution" and Senator Joseph Biden has spoken of the efforts of unnamed reformers to draft a new document as well.

CONCLUSION Palestinians have written several constitutions but have not been able to bring any into effect; they are the only Arab people to have failed to do so. Given the current political disarray, constitutional efforts might seem virtually quixotic. Yet many domestic and international actors seem to have come to the precise opposite conclusion: the road out of the current crisis passes through the sort of institutional reform that a constitution can enable. And the experience of the period since 1993 has left definite traces: Palestinians now discuss constitutional issues with both interest and sophistication. The program of Palestinian political reformers seems extremely ambitious. But it must be acknowledged that the constitutions they have recently drafted are carefully designed, popularly supported, and liberal—which is one of the reasons none has yet been adopted.

REFORMING
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

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Brief Description: *This paper discusses ways and means to improve and develop the existing public administration sector of Palestinian Authority (PA). It proposes taking action for the institutional development of the infrastructure of the public administration sector for short and long-term needs. It recommends strategic planning at various levels to provide the basis for development. Complementing the planning, it affirms the need for conducting focused tailor-made training workshops and seminars, panels and discussion meetings. Emphasis is on institution building to strengthen the capacities of institutions of the Palestinian Authority in support of local and international endeavors to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East.*

Table of Contents

Glossary of Acronyms

AI	*Al-Aqsa Intifada*
BD	Barcelona Declaration
CA	Cairo Agreement
DoP	Declaration of Principles
EEA	Early Empowerment Accord
EU	European Union
GJAA	Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement
GPC	General Personnel Council
IAA	Interim Autonomy Agreement
ICA	Israeli Civil Administration
MDGD	Management Development and Governance Division (UNDP)
MAS	Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
OA	Oslo Accord (Agreement)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PA	Palestinian National Authority
PAPP	Palestinian Authority Political Program
PISGA	Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PADI	Public Administration Development Institute
SSA	Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement
TA	Taba Agreement
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WBGS	West Bank & Gaza Strip
WB	World Bank
WRM	Wye River Memorandum

I.   Introduction

All rational indicators suggest that the Middle East central region[1] has vast potentials if the necessary conditions prevail, such as regional peace and security. Governments of the region have already indicated over the past decade their willingness to seek a lasting comprehensive peace and their desire to move rapidly towards achieving economic development targets to ensure prosperity for their people. No doubt, if existing human and natural resources as well as the geographic strategic location is utilized efficiently, the challenges posed by the 21st century could be easily met. Should peace and stability prevail, then incomes in this region will double, life expectancy would increase, literacy rates will diminish, poverty rates will be reduced, job opportunities will increase, and infant mortality would be cut down drastically. The region would then become full partners in the new world economic order.

Thus the way forward for Palestine is considered to lie in the adoption of a wide ranging reform programs which emphasize the following elements:

- Development of a credible political participatory system
- Enhancement of a healthy investment environment
- Improvement of educational facilities
- Strengthening of good governance and human rights
- Promotion of regional cooperation

In November 1995, the President of the Palestinian Authority, among others[2], approved the **Barcelona Declaration** which stressed ideals and principles that would contribute to peace, stability and development in the region. More specifically, the Barcelona Declaration contained sections on:

(i)   **political partnership and security**- which specified confidence and security building initiatives to consolidate an area of peace and stability;

(ii)   **economic and financial partnership;**

(iii)   **social, cultural and human partnerships** -- which emphasized the essential nature of the development of human resources, dialogue and respect between different cultures and religions. Participants agree to strengthen or create the instruments needed to develop exchanges between those active in development; political and civil society; the cultural and religious worlds, universities, media, associations, trade unions, private and public enterprise.

The broad concept of this paper is to visualize PA public sector reform and human resources development through improved public administration, governance, capacity building and training as a cornerstone and catalyst for peace building and social integration.

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[1]   By the term "Middle East Central Region", I refer to Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

[2]   The Barcelona Conference was held on 27th-28th November 1995 and was attended by the EU Foreign Ministers and the 12 Mediterranean partners invited namely, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Mauritania attended as a member of the Union of Maghreb Arab Countries.

II.   Historical Background

Palestine was under Ottoman occupation from 1516 till 1918. In 1922, the British Mandate was put in effect. It lasted until 15 May 1948 when the State of Israel was declared. At the time, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip[3] were left without any strong centralized Palestinian authority. Eventually, the Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration, while the West Bank opted in 1950 for unity with Jordan. In June 1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli Occupation. Jordan kept its constitutional ties with the West Bank until 31 July 1988 when King Hussein severed administrative and legal ties in order to reaffirm the Palestinian entity.

Following lengthy secret talks beginning in April 1992 and masterminded by Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgan Holst, the **Oslo Accord** between the PLO and Israel was secretly hammered out in Oslo, Norway on 13 August 1993. It called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank town of Jericho which would then fall under the civilian control of a Palestinian autonomous authority. This historic step was followed by the **Declaration of Principles (DoP)** signed by Israel and the PLO in Washington at the White House on 13 September 1993. It stipulated mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and a commitment by the Palestinian side to end terrorism and delete calls for the destruction of the State of Israel from the Palestinian Charter. The DoP called for a transitional period of no more than five years, during which final status arrangements for a lasting and comprehensive peace settlement will be negotiated. Article I of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) stipulated the establishment of a **"Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority"** for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, "for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." Major issues such as - **Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and foreign relations** and cooperation with other neighbors - were deferred to "final status" negotiations to begin two years later. The DoP was ambiguous on other issues such as:

1. Definition of the territory of the Jericho autonomous zone;
2. Release of the Palestinian political prisoners;
3. The nature of Israeli military withdrawals or redeployments;
4. Acts of violence by extremists on both sides.

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[3]   The West Bank and Gaza Strip have a combined land area of about 6,000 square kilometers with a population of around 3.3 million, a GNP of US$5.8 billion and a per capita GNP of US$1,824. The Palestinian diaspora is estimated at 3.5 million people. The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is predominantly service-oriented. Trade constituted 13.6% of the Palestinian GDP. The economy is heavily dependent on Israel: over 85% of trade is with Israel. Moreover, about one third of the labor force worked in Israel until the institution of the closure policy by Israel (120,000-140,000); earnings from these workers amounted to more than one quarter of the income of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Remittances from Palestinians working in the Gulf countries have been another important component of disposable income, although this source of revenue has been substantially diminished since the Gulf War in 1991.

The Declaration of Principles had a fundamental feature which held an impact on the Palestinian public administration system: its declared aims at establishing interim arrangements which would lead to "a Permanent Settlement".

On 4 February 1994 the **Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement**[4], a three-page document on principles of self-rule outlining the first stage of Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, was initialed in Cairo by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Added to it was an eight-page document that included details and maps of the control of border crossings and security arrangements for Jewish settlers in Gaza. The accord called for shared responsibility at border crossings but gave Israel the ultimate right of decision. Israel remained in control of the settlements, military locations, and security matters. Joint Israeli-Palestinian forces led by Israel would patrol Gaza roads leading from Jewish settlements to Israel. The boundaries were not covered in this Agreement.

The **Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement** signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 stipulated that the Palestinian Authority shall establish "a strong police force - the Palestinian Police."

The **Palestinian Authority Political Program (PAPP)** declared on 28 May 1994 the establishment of the **Palestinian Authority (PA)** "as an extenuation of the PLO." The PAPP maintained that the PA was "a temporary interim authority implementing its tasks until general democratic elections in the Palestinian land takes place." The PA was authorized to execute the interim programs during the interim phase in order to achieve a program for connecting the interim period to the final solution. The PA was authorized to "temporarily exercise its executive and legislative mandate until the general elections." Among the main tasks designated to the PA were:

1. Preparing for legislative and municipal elections and ensuring their free nature and legitimacy.
2. Planning and formulating an active local governmental structure which included a new framework for local, municipal, and village councils.
3. Drafting laws and decrees especially for the Palestinian Authority's institutions.
4. Coordinating with international institutions and donors in development programs.
5. Reconstruction of the judiciary system.
6. Preparation of modern, efficient monetary system.
7. Complementing and structuring primary institutions such as a treasury, development bank, employee bureau, accounting bureau, administrative monitor, economic council, and statistic bureau.
8. Reorganization of the public service sectors.

The **Early Empowerment Accord (EEA)** initialled in Cairo on 24 August 1994 by Palestinian minister Dr. Nabil Sha'ath and Israeli negotiator Danny Rothschild expanded the PA's authority in five key "spheres" to cover all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The five spheres of "early empowerment", for which PA authority extended beyond the autonomous areas of Jericho and the Gaza Strip included education, culture, health, social welfare, tourism, and direct taxation/Value Added Tax (VAT). According

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[4]   Also known as the **Cairo Accord or Oslo I Agreement.**

to the Early Empowerment Accord, Israel would continue to control the remaining civilian administrative functions until after the Palestinian elections. The Israeli Cabinet on 28 August 1994 approved the EEA, but stated that it was conditional on Palestinian efforts to halt violence and terrorism. Issues delayed until the permanent status negotiations included **Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and military locations.**

The **Early Empowerment Agreement** signed in Gaza on 29 August 1994 by Israel and the PA, transferred to the PA from the Israeli Military Government and its Civil Administration in the West Bank the powers and responsibilities in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and VAT. According to this agreement, Israel was to provide the PA to enable free access to all information that is necessary for an effective and smooth transfer. The PA became fully responsible for the proper functioning of the offices included in the spheres and for the management of their personnel in all aspects, including employment and placement of employment, payment of their salaries and pensions and ensuring other employee rights. The PA continued employing Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration who were employed in the offices included in each sphere and maintained their rights. Article VII of the Agreement transferred legislative powers also to the PA. It authorized the PA to promulgate secondary legislation regarding the powers and responsibilities transferred to it. Such legislation included amendments and changes to the existing laws, regulations and military orders. However, Israel would have no reservations concerning any proposed legislation, for such legislation to enter into force. Article XI of the Agreement stipulated that the PA will do its utmost to establish its revenue collection system immediately with the intent of collecting direct taxes and VAT.

On 28 September 1995 Israel and the PLO signed the landmark 400-pages **Interim Autonomy Agreement(IAA)**[5], at the White House in Washington, paving the way for an Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The IAA provided for two elections: one for the head of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in January 1996; and another to elect an 82-member self-governing authority - the Palestinian Council - which will have legislative and executive powers to be held in April 1996. It also provided that legislative power would be exercised by the **Palestinian Legislative Council** as a whole, while its executive power will be exercised by a committee of the Council called the **Executive Authority**. This committee comprised Council members together with appointed officials. The powers of the Council would extend to all matters within its jurisdiction. However, it did not have powers in the sphere of foreign relations. The IAA did, however, provide for a number of areas in which the PLO may, on behalf of the Council, conduct negotiations and sign agreements.

The **Interim Autonomy Agreement** divided the West Bank into three areas:
1. Area A with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security;
2. Area B with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and joint Israeli-Palestinian internal security;
3. Area C with Israeli civil and overall security control.

Though Israel continued to control some 70 percent of the land in the West Bank and

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[5]   Also known as Oslo II Accord or Taba Agreement.

Gaza Strip, the **Interim Autonomy Agreement** allowed the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, to reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and to open a new era of cooperation and coexistence based on common interest, dignity, a mutual respect. At the same time it protected Israelis' vital interests, and in particular its security interests, both with regard to external security and the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Negotiations on the final disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were due to begin no later than May 1996. During the first stage of the Accord, it was agreed that Palestinians would gain full control of the municipal areas and would have administrative control over an estimated 460 villages.

The **Interim Autonomy Agreement** contained three undertakings from the PLO to Israel:

1. A commitment to annul the Palestinian Covenant clauses calling for the destruction of Israel;
2. A commitment to put a stop to hostile propaganda;
3. A commitment to wage war against terrorism.

To the main body of the Agreement were appended six annexes dealing with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of powers), legal matters, economic relations, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. The permanent status negotiations were to deal with the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations, cooperation with neighboring countries, etc.

The **Wye River Memorandum (WRM)**, signed on 23 October 1998, called for the implementation of the **Interim Autonomy Agreement** and the resumption of the final status talks. It included: modifying the PLO Charter, opening Gaza Airport and the Safe Passage connecting Gaza with the West Bank, reduction in the number of Palestinian police, and release of Palestinian political prisoners.

The **Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement (SSA)**, signed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PA President Yasser Arafat in Sharm Esh-Sheikh on 4 September 1999, stipulated that Israel will withdraw in three stages from 11% of the West Bank, release 350 political prisoners, open the safe passage, and begin permanent status talks on 13 September 1999 to reach a framework for a settlement by February 2000 and a final peace agreement by September 2000.

The *Al-Aqsa Intifada* which began on 28 September 2000, and the Israeli Revolving Door Policy of incursions into the West Bank which came as a reaction to it, sealed the fate of the Oslo Peace Process bringing it to a sudden abrupt halt and causing unprecedented human losses on both sides, heavy destruction of Palestinian infrastructure and economy as well as vast demolition of main PA institutions.

The preceding discussion focused on the separate threads of the complex Palestinian-Israeli relationships, which now need to be pulled together to explain why it is of paramount importance that conducting administrative reform be given full support.

IV.   Donor Assistance for Public Administration Development

To begin, this paper will survey Donor technical assistance, existing documents and mission reports relevant to Palestinian public administration development in order to assess the current status of the sector.

A.   Technical Assistance: Financial Aid

Much of the initial Donor initiative in public administration development focused on support for the initial start-up phase of the Palestinian assumption of responsibility, accompanied by institution-building efforts, assisting in the development process through technical assistance to those ministries and other institutions responsible for the delivery of public and social services.[6]

In 1994, through a contribution of $7.25 million from the Government of Japan, UNDP/PAPP provided support to nineteen PA Ministries and Agencies in setting up their own operations. UNDP procured furniture, equipment, office machinery, office supplies and vehicles for these institutions.

In July 1995, UNDP/PAPP allocated an initial amount of $98,500 of its core funding to immediately begin to build-up a Public Administration Development Support Program. Under this project, UNDP recruited, as of August 1995, a full-time resident **Chief Technical Adviser (CTA)** to the Palestinian Authority on Public Administration Development. The CTA worked with counterparts in the Palestinian Authority such as, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government, to identify in more detail the specific activities to be conducted for the fulfillment of the PA's **Plan for Public Administration Development**. Through a contribution of $1.00 million from the Government of Japan, UNDP/PAPP provided public administration training activities in administrative and management skills for civil servants, specialized advisory support to the PA in organizational management, drafting of the legal foundation for the operation of the public sector, and support to the decision-making process of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Several other Public Administration-related support programs were implemented by bilateral and multilateral donors. For example, the British Government provided more than USD 1.2 million to improve the performance of the Civil Service of the PA through the provision of training and consultancy advice. According to the ODA proposal called "Management for Government", this capacity-building program was achieved over the three financial years 1995/96 - 1997/98.

The Government of Germany provided some support activities in Public Administration Development, which focused on the area of training.

The Government of the Netherlands also provided USD 500,000 for start-up cost

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[6] Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, United Nations, Programme of Cooperation for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1998-1999, p. 18.

financial support and a public management program to strengthen the operating functions and capabilities of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, offering basic equipment to facilitate staff efforts to work and providing immediate training.

The European Union (EU) pledged priority assistance with the aim of helping the Palestinians form a responsible administration. The EU allocated $600 million over the five- year period 1994-1998 as direct aid to the PA; $300 million in the form of grants and $300 million in the form of loans and projects. The money aimed to mainly finance economic development and housing projects.

USAID, through its support of AMIDEAST's Institutional Development Project (IDP) worked with ministries and agencies of the PA to offer technical assistance and training in the areas of management, human resource development and administration with the aim of strengthening systems and organizational capacity of the new Palestinian Authority.

B.   Technical Assistance : Advisory/Support Missions

In 1995, UN Department for Development Support and Management Services undertook two needs assessment missions at the invitation of the PA: one on strengthening the capacities of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Local government; and the other on developing the institutional capacity of the PA in terms of civil service training and strengthening the administrative functioning of the various ministries.

In May 1995, UNDP through its Management Development and Governance Division (MDGD), undertook a diagnostic mission to the Palestinian Territories to work with the PNA to examine ways to improve the machinery of government, to provide advice on the clarification and rationalization of mandates and responsibilities among selected ministries, and to identify needs for action in public administration development in order to begin the process of formulating an overall national strategy for public administration development.[7] The main areas identified by the Mission of critical importance where remedial action was necessary included the following:

(1) Strengthening PNA capacity in Public Administration Development
(2) Training for Civil Servants to be conducted as per priority needs.
(3) Clarification of Ministry Mandates.
(4) Strengthening Local Government Structures
(5) Legal and Justice Reform

The Mission concluded that by addressing these issues in a comprehensive manner, the PNA will be able to boost the capacity of all public institutions, both at the national and local levels. Clearly, this is a long-term program of institution-building, which will take time to implement. The PNA will need technical and advisory support from many donors, both inside and outside the UN system, in each of these areas of public administration development.

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[7] UNDP's Management Development and Governance Division (MDGD), Mission Report dated 14 May – 2 June 1995.

In May 1995 AMIDEAST assisted the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) in developing the "administrative areas" of PA ministries, including a new procedures manual and job descriptions for different ministries. AMIDEAST also provided specific assistance to the Civil Service Administration (CSA) and two ministries in preparing their organizational structures, functional charts, job descriptions, authorities, job requirements, and both policies and procedures.[8]

Released in June 1999, the Rocard Report, *Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions*[9], identified the following areas in which public administration in the Palestinian Authority is still weak:
1. duplication of functions and redundancy of institutions;
2. competing chains of command;
3. insufficient delegation of authority;
4. excessive compartmentalization in certain respects and lack of departmental autonomy in others;
5. inadequacy of formal procedures;
6. insufficiency of information flows within and between institutions;
7. inadequacy of routine external audit.

III. Palestinian Authority Public Administration Strategy

Prior to the implementation of self-rule in Gaza and Jericho, public administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was handled by the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities assisted by the Civilian Administration (CA). The CA had overall responsibility for the promotion of economic development and public services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Established in March 1981 by Israel, the declared purpose of the CA was to prepare the ground for the implementation of the "autonomy for residents" plan. Its assignment was "to deal with civilian matters pertaining to the local residents, with due attention to law and order."

Approximately 21,000 out of 22,000 employees of the CA were Palestinians. The CA took principal responsibility for delivering education, health and inter-city road services. It hired and paid teachers and health workers, and built necessary facilities. In addition, the CA assisted municipalities in building water, sanitation and other facilities.

On November 15, 1988, the Palestine National Council (PNC) announced the Declaration of Palestinian Independence which proclaimed the establishment of the State of Palestine, with Jerusalem its national capital. In 1989, a modest attempt was made by a number of Palestinian experts to translate the themes contained in the Palestine Declaration of Independence into a plan of action consistent with the national aspirations and priorities of the Palestinian people. It proposed preliminary broad guidelines for strategic development planning in the State of Palestine both after independence and during the

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[8] "Actions to Strengthen Civil Service Administration in the Palestinian National Authority", Report prepared by Robert E. Mitchell, Consultant to AMIDEAST, July 1995.

[9] Unfortunately, this valuable report was limited in its circulation and was not translated to the Arabic language for public employees to read it and learn from it.

interim period until full independence is achieved.[10]

In 1993, the PLO drafted a set of mandates and responsibilities for various ministries in anticipation of a breakthrough in the peace process. The study aimed at formulating inter-sectoral economic development strategies based on detailed assessments of sectoral needs and requirements. However, the study was never implemented.

With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in May 1994, the PA took over partial responsibility for civilian administration from the Israeli authorities. Then, with the signing of the 1995 Interim Autonomy Agreement, the PA took full responsibility for the civilian administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In late November 1999, a 4-day workshop entitled "Creating Palestinian Public Administration and Civil Service" was held in Tantur, Bethlehem. Sponsored by the World Bank, the workshop was attended by 35 senior PA employees as well as 10 international and 5 local experts. Its main objectives were;

1. To acquaint Palestinian officials with the experiences of other nations in public administration;
2. To introduce Palestinian officials with the recent orientations in public administration and civil service;
3. To discuss the problems and obstacles Palestinian civil servants face and seek ways and means to overcome it;
4. To assist in identifying the future mission of the public sector.[11]

The final recommendations of the workshop were:

1. To benefit from the experiences of other countries in public administration but taking into consideration the Palestinian specialty;
2. To set up a legal framework that would confirm the basis of governance and specify the relationship between the political authority and the citizens;

In an effort to improve the efficiency and practice of public sector institutions, the Palestinian Authority assigned to the **Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)** the task of coordinating all PA activities in the area of public administration development. Such an important assignment was duly needed to regroup all previous efforts from other institutions into one unit, a specialized department under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to be concerned with long-term public administration development.

In this capacity, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in its **Plan for Public Administration Development (1995)** specified the following targets:

1. To organize public institutions and prepare efficient organizational structures.
2. To specify the responsibilities and authorities of the various PA institutions and to suggest job evaluation methods that would increase employee productivity.
3. To cooperate with Palestinian universities and educational institutions in the

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[10] Center for Engineering and Planning, Masterplanning The State of Palestine, Suggested Guidelines for Comprehensive Development, Ramallah, March 1992.

[11] MAS, Final Report, Workshop entitled "Creating Palestinian Public Administration and Civil Service", 27th November-1st December, 1994, Tantur, Bethlehem (Jerusalem: MAS, March 1995), p. 7.

development of lower, middle and higher management in the Palestinian Authority.

4. To identify the exact needs of the Palestinian institutions pertaining to human resources; to locate the various fields of specialization, the different vocations and professions that would facilitate the process of development and that would be in line with comprehensive plans for economic development.

5. To define roles and functions of the core PA Ministries and the construction of an efficient Public Sector apparatus.

6. To improve public administration conditions and establish clear lines of administrative authority.

7. To increase institutionalization of public administration and the establishment of the political and judicial mechanisms of democratic governance.

8. To ensure institutional development for long-term needs;

9. To eliminate overlap, duplication and gaps in functionality.

10. To create a better functioning civil service with clear job descriptions for the various departments and agencies.

11. To propose legislations to improve the basic structure of laws and regulations.

12. To establish sound administrative practices and control of customs and practices which govern how things get done.

13. To establish an effective Cabinet decision-making process to support the development of the Palestinian Authority, leading toward decreased centralization in the decision-making process.

14. To transfer of tasks performed by international agencies and NGOs to public sector organizations under PA control.

15. To create effective economic institutions to help the PA absorb desperately needed foreign aid.

Consequently, the Palestinian **Plan for Public Administration Development (PPAD)** was directed to address all administration problems and training programs at all levels within the context of its priority objectives. It called for reorganization and implementation to empower the functions performed by PA Ministries and other public institutions through the development of a unified modern administrative system consistent with defined roles, responsibilities and authorities that are firmly enforced and clearly identified in a civil service manual. The scope of operation for the PA's **PPAD** was expected to meet its initial objectives over a period of three years subject to the availability of adequate funds.

To achieve such ambitious goals, a specialized unit headed by a Director General, the **Centre of Public Administration and Human Resources Development**, was created in 1996 inside MOPIC for the purpose of coordinating all public administration activities. The main tasks of this **Centre** were:

1. To reorganize the Public Sector
2. To develop modern policies and working procedures
3. To promote and develop human resources of public sector employees
4. To provide consultancy support to PA ministries and agencies in management, organization and administration.

The CPAHRD was succeeded by the National Center for Public Administration

(NCPA) which was transferred in 1998 to the General Personnel Council (GPC) becoming the Council's Directorate for Human Resources Development (DHRD). Both the NCPA and DHRD failed to play any major role in the development of the public sector employees. The NCPA claimed credit for the work done by another entity: the **Public Administration Development Institute (PADI)**, established in 1996 by UNDP/PAPP, to coordinate all public administration training activities, undertaken by local institutions and training centers and eventually fizzled away. The short-lived PADI, headed by UNDP Chief Technical Advisor on Public Administration Development, conducted more than 100 training workshops throughout the West Bank and Gaza in a wide range of management skills. It also sponsored the establishment of training units within PA institutions. In 1997 it was transferred from UNDP to MOPIC upon the insistence of MOPIC Minister and was merged with NCPA.[12]

PADI provided consultancy services to PA ministries on civil service structure as policies, procedures, responsibilities, authorities, job descriptions, positions, grades and salaries in order to have them specified in a clear manner and made known. Advisory on the selection of highly competent leadership and staff employees at different levels and files was also provided; coupled with adequate training programs conducted "in-house", and by private expert institutions, universities, and international training agencies.

V. Obstacles Facing Public Administration Development

From the start, many difficulties faced the Palestinian Authority (PA) in its administration tasks. The PA had only limited autonomy in the face of huge and pressing problems which were the result of a long history of occupation, in addition to the other challenges such as building new public institutions without any prior expertise, the frequent closure of Israel to Palestinian workers and goods, and a weak economy. Most institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had suffered under occupation from the lack of coordination and the inability to complement each other within a common framework.

The main obstacles facing public administration development in Palestine that need to be addressed may be categorized as follows:

1. Geographic Dispersal
The geographic dispersal of PA Ministries among Gaza, Jericho and other parts of the West Bank is very deleterious to coherence and consultation. The reality of this geographical dispersal is made much worse by limited technical capacity to communicate among them.

2. Overweight Civil Servants Body
Since the PA was established in 1994, the number of public sector employees has grown

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[12] The World Bank Report, West Bank & Gaza: Strengthening Public Sector Management, Jerusalem, 1999, states: "In its first year alone, the NCPA provided training to over 2,000 public sector employees throughout the West Bank in a wide range of management skills." p. 27. In fact, those training workshops were conducted by PADI and not the NCPA. The World Bank statistic is quoted from the publication Partnership for Development: Development Plan, published by MOPIC, NCPA in September 1996. The booklet lists at the end courses financed and implemented by Donors and not the NCPA (ODA, USAID, and mostly by UNDP). For comparison, see UNDP/PAPP, Public Administration Training in Palestinian Territories, Report of the CTA, Public Administration Training Programme, July 1996.

substantially. The establishment of PA institutions and pressures to solve the high unemployment problem through public sector employment has resulted in a rapid expansion of the public sector. The number of civil servants more than tripled, from 22,000 to 75,000 between 1993 and 1996, resulting in a low-paid and inefficient public sector. Growth in the public sector was made possible with access to two sources of funds: donor aid and tax clearances.[13] In 2000-2001, most new jobs were generated by the public sector. In 2000, public sector employment grew by 12.8% to some 120,000 persons, reflecting its high share in job creation.[14] All efforts to decrease this inflated number of employees failed.

3. Lack of Skills and Knowledge in Public Administration
Although few members of the PA leadership have had some experience with public administration, most PA senior employees and general staff lack such experience and knowledge. There is a general lack of managerial skills in public administration management.

4. Structural and Organizational Problems
There is a serious problem in the structure of the public sector of the Palestinian Authority (PA): it is two bodies in one. One body comprises the regular civil servants while the other body comprises the social security beneficiaries. The absence of a social security system had prompted the PA President to use the civil service as a security blanket for those who would normally have been registered on the social security payroll. In the West Bank and Gaza still operate two different administrative and legal systems as well as two pension systems. When in 1951 Jordan incorporated the West Bank, it established a common civil service to administer the Palestinian and Jordanian regions of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In consequence, the structure of West Bank's civil service system was based on Jordan's Rules 20 of 1955, 36 of 1956, and 23 of 1966. On the other side, Egypt administered Gaza as a trusteeship under Egyptian civil service rules.
Within the public sector there exist two distinct cadres: the staff of PA ministries and institutions, and the police and security forces.[15]
Furthermore, there exist different layers of organizational development within the ministries, some much more developed than the other, which affected the overall performance and cohesion of the Palestinian public sector.

5. Pre-occupation of PA Leadership with the Peace Process
Since its establishment, the PA cabinet meetings have been almost totally dominated by discussion of the various aspects of the peace process. Glen Shortliffe, Senior Consultant on the Machinery of Government, noted this factor back in 1995 in his Report to the UNDP entitled "The Palestinian Authority and Machinery of Government".[16] Although such neglect of the public administration sector in the early stages of the PA was

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[13] "Larger Public Sector and Lower Private Sector Activity", in Development Under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition, Edited by Ishaq Diwan and Radwan Shaban, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank, p. 7.

[14] UNSCO Report on the Palestinian Economy, Spring 2001.

[15] Ibid., p. 25.

[16] Glen Shortliffe, Senior Consultant on the Machinery of Government, Report to the UNDP, The Palestinian Authority and Machinery of Government", 30 June 1995, p. 4.

understandable since the PA was new and still embryonic. However, this pre-occupation of PA leadership with political issues at the expense of institution building remained to receive full presidential priority.

6. Responsibility Overlaps
There are serious mandate overlaps and gaps in terms of spheres of responsibilities and functions among the various ministries.

7. Lack of Legal Homogeneity
The rule of law, equality before the law, legal certainty, and effective law enforcement are pillars of a democratic society and enable citizens to mobilize, organize and manage themselves for their advancement and for the common good. A fair and consistent legal structure enables a society to function effectively. The laws governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip are a complex mix of Ottoman, Jordanian, Egyptian and British mandate laws as well as Israeli Military Orders. Eversince the PA took power in 1994 there has been a legal and judicial vacuum. There is still no unified single "Palestinian" modern legal framework.[17] Palestinian laws are in great need of harmonization and modernization. In addition, there is a dire need to draft an administrative law that governs the public sector and to establish statutes governing public organizations, in order to clarify levels and domains of responsibility.

As reported by UNDP/MDGD Mission, the legal framework is a defining element of the Government's overall relationship with the society. The difficult process of developing a fully Palestinian legal framework, based on the existing laws as a starting point, needs to be undertaken in order to legitimize the legal system and provide a solid legal foundation for the development of Palestine. Further support will also be required for the strengthening of institutions for the administration of justice.

8. Oversized Cabinet
According to the Presidential Decree No. (1) for 1996, the structure of the Palestinian Authority (PA) was made up of 19 ministries. A Cabinet shuffle that took place on 6 August 1998, included the appointment of ten additional ministers, including eight state ministers and one minister without portfolio. These ministries were: 1) Agriculture, 2) Civil Affairs, 3) Communications, 4) Culture and Information, 5) Detainees and Freed Detainees Affairs, 6) Economy and Trade, 7) Education, 8) Environment, 9) Finance, 10) Health, 11) Higher Education, 12) Housing, 13) Industry, 14) Information, 15) Interior, 16) Jerusalem Affairs, 17) Justice, 18) Labor, 19) Local Government, 20) NGO Affairs, 21) Parliamentary Affairs, 22) Planning and International Cooperation, 23) Post and Telecommunication, 24) Public Works, 25) Social Affairs, 26) Supplies, 27) Tourism and Antiquities, 28) Transport, 29) Waqf and Religious Affairs, 30) Youth and Sport, and 31) Bethlehem 2000. The latest cabinet shuffle that took place on 12 June 2002 decreased the number of ministries to 21. The present ministries are: Agriculture, Civil Affairs, Post/Communications, Culture/Information, Economy/Industry/Trade, Education/Higher

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[17] On 28 May 1998, a new Civil Service Law was signed into law by the President establishing a unified civil service managed by a consistent set of institutions. Despite Presidential approval and subsequent publication making the law operational in August 1998, the new grading structure and salary scale proposed by the law caused so much dissatisfaction among PA employees that the President suspended the law in January 1999 and called for its revision.

Education, Finance, Health, Interior, Justice, Labor, Local Government, Natural Resources, Planning and International Cooperation, Public Works/Housing, Social Affairs, Supplies, Tourism and Antiquities/Bethlehem 2000, Transport, Waqf and Religious Affairs, and Youth and Sport. Not included in the new shuffle are the following ministries: Detainees and Freed Detainees Affairs, Environment, Jerusalem Affairs, NGO Affairs, and Parliamentary Affairs. The Ministry of Industry was annexed to Ministry of Economy and Trade; the Ministry of Higher Education was annexed to Ministry of Education; Ministry of Housing was annexed to Ministry of Public Works; while the Ministry of Natural Resources was newly created. In the new shuffle, the number of Ministers dropped from 27 to 20 ministers; 15 ministers kept their posts, 12 were relieved, and five were newly appointed.

9. Inefficiency of Cabinet Ministers and Senior Officials

PA salaries, unattractive employment benefits, lack of incentives as well as poor work conditions do not attract the best and the brightest among the Palestinians. A number of the PA ministers and senior PA officials owe their posts to political, ethnic or religious considerations rather than to expertise or qualifications. Some cabinet members and senior officials do not even reside in the Palestinian Territories yet they occupy such high public offices. The relationship between ministers and senior civil servants is highly politicized. Furthermore, although there is some accountability to the PA President but there is no accountability to the public. Definitely, the concept of the "right man in the right place" was not taken into consideration when filling the top seats in the public sector. Thus some would fail miserably in a test that would include the following questions:

- What is the role of the minister/director in establishing and maintaining the governing values of his ministry/department?
- How to maintain a team approach amongst your staff?
- How would you balance public expectations with reality?

10. Administrative Politicization

Another special consideration in the Palestinian Public administration context is that there is no separation between administration and politics. In making value choices it is a characteristic of high level administrators and bureaucrats to be importantly engaged in politics. Participation in the formulation and execution of public policies in Palestine means, ipso facto, involvement in politics; generally speaking, it is interpreted as a political act when the president appoints a Minister, deputy Minister, General Director or any other senior public employee. Senior public officials move in this environment, because for one thing, they seek power and influence to establish their authority in order to muster support for the programs they administer. When the Palestinian Security forces in Gaza take strong action against political groupings or individuals opposed to the peace process, they are angrily denounced by some groups and praised by others and each side mobilizing their political strength in the confrontation. This example can be multiplied many times over; every day's news of the Palestinian events should supply new illustrations.

11. Ambiguity in Separation of Powers Concept

Policy is normally made by the legislature in the form of laws and is carried out by the executive branch. In this conception, administration is execution, that is, carrying out the

laws passed by the legislature with a clear distinction existing between legislative and administrative powers. During the period of Israeli occupation, The Israeli Military Area Commander was endowed with all legislative, executive, and judicial powers in Palestine. The tradition persisted after the occupation ended of Palestinian Territories. The Executive Branch is still very dominant in law-making despite the fact that this task had been entrusted to the Palestinian Council formed since 20 January 1996. So it follows that public administration is "what the executive branch does". Complicating the matter further, is the absence of an independent judiciary branch that stands apart from administration, restraining public administrators from unconstitutional, illegal, and arbitrary acts.

This situation raised particular concerns voices by many Palestinian citizens and organization, particularly the non-governmental organizations, over the constitutionality and wisdom of legislative and judicial powers being vested in the executive branch. The absence of other branches of government as separate independent entities that have the right to check up on what kinds of decisions the executive branch had made on national and private issues complicates the matter further. Thus "administration" in the Palestinian Context, is not limited to "execution", as there is no clear distinction between legislative and administrative powers. Consequently, public administration definition in this particular case cannot leave out the legislature and the judiciary, as there is no other branches that would directly oversee the activities of the administrative ministries and agencies.

12. Absence of Constitution
There exists so far no Palestinian Constitution that would make a statement of differences between legislative, judicial and administrative powers and which would prevent one branch of government (executive) to encroach upon the powers, functions, and duties vested in the other two branches of government (legislative ad judiciary).

As a result in the Palestinian scheme of government, law-making, law-implementing and law-interpreting entities are so far practiced by the Executive, and "administration" is all contained within that branch. No branch so far is responsible for maintaining a close watch on what goes on in the administrative sector under the president. This is very crucial particularly with the growing structure of the Palestinian Authority and the expansion of its authority to the West Bank and Gaza.

13. Mismanagement of Funds and Time
Many PA employees fail to appreciate the value of time. Thus most directors and managers would not do well in a test that would include the following questions:
- What sorts of issues require your direct involvement?
- How is your time managed?
- Who has access, when and why?

14. Poor Lines of Communication between Public Governance Sectors

VI. Looking Ahead - Future Strategies:
Public Administration Planning and Development

The success of any lasting peace in the area requires stability in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a maturation of internal public administration processes. Implementation of a farsighted public administration development vision, would require a well-functioning public administration sector. Four initiatives are recommended:

A. Initiative One: Public Administration Development Strategy

Priority ought to be given to supporting actions to develop a Public Administration Development Strategy, which would outline needs assessment for Public Administration Development and design the necessary training plans and strategies. Because of the nature of public administration, particular attention would be paid to preparing Public Administration Development Plans, managing human resources, and developing gender sensitive programs. The Public Administration Development Strategy would provide a cooperative structure for all concerned to promote this vital element for governance. It would include:

a. An independent assessment of PA public administration needs.
b. Development of proposed policies and guidelines for Public Administration improved performance.
c. Development of Public Administration Development Institution and related facilities.
d. Assessment of personal needs and development of plans of actions to locate and attract expatriates to fulfill these needs.
e. Strengthening Local Governments
   To promote the full contribution of Palestinian municipalities, towns and villages to national development, the management and planning capacity of municipal and village council staff needs to be strengthened; an exchange of experience and expertise needs to take place between large and relatively successful municipalities and smaller village and local councils; the supporting and coordinating role of the Ministry of Local Government Affairs needs to be strengthened; and the role of Palestinian NGOs, many of which operate in the public sphere, needs to be rationalized.

Initiative Two: Public Administration Development Ministry

Depending on how comprehensive its strategy of reform is, the Palestinian Authority has a number of options to choose from in terms of organizational status and affiliation[18]:

1. Administration within a certain ministry, i.e. Qatar;

2. A Civil Service Board affiliated to the prime minister, i.e. Kuwait;

3. A Civil Service Board attached to a Minister for Administrative Affairs, i.e. Egypt;

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[18] See Nazih Ayubi, "Policy Development and Administrative Changes in the Arab World," in O. P. Dwivedi and Keith Henderson, eds., Public Administration in World Perspective, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990.

4. A minister for Administrative Affairs without an affiliated central agency, i.e. Morocco;

5. A Ministry for Administrative Development with an affiliated Public Administration Institute, i.e. Jordan;

6. A Higher Committee for Development and Reform, i.e. Saudi Arabia.

Also, to adopt one of the following options regarding administration and organization:

1. The principle of a unified agency in charge of all activities of administrative development, such as Egypt;

2. The principle of a multiplicity of agencies, such as Lebanon, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

. I would strongly recommend establishing a Ministry for Administrative Development with an affiliated Public Administration Institute to conduct a comprehensive strategy of reform with an incremental, piecemeal approach, experimenting with various methods at different stages.

Initiative Three: Public Administration Development Institute

No doubt, there is a need to establish a **Public Administration Development Institute (PADI)** to support priority technical assistance activities in Public Administration for the Palestinian Authority, including the training of civil servants program, and providing consultancy services for the various ministries. Its broad strategic goal would be to improve public administration and governance of the Palestinian Authority in Palestine, and to support the Palestinian Authority in undertaking the following priority activities:

    a. **Public Administration Development Strategy.**

    b. **Public Administration Structure and Organization.**
An appropriate structure for undertaking Public Administration Development needs to be put in place both at the policy-making level, so that policy decisions effecting Public administrations development can be made, and at the operational level , so that the groundwork for policy decisions will be made.

    c. **Preparation and Implementation of Training Programs for PA Civil Servants.**
This element would include training personnel in order to work more effectively in aspects of public administration,

    d. **Steering Public Policy Agenda**
This element would include developing a public management framework to steer, coordinate and implement Public Administration Development activities.

    e. **Publication and Dissemination of Public Administration Information.**

This element would include the development of series of public administration training manuals and booklets suitable for training purposes and use by participants of training programs. Materials to be prepared under this activity would include video presentations and pretend materials, including guidebooks on public administration and specific topics of interest to public employees, prepared in Arabic to assure their broad use. This element would also support training personnel in effective management.

These activities would be undertaken by the Public Administration Development Institute as a priority need for the Palestinian Authority to allow the PA to provide basic policies and guidelines. Its end objective would be to assist the Palestinian Authority widen its base of support among the Palestinian people and the international community through:

1. Improved quality performance of PA employees.
2. Increased efficiency of PA public administration.
3. Proper functioning of PA process and apparatus.
4. Sound administrative practices.
5. Effective public administration institutions.
6. Better organizational structures of PA ministries.

Specific organizational structures, job description and general consultancies would be carried out for all PA ministries requesting it. Experts and Consultants in this area of specialty would evaluate past consultation reports and identify their strength and weakness. They would examine proposed organizational charts for the ministries, job descriptions of employees, assess training requirements and study current restraints to effective Public Administration Development.

Establishing a **Public Administration Development Institute** would help the PA gain the necessary capacities and infrastructure upon which to launch the implementation of the PA's long-term **Public Administration Development Strategy**.

Initiative Four: Public Administration Anti-Corruption Task Force
There is an urgent need to establish a Public Administration Anti-Corruption Task Force.

IX. Final Remarks

There is no doubt that the Oslo Peace Process would only succeed if both peoples felt a stake in creating broader political, economic, and social stability. Thus, as one UN report asserts:

> "*Technical assistance to the public sector – at planning, implementation, monitoring and accountability levels – is essential, in order to further the goals of good governance and*

public administration, and to ensure efficient and effective delivery of services at the central and local governmental and non-governmental tiers. The continuing challenge is to assist in the assumption of central responsibilities by the Palestinian Authority, while also supporting local and non-governmental levels." [19]

On a long-term basis, conducting public administration reform would contribute to the foundation for self-rule and would provide the nuts and bolts of day-to-day efficient administration, and would ensure financial accountability and operational transparency, essential for the continuing progress of the peace process.

In its report, **Developing the Occupied Territories**, the World Bank stressed that the PA must address the large backlog of physical and social infrastructure needs that accumulated under the Israeli occupation. "This is a function to be undertaken mainly by the public sector." The PA faces this challenge with "limited institutional capacity."[20] The PA failed to recognize adequately the importance of putting in place a civil service system adequate to meet this challenge as quickly as possible. Neither did it recognize the urgent need to develop adequately its capacity by recruiting new qualified employees, defining clear objectives and establishing the necessary bodies demanded by the system in order to proceed in the process of development in a planned fashion that will serve Palestinian economic and development interests. It underestimated the need to open the way for all public institutions to develop within a clear framework and with a common vision.

The longer term PA strategy need to be carefully drawn to achieve higher level goals, and therefore identify high priority actions that needed to be taken as well as issues contributing to the successful performance of public institutions while holding PA personnel accountable in the execution of their duties at low cost.

The PA's emphasis so far has been geared to coincide with the high expectations of the Palestinian people: to create a social, economic and political system within a state of law and equal opportunity for all Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Albeit, the general activity for implementing the action plan itself was never put in progress, and no tangible results were ever felt.

Therefore, reforming the PA is a Palestinian necessity dictated by the current political, economic, and social deterioration of the Palestinian society. The aim is to improve the performance of the political system to such an extent that the decision-making apparatus becomes more transparent, more democratic, more rational and more productive.

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[19] Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, United Nations, Programme of Cooperation for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1998-1999, p. 18.

[20] The World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories, An Investment in Peace : Overview. Volume 1, Washington, 1993, p. 23.

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PALESTINIAN REFORM DISCUSSION GROUP

A broad consensus emerged around the objective of establishing a Palestinian political system that is transparent, accountable, efficient and democratic. Survey date confirms massive support. Questions relate to how much is possible given external and internal constraints.

The aspiration is not new ; some asked whether it is now surfacing because of external pressure. What is the role of outsiders, how can they contribute, what is being asked of them.

Palestinian participants responded that reform is first of all a Palestinian demand, pointing for example to the legislative Council's committee of inquiry after the comptroller's report in 1997.

Palestinians said the focus should be on ending the occupation; little is possible without a withdrawal of the IDF from area A. for example, neither the cabinet nor the legislative council have been able to meet for the last 18 months.

Israelis focussed on the requirement for security. The PA had been undermined by the president himself who encouraged recourse to revolutionary legitimacy as opposed to institutional. The PA hardly exists any more and Palestinian society risks disintegration. What is the power base, such as Fatah and the Tanzim, that can carry through reform? Can the international community nurse the PA to a new existence?

The Palestinians responded that the PNA had been a colony rather than a state, subject to insuperable constraints. What is critical is the emergence of a political horizon to enable Palestinians to take their institutions in hand, the lifting of the occupation. Fatah and tha Tanzim would probably b e the main contenders in forthcoming elections.

It was suggested that Palestinian security forces had become fragmented during the second intifadah and had ended up fighting Israelis. Security leadership has to be renewed, made up of educated officers, filtering out those involved in violence. Numbers might be reduced.

Israelis expressed understanding of the impossibility of reforms in the context of terrorism and in a situation of occupation. Squaring democracy and security is a challenge. They hoped that Palestinians could build on the positive elements of the Bush policy which does offer the prospect of a viable Palestinian state, as also expressed by defense minister Ben Eliezer in his article for Al Quds. (Palestinians pointed to a contradiction between word and deed).

A European perspective underlined the priority that had been given by the PNA to symbols and security over reform, since 1994. The European Commission had used its budgetary support to nudge toward reform; the consolidation of accounts, independence of the judiciary. The commission is still developing a comprehensive plan to support reform, still looking at the outside conditions necessary for it to happen.

The group moved towards agreement on the formula that reform is a Palestinian requirement for which outside help is needed. There is a need for a cooling off period, to foster an inversion toward a virtuous circle where the present public disapproval of suicide attacks could be consolidated, lead to reciprocal action and to cooperation between security services.

A view was expressed, shared by several Palestinians, that:
1. real reform is required, not cosmetic;
2. personalizing the issue is unproductive;
3. priority should go to judicial independence, including the means to enforce decisions, fight corruption and guarantee basic freedoms;
4. new elections could follow with the help of the international community (oversight, protection, intervention, assurances to Israel) and the cooperation of Israel (end extra-judicial executions, removal of checkpoints in Palestinian territories, withdrawal from areas A and B);
5. this formula would lead to confidence in government and a Palestinian state in the areas occupied in 1967, at peace next to Israel.

All members of the group agreed about a two state solution, both states having to cooperate in their own interest. Israel has an interest in cooperating in the Palestinian elections. One voice warned however, that the only superpower had determined that the PA president had to be removed, provoking the response that the occupation and not Arafat is the root problem and that the people would decide.

Israelis expressed full support for the five point course outlined above, and a willingness to undertake the elements identified for Israeli cooperation except that withdrawal, they

said, could only happen on the basis of trust. Palestinians must figure out a way to reassure.

A non-regional view pointed to the difficulty but the desirability of de-linking reform from the political context, when the American president had specifically linked them. To protect the integrity of reform, it would be useful to bring in an outside monitoring committee, to sponsor and vouch for reform in the face of international opinion. The difficulty of isolating from personalities could be mitigated by emphasizing transparency and accountability, for example by making the executive responsible to the assembly in a prime ministerial system.

Most Palestinians agreed on the priority of judicial independence and empowerment which is linked in turn to the ability to summon, to jail, to police and to implement follow-up, all of which require freedom of movement.

One Israeli drew the conclusion that it was important for the USA and the Israeli publics to understand that reform goes much beyond the issues of leadership and security.

A broad consensus emerged about:
1. the impossibility of implementing reform in a situation of occupation;
2. therefore, the usefulness of starting by devising a blueprint, work on which can start immediately;
3. the importance of the blueprint and of an outside sponsor that can together attract international attention, foremost in the USA and Israel;
4. the blueprint would focus on a package of a few salient measures which could include the judiciary, election of a constituent assembly, accountability of the executive;
5. demonstrating serious intent could help speed up the withdrawal of occupying forces;
6. the need for things to happen in parallel, inverting the spiral of violence (without realistically expecting to eliminate it completely), withdrawal of forces, new dynamic.

The group ended by reconsidering its mandate. There was no opposition to the view that the focus on an internal Palestinian matter discourages non-Palestinians from participating. If retained for future meetings, its mandate should be broadened to include reform-type issues of democracy, basic freedoms, accountability and transparency of government outside the Palestinian national community as well.

Bruges 16/7/02

REFORMING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORUTY (PA)

PROFESSOR MOHAMMED DAJANI
AL-QUDS UNIVERSITY
JERUSALEM

# REFORMING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORUTY (PA): WHICH ROAD TO BE TAKEN ?

DR. MOHAMMED DAJANI AL-QUDS UNIVERSITY JERUSALEM

REFORMING THE PA : OBJECTIVES

TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT IS:

- DEMOCRATIC
- TRANSPARENT
- ACCOUNTABLE
- RELIABLE
- EFFICIENT
- STABLE
- PEACE ORIENTED

WHY IS REFORM NEEDED?

1. NEED FOR SERVICE DELIVERY
2. NEED FOR MODERNITY
3. TO AFFIRM RULE OF LAW
4. TO RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
5. TO END MISMANAGEMENT
6. TO END NEGLIGENCE
7. TO END WASTE OF RESOURCES
8. TO STAMP OUT CORRUPTION

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research has conducted a public opinion poll in WBGS during 15-18 May 2002. A representative sample of 1317 adults were interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations, with a sample error of 3%.

- 91% support fundamental changes in the Palestinian Authority,
- 85% support the unification of the security services,
- 95% support dismissal of ministers,
- 83% support holding elections in the next few moths,
- 92% support adoption of a constitution.
- But only 48% support, and 43% oppose, changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of a prime minister while the office of the president would become ceremonial.
- 83% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions.

- 89% support a democratic political system,
- 95% support periodic elections,
- 82% support the election of the head of the state for a limited period only, 85% support full freedom to form political parties,
- 82% support free press without state censorship,
- 78% support a judiciary independent of the executive branch

REFORMING THE PA:
WHAT DOES IT MEAN? FOR WHOM?

IT MEANS DIFFERENT THINGS
TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE:

FOR ARAFAT:	STAYING IN POWER
FOR SHARON:	GETTING RID OF PA & ARAFAT
FOR BUSH:	GETTING RID OF ARAFAT
	EMPOWERING THE PEOPLE
FOR EUROPEANS:	CREATING A MODERN GOVT
FOR ARABS:	MAINTAINING STABILITY
FOR PALESTINIANS:	ENFORCING ACCOUNTABILITY,

TRANSPARENCY, EFFICIENCY AND DEMOCRACY

REFORMING THE PA:
HOW MUCH IS NEEDED ?
HOW MUCH WILL BE ALLOWED ?

- **WINDOW DRESSING?**
- **COSMETIC SURGERY?**
- **HEART TRANSPLANT?**

REFORMING THE PA:
SPHERES IN NEED OF URGENT REFORM

1. ADMINISTRATIVE SPHERE

2. ECONOMIC SPHERE

3. LEGAL SPHERE

4. SECURITY SPHERE

REFORMING THE PA: WHO TO DO WHAT ?

1. ALL SPHERES:

WOULD PA PRESIDENT ARAFAT BE WILLING TO IMPLEMENT NEEDED REFORMS IN THE VARIOUS SPHERES OF PA?

2. ADMINISTRATIVE SPHERE

CAN VETERAN MOPIC MINISTER NABIL SHAATH IMPLEMENT NEEDED REFORMS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SPHERE OF PA?

3. ECONOMIC SPHERE

CAN NEWLY-APPOINTED FINANCE MINISTER SALAM FAYYAD IMPLEMENT NEEDED REFORMS IN ECONOMIC SPHERE OF PA?

4. LEGAL SPHERE

CAN NEWLY-APPOINTED JUSTICE MINISTER IBRAHIM AL-DAGHMA IMPLEMENT NEEDED REFORMS IN THE LEGAL SPHERE OF PA?

5. SECURITY SPHERE

CAN NEWLY-APPOINTED INTERIOR MINISTER ABDEL RAZZAK AL-YAHYA IMPLEMENT NEEDED REFORMS IN THE SECURITY SPHERE OF PA?

Reform Agenda of the Palestinian Government
## A. In the General Domain

The Palestinian Authority's Reform Program	PA Implementation Commitment: First 100 Days[1]	Milestones of Reform	Donor Support
"A-1. Reinforce the separation of powers, such that the Legislative Council can play its role to the full, as well as the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law."	"1-The Basic Law will be published in the Official Gazette no later than **15/7/2002**." "2-The government will start implementing measures that separate powers **immediately**." "4-Regulations relevant to the Governors will be prepared and issued by the **end of September 2002**."	A-1.1 Publication of Basic Law in Official Gazette. Entry into force of the Basic Law before 31 August 2002. A-1.2 Issuance of regulations relevant to Governors.	(not required) (not required)
"A-2. Restructure the ministries and governmental institutions, review their methods of work and create a modern and effective civil service, as elements of a reform process that ensures the effectiveness and efficiency of work in the service of the citizen."	"5-Restructuring all ministries and government institutions and reforming their operations will take place, starting with the conciliation of the operations of the Ministries of Finance, Planning and International Cooperation, and Economy, Industry and Trade within **two months** of the adoption of this plan." "12-The ministries to finish preparing 3-month plans based on the guidelines of this reform and development program and to submit these plans to the Cabinet **within two weeks** of the adoption of this plan."	Clarify and publish ministerial mandates, organizational charts and reporting relationships. Conduct strategic reviews to determine optimal structure, function and organization of PA institutions. Carry out job evaluation and description to better match staffing to institutional needs. Unify Civil Service legal and institutional framework for West Bank and Gaza through passage of Civil Service Law with appropriate revisions and integration of administrative systems, including computerized personnel information and payroll functions; strengthen systems for establishment management and control. Development of modern, merit based systems for	Technical assistance and management consulting services; training in strategic review methods. Technical assistance. Support for analytic and programming work; investment in HR information management systems; technical assistance. Technical assistance.

[1] The Palestinian Government, as an expression of its determination to implement the measures listed above in column 1, commits itself to "start working immediately on implementing all other measures in this plan so as to leave an effect, tangible and visible to the people, **within three months** of its adoption." This thirteenth commitment is in addition to the twelve listed above in Column 2.

AT TOP OF AGENDA:
REFORMING SECURITY APPARATUS

1. **CONSOLIDATING TWELVE DIFFERENT SECURITY AGENCIES INTO ONE STRUCTURE: WITH ONE BUDGET AND ONE CHAIN OF COMMAND**

2. **ANSWERING TO A CIVILIAN AUTHORITY: INTERIOR MINISTER TO HAVE AUTHORITY OVER ALL SECURITY FUNCTIONS**

3. **FOR SECURITY HEADS:**
   * **LIMITED MANDATE**
   * **LIMITED TERM OF OFFICE TO 4 YEARS**
   * **NO INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS, INVESTMENT OR MEDIA**

GESTURES IN THE DIRECTION OF REFORM : DEMOCRACY BILL

On 28 May 2002 PA PRESIDENT ARAFAT SIGNED A BILL PLEDGING THE CREATION OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

THE BILL:

1. GUARENTEES POLITICAL AND PERSONAL RIGHTS FOR PALESTINIANS

2. ESTABLISHES A SEPARATION OF POWERS AMONG EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIARY BRANCHES

3. CALLS FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT

GESTURES IN THE DIRECTION OF REFORM : CABINET RESHUFFLE

OLD CABINET	NEW CABINET
o **30 MINISTRIES**	o **21 MINISTRIES**
o **31 MINISTERS INCLUDING**	o **21 MINISTERS**
o **8 STATE MINISTERS**	o **5 NEW MINISTERS**
o **1 MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO**	**INTERIOR**
	JUSTICE
	EDUCATION
	FINANCE
	LABOR

REFORMING THE PA:
Looking Ahead - Future Strategies

INITIATIVE 1:

DESIGNING PA DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

INITIATIVE 2:

ESTABLISHING PA DEVELOPMENT MINISTRY

INITIATIVE 3:

ESTABLISHING PA DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE .

INITIATIVE 4:

ESTABLISHING ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE

REFORMING THE PA

IS THERE CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM ?

Bruges, Belgium
July 13-16, 2002

Military Escalation and the Neglect of a Political Solution Weakens Peace Advocates

By: Kamal BEN YOUNES,
BBC Correspondent, Tunis / Editor, Assabah Daily

INTRODUCTION

When our previous meeting in London drew to an end, the Palestinian- Israeli scene was being marked by a slight quietness, after two weeks had passed without any suicide attacks and after some had started to talk about a new international peace summit. But, even before most of us left London, we learned about a new suicide attack near Tel-Aviv. An attack that resulted in seventeen dead and tens of injured among Israelis. The usual scenarios then went on: the Israeli charts and planes attacking the Palestinian cities and villages, from one side, versus suicide attacks against the Israeli settlements and against civil as well as military targets, from the other side. Attacks, assassination and arrests, on one part, versus intensification of verbal and physical violence, including against civil and children, on the other part.

And despite the increasing of the American, European and Arab diplomatic and political action, and the announcement of several new peace plans (mainly that of Bush), the region's mood appeared far from paving the way to negotiations for the realization of a true peace; negotiation that mean the existence of parties that accept political negotiations over solving their disputes according to clear political and legal references, that is on the basis of the UNO resolution, precisely those number 242 and 338.

In this framework, what could be required from those seeking practical solutions to the Middle East crisis? A crisis that has consumed the human energy and resources of the region since more than half a century. And what should be done to put on end to the unstoppable political agitation, security shaking, and political and economic problems, the all caused by this bloody, multi-facial conflict inside those parts of this region that

are directly related to it? These parts include,   besides
Syria Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, most of the Arab and Muslim countries from
Morocco to Indonesia.

For decades now, the conflict has taken international dimensions and become
universally complex once some states such as Iran, that backs Syria and Hizbollah, and
Iraq, that bombed Israel during the second Gulf war, transformed to direct actors in the
conflict.

The resolving of this conflict has become even more urgent following the September 11
attacks and war in Afghanistan, and after the thousands of demonstrations held
throughout the world (including those inside the Arab countries, and which had been
violently repressed) . These demonstrations in some cases expressed peace-supporting
positions, and in other ones reflected an opposition to Israel and a rejection to the U.S.
foreign policy. Tensioned movements were also organized against Israel and the U.S.
government in Europe, America and even the countries that have made big steps
towards the political and economic naturalization with Israel, such as Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia , Qatar and Oman .

I/ Securing an international legacy for any just political solution

1 - Bi-lateral solutions are impossible for a conflict that has turned universal since its birth

Israel was created following the UNO resolution 181 and gained international support throughout its various wars against the Arabs and Palestinians in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982 due to its backing by the Security Council against countries and movements that opposed it in a conflict over "existence" (and not over natural "frontiers").

These countries even considered Israel a part of the British colonization's heritage in the region. A heritage which should be eliminated.

And despite the Israeli military superiority, which is a result of American and European support, Israel was not able to end its isolation until former Egyptian president Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the launching of a non-declared dialogue between the governments of Israel and the Arab countries, on one part, and with Palestinian leaders (via PLO) through mediation by the US, some European countries and Arab ones, including Tunisia and Morocco, on an other part.

But Israel did not succeed to break its isolation from the non- allied countries, the OCDI member states, the Arab League and in the OUA only after the September 1993 Oslo-Washington agreement and after the historic and symbolic OLP leadership officially recognized the state of Israel. That is when OLP symbol leader Arafat shook hands with former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, whom the Arabs and Palestinians consider "slaughterer of the first Intifadha's children" and "war minister of the Zionist enemy".

And despite the different Israeli governments' reserves over a lot of the UNO resolutions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict (mainly those issued by the SC), and Washington's vetoes against more than 80 resolution plans on the Middle East issue, nobody can expect (in this age of globalization and OMC) the success of implementing an everlasting and just peace in the regions and a resolving of the Arab-Israeli conflict without the referring , in a way or the other, to the UNO resolutions and international legacy. Whatever be the conditional consideration and the internal "electoral tactics" in Israel and the US (which is going to hold general election next year).

The US succeeded to end Iraq colonization to Kuwait at a record time in 1991 because it recurred to UNO and built "an international coalition against the Iraqi regime" in which 30 states took part. The US political and military action in the Gulf region since 1991, and some aspects of its campaign in Afghanistan have been also criticized. But what threw a certain legacy on American's "international war on terror" is the UNO's consent with the strategy of Washington and its allies. In their successful campaign in former Yugoslavia, the US and allies were also able to end the civil war and internal conflicts because they had gained international political support. One of the main reasons for the failure of the Oslo-Washington process is that Palestinians and Israelis agreed on bilateral (secret and public) negotiations while excluding the role of UNO and its Secretary-General, whose role has been reduced to that of a "witness" several times since the 1991 Madrid Summit or during the ceremonies held in Washington and Wye River by President Clinton .

The direct bi-lateral talks could be more efficient if things go well, as it was the case with the teams of Rabin-Peres and Arafat-Abu Mazen between 1993 and 1995. But whenever relationships worsen between senior Israeli and Palestinian officials (as it is the case at the moment between Arafat and Sharon), it becomes necessary to find an international tool that directs negotiations and follow up the building of peace, even under a US leadership .

And despite the crisis caused by Netanyahu in his relationship with the Arabs and Palestinians, the American, European and Russian interventions from 1996 to 1999 succeeded in bridging the gap between the standpoints of the Palestinians and those of Netanyahu's teams (even if Netanyahu presented an election program opposed to the peace plan started by Rabin and Peres). This lead to Al-Khalil and Wye River agreements. It was, then, thanks to these intervention that the "breakdown" and "total

confrontation" (mentioned in Rabin's electoral program and his famous book that was also translated to Arabic) were avoided.

Barak's success in the 1999 elections lead to an amelioration in the relationship between Palestinian and Israeli officials. But international interference helped several times bridge the gap between points of view. The failure of Camp David II talks could even be accounted for by such reasons as the lack of a strategic vision in Arafat and his team who then opposed the Clinton plan, thus contributing to Barak's falling and leading Sharon and his team to power.

Other reasons of the failure of Camp David II are the absence of international guarantees and a role by the UNO. This role could afford any agreement with a kind of legacy, besides compelling the Palestinian and Israeli parties to respect such an accord, through a SC requirement and guarantees, not just as a "courtesy" to president Clinton and his collaborators, especially that the USA was then preparing a presidential election that many signs showed the Clinton team will lose to a team more influenced by the extreme right. The scale of this right even grew after the Sept.11 attacks and the apparition of Terrorism.

2 – Aborting the peace process and pressing PLO and Arab states towards accepting a "fake (formal) peace" that will encourage extremists and advocates of violence and terrorism

Whatever the new pressures that Washington may put on Arab and Muslim governments in the future, so as to normalize their commercial and diplomatic relations with Israel, it will certainly fail for the following reasons:

A/ because <u>there is not one Arab or Muslim government that can convince its people to drop down East Jerusalem, Al-Khalil, Bethlehem, and other cities and villages</u> that has been Arab and Palestinian for over 1400 years.

I do not think it will be interesting for the USA or Israel, or the whole world, to go back to the period when some symbols of peace and political moderation (such as Sadat and Saratawi) were assassinated.

B/ because all of the resolutions of the UNO, EU, governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the US media, agree on bearing on Sharon's government the responsibility of "exaggerating the use of force" and "the decline of the humanitarian situation among Palestinians", which constituted a background for violent reactions

against Israeli troops and for a total support in the whole Arab and Muslim worlds to the suicide attacks, including those against Israeli civilians inside Israel.

All the evidence, including Bush's speech, shows that the state of "big anger and despair" of the Palestinian people (**who have been hostages for decades**) leads to despair and violent reactions, amid two realities that Bush himself recognized:

* *"For too long, the citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear"*

* *"suicide-bombing missions could well blow up the best and only hope for a Palestinian state"* .

C/ because the Arab and Muslim peoples, whom Bush called believes *"must choose and must move decisively in word and deed against terrorist acts"*, are people who are still suffering, at various degrees, from the heritage of the era of direct colonization, and from the evils of poverty, unemployment, economic deterioration, ignorance, and dangerous diseases (such as AIDS). Most of them are also suffering from the absence of democracy and the little respect of their governments to the principle of alteration , the right to fair, transparent elections, and to a state of law, institutions and human rights.

In such an atmosphere, the possible American pressure on Arab and Muslim countries will result in more violence, , extremism and terrorism in these countries, and among the Arab and Muslim communities in Europe and America. The many strikes and demonstrations organized all over the world and mainly in the Arab and Muslim countries this year in reaction to attacks against Afghanistan and OLP, showed that Arab and Muslim regimes are facing new challenges, like:

a - an increasing and more violent criticism to the US foreign policy, precisely because of the US "double-standard" policy when dealing with Israel and with the rest of issues and crises, such as in the Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Pakistan-India conflict.

b – The Arab-Muslim public opinion (and millions of Muslims in America and Europe) do no longer accept to confound between Islam and terrorism, while accusing Washington of being behind all its political and economic problems, such as the backing of the Israeli occupation, the support of ageing governments whose internal problems grew so complex that some US media accused of producing terrorism and exporting it to the rest of the world.

II/ The PA dissolving itself and going back to the bipolar situation of OLP/High Committee of Intifadha

On the eve of Arafat's leaving of Tunis towards Gaza, twelve years ago, I asked him during a dinner he offered to a small group of journalists: "are you sure that your going back to Gaza with thousands of your soldiers at this moment, and after decades of exile and wandering, is a reasonable decision of yours? will you one day regret to have chosen a way rejected by the majority of OLP Executive Committee and Fatah's Central Council?" He replied, smiling: *"I'm betting on Rabin and Peres' belief, like myself, in a 'peace of the braves' and in American and European guarantees"*.

I then asked him again: "but some of your opponents from Palestinians (leaders in OLP and Fatah) and Arabs do not exclude that the Israeli forces would profit, one day, from the return of thousands of OLP soldiers to take vengeance and to attack the security and military institution of OLP, after Israel failed to eliminate it during your action against it from Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia?"

"We have started a new era, an era of global peace, under American and international guarantees", Arafat commented, adding that *"PLO HQ is to remain Tunis during the interim period and PLO will not be dissolved before the creation of the independent Palestinian state"*.

I remembered Arafat's betting on PLO (when some of his collaborators were showing their consent with him) after president Bush adopted, in his last speech, Sharon's old idea calling for the exclusion of Arafat from any political process.

Various reactions appeared towards Bush and Sharon's "call" to eliminate Arafat, even inside the USA and among the biggest US media such as USA Today, The Washington Post and New York Times. Some violent critics also submerged in reply to this declaration, mainly among Palestinians, Arabs, Europeans, and G8 members who were meeting in Canada.

I personally believe that one advantage in Bush's last declaration is that it backed those who call for more daring, clarity and credibility when dealing with the M.E. issue, and not to seek excuses to the mistakes cumulating since Madrid II, including mistakes made by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, which are numerous.

But it seems to me that eliminating the symbolic leader Arafat, the P.A, Hamas, and Jihad will not reduce Israel's urgent need for a political accord with a legitimate Palestinian leadership that enjoys credibility among Palestinians.

Every Israeli military action against the Palestinian advocates of the political solution with Israel means the backing of those who favor confrontation and breaking-up with

Israel and its allies (mainly Washington). Not only among Palestinians but in the Arab-Muslim world and among the elite and decision-makers in Europe, Asia, and Africa, who are frustrated by the military and political distortions in favor of a unique pole, and a unique country, the USA.

1/ Advocates of a clash with Israel are gaining supporters outside Palestine and Israel, and precisely in the Arab and Muslim worlds, including countries whose peoples and governments have already gone ways towards naturalization with the Israeli society and government.

The mistakes of the US politicians contributed to the creation of a public opinion strongly opposed to the US policy because of its exaggerated partiality with Israel.

2/ Palestinians have varied in their evaluations of the suicide operations and of the evaluation of the job done by the P.A so far. Yet, most of them still insist on the legitimacy of combating colonization and building an independent, autonomous Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital city. They also consider PLO their major reference and the institution for which all of the P.A. staff, as well as Palestinian politicians and people , refer back to.

And despite the decline of Arafat to hold regular periodical meetings of PLO institutions (the Executive Committee, the National Council, Faction Leaders Meeting...), he kept his contact with the PLO offices in Tunis and Amman during the seven past years.

He also insisted that the Tunis office , the Political Circle (presided by Abullotf), the Organization and Mobilization Circle (headed by Abu-Maher), and the Public relations Circle (presided by Abu-Mazen) all continue their normal job as are doing PLO institutions in Oman, mainly the Palestinian National Council's Presidency which directly coordinates with Arafat's HQs in Jericho, Ramallah, and Gaza.

I have written, since Sept. 1993, that it is not haphazardly that Arafat, who bet on Oslo, entrusted to Farouk Kadoumi, his right-hand man and PLO's Secretary General, the task of leading the opposition and contacting the rest of Palestinian factions (under PLO leadership) including opposition leaders in Syria and Lebanon, who still stick to PLO.

This is to say that **forcing Arafat and fellows to a deadlock could enhance them to try to get back to the pre-Oslo era** through:

a/ declaring the dismissal of the Palestinian Authority, whose institutions are being destroyed and officials killed by Israel for more than a year now, and especially since last March, 29.

b/ discerning to the High Committee of Intifadha (which enjoys the support of all the Palestinian factions (inside and outside PLO) the responsibility to guide the Palestinians. **This leadership could announce a two- or three-year armistice with Israel before the starting of the "third Intifadha".**

c/ reviving the roles of PLO institutions under the leadership of Arafat and officials in Tunis, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and entrusting these leaders exceptionally with political negotiations with the USA and other world leaders. Besides bearing on Israel the responsibility of canceling the Oslo-Washington process and <u>aborting the Arab peace initiative.</u>

3/ UNO resolutions as well as some international and regional institutions (such as the E.U.) started to criticize practices of Sharon's government, accusing it of the over-use of force against the civilian Palestinians.

An example for this trend is the UNO report on 06/25/2002 which accused the Israelis of destroying around 28.000 Palestinian houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and building 114.000 residences to host tens of thousands of new settlers on Palestinian territories, despite the condemnation of settling in all UNO and EU resolutions, and in the different US peace plans, such as that in Bush's last speech on Monday June, 24.

III/ How could peace advocates constitute, once again, two-thirds of the Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs ?

In Bush's speech, one of the sequences that attracted attention is his link between the success of any official political peace process and the support it should gain from the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, as well as from the Arab and Muslim countries. I think that if we go behind the details of the different peace plans, the most important remains the situation of pre-1995/96, when two-thirds of Israelis and Palestinians supported peace.

So, what are the measures needed to change the opinion of the majority who opposes, at this moment, peace and cohabitation, into a majority supporting them as in 1994 and 1995?

A/ In Israel

The media in Israel, the USA, the Arab countries, and in other parts of the world have a major role to play to explain and advertise the ideas and theories of Israeli and Palestinian peace advocates (who turned to a minority) so that to convince the majority of journalists, intellectuals and politicians in Israel with the interesting ideas addressed by Bush to the Israelis. We could hereby refer to:

1- Stability and security has been achieved relatively in Israel and largely for the Palestinians in 1994, 1995, and the first part of Barak's era (1999-2000). But the military escalation by Israel and its re-occupation of Palestinian cities, the destruction of Palestinian houses and the building of settlements are sterile measures that only caused, as Bush mentioned, *"Israeli citizens will continue to be victimized by terrorists, and so Israel will continue to defend herself, and the situation of the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable"*.

Palestinians, and Arabs in general, should equally be convinced that the suicide operations and the second Intifadha have had an opposite effect.

2- Peace means rights and obligations for both the Palestinian and Israeli sides and that it is in the interest of Israel to *"halt incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas and begin the withdrawal from those cities it has recently occupied"* because *"It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror"*.

If Lekud played a positive historical role in the Camp David accord with Egypt and in Madrid 1991, it is necessary to convince the Israelis (and Lekud militants) of the dangers of the decision taken by Lekud's Central Committee, whose majority opposed last May a plan to create a Palestinian state. Despite this fact, it is necessary to back the Lekud minority that opted for peace and a media campaign is needed to convince the Israelis of the fact that more than a third of Lekud's C.C. voting for the creation of a Palestinian free state is a positive step and the only way to serve both peace and Israel's security despite the inappropriate in which the project was presented for vote and the mood of political and party speculations that prevailed during the meeting, including the speculations the race to Lekud's leadership and presidency of the coming Israeli government witnessed.

3- The number of peace and reason defenders in Palestine and the Arab Muslim world was much bigger twenty months ago, and the majority of the Arab and Muslim public opinion agreed (principally and tactically), in the mid-1990s, on a cohabitation between an Israeli state and a Palestinian one. This was during the reigns of Rabin, Peres, then Barak.

But Sharon's choice, again, of the most extreme scenarios of escalation and public punishment of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians, disappointed peace advocates in the Arab and Muslim worlds and pushed the region's governments to really boycott Israel once again, and to stick to this choice despite the US pressure on them.

B/ For Palestinians

Bush's speech recognizes the Palestinians' sufferance since decades, and their right for an independent state. This is a development (evolution) that coincides with the position of most countries (including the UE, Japan, China, and Russia) on the national claims of Palestinians.

And despite the Palestinians' right to criticize the lack of an American rigor in applying the UNO resolutions whenever it is a matter of the Israeli government and its violations of human rights and international legacy, the Palestinian leaders are asked to:

1- present a public **self-criticism to their mistakes since Oslo**, such as the implication of some Palestinian officials in the backing of killers and supporters of violent action against Israel, which is against their engagements in Oslo, Washington, Taba, and Sharm Sheikh.

It is necessary, in this context, to use a clear discourse with the Israeli public opinion. A discourse that criticizes the attempt to smuggle developed weapons in that captured boat behind of which Iran and Hezbollah were suspected to have been.

2- publicly present excuses to the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, the USA, and peace-supporting countries, for **the improvisation that whelmed over the Palestinian leaders' action in the last two years, mainly when they aborted the Camp David II process**, refused Clinton's suggestions, and caused Barak's government failure through triggering off Intifadha II , which in fact contributed to the arriving to power of the Israeli extreme right, led by Sharon. It also pushed the region in a dilemma that thousands of innocent children, youngsters and women expensively paid the price.

3- recognize that the absence of a true role played by **Palestinian institutions**, and by NGOs, opened the way to some Palestinian security officers and to "fiends" of Arafat to turn into "ministers and emirs for life" and "speculators" at a time when the economic situation of the Palestinians terribly declined. This reality led to a popular discontent (inside the elected Legislative Council) against some members in power and security forces, which is an additional point that accounts for their failure to preserve security, a fact that irritated Israel and the USA.

4- try to improve the internal situation through holding the general elections that have been postponed three years, despite the calls by some Palestinian democrats such as **Hayder Abdeshafi** and high members in PLC and Fatah. Some of these have even been imprisoned and prosecuted by Palestinian security forces. But these elections and reforms could not be useful without some conditions, such as the following ones:

a/ candidates should be peace advocates, according to the UNO resolutions;

b/ people inculpated in financial scandals and the mistakes cumulating since 1995 should not be candidates, so that to give the future leadership some credibility;

c/ institutions should be given more power than that of individuals and "leaders". That is, they should not have a "formal" role compared to that of the "leader", some of his advisors, and security officers.

IV/ Some Practical Suggestions

In my previous paper, entitled "New Democratic Elections And Respect of UNO Resolutions" (London, May 05-07, 2002), I presented some practical suggestions:

1/ organizing democratic elections among Palestinians and Israelis for which only peace advocates can apply;

2/ restoring mutual confidence between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples through different measures, most important of which is the elimination of the military and security aspects of the settlements in all of the W.B. and G.S.;

3/ implementing all of the UN resolutions and dispatching international monitors;

4/ respecting human rights, such as the right to development, for Palestinians, Israelis, and all Arab peoples, so that to fight the root causes of terrorism.

I think these ideas are still relevant, especially after the PA announced the organization of general election next year. There are some other ideas that still could be suggested:

1/ The USA, Israel, and the rest of the international community, are called to back those who support the holding of democratic, true reforms, the creation of a new leadership able to play an influential, not "formal", role. It is necessary, in this context, to avoid improvisation and ideas that might be wrongly interpreted, give negative effects, and thus cause confusion and amalgam which are only useful to extremists.

2/ Attacking Iraq without the UNO consent should be avoided because it could lead extremists to oppose it. Besides, governments, public opinion, and opposition parties in the Arab and Muslim countries will not accept such double standards in dealing with the same kinds of issues.

3/ The USA and its allies should try to gain a minimum of credibility among Palestinians and inside the Arab and Muslim world. This is could be achieved on two levels:

a- economy: helping Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims to find solutions to their complex economic and social problems through World Bank and IMF actions and financing. We can evoke here the Tunisian initiative relevant to the creation of an International Solidarity Fund;

b- media: addressing media and advertising campaigns to the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, and holding debates with them on the necessity to dissociate between war against terror and the clash between religions and civilizations, to avoid the mistakes made by the Americans and their Western allies.

4/ supporting and enhancing the dialogue between NGOs and other components of the civil society from developed countries and those in the developing South.

Because I believe that if the collaboration and dialogue between governments and officials fail, the debate between the different civil institutions, NGOs...could very constitute an appropriate alternative and a chance to resume official talks.

CONCLUSION

The G8 summit who lately met in Canada made varying reactions towards the speech delivered by president Bush on Monday, June 24. In this speech, he asked the Palestinians to

"I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror... so that a Palestinian state can be born"

While most of the industrialized countries' leaders avoided to violently and directly oppose the American initiative, the leaders of Europe, Russia and Japan showed

reserves for the "new American strategy" which considers the elimination of president Yasser Arafat a new condition to the success of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

French president Chirac, German Counselor, President of the EC, and Canadian Prime Minister all opposed to this condition. Yet, despite his call to Arafat to "get aside willingly, after a good initiative", Italian PM Berlusconi agreed with his European counterparts on two points: recognizing Arafat's legacy as a president elected by his people in 1996 after election that nobody contested (not even Sharon's government); and taking into consideration that the election of any political leadership of any people is the responsibility of that people and not to any external party, even if the excuse is the success of the American efforts to build a Palestinian state.

And despite the international reserves over Bush's new initiative, everybody knows that the solution today remains in the hands of the American president and administration, since Washington is the only party able at the moment to convince the majority of the Israeli politicians, intellectuals and journalists that the best way to secure the Israeli's peace and stop the suicide operations is to bet once again on the choice of peace, and on the restoration of hope among Palestinians who strongly backed the Oslo-Washington process from 1993 to 1996. But this Palestinian people has several times been disappointed since Netanyahu's access to power in 1996. And his anger even grew stronger after the Israeli extreme right succeeded to lead Sharon to power (in early 2001) to realize his election program calling to go back to the pre-Oslo (and pre-Camp David) situations.

The American administration is, more than any other party, able to put pressure on the Israeli extreme right, and its allies in the USA, so that they accept a time schedule for peace, and a precise date to announce the Palestinian state. This could be during the coming three years mentioned by Bush.

It is expected that Bush receives, until next fall's election in the USA, new pressures from the Israeli extreme right, and its allies in the USA, but he is supposed to stick to Washington's old standpoints supporting peace and the Palestinian people's right for an independent national state that cohabitates with the sate of Israel on the security, economic and political levels.

Changing Palestinian leaders does not mean that the personalities accepted by Washington and the present Lekud government for negotiations, such as the trio Dahlan, Shaath, and Erikat, will accept less than what Camp David II, Taba, and Sharm Sheikh negotiations produced during the lest months of Clinton's presidency.

Washington should also know that the Palestinian public opinion, which strongly backs the unified leadership of Intifadha and Fatah's leaders), besides the Arabic and Muslim public opinion, will not accept any solution that does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian free, autonomous, patriotic state, whose capital will be East Jerusalem.

Nor the Arabic and Muslim street will support any international coalition against terrorism, led by Washington, if the USA do not again play the role they played in the early 1990s (backing Israeli, Palestinian and Arab peace advocates), instead of backing supporters of the security-military option, led by the Israeli extreme right. This choice proved a failure. It, first, failed to secure peace and stability for the Israeli, and, also increased the popularity of advocates of armed clashes and violence inside the Palestinians, whose influence largely decreased in the mid-1990s.

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WHAT DO PALESTINIAN TEXTBOOKS REALLY TEACH?
NATHAN J. BROWN*

The textbooks used in Palestinian schools have provoked remarkably international controversy. The most current phase of this controversy dates back to 1998, when an organization calling itself the "Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace" (CMIP) issued its first report on the subject. Since that time, the organization's reports have dominated the international and Israeli debate on the topic. CMIP's reports make for disturbing reading: they claim to show harsh anti-Semitism, incitement to violence, and calls for the end of the state of Israel.

Because of their influence, it is worth examining the CMIP reports in some detail. A close examination of CMIP's work demonstrates a series of severe problems. The general method is to follow harsh claims with quotation after quotation purporting to prove a point. However, a careful reading reveals that many quotations do not support the strong charges. Further, CMIP's first report obscured that the offensive material it found came not from Palestinian-authored books but instead from the Jordanian and Egyptian books that the PA was working to replace. Criticizing the PA for interim use of the books was certainly fair. But the CMIP neglected to mention that the Israeli government distributed the same books in East Jerusalem schools while it refused to distribute the innocuous 1994 "National Education" supplements (because they were clearly written by the PA meaning that their use might have undermined Israeli claims to sovereignty in all of the city).

Nor did the report mention that dramatic changes were evident in the only texts written by the Palestinian Authority up to that point: a 1994 series on "National Education" that was to supplement the Egyptian and Jordanian books then temporarily in use. In the 1994 books, there was no mention of any location as Palestinian except for those Israel occupied in 1967; no anti-Semitism; only brief and neutral references to Israel; and often awkward attempts to deal with sensitive political issues. An organization naming itself for monitoring "the impact of peace" might be expected to compare the older, non-Palestinian books with the newer, Palestinian ones. Indeed, such a task would seem basic to its mission. The Center did not simply fail to live up to its name; its reports were written to obfuscate the distinction between the old and new books.

Similarly obscured was the rich documentation on the Palestinian project to devise a new curriculum to replace the Egyptian and Jordanian books. A 600-page official report mercilessly criticizing existing educational practices had been published in 1996. In 1997, the Palestinian legislature and cabinet approved the Ministry of Education's plan—based partly on the 1996 report—to write the new curriculum. Neither document contained anything anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic, so the CMIP showed no interest.

In short, the CMIP reports read as if they were written by a ruthless prosecuting attorney anxious for a conviction at any cost. Recent research of Israeli academics (and also my own children's experience in an Israeli school for a year) leads me to conclude that a hostile and highly selective report on Israeli education might produce a similarly misleading result. Israeli educators in the secular schools have begun an effort to revamp their textbooks to rid them of stereotypes and incendiary material. The fact that the effort has not been completed and that religious schools have shown far less enthusiasm for the project would have left enough selections for a Palestinian zealot to compile quite a report. Since almost all Israeli maps mark no border between the West Bank and Gaza, such a merciless critic might be able to claim (inaccurately) that Israelis are unwilling to consider territorial compromise. Thankfully, no such report has been written. (And when the CMIP finally issued its own report on

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Israeli textbooks, the organization showed a hitherto hidden ability stress context and be judicious and understanding, even when discovering some fairly distasteful material.)

A fairer analysis should start not with predetermined conclusions but with a study of the books, and the process and context that produced them. In my own work, I collected published and unpublished documents and followed public debates on the new curriculum being written. I interviewed figures in the Legislative Council, the Ministry of Education, the Curriculum Development Center, and NGOs. Discussions among educators are often very rich: some teachers and NGOs had begun a periodic supplement for a leading Palestinian newspaper to discuss educational issues. And in reviewing this material, I found an active debate on all sorts of issues that sounded oddly familiar to American ears. How could democratic values be taught without undermining the authority of schools and teachers? Should the curriculum concentrate on teaching a specific body of material, or should it foster independent and critical thought? Should books show non-traditional gender roles, or would that undermine accepted values?

Despite this very active debate, one issue was never treated in detail: how should "Palestine" be taught? The first Palestinian-authored curriculum was to be an authoritative statement of Palestinian values. Exploring the relationship between Palestinians on the one hand and Israel, Zionism, and Jews on the other might logically be seen as central to any attempt to educate Palestinians about their past, their present, and even their geography. Yet educators and officials seemed to wish to avoid the subject, even in internal documents. The 600-page report mentioned the issue in passing; the educational supplement for the newspaper bypassed the issue entirely. Even the debate on the curriculum in the Legislative Council was surprisingly lacking in depth.

When I pressed the matter in interviews, the explanation for this reluctance became clear: these questions were enormously sensitive and difficult. Palestinian textbook authors would likely do what their counterparts did throughout the world when confronted with controversial matters. First, where possible they would settle on official documents (such as the Palestinian declaration of independence of 1988) or matters where national consensus existed. Second, where no documents or consensus existed the textbooks would likely avoid the subject. Given the unsettled nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is much to avoid.

In 2000, the first and sixth grade textbooks for the new, comprehensive Palestinian curriculum were completed. In 2001, the second and seventh grade books came out. The newer books showed some of the same reticence of the 1994 interim series, though they often broke the silences of those books in some confusing ways. For instance, the books handled the awkward issue of maps in a series of awkward ways. Perhaps no single matter has attracted more external attention. But the issue is surprisingly complicated for educators: How should Palestine be represented in map form? Was it the patchwork created by the explicitly interim Oslo Accords? Was Palestine the West Bank and Gaza alone—which Palestinian leaders constantly insisted was their vision for their state, but which remained unrecognized? What of areas in pre-1967 Israel? Were those who fled those areas in 1948 not Palestinian? But if they were Palestinian did their home towns become non-Palestinian at some point? And what of the Arab population that remained? Should the textbooks do what many Palestinians do in order to make these distinctions in conversation—separate "geographic" or "historic" Palestine (the entire territory) from "political" Palestine—the area of the prospective Palestinian state?

These issues were difficult for adults to resolve, but the textbook authors were supposed to draw maps for children. The 2000 books tried various approaches. They sometimes resorted to a topographical map to avoid drawing any borders at all. And they also regularly drew a border between Israeli and the West Bank and Gaza—without labeling either side of the border or even explaining what the border was. The new books did abandon the practice of the 1994 books of refusing to mention any territory outside the West Bank and Gaza, but they did not (as the CMIP charged) claim

the entire area for a Palestinian state. The books implicitly followed the distinction between geographic and political Palestine, but they lacked the courage to address the subject directly.

The 2000 books showed other forms of confusion. They praised Gandhi at length for his non-violence but also included a poem praising children who threw stones during the first intifada. In a few areas they were bolder then the 1994 predecessors. The nationalism is very strong, extending to lauding those who give their life for the nation. The books avoided any sustained treatment of Palestinian history or of Israel but they did delve briefly into matters that united all Palestinians (such as Jerusalem, the refugee issue, Israeli settlements, and home demolitions). In treating such issues, the books certainly contained material unfriendly to Israel, but they did not attack its existence or veer into anti-Semitism.

The textbook authors simply failed to explain the Oslo Accords, Palestinian borders, checkpoints, or many other sensitive issues. Some textbook teams (especially those working on Arabic language) were far more willing to confront sensitive issues than others, but none found a way to present an authoritative and comprehensive explanation of the recent past or the present of Palestine.

Some elements of an explanation are beginning to emerge in the new books, to be sure, but they are notable for their gaps. On areas where a clear national consensus exists among Palestinians, or where the Palestinian leadership has given clear and authoritative declarations of a position, the textbook authors lose all bashfulness. Jerusalem, for instance, is repeatedly described as the capital of Palestine (though its precise borders are not mentioned, nor are any locations in West Jerusalem). The responsibility for the refugee problem is squarely placed on Israeli shoulders and the right of return is unambiguously affirmed. Indeed, the books issued for the second and seventh grades in 2001 are far stronger in this regard than the first and sixth grade books, authored before the September 2000 intifada. Authoritative Palestinian documents (especially the Declaration of Independence of 1988) are quoted wherever possible (though even here there is some awkwardness: the books refer to the Palestinian constitution but cannot bring themselves to explain why there is no such document). There are references to Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and pictures of Israeli bulldozers destroying houses and uprooting olive trees. Thus, as much as the authors of the 2000 textbooks seem to wish to avoid some of the gaps of the 1994 series (thus including references to some of the conflictual and tragic aspects of Palestinian life), they do not do so in any coherent manner. Even when addressing the topics most likely to reflect Palestinian anger, the books are reticent: there is no narrative to explain where the camps came from, where Palestine's borders are located, who the occupiers are, or when to turn from Gandhian nonviolence to vengeance.

Yet when the 2000 books came out, the CMIP rushed out a report recirculating the old charges. The report was fairly cavalier in its prose and use of evidence, especially in that anything undermining its claims was overlooked. In 2001, when the second and seventh grade texts were published, and the CMIP pressed its claims yet again. In one, its latest report is the more responsible, avoiding the misleading technique of mixing material between the old and the new books together (which led most readers to assume it was the new books rather than the old that contained the objectionable content). Yet its strongest charges are simply unsupported by a fair reading of the books. For instance, the CMIP cites an "implicit aspiration to replace the State of Israel with the State of Palestine." No such aspiration is implicit in the books. Each textbook begins with a foreword describing the West Bank and Gaza as "the two parts of the homeland"—directly contradicting the CMIP's claim. Nor does the CMIP mention that the Palestinian curriculum plan approved in 1997 envisions introduction of Hebrew as an elective language for secondary-school students—hardly an expected step for a curriculum premised on destruction of the Jewish state.

The CMIP has finally admitted that overt anti-Semitism has been removed, but it has buried its admission in such grudging and qualified prose that most readers missed the point. Oddly, just as the

Palestinians moved to construct an entire curriculum free from anti-Semitism, international criticism (generally based on cursory readings of the CMIP report) gained increasing steam. Indeed, past criticisms of the Palestinian textbooks have been so widely and uncritically accepted that I generally receive either confused or highly skeptical stares when I present a less charged version of the books.

Recently, the campaign against the books has taken some odd forms, tainting taint even those who were not associated with them. UNRWA has come under fire for supposedly funding the textbooks (it does not). The European Union came under steady fire on the subject, and CMIP encouraged European parliamentarians to pressure the European Commission—even though the EU provided no funding for the books. While some European states did provide funding to the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center, the EU did not. This did not stop a group of European parliamentarians from working to amend the EU budget to stop the funding (which it did not give in the first place) for books that removed anti-Semitism from the Palestinian curriculum. In November 2001 the group realized a victory of sorts when it succeeded in attaching a rider to the EU budget insisting that EU-supported textbooks not contradict basic European values.

To its credit, after 1999 (when the Netanyahu government raised the issue in a Palestinian-Israeli-American committee on incitement), the Israeli government held back from joining the campaign. But the bitterness of the second intifada made the target too tempting, and in the fall of 2001, Israeli officials began to take the lead in denouncing the Palestinian textbooks. The Israeli Foreign Ministry joined the lobbying campaign in the European parliament against funding for the books. In March 2002, a cabinet minister issued a report resembling the CMIP's work in tone, content, and method. Given the intensity of feeling aroused by Palestinian suicide bombings and a general atmosphere of war, such propagandizing should be no surprise. It took dangerous form, however, when Israeli military officials apparently began to believe their government's claims. On 23 April 2002, an Israeli intelligence officer justified the extraordinarily destructive takeover of the Education Ministry (in which computer hard drives were systematically removed and examination records taken) largely in terms of the textbooks. He laid responsibility for the books at the feet of the Canadian government, later forcing an embarrassed Israeli embassy spokesman in Canada to repudiate the charge.

The harsh and tendentious campaign against the schoolbooks has obscured the real and significant improvements. But the worst effect of the campaign has been to make it difficult to make more accurate but far milder criticisms about the Palestinian curriculum. A true peace curriculum will probably have to come after, rather than before, a comprehensive settlement. But in the mean time, less hostile critics might persuade the Palestinians to be more direct in their treatment of Israel and Jews, more willing to engage students in thinking critically about issues of national identity and coexistence, and more explicit in the political assumptions underlying their treatment of such subjects. Exaggerated rhetoric, charges of anti-Semitism and racism, and denial of the significance of existing changes in the curriculum will hardly convince anyone further improvements are worth the effort.

The Palestinians will continue introducing their new curriculum, two grades at a time, over the next few years. If the past is any indication, we should expect a highly nationalistic curriculum that criticizes Israel's policies but not its existence. We should also expect that matters unresolved on the ground will remain unresolved in the texts. And as the conflict has turned increasingly violent since September 2000, the books will probably include more on perceived grievances against Israeli policies. To be sure, the Palestinian curriculum is not a peace curriculum. But neither is it a war curriculum or one based on anti-Semitism.

"THE TURKISH MODEL": WHAT IS IT?

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"THE TURKISH MODEL": WHAT IS IT?

Dr. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer[*]

Introduction

The horrendous attacks of September 11 on America by members of Osama Bin Ladin's terrorist network in the name of defending Islam has since intensified the international debate on the nature of Islam's relation to the state, the society and the Western world. In this debate some have advanced the so-called "Turkish model" as a possible alternative design that might help the world come to grips with what appeared to be an intensifying polarisation and radicalisation between the so-called Muslim world and the Western world.

This paper will offer a brief analysis of the main characteristics of the "Turkish Model."

The Ottoman Legacy

Modern Turkey is the main successor to the 600-hundred year old multi-national and multi-religious Ottoman Empire. Hence, modern Turkey began life on the foundation of a complex cultural, socio-economic and political heritage left by the Ottomans. It is therefore, important to understand the outstanding forces that shaped the Ottoman experience.

The fundamental influence that energized the totality of the Ottoman experience was Islam. In fact, the empire's soul was shaped by Islam. The paramount motive of the founders of the empire, who in 1299 began their

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advances towards former Byzantine lands in Anatolia and the Balkans, was to defend and advance the Islamic faith. To this end the Ottomans engaged in constant warfare with the Christian West.

The missionary zeal behind *Jihad* that for centuries animated the Ottoman expansion to the heart of Europe affected the whole structure of Turkish society and institutions. The rationale behind almost every major policy move and institution was Islam, which, as practiced by the Turkish frontiersmen, turned into a religion of warriors, "whose creed was a battle-cry, whose dogma was a call to arms."[1] The *Sheriat,* the Sacred Law of Islam, was the law of the State and of the Muslim population of the empire (which contained large non-Muslim peoples of Christian and Jewish faith living in self-governing and self-contained *millets.*)

In the early centuries the Ottoman State came in contact with Western Europe for war-related aims. During periods of respite between the wars, there was diplomatic and commercial activity. Despite this close interaction, the Ottoman State kept its eyes closed to the dramatic developments in Western Europe that culminated in the Renaissance and the Reformation, and the passage to a system of centralized nation-states.

This policy of isolation from what was perceived as an inferior civilization began to change when the balance of power with Western Europe entered a radically new phase upon the Ottomans' retreats before the Christian armies. To save the empire, the Ottoman elite engaged in a serious reform movement especially in the 19th century by borrowing from Western Europe. The initial emphasis was on the transfer of militarily-relevant technology and institutions,

but by mid-19th century Western-inspired reforms were introduced into social (i.e. education) and political-administrative domains. The central administration was extensively modernised. Andrew Mango, a prominent English scholar on Turkey concludes that, "by the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman State had developed a military and civilian administrative machine fashioned on European models. Power was transferred from traditional groups –the Janissaries, feudal levies, the *ulema*, guilds, provincial notables- to a European-style bureaucracy."[2] In 1876 general elections were held for the first time to elect the empire's first national parliament.

By the time the country was defeated by allied forces in World War I, to be dismembered and occupied at the end of the war, the Ottoman polity had covered significant ground along the road to modernization on the West European model. The Muslim component of the population remained deeply loyal to Islam. However, the reforms legislated in the capital hardly affected the rural lifestyle of the majority. The Jewish and Orthodox Christian *millets*, in contrast, greatly benefited from them.

From a Political Culture of Jihad to a Culture of Enlightenment

The Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923 on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire had a radically new vision for the country. Inspired largely by the worldview and concepts of West European Enlightenment, they aspired to take the Turkish state and society on the path of "civilization" and to transform it into a respected and equal member of the civilized world. The social scientific name of

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[1] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968. Second

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this envisaged transformation was *modernization.*[3] The content of the modernization project was Western-inspired.

To this end a series of radical reforms were undertaken in all fields of life. Two moves at the end of the War of Liberation waged, and won, against the allied occupying powers between 1919-1922, offered early signs about the direction of the future course: the termination of the rule of the Ottoman dynasty and the proclamation of a republic as the new form of government transferring sovereignty to the people, and second, the annulment of the Caliphate, thus giving up the title to being the religious leader of the world's Muslims.

Reforms followed in quick succession aiming first and foremost at what is better known in the West as the "separation of church and state." Most fundamental of all was the repeal of the *Sheriat.* This act aimed at the disestablishment of Islam from its supreme position as the guiding force in running the affairs of the state and to move religion to the private space of the individual.

Supporting acts came in quick succession: the restriction and then prohibition of religious education and its replacement by a uniform secular educational system nationwide to be based on scientific and positivist methodology and thought; the adoption of European civil and penal codes, among others granting women equal rights with men; the nationalization of

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Edition), p. 43.

[2] Andrew Mango, *Ataturk* (London: John Murray, 1999), p. 2.

[3] As is well known, "modernism" and "modernization" as understood within the intellectual parameters and historical evolution of Western Europe have been the subject of challenge from several different quarters. There is an intense debate in scholarly circles about whether there are more modernities than the European type of modernity that Turks have pursued for nearly two hundred years now. See, for example, Dilip P. Gaonkar, ed. *Alternative Modernities* (Duke University Press, 2001)

pious foundations; the reduction and eventual elimination of the power of the Islamic clergy; the transformation of social and cultural symbols and practices, such as dress and headgear, the calendar and the alphabet. The goal of transforming Turkey into a legally secular country culminated in the removal of Islam from the constitution in 1928.

In short, republicanism and secularism have been the two most fundamental and constitutionally irrevocable principles of the new Turkish state since 1923.

Where is Islam in Turkey Today?

In the more than seventy years that have passed since then, the excesses of the early practices designed to restrict Islam's role and influence only to the private domain of the individual have greatly been eroded. The control that single-party authoritarianism could impose until 1946 was much relaxed after that turning point when Turkey moved to adopt democracy. Yet, the state has never completely withdrawn from its regulatory role, with the armed forces being particularly sensitive to challenges to secularism.

Needless to say the socio-political revolution brought about by the secular reforms had raised strong opposition from the former religious hierarchy and other traditionalists. That opposition continues today in the form of political Islam with an effective political organization. In other words, Turkish democracy has evolved to accommodate even political Islam which has come to enjoy a very visible, legitimate position in the system—so long as it does not push the outer boundaries of legitimacy, for example by challenging the system by calls for a return to the *Sheriat.*

An important criticism levelled against Turkish secularism all along has been the charge that it was, and is, anti-Islam, anti-religion, and even "Godless."

Some of the early practices were so harsh as to give rise to such charges. As the history of revolutions teaches us, however, it was in the nature of a top-down socio-political revolution that such excesses be committed. However, the republican regime has progressively softened its approach in order to keep in step with the dynamics of multi-party politics that helped mobilize the popular base of Islam. As previously stated, official Turkey has thus traversed a long way not merely towards the recognition of Islam as an important social force but it has sought the co-optation of political Islam into the system.

More recently, the appointment of Mr. Necmeddin Erbakan as the Prime Minister following the victory of his party at the polls in 1995 is a remarkable example of the "Turkish state" bowing to the rules of the democratic process. The hope was to help legitimate Islamic politics by fostering moderation and pragmatism while faced with the responsibility of power. But Mr. Erbakan preferred the game of anti-secular brinkmanship. He was forced out of office not only by the military but by the outcry of a highly-aroused civil society, including leading businessmen's and labor organisations—a point some critics of Turkish secularism in the West seem to ignore in their analysis of that case. His performance was perceived by these civil groups as an assault on the ground rules of the political system.

Official Turkey has also acknowledged people's right to "live" (to fulfill the dictates of) their religion. Hence the elaborate network of state-funded educational programs—something unimaginable in the early, militant phase of Turkish secularism. A few statistics on the subject might help make the point.

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High-schools to train Muslim clergy (the *Imam-Hatip* schools) have flourished since 1950s. In 2001-2002 a total 558 of such schools (fully accredited as a high-school from where one could move on to the university) offered instruction on Islamic teaching and prayer to 88,131 students of both sexes. The same year 12,800 university students were enrolled at 22 Faculties of Theology. For the younger minds with an elementary school diploma, the state offers special courses, *Kuran Kurslari,* where the focus is on reading and memorizing *The Book* in Arabic--a language foreign almost to all Turkish citizens. (The demand by Islamists on strict loyalty to the original language of the Kuran does not seem very promising for the '*reformation*' movement in Islam that some Western analysts have been making reference to in the post-September 11 era.)

The Muslim community also enjoys unlimited freedom to build its place of worship, the mosque, generally on public land granted by municipal authorities—who seem to be keenly aware of its vote-getting potential. In 2001 there were 75,369 mosques. In 1981 that number was 47,645. This means roughly one mosque for every 4500 male Muslim -the privileged gender required by Islam to attend the mosque- in 2001.

Finally, the democratic sounds of Fazilet/AK party are in many important ways a by-product of Turkish secularism which over time has progressively shown a willingness to carefully co-opt Islamists into the system, as argued above. But co-optation requires compromises from both sides of the game, both the co-opter and the co-opted. Mr. Erbakan could not sustain this delicate balancing act between the secular state and political Islam. The same politicians who served as close associates of Mr. Erbakan during the latter's term as Prime Minister have proceeded to form Fazilet/AKP. Their willingness to

honor the rules of democracy will ultimately be tested by deeds, if and when they come to power at the future general elections.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The brief historical analysis above should indicate that Turkey launched an ambitious, revolutionary project in the early 1920s to redefine Islam's place in state and society. Its utmost objective was to remove Islam from the confines of the state, not from the lives of the people—a difference which is very important to appreciate.

Implementation in the first few decades was harsh and excessive. Over the last fifty years, however, Turkish democracy has learned to accommodate even political Islam into the parameters of the system so long as the regime's bottom line –no return to the Sheriat- is respected. At the popular level people have the freedom to enjoy their faith to the fullest—yet without the right to impose their own choices on the political identity of the State and on the religious choices of the rest of the society. The "headscarf" case is one such case. It would have been a non-issue had the political Islamists not effectively manipulated it to confront and destabilize the system.

BEYOND PUBLIC OPINION:
SHORT TERM ATTITUDINAL CHANGE OR LONG TERM PEACE EDUCATION?

David Newman

This paper deals with the role of public opinion in influencing the peace process and the extent to which public opinion can be manipulated in such a way as to create a new source of pressure on the respective Israeli and Palestinian leadership to reengage in political negotiations, rather than public opinion surveys being used as a simplistic reflection of a particular political situation. As such, public opinion is seen as constituting a dynamic factor in its own right, rather than simply a passive outcome of any given situation. Changes in public opinion can feed into the concerns and considerations of decision makers and power elites in determining the next stage of the conflict – to a great extent can determine whether leaders are prepared to continue with the present situation of violence, or can be pressured into finding a return to political negotiations.

Public opinion is concerned with attitudes and the way they change over time. Contextually, we need to distinguish between short term attitudinal change which reflects the changing events of today and yesterday (the breakdown of Camp David, the return to violence, the construction of a security fence etc;) and the longer term structural change which is part of the socialization process aimed at creating a language of peace through education, especially amongst the youth. Clearly the two are interlinked – there is no point in trying to create longer term structural programs if peoples are still killing each other on a daily basis. There are a number of prerequisites for the longer term programs to be put into operation. But the investment in structural attitudinal change did not take place even in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo Agreements, a period when such prerequisites existed. Should a situation of non-violence, a return to political negotiations, re-emerge, it will be essential to invest in some of the longer term programs of peace education parallel to the process of conflict resolution, rather than to leave it to a later date.

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The paper is based around a series of four, somewhat rhetorical, questions concerning the nature of public opinion – amongst both Israeli and Palestinians – concerning the current situation. It is presented in such a way as to create an agenda for the orderly discussion of these ideas at the Brugges conference – possibly having a separate discussion around each of these questions, rather than discussing everything at one and the same time.

Why Discuss Public Opinion Right Now?

Given the current state of affairs in the Israel / Palestine arena, it would appear out of place to discuss the issue of public opinion. The public on both sides of the conflict no longer believe in peace – one sees continued terrorism and suicide bombings, the other sees continued occupation, military incursions and the expansion of settlements. Whatever grass roots support there was in the early years of Oslo has gradually dwindled away, suffering an almost total collapse in the past eighteen months since the breakdown of the Camp David and Taba talks and the return to violence, terror and killings, and the limited re-occupation of the Palestinian towns.

Yet, surveys of public opinion amongst Israelis (particularly those of the Steinmetz center at Tel Aviv University which are probably amongst the most reliable and least biased of all Israeli public opinion surveys) show that the desire to reach a political solution is still favoured by well over half of the (Israeli Jewish) population. We would assume that the reason for this is different to the support displayed for the peace process during the years of Oslo negotiations. Then it was a desire, an almost naïve belief that peace would bring about not only an end to the immediate conflict but also a long term reconciliation between the two peoples. This belief has completely fallen away and has been replaced by a support for a return to political negotiations which will bring about physical separation between the two peoples and an end to the physical dimensions of terrorism and/or occupation. It no longer has anything to do with a belief in reconciliation between the two peoples – precisely the opposite. Since both peoples now believe that notions of reconciliation are impossible, they no longer want to see or have any contact with each other. For many, the continuation of conflict would be an option were they convinced that their own side would be the ultimate victor. Since they now realize that this is not a practical

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option – the continuation of conflict will only result in ever more violence and ever more settlements – a growing segment of the public is prepared to go, once again, for the political option as the choice of least evil. Thus, the current public support in Israel in favour of a return to political negotiations, despite the continuing violence, is based on a realism approach, as contrasted with the altruism and euphoria which greeted the Oslo Accords in the 1990's.

This raises a question concerning whether public opinion is actually important in influencing policy makers or whether it is no more than a mere reflection of how the public is thinking at any particular time. If it does influence policy makers, then it should be in the interest of those who want to change both the short and long term situations, to create a public atmosphere or environment which is more conducive to negotiations and a willingness to make the necessary compromises. Is it realistic to assume that in the present political and military climate, public opinion can be changed in such a way, or whether there needs to be a complete cessation of violence on the one hand, and a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Areas A and B, before grass roots attitudes can be addressed? As mentioned above, only if the assessment was based on political realism, rather than the general mystification of the long term benefits of "peace" (in which neither population believe possible at present), a clear presentation of the tangible concessions and benefits to be traded for each other, an understanding of what is involved, and a perception that the other side is also making concessions – in short, a hard headed realistic assessment of the situation rather than a utopian belief in a mystical process of automatic peace and reconciliation – would it be possible to bolster grass roots support for a renewal of political negotiations aimed at reaching a final agreement.

What Are the Structural causes for the Lack of Public Support for the Peace Process?

Public support for any specific policy has a number of different, often contrasting, objectives. It must create pressure on leaders who prefer to act without the constraints of mass public support for any specific policy. Such pressure did not exist at either Camp David or Taba – there were no mass demonstrations or petitions amongst either Israelis or Palestinians urging their respective leaders to return with some form of

agreement, even if it was only the basis for another, final, round of negotiations aimed at ironing out those issues which had still not yet been resolved. Thus the public support for the peace process, or the belief that peace is possible, did not simply fall away after the breakdown of the talks and the return to violence. This is too simplistic an explanation. The grassroots belief that peace was a tangible, not just abstract, possibility had fallen away long before Barak and Arafat went to Camp David, perhaps it had never really been there in the first place. Neither of the leaders felt constrained by the fact that they would return empty handed to their respective domestic constituencies – on the contrary, there was a begrudged acceptance by most people that the failure to reach an agreement was almost inevitable and to be expected.

This somewhat fatalistic acceptance of the outcome of the talks must be partially attributed to the failure of leaders and educators on both sides of the political fence to invest in long term peace education during the post-Oslo period. The sum total of Track II, people to people and similar programs reached no more than minority of the political and academic elites on both sides – rarely reaching into the houses, schoolyards, clubs or synagogues/mosques of the respective peoples. The messages in the media and the school textbooks were not conducive to peace, in some cases simply being cynical of the process, in other cases being outright inflammatory (although for a more reasonable analysis of the Palestinian textbooks, one should read Professor Nathan Brown's recent analysis of what is actually written therein). Some Israeli textbooks, particularly those in the religious school system, also have a role to play in their presentation of the conflict and the enemy "other", while the general Israeli media has undergone a clear switch from a centrist and left of center, largely supportive of Oslo, position, to one which has become increasingly right wing (with the single possible exception of Haaretz) and supportive of all attempts to delegitimize Oslo as having been a major policy mistake and disaster. No pro-peace process radio or TV stations were created, nothing which reaches into the front rooms of the Israeli and Palestinian children. The only meeting point of the two peoples remained at the interface of the conflict, even in periods when there was relative quiet and the political negotiations were progressing in a positive direction.

What Practical Measures Need to be taken to Change Short and Long Term Attitudinal Change?

Accepting such an analysis requires a clear distinction to be made between two different strategies aimed at influencing public opinion – one which deals with the short term acceptance of any agreements to be signed, the other with the longer term changing of attitudes and perceptions. The first of these strategies is essentially concerned with the preparation of public opinion for conflict resolution and the various compromises which have to be made by each side if an Agreement is ever to be reached. The second strategy is concerned with the wider and structural dimensions of the peace process, aimed at changing attitudes and perceptions especially amongst the younger generations who are yet to be socialized into hating their neighbour. The first strategy is essential if conflict resolution is to be reached and accepted by significant numbers of people on each side, despite the fact that an Agreement can be reached and implemented without the overall mass support of the public. The second strategy is essential if a situation of cold peace is to be transformed into warm / hot peace, but it is not essential for conflict resolution to be maintained (as in the case of the relations between Israel and Egypt).

Public support of a specific policy is also a major factor in influencing the public on the "other" side of the political divide, that the "people", not just the leaders, are behind the peace process. The extent to which Israelis or Palestinians respectively gauge the support, or opposition, of the "other" people (however collectively expressed) for the respective concessions to be made, is critical in the way their own opinion continues to be formed and undergoes modification. This is a vicious cycle, in which the lack of a publically expressed opposition to suicide bombers amongst the Palestinian street (as contrasted with a carefully worded statement on the part of some Palestinian leaders) convinces the Israeli public that there is no grass roots support for a political process amongst Palestinians and, in turn, hardens their own position in their willingness to make concessions (such as full territorial withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, including settlement evacuation) which, in turn, convinces moderate Palestinians that the Israelis dont really intend to make peace, and so on.

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A new strategy for creating attitudinal change has to break through this vicious cycle. It requires coordinated statements on the part of large numbers of people on both sides of the political fence, affirming their belief in a set of common beliefs and objectives aimed at bringing about the first stages of conflict resolution. This requires coordination since neither side is prepared to make that necessary unilateral confidence building statement given the current situation. Such a statement can not be limited to relatively small groups of pro-peace activists but must include large sections of the respective populations who can still be persuaded that there are common pragmatic objectives which can be achieved through political negotiations. Such a statement must seek some form of symmetry in determining the respective concessions which each side will be prepared to make for the sake of reaching conflict resolution (e.g: Palestinian concessions on refugee return; Israeli withdrawal from all areas and evacuation of settlements). The details are less important since, if negotiations are to get moving again, the outstanding issues will be placed on the negotiating table, but there does need a mutual statement of the issues over which each side is prepared to consider compromises.

A public statement of this sort must reach large sectors of the respective populations and must be agreed upon by both peoples – although an alternative would be to publish two parallel statements of intent, signed respectively by Israelis and Palestinians, if agreement over a single statement could not be reached. For parallel statements to have any effect (rather than to be used by anti-peace forces as proof of the fact that even the pro-peace forces can not reach an agreement) the differences must be minor, rather than major – relating to specific issues and the way in which they can be resolved, rather than the ultimate objectives of the two peoples.

Is there anything which could provide a catalysator for a public message of this kind? Only a mutual frustration, increasingly felt by large sectors of both populations, can provide the necessary impetus. A frustration with the physical insecurity, a frustration with the worsening economic situation amongst both peoples which can be attributed directly to the return to violence and direct warfare, a frustration with leaders, neither of whom are seen as being in the position to offer any pro-negotiation initiative of their own.

No doubt, Israelis will argue that while there have always been pro-peace groups, prepared to make public statements of this kind, the equivalent does not exist amongst the Palestinians. Right wing critics of the Israeli peace movement have often used this argument, the lack of a clearly defined grass roots Palestinian peace movement, as evidence of the fact that no true conflict resolution can ever be achieved because the "other" side does not want it to happen. While a public statement of this nature which would include at least 200,000 Israeli signatories would be necessary for Israeli leaders to pay any attention to it, an initial public support of at least 20,000 Palestinians would probably be sufficient for a similar, if not greater, impact to be felt amongst the Palestinian hierarchy. Relative to the current respective public discourse amongst the two peoples, a joint statement of this nature could conceivably have a significant impact – not only in terms of influencing leaders to think again, but also in terms of drawing an ever wider circle of public support, even a suspicious support, for a return to direct political negotiations.

Issues must be addressed in such a statement, especially those issues which are still perceived overtly from a symbolic, rather than tangible or concrete, point of view by the respective peoples. Jerusalem must be addressed as a city with neighbourhoods and problems of municipal management, rather than as the "eternal" city never to be relinquished. Refugees must be addressed as a population problem which has a variety of solutions in terms of their absorption in the Palestinian state, compensation, international assistance etc; rather than as an issue which is perceived as being the heart and essence of the whole conflict threatening the demographic integrity of the Jewish State of Israel, or alternately that as long as a single refugee remains in a refugee camp, the conflict will never be resolved. This requires a concerted attempt to put these issues at the forefront of the public debate and discourse, to make the respective publics more familiar with the tangible ways in which they can be resolved and, through familiarity, to feel less threatened by any concessions which will have to be made on these, or other similar, issues. The notion that familiarity breeds contempt may overstate the desired affect of such a public discourse, but breeding a greater understanding of the issues involved, could go a long way to enabling the two peoples to accept, if not overtly support, any future process of negotiations which will have to finally address all the outstanding issues. The parallel to make would be the way in which the notion of a Palestinian state has, over a period of ten years,

moved from the periphery of the public discourse, something which constituted a non-discussable topic amongst most Israelis, to one which is now broadly accepted (regardless of Netanyahu's attempts to have it removed from the public discourse of his own right wing Likud party) amongst virtually all Israelis – right and left wing alike – even if that acceptance is, in some cases, begrudging.

Who is In a Position to Facilitate Public Opinion Change?

The answer to this question necessitates an understanding of what the different actors in the conflict stand to gain or lose from a return to the political negotiation track. Who needs to do the influencing and who needs to be influenced? In that sense, the public can be perceived either as a passive actor whose task is simply instrumentalist and whose support for any particular policy will be used by those who have an interest in a return to the negotiation track, to influence the policy makers and power elites to change track. Alternately, the public opinion factor can be perceived from an altruistic perspective, in the sense that for a peace agreement to be signed, implemented and to last, the public must stand behind it and be prepared to come out on to the streets and undertake public demonstrations if and when there were signs that a renewed negotiation process was in danger of breaking down.

Leaders? In the present context, the leaders are the people to be influenced, rather than to do the influencing. Neither Sharon or Arafat are likely to make any significant move back to the negotiation table unless there is extremely strong international pressure on both, or they feel that there is a strong swell of public support for a change in direction. Neither of these conditions exist at present.

Peace Organisations? These can be catalysators for increasing public awareness, but they have proven to be limited in their scope. They are too fragmented over ideological issues (as contrasted with the almost united front put forward by right wing and pro-settler organizations), they are tired and frustrated at the breakdown of the peace talks (they have not renewed their leadership over the past twenty years, again in direct contrast to the right wing movements) and they do not have the funding or financing required for a major public awareness program. They have also been largely discredited by the center and right wing for having "given their unlimited

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support to Oslo" and are perceived as being too "left wing" for many of the population groups that would need to be reached in a new campaign.

<u>Economic and Business Elites</u>? These groups have either remained outside the direct political process, or have been involved in economic projects which were facilitated by the opening of new markets, either in the Middle East itself or through the increase in international investment in the region in the immediate post-Oslo period. Beyond the cessation of violence and the return of political stability – which all the population should benefit from – the economic and business elites have the most to gain, and equally the most to lose, from a return to political negotiations. They also have the necessary economic resources for investing in a major campaign, or education program, aimed at influencing public attitudes towards the conflict.

<u>Outside powers</u>? There is an increase in the willingness of both Israelis and Palestinians to accept active international intervention in the mediation and implementation process. But this is different from international intervention aimed at influencing public support in favour of a renewed process of political negotiations. For many in the region, such attempts could be perceived as a form of "meddling" in the internal affairs of the State. There are two ways in which international intervention in this area could be productive – sponsorship of education / socialization projects which are not seen as being biased to one side or the other, and through material investment, as third party facilitators, in projects which are created by local (Israeli and/or Palestinian) organizations, public agencies and even governments.

Summary

This paper has done nothing more than simply to try and draw the different threads relating to public opinion, grass roots attitudes and long term peace education into a single framework for analysis and action. It is based on the prior assumption that it is necessary to actively work on changing public attitudes towards the process of conflict resolution (short term) and attitudinal change and peace education (long term). It's starting point is an a priori acceptance of the necessity to undertake such activity, rather than engage in a discourse whether such activity is necessary or not.

The two main arguments have been:

a) Public attitudes have their own dynamic role to play in influencing both leaders and the "other" public, rather than simply constitute a passive outcome of "what the public thinks" of any given situation.

b) Attitudinal change is both a short and long term process. The distinctions of the type of projects which can influence either need to be made, but they are not exclusive of each other. Short term expressions of public support for a particular policy must be used as a means of influencing policy makers and leaders, long term peace education programs must be used as a means of preserving the implementation of conflict resolution and changing the attitudes of the younger generations vis a vis the "other".

My proposal is that each of the four questions raised in this paper (or additional or alternative questions raised by other participants) form the basis for a series of separate discussions aimed at producing a policy paper about a series of realistic steps to be adopted, including the identification of the actors in whose interests it is to facilitate such programs, as a means of achieving a turnaround in the present situation.

David Newman, July 2002, Beer Sheva, Israel.

WORKSHOP ON PUBLIC OPINION / PEACE CULTURE

SUMMARY

The working group on public opinion and peace culture began with an overview of the current state of public opinion among Israelis and Palestinians. While initial enthusiasm for a negotiated peace was high on both sides, it has declined, partly due to the upsurge in conflict over the past two years.

The group discussed a number of ways that might be used to move public opinion in a direction more supportive of peace and even create a culture of peace throughout the region. To this end, four areas received particular attention:

- Polling

  While polling has produced very useful information about public opinion on both sides, it has also been used by both sides to question the intentions of the adversary. Working group members discussed ways in which pollsters can be attentive to the assumptions behind their questions and to avoid allowing immediate political issues to dictate all surveys. Greater use of alternative methods of assessing public opinion (more open ended questioning, focus groups, etc.) and more imaginative framing of issues might be possible ways to probe public opinion in ways that promote conflict resolution.

- Media

  Structural difference between the media in Israel (which are commercially driven) and the Arab world (where the direct role of the state is stronger) were considered. In both cases, the result is often superficial coverage of the conflict, though some exceptions were noted. Broadcast media on both sides may have aggravated the conflict of the past two years. Working group members explored two proposals. One, an ambitious effort to create joint broadcasting, was deemed as worthy but perhaps premature. If such an enterprise is to be undertaken, it should be based on frank, open, and equal airing of opinion if it is to have credibility. Join broadcasting would require a political commitment from both sides at the highest level and is therefore unlikely to occur in the short term. The second, more modest, suggestion concerned an attempt to educate senior journalists who have demonstrated an interest in learning about various points of view in depth. Given the current state of feelings on both sides, such a quiet approach might be the best that is feasible at present.

- Religion

  The working group discussed the necessity of engaging the religious publics on both sides. While there was strong support for such an initiative in principle, there was less consensus on how to pursue it. An exclusive focus on official religious leaders might result in a dynamic in which they appropriated religious discourse for themselves, inhibiting broader dialogue. Involving religious opponents of peace negotiations might privilege a discourse in which peace advocates operate at a disadvantage. At a minimum, however, it might be possible to invite members of the religious publics on both sides to participate in future meetings.

- Socialization

  The working group focused its discussion on school curricula and socialization and considered the possibility of cooperation in writing authoritative national narratives. A join narrative was deemed overly ambitious, but attempts at composing works exploring various narratives (especially for older students) was deemed worth pursuing. The group also discussed the technique of "scenario analysis" in which a diverse group of stakeholders gather to imagine alternative visions of the future. Such a technique has been used successfully in other settings; the results can be released more broadly in order to engage broader publics in thinking about ways to frame the present and the future.

Brujes 16/7/2002