THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM
BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)
European University Institute (EUI)
Brookings Institution
Paris, 3-4/XI/2011

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b. List of participants
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2. #Islam: Mediterranean Islamic Expression and Web 2.0+ / Gary R. Bunt (16 p.)
3. Gender Dynamics and Social Change in North Africa / Maria Cristina Paciello and Renata Pepicelli (18 p.)
4. Modern Commercial and Social Entrepreneurship as a Factor of Change / Gonzalo Escribano and Alejandro Lorca (23 p.)
5. Demography, Migration and Revolt South of the Mediterranean / Philippe Fargues (20 p.)
6. How not to Think about Evil: Misunderstanding Political Islam / Alan Wolfe (15 p.)
7. Religion and Values: Towards a Common Religious Market? / Oliver Roy (9 p.)
8. Societal Change and Political Responses in Euro-Med Relations / Roberto Aliboni (17 p.)
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10. Transatlantic Relations in the Mediterranean / Cesare Merlini (13 p.)





BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

An International Conference

Paris, November 3-4, 2011

The World Bank
66 Avenue d'Iéna

Working language: English

PROGRAM

With the support of

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Thursday, November 3

12.00 Registration of participants

12.30 **Opening Session** – *Plenary room*

- Welcome, introduction to the proceedings: *Carlos Braga, Cesare Merlini*
- Speaker: *Caroline Freund*, Chief Economist, MENA Region, The World Bank

13.00 Lunch – *Adjacent room*

13.45 **Session one** – *Plenary room*
SOCIETAL CHANGE IN THE ARAB/MUSLIM WORLD: THE CASE OF THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN

- Chair: *Eberhard Kienle*
- Introduction: *Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid*
- Discussants (and paper authors): *Gary Bunt, Renata Pepicelli, Gonzalo Escribano, Olivier Roy*

15.45 Coffee Break

16.15 **Session two** – *Plenary room*
THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC FACTOR ON SOCIETAL CHANGE

- Chair: *Raed Safadi*
- Introduction: *Caroline Freund*
- Speakers: *Giorgio Gomel, Alejandro Lorca, Maria Cristina Paciello, Giuseppe Scognamiglio*

18.15 Conference adjourns

20.00 **Dinner** – *Residence of the Italian Ambassador, 47 rue de Varenne*

- Welcome *by the host*

THE AMERICAN CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM

- Speaker: *Alan Wolfe*

Friday, November 4

9.00 **Session three** – *Plenary room*
THE POLITICAL FACTOR IN THE FUTURE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

- Chair: *Mats Karlsson*
- Introduction: *Olivier Roy*
- Discussants: *Assia Bensalah Alaoui, Margot Badran, Mohammed Hachemaoui*

10.30 Coffee Break

11.00 **Session four** – *Plenary room*
EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

- Chair: *Francis Ghilès*
- Speaker: *Roberto Aliboni*
- Discussants: *Ian Lesser, Mohammad Selim*

12.30 Lunch – *Adjacent room*

13.15 **Session five** – *Plenary room*
US POLICIES TOWARDS THE ARAB/MUSLIM WORLD

- Chair: *Jonathan Brown*
- Speaker: *Jonathan Laurence*
- Discussants: *Silvia Colombo, Bichara Khader*

14.45 Coffee Break

15.00 **Session six** – *Plenary room*
THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

- Chair: *Carlos Braga*
- Speaker: *Cesare Merlini*
- Discussants: *Samir Aita, Nathan Brown*

16.30 Round Up and End of Conference

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

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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Assia Bensalah Alaoui	Ambassador at Large of His Majesty the King of Morocco
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Luigi Sampaolo	Head of Political and Institutional Scenarios and Analysis-Public Affairs and Communication, ENI, Rome
Giuseppe Scognamiglio	Head of institutional and International Affairs, Unicredit, Rome
Mohammad Selim	Professor of Political Science, Cairo University
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Middle East and North Africa: In the Midst of Transition

Caroline Freund, Chief Economist
Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank

Paris, October 2011

- Economics of Arab transitions
- Short-run challenges
- Long-term issues

Subsidies and Social Compact

	Percent of GDP	In billions USD
	2009	2009
Tunisia		
Food	1.2	0.5
Energy	1	0.4
Transport	0.4	0.2
Lebanon		
Energy	4.3	1.4
Jordan		
Food	0.8	0.2
Energy	0.2	0.1
Morocco		
Food	0.7	0.6
Fuel	1.1	1.0
Egypt		
Food	2.0	3.8
Energy	6.0	11.3
Other	0.3	0.5
Syria		
Food	1.4	0.7
Other direct	1.1	0.6
Implicit energy subsidies	4.9	2.6
Yemen		
Energy	10.3	2.6
Iraq		
Food	3.5	2.3
Implicit energy subsidies	1.5	1.0
Algeria	13.5	18.8

Government jobs and Social Compact

- **Government services sector's share in total employment in a typical MENA country is large and above 25%, a larger share than in Brazil (18%), Malaysia (18%) Turkey (16%) and Indonesia (9%).**
- **Government jobs offer security, high wages, and pensions.**
- **Government sector growth is limited.**

Economic issues linked to Arab spring events

- Shortage of quality jobs and high unemployment rates, especially for youth
- Corruption has reached a scale not seen before
  - Lack of level playing field in many aspects of life, including access to resources, services and information
- Insider-outsider business climate
- Food prices up over 30 percent

Unemployment



Constraints to business



Democracy Trends by Region: Change Overdue



Arab uprisings surprised the world

- Occurring in many countries with different socio-economic and institutional settings
- People are demanding political re[illegible]s to ensure voice and accountability, dign[illegible]
- Political developments linked to long-standing economic issues
- Represent a fundamental change in the MENA region with potentially far reaching implications

Transitions present challenges, but can be rapid

Impact of successful transitions on growth and investment



Source: Freund and Mottaghi (2011)

Impact of transitions in MENA on investment plans



Source: MIGA-EIU Political Risk Survey

Impact of uprisings on economic growth in 2011

Growth faltered in developing MENA, but recovery in the GCC economies remains robust



Source: World Bank (2011). Note: **Developing MENA** includes **developing oil exporters** such as Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Algeria, and **oil importers** such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan and Djibouti.

Arab spring events have affected negatively economic activity:

However, IP has recovered quickly in Tunisia and Egypt

Industrial production (IP) (% change, 3m/3m seasonally adjusted annualized rates)



Source: World Bank based on data from Datastream

Services exports and labor markets have been hurt especially hard

Tourist arrivals (% change over same period last year)



Source: UNWTO.

Unemployment rates (%)



Source: Government statistics.

Social Policies Expand

	Wages	Subsidies	Tax cuts	Transfers	Infrastructure	Jobs	Total cost % of GDP
GCC							
Bahrain	X	X	X	X	X	X	2.5
Kuwait	X	X		X	X		--
Oman	X	X		X		X	4.5
Qatar	X						
Saudi Arabia	X			X	X	X	
UAE		X		X			
Developing oil exporters							
Algeria	X	X			X	X	
Iraq	X	X		X	X	X	
Syria		X		X			2[illegible]
Yemen	X	X	X	X		X	>4[illegible]
Oil importers							
Jordan	X	X	X	X	X		5
Egypt	X	X		X		X	0.8
Tunisia	X	X	X	X	X	X	--
Morocco	X	X		X		X	--
Total	**12**	**12**	**4**	**12**	**7**	**9**	**--**

Impact of uprisings on fiscal outlook:
expected to worsen in developing MENA as spending grows and revenues decline



Source: World Bank (2011).
Note: **GCC oil exporters** include Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain. **Developing MENA** includes **developing oil exporters** such as Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Algeria, Libya and **oil importers** such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan and Djibouti.

Medium-run Challenges

- Jobs, especially for youth
- Social and economic inclusion
- Governance and accountability
- Growth

Growth and Unemployment

Growth accelerated in response to reforms but not enough to address the key challenges facing the region (average, annual growth rates in %)



The MENA region has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world (%)



MENA has the lowest participation rate, and also among women (% of working age population)



The young population has been soaring in ME



MENA needs more jobs, but the job problem cannot be attributed solely to a slow pace of job creation relative to growth

- MENA, especially the oil exporters, create jobs at a fast pace relative to growth so their main problem is low income growth
- Oil importers record a slow response of job creation to income growth
- In all MENA countries, job quality is an issue

Employment-growth elasticities, 2004-08



MENA needs rapid economic growth to address its job problem



Source: World Bank

Evidence Implies Little Gain from Democracy There is a Large Gain from Good Governance



Data Source for calculations: KK 2004. Y-axis measures predicted GDP per capita on the basis of Instrumental Variable (IV) results for each of the 3 categories. Estimations based on various authors' studies, including Kaufmann and Kraay.

Governance complements standards good practices

- In economies with weak rule of law no evidence that public investment stimulates private investment and growth
- In countries with good rule of law, public investment strongly linked to growth
- Good rule of law helps attract private investment and improve investment efficiency





Source: Authors' estimates. Note: t-statistics in parentheses below trend equations.



Medium-run Challenges

- Jobs, especially for youth
  - Short run active labor market policies
  - Medium-run private sector , entrepreneurship, innovation
- Social and economic inclusion
  - Insiders /outsiders has to change
- Governance and accountability
  - Transparency, voice, provision of services, clear regulatory framework and implementation
- Growth
  - Business climate, macro stability, openness to trade and investment



BROOKINGS

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An International Conference

Paris, 3-4 November 2011

#ISLAM: MEDITERRANEAN ISLAMIC EXPRESSION AND WEB 2.0+

a paper by

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Abstract

According to a report released in 2010, the Middle East was witnessing the greatest expansion of internet and digital access worldwide, with increasing numbers of individuals in the Middle East and North Africa regions able to have some access to digital media.[1] While recognising that there are still many information gaps, the extent to which this development contributes to the bridging geographical, cultural, political and digital divides – particularly around the Mediterranean basin in relation to Islamic expression – is the subject of this chapter. The discussion explores diverse forms of internet-related communication, while recognising that directly Islam-related online activities represent a small (but influential) percentage of overall patterns of internet use in Mediterranean Muslim contexts, and that Islam and Muslim culture(s) indirectly informs many of the other discourses and activities on the web: for example, social networking, online commerce, entertainment, e-government and online news media *may* be informed by a common thread of Muslim influences – which may be subtle rather than overt in texture. The term 'Islamic expression' encompasses in this context a range of discourses carried out online by participants who may be identified as 'Muslim', from individuals to organisations, on a range of themes which may be associated with Islam in religious, cultural, political and other frameworks.

Many headlines focus on the use of the world wide web by jihadi groups and individuals in Mediterranean Muslim contexts (and beyond), which constitute only a small component of wider online discourse. However, jihadi activites are briefly referred to within this chapter – with an underlying question being whether the continually reducing digital divide will (further) impact on radicalisation and recruitment to diverse causes?

The chapter will also discuss the role of Web 2.0+ social networking tools, in particular Facebook and Twitter, in relation to Muslim societies: in particular, the dynamic political implications of these tools, and the ways they have increasingly influenced social mobilisation, particularly in the light of the so-called 'Arab spring' and its aftermath. 'Web 2.0' is a term that suggests the use of the world wide web in particular in relation to social media, networking and participation online. Since the term became widespread in the 2000s, the world wide web has seen further shifts in technology and emphasis, which are suggested here with the use of the "+" sign.

The implications in terms of the more widely publicised and news-worthy issues associated with Islam, Muslims and the internet also have to be seen in terms of the more subtle and discrete influences of the internet on religious opinion and practice. The discussion will present a snapshot of Mediterranean Muslim online activities, to indicate the way forward within dynamic and evolving cyber Islamic environments.

*

Islam Interactive 2.0

In 2001, just prior to 9-11, I completed writing a piece entitled 'Islam Interactive: Mediterranean Islamic Expression on the World Wide Web'. This was written shortly after my book *Virtually Islamic* was published.[2] The events of 9-11, coupled with the technological

developments of the past decade, make that period seem like a different world compared with today – one that was relatively unconnected digitally. The main driving elements of the internet at that time were FTP, e-mail, Usenet groups and prototype web pages. It was an era with limited online activity in languages other than those using roman script. A significant digital divide was represented by slow connection speeds and limited online multimedia. It may be difficult for today's 'digital natives' to recall an era when there were no blogs, Twitter or social networking: MySpace and Facebook were on the distant horizon, and Mark Zuckerberg was still at high school. Hardware was primarily desk-bound for internet access: there were no iPods, BlackBerrys, eBooks, smart phones, or iPads. This was an era dominated by Internet Explorer, Mosaic and Netscape browsers, used on versions of Windows and Apple operating systems that might be seen as antique by contemporary standards. Search engines were limited: Yahoo was a dominant brand crawling the web, and Google had only been running a couple of years. The leaps in technological and internet development within a relatively short period have transformed communication patterns and methods on a global scale, and the impact has been felt throughout the Mediterranean microcosm.

In the 1990s, when I started my work in this academic area, there was a great deal of scepticism from some quarters about the relevance of observing, chronicling recording and analysing Islam on the internet. My perspective was shaped by an interest in religious authority, and – although multidisciplinary in scope – was shaped by religious studies frameworks. The reason I personally found it relevant was because Muslim scholars and activists had begun communicating and networking globally online, and those pulses of digital activity were starting to have an impact at grassroots levels. I established my own Islamic Studies Pathways site as a platform to monitor these developments.[3] Additionally, my undergraduate students were coming to seminars with web materials. I often had to question the veracity of the online materials presented, how or whether they were representative of a specific world view, and how digital discourse was starting to underpin significant contemporary discussions on Islam and Muslims?[4]

Ten years on from my early publications, we may be in a position to answer these questions. Of course, the answers are contextual, in that they depend on which situation, location and issue is being studied. Issues may be global, national and/or local in nature. It may still be possible to examine the Mediterranean sphere, with the proviso that the input of globalising influences is more profound than a decade ago. It would be naïve to suggest that the web was changing all boundaries of knowledge and authority. One would also have to explore other channels of internet driven and related activities, of which the world wide web is but one component. We are now looking at integrated cross media platforms and dialogues accessed through a variety of devices and methods, an online environment in which even previously sceptical parties are now fully engaged.

CIE+

I continue to utilise the term cyber Islamic environments (CIEs), while recognising that the conceptual framework has shifted somewhat since I first introduced it in *Virtually Islamic*. It encompasses digital online media content developed with an 'Islamic' emphasis, however subtle or overt that might be. CIEs refer to a variety of contexts, perspectives and applications of the media by those who define themselves as Muslims. These contain elements of specific worldviews and notions of exclusivity, combined with regional and cultural understandings of

the internet and its validity. CIEs demonstrated the ability to transform aspects of religious understanding and expression within Muslim contexts. A complex spectrum of access, dialogue, networking and application of the media has emerged. The term's original definition as an online internet space with an Islamic religious orientation has evolved to incorporate elements of so-called 'Web 2.0' tools, as well as alternate interfaces with different forms of functionality, such as web enabled smart phones, gaming interfaces, and televisions with net access. It can include online services such as blogs, social networking sites, media distribution channels and interfaces in which the web is integrated into 'traditional' media delivery (for example, media channels using online delivery in real time and storage modes). I stress elsewhere that – for some users – Islam is 'always on', whether being accessed online or through traditional channels. Just as there can be different levels of determining religiosity and 'Islamic' activity, depending on the beholder, so the levels of Islamic activity and usage of online materials can vary. A number of different reading styles, diverse media frameworks and user attention spans mean that consumption of web content can differ from other media forms.

For some individuals and organisations, the effect of this online activity has been transformative, and that includes those within the Mediterranean Muslim sphere. Those 'iMuslims' – a term I use elsewhere as representative of diverse online users with Muslim identities - can feel obligated to be online regularly, in order to maintain and reinforce online affiliations, networks and relationships. They may do so at the expense of traditional networks. The elements of everyday online 'Islamic' activities, including business, shopping, chat, and social networking, may fall under the radar of international headlines. In many ways, they are as equally significant as 'jihadi' sites or online fatwa services. For example, consider the relevance on personal and community levels to the abundance of 'Islamically approved' sites for arranging marriages. The world wide web, social networking sites, chat-rooms, video blogs, Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, collaborative wiki sites, podcasts, and video upload sites such as YouTube are just some of the materials that have been applied to represent aspects of Islam and Muslim expression. For those with access, computer use forms an integrated component within contemporary Muslim political-religious-cultural expression, networking and understanding across generations.

Broad ranges of 'authoritative' Islamic opinions are located on the internet. They have a variety of agendas, ranging from tackling the mundane issues of everyday life through to providing commentary (and inspiring action) in relation to world affairs. Some Islamic websites seek to project 'religious authority' via the internet. The phenomena of the online fatwa has become commonplace online, with petitioners emailing questions to authorities for a scholarly response. The utilization of the internet, and in particular the world wide web, in the name of Islam has necessitated a reconsideration and reconfiguration of Muslim networks. While elements of historical networking patterns and concepts apply, there are also new issues to address.

An innovative online knowledge economy, focused on peer-to-peer networking, has become a challenge to traditional "top-down" authority models. Through creating attractive portals and online services, various shades of the Islamic spectrum sought to channel their readers and 'manage' knowledge associated with their belief perspectives. Islamic platforms, organisations and Muslim individuals are competing in the internet marketplace, and have established an abundance of online materials promoting their understandings of Islam. Products include

translations of the Qur'an, commentaries, chat-rooms, free email services, women's and children's web sites, and online community services. There can be commercial elements to these services, with digital entrepreneurs recognising markets with specific interests and requirements for Islamic online content. This has included ensuring that services evolve to match new technical requirements and types of readerships. There remains a jostling for position within CIEs at local and global levels – especially in the Mediterranean microcosm.

Cellular CIEs

Telecommunications are a critical factor in Muslim contexts, with serious differences in access across a multi-layered digital divide. Internet access can vary in different contexts, ranging from the establishment of a telephone line, enabling simple dial-up access, through to the establishment of high-speed ADSL connectivity, integrated with wireless technology and 3G-4G smart phone access. The digital divide widens further when discussing the international coverage of broadband ADSL penetration. There is a spectrum of access, so it is not possible to generalise regarding internet access within and across Muslim contexts. These range from technology rich locations within urban environments, providing a multitude of entry points and connections to the internet, through to rural environments with limited or no telephone access, unable to access the most basic of internet services. Location, cost and digital literacy are significant generic factors influencing internet access, alongside religious factors, such as the barriers imposed by those perceiving the internet as 'un-Islamic'.

Mobile phone access is another channel for internet networking and information distribution, which shows no signs of slow down, as networks expand, access increases and technology becomes cheaper. Service providers have moved into the area of content provision, while competition to obtain licences to operate in various territories intensified, and the markets became more regulated. This all has implications in relation to internet access within Muslim contexts. The types of user have also evolved: it is a cliché to consider generational divides between internet users, but it is also true to say that there are generation(s) for whom the internet (and technology in general) is a more natural expectation for communication, obtaining news, commerce, entertainment and knowledge. This can include the development and exchange of packets of data about Islam, although it is recognised that religiously oriented transactions form only a small component of overall net use by web users who define themselves as 'Muslim'. Determination of web surfing habits, especially in Muslim contexts, can be speculative at best, internet use being a highly personalised activity, with participants unwilling to enter the public domain with indications of their activities. Individuals for whom there have been cultural and religious barriers affecting potential expression – for example, in some contexts, Muslim women – have taken advantage of the internet medium in order to articulate their concerns. This has opened up possibilities for networking and communication which have had an impact on societies in the Muslim Mediterranean context. It is not possible to generalise about 'Muslim' internet surfing habits, although – as with access issues – some general trends emerge which may also apply outside of Muslim spheres.

Mobile devices - including mobile phones, media players and personal digital assistants - have been significant in opening up access to the internet in a variety of Muslim contexts; for several years, Islam-oriented applications and programs have been devised for phones, and these have been enhanced with multimedia and Flash elements as technology has further developed. Significantly, information and communication technology growth has been linked

to mobile phone use in a number of contexts. The growth in mobile phone use in previously marginalised markets, such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, has opened up basic mobile phone access for many, including (for some) internet access. Many Muslim sectors have high mobile phone use and ownership (there is an implicit differential between the two). This level of cell phone use was reflected in the events of the 'Arab spring' in Egypt and Tunisia (discussed below), and in events contemporaneous to the writing of this present chapter, in Syria and Yemen.

As with the early growth of Islamic websites, there is now a vying for influence to promote Islamic apps and other programs to the mobile computing and mobile phone markets, which may have the result of expanding influence on matters of religion. Some Islam-oriented websites are already user-friendly for mobile phones. As with other areas of internet consumption, content developers have seen that the future for internet access is less restrained to the desktop, and with that in mind have focused on the development of mobile phone specific applications. Web design for mobile phones is a critical issue, with the need to integrate content accessibility, bandwidth restraints, clarity and navigation for mobile phones within their design.

The development of Islamic apps and phone products has a number of significant impacts: for phone manufacturers, seeking to promote their brand in a crowded market place, the integration of pre-installed Islamic apps offers a selling point that – if not unique – may be influential in a purchaser's decision. The phone market has moved substantially in the past decade, with improvements in memory, audio-visual quality, and network coverage. This has stimulated the development of multimedia applications, in particular for the iPhone, BlackBerry and Android smartphones, and for Pocket PCs. It has also generated a number of ethical and religious issues in association with mobile device use. [5]

Censoring CIEs

With the growth in internet access and use, especially through blogs, comes the issue of censorship. A number of different models apply, where censorship has been deemed relevant. Muslim political discourse has been one area of consistent censorship, where paradigms of Islamic political activism have been represented online and/or in other media. Transgressions of religious values and/or attacks against state policy are dominant motivating factors for some forms of censorship, even by those who otherwise claim that they uphold 'freedom of speech.' The parameters may vary in different Muslim contexts, with some critics suggesting that the concept is a misnomer. The freedom of speech platform embraces a number of different themes and causes, not all of which are mutually compatible within an Islamic context. This is, of course, not just an internet-related issue. Advocates of freedom of Islamic political and religious expression may seek censorship of those espousing support for values that are not deemed to be compatible with their worldview. The issue itself is indicative of an intensified awareness of the potential and realized impact of the internet on Islamic values and societies, as well as its application as a means of fulfilling a variety of political-religious agendas.

The protests that some governments in Muslim contexts have indexed and filtered political opposition, drawing on software from international corporations, brings in complex attendant issues associated with the information flow emanating from jihadi and other forces perceived

as 'destabilizing' online. Ministers responded in various ways to censorship and other forms of pressure. Governments applied the internet to observe dissident activities online. More sophisticated encryption programs meant that control of many aspects of the internet becomes problematic for government agencies in some Muslim (and other) contexts, for example in censoring email exchanges. Advice is made available online on how to evade controls of internet usage, such as retaining anonymity.[6]

Complaints emerged from diverse Islamic perspectives relating to apparent anti-Islamic materials published online. Not all objectionable materials were necessarily produced and/or published in the complainants' own countries, making censorship and restrictions problematic. Governments in Muslim Mediterranean contexts have had to adjust to the consequences of the internet as a phenomenon. Censorship can take many forms, in attempts to prevent apparent transgressions in societal and religious norms. Many of these issues are universal in nature.

Jihadi discourse

The use of the web as a strategic 'jihadi' tool predated 9-11, with a relatively sustained level of activity – albeit among small groups, given lower levels of web literacy and access. I observed dialogues about jihad oriented issues in the mid-1990s, primarily on mailing lists, FTP platforms and discussion groups. Files were small, text only – often mass mailings. The development of internet browsers enabled graphical interfaces presenting various Islamic perspectives, including online campaigns which had forms of jihadi discourse integrated into them.[7] 'Jihadi' has entered discourse online, when applied to protagonists and supporters of the lesser jihad (militaristic in nature), as articulated in cyberspace and elsewhere. While theoretically the term jihadi could be applied across conflicts and interpretations, it is narrowed down here to refer to those ideologically affiliated to the entity/networks known as al-Qaeda. This in itself is an amorphous concept: there is no single headquarters or structure, and, while its leadership had focused on Osama bin Laden and his immediate associates (especially bin Laden's successor and long-term deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri), the unstructured structure mutated to develop separate but affiliated identities within different zones – including within the Mediterranean Muslim microcosm.

Jihadi discourse also comprises part of the cyber Islamic equation. Defining 'jihad' is a significant issue, and one would not want to produce a homogeneous, umbrella definition of jihadi activity that can be nuanced and contextually oriented. Concepts associated with electronic jihad, or 'e-jihad', have been utilized in cyber contexts in many forms, in combination with classical interpretations of the term 'jihad' – the term encompasses nuanced ideas of religious understanding.[8] Those applying militaristic approaches jihad have benefited from improvements in internet access, a reduction of the digital divide, and increased web literacy. The use of video and publication of online magazines has been augmented by Web 2.0 applications to enhance the effectiveness of their message. Online distribution of content is an essential element of jihadi strategy. Media campaigns have been shaped by applying the internet as an effective method to corner support, intimidate opponents, developed logistical planning, and facilitate the raising of funds to support military campaigns. Participants and supporters may represent militaristic jihadi actions as "Islamic." Some Muslim observers, scholars, opponents and apologists have reacted by stating that they are criminal acts or forms of "terrorism" with no connection with, or contradictory

to, Islam. There are long-standing issues associated with stereotyping of Muslims here, which came into sharp focus after 9-11.

Post 9-11, the principal focus on e-jihad centred upon al-Qaeda. As well as the logistical implications of computer technology for al-Qaeda, one key element has been the ways in which the internet has been applied to communicate various agendas, aims, objectives and results to audiences in a nuanced and, in many cases, creative, structured and professional fashion. Attention was focused online on Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the al-Qaeda configuration(s). Supporters of al-Qaeda applied the Internet to disseminate statements from bin Laden and others, representing al-Qaeda's influence in (aspects of) jihadi networks in various locations. The connections between various campaigns were emphasized online, suggesting the 'global' and cellular natures of al-Qaeda. This dissemination drew on the representation of campaigns and statements through web sites, as well as the application of chat-rooms and email listings.

The technological shifts relating to the internet and computers in general have been reflected in the evolving nature of jihadi discourse. For example, the martyrdom pages of websites have shifted: from text only, to graphics, to poster style photos, to downloadable audio recordings, to slickly edited videos. Increasingly emphasis has been placed on the production of online manuals, as a means of propagation to nuanced audiences. This has also seen linguistic diversity, for example in the preponderance of English language manuals generated during 2010-11, particularly through *Inspire* magazine, and the online activities of US citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, who were working out of Yemen for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.[9] Within the Mediterranean sphere, al-Qaeda output was dominated by media productions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which have included videos, magazines and a stream of news and pronouncements. Affiliates and supporters of al-Qaeda in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey have been similarly productive. The internet was fully integrated into the strategies of al-Qaeda within global and regional contexts, keeping supporters and media informed and logistically networked through development of nuanced productions focused on specific markets and interests.

Social networking and the 'Arab spring'

Many platforms and campaigns, far beyond the jihadi sphere, have applied the internet as a means to facilitate the promotion of agendas and coordination of activities. In 2010-11, attention was particularly drawn to the 'Arab spring' and the ways in which social networking tools such as Twitter and Facebook were used to contribute to activism in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, the Yemen and elsewhere. Participation in Facebook is, according to statistical analysis by the *Arab Social Media Report*, an activity primarily undertaken by people between the ages of 15 and 29, comprising three quarters of Arab region Facebook users.[10] The *Arab Social Media Report* noted substantial regional increases in Facebook and Twitter users during the first quarter of 2011, as a response in-part to the 'Arab spring'.[11] The *Report* also noted that "... most information on Twitter is generated by a minority, while the majority use Twitter to consume news as more of a newsfeed than a microblog."[12]

It is not possible to reduce these issues to a single paradigm, although there are some shared factors. Social networking tools undoubtedly had a role to play in the events of this period – which are still ongoing at the time of writing - and clearly each location has diverse contextual

factors to consider. It is not necessarily helpful to generalise regarding 'Facebook revolution(s)' or similar epithets, given the combination of social, economic, cultural, religious and other factors: "There is no doubt that social media played a major role in the recent revolts but equally looking at the current events unfolding there are clear indicators that social media will only ever be a tool of organising. The streets are the place where revolutions can create facts on the ground."[13]

Long standing issues of regional economic and social deprivation, dissatisfaction with government and national leadership, (lack of) political accountability and representation, and human rights issues combined with the growing influence of diverse regional media to create a momentum of activism. The 'exposure' through the uploading onto WikiLeaks of sensitive US state documentation, including cables and emails from embassies discussing regional and local intelligence on specific countries, amplified discontent – particularly as these materials were discussed, edited and reposted by news media and through social networking sites.[14]

This coincided in turn with the intense growth in access to digital technology and broadcast media, and recognition of the potential of these tools to promote and mobilise campaigning: the use of these tools in Iran during the 'Green Revolution' in 2009 provided a template of social networking practice.[15] Coverage of relatively small protests received rapid circulation locally, nationally and internationally: this included 'conventional' domestic and satellite television broadcasts (such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya) and the reportage gathered from cell phone clips and reports posted online. A symbiosis between these two sources meant that satellite broadcasters drew upon these alternative materials, rebroadcasting them on their own networks, while the grassroots activists also reposted and publicised broadcasters' reports. The reporting by satellite broadcasters had a profound effect on the Arab spring sequence of events; the organisation, mobilisation and publicising of protests was facilitated in a significant part through social networking tools such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, photo sharing tools, and generic web sites. These tools were mashed together and accessed at an unprecedented level online through cell phone and computer use.

While the events have their origins in the social and cultural histories of the region – with long-standing factors - the starting point in this sequence of events has been seen as the 'Jasmine Revolution' in Tunisia.[16] This developed from on- and offline protests, following events on December 17 2010 in the town of Sidi Bouzid: street trader (and university graduate) Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated himself, apparently frustrated after a conflict with local officials relating to trading permits and restrictions. The accounts of these events were subsequently disputed. What was clear was that Bouazizi has previously updated his Facebook status, with an indication of his suicide plans.[17]

The action of suicide in itself is controversial within Muslim contexts, being forbidden in Islamic authoritative sources. Whatever the ethical dimensions of Bouazizi's actions, small protests in Tunisia rapidly gained a national momentum, as images of Bouazizi's death spread through the internet. They combined with concerns about food prices, the economy, and dissatisfaction with perceived government corruption. Footage of a heavily bandaged Bouazizi being visited by President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, apparently prior to Bouazizi's death on 4 January 2011, were followed by the uploading of clips showing Bouazizi's well-attended funeral. The Tunisian authorities tried to suppress this coverage, but it was subsequently re-broadcast on satellite media, focusing international attention. Protests galvanised through the

use of social networking tools by participants, and the uploading of mobile phone clips online. This combined with expressions of popular culture and protest, notably the rap track "Rais Lebled" performed by El Général, circulated via YouTube – which achieved wide circulation due to its lyrical attacks on the government, and the demographical profiles of predominantly youthful protesters.[18] Twitter hashtags such as #sidibouzid trended.[19] The protests' organisation could not be effectively suppressed or censored by Tunisian state agencies, contributing to the departure of Ben Ali in January 2011.[20]

Key activists did not necessarily use their own identities to promote campaigns. Anonymity and collective approaches to activism mean that highlighting one individual in events may be seen as inappropriate. One prominent online campaigner, whose name emerged during protests in Egypt in 2011, was Wael Ghonim, a Middle East executive for Google. In a personal capacity, Ghonim organised (initially anonymously) the 'We are all Khaled Said' Facebook page, which became the central point for articulation of discontent and organisation of protest in Egypt: "It became and remains the biggest dissident Facebook page in Egypt, even as protests continue to sweep the country, with more than 473,000 users, and it has helped spread the word about the demonstrations in Egypt, which were ignited after a revolt in neighboring Tunisia toppled the government there."[21]

Khaled Said was a victim of Egyptian state security. Police murdered him after he exposed corruption, and presented evidence of it online. Photos of Said's battered body were posted on the internet, leading Ghonim and others into a flurry of protest. This combined with factors such as newly formed initiatives of platforms seeking reconciliation following conflicts between Coptic Christians and Muslims in Egypt, presenting a singular 'Egyptian' identity. Information quickly circulated on Twitter and Facebook, highlighting videos on YouTube and blog postings.[22] The protests were effectively streamed to regional and global audiences, resulting in a panicked response from Egyptian authorities unsure how to respond to this online discourse.

Ghonim's own participation combined digital media with appearances at protests: he was arrested on 28th January, and released ten days later. He was probably the most prominent of the arrested online activists. Ghonim later addressed protestors at Tahrir Square, the central protest point in Cairo. Throughout the sequence of events in Egypt, Twitter was utilised, in particular through hashtags including #Egypt #Jan25 and #25Jan:

"The most popular trending hashtags across the Arab region in the first quarter were #egypt (with 1.4 million mentions in the tweets generated during this period) #jan25 (with 1.2. million mentions), #libya (with 990,000 mentions), #bahrain (640,000 mentions), and protest (620,000)." [23]

These hashtags enabled Twitter users (via cell phones and other entry points) to keep pace with the hundreds of thousands of tweets that emerged on Egyptian issues, from in- and outside of the country.[24] Bloggers with high profiles on Muslim issues, such as Mona Eltahawy (a US citizen of Egyptian origin) became central points for the reposting of Facebook and other web content, and were drawn upon by other media.[25] This combined with dramatic footage posted on YouTube from the protests, subsequently re-broadcast and re-posted worldwide. The role of broadcasters such as al-Jazeera, reporting live (and posting live on their websites) from Cairo in English and Arabic during this turbulent period, cannot be

underestimated. Despite attempts at censorship by Egyptian authorities, web users were able to circumnavigate restrictions. When online access was cut, protesters were able to post audio reports of events in Tahrir Square and elsewhere by landline phone, through services such as AliveInEgypt or Tweet2Speak: ""The service has been used to express outrage, indignation, fear, exhilaration and pleas for help in the fight to oust Mubarak. "This corrupt regime must be eliminated," said one of the translated tweets on AliveInEgypt. Another said: "For all our Arab Brothers, for all the men in Tahrir Square. Please help us, stand with us, if you abandon us we will die."" [26]

The Egyptian authorities own efforts at countering online pronouncements through their own online output were unsuccessful.[27] Internet censorship was seen as a sign that President Hosni Mubarak's hold on power was becoming increasingly tenuous, especially when Egypt 'disappeared' from the internet:[28] "Twitter was an early casualty. Then Facebook access became spotty. But when the Internet itself went down, Egyptian pro-democracy activists knew their protests were having an effect."[29] Bloggers and social networkers were clearly aware of the implications of censorship and internet closure: "While the Egyptian government believed that shutting down the Internet would quiet the protests, the exact opposite happened, said Tarek Amr, an Egyptian blogger and computer programmer. 'The protests became bigger and bigger without the Internet,' Amr said during a webcast hosted by Access, a nonprofit digital rights advocacy group."[30]

The departure of President Mubarak from office was heralded on- and offline, by networks of supporters in and outside of Egypt. Clips of Ghonim embracing Khaled Said's mother in Tahrir Square appeared on YouTube, and across social media sites of supporters.[31] Ghonim was feted by international media for his role, although he did not necessarily embrace this new status, tweeting: "The real hero is the young Egyptians [sic] in Tahrir square and the rest of Egypt #Jan25'." He was one of thousands using social networking tools as part of the protests during this period.[32] The departure of Mubarak on 10 February 2011 did not end the problems for Egypt, with subsequent protests and activism continuing online, including demonstrations from Tahrir Square that continued through 2011.

In a prescient comment (at least in terms of bin Laden's subsequently revealed location), Abubakar Siddiqui noted: "It's not difficult to imagine Al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri huddling together listening to Arabic-language broadcasts inside some nondescript house in a teeming Pakistani city. Like their enemies in the West, they are probably grappling with one fundamental question: how to manipulate the popular revolt on the "Arab Street"?"[33]

One critical point within this, however, is that these campaigns were not 'Islamic' in orientation. Key participants had Muslim identities (on a number of levels): many would identify themselves as secular, agnostic or atheist – but a number were not Muslim. Some Muslim platforms held back from full participation in demonstrations: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was a prominent example of this, although their infrastructure is web-literate, and they apply the internet to coordinate and publicise their activities, as well as to articulate internal disputes and quests for reform within the movement.[34] Regional and national hubs linking to social networking sites provided a broad digital infrastructure for the Muslim Brotherhood. They also developed their own tools, notably IkhwanBook, based on the Facebook social networking model.[35]

The sequence of events in Tunisia and Egypt stimulated further protests in other very different contexts, notably – in relation to the Mediterranean zone – Libya and Syria. This adds further layers of complexity to analysis, given that at the time of writing activities were ongoing. What can be said at this stage is that digital media were very much part of the very different milieu in Syria and Libya. Reports and footage from protests in Syria were immediately uploaded onto YouTube, despite censorship, drawing on networks of activists. The Syrian Revolution 2011 Facebook page was one significant hub, presenting news drawn from conventional media as well as cell phone footage from demonstrations in Damascus and elsewhere; often there was a blurring between the news sources.[36] Libyan protests had a different edge, given the militaristic campaigning that occurred, and the involvement of western powers through NATO against Muammar Gaddafi. Movements in Libya used YouTube to upload footage of military action from front lines, and also drew on Facebook to mobilise support.[37] Digital content was very much integrated – albeit with different emphases - into protest and conflict in the Mediterranean microcosm.

Concluding comment

This chapter was written in July 2011, as protests (and their suppression) continued in various forms– in Libya and Syria (in relation to the Mediterranean Muslim context) but also in Bahrain and Yemen. The 'Arab spring' had, perhaps, become a misnomer as its impact stretched across the year. There is scope for expanding the discussion to include the impact of social networking tools and their influence on religious issues and discourse in other Muslim 'Mediterranean' contexts, such as Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, the Lebanon, and Turkey; this could conceivably extend to concerns within minority contexts, such as France, Italy and Spain.[38] Issues such as media representation, gender roles, sexuality, intergenerational communication, economics and education and their online articulation in relation to Islam would further highlight the dynamic impact of the internet in Muslim contexts.

In the Muslim Mediterranean microcosm (and elsewhere) governmental, political and religious organisations and individuals continue to face new challenges in managing the internet medium – and respond to rapid shifts in levels of access and technological availability. Those platforms who failed to respond appropriately to social media developments have – in some cases – damaged their profiles and levels of influence. Responses may include participation in social networking contexts, or using the internet to present specific documentation or world views. It may also include – in governmental contexts – the use of monitoring tools in order to observe opponents.[39]

In the brief overview within this chapter, what can be said, at this early stage, is that developing a comprehensive understanding of the role of the internet in social activism is a critical element within the study of Islam and Muslims in the Muslim Mediterranean microcosm. While the actions were not predicated around Islam and Muslim issues, they clearly have a role in societal development, and have a mediating influence in the articulation of approaches towards contemporaneous religious issues in Islamic contexts – especially in the Mediterranean context.

Endnotes

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[10] Racha Mourtada, and Fadi Salem. 'Arab Social Media Report 1:1'. Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2011. 4 The data captured here goes beyond the Mediterranean sphere, but remains useful in providing an indication of trends and activities.
[11] Racha Mourtada, and Fadi Salem. 'Arab Social Media Report 1:2'. Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2011. 9
[12] Ibid. 15-6
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[15] Gary R. Bunt, *University of North Carolina Press Blog,* 'Gary Bunt on the 2009 Iranian presidential elections ...', (2009) accessed 22 June 2009, *http://uncpressblog.com*

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[24] Analysis of data traffic Google Realtime Twitter archive search – using Timeline #Egypt site:twitter.com 2.2.11 An archive of Twitter content became available in June 2011 'R-Shief', accessed 11 Jun 2011, *http://www.r-shief.org/*
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

BROOKINGS

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GENDER DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NORTH AFRICA

a paper by

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Introduction

In January-February 2011, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt were overthrown by unprecedented mass mobilisations. Inspired by the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions, a wave of popular protest has spread to other Arab countries, although incumbent regimes are still in place. Contrary to the widespread view that Arab women are passive victims in their societies, they have played a prominent role in this large movement of protests, contributing as key actors of change. Women's massive participation in the so-called 'Arab spring' is emblematic of the direction and the extent of gender changes in the Arab region, in general, and in the North African (NA) region, in particular, over the last decades.

Unsustainable socio-economic conditions combined with a lack of political freedoms and repression lie at the root of the mass protests across the Arab world. As far as women are concerned, their political and economic exclusion, particularly among the young, has been even deeper than that of men. While women in NA societies have made considerable progress with regard to education and fertility rates, as this paper will show, their integration into the economic sphere and formal political structures has been much slower. Moreover, NA women's political agency in the public sphere is not a new phenomenon. Over the decades, NA women, in growing number, have made their voices heard in various ways, from being active in women's organisations and Islamist groups/political parties to participating in more spontaneous expressions of dissent and frustration such as sit-ins, strikes and so on. As a result, the Arab spring did not spring from a void, but built up through a long process of individual and collective awareness of men and women alike, suggesting that women have long been shaping change in the NA region. Nevertheless, the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia came at a time when civil society actors, including women's associations, human rights groups and political opposition forces, including Islamist groups, were increasingly incapable of affecting political and economic change, owing to growing repression as well as internal weaknesses. The absence of large, viable, organised opposition forces and formal channels of political expression, combined with the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and political regression, explains the spontaneous and broad nature of the mobilisations.

Based on this premise, this paper will look at the NA region and assess the direction and extent of gender changes[3] in the economic and political fields as well as provide a broad overview of women's activism in its diverse forms, with a particular focus on the Arab spring.

1.1 North Africa women – between progress and resilience to change

Over the past decades, women in NA societies have made considerable progress with regard to education and fertility rates. More girls than boys are now in secondary and higher education, and other aspects of demographic transition have proceeded rapidly

[1] University La Sapienza of Rome. Maria Cristina Paciello wrote 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.6.
[2] University of Bologna. Renata Pepicelli wrote 1.4, 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8.
[3] This work is based on the idea that the gender changes occurred in the economic and political fields in North Africa have been the product of indigenous dynamics which have been influenced by external factors but not determined by them. This means that the gender changes of the last decades are not the result of Western political and economical impositions.

since the early 1990s. Although there are variations across areas of residence and social classes, NA families have undergone important structural transformations: the age of first marriage has increased; family sizes have been reduced; the nuclear model has come to represent the majority of families; the percentage of unmarried women has increased; and a growing number of families are headed by women (Breslin and Kelly, 2010, El-Zanaty and Way, 2008; Assad, 2007, Fargues, 2005).[4]

These achievements, however, have not been accompanied by corresponding improvements in the participation of NA women in the economy. As shown in Table 1, labour market indicators are comparatively more unfavourable for women in NA than in other regions. Yet, while participation in the labour force of women in the NA region has been rising since the 1960s, it remains among the lowest in the world, meaning that most women continue to be outside of the labour market. Together with the Middle East, the NA region also has the lowest employment-to-population ratio for women and the highest female unemployment rate in the world. Moreover, while unemployment is high for both men and women in the NA region, the gender gap is much wider here than in other regions.

The labour market situation in NA is even worse for young women (see Table 2). In particular, in Algeria, in 2010, unemployment among young female university graduates was 33.6 percent compared to 11.1 percent for young men with corresponding levels of education (ONS, 2010). Similarly, in Egypt, in 2009, the unemployment rate among young women was about 32 percent, compared to 12 percent among young men (UNICEF, 2010). At the same time, wage discrimination against women and gender segmentation in the labour market continue to be marked in the NA, with women being squeezed into a limited range of occupations that are mostly low paid, and concentrated in forms of temporary/precarious employment (see Breslin and Kelly, 2010; Catusse et al., 2009; el Haddad, 2009).

The limited access of women to the labour market has been an important factor in perpetuating the Arab patriarchal contract and undermining gender change in NA countries. The fact that NA women have problems in entering the labour market means that delayed marriage and declining fertility are not associated to the greater empowerment of women and a weakening of the patriarchal contract (Fargues 2005). In Egypt, for example, young women and men delay marriage mainly because of lack of employment opportunities and deteriorating economic conditions. In the case of women, postponing marriage in the absence of economic independence means that they remain under the authority of their father or legal guardian (Assad, 2007). Yet, as women's jobs tend to be concentrated in sectors where salaries are low, this reduces their prospects for financial independence and greater say in the family.

Although NA women's low levels of participation in the labour force are the result of the cumulative action of a range of economic, legal and political factors, they should be understood primarily within the economic policies pursued since the 1960s. Owing to oil windfalls, particularly during the first and second oil booms, which allowed for high real wages for male workers and remittances from male migrant workers, the contribution of women to the market was considered unnecessary (Karshenas 2001). The adoption of an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy by most Arab countries in the 1960s-1970s also worked against women's economic participation as

[4] In Morocco, for example, the nuclear model has come to represent 60 percent of all families, meanwhile, the percentage of unmarried women went up from 17 percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 2004. More than 20 percent of families in 2007 were female heads of household (Kerrouache, 2010).

it was inward-looking, capital-intensive and required skilled labour, all factors that favoured male employment (see Moghadam 2005).[5]

In the mid-1980s, with collapsing oil prices and the consequent debt crisis, NA countries were compelled to change the direction of economic policies, adopting market-oriented reform programs. For a number of economic and political reasons, these policies, accompanied among other things by the retrenchment of the state from welfare services, failed to ensure well-balanced development and sufficient jobs, thus making the breadwinner model of the family less sustainable. As a result, even while NA women have been facing more constraints in accessing the formal labour market, more and more of them have sought jobs in order to augment deteriorating household budgets. At the same time, married couples have opted for smaller families.

Market-oriented policies have dampened prospects for female more than male employment , with social and labour market policies, with the exception of micro-credit programs, biased against women (see Bougroum & Ibourk, 2003; Catusse *et al.*, 2009). The personnel reductions in the public sector, where many educated women had found jobs since the 1960s, and the implementation of privatisation programs have significantly curtailed employment opportunities for them, particularly in Egypt. Trade-oriented policies in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt initially accelerated the employment of young uneducated women in the private sector, particularly in the textile-clothing industry, albeit for low wages, and under exploitative and bad working conditions (Bourqia, 2002; Destremau, 2009; Solidarity Center 2010). Since the mid-1990s, however, with the intensification of international competition and the consequent contraction of the manufacturing sector, particularly of the textile-clothing industry, employment opportunities for Moroccan, Tunisian and Egyptian women have declined drastically and working conditions in this industry have further worsened. The result of all these factors has been the emergence of very high rates of female unemployment, especially among educated women, alongside a rapid expansion of low social strata female employment in the informal economy.

Although North African countries have grown remarkably over the last decade due to the third oil boom, labour market problems, particularly among women and the educated young, have worsened dramatically. In Tunisia, from 1994 to 2007, female unemployment stagnated (from 17.5 to 17.8 percent), even though unemployment at the national level declined (from 15.8 percent to 14.1 percent) (Mahjoub, 2010). In Egypt, the decline in female unemployment from 1998 to 2006 reflects the fact that young women adjusted to deteriorating labour market conditions by withdrawing from the labour force. Indeed, this decline was associated with decreasing rates of participation among young women with post-secondary and university education. In other words, the lack of job opportunities for young, educated Egyptian women, reflecting the dramatic diminution in government hiring, and the large gender gap in wages in the private sector discouraged them from looking for a job (Assaad, 2007).

The impact of the global financial crisis has been particularly adverse for women and youth in NA (Paciello, 2011a, Klau 2010). For example, in Morocco and Egypt, as the textile/clothing industry, which is a women-intensive sector, was hard hit by the global crisis, reporting the largest number of lay-offs, women, particularly young women, found it increasingly difficult to remain employed (Ibid). Moreover, as the case of Morocco shows, the fiscal stimulus packages implemented by the government to cope with the negative effects of the global crisis were completely insensitive to the

[5] In Tunisia and Morocco, where dependence on oil revenues was more limited and a manufacturing export-oriented strategy began earlier than in other Arab countries, women's labour force participation rates have been historically higher.

needs of women and youth, particularly educated ones, as a large amount of public resources was devoted to infrastructure spending and no special program directly targeted the large number of women affected by job losses in the textile/clothing industry.

1.2 North African women in the labour market as agents of change

When NA women do participate in the labour market, there are signs of positive changes in both the private and public spheres.

The private sphere

Within households, work distribution in NA countries is strongly gender biased, with women bearing most of the burden of reproduction (Direction de la Statistique, 1999; UNICEF, 2010). More than in other regions, in NA societies, motherhood and marriage play a significant role in constraining the supply of women's labour to the market (UNECA, 2005; Direction de la Statistique, 1999; Willman et al. 2011; Hendy, 2010). In Egypt, for example, many women (75 percent) who were active in 1998 still worked in 2006, conditional on the fact that they remained single. If and when they transited into marriage, about 60 percent dropped out of the labour force (Hendy, 2010).

When women enter the labour market, as quantitative evidence for Morocco shows, there seems to be no redistribution of the burden of domestic work within the family, with women either continuing to bear the main burden of domestic work, or sharing it with other female members of the household, often their daughters (Direction de la Statistique, 1999). The burden of household chores also limits the mobility of married women. This means that female entrepreneurs tend to serve local and national markets (World Bank, 2010), while single women are more likely than married women to emigrate for working reasons (Bouchoucha, 2010).

This is also due to the fact that, apart from generous maternity benefits for working mothers in the public sector, the number of nurseries and kindergartens run by the state in NA remains very low. High-middle class working women in NA, however, appear to be in a better position to reconcile family and professional life, as they are increasingly resorting to paid day care services.[6] Nevertheless, there is growing evidence for Tunisia and Morocco that, alongside the single and the divorced, married women have also started to emigrate, leaving their families behind, often temporarily, in their home country (Schmoll, 2007; Khachani, 2010).Caution is needed, however, in interpreting this evidence as univocally positive for women, as women migrating for temporary employment may be faced with the exploitative conditions of seasonal agricultural work, as the case of Moroccan women migrating to Spain shows.

While the intra-household redistribution of domestic work is resilient to change, a few studies on NA countries suggest that working women improve their self-confidence, earn greater respect and are more likely to intervene in various decisions within their families (Direction De la Statistique, 1999; Willman et al. 2010, IFES, 2010; El-Zanaty and Way, 2008; Pin et al., 2008, Schmoll, 2007).

The public sphere

Although the gender segmentation of the labour market in NA countries continues to

[6] See for example, "Tunisian parents choose day-care over Grandma", *Magharebia.com*, 26/11/2010, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/reportage/2010/11/26/reportage-01. Also in Cairo, one can see how the number of private crèches has expanded over the last years.

be substantial, a number of positive, albeit still limited, developments can be observed. While women in NA countries are generally encouraged to study in traditionally female disciplines such as teaching and health care, they have nonetheless started entering new fields, including engineering and science (Breslin and Kelly, 2010). Moreover, NA women have gradually been moving into other fields of work that were previously the exclusive monopoly of men. In Egypt, women have taken the driver's seat in Cairo's cabs; in Tunisia, women own shops in the *suq* alongside men; in Morocco, women have entered the police force and, in 2008, for the first time, 19 women graduated as police commanders. NA women are also increasingly working in male-dominated occupations such as judges and lawyers.

The presence of women in the media as journalists, bloggers, film producers and so on, has expanded, with positive implications in terms of producing alternative discourses and images about women (Skalli, 2006; Malt Carol, 2006). While the share of female entrepreneurs in the NA remains lower than in other middle-income countries, their number is reported to be on the rise, particularly in Tunisia and Algeria.[7] Interestingly, as shown in a number of recent studies on NA, when these women are able to establish and manage their enterprises, these are as likely or even more likely than male-owned firms to be dynamic, stay in the market, grow and export (World Bank, 2010; Nasr 2010; CAWTAR 2007).[8] However, the women that emerge as successful entrepreneurs generally benefit from strategic assets (e.g belonging to wealthy families, being well-educated and having good access to social/political networks), which allow them to get around typical gender-related constraints such as lack of access to formal credit, child-care responsibilities and so on.

1.3 Women in decision-making structures

The presence of women in decision-making structures (e.g., political parties, parliaments, governments and trade unions) remains low in the Arab region compared to other regions (see Table 3), although there have been important improvements in recent years. Women in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have increased their participation in parliament, in government positions, local municipalities and trade unions (see Breslin and Kelly, 2010). There are currently political parties headed by women, such as the Workers' Party led by Louisa Hanoune in Algeria,[9] the Democratic Society Party by Zouhour Chekkafi in Morocco and the *Parti Democratique Progressiste* by Maya Jeribi in Tunisia. As discussed below, the presence of women in Islamist parties has been increasing in NA countries. Also, trade unions in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco have created women's committees.

However, the capacity of NA women to affect change and policy-making through these formal channels of expression has remained very limited. Because authoritarian regimes in NA exercise tight and systematic control over political life, weakening the functions of parliaments and co-opting political parties and trade unions, women's agency through these bodies has been either ineffective or has reflected clientelistic interests. For example, increases in the number of female parliamentarians in the last elections in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia were achieved by governments through

[7] For Algeria, see "Algeria: Algerian Women Expand Business Opportunities", *Magharebia*, 19/12/2010, (www.magharebia.com), reporting a study by the National Business Register Centre (CNRC) released in March. "Tunisia NGOs promote women-run businesses", *Magharebia*, 22/12/2010, (www.magharebia.com).

[8] Also see "Tunisia NGOs promote women-run businesses", *Magharebia*, 22/12/2010, (www.magharebia.com).

[9] She was the only woman to run for president in 2004 and April 2009, taking roughly 1 percent and 4 percent of the vote, respectively.

quota systems, in order to consolidate the power of ruling parties, and were therefore more symbolic than real (Breslin and Kelly, 2010).
Also at the level of trade unions, professional associations and entrepreneur organisations, NA women have remained under-represented in the upper echelons. The so-called Arab spring could open up opportunities for women, however, in terms of influencing policy decision-making and occupying key positions within these institutions. After the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, for example, the *Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat* (UTICA), the existing organisation of entrepreneurs, in an attempt to renew its image, appointed a woman, Wided Bouchemmaoui, as its interim president. Moreover, the vice-president of the new organisation of entrepreneurs, the *Confédération des Entreprises Citoyennes de Tunisie* (CONECT), established in September 2011, is a woman, Douja Gharbi. Also, in the post-Ben Ali era, the *Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens* nominated Nejiba Hamrouni as its new secretary, while the UGTT, the only trade union operating under Ben Ali, is seriously considering introducing a female quota system prior to the elections for the new Congress that will take place in the coming months.[10] Although these changes do not always reflect a radical change *vis-à-vis* the old system of power, as is the case with the UTICA,[11] they may nonetheless highlight a new positive trend toward a larger number of women in key decision-making positions.

1.4 The role of women in Islamist organizations

The presence of women in Islamist parties has been on the increase all over the Arab world. Even within an Islamist framework, women are recognized as key political actors. In Morocco, 7 out of 34 women elected to Parliament in the 2007 election, came from the Islamist party, PJD.[12] According to Nadia Yassine, founder and head of the women's branch of the Moroccan Islamist association, *al Adl wa al Insan*, women are claiming more and more space in the organization. Thirty percent of the movement's internal assembly, *El Majlis Choura*, is composed of women. Of the six members elected by the general secretariat without a quota system, three are women. The women's section is very active and influent (Yassine, 2006).
In Egypt, the Islamist movement, the Muslim Brothers, has also started to recognize the importance of women. This has been reflected in the selection of women as candidates for the parliamentary and municipal elections in 2000, 2005, and 2007, as well as in the growing number of women involved in the Brotherhood's political activities. In the last decade, the party has taken an advanced position concerning women, stressing that they should have the right to strike a balance between their social duties and their work in the public sphere. It is worth mentioning that the ban against women running for the presidency maintained in the 2007 party platform led to a vigorous debate within the movement. This ongoing ban can be considered a retreat from the position previously advanced by many in the movement. A new generation of women, critical of their marginal status in the movement are, in fact, seeking ways to assert their demands for more representation and broader participation in the movement's politics (Abdel-Latif, 2008). Thus, it is not surprising

[10] Author's interview with various members of the UGTT in Tunis, September 2011.
[11] Wided Bouchemmaoui is also member of the UTICA's executive bureau, which was elected under Ben Ali. In spite of the revolution, the bureau has continued to operate, albeit with limited functions. A new executive bureau is expected to be elected in December 2011.
[12] Amina Barakat, "Status quo pour les femmes au parlement", 20 September, http://ipsinternational.org/fr/_note.asp?idnews=3807

that many women from the Muslim Brothers participated in the protests that forced Hosni Mubarak to step down in February 2011.
The main Islamist party in Tunisia, *en-Nahda*, which was illegal until the fall of Ben Ali and now endorses the public and political role of women, is favourable to female candidates in political competitions and claims that it intends to respect the achievements obtained so far by Tunisian women.
From Tunisia to Egypt, Islamist women participate in political activities and religious gatherings. They are usually very active in women's groups where they discuss the sacred texts and the role of women in society and the family according to the Islamic sources. Based on their reading of the Quran and hadith, Islam grants women respect and rights (to property, education, political participation), but those rights have been obscured by a wrong reading of the sacred texts. Even if the latter claim that the main role of a woman is as a mother and educator, Islamist women are not a priori against women working and participating politically as they argue simply that these commitments should be subject to the fulfilment of family obligations. In their speeches, they particularly emphasize motherhood, which is considered the meeting point between the individual and social spheres, the personal and political domains. According to them, women make their main contribution to the welfare of humankind by engaging in the role of educators of their children, in the strict sense, and generations of Muslims in a broad sense.

1.5 Women's activism
The activism of Arab women has focused on a variety of topics ranging from the protection of children to environment, the fight for freedom and democracy and against illiteracy. Certainly, the promotion of gender issues is a central topic. It is worth mentioning, however, that women's activism in the Arab world is not a new phenomenon. The women's movement goes back more than a century (Pepicelli, 2008). At the end of the 19th century, Arab women (Muslims, Christians and Jews) started to claim the right to education and participation in the public sphere in journals, newspapers, novels, poems, protests. It is important to underline that the early 20th century Arab feminist wave, characterized by nationalist and anti-colonial claims, was the result of both internal changes (e.g. diffusion of women's education, the desire of middle and upper class women to enjoy more freedom and rights, spread of new ideas of development) and external influences (e.g. the economic and cultural penetration of Europeans in North Africa and the Middle East, European criticism of the status of women and the travels of Arab upper class men and women in the West).
The first Arab feminist movements interacted with the activism of women in Europe and the rest of the world, albeit without losing their specificity. From the beginning of the 20th century, in fact, women's rights activists of Arab origin, mostly Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese and Palestinian, exchanged views with European movements during international conferences on women, held in various European cities. The activists from the Arab world, far from being in a subordinate position to the West, gave rise to a battle for the assertion of indigenous women's rights.
The first explicit feminist organization in Egypt, the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) of Hoda Sharawi, was founded at the beginning of the 20th century. And already in the year of its constitution, 1923, three delegates participated in the 9th Congress of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance in Rome, underlining their commitment to the right to vote. Other women's associations like the EFU were founded all over the Arab world during the last century to fight against patriarchal institutions and laws (Badran, 2009). Their battles were mostly set within a secular framework, in the name

of the universality of human rights and, later, for the enforcement of international agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).[13]
Now, in the first decade of the 21st century, women's activism is characterized by both continuity with this secular approach and the emergence of gender activism with an Islamic perspective. In fact, since the early 1990s, a growing number of Muslim women in different parts of the Islamic world have argued that the Quran guarantees them freedom and rights, but that these have been denied by the patriarchal traditions and misogynistic interpretations that have become dominant over the centuries. Scholars such as the Moroccan, Asma Lambrabet (2007, 2004), or the Egyptian, Omaima Abou-Bakr (2001), maintain that there is no justification for the subordination of women, which is done against the message of Islam. The new exegesis produced by women like these represents the basis on which many activists are building their battles against patriarchal laws and institutions. Their discourses and practices are called Islamic feminism (Badran 2002; Pepicelli, 2010).
Thus the contemporary women's movement in the Arab world can be schematized into three main areas: 1) women's organizations that work in a secular setting; 2) associations acting in a religious sphere, referring to the discourses of Islamic feminism, and 3) women's associations close to Islamist movements and parties. These three souls of the women's movement are very different from one another, in some cases they are openly and irreconcilably conflicting (especially if you think of the secular feminists and the Islamist activists' agenda), but in others they are compatible. It is not always possible to draw a clear line between the different groups. Despite substantial differences, proximity can sometimes be found for strategic reasons, as was demonstrated by the unity achieved by Islamic feminists and many secular feminists in the battles that led to reform of the Moroccan Family Code in 2004. It is worthy of note, however, that even if both Islamic feminists and Islamist women refer to Islam, they attribute different meanings to such concepts as Islam, human rights, democracy, women's issues and shari'a (Buskens, 2003). In fact, unlike the Islamic feminists, for the Islamists and for the women within the so called Muslim piety movement, equity rather than equality between the genders should be pursued in all aspects of society. In this social construction, the man remains responsible for maintaining the family. Gender equity has to do with the complementarity of roles: reflecting their natural inclination, men are more predisposed to the public sphere and women to the private (Alami M'chichi, 2002). This does not mean, however, that women should be excluded from the public sphere, or that, if they participate in it, they should be considered inferior. Participation in the public sphere is considered a way to develop the Islamic concept of "common good" and fulfil one's duties towards society and God. The choice to act in the public sphere, including politics and voluntary associations, is primarily tied to the desire to adhere to the model of the pious Muslim woman who tries to strengthen her faith and go to heaven, thanks to her work on earth (Deeb, 2006). Thus, achieving gender equity is one of the goals of these women, but it is not the only one, and certainly not the most important.

1.6 Growing contestation in the last decade and the role of women

The last decade has seen a wave of social and political contestation in NA countries, reflecting the deterioration of socio-economic conditions and political regression. In

[13] Cedaw was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, and ratified by the majority of arab countries even if with reservations. Described as an international bill of rights for women, it defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination.

the absence of formal channels of political expression, dissenting voices in NA have taken alternative and diversified forms (sit-ins, petitions, strikes, etc.), often localised and focused on particularistic demands (see Beinin and Varel, 2011; Ben Nefissa and Destremau, 2011). Women have been part of this wave of contestation, even though they have been less visible than men. Women, for example, actively participated in the revolt in the Gafsa Mining Basin in Tunisia in 2008, which was one of the most important protest movements seen in Tunisia since the bread revolt of January 1984. Staging sit-ins, they confronted the police and demanded the release of their sons (Gobe, 2010). Women have also expressed their political ideas and denounced human rights violations as bloggers (for example, Lina Ben Mehenni in her blog "A Tunisian girl"[14]) or through facebook (for example, Esraa Abdel Fattah Ahmed Rashid, a 30-year-old Egyptian woman, who was one of the founders of the April 6 Facebook group and among the main organisers of the general strike of April 6 2008, after which she was arrested).

Egyptian women workers, mostly uneducated and young, played a leading and crucial role in the unprecedented wave of labour protests that began in 2004, reflecting the intensification of market-oriented reforms and the increased hardship experienced by large swathes of Egyptian society. Following the refusal of the prime minister to increase annual bonuses, in December 2006, female workers in the state textile factory in the industrial town of Mahalla al-Kubra initiated the largest industrial strike since 1947, demanding that their male colleagues stop production and join them in the protest (Beinin, 2010; Solidarity Center, 2010). During fall 2007, women workers also took part in the strikes staged by property-tax workers, who mobilised the largest and most successful collective action of the labour movement since 2006 (Beinin, 2010). Female workers such as Aisha Abd-al-Aziz Abu-Samada at the Hennawi Tobacco factory in the Delta town of Damanhur also played a leading role in organising workers, women and men alike (Solidarity Center, 2010). These strikes were successful in pushing a number of economic demands and the significant participation of women in the protests encouraged gender mixing in public spaces, challenging conventional gender norms and stereotypes (Ibid).

1.7 Women's claims and the Arab spring

As stated earlier, the so-called Arab spring was ushered in by a long process of active citizenship by women. During the protests that led to the overthrown of Ben Ali in Tunisia and H. Mubarak in Egypt, women were present everywhere: in the front row throwing stones and rejecting the police, in the crowds of protesters documenting what was happening with their cameras and then posting it on the internet, in the rear distributing food and water and treating the wounded. Their action had no particular political orientation. There were women of both secular and Islamist tendencies. Some had long experience (in militant opposition groups or feminist associations), others were not a part of these organizations, and others still had grown up in the opposition movements that emerged on the web during the last decade. In recent years, most women and men have become involved in the anti-government mobilisations spontaneously. There is no doubt that, during the protests, opposition parties, associations, movements such as *Kifaya* and the April 6th movement in Egypt, as well as the historical organizations of opposition in Tunisia, including the *Ligue tunisiennes des droits de l'homme* (LTDH), the *Conseil national pour le respect des*

[14] See her blog on http://atunisiangirl.blogspot.com/.

libertés en Tunisine (CNLT), and the *Association tunisienne des femmes démocrates (ATFD)*, played an important role.
The protagonists of the Arab spring, however, were young men and women, mostly educated and not framed into political parties and movements. It was a non-organized civil society that made the change possible. Young men and women like Asma Mahfouz, the 26 year old Egyptian, who made a brave "video-blog" of 4 ½ minutes with her own mobile phone, later posted on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgMdsEuk. In the video, she strongly invited Egyptians to demonstrate: "I'm making this video to give you one simple message. We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25. If we still have honor and we want to live in dignity on this land, we have to go down on January 25 [...] Whoever says it's not worth it because there will only be a handful of people, I want to tell him you are the reason behind this, and you are a traitor just like the president or any security cop who beats us in the streets. Your presence with us will make a difference, a big difference!".
Like many other women in the protests, Asma Mahfouz is veiled. For many of them, *hijab* (the veil that covers the head, but leaves the face uncovered) does not symbolize the transmission of traditional religion, but is rather a sign of re-appropriation of Islam as a religious, cultural and often political identity;it is not necessarily an expression of political affiliation to Islamist organizations.

1.8 Women and the post-revolution

During the protests in both Egypt and Tunisia, there was an unexpected synergy between men and women. Mona Seif, 26 years old, recounts: "Pre-January 25 whenever we would attend protests I would always be told by the men to go to the back to avoid getting injured, and that used to anger me. But since January 25 people have begun to treat me as an equal. There was this unspoken admiration for one another in the square. We went through many ups and downs together. It felt like it had become a different society" (Naib, 2011). In the aftermath of January 25, many women and even several men expressed similar considerations. Many were confident that they would be able to build a more just society, with no dictatorship and female subordination established by law and reinforced by customs. Soon, however, the enthusiasm gave way to concerns and disappointments. In Egypt, women have been excluded from decision-making positions. Only one woman was nominated to the interim cabinet; the eight members of the committee tasked with formulating constitutional amendments are all male; one of the proposed amendments suggested that future presidents could only be male; and the quota of 64 parliamentary seats for women has been abolished.
Moreover, what happened during the demonstration to celebrate March 8, International Women's Day, seems to suggest that the revolution, which had benefited so much from female participation, was leaving women behind. To commemorate the date, several groups of women's associations and individuals who had participated in the protests held a march in Tahrir Square demanding that women have a voice in building Egypt's future. The reaction in Tahrir Square that day was brutal, as there were only a few hundred women in the square. They were accosted by several groups of men, shouting insults and much worse. They were told to go home and wash clothes, that their actions were "un-Islamic" (Khan, 2011). The next day, on March 9, almost a month after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, things were even worse. During a raid by the police in Tahrir Square, 17 young women were arrested and taken to the police station. There they were beaten, subjected to electric shock, forced

to undress, be photographed by soldiers and finally subjected to a "virginity test", under threat of being indicted for prostitution.[15]

Thus post-revolutionary Egypt is going through particularly difficult times with women paying the highest price. Excluded from decision-making, as stated earlier, they are having to deal with the offensive of conservative groups. The Egyptian Centre for Women's Rights has collected several testimonies of women assaulted by Salafis, who ordered them to cover themselves from head to toe, get out of their cars and go home (Khan, 2011).

While the situation of women in Egypt is quite difficult, there are signs in Tunisia that give hope that the post-revolutionary period can create more space for women. Although anti-revolutionary forces are present in all segments of the country and despite the fact that several women have complained of being attacked during demonstrations by small groups of Islamists or presumed Islamists, some important positive results can be observed. Tunisian women have obtained that the lists for the next election of the Constituent Assembly, to be held on October 23, 2011, will be composed of equal numbers of men and women placed in alternating order, so that women do not find themselves confined, as often happens, to the bottom of the list. The Tunisian activist Sihem Bensedrine comments: "It was not easy, even the old progressive parties were opposed, saying that reform was impossible, that there would not be enough women to make up the lists. For them, women were there only to go to the streets, to take beatings, to formulate slogans for the revolution. It is still the opportunism of parties led by men who consider the public space a male prerogative. By having imposed equal candidacies it will be a success: whatever happens, at least one quarter of the deputies in the future Constituent Assembly will be women. Developing a new constitution without women would be a danger: what kind of democracy is one that marginalizes half of society? " (Forti, 2011)

Concluding remarks

This paper has shown that, over the decades, NA women have increasingly entered the public sphere. As far as economic participation is concerned, NA women have gradually been moving into fields of work that were previously the exclusive monopoly of men, while the number of female entrepreneurs is reported to be on the rise, at least in some NA countries. Moreover, NA women have been expressing their voices in growing number, in diverse ways, from being active in women's organisations and Islamist groups/political parties to participating in less structured expressions of dissent. In spite of this growing presence of women in the public sphere and the considerable achievements in terms of education, NA women have continued to be marginalised from the economic and political spheres as well as almost absent from the high-level positions where decisions are taken.

The changing political context in Tunisia and Egypt could provide women with new opportunities for implementing a more gender sensitive agenda and influencing policymaking. The revolutions in both countries have indeed released enormous and promising energies in these societies, which could positively affect gender relations. However, the evidence in this regard has been contrasting so far. While the case of Tunisia shows promising trends, in the case of Egypt, women have continued to be marginalised from the political arena. Moreover, given that the trajectories of both Egypt's and Tunisia's political changes are still uncertain and face a number of

[15] See Amnesty International, 23 March 2011,
http://www.amnesty.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/4652

challenges that could hamper the two countries' transition toward a sustainable state (see Paciello, 2011b, 2011c), it is too early to say whether or not women will be able to influence the future course of events.

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Appendix: Tables

Table 1: Labour market indicators by gender, regional averages (2007)

	Labour force participation rates 2007 (%)		Employment-to-population ratio 2007 (%)		Unemployment rate 2007 (%)	
	females	males	females	males	females	males
Developed Economies and European Union	52.7	68.2	50.6	68.5	6.8	6.6
East Asia	67.1	81.4	69.7	83.1	2.9	3.9
South-East Asia and the Pacific	59.1	82.8	58.9	87.8	5.8	5.3
South Asia	36.2	82.0	37.4	86.4	6.0	5.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	52.9	79.1	52.3	82.2	9.1	5.6
Middle East	33.3	78.3	24.3	81.9	13.4	8,7
North Africa	26.1	75.9	26.7	81.8	16.3	8.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	62.6	86.1	62.5	85.5	8.4	7.7

Source: ILO (2008, 2009)

Table 2: Labour market indicators by gender and youth (2007)

	Employment-to-population ratio 2007 (%)		Youth unemployment rate 2007 (%)	
	females	males	females	males
Developed Economies and European Union	42.8	45.6	12.5	13.8
East Asia	64.5	61.6	5.8	7.9
South-East Asia and the Pacific	40.3	53.7	16.7	16.0
South Asia	26.2	57.2	9.9	9.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	35.3	53.4	21.6	14.0
Middle East	19.5	44.3	29.5	21.1
North Africa	14.7	39.8	32.3	21.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	49.0	63.5	13.9	13.6

Source: ILO (2008)

Table 3: Women in national parliament, regional and country averages (Updated to December 2010)

	Women in Lower House (%)	Women in Upper House (%)
Regions		
Nordic countries	42.1	-
Americas	22.4	23.8
Europe - OSCE member countries exc. Nordic countries	20.1	19.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	19.6	19.7
Asia	18.2	15.3
Pacific	12.4	32.6
Arab States	11.4	7.3
North Africa		
Egypt	12.7	-
Libya	7,7	-
Morocco	10,5	2.2
Tunisia	27.6	15.2

Source: IPU, Women in national parliaments, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif311210.htm

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

BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

An International Conference

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MODERN COMMERCIAL AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A FACTOR OF CHANGE

a paper by

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With the support of

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***Reference**: Entrepreneurship is an indicator of social transformation and mobility. The paper will deal only marginally with its micro-dimension, that is the "informal" sector of traditional family subsistence, though it may represent up to 90% of the economy of North African countries. It will rather focus on the small and medium-sized enterprises, its most dynamic sector in the production of goods and services, including social services. It is part of a local market generated by the nascent medium class, mostly urban, as well as by the process of outsourcing and sub-contracting by Western companies. This paper will connect with the previous ones, in particular as regards the impact of migration on entrepreneurship, with women gaining autonomy and recognition via entrepreneurial activities, and the impact of the internet and, broadly speaking, telecommunications technologies in changing business relations.*

1. Introductory remarks.

Classical modernization and political economy approaches both consider a wide array of economic agents as potential drivers of change. These actors include international agents like foreign companies (transnational corporations but possibly also smaller companies), international organisations and NGOs; and local agents like national public companies, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and segments of civil societies involved in economic or social activities, like professional associations, trade unions and NGOs. Several authors have highlighted the linkages between entrepreneurs and Mediterranean political systems (Roy, 2004; Catusse, 2008; Greenwood, 2008), but their analyses have tended to focus on the role of big entrepreneurs. In fact nobody could have anticipated that the self-immolation of a humiliated and frustrated street fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, exemplifying the figure of the over-trained informal micro-entrepreneur, would unleash the most profound upheaval seen in the Arab World since its independence. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by analysing entrepreneurship as a driver of social transformation, focusing on the role of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). While mainly dealing with the Southern Mediterranean region, the paper also includes some contextual references to the wider Middle East.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section briefly presents the current situation of SMEs and entrepreneurship in North Africa. The second section tries to conceptually address the role of entrepreneurship as a driver of social change in North African countries. The third section is devoted to identifying the linkages of SMEs and entrepreneurship with some aspects of the other factors of change included in the study, mainly business diasporas, the role of women entrepreneurs, religious attitudes towards business and the economy, and the impact of new telecommunications technologies (TLCs) in changing business relationships. The final section concludes with some implications for US and EU relationships with the region, as well as for transatlantic relations.

2. SMEs and entrepreneurship in North Africa[1]

[1] Several observations in these pages derive from interviews in Algiers (November 2008 - Escribano, 2008b, and May 2011), Istanbul (February 2008 - Escribano, 2008a), Rabat and Casablanca (December 2009 - Escribano, 2010), and Tangiers (June 2011).

The nature of the North African productive fabric has largely been dependent upon the historical evolution of its economic strategies, which in turn has resulted from continuous bargaining between the State and the succesive economic actors that emerged from those strategies. This has led to a process well documented in the region's political economy literature (Alissa, 2007; Catusse, 2006; Escribano and Lorca, 2008a; Greenwood, 2008; Heydemann, 2004; Richards and Waterbury, 2007). After independence, state-led growth and import substituting industries generated a group of public company managers and rent-seeking entrepreneurs. The collapse of this model in the 80's led to liberalization policies that resulted in the economic elites obtaining most of the privatized assets, thanks to their political connections, in a more sophisticated model of rent-seeking. In fact, corporatist capitalism, through privilege and cronyism, is the main entry barrier to new entrepreneurs and the development of entrepreneurship (Toscano, 2011; Paciello, 2011).

However, recent efforts directed towards diversification and export orientation have created a new class of micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs integrated in transnational industrial networks, which coexist with a more traditional class of small and very small merchants and traditional service providers. Today, SMEs, including micro and often informal or semi-formal entrepreneurs, are the most dynamic economic actors in the Southern Mediterranean region: they grow faster, are more flexible and more innovative than big companies, and are far more labour intensive (Henry and Saint-Laurent, 2010; Alissa, 2007). According to the MENA-OECD Investment Programme, SMEs contribute to over two-thirds of total formal employment in the region and provide a very significant share of value added. To these figures must be added the whole informal sector, formed mostly by micro-entrepreneurs. For instance, according to the Direction de la Statistique in Morocco, 97.4% of companies have less than 10 employees, and very small enterprises, when including semi-formal ones that pay the professional tax, account for over 80% of them. While there are no rigorous and homogeneous statistics, it is estimated that SMEs account for 70% of GDP, while the informal sector varies between 20% to 30% of GDP[2].

Today, Mediterranean (and Middle East) non-oil economies are no longer driven by the public sector. Even resource rich economies like Algeria, Syria and Libya (or Iran in the Middle East) with significant state ownership are now dominated by the private sector, which averages 80% of GDP across the MENA region, a share similar to that of Eastern Europe or Asia. Nevertheless, while it produces most of the region's value added, the private sector's share of total investment in the MENA region is the lowest in the world: around 60% for non-oil MENA countries and 50% for oil MENA countries. Between 1995 and 2006, the share of private investment increased only in Egypt, Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia, while it rose sharply in most of the developing world. The private sector has a strong dualistic structure, with some companies adopting modern management techniques but with most SMEs still at a traditional level, being family-managed. SMEs suffer more than big companies from lack of access to credit, anti-competitive practices (including informality), corruption and administrative burdens (World Bank, 2009).

According to World Bank enterprise surveys, the industrial sector in the region is disproportionately dominated by older firms, which are able to survive all kinds of

[2] OECD-MENA Initiative on Governance and Investment for Development, www.oecd.org

reforms, capturing their benefits. The median age of local manufacturing firms in MENA is 19 years, the same as in mature OECD economies, but twice the average in East Asia and Eastern Europe, making renewal of the industrial structure slower than elsewhere. The subsequent absence of renewal in the business elite runs parallel to the one described by political scientists for the political elite, and has profound implications for social mobility and political change in the region. Businessmen also tend to be older than in other developing regions (14 years of average experience compared with around 8 years for Latin America and South Asia), a striking fact for countries where youth represent the majority of the population. Furthermore, and in spite of the efforts to increase the number of university graduates, the educational level of MENA businessmen is still consistently lower than in other developing regions: 13% of MENA manufacturing business owners have not completed secondary education, the highest share in the world.

The generational gap is even higher when comparing semiformal microenterprises to formal SMEs: data from Morocco shows that the median experience in formal SMEs is between 16 and 18 years, while for microenterprises it is eight years, and the average age of their owners is 32 years (World Bank, 2008). These data easily explain the widespread unrest and frustration among young graduates who are unable to climb the social ladder in spite of being better prepared, more dynamic and more internationally oriented than the old business elite. They feel over-trained (at high economic and personal cost) for the kind of jobs they obtain, developing a deep sense of injustice towards the old entrepreneurial elite and its heirs, who profit from their political connections and monopolize quality jobs in the labour market. Anyone visiting the cities of the region can easily observe a vibrant, established business sector together with a myriad of young micro-entrepreneurs trying to overcome deeply entrenched entry barriers.

The capacity of the economic elites to capture capital and labour rents, together with the paucity of the region's economic institutions, has led to low entrepreneurship levels by international standards. Entrepreneurship can be proxied by average business density (the number of businesses per 1,000 active population). The World Bank entrepreneurship database shows that the average business density in the MENA region is among the lowest in the world, with the average firm density in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia being between a third to a quarter of the figures for Latin America or Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Table 1 shows a more dynamic indicator of entrepreneurship, firm entry density (newly registered limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age people), in some selected countries. As a group, MENA countries have the second lowest entry density in the developing world for the 2004-2009 period (0.63), close to the Sub-Saharan Africa ratio (0.58), but lower than Asia (around 0.8), Latin America (1.31) or Europe and Central Asia (2.26); for high income countries entry density is 4.21.

However, firm entry density within the region has greatly increased in countries such as Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, while Algerian and especially Egyptian data reflect very low and decreasing firm entry density. Table 1 data on new firms in Morocco and Tunisia for 2009 are impressive, and are probably related to the slow but cumulative process of economic opening and modest upgrading of the business environment. This points to the fact that when entry barriers are relaxed or become less effective in a more

diversified and internationalized economic system, new entrepreneurs enter the market in both new activities and existing markets.

Table 1: Firm Entry Density, selected countries

Country	Year	New Firms	Entry Density
Algeria	2004	11.252	0,53
	2009	10.544	0,44
Egypt	2004	6.303	0,14
	2008	6.291	0,13
Jordan	2004	1.104	0,37
	2009	2.737	0,74
Morocco	2004	9.852	0,53
	2009	26.166	1,28
Tunisia	2004	4.917	0,73
	2009	9.079	1,23
Turkey	2004	40.819	0,87
	2009	44.472	0,87
Pro-memoria			
Brazil	2009	315.645	2,38
Czech Republic	2009	21.717	3,00
Israel	2008	19.758	4,46
Korea, Rep.	2008	60.039	1,72

Source: World Bank Entrepreneurship Database
New firms: number of newly registered limited-liability firms during the calendar year.
Entry Density: number of newly registered limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age people (ages 15-64).

Another problem is that most business associations in the region are weakly institutionalized and tend to be controlled by a tacit alliance between large incumbent firms and political elites to preserve the status quo. In most cases, they do not represent SMEs' interests at all, but rather pursue rent-seeking strategies for the benefit of incumbents. SMEs find several obstacles to developing collective action because independent associations are directly forbidden in many countries or, *de facto*, lack the capacity to advocate their interests or criticize economic policies. A 2007 survey of the main business associations in the MENA region showed that their demands were usually mismatched with the needs identified by the majority of companies, predominantly SMEs, which mostly relate to economic governance and the quality of institutions. However, with the opening and diversification of economic activity, where allowed, new business organizations have been created to give voice to the concerns of new young entrepreneurs (Algeria and Syria), specific regions or sectors (Algeria, Jordan and Morocco), SMEs (Egypt) and even Islamic-oriented business associations (Musiad in Turkey).

Whatever the progress made, entrepreneurs are still fragmented in several associations that tend to be weak and divided. The Algerian case illustrates this situation, with at

least four business organizations and other associations of managers and agricultural owners. This includes the *Union des Commerçants et Artisans Algériens* (UGCCA) representing about 200,000 SMEs, whose main demand is fighting against informality, but they have not been involved in policy reform discussions and their influence is marginal. The situation is very similar in the agricultural domain, represented by two organizations: *l'Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens* (UNPA) who inherited the structures of the old single party agricultural arm but lost all its influence in the policy-making process and today is very passive and subjected to government decisions; and the *Union des Agriculteurs Indépendents* (UAI), which sprang from the restitution at the beginning of the 90's of lands nationalized in the 1973 agrarian revolution, and whose influence and representativeness is very small. In practice, most agricultural and agro-food producers channel their demands through the Regional Agricultural Chambers, created at the beginning of the 90's, whose directors are appointed by the government. The absence of functioning and representative business institutions has left a space filled by hidden clientelistic networks mostly dominated by big companies closely associated with the regime[3].

3. Entrepreneurship and SMEs as drivers of change

Classical modernization and economic development theories stress the importance of achieving some economic prerequisites before transiting from authoritarian to democratic regimes. Economic development should fulfil basic economic needs, market institutions need to be in place and a bourgeois middle class has to emerge (Lipset, 1959 and 1994; Rostow, 1960). This theoretical framework has been challenged by authors that see it as an argument to support authoritarian leaders with supposedly developmental attitudes. As Carothers (2007, p. 15) has put it, "despite some commitment to socioeconomic progress, such leaders may also be fixated on enriching themselves, protecting certain privileged groups (...) and undercutting potential political rivals". This argument applies not only to authoritarian leaders or political elites, but also to economic actors, both local and foreigner, who pursue different agendas according to their (often narrow) interests. Business associations, for instance, tend to follow the 'distributive coalition' model first described by Olson (1965) in order to capture rents.

As has already been mentioned, the Southern Mediterranean political economy literature has shown how incumbent firms and regime-controlled business associations in the region have managed to preserve the status quo and positioned themselves to capture not only State rents, but also the benefits of economic reforms that have often been pushed from abroad, like privatization and liberalization. Foreign investors have had a more mixed behaviour: when confronted with local economic and political elites they have had to choose between accommodation and defiance. In the first and most common case, they clearly become a part of the status quo preserving coalition. The clearest example is the entrenched network of interests knit together by EU and Tunisian companies closely related to the Ben Ali clan, but similar cases can be found in most countries in the region.

[3] Interviews in Algiers and FEMISE (2006). Kausch (2008) reaches similar conclusions regarding the lack of interest of the Moroccan business community in institutionalising dialogue on economic reforms or accountability mechanisms.

When foreign companies' interests have clashed with those of the ruling elites, they have opted for calculated exit strategies allowing them to optimise returns on their investments. A recent example is the Spanish telecom company Telefónica, allegedly selling its Moroccan business to local investors when confronted with the fact that the Palace had decided to enter its business. Hibou (2010) describes a similar experience in the Tunisian insurance market: the insurance group Allianz was unable to become the majority holder in the local company Astrée by increasing its participation after the departure of other foreign investors; Allianz decided then to leave Tunisia and sell off all its shares, part of which went to local investors.

So, whatever their merits in modernising the domestic economy, neither local incumbents nor foreign companies have been helpful as drivers of political change in significantly altering the political economy *equilibria*[4]. Foreign companies have, however, been more helpful in promoting social mobility through their more merit-based management of human resources, but the need for employees or counsellors with local political connections has to some extent eroded such transformational behaviour. By contrast, SMEs are often able neither to come to terms with the ruling elites, which rely on patronage and do not need to compromise, nor to implement optimal exit strategies. In the absence of reforms allowing them to exploit their comparative advantages, they are trapped in a low level equilibrium that leads to mere survival strategies or the option of going informal. In both cases, productivity and innovation suffer, and so does their potential for fostering social mobility and therefore societal transformation[5]. In order to prosper, SMEs have to find a way to advocate reforms that alter the status quo, and by doing so they can eventually become a driver of change challenging the entrenched alliance between economic and political elites.

What entrepreneurs are not doing, at least not in an open and collective manner, is to participate in the recent protests that, at the time of writing of this chapter, have led to the stepping down of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak from the presidencies of Tunisia and Egypt and a protracted civil war in Libya. In a recent account of the protest movements that have been taking place in the Arab World during the last years, Ottaway and Hamzawy (2011) stress the importance of labour unions, youth movements, leftish and Islamist movements, and bloggers, but not entrepreneurs. However, they also highlight the participation in the protests of professional associations (mainly lawyers' organisations), which are not formally business organizations but in some cases represents liberal professionals who in fact are often small entrepreneurs. Bayat (2011) has also stressed the role of middle-class professionals in democracy movements, dating back to the 2004 Egyptian demonstrations catalysed by *Kefayaat*, as well as the massive participation of the 'middle class poor' gone to informality and civil servants who have to take second or third jobs in the same informal sector, which now employs between one third and one half of the urban population.

This is hardly surprising and is in fact a common trait of most democratic transitions. There are several reasons for this. First, as has been shown in the previous section, existing business organizations are controlled by incumbents and lack independence from the regimes in place. Second, in most countries in the region SME associations

[4] Youngs (2011, p. 7) argues that multinationals' actions regarding democratisation vary enormously, but when referring to the Middle East he notes their lack of commitment to democracy promotion.
[5] Hibou (2010) reveals however some ambivalence in the role of the Tunisian informal sector, which acts as a driver of modernization while remaining a part of social reproduction mechanisms.

simply do not exist (not to speak of informal or semi-formal micro-entrepreneur organizations), and entrepreneurs have to participate in protests in an individual capacity. Finally, entrepreneurs are probably very sensitive to retaliation by the regimes in place, which can easily deprive them of their means of living: interestingly enough, while entrepreneurs tend to be economic risk-takers, they show much higher levels of politically induced risk-aversion. In this regard, the regimes consistently implement co-optation strategies towards entrepreneurs, either by inclusion or exclusion from economic reforms (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). As Grim (2011) explains for the Algerian case, the emerging entrepreneurial class is fragmented "par tous les coups de boutoir que le pouvoir a assénés à tous ces cadres (...) en les appauvrissant ou en les récupérant". In Egypt, businessmen who want to donate funds to human rights NGOs, another channel for entrepreneurs to promote democracy, "are systematically harassed, and on in many cases this has led to withdrawal of the funds" (Kausch, 2009, p. 13).

This is not to say that businessmen are absent from protest movements, but rather that they participate as citizens instead of as entrepreneurs or managers. A good example is the case of the Google marketing executive, Wael Ghonim, who has become one of the most prominent figures of the Egyptian protest movement. However, the role of entrepreneurs seems to lie more in changing the political economy equilibrium by expanding the middle class and private sector, and by advocating institutional and economic policy reforms. While both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions have attained a wide social base, the participation of middle class professionals and middle class poor have been widely highlighted (Bayat, 2011; Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011). Given their lack of voice and the absence of representative associations, the only way they have found to express their preferences is by joining in the protests. Nevertheless, the main influence entrepreneurship can have in promoting political change is through the widening of a middle class with preferences that are different from the economic elites'. Martínez (2011, p. 1) has made explicit what he calls the Tunisian paradox: "comment une société éduquée, employée dans une économie diversifiée, composée d'une classe moyenne, peut-elle cohabiter durablement avec un régime policier aussi brutal que corrompu?".

But there are other ways by which entrepreneurs can induce political change. In some cases, they can have demonstrative effects by changing the functioning of business associations towards more open and democratic procedures, and pushing for higher degrees of freedom and independence from incumbents and their patrons in the regime. The troubled 2009 election process of the president of the Algerian *Forum des Chefs d'Entreprises* illustrates this demonstration effect. A young and reform-oriented entrepreneur, Slim Othmani, ran for the presidency of the Forum, challenging the incumbent supported by the government, who had previously backed the re-election of Mr. Bouteflika. While he ultimately lost the election, he was successful in introducing electoral competition, changing voting rules from open-vote to secret ballot, and attracting considerable public attention through debates, conferences and other public events. However limited in scope, by setting such a precedent in the region he was able not only to influence positively the functioning of the association, but also to offer a benchmark for other organizations and set a widely publicized example of democratic governance. Foreign assistance to professional associations, like artisans or small merchants, as well as supporting schemes for start-ups and exporters, may be equally conducive to the spreading of such a culture of participatory and democratic procedures.

The Tunisian experience is quite different: Hédi Djilani, president of the country's main business organization, *l'Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat* (UTICA), was forced to resign only after Ben Ali left the country, after heading the association for 23 years. He is the father-in-law of Belhassen Trabelsi, the Trabelsi clan bigman, and always supported Ben Ali to the point that he directed his 2009 campaign and announced that he would support Ben Ali's candidature for the 2014 elections. His removal was a long-standing demand from the *Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants* (CJD), which represents the aspirations of a new generation of entrepreneurs, but they only managed to force him to step down once Ben Ali disappeared from the scene.

The Egyptian case shows several similarities with Tunisia. The population's anger against cronyism was personalized in Ahmad Ezz, whose fortune was frozen shortly after Mubarak's resignation. He is a steel businessman and ruling party leader who funded Mubarak's campaigns, and a close associate of his son Gamal, having played a major role in the last fraudulent parliamentary elections. Less regime-contaminated Egyptian businessmen have opted for adhering to the wave of change and distancing themselves from the Mubarak regime in an *ex-post* manner, like the Coptic owner of ORASCOM, Naguib Sawiris. As Ellis Goldberg (2011) has argued, the merit of the Egyptian revolution should accrue to the people that risked their lives demonstrating against the regime and allowing businessmen "to come out in the open and demand structural changes". While SMEs have succeeded in having more voice in the last years (World Bank, 2009), their persisting lack of participation in policy-making and the representation gaps have left most private sector influence in the hands of big business.

These experiences show that SMEs' main potential contribution to political change in the Southern Mediterranean region lies in promoting social mobility by expanding the middle class and renewing entrepreneurial elites. This can help to alter the political economy equilibrium within societies by favouring the diversification and decentralization of economic power away from big entrepreneurs and public companies that tend to support the regimes in place. At the same time, SMEs can advocate institutional reforms that weaken economic elites' capacity to capture the benefits of economic reforms. This can in turn erode the political elites' capacity to exert social control through patronage and nepotism, contributing to social transformation. SMEs can also deliver demonstration and learning effects when implementing more transparent and democratic procedures within business associations, which can have spillovers in other civil society organizations and, eventually, in the whole political system.

There are definitely other sources of entrepreneurship in the region, notably social entrepreneurship, usually defined as the 'other kind of entrepreneurship' (*entreprende autrement*) which, for the sake of simplicity, can be identified with co-operatives, associations, and foundations and benefit societies devoted to providing social services. A broader approach could include all civil society organizations, which have historically been repressed in several countries in the region, especially Egypt (Abdou *et al.*, 2011). In the Southern Mediterranean region, social entrepreneurship has a long history and has often been linked with religious movements (in Egypt up to half of the existing associations – Kausch, 2009). However, there are also other institutions of social entrepreneurship that date back to spontaneous mutual help and solidarity mechanisms in agriculture (*Maouna*) or deliver social services (public *waqfs*), as well as the modern institutions introduced by colonization (co-operatives). Their trajectories vary from

country to country and are sector-specific. Given the lack of studies on their economic and entrepreneurial activities, they are mentioned here just in recognition of their existence. The lack of comparable data about Islamic social entrepreneurship in North Africa, beyond the fact that its influence is prevalent in the provision of non-governmental social services, prevents further elaboration.

Going back to non-religious oriented associations, in Tunisia, for instance, agricultural co-operatives were instruments of the State in its collectivization efforts in the 1960's. Some of them are still dependent upon the Agricultural and Economy ministries. With 2006 data, they represented 20% of Tunisian agricultural producers and 5.5% of agricultural production. There are also non-agricultural co-operatives about which very little information is available. Tunisian socially-oriented associations are mostly local in nature and play a very important role in the social economy or 'third sector'. They are financed mainly by the State and have a very poor governance structure. Foundations have no legal backing in Tunisia, which suppressed public *waqfs* in 1956 and private ones in 1957. In general, the whole sector remains very fragmented, lacks human resources and a governance framework (very few have internal statutes), and is highly dependent on financing from the State (Belaïd, 2010). In Morocco, the picture seems more dynamic, especially regarding social institutions devoted to socio-economic development, but they share the Tunisian problems of State dependence and lack of human resources (Abdelhalek, 2010).

From a more general perspective, while many countries in the region may claim to have a 'vibrant' civil society when measured by the number of registered organizations, those organizations working on democracy promotion or human rights tend to face administrative obstacles to registration and in acceding to foreign financing. However, these measures do not seem to be able to eradicate their long-term effects, especially when confronted with increasing social needs (and demands), resulting in a "more disenfranchised citizenry, less willing to cooperate with their governments and rulers" (Club de Madrid, 2009, p. 14).

In sum, what we find in the region is a typology of business with different transformative potentials for inducing social change that can be skewed across different divides[6]. First, the public-private sector cleavage, which is however quite porous in the sense that big entrepreneurs are co-opted by the regimes to occupy posts in public company councils and benefit from monopolistic administrative concessions. Second, within the private sector, we find the big companies-SMEs divide, with the latter accounting for most of labour and value added but being under-represented in business associations. Finally, within SMEs there are traditional and modern firms that to some extent reproduce the aforementioned generational gap. Traditional firms are usually family-led companies relying on traditional and unskilled management, like the *bazaris*, as well as traditional service providers and agricultural exploiters, many of them working in an informal or semi-formal context.

Finally, the economic reforms implemented in the region during the last three decades, however slow and fragmentary, have generated a new segment of industrial and modern service SMEs owned and/or managed by younger and more dynamic, innovative and internationally-oriented entrepreneurs. These firms probably have more transformative

[6] Interviews in Algiers (November 2008 - Escribano, 2008b, and May 2011), Istanbul (February 2008 - Escribano, 2008a), Rabat and Casablanca (December 2009 - Escribano, 2010) and Tangiers (June 2011).

potential, but their ability to prosper suffers the most from corruption, lack of financing and absence of business infrastructures. They are potential Schumpeterian entrepreneurs with the capacity to induce social change through political and social externalities related to the values and preferences embedded in their entrepreneurship. However these political and social spill-overs are limited by path-dependent and political economy-generated institutional constraints (Kuran, 2010; Richards and Waterbury, 2007), which hamper the social projection of their values and preferences. Regarding social entrepreneurship, although mainly of a local and fragmented nature, it has in spite of several obstacles found a way to develop a significant number of associations struggling for independence from the State. While many of them may be precarious, they are somehow paving the way for a less dependent and more open and participatory model of society.

4. Linkages between entrepreneurship and other drivers of change

Entrepreneurship does not develop in a *vacuum*. As a social phenomenon, it interacts with the other drivers of change contemplated in this study. The role of business diasporas links it to the issue of migration; entrepreneurship offers women an opportunity for gaining autonomy and political influence; information and communications technologies (ICTs) can widen and transform business relations; and religious (Muslim) values have the potential to foster entrepreneurship. This section of the paper builds upon the results obtained in each of the preceding chapters to assess the linkages and synergies in promoting social transformation.

The birth of the individual described in Philippe Fargues' chapter seems a fundamental driver of transformations that promote the emergence of entrepreneurs. Regarding migration, in spite of the dramatic changes in migratory profiles pointed out by Fargues, business diasporas are one of the most analysed linkages between migration and transformative entrepreneurship. In this section, we will concentrate on the latter dimension, trying to complement the thorough analysis conducted in Professor Fargues' chapter.

There are several ways in which migration can influence entrepreneurship. The 'brain drain' paradigm tends to see migration as a mechanism that deprives emission countries of their more entrepreneurial and creative individuals, while the 'circular migration' model emphasises co-development, mainly by means of monetary remittances. Remittances, however, tend to finance consumption, improved accommodation conditions, health and education, and seem to play a limited role in financing economic activity and, consequently, in fostering entrepreneurship. The 'brain circulation' paradigm, by contrast, focuses on the mobility of competences and skills through a network that serves as a gateway for knowledge and innovation, including mentoring, coaching, inter-cluster missions and productive externalisation in the home country (Saxenian, 2002).

Inspired by the experience of Asian immigrants in Silicon Valley, this diaspora model is more complex, not implying necessarily the return of the emigrant to the home country, nor exclusively a massive flow of monetary remittances, but rather the creation of business networks that act as corridors through which goods and services, but also financial and human capital are exchanged and integrated. The Chinese diaspora, for instance, has woven a dense network of commercial, financial and productive links both

with its home country and among its different communities abroad. The Lebanese diaspora, on the other hand, while widespread all over the world, has not maintained such a productive nexus with Lebanon. These multi-faceted corridors have not been built in the Southern Mediterranean to the same extent as in the Asian region (Hong, Lorca and Medina, 2010).

Mixing all the ingredients of the above-mentioned models, the circulating diaspora model seems to have the potential to be the most operational in attaining real societal transformations, at least regarding the spread of entrepreneurship. Social, non-financial remittances, including ideas and behaviours, play a significant role in promoting entrepreneurship (Levitt, 1998). For our purposes, social remittances in the form of entrepreneurship can have a higher transformative potential than financial ones (El Nur, 2010). While countries like Morocco, Egypt or Lebanon receive very significant flows of monetary remittances, these seldom generate a well-structured bi-directional corridor of goods, services, production factors and, most importantly, new ideas and entrepreneurial behaviour patterns.

It is true that the Southern Mediterranean ecosystem does not facilitate such a process of productive integration of resources and ideas. A poll among Moroccans both living abroad and having returned to Morocco gives some insight into the gaps between their aspirations and accomplishments (Box 1). While contributing to the development of their home country ranked high as the main reason for the return of foreign residents (25% of those polled), it was the first reason of satisfaction for only 7.7% of those who have returned. The main obstacle to return perceived by 82.7% of foreign residents related to an unfulfilling professional milieu, due to its archaism (lack of professionalism and administrative burdens) and arbitrariness (absence of meritocracy, clientelism and abuse of hierarchical power), while this was the main cause of dissatisfaction of 92% of those who have returned.The majority of foreign residents considered creating a new business, while only a few wanted to enter the public sector. Entrepreneurship was higher among the male, 36 to 40 age segment, resident in the US.

Box 1: Attitudes on returning to Morocco

In 2006, the *Association Maroc Entrepreneurs* conducted a survey on the attitudes to returning to Morocco of both Moroccans living abroad and those who have already come back to the country. Its main results can be summarized as follows:

- For Moroccans living abroad, the main reasons for coming back were personal and family reasons (34.5% of the cases), followed by the desire to contribute to the country's development (25.2%), which included (but not disaggregated) contributing to economic and social/human development and participation in Moroccan political life.
- The main obstacle to coming back was the perception of a not fulfilling professional milieu (82.7%), followed by social reasons (9%), which included (but not disaggregated) lack of tolerance and liberties, and conservatism; among younger individuals (age 21 to 27), however, social obstacles accounted for around 20%. The main criteria for perceiving the Moroccan professional milieu as unfulfilling was the low quality of organisations (42.1%), due to the archaism implicit in the lack of professionalism and administrative burdens; and

arbitrariness (39.6%), which included the absence of meritocracy, clientelism and the abuse of hierarchical power.

- Regarding entrepreneurship, when asked if they would like to come back to Morocco to create a new business, 43.5% answered 'yes', 48.8% 'perhaps' and only 7.7% 'no'. Entrepreneurship was higher for individuals in the 36-40 age group (60.1% answered 'yes'), men (46.9% answered 'yes'; only 34.1% of women) and US residents (82.8% answered 'yes' or 'perhaps' with respect to an average of 73.2% for French, UK, Canada and Belgium residents, French residents showing a smaller propensity towards entrepreneurship).
- Among returned Moroccans, 61.8% were 'satisfied' or 'satisfied enough', while the rest expressed low or no satisfaction. Personal and family fulfilment was the first reason for satisfaction for 59.4% of individuals, while professional fulfilment was the first reason for satisfaction for 24.1%, and contributing to the country's development was the first reason for satisfaction for only 7.7% of those polled. For 92% of the returned Moroccans polled, the first reason for dissatisfaction was the unfulfilling professional milieu.

Source: Association Maroc Entrepreneurs (2006).

In spite of the severity of return barriers, several efforts have tried to replicate the 'brain circulation model' for emigrants from the Southern Mediterranean region. One of these is the *Association Maroc Entrepreneurs* (AME) itself. AME was created in 1999 with the aim of contributing to the country's economic development by encouraging Moroccans living abroad, especially in France, to create a new business in their home country and offering incentives to 'talented' Moroccan to return. It offers information on investment and job opportunities, organising seminars to accompany prospective entrepreneurs and an annual business plan competition.

In the last years, many other initiatives have developed related to the Southern Mediterranean region's diasporas, to which the ANIMA network has devoted a recent study (ANIMA, 2010). Many of them are not focused on the physical return of emigrants, like the TechWadi network, launched in 2010 to draw the attention of the Arab-American diaspora working in Silicon Valley to the need to improve the region's technological capacities; or the Algerian Start Up Initiative, a network created in 2010 gathering together ICTs professionals living in Silicon Valley and Europe, which implements coaching activities and organises a business plan competition directed at young innovative Algerian entrepreneurs.

The ANIMA MedDiasporas directory identified 470 networks related to Southern Mediterranean diasporas between January and September 2010. The main host countries were the US (155), France (47), Canada (45), the UK (32) and Germany (29), while the main countries of origin were Morocco (72), Lebanon (66), Algeria (51), Egypt (42) and Israel (40). ANIMA conducted a mini audit of their web pages and concluded that, while some of them were 'fallen stars', most remain active. Among them, 50% belonged to the business community, 37% to civil society (mainly associations and think tanks), and 13% to the scientific and technical community. Many of the business and scientific networks were devoted to the development of ICTs, while some of the civil society networks promote gender approaches.

As analysed by Gary Bunt in the chapter on ICT, its spread has become a 'game changer' in North African politics, although not necessarily in the image and likeness of Western models. Concerning entrepreneurship, it offers new business opportunities and changes the way businesses are managed. Beyond big public contracts on mobile telecommunications and the privatisation of the old State monopolies, there is a plethora of SMEs emerging in the field of ICT-related services. Most of them may be unsophisticated service providers or equipment sellers whose activities have few technological or internationalization spillovers. But some countries like Morocco and Tunisia have structured strategies for the promotion of offshore ICT services and, as shown in the previous section, entrepreneurial diasporas that are quite active in the sector. In any case, ICT should be valued as an opportunity to develop a new segment of middle-class professionals and entrepreneurs.

While widespread scepticism exists about the possibility of such countries developing an ITC-related service sector comparable to let's say the Indian one, it would be helpful to remember that the Indians also started with call centres and other unsophisticated services to later scale up and climb the ladder toward higher value added activities. But there is no direct link between being a Twitter or Facebook activist and starting to programme. North African countries are too short on engineers and applied science students for this to come true. But the ITC-related service sector offers new opportunities to develop a range of economic activities that by theirvery nature are decentralised and difficult to harness with traditional entry barriers. In particular, it allows small firms to obtain information on international markets and to establish international connections. Also by definition, ICT professionals are thought to be more cosmopolitan oriented and better informed, but this is not necessarily so.

In the short run, perhaps the most valuable ICT input is that the sector's expansion could constitute an expanded opportunity for consolidating some of the social attributes of middle classes, like information and participation in political decisions on such things as economic policies. In this sense, ICT both reduces information costs and increases the opportunity to voice and project social preferences, and its role in recent revolts has been widely acknowledged.

The comprehensive chapter by Paciello and Pepicelli shows the potential of entrepreneurship in transforming women's role in both households and the public space. Their conclusions are cautious on the effectiveness of several tools, like micro-credits, on the grounds that men are somehow able to capture part of the benefits of gender equality measures. According to them, this kind of gender based rent-seeking is however increasingly challenged by businesswomen, but in a personal, not associative manner. It is difficult to add much more to their in-depth analysis of the economic impact of women or to the transformative role of women's entrepreneurship and we prefer to refer to it in this regard. In fact, many of their findings are in line with ours: businesswomen face additional entry barriers, but once these barriers are either relaxed or painfully surmounted, they play a more significant transformative role in both the economic and political arenas than businessmen.

The fact that the changes induced by drivers like demography, ICTs and women gaining autonomy are neither linear nor necessarily in line with the preferences of the west or western-oriented Arab citizens has already been highlighted by the respective chapters of this study. This is perhaps even more the case when dealing with the religious

dimension. Islamic economics is a rather unconsolidated theoretical corpus. More importantly, when reconciling these often contradictory theoretical frameworks with economic policy decisions, it seems that the pattern is that almost anything goes: both free trade and protectionism, interventionism or *laissez-faire*, Arab socialism and IMF-backed reforms can be defended on the grounds of Islamic economics. There is definitely a strong sense of social justice in all Islamic approaches to economics, but it can be attained in different ways, most of which can usually be explained by political economy equilibria rather than religious beliefs.

Concerning religious movements, as Oliver Roy has shown, there is an entrepreneurial dimension of Islam which in some cases aspires to offering an alternative to the Weberian Protestant model. 'Green capitalism' portrays an Islamic entrepreneur with most of the Schumpeterian attributes but whose ethical set of values is influenced by Islamic religious references rather than Protestantism (Adas, 2006). This segment of business has grown considerably over the last decades, especially in Turkey, but also in some Maghreb countries, and is somehow path-dependent on the traditional alliance between the Mosque and the Bazaar. Its transformative role is, as explained by Roy, quite ambivalent. On the one hand, promoting honesty, transparency and business success as self-accomplishment is without a doubt a vigorous driver of change. However, these preferences can conflict with unrealistic social demands that pursue social justice by means of unsustainable fiscal policies.

In recent months most North African countries, with the only exception of Libya due to the civil war, have adopted fiscal packages to increase public wages and employment, introduce food and/or energy subsidies, and stimulate public works. While these measures are not the exclusive result of a projection of Islamist preferences, and are shared by a majority of Arab citizens, they have been presented as an effort to advance social justice. Whether it is a way to wink at Islamist movements or a strategy to erode its influence through the appropriation of the most socially attractive component of its social narratives, it seems that socio-economic inclusiveness has finally come to the fore.

What is relevant for our purposes is that the most effective barrier to counterproductive economic policy measures aimed at an ill-conceived, short-term concept of social justice may lie in this segment of pious entrepreneurs. Nobody is as aware as they are of the trade-offs between religious values and a thriving economy. As businessmen, they are expected to have a pragmatic and bargain-prone approach, allowing them to advocate compromise and alliances with other economic agents. They are also the main source of local financing for Islamist social entrepreneurship, which as mentioned in a former section, may be by far the most efficient and extensive network for the provision of non-governmental social services. This reinforces the influence they could have in dealing with socio-economic policy decisions. By moderating political radicalism and projecting a set of ethical economic values, even if they do not always practice what they preach, they constitute important agents of change that should be targeted in any accompanying strategy.

5. Final remarks: towards more comprehensive EU, US and transatlantic perspectives on entrepreneurship in North Africa

The previous sections have tried to offer some insights into the transformative role of entrepreneurship in North Africa. Our findings can be summarized by saying that businesses, especially small and very small (often individual or family) companies, constitute a potential driver of economic, social and, finally, political change. The relationship may be neither univocal, nor mechanical, and gives ample room to unexpected consequences, as usually happens with complex social dynamics. But if we assume the conclusion above to be true, then the policy debate should not focus on whether or not to promote entrepreneurship, aimed at obtaining both private and social benefits, but rather on by what means small entrepreneurs can be supported. This final section briefly summarizes the response of the EU and the US to this challenge, and provides some reflections and thoughts aimed at providing input for targeted policy design[7].

To begin with, the toughest question may be whether current and past EU and US economic relations have had externalities regarding nascent social and political transformation processes. The best example could be the long-term socio-political effects of free trade agreements, for which the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area offers a longer time perspective. In spite of its shortcomings, which will be dealt with immediately, free trade areas have generally had a gradual but cumulatively significant impact in fostering and anchoring microeconomic reforms and macroeconomic stability. As a consequence, some entry barriers have been relaxed, easing market competition in sectors that used to be closely controlled by incumbents. The integration in the world economy implicit in the agreements also entails the diversification and decentralization of economic power.

It would not be very realistic to infer that the EU's Mediterranean Policy by itself has 'caused' the socio-economic transformations analysed in this study, which are of a wider and longer-term nature. But in some way it may have helped to gradually configure a somewhat different ecosystem, more conducive or at least receptive to change. The extent to which this strategy has delivered in the long run and how it could be upgraded and made more consistent, should be kept in mind when thinking about the challenges ahead.
In this regard, four different aspects may be noteworthy for the EU and the US, as well as for working out consistent transatlantic approaches to promoting entrepreneurship and SMEs in North Africa.

First, both EU and US relations with North African countries are afflicted by a *de facto* lack of inclusiveness regarding micro-entrepreneurs and SMEs. They are rarely considered, consulted or even informed of the design of policy measures that may affect them significantly , like the signing of free trade agreements, whosenegotiation procedures lack transparency and are often opaque and difficult to be informed about. The EU and the US tend to take for granted that the preferences of SMEs are included in the set of negotiating positions adopted by North African governments, but as we have tried to show this is seldom the case. If the EU and the US want to empower small and medium entrepreneurs, and offer more opportunities for developing transformative entrepreneurship, they should start by including them more fully in their bilateral relations with governments. This includes the full array of private and social entrepreneurial actors: different business and professional associations, co-operatives,

[7] When referring to the EU, we include both the European institutions and the policies Member States project towards the EU to be implemented at the EU level.

social entrepreneurs, and other representatives of civil society, including religiously inspired ones. Two basic examples: could traditional, small farmers not be 'included', together with consumer associations, at the very least informally, in agricultural trade liberalization negotiations? And neighbourhood associations when designing a sanitation project?

A second line of action is to support initiatives that promote SMEs. This requires a more subtle distinction between measures that directly target SMEs and more horizontal policies to improve economic and legal institutions and infrastructures, from which very small and small businesses are supposed to benefit the most. While the latter is a highly doubtful assumption if not nuanced by a detailed account of the measures and sectors, on the whole horizontal policies regarding liberalization and institutional and administrative upgrading have given more space to SMEs and should be fostered. Regarding direct SME promotion, this has become a mantra of recent EU initiatives in the region. There are dedicated partnerships; they constitute one of the six projects in the Union for the Mediterranean (promoted by Italian and Spanish delegations), and are included as a priority in the recently delivered package of measures included in two Commission and High Representative Communications: *A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*[8] and *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*[9]. Unfortunately, as of today, the measures remain vague and infra-specified at the policy level.

In fact, the EU's and US' record in promoting SMEs and entrepreneurship is at best modest: there have been several meetings between entrepreneurs on both sides of the Mediterranean, but they have usually been focused on big, well-established firms rather than SMEs, not to speak of initiatives targeting the informal sector. While there have been some exceptions, these have probably not attained the threshold to make a difference. Euro-Mediterranean relations, for instance, focus on governments and big policy designs, and SMEs have often been marginalised. The best example is the Union for the Mediterranean, mainly made up of huge projects whose impact on inclusiveness is doubtful, but the exclusion of SMEs is a general shortcoming of Euro-Mediterranean relations (Escribano and Lorca, 2008b). In their analysis of how the US and international financial institutions can engage civil society organisations (CSOs) , Abdou *et al.* (2011) identify some drivers that are rather in line with our suggestions for SMEs and economically-oriented CSOs: including them in policy dialogue, scaling up success stories, core funding and institution-building, and improving their legal framework. Regarding SMEs, these measures can include targeted measures like trade facilitation and training programmes, a dedicated financial facility managed either by a regional bank or the EIB. In short, the set of mechanisms that have been discussed for years in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations, but that both the EU and its southern partners have failed to implement.

In third place, and going back to horizontal policy reforms, North African countries are facing very difficult economic situations that require tough policy decisions. The cronyism and capture of previous reforms by economic elites, rather than the way they were implemented, have discredited the reforms themselves, together with their proponents. While some reforms like fighting corruption may be in line with social

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[8] Bruxelles, 8/3/2011 COM(2011) 200.

[9] Bruxelles, 25/05 /2011 COM(2011) 303.

demands, others are not necessarily so, such as reducing and targeting subsidies , containing fiscal imbalances, or trade liberalization, to mention just a few. In the midst of economic difficulties, both at the national and the international level, keeping North African economies on the path to reform is crucial for the survival and expansion of a more robust SME productive fabric. This ties in with the incentives the international community is ready to offer these countries to anchor economic reforms. Both the EU and the US should consider offering a consistent package of incentives, including financial assistance and better access to their markets, for North African goods, services and workers.

While these are probably not the best times for such an effort, the opportunity cost of not doing it would probably be higher. In this regard, SMEs are usually the weakest link in North African productive systems: they have no voice or representative associations to effectively represent their preferences, are defenceless vis-à-vis corporatist interests and lobbies, and have serious difficulties in accessing financing or overcoming institutional entry barriers. As the World Bank (2011) has highlighted, the recent events in the region have halted economic activity and seriously affected SME activities in several countries. Horizontal packages intended to recover economic activity are needed, but their design should consider SME needs as well, even though the latter do not make up the bulk of economic adjustments.

Finally and more directly linked to the troubled relationship of business with democratization, is the fact that "the one sector rarely included in democracy initiatives is the business sector" (Youngs, 2011, p. 6). Businesses are not usually considered by most NGOs as a part of civil society that is worth targeting. They are seldom invited to civil society meetings, and few efforts are made to involve them in discussions beyond narrow economic issues, if at all. Business associations are not considered as civil society organizations able to organise themselves in a participatory manner and to lead by example. They are only occasionally compared to other civil society actors, both local and international, obliged to form opinions on socio-political issues and defend them. Inclusion of the business sector, especially SMEs, in democracy promotion programmes to empower small entrepreneurs and have them commit towards other civil society actors seems to be an unexplored field.

These four points present several opportunities for cross-fertilization with the remaining drivers of change considered in this study. The complexity of the social interactions involved paves the way for ambivalences and unexpected consequences. Demographic transition offers an opportunity to develop more individualistic approaches, which in principle are more in line with private than social entrepreneurship, but self-realisation can be achieved both ways. Migration has led to the building of entrepreneurial bridges between diasporas and their countries of origin. ICT reduces transaction costs and lowers entry barriers like access to information and communication for all social agents, not just businesses. Women's autonomy and influence in the public and private sphere improve with their inclusion in the labour market, and entrepreneurship seems to have a significant impact. The role of pious entrepreneurs in shaping the preferences of religiously inspired political or social movements may also be important. But in order to profit from these interlinkages, SMEs and economically-oriented CSOs should be more fully included in civil society, and both the EU and the US should incorporate their preferences more seriously.

For transatlantic relations, convergence towards this inclusion of SMEs and related CSOs can be built upon existing and past initiatives, but new impetus is needed. Supporting SMEs and entrepreneurship can serve several key objectives in the region, like job creation, economic growth, social stability and the decentralization of economic power structures. At the same time, it complements the usual political focus of transatlantic relations in the region with a more pragmatic economic narrative that may be closer to North African citizens' demands. Certainly, this will not balance the asymmetries and gaps in transatlantic relations in the region (Aliboni, 2010). However, it can provide a relatively de-politisized field for the convergence of preferences among the EU, the US and North African societies, and could have significant transformative political externalities in the medium to long run. Moreover, it would also signal differences from the approaches of other external actors like China or the Gulf countries, whose main strategies in the region are doing business with traditional elites. In this regard, the promotion of SMEs offers the EU and the US a field for transformative co-operation quite aligned with both their interests and values and entailing a significant differentiation from other external actors' strategies.

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DEMOGRAPHY, MIGRATION AND REVOLT SOUTH OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

a provisional draft by

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UNFINISHED DRAFT, NOT TO BE CIRCULATED OR QUOTED

Introduction

The early 2010s will remain in Mediterranean memories as a period of great changes. In the South, Arab peoples' claim for fundamental freedoms and dignity has begun to overthrow or seriously shake decades-old dictatorships while in the North the market's failures confront governments with an unprecedented crisis of decades-old but unsustainable production and welfare systems. The two crises, political in the South and economic in the North, have no common causes except that they are both partly rooted in the progressive but inexorable transformations brought about by demography.

Historians will certainly highlight the crises' concomitance with a radical demographic turning point that is barely noticeable in real time, as demography evolves slowly and therefore invisibly for who focuses on immediate facts. The period around 2010 is indeed the precise moment in long-range history when numbers of young adults reach a peak in the Arab world while a durable population decline starts in Europe. Demography offers a key to understand changes that affect separately the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean and at the same time tie them together through international migration.

This chapter will start with briefly recalling how demographic trends challenge Europe's ambitious economic, social and political goals and to which extent immigration can help addressing demographic challenges. It will then focus on Europe's closest neighbourhood, the Arab Mediterranean region[1] in which large flows of recent immigrants originate. It will describe the dire lack of economic prospects, political freedom and individual agency that young adults more numerous but more excluded than ever suffer, putting emphasis on the powerful social changes that accompany demographic change, such as women's empowerment, the spread of education and, for the first time, the birth of the individual in societies that were made of families and communities since time immemorial. It will then offer an interpretation of emigration and revolt as two possible responses of the youth, whose new aspirations are frustrated by a still patriarchal order of the family and the polity.

A second section is dedicated to migration in its relation with demography, externally as migration across the Mediterranean takes place along the lines of demographic differentials, and internally as Arab emigration responds to a discrepancy between demography that is characterised by a shift from a society of families to a society of individuals and the economic and political order that largely negates the individuals' aspirations. It will recall that Arab countries form a receiving as much as a sending region and that Europe is not the sole destination for Arab migrants but competes with others, in particular within the Arab world itself the Gulf States.

The conclusion will speculate on the future of migration in relation with long-term demographic and short-term political changes in the Arab region as well as the future of European policies regarding Arab migration.

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[1] The countries that are mainly considered in this chapter –from West to East Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria– are at the same time Arab and Mediterranean (except Jordan). While they are viewed as one region by Europe (EU's southern neighbourhood, sometimes called 'MEDA' in EU's jargon) they do not form an entity that would be recognised as such by the concerned peoples who rather identify themselves to the wider Arab-speaking world which also includes (Northern) Sudan, Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf States. In order to stay close to common perceptions among Arabs, the paper will also use when needed the following terminology: Arab world that encompasses all the above countries; Northern Africa ...West Asia ..., Maghreb, ... Mashrek ...

Generational contracts at risk across the Mediterranean

For the first time in history, Europe must be prepared to a durable reduction of its population numbers that will not be the result of wars or epidemics as in the past, but the outcome of individual free choice made by its own people over the last half a century regarding the procreation of children. Demographic recession cannot be stopped unless natural demographic trends are offset by large-scale immigration. Moreover, below-replacement fertility rates will combine with continuous gains in life expectancy to trigger unprecedented population ageing. While this process is potentially universal, it will affect Europe first and more acutely than any other part of the world.

Europe's demographic recession will have three facets. The first is a shrinking size of Europe. While the total population of Europe will decrease or stabilise, depending upon migration scenarios, most other regions will continue to increase so that the relative weight of Europe in world population terms will dwindle, thereby removing any legitimacy in the European Union's (hereafter EU27) weight in world affairs and the institutions of global governance. In particular, Europe's closest neighbours will continue to follow their own demographic path. If the members of the League of Arab States would eventually come to accomplish the dream of its founders and build one Arab nation, this nation would have 633 million inhabitants in 2050 (against 357 in 2010), while the EU27 is projected to have only 448 billion inhabitants in 2050 (against 506 million in 2010) if no immigration takes place and 0.521 billion if immigration continues at peak levels observed in the early 2000s before the economic crisis.

The second facet is a fast decline of Europe's workforce endangering its wealth. If no migration takes place between 2010 and 2050, the EU27 will lose 84 million working age persons, i.e. a relative change of -27% (compared with an absolute gain of +1,349 million, or +34% at world level). The third facet of demographic change is an unprecedented rise of the elderly population jeopardising Europe's social contract. Booming numbers entitled to pension combined with shrinking numbers subjected to taxation will soon make pension systems and the whole welfare state unsustainable and call for painful overhauls of pension and taxation rules. It must be recalled, firstly that the pension crisis that erupted in France and other EU countries in 2010 was built in the age pyramids of these countries since the 1980s and therefore entirely predictable and, secondly that this crisis gives only a foretaste of what will follow. Indeed, we already know for sure that with no further immigration EU27 aggregate old-age dependency ratio (population aged 65 and over / population aged 15-64) will jump from 0.256 in 2010 to 0.468 in 2050.

In order to address the worrying consequences of these population trends, Europe can have recourse to a range of strategies. Pursuing the enlargement and including new countries in the European Union would bring at once additional populations to the Union. Whether acceding countries have demographic patterns that resemble (e.g. Eastern Europe) or not (e.g. Turkey) those of the current EU27, enlargement would only increase the size the total population or affect also its age distribution.

Adopting pro-natalist policies is another strategy to increase the size of the total population (immediately) and of the workforce (20 years later) but it must be noted that these policies have reaped only limited results so far. Elevating the age at retirement is a way to address some of the problems brought about by demographic numbers without changing the numbers themselves, but it is unsure that societies are

ready to pay the price: indeed, maintaining the old-age dependency ratio at its 2010 level would need to continuously raise the age at retirement from 65 in 2010 to 75.7 in 2050 at EU27 level. Other policies, can also contribute to offsetting the loss in working-age population through increases in economic participation (e.g. social and employment policies fostering the economic activity among women and immigrants of former waves) and/or in labour productivity (e.g. education and vocational training policies). Redesigning pro-immigration policies –instead of suspending them in response to unemployment rising with the economic crisis as most EU states are doing at the time of writing– is finally a strategy that states must not dismiss, keeping in mind that the economic crisis will pass but the demographic depression will stay.

At a few cable's lengths to the south, the Arab world presents a demographic pattern which strikingly contrasts that of Europe. Until the 1980s Arab populations were viewed as the epitome of the demographic explosion. The 'population problem' was felt as early as the 1930s in Egypt (Cleland 1937)when intellectuals and scientists pointed at overpopulation and rapid population growth as a major cause of underdevelopment (Fargues 2011d) and a *fatwa* making contraception licit was pronounced by Egypt's Grand Mufti in 1937 (Omran 1992), decades before the issue became a matter of debate for the Vatican.

From that time until the 1980s, the population problem was with high birth rates making population grow faster than the economy and the solution was seen in demography itself, namely in birth control. Programmes of family planning were initiated in the early 1960s in Egypt and Tunisia then in the following decades across all the Arab world except the Gulf States (where governments considered national populations too small in relation to the size of oil-driven economies) and they were finally successful when annual numbers of births began to grow slower and to stabilize between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, according to countries, which are the years during which the largest generations were born.

Twenty to thirty years later, in the early 2010s, these generations have become young adults and the population problem has shifted, as it is now the age group 20-35 which now stands at historical peak and the solution to the problem can no longer be found in demography. Because numbers of young adults have grown faster than resources available to them –from acceding labour and income to enjoying freedom and agency– the solution must now be economic and political. Before looking at the various options in the hands of Arab youth, it is useful to reflect on two key determinants of demographic change, namely the condition of women and the development of education.





Women against patriarchs

The average total fertility rate (TFR) in the MENA was 3.3 children per woman in 2005-2010. Relatively high compared to the world average (2.5), it is low compared to the six to eight children per women which were the norm for the previous generation (Figure 2). The decline of the birth rates onset later in the Arab world than in South-East Asia or Latin America but once under way it progressed faster. Significant differentials are still observed according to countries, from Tunisia and Lebanon which are now just at replacement level (between 2.0 and 2.1 children per woman), Morocco slightly above (2.4) then Libya (2.7), then Egypt, Jordan and Syria (3.0 to 3.5) to still high levels in the Gulf States and Sudan (around 4) and in the

Palestinian Territory (5.1) where the factors of fertility decline has largely been kept in check by the economic and social ramifications of the Israeli occupation and the conflict (Fargues 2000).

Fertility varies also according to regions in the same country. As a general rule, cities and the richest regions have lower levels of fertility than villages and the poorest regions. For example in Morocco in 2004 urban women had a TFR of 2.1 (replacement level) compared with 3.1 for urban women (Royaume du Maroc 2008); in Tunisia in 2009, the district of Tunis had a TFR of 1.65 (with a minimum of 1.50 in Ariana –a level comparable with the very low fertility observed in Mediterranean Europe) while the district of Centre-Ouest (Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid) had a TFR of 2.46 (République Tunisienne 2010). In the Arab world as elsewhere, forces that explain birth control are the role of women and the place of children in the family and society that have dramatically changed with urbanisation, the shift to service economies and the spread of school education.



Why have these universal causes acted later in the Arab world than in other parts of the world? The common view among Western social scientists is that Islam would have hold back two key factors of demographic transition: women's autonomy and the emergence of civil society that foster community self-empowerment (Morgan & al. 2002). If this were true, one would not understand how Iran could experience one of the fastest fertility declines in history –with a TFR literally collapsing from 6.54 in 1980-85 to a far-below-replacement level of 1.77 in 2005-10–precisely in a period when the country was ruled by the most fundamentalist of clergies (Ladier-Fouladi 2003) or how fertility collapsed in Algeria in the 1990s in parallel with Islamic radicalism gaining momentum.

Another explanation may be found in the particular political economy of the Arab countries. Apart from Islam, all these countries (except Morocco) share a heavy dependence on oil revenues. Dependence is direct in the case of major oil exporters (the Gulf States and Iraq in Western Asia, Libya and Algeria in North Africa) and mostly indirect for minor exporters and for non-exporters that Arab oil wealth nevertheless reaches under the form of development assistance, foreign investment and migrant workers' remittances.

The dramatic oil boom between 1973 and the early 1980s generated an income that enabled Arab governments to subsidise a wide range of households' consumptions, from food to school education and health, thereby cutting the cost of children for families, in other words making high fertility affordable. In an enduring patriarchal context valuing large families, the oil boom offered a time extension to high levels of fertility. Through significant oil wealth redistribution could play the forces of conservatism and change off against one another. A below-standard level of economic participation among married women, whose maintenance in the home directly fostered high fertility, reflected social conservatism. On the other side, social change took among others the form of rising school attendance among the youth that would later become a key trigger of political change.

The oil crisis in the mid-1980s put an end to the above-described pattern of oil-supported high fertility. Collapsing oil prices affected States' revenues and all Arab countries, except the Gulf States, adopted IMF-inspired economic reforms from which families lost out. Age at marriage rose –from below 20 years on average in the 1960s to between 25 and 30 years in the early 2000s for an average Arab woman– and couples started to drastically limit the number of their children in order to be able to provide them with education opportunities. The universal mechanism described by Gary Becker as a children quantity for quality trade-off was no longer deactivated by oil wealth.

Will fertility continue to decline and reach the replacement level in Arab countries (by around 2030 as it is assumed in the population projection of the United Nations)? While there seems to be no question that demographic transition is an irreversible process here as elsewhere as it responds to changes that are themselves unidirectional, its actual pace is unclear. Indeed, the declining trend of fertility was curbed or even slightly reversed in several Arab countries in the early 2000s. In Algeria the TFR has regularly increased from a historical minimum of 2.4 reached in 2001, to 2.5 in 2002, 2.6 in 2005, 2.8 in 2008 and 2.9 in 2010 (République Algérienne 2011); in Egypt it never felt below 3.5 children per woman, a level that was already reached in 1991 (Table 1); in Tunisia, the Arab forerunner in demographic matters, it has imperceptibly risen from 2.04 in 2005 to 2.05 in 2009 (INS 2011). Etc. One cannot rule out that the resilience of patriarchal views that a woman's role should be confined to being wife and mother is currently at play in the Arab region, whether or not it is fuelled by Islamic fundamentalism.

Table 1: Total fertility rate in Egypt 1990-2009

Year	TFR	Year	TFR	Year	TFR	Year	TFR
1990	4.68	1995	3.82	2000	3.73	2005	3.49
1991	4.38	1996	3.87	2001	3.66	2006	3.52
1992	3.89	1997	3.74	2002	3.63	2007	3.63
1993	4.04	1998	3.76	2003	3.59	2008	3.74
1994	3.95	1999	3.69	2004	3.52	2009	3.95

Source: Calculated by the author, using CAPMAS 2011

Actually, women have gained considerable visibility and capacity to act for themselves over the last half century but their empowerment is unfinished. While school has allowed girls previously confined to the family house into the public space (see the following section), many workplaces remain de facto closed-off to women. In the 2000s, Arab countries keep by very far the world's lowest female rates of economic participation. In the mid-2000s (last available statistics), the rate of economic activity among women aged 15 and over was 24.7% in Morocco (2004), 24.2% in Tunisia (2004), 16.0% in Egypt (2006), 14.6% in Syria (2004), 15.7% in Palestine (2007), 14.2% in Algeria (2008), etc. to be compared with a world average of 55%. While female employment exists in Arab countries as elsewhere it is mostly held by never married, divorced and widowed women, not by married women, a fact showing that society accepts that a woman works in the pubic space but husbands do not.

Demographic change, however, is slowly undermining the patriarchal system that has governed the family since time immemorial. That system rests on two pillars: younger brothers' subordination to the eldest brother, and women's subordination to men. Fertility decline suppresses the first pillar. Schematically, the current trend towards two-child families –on average a boy and a girl– just makes impossible a hierarchy between brothers, for lack of brothers. The second pillar can still be based on Islamic law, but the gap between law and practices is widening. Rising education levels are shaking the hierarchy of genders. Young adult women have now received an education comparable to men of their age (which makes them much more educated than their fathers), and a new competition, between genders, is appearing at the upper levels of the labour market.

The youth of education and the primary forms of inequality

The large majority of today's children spend at least a short period of their existence at school. In their grandparent's (or even parent's, according to the country) generation the same majority had never been to school and remained illiterate all their lives. Schools have become such familiar buildings in urban and rural neighbourhoods – like mosques – and the population is still so young that they forget that school education is one of the most recent social achievements. School has introduced a modern kind of hierarchy according to level of education that differentiates between the most elementary groups in society, sexes and age groups.

Arab countries share three characteristics with most other developing countries. Firstly, despite the fact that school education is so well established that is taken to be one of the fundamental rights of the individual, it is only recently that it has become accessible to the greater number. A very short period, from a few decades to almost a century depending on the countries, has elapsed since the time when school did not feature in the existence of ordinary people. The second characteristic of school education is that it is only provided for children and young people. Thirdly, the level of education remains beyond the age at which it was acquired to become one of the few stable characteristics of an individual, in the same way as eye colour or date of birth (a fact that adult literacy programmes are too limited to alter).

From these three characteristics, it follows that a generation can be characterised by its level of education, from the time when that generation passes school age (20 years) until its death. In times of change, when different generations coexisting at a given

time have not had the same access to education in their youth, education introduces vertical differentiation in the population, between the generations and to the advantage of the youngest ones.

Arab societies have a scholarly tradition dating back to the establishment of Islam in the wake of which elementary schools (*kuttâb)* and higher-level establishments (*madrasa*) were instituted to teach the Koran and religious disciplines. However, public education as a prerogative of the State was not established until the twentieth century. Whatever the level of education being considered, from access to simply learning to read to leaving university with a diploma, education has not ceased to make up ground since then. This has resulted in a remarkable continued rise in the average level of education of the population. In Egypt, the average number of years in education goes from less than one year for the generations born before 1900 (0.9 years for boys and 0.1 for girls) to 8.4 and 7.2 respectively for the men and women in the generations born around 1980.

During an initial stage, the pupils were mainly boys, but the great majority of boys, as well as girls, never become pupils at all: almost all children were excluded, schools did not therefore introduce inequality to the mass population, but only to the privileged minorities who, in the early days of schools, only sent boys to them. Gender inequality regarding modern education was confined at the top of the social ladder. As school spread, it became common place for boys of a variety of social conditions before being expanded to girls. As a result, the institution of the modern school reinforced the traditional hierarchy between the sexes by following a domineering traditional patriarchal model. In Egypt, the generations with the highest gender inequalities in education were born in the 1950s (Figure 3). A new gender equality, this time in accessing school at all levels, is almost achieved in Egypt, as well as in most Arab countries.



This movement from an old equilibrium dominated by illiteracy to a new one dominated by (some) education inspires three remarks. Firstly, the most elementary inequality between the sexes, that which regards reading and writing, has descended through all the steps of the social hierarchy, starting from the privileged classes and ending up in the underprivileged groups (the only groups among whom some residual illiteracy among the young remains). Secondly, as women gained access to education, men gained an even longer access, so that gender equality is not yet fully achieved. Thirdly, inequality between the sexes had peaked in the generations born from the 1940s to the 1960s, therefore those that occupy positions of power in society and the political system at the beginning of the twenty first century. These generations are from this point of view the greatest heirs of the patriarchal tradition, which paradoxically has found reinforcement in the hierarchies produced by the modern school.

Continuing progress in education produced an inverse effect on the hierarchy between age groups. While the patriarchal model placed the elders at the top, school has given pre-eminence to the young who are more educated than their elders. As the process is coming to an end, the decrease in illiteracy is an example of this reversal of traditional order. Until the generations born around 1920, children were more or less on a par with their parents in terms of education: for the most part none of them would have received any; illiteracy was their common destiny. As the soon to come widespread diffusion of schools benefitted only children, it created a distance between them and their parents, a generation gap that is constantly widening. In Egypt, the biggest gap is that which exists between parents belonging to the generation born around 1945 and their children of the generation born around 1980. From this point of view, young adults of today have reached a critical point where their knowledge exceeds their elders' to a greater extent than ever before. These elders, however, still hold the key positions of authority in the family and in society.

Growing access to education is accompanied by a profound change in the aspirations of individuals. Increasing in scale all the time, the powerful educational factory soon ceased, however, to be matched by the employment market. During the last quarter of the twentieth century the young have been confronted with the phenomenon, unknown before 1975, of unemployment amongst graduates. The Egyptian case described below applies across all Arab countries.

The vast majority of those unemployed are under 30 years of age and have never been employed before. Out of ten young adults, four start their active life with a period of unemployment lasting on average 2.5 years. Women are in equal numbers with men amongst the unemployed, a fact which makes their unemployment rate (unemployed/economically active) much higher than that of men (...%) simply because women are much fewer than men in the active population.

A major change occurred in the 1980s and 1990s is the steady rise in the unemployed person's level of education. In the 1960s, with almost 90% of them being illiterate or having only partially completed their primary education, the unemployed were below average in terms of education. A generation later, the situation was to be reversed. In 2006, those who were illiterate or who had not completed their primary education made up not more than ...% of the unemployed, of which ...% had at least a secondary education and ...% a university education. The irruption of unemployment among graduates means the collapse of a myth which had once raised school to being seen as an avenue to individual well being and social progress.

A powerful process has been set into motion by school. By giving the young an advantage over their elders and gradually erasing gender inequality, the educational institution establishes an order which openly contradicts that which continues to rule in relationships between persons in their ordinary existence, public or private and which gives precedence to older people and to men. School, which previously opened the doors of the civil service to the sons of a peasant or local shopkeeper, has seen its value eroded in a labour market which has since been handed over to the *wasta,* the influential person who will intervene on your behalf and without whom your diploma is worth nothing. The stage is set for large scale frustration amongst the youth that can produce differing results from resignation to rebellion or emigration.

The birth of the individual

Falling birth rates are expected to relieve pressures on labour markets, but with a delay of 20 to 25 years. In the meanwhile, numbers of new entrants (age group 20-25) continue to grow and reach a maximum somewhere between 2005 and 2030 according to when fertility started to decline. Larger numbers however are only one facet of the changes that Arab labour markets will go through in the next two decades. Indeed, the other trends recent declines in birth rates are linked with – fundamental change in women's role and dramatic spread of school education– sharpen the competition for employment. The quantity of human capital entering the labour market is soaring.

Is this massive demographic inflow on Arab labour markets a chance or a burden? There are two possible interpretations. The first one is a rather optimistic view according to which demographic change is a 'gift', for it opens a window of opportunity to endogenous economic development (Bloom 2003, World Bank 2007, Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007). As a consequence of recent but sharp declines in the birth rates, the dependency ratio (sum of the population aged 0-14 and that aged 65+ to the population aged 15-64) is minimal. This is an opportunity that must be seized because declining birth rates will soon end up in population ageing and the child dependency of the recent past will give way to old-age dependency.



Figure 3: The Youth Bulge in North Africa
Source: UN Population Database

The current decade is a unique period during which the proportion of potentially active to inactive population is exceptionally high. For young people now beginning their working life, the future benefits of their work are no longer mortgaged to support numerous children (as was the case until recently), or the burden of the aged (as will soon be the case). This is a situation favourable to savings and investment. Investment can now be economic rather than demographic: it may serve to improve the quality of life of future generations rather than to meet the demand effect of the population explosion.

The problem with this interpretation, however, is that for young people to be able to save, they need to work and earn a sufficient income. In reality, Arab young adults are confronted with high unemployment, underemployment, low wages and poor returns on education. On average, it takes a young educated person two to three years to find a first employment, then again two to three years to accumulate enough savings for his or her marriage. Transition to adulthood occurs at the price of a long period of expectation and exclusion (Dyer and Yousef, 2008).

In Algeria, a country where oil wealth could never translate into job opportunities for everyone, unemployment is the lot of 31% young adults at 20-24 and 26% at 25-29 (ONS 2005). In Morocco unemployment is highest among the young (33% at 15-24 years and 26% at 25-34 in urban areas), and highly-skilled persons (24% of people with a diploma are unemployed, against 9% of those with no diploma); between 1999 and 2004, unemployment has declined for every category except those with a university degree and the higher the diploma the higher the probability of being unemployed; unemployment starts as soon as education ends, and the higher the education received the longer the duration of subsequent unemployment; two out of three first job seekers with a university diploma are unemployed for more than one and for up to three years (CERED 2005). Egypt, Tunisia and Syria have similar patterns.

An alternative interpretation of demographic transition focuses on the implications of low birth rates' at family and individual levels and notices that family constraints of earlier times are lifted for new generations. Due to their own (expected) low fertility,

they no longer bear the burden of numerous children; due to their mothers' high fertility, they still have numerous siblings to share the burden of old persons. As a result, young adults today bear a lighter family burden. From a demographic point of view, the Arab world is now witnessing the birth of the individual. For the first time there is personal freedom in movement. Demography sets the backdrop against which young and often educated adults now arrive on Arab labour markets, freed from family charges. The freedom of movement which has been gained through demographic change also entails a certain level of individual availability for risk.

More human capital flooding into the labour market engenders more capabilities, but also more expectations. Human capital has a potential for progress but also for protest. If expectations are frustrated, then the response can be anything from voice to exit. The voice response is dealt with elsewhere in this volume. Two decades before the revolution of 2011, a statistical analysis of political violence in Egypt in the early 1990s showed striking correlations between the rise of education, the speed of birth rates decline, urban growth and the rise of violent political action (Fargues, 1994). But it is exit, or emigration, which was the most salient response to frustrated expectations over the last decades.

Exiting instead of voicing

Emigration from the Maghreb to Western Europe –in the first instance to France–had actually started long before the demographic mechanisms described above, in the interwar years. It took momentum after WWII in response to the large-scale labour needs of post-war reconstruction and accelerated when Tunisia (1956), Morocco (1956) and Algeria (1962) became independent nations, soon confronted with huge unemployment at home. Migration was then driven by economic forces –the search for labour force in Europe meeting the search for employment in the Maghreb– and managed by guest workers programmes defined under bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states. Migrants were all men moving back and forth between their homes in the Maghreb and their workplace in Europe according to labour agendas.

This situation was to dramatically change with the deep economic crisis triggered by soaring oil prices that hit industrial economies of Western Europe starting from 1973 and soon resulted into mounting unemployment in Europe. One after the other all the concerned governments responded by closing the borders to foreign workers in order to put an end to migration. However, this measure was to produce just the opposite outcome: migrants who where in Europe at that time did not return to their home countries for fear of not being any longer allowed to enter Europe, but took advantage of European legislations on family reunification to have their wives and children joining them. In a few years, it became obvious that visa restrictions had transformed the two-way mobility of temporary male migrant workers into the one-way permanent immigration of mostly inactive family dependents of former migrants. Forces at play behind immigration were no longer the economic logics of labour markets, but the sociological drivers of families and networks. Legislations on naturalisation and *jus soli* then made populations originating in the Maghreb and their descendents a genuine part of national populations in Europe.

Two remarks must be made. First, European labour markets always remained more open than states to migrant workers, for migrants accept jobs that are no longer attractive for natives and more generally allow a flexible adaptation of labour supply to demand. If there is no legal way to enter or reside in the country, then unauthorized

entry and/or unauthorized stay offer a second best solution. And actually, irregular migration started to grow from the late 1980s in response to visa restrictions as well as to employers' strategies of hiring underpaid workers. Second, soon after Western Europe fell into the crisis, Southern Europe emerged as a new magnet for migrant workers. Starting from the late 1980s, the steady growth of the Italian economy and, even more strikingly the boom of the economies of Greece, Spain and Portugal with the fall of dictators and the admission into the European Union, transformed countries with a long tradition of emigration into new destinations for South and East Mediterranean migrants. From there, due to the entry into force of the Schengen Treaty in 1990, they could reach the whole European space of free circulation. The term 'Fortress Europe' may apply to policies but certainly not to facts: European borders were never sealed up.

Farther away from Western Europe, emigration originating in Egypt and the Mashreq followed a distinct path. In the Arab East where the Ottoman Empire had once established a vast area of free circulation, the mobility of people has remained until the present day the most significant form of regional exchange. Contrasting with peaceful movements of the past, however, modern migration has constantly been linked with wars and conflicts in the Mashrek. The wars of Palestine (1948-4 and 1967) as well as the low intensity conflict that never stopped since then have been instrumental in fostering emigration: directly, locally, they caused two Palestinian exoduses and a constant flow of emigration from the Palestinian occupied territory that is continuing today; indirectly, beyond Palestine, the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict provided a strategic resource to military regimes claiming their solidarity with the Palestinians (and belligerence with Israel) whose authoritarian rules became a strong driver of Arab migration.

The October 1973 war on the Suez Canal during which oil became a new weapon and its price quadrupled and created gigantic wealth in the and booming demand for imported labour in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, was decisive in orienting flows from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon towards Arab oil states, which have remained until the present day their fist destination. The Gulf war 1990/1 then produced in these states an unprecedented trauma, throwing overnight onto the roads of exile some three million migrant workers who simply happened to bear the wrong nationality: Egyptian peasants in Iraq, Yemenis unskilled construction workers in Saudi Arabia and Palestinian white collars in Kuwait.

In the 2000s, the largest wave of Arab refugees since 1948 was triggered in Iraq by the sectarian violence that erupted all over the country after its invasion and occupation by the United States, Great Britain and a few other countries. An estimated 2 million Iraqis fled their country from October 2005 through 2007. The previous wave that had fled Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the 1990s could find refuge in a number of countries, including several EU member states, but those fleeing Iraq under American occupation found shelter almost exclusively in nearby Arab countries. They arrived first in Jordan until 2005, then in Syria and Lebanon, and lastly in Egypt, four countries located in the Euro Mediterranean area and linked with the EU by association agreements. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, on top of being the main countries hosting Palestinian refugees, became the largest receivers of Iraqi refugees at Europe's door, with only tiny numbers allowed into Europe. The next section will show how history repeated itself in 2011, this time with refugees fleeing Libya.

In 2010, Arab Mediterranean countries were source of a recorded 10.8 million emigrants (Table 2) –more likely 12 million or more if unrecorded migrants are

included[2]. Migrants represent 5.3% (more likely 6%) of the population of their origin countries, which is twice the 3% world average and demonstrates the very high propensity for migration among Arab youth. Moreover, emigration was steadily rising until the economic crisis that hit its main destinations in Europe and in the Gulf starting from 2008, and the war in Libya which triggered in 2011 a movement of return migration mainly to Egypt and Tunisia (see next section).

Table 2: Migrants originating in Arab Mediterranean countries by region of residence - most recent data available in 2011

Country of origin	Region of residence					
	European Union	Gulf States	Libya	Other Arab countries	Other countries	Total
Algeria	1,475,662	19,595	4,593	21,850	56,310	1,578,010
Egypt	199,153	1,132,091	164,348	121,082	226,661	1,843,335
Libya	43,646	2,035		6,928	10,947	63,556
Morocco	2,390,174	46,544	19,839	26,279	92,522	2,575,358
Tunisia	516,440	15,985	14,124	11,311	20,308	578,168
Mauritania	26,518	1,012		3,174	2,648	33,352
Jordan	25,745	168,668	2,053	48,990	78,195	323,651
Lebanon	153,196	52,543	966	6,635	296,065	509,405
Palestine	8,401	136,573	28,596	2,699,280	34,530	2,907,380
Syria	109,913	120,524	17,017	91,477	82,482	421,413
Total	4,948,848	1,695,570	251,536	3,037,006	900,668	10,833,628

Source: national censuses data compiled by A. di Bartolomeo for CARIM - EUI - migrants are defined as "foreign-born" or "non nationals" according to countries

Figure 4 shows the considerable increase in Moroccan migrant stocks from 1993 to 2007. Their total number rose from 1.545 million in 1993 to 3.293 million in 2007, i.e. at an average rate of 5.4%, which is more than four times higher than the rate of growth of the total population in Morocco (1.2% during the same period). It is worth stressing that 1) emigration from Morocco kept growing steadily precisely at a moment when demographic growth started to decline and to produce the youth bulge which is correlated with migration; and 2) Moroccan migrants kept going to France, Italy and particularly to Spain after the crisis had started, despite of soaring unemployment

[2] The total number in Table ... underestimates real migrants stocks in 2010 for three reasons: estimates for the Gulf States refer to the year 2000 and emigration to the Gulf has been intense in the early 2000s; Egyptians and Tunisians in Libya –where they don't need an entry visa– are obviously underestimated; a number of host countries are missing.



Surveys of Middle Eastern youth reveal that the proportion of young people who wish or intend to emigrate ranges from a quarter to an enormously high three quarters of an age group, according to countries. In the second half of the 1990s, a EUROSTAT-coordinated survey already found high proportions: 14% in Egypt, 27% in Turkey and 20% in Morocco. More recent surveys unveil far higher numbers. Tunisia, a country with a successful economy, but a stalled democratisation process, is a case in point (Table 3): in 2006, 76% (against 22% in 1996 and 45% in 2000) of the age group 15-29 declare that they are contemplating emigration as an option. Many of them may simply dream without making concrete plans or taking actual steps, but their dream tells much about the deep discomfort that is now common among the young in the MENA.

Arab Mediterranean countries have a potential for future migration that varies in proportion of their youth bulge, but also with a number of unknown economic and political factors. Whether and in which proportion will theirs migrants' destination be Europe is also a matter of conjecture. What is less debatable, however, is that due to demographic change future patterns of migration will not resemble those of the past and not even those of the present day. Family profiles of young Arab migrants are going through radical changes. Yesterday, they had a family left at home and their emigration was motivated by a drive to feed and educate this family. Remitting money to those at home was the main reason for leaving the country and in many cases return was part of the migration project. Tomorrow, young emigrants will typically have no children or wives and their goal will rather be self-accomplishment (Fargues 2011c).

Table 3: Wish to emigrate among Tunisian youth 1996-2005

Percentage who declare that they wish to emigrate		1996	2000	2005
Sex	Male	29	54	84
	Female	14	37	66
Age	15 – 19	21	44	76
	20 – 24	24	47	77
	25 – 29	23	45	74
Instruction	Illiterate	6	3	66
	Primary	19	45	77
	Secondary	26	49	77
	University	24	46	73
Activity	Employed	25	48	77
	Unemployed	31	54	85
	Student	26	48	75
Total		22	45	76

National representative sample [sample size: 20,000 in 1996; 10,000 in 2000; 10,000 in 2005]- Source: Fourati, Habib 2008, Consultations de la jeunesse et désir d'émigrer chez les jeunes en Tunisie 1996 – 2005, CARIM

The south of the south

Arab Mediterranean countries are not only senders but also receivers of international migration. In 2010, they had some 4.5 million immigrants (Table 4). A majority of them are migrant, mostly low-skilled workers coming from less developed countries further south or east to take jobs that have become unattractive for natives. Refugees form a second category, soaring in the 2000s with conflicts in the neighbourhood, in Iraq and Darfur as well as in several Sub-Saharan countries. Most them find themselves stranded in countries of first asylum where they cannot obtain residency or even a proper refugee status and are either waiting for resettlement in a third country or for return to their country of origin when the conditions allow. A third category of migrants, by far the less numerous, are transit migrants stuck on their way to Europe which they cannot enter for lack of a visa.

A salient characteristic of the early 2000s is the dramatic rise of irregular migration South of the Mediterranean. While much attention is given to those who clandestinely attempt or success to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, very little is said about the bulk of this migration, which is actually destined to or stranded in countries south of the Mediterranean. Some of these migrants had entered irregularly, but many others had their passport regularly stamped at the border but their permit to stay has expired or been invalidated due to changes in the legislation regarding the conditions of work and residence for foreigners. For example, in Egypt the legal status of the Sudanese who form the largest migrant population has varied several times, from full freedom of movement and residence (1956-95) to visa requirement (1995-2004), then again theoretically freedom of residence in virtue of a bilateral agreement signed in 2004 but never fully implemented. In Syria, a country open to nationals of all other Arab countries in the name of Pan-Arabism, a visa obligation was suddenly imposed on Iraqis in 2007, transforming hundreds of thousands of refugees who had originally been admitted as "guests" into irregular migrants.

Libya before the fall of Kaddafi was a case in point. Persistently subordinating migration policy to changing foreign policy interests, its government successively

opened the country's borders to Arabs in the name of Pan-Arabism, then to Africans in the name of Pan-Africanism, before imposing visas on both Arabs and Africans to please Europe at a time when Libya had become a major gateway for irregular migrants from Africa. Potentially, all those who had entered Libya without a visa were made irregular by measures taken in 2007. Irregular migrants have recurrently been scapegoated being presented as a threat for public security and subjected to mass deportations in 1995, 2003-2005 and 2008.

Table 4: Regular and irregular immigrants in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (ca. 2005)

Country	Regular immigrants	Irregular immigrants				Total immigrants	Ratio irregular / regular (minimum)
		Labour	De facto refugees	Transit	Minimum total		
Algeria	80,238	Tens of thousands	95,121	Tens of thousands	≥ 10,000	≥ 185,000	0.1
Egypt	115,589	Tens of thousands	104,390	n.a.	≥ 100,000	≥ 215,000	0.9
Jordan	392,273	100,000 or more	519,477	n.a.	≥ 600,000	≥ 1,000,000	1.5
Lebanon	302,315	400 - 500,000	22,743	n.a.	≥ 400,000	≥ 700,000	1.3
Libya	449,065	1.0 - 1.2 million	4,754	Tens of thousands	≥ 1,000,000	≥ 1450,000	2.2
Mauritania	48,000	Few thousands	861	Tens of thousands	≥ 10,000	≥ 60,000	0.2
Morocco	62,348	Tens of thousands	1,878	Tens of thousands	≥ 10,000	≥ 70,000	0.2
Syria	55,000	Thousands	707,422	n.a.	≥ 700,000	≥ 750,000	12.7
Tunisia	35,192	Thousands	161	n.a.	≥ 10,000	≥ 45,000	0.3
Total	1,540,020	2-3 million	1,456,807	50,000 - 150,000	≥ 2,840,000	4,475,000	1.8

Source: Fargues, 2009

Revolt and its impact on migration

At the beginning of 2011, revolt has flared across the entire Arab region in response to long-standing frustration of peoples. Uprising spread in predominantly migrant sending countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen...) as well as in predominantly migrant receiving countries (Libya, Bahrain...). While it has already had a massive

impact on immigrants in war-torn Libya, it will probably produce far-reaching, long-run consequences on migratory movements both originating in and destined to the region.

In Libya, the exodus caused by the war strikingly resembles what had happened in another oil-rich, labour-importing part of the Arab region twenty years earlier, when the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait provoking the exodus of three million migrant workers. Between February and October 2011, more than one million people crossed the border out of Libya (Table 5), 37% of them being Libyans seeking refuge in a neighbourhing country and the rest consisting of mostly temporary migrant workers returning to their homes, but also an unknown number of de facto refugees (nationals of conflict-torn Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad and a few other African countries, who were in need of protection but could not claim a refugee status in Libya, since the country does not recognise refugees) trying to find another shelter.

Many Libyan nationals may have returned to their homes at the time of writing. On the other side, migrants, in their vast majority (96.1%) have reached an African destination, either their own or a third country. Only 3.9% of them, including European migrants, went to Europe when the country erupted in riots (Table 6). Contrary to fears expressed, among others, by the Italian government, waves of migrants and refugees did not flood into the European Union. Measures were taken by the EU to alleviate the burden supported by Tunisia and Egypt, the two countries that actually took in the largest waves while they were themselves destabilised by ongoing revolutions, but no action was iniated to accommodate in Europe part of the refugees. The Libyan crisis could be an occasion for European states to critically reassess not only their asylum policies, but also migration policies that had led some of them to support, and thereby strengthen, the Kaddafi regime in Libya in order to contain irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

Table 5: Persons fleeing Libya by country of nationality

Libyans seeking refuge abroad 1/	422,912
Migrants 2/	706,073
Tunisians returning to Tunisia	96,913
Egyptians returning to Egypt	140,642
Third country nationals reaching Tunisia or Egypt	292,772
Other migrants reaching an African country bordering Libya	148,281
Migrants and refugees of all nationalities fleeing from Libya to Italy or Malta	27,465
Total Migrants + Libyans 3/	1,128,985

1/ Arrivals of Libyans in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria as of 08 June 2011

2/ Movements of non-Libyans as of 30 September 2011

3/ As of 30.09.2011 for Migrants and 08.06.2011 for Libyans

Source: IOM

Table 6:Migrants fleeing Libya by country of arrival

Country	Number	Percentage
Tunisia	304127	43.1%
Egypt	226200	32.0%
Niger	80329	11.4%
Other African State	67952	9.6%
Italy	25935	3.7%
Malta	1530	0.2%
Total	706073	100.0%

Source: IOM





BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

An International Conference

Paris, 3-4 November 2011

HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT EVIL: MISUNDERSTANDING POLITICAL ISLAM

by

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The Power of False Analogies

"We have seen their kind before," President George W. Bush said of those who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. "They're the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking, 'How will we fight and win this war?'"

Answering his own question, Bush then went on to outline the kind of war that the United States would have to fight if it was going to defeat the terrorists. This conflict, he said, will not resemble the one his father had led against the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Nor would it be a limited campaign with minimal loss of life such as the one Bill Clinton had pursued in Bosnia. The stakes now were much higher than those posed by one nation's invasion of another or by the grim realities of ethnic cleansing. "This is not... just America's fight," the president declared. "And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom." With the stakes that high – indeed with the stakes as high as they could possibly be – the war would have to be fought with every tool available to the United States. "We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network." To accomplish that objective, the president made demands on the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan in preparation for destroying the home base for al Qaeda that had made the attacks possible. But this would be just the first step: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated." In many ways Bush's speech called for a *more* thorough-going response than the one the West adopted in the face of the totalitarian threat. During World War II, after all, the U. S. was willing to ally itself with one totalitarian state, the Soviet Union, in order to defeat another, Nazi Germany. In the war against terror President Bush was calling for the compete destruction of the evil of terrorism in whatever form it took.

In speaking this way, Bush borrowed the language of the past to talk about the challenges posed by the future. His basic assumption was that al Qaeda, and by extension any militant Islamic movement, posed a threat that could only be met by resolute resistance and military might. A crucial feature of this worldview is what the strategist and lawyer Joshua Geltzer calls signaling: sending a message to your opponent that you will be relentless in your determination to use force in order to get him to desist. The most exemplary advocate of signaling in the Bush administration proved to be Vice President Cheney. Like other members of the Bush administration, Cheney, despite warnings from Clinton administration officials such as National Security Advisor Samuel Berger and terrorism expert Richard Clarke that al Qaeda would become the nation's primary enemy, was taken aback by the September 11 attacks. But the moment they occurred, he took the lead proposing a theory designed to explain them. Terrorists, Cheney was convinced, had targeted the United States because they perceived it to be weak. As he put the matter in one of the many television interviews he granted in the aftermath of the attack, Bill Clinton's failure to respond more aggressively during the 1990s had "encouraged people like Osama bin Laden ... to launch repeated strikes against the United States, and our people overseas and here at home, with the view that he could, in fact, do so with impunity." The post-2001 political world, in Cheney's view, closely resembled the one that had existed during the Iran-Contra affair. He had concluded from the earlier experience that Congressional Democrats were not responsible fellow Americans with whom one debated but political opponents whose misguided faith in civil liberties, insistence on Congressional oversight of the executive, and squeamishness toward firm

methods would weaken the country and thereby give all the wrong signals to the enemy. He was going to use his close relationship with George W. Bush to keep them from meddling in the decisions he was planning to make in the upcoming war on terror.

Cheney was not the kind of political leader that required advice; he knew what he was going to do and was not going to be dissuaded by experts. Nonetheless there were a number of prominent intellectuals in the United States and Europe who could have furnished support for the underlying assumptions that guided the Bush administration in the aftermath of September 11. Whether neo-conservatives or liberal interventionists, these thinkers were convinced that it was indeed proper to view militant Islamists as the heirs of the fascist movements of the twentieth century. One of the more outspoken voices articulating this point of view belonged to the conservative commentator Daniel Pipes. Roughly 15% of the Muslim world, Pipes told an association of Coptic Christians in 2004, adheres to one or another form of militant Islam which, as he defines it, "derived from Islam but is a misanthropic, misogynist, triumphalist, millenarian, anti-modern, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, terroristic, jihadistic, and suicidal version of it." Pipes, like all those who share his convictions, argued that militant Islam's radicalism inherited its drive for world conquest directly from totalitarianism. Indeed there exists something of a cottage industry among neo-conservative historians dedicated to showing direct links between the Nazis and Islamic jihadists. In their book *Icon of Evil*, for example, the historians David Dalin and John F. Rothman, argue that Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem during the 1930s and 1940s, imbibed the anti-Semitism of the Hitler regime only to return to Palestine after World War II and infect the Arab world with his poison, a position adhered to by nearly all neo-conservative writers. Having established such a link, scholars and pundits of this persuasion feel free to rely upon the term "Islamofascism" to emphasize the degree to which Islamic terrorists seek worldwide domination. Despite the criticism this term has received for conflating a political ideology with a religion, the prolific British-born American intellectual Christopher Hitchens defends it on the grounds that "both movements are based on a cult of murderous violence that exalts death and destruction and despises the life of the mind." Islamic terrorists, all these writers agree, talk locally but think globally. When we combat political evil today we are therefore engaged in a replay of the struggle against the radical evils of yesterday.

In this paper I will argue that this entire way of thinking misunderstands the problem of political Islam for two main reasons. One is historical: the era of totalitarianism has come and gone and the conditions that produced it are unlikely ever to be repeated. The other is spatial: terrorism is indeed a challenge the West must meet, but, in contrast to the totalitarian era, its aims are very rarely global in nature but local and contextual. The premise contained in the idea that militant Islam is the heir to totalitarianism is that tyrannical government at home means expansionism abroad. Recent experience shows just how false this premise is.

Why Totalitarianism Will Never Happen Again

The concept of totalitarianism that became so popular in the years after World War II was based on the historical experience of three countries: Italy, where the term had been invented, and then Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The theorists who formulated the concept, including Hannah Arendt and Carl Friedrich and Zbegniew Brzezinski, held that a combination of pernicious ideological thinking, dictatorial accumulation of state power, ruthless methods of propaganda and terror, charisma and the adulation of leadership, and aggressive foreign policy intentions had created an entirely new political reality. The books elaborating this concept became contemporary classics. But not only did their authors lack access to documents that have since become available, they were too close to the horrors just passed to have sufficient perspective on their ultimate meaning. As a result, they failed to

anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union and could not foresee how thoroughly postwar Germany – indeed all of postwar Europe – would turn its back on the twentieth century's history of violence.

A new generation of historians has emerged challenging the assumptions of the totalitarian model. The basic conclusion of these historians can be summarized as follows: far from being the wave of the future, as both the defenders and the of the totalitarian regimes themselves frequently asserted, both Nazi German and Stalinist Russia were created at a time when a number of highly unusual conditions came together to shape the specific form both states took. This finding could not be more relevant to the way we think about militant Islam today. If the conditions that brought about totalitarianism cannot be replicated, straining to avoid the appeasement of evildoers could not be more self-defeating. We unfortunately find ourselves face to face with a number of depressing realities when dealing with contemporary forms of terrorism. Fortunately, the return of totalitarianism is not among them.

Totalitarianism, first of all, was a direct result of World War I. "The first World War made Hitler possible," writes Ian Kershaw, Hitler's most accomplished biographer, and the same could be said for Lenin or Mussolini. None of the leaders that took their nations to war in 1914 realized just how long and bloody that conflict would be, and it was the peculiar political genius of the totalitarian dictators to explore the resulting resentments for their own ideological ends once the war finally came to an end. Totalitarianism was a massive reaction against the spirit of liberal optimism that had dominated much of the late nineteenth century. Populations that had seen irrationality on so massive a scale in the trenches could not be surprised by politicians preaching fear and creating campaigns of mass hysteria in peacetime. Totalitarianism required extensive psychological preparation and the futility of World War I provided it.

Militarily speaking, World War I was like no other war before it. In previous European wars one hoped, not always successfully to be sure, for a quick defeat of the enemy after which conditions would return to normal. World War I, by contrast, radicalized the whole idea of warfare. This war, the historian Alan Kramer writes, was geared "toward systematic, total exploitation of enemy civilians and the resources of the conquered territory. From cultural destruction, in the sense of deliberate targeting of cultural objects, the war moved to a 'culture of destruction,' – the acceptance of the destruction, consumption, and exploitation of whatever it took to wage war (including the lives of one's own soldiers as well as the enemy's." The totalitarian state's coercive capacity, from this perspective, was not created out of thin air; it was built upon a state that had already come into existence to fight as ruthlessly as possible. "The most spectacular and terrifying instance of industrial killing in this country was the Nazi attempted genocide of the Jews," another historian, Omer Bartov, concludes. "Neither the idea, nor its implementation, however, can be understood without reference to the Great War, the first truly industrial military confrontation in history."

As in Germany, so in Russia. "The First World War brought communism into being," as the late Martin Malia put it in *The Soviet Tragedy*. Not all that popular, possessing an ideology wildly inappropriate for actual Russian conditions, excessively conspiratorial and sectarian, Lenin and the Bolsheviks never could have assumed power in any kind of open competition. But World War I and its aftermath created conditions perfect for their methods. "Normal politics were suspended, the economy was nationalized and militarized, culture was turned to propaganda, and private life was eclipsed by public purpose," Malia went on. "No nation's social order could survive such intrusion unaltered, and that of fragile, rickety Russia least of all. Her economy, her society, and her political system were radically transformed from what they had been in 1914." It was, moreover, not just at its start that the shadow of World War I loomed over the Soviet system. Knowing full well that communism's triumph was made possible only by Russia's defeat in one world war, Stalin was determined to prevent another catastrophic military defeat in the coming one and he continued the Soviet Union's militarization and industrialization unabated.

For something like totalitarianism to happen again, something like World War I would have to happen again. It is certainly possible that the world could experience another truly global war: conflicts between nations spilling over into violence are unlikely ever to disappear. But the pernicious effects on political life evident in so many countries in the aftermath of the World War I were not due to the violence of the conflict per se, nor even to the defeats suffered by Germany and Russia. It was the very senselessness of the war, the unexpected number of casualties, the inability to make visible progress on the front that did so much to produce the apocalyptic style of politics in which totalitarian leaders thrived. *That* kind of war is impossible to image happening again, if for no other reason than the existence of nuclear weapons. Obviously nuclear weapons create the potential for horrendous political evil; the prospect of their use in the Middle East or over disputes between India and Pakistan is too frightening to contemplate. Yet because of their sheer destructive power, nuclear weapons make protracted trench warfare, and its particularly irrational legacies, obsolete. Either the possession of nuclear weapons will deter such a war from being fought in the first place or they will, hopefully never, produce a war whose huge number of casualties will be predicted because they will be so expected.

If the war that started totalitarianism is unlikely ever to be repeated, so is the war that ended it. World War I is remembered for its irrationality. World War II will always be recalled for the sheer scale of the destruction it caused. The Jews, of course, were the primary victim of Hitler's murderous obsessions. But World War II also produced its own share of death and destruction everywhere. If anyone doubted the cost in human lives necessary to bring the era of totalitarianism to a close in the 1930s, they knew by the 1940s just how extensive those costs could become. This is not to suggest, as the American writer Nicholson Baker has done, that the costs were too high. But it does serve as a reminder of the havoc that totalitarianism could wreak.

It is surely worth emphasizing, therefore, that in Europe, where so much of the carnage of World War II was felt, the desire to go to war has been all but extinguished.

In the years since totalitarianism's passing, Western European societies gave up their imperial ambitions, formed first a commercial and then a political union, demilitarized themselves, aided and supported democratic movements in the Eastern bloc, survived domestic terrorism without completely abrogating liberal democratic procedures, and made clear their skepticism toward America's reliance on doctrines of preventive warfare in Iraq. "In the first half of the century," writes Stanford University historian James Sheehan in *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?*, "European states ... were made by and for war... In the century's second half, European states were made by and for peace." To the American neoconservative writer Robert Kagan, Europe's skepticism toward militarism represents the victory of naïve Venus over tough-minded Mars; no better proof of the attraction of appeasement exists than this general European failure to recognize the need for a strong national defense. But another interpretation of Europe's aversion to militarism is more persuasive. Given the historical experience of totalitarianism, it makes far more sense to view the post-war European experience as evidence of just how much Europeans have learned from their totalitarian past – and how determined they are to avoid repeating the conditions that gave rise to it. It is difficult to know which to admire most: postwar Europe's success with democracy or, with the admittedly significant exception of the Balkans, its experience of peace.

The economic circumstances that gave rise to the era of totalitarianism were almost as unique as the military ones. One of them was the rapid hyperinflation that gripped the Weimar Republic in 1923, the same year in which Hitler conducted his Munich putsch; prices at the peak of the inflation doubled every 48 hours. Economically speaking, hyperinflation all but destroyed the German middle class. If one believes, as many political sociologists do, that a strong middle class is a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy, hyperinflation's immediate political consequence was to fuel the rise of extremist political parties of both the right and left. But the psychological and cultural effects of hyperinflation may have been greater than either its economic or its political effects. Just as World

War I's futility contributed to the sense that the world lacked any sense of order, hyperinflation undermined bourgeois ideas of prudence, long-term investment, and merit. "People just didn't understand what was happening," wrote the publisher Leopold Ullstein at the time. "All the economic theory that had been taught didn't provide for the phenomenon. There was a feeling of utter dependence on anonymous powers – almost as a primitive people believed in magic – that somebody must be in the know, and that this small group of somebodies must be a conspiracy." When currency loses meaning, everything loses meaning. Even though hyperinflation was eventually brought under control in Weimar Germany, its contribution to the rise of fascism cannot be underestimated.

Even more devastating that hyperinflation was the U. S. stock market crash in 1929 and the subsequent worldwide Great Depression. In the years after the crash, unemployment in Germany expanded dramatically; roughly one-third of all Germans were without work in 1932 and the percentages were even higher in the major industrial areas. The political effects registered almost immediately. "As Germany plunged deeper into the Depression," writes the British historian Richard Evans, "growing numbers of middle-class citizens began to see in the youthful dynamism of the Nazi Party a possible way out of the situation." They may not have been good ones, but Hitler did have answers to the economic catastrophe. He blamed Jewish capitalists for its persistence. He pursued autarkic economic politics that promised to end Germany's dependence on foreign investors. He sponsored rapid remilitarization of the country in ways that would create jobs and stimulate further growth. The crisis atmosphere spawned by a badly functioning economy fostered a crisis atmosphere in politics; without the chaos represented by idle workers, food and product shortages, and unused industrial capacity, it is hard to imagine the Nazis even getting an electoral foothold, let alone rising to the highest levels of power and retaining that power as long as they did.

Hyperinflation and depression, in short, when added to the pot already brewing in the aftermath of World War I, increased people's receptivity to the idea that strong-armed ruthlessness offered the only path to stability. "The Great Slump almost inevitably increased social and political tensions everywhere," Volker Berghahn, a German historian, points out in *Europe in the Era of Two World Wars*. "Violence that had become part of daily life during World War I and the years thereafter returned, and with it reappeared men who had a vision of the future that was different from the civilian one of the mid-1920s.... The most radical elements came to believe that the struggle could easily be won by the ruthless annihilation of the internal enemy." There is no direct line from the worldwide Great Depression to the extermination camps but there is an indirect one. Extremist politics requires crisis conditions and the economic collapse of the early 1930s provided more than its share.

In the context of today's world, any return to the combination of hyperinflation and depression that gave totalitarianism its breathing room is about as unimaginable as any war on the scale of World War II. Hyperinflation can still happen; Chile, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe have all experienced it in recent years. But not only is it rare, its chance of recurring in heavily industrialized countries is close to non-existent. The closest the United States has ever come to hyperinflation in recent years was the 18% rise in prices under Jimmy Carter, but in the long history of hyperinflation, this was less than a blip. America's bout with excessive inflation did have its political consequences; Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980 in large part because of it. Although the entire episode was accompanied by talk of the Latin Americanization of the American economy, however, the United States, like all advanced capitalist democracies, had in place fiscal and monetary tolls unavailable to political leaders in the 1920s. Before long the inflation of the 1970s was brought under control without any damage to the structure of democratic politics.

These days policymakers worry more about deflation than hyperinflation. While tools exist to prevent prices from rising too rapidly, there are no especially helpful tools available to government when prices decline too fast; once interest rates are lowered to zero in the hopes of stimulating aggregate demand, they cannot be lowered any further. Deflation could therefore have dangerous

effects on democratic forms of government if it persists too long. But the most serious case of deflation in recent years, Japan's, lasted for decades and, despite the fact that liberal democracy did not have long-lasting historical roots in that country, its deflation did not result in anything like a turn toward totalitarianism. Because of what happened during Weimar, we have a pretty clear understanding of how hyperinflation can create the conditions for political extremism. No one knows whether prolonged periods of deflation, should they spread from country to country, would have anything like similar political consequences. But even if deflation were to reinforce economic stagnation and political gridlock, as it did in Japan, it would be highly unlikely to contribute to the same sense that the world is spinning hopelessly out of control that happens when prices increase hour by hour. Hyperinflation leads to a politics of fervid enthusiasm. Deflation is more likely to produce a politics of sullen despair.

Toward the end of 2008 the United States and other countries around the world began to experience one of the worst recessions of the post World War II era. Comparisons to the era of the Great Depression were not long in forthcoming. One can certainly imagine a situation in which a prolonged and severe recession could result in threats to democratic stability. Because of globalization, national government have less control over the economy than they did during the heyday of Keynesian economic policymaking. Globalization could also fuel massive anger at the foreign capitalists and financers held to be responsible for the crisis. Countries could become engaged in a protectionist competition with each other. Hostility toward immigrants, blamed by xenophobic politicians for stealing jobs away from loyal and patriotic workers, could intensify. Were all these developments to combine and reinforce each other, the contemporary world's free trade system would be severely challenged – and with it, extremist policies and politicians would find themselves attracting greater support.

Remarkably, however, nothing quite resembling this scenario happened in the wake of the Great Recession. The reason may well lie in the ways both economics and politics have changed since the late 1920s and early 1930s. The initial U. S. response to the deteriorating economic conditions of the earlier era was protectionist; in more recent times, despite the domestic unpopularity of free trade, as well as the severity of the recent recession, politicians from both parties in the United States remain committed to an open world economy. In large part this may be due to the lack of any credible alternatives; for all the passion of the demonstrations led by anti-globalization forces, no one has developed a credible model for promoting growth along the autarkic political lines in a capitalist world as interconnected as today's has become. Nor are more radical solutions all that attractive, for, as the economic historian Harold James points out, "the obvious types of reaction against globalization – fascism, Stalinism, and their economic manifestations in managed trade and the planned economy – are forever discredited." While the recovery from the recession of 2008-09 was uneven, leaving unacceptably high rates of unemployment in its wake, the Obama administration's bailout program, although denounced by his Republican opponents as radical and socialistic, was actually rather moderate. Even more importantly, it proved effective enough to take the teeth out of totalitarian-like responses. To be sure, the most significant political force to emerge in the wake of the 2008 recession, the so-called Tea Party movement, proved itself conspiratorial, given to hyperventilation, and susceptible to the charge of racism. At the same time, it was also, for better or worse, well within longstanding American traditions of populist revolt. While the tea party movement has produced its share of extremists, there is no reason to believe that anything like the Great Depression and the radical forms of political expression produced by it in both the United States and Europe during the 1930s are on the contemporary political agenda anywhere in the advanced capitalist world.

There is still another reason to doubt the return of totalitarianism: one totalitarian system existing all by itself is something of an impossibility. Because they all came to power in the aftermath of World War I and faced similar challenges in the drastic economic conditions of the 1920s and 1930s,

totalitarian leaders watched each other carefully and applied the lessons of the other regimes to themselves. "The Bolshevik Revolution and the first phases of Soviet practice radically changed the political situation in Italy and Germany, not least in affecting what could now be imagined, what seemed to have become possible," writes the historian David D. Roberts. "Lenin influenced Mussolini, Mussolini and Stalin both influenced Hitler, and the advent of Nazism changed the situation for the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence of mutual admiration and influence, rivalry and fear, all constituting a kind of web connecting the three regimes." Ideological opposites, totalitarian regimes were operationally similar. Each system required terror because the other system had terror. Propaganda had to be organized and systematic in one because it was organized and systematic in the other. Totalitarianism required an enemy, and when the enemy was itself totalitarian, the existence of one regime made possible the continued existence of the others. Little or nothing about totalitarianism was predetermined, but the unique political atmosphere of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, by strengthening totalitarianism in one place, strengthened it in all.

The fact that totalitarianism existed on the extreme right as well as the extreme left during the 1930s and 1940s made democracies such as Great Britain, France, and the United States feel doubly threatened; no matter which way they turned, there was a vicious dictator facing them. Yet because the totalitarian regimes were so interdependent, the collapse of one unexpectedly prepared the ground for the collapse of all the others. The defeat of the Nazi regime required the military might of the Soviet Union, and when World War II ended it seemed as if the Stalinist regime had been strengthened by its victory. Quite the opposite proved to be the case. Without Hitler's dictatorship, Stalin's was doomed; the Soviet Union went out of official existence in 1991, but it had already lost much of its totalitarian character even before Stalin's death in 1953 and had lost it completely by the time of Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1962. With no totalitarian enemies to sustain it, the Soviet system turned in on itself, producing more than its share of corruption, assaults on civil liberty, and meddling in the affairs of other countries, but little or none of the massive killing and sheer everyday terror of the Stalinist period. Although American foreign policy makers continued to emphasize the Soviet threat during the last two decades of the Soviet Union's existence, persuaded that once a society had become a totalitarian dictatorship it would always remain one, the leaders of those last few years, now all but forgotten, were in no position either to threaten the West or to contain the longings of their own people for a fresh start.

Totalitarianism came into existence when the countries attracted to it were undergoing rapid militarization and industrialization without many of the features of modernity already in place. Germany and Italy were among the last nations in Europe to become unified nation-states, and the borders of the Soviet Union were never fixed. In both Italy and the Soviet Union, some lived traditional lives not unlike the peasants of the feudal period while others embraced futurism in art and politics and worshipped the avant-garde. None of these countries had had much experience with liberal democracy and in one of them, Germany, the brief and unhappy life of the Weimar Republic only contributed to liberal democracy's destruction. Totalitarianism, in other words, offered the lure of quick journey into the modern world. Industrialization and militarization would take place at so fast a rate that liberal democracy would be put to shame.

Totalitarianism's inability to survive the conditions that brought it into existence has had the consequence of undermining its attractiveness to societies that are seeking the same goal of rapid modernization today. The most interesting case in this regard is China. Chinese leaders are determined to turn their country into a major industrial power and to exercise all the political influence that comes with that status. They have, in addition, no real interest in democracy; public opinion is carefully monitored, demonstrations against the regime are rarely permitted, the internet is controlled, and nothing like free elections take place. It is therefore quite striking that contemporary China, while certainly not democratic, cannot be described with any accuracy as totalitarian either. "Under

conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic transition," writes the political scientist Andrew Nathan about the years since the death of Mao, "China has made instead a transition instead from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regimes, and one that appears to be stable." To promote economic growth, its leaders have opened its economy to some degree to the world economy. The Army has become more professionalized and less politicized. Party and state are increasingly differentiated. Less overtly communist in its ideological coloration and leadership styles, China is less threatening to the United States; by assuming out of control American debt, the Chinese are in fact supporting Americans in their lifestyle rather than threatening the West militarily. As a result, far from viewing the Chinese as an aggressive power the U. S. ought never to appease, American politicians routinely overlook Chinese violations of human rights in order to keep the Chinese market open for American products. China's recent history suggests that neither liberal democracy nor totalitarianism are the only paths to modernity. In the world as it currently exists there are other alternatives clearly on the authoritarian side and the Chinese, as well as other societies from Qatar to Peru, are finding ways of relying upon them.

The evils of totalitarianism, in conclusion, were unique to a particular time and place. Policymakers and intellectuals inclined to see the specter of totalitarianism in the actions of today's terrorists and tyrants therefore ought to think a bit more about the historical comparisons they throw so loosely around. There exists enough political evil in the contemporary world to turn anyone's stomach, and people truly as rotten to their core as Hitler and Stalin can find themselves killing innocent others in the name of a cause. Many of them will use state power, if they can obtain hold of it. to oppress their own citizens, often in the cruelest of ways. If opportunities present themselves, some of them will seek to satisfy their ambitions to gain additional territory or interfere in the affairs of other states through whatever military force they can accumulate. But none of this bears even the slightest resemblance to what took place in Munich in 1938. No leader on the world stage today could ever create a political system and cruel and as expansionist as those that were fashioned by Hitler, Stalin and their henchmen; neither the military, economic, political, or cultural conditions of the contemporary world would permit it. And the idea that terrorists, whose resort to terror is generally fueled by the fact that they have no state to control, somehow bear direct comparison to the radical dictators of the 1930s, is especially divorced from reality. No state can and should stand by when its citizens are victimized by terror. The United States was attacked on September 11, 2001 and had every right to respond by identifying those responsible for the violence and using force to punish them and deter others from trying similar methods. But the Osama bin Laden killed in Pakistan by the Obama Administration was not a reincarnation of Hitler and Stalin. He did not live in a world in which totalitarianism could happen, His threat was real but it was a very different kind of threat than the one formulated by the Bush/Cheney approach to national security.

Evil at Home, Aggressive Abroad

One of the reasons for the power of the totalitarian analogy was that it provided those who favor strong military responses to argue that leaders who are evil at home will inevitably be expansionist abroad. A particularly striking example of this way of thinking is provided by the influential neo-conservative writer William Kristol. In his 2003 book *The War Over Iraq*, coauthored with the journalist Lawrence Kaplan, Kristol first made the case that Saddam had to be removed from power because of his domestic reign of terror; only then did he go on to discuss any threat he might pose to the United States. Saddam, Kristol and Kaplan wrote, "epitomizes – no less than Osama bin Laden – sheer malice. Here, after all, is a man who has imposed a violent, totalitarian regime on the people of Iraq... He is at once a tyrant, an aggressor and, in his own avowed objectives, a threat to civilization." Saddam tortures children. He relies on terror. He has engaged in "virtual genocidal." However awful

his actions against fellow Arabs, his campaigns against the non-Arab Kurds were even more savage. George H. Bush was in their view right to punish Saddam. But his failure to bring the matter to a close by toppling Saddam was a disastrous mistake.

The War over Iraq dismissed realists such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick or Henry Kissinger. out of hand. Kristol and Kaplan viewed the Arab world in particular as awash with petty tyrants. "The idea that the United States can 'do business' with any regime, no matter how odious and hostile to American principles, is both morally and strategically dubious," they wrote. In the early years of the twenty-first century, in their view, the United States was in an even better position to apply the lessons of cold war foreign policy than it had been during the cold war. Then, democracy had not yet proven its global appeal. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union we know how much people around the world want democracy for themselves and it is therefore America's obligation to help them achieve even if doing so requires military intervention to remove from power their own leaders who stand in the way. "A century of fighting fascist dictators in Germany, Italy, and Japan, communist dictators in Korea and Vietnam, neofascist dictators in the Balkans and Iraq, and for that matter a narco-trafficking dictator in Central America has alerted all but the most obdurate policymakers to the fact that the character of regimes – not diplomatic agreements or multilateral institutions – are the keys to peace and stability." If Kristol and Kaplan had their way, the United States would be in the business of replacing leaders of bad character with those who had passed some kind of moral intentions test. Following the logic of their analysis would take the United States back to the era of totalitarianism when Western leaders and foreign policy intellectuals, consumed by Manichean gloom, paid little or no attention to actual political developments in those societies with which they viewed themselves at war.

In an interview with the conservative magazine *National Review* shortly after their book was published, Kristol and Kaplan were asked by the journalist Kathryn Jean Lopez if there was any group that they ought in particular to try and convince of their arguments. "Liberals," they replied. "Not liberals at *The Nation* or *The American Prospect*, who can always be counted on to favor tyranny over anything that strengthens American power, however marginally. But liberals who supported the American interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo — humanists, in short. For if ever there was a humanitarian undertaking, it is the liberation of Iraq from a tyrant who has jailed, tortured, gassed, shot, and otherwise murdered tens of thousands of his own citizens." Actually, Kaplan and Kristol did not need to engage in all that much persuasion. When it came to seeing evil incarnate in Saddam's Iraq, a number of prominent liberals were already convinced.

During the early years of the cold war conservatives were the first to adopt Manichean language of good and evil and it was only after they had occupied that ground that liberals ultimately joined them. When it came to Saddam Hussein, the directional arrow went the other way. A thinker who played a particularly prominent role in applying the language of totalitarian evil to Saddam was the Iraqi dissident Kanan Makiya whose cosmopolitan outlook and humanistic sensibility marked him out as liberal. Writing with both the same sense of moral passion and theoretical acumen on display in Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Makiya's *Republic of Fear*, first published in 1989, drew numerous parallels between the evils once embodied in Stalin and Hitler with those on display in Baghdad. On the one hand, the Ba'th Party led by Saddam relied on the same kind of techniques – terror, gulags, secret police, control of the press – that had once characterized Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. On the other there was the personality of Saddam himself, "marked by this calculated, disciplined, and above all effortless resort to violence genuinely conceived to be in the service of more exalted aims. His language is therefore a reflection of his personality – as opposed to professional training – in which violence and vision, through party organization, got distilled into a volatile mixture."

As the case for waging war against Saddam built up, Makiya's writings had a major impact on conservatives such as Kristol and Kaplan. But they would have an even bigger impact among liberals,

especially the writer Paul Berman, one of the leading enthusiasts for war against Saddam. Berman took the Manichaeism implicit in Makiya's analysis and made it explicit. For the Iraqi dissident, Ba'thism, with its toxic combination of socialist ideology and Arab nationalism, was the problem. For this American liberal, Ba'thism was just one aspect of a far more insidious form of evil lose in the world: all forms of radical Islam. Berman described Islamic radicalism in the "wide arc from Afghanistan to Algeria, and beyond" in the following terms:

> Piety spread. Religious devotion deepened. Women hid behind their veils. And as piety, devotion, and patriarchy bloomed, in every country a new kind of politics came into flower. It was the politics of slaughter – slaughter for the sake of sacred devotion, slaughter conducted in a mood of spiritual loftiness, slaughter indistinguishable from charity, slaughter that led to suicide, slaughter for slaughter's sake. It was a flower of evil. And this new politics, in its bright green Islamic color, proved to be sturdy.

As this passage illustrates, Berman, who was as passionate as he was poetic, uses language in a fashion that Whittaker Chambers would have appreciated. One can read sections of *Witness* dealing with communist evil and sections of *Terror and Liberalism* dealing with Islamic evil and not have any idea which author was responsible for which passages. For the one writer as for the other, the enemy was not only evil in itself but a force that had developed an entirely new form of politics and possessed seemingly unlimited strength. *Terror and Liberalism* was an anguished cry from the heart, a work seamlessly blending historical and political analysis with personal confession and a coming sense of doom. His book was a *Witness* for the left.

If Paul Berman's case for war against Saddam sounded like Chambers, the one made by the Middle East specialist Kenneth Pollack was a liberal version of James Burnham. Burnham's late 1940s arguments for confronting communism had not been written with emotional fervor; his books were clinical, almost legalistic, in tone, as bullet points rather than flowery metaphors dominated his prose. The case he made, moreover, was not based on the Soviet Union's military prowess. Unlike later conservatives who would go out of their way to exaggerate the Soviet threat, Burnham had written that "technologically, the weakness in the Soviet economy and culture are reflected in the armed forces. With some exceptions, the quality of weapons and equipment is relatively low, and in many ways lines there are major shortages." But rather than take such weakness as an indication that perhaps the Russians were not so evil after all, Burnham argued quite the reverse. It is not the military capacity possessed by the Soviet Union that ought to worry us, he suggested, but its intentions. Guided by a messianic ideology, it is determined to dominate the world. "Unfortunately we do not get rid of cancer by calling it indigestion," Burnham wrote in one of his rare metaphorical moods. Disease has to be stopped early, before it metastasizes. Sitting around and waiting would only allow the Russians to develop the capabilities that would enable them to realize their evil aims.

In *The Threatening Storm*, a book whose Churchillian title evoked the earlier struggle against totalitarianism, Pollack, following in Burnham's footsteps, urged the West not to focus on what Saddam could do – his actual capabilities were not known to us – but instead on what he hoped to do. Saddam, Pollack pointed out, thought of himself as the latest in a line of Middle Eastern strong men such as Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin, and al-Mansur. We know what the man wants, Pollack wrote: he aims to transform Iraq into a global power, become the leader of the Muslim world, and lead the fight against Israel, all of which "would be disastrous for the United States." The fact that he cannot actually do these things does not make him less dangerous but more so. Relying on the work of an American psychoanalyst Jerrold Post (who, needless to say, had never sat Saddam down on a couch), Pollack concluded that while Saddam's regime did not threaten the United States directly the way Hitler's had done in the 1930s, Saddam himself "did share some of Hitler's most dangerous traits, and one of them was his propensity to take colossal risks." Since evil can never be trusted to act rationally, to protect itself the United States had to shut down him down now because it could never be sure what threats his

delusions of grandeur could pose in the future. Pollack was the strategist turned moralist just as Berman was the moralist become strategist. It was as if James Burnham had come back to life dressed in liberal rather than conservative clothing.

The war in Iraq thus returned Manichaeism to where it had been in the late 1940s – and brought with many of the same problems. Conservative Manichaeism in the early years of the cold war had transformed anti-communism from a geopolitical outlook to an obsessive mania, leaving the West far too insecure, defensive, and moralistic to recognize that, far from monolithic, communist regimes were politically divided in ways that could be effectively exploited. Communism is now gone but many examples of political evil remain. Liberals who opt for a Manichean way of dealing with them run the same risk of misunderstanding the nature of the political evil we face today as conservatives who once saw the Soviet Union as the moving force behind every event that took place in the world. Once again, in urging us to ignore politics and to place our focus on evil instead, they lead us in a self-defeating direction.

Consider the very case that did so much to inspire contemporary Manichaeism: the regime of Saddam Hussein. As early as the first Gulf War led by George H. W. Bush, Saddam had been viewed by prominent American strategists and thinkers as the essence of evil. Illustrative of them are the thoughts of Peter Galbraith, a diplomat long identified with the cause of the Kurdish people. "Hitler, when he took power in 1933, did not have a plan to exterminate all the Jews in Europe," Galbraith pointed out in 1988. "Evil begets evil." His words, along with those of writers such as Berman and Pollack, or for that matter Kristol and Kaplan, certainly had a ring of truth. Saddam's actions against the Kurds, most notoriously during the Anful massacre of 1987-88, really were genocidal. He liked using chemical weapons. He jailed and tortured his political opponents. The scale of Saddam's crimes, to be sure, never approached those of Hitler and Stalin. Under pressure from the rest of the world, moreover, he had softened some of its policies, abandoning, for example, his plans to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Yet as tyrants go he was a major one. What harm could come from refusing to coddle to him, as a Machiavellian might have urged, and instead not only seek to call as much public attention as possible to the evil he represented but to seek his overthrow by military force?

A good part of the harm came from the fact that leaders who oppress their own people, even in the most evil of ways, are not necessary threats to other people; the link between domestic ugliness and foreign policy aggressiveness, however appropriate for the totalitarian leaders of the 1930s and 1940s, rarely applies to the politically evil leaders of today. Against the Kurds, Saddam stopped at nothing. Against the Iranians he launched an aggressive war. But against the rest of the world he was no threat. We can trace both the military and diplomatic failures of the younger Bush administration's efforts in Iraq directly to its mistaken diagnosis of the kind of evil Saddam represented. The Bush administration was so persuaded that Saddam was a reincarnation of Hitler that it was never able to understand the differences between Sunni and Shia, the way the U. S. occupation of Iraq would be perceived by its residents, or the necessity of co-opting former members of the Saddam regime, no matter how complicit in evil they may have been, into the process of reconstructing Iraqi society. It was not a flawed military strategy that doomed the American efforts in Iraq but flawed ways of thinking about evil.

Saddam and his cruelty, to be sure, are gone, and there may come a day when the cost will be viewed as having been worth it. In the meantime the attempt by those to treat Saddam as evil incarnate persuaded the rest of the world that whatever tactics might be used to combat terrorism, relying on the United States to accomplish the job by itself was not the right way to go. About the only good thing that emerged out of the way the United States responded to the evils represented by Saddam was that mistakes so egregious are likely to be avoided in the future – unless, of course, Americans somehow find themselves persuaded that the very same way of thinking about evil that failed in Iraq should be

applied to its neighbor, and long-time enemy, Iran. Turn to the pages of neo-conservative journals of opinion, and one can see the case already being formulated. Once again a new Hitler is in the making, posing a direct threat to both the United States and its main Middle Eastern ally Israel, and unless steps are taken to depose this horribly evil man before he can achieve his global ambitions, once again the West will be sorry. The fact that Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is not all that powerful within Iran, and indeed may be on his way out, cannot be allowed to interfere with the comparison. The idea that bad leaders are expansionist leaders is just too ingrained in the way influential Americans think about foreign policy to go away.

Conclusion

Attracted to liberal humanitarianism, I took it as good news that in the aftermath of the 1960s an impressive number of Western thinkers turned back to the great thinkers who exposed the evils of totalitarianism in the years after World War II, including Arthur Koestler, George Orwell, Ignazio Silone, Raymond Aron, Czeslaw Milosz, Simone Weil, Lionel Trilling, and Leszek Kolakowski, all of whom, whether religious or not, knew that Satan still walked among us. Whether it was the so-called new philosophers in France or the liberals and socialists who became neo-conservatives in the United States and Great Britain, those writing under their guidance became the ones most sensitive to the political evils that erupted as the twentieth century came to an end. The best place to turn for an analysis of terrorism was to the books and articles they wrote primarily because these were the only places to turn; more idealistic liberals were too preoccupied with emphasizing the good times around to corner to pay attention to the evils around the bend. The same era that saw the publication of *The Black Book of Communism*, the 1997 accumulation of totalitarian horrors edited by the French historian Stéphane Courtois, also witnessed the publication of *The Black Book of Bosnia*, a 1996 compilation of articles from the circle writing for *The New Republic* documenting the monstrous deeds carried out in the Balkans. No one could read either black book and maintain that the writers who contributed to them failed to take the problem of evil seriously. On the contrary, genocide in Africa and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans could not let them forget that the dream of a better world holds out such a powerful attraction that some will become determined to kill everyone who stand in the way of its realization.

Unfortunately for the question of national seriousness, if the 1960s failed to offer firm guidance for dealing with political evil, neither, it turns out, did the 1990s. We have for the past two or more decades witnessed enough cases of terrorism to teach us that the age of moral clarity that followed the age of moral relativism has had problems of it own. We should have learned from the all-too-frequent failures of our responses to those horrors not to look back to the dark days of Nazi and Soviet aggression but to focus on causes that were local and contextual. It equally should have been apparent that if it was correct to avoid the kind of grand, sweeping thinking that seductively leads to utopia, it is also essential to avoid being tempted by grand, sweeping ideas about sin and its temptations. Little was gained when the moral thinness bequeathed to us from the 1960s gave birth to the unvarnished Manichaeism that emerged in the 1990s. Political evil, we should have learned, resists the strictures of orthodoxy as much as the blandishments of liberation. It does not occur because we are too permissive and it is not controlled when we become too strict. Koestler and those who thought like him, brilliant critics of one era, turned out to be unreliable guides for another.

If anything, yesterday's seriousness has become today's shallowness. Because so many thinkers of our time have tried to squeeze today's political evils into a moral and theoretical framework designed for yesterday's radical ones, the tough-minded awareness and deep appreciation of the darker side of human nature so prominent in the decade or two before the 1960s and 1970s has turned has turned rigid, sectarian, and at times downright pathetic in the decade or two after. It is not just that

those who once exposed tyranny on the left have become indifferent to, if not apologetic toward, reactionary regimes on the right: no ideology has a monopoly on double standards. The calcification of political thought runs much deeper than that. Political leaders whose speechifying insists that Americans are an exceptional people blessed by God to advance the cause of liberty rushed to copy the ugliest methods of the totalitarian states that once were their enemies. Thinkers who ask the West to appreciate the need for limits taught by the Judeo-Christian religions transformed themselves into advocates for endless war against the world's only other major monotheistic faith. Promoters of democracy and statehood for one people in the Middle East found all kinds of reasons to deny the same benefits to another people in the same region. Those who once called for moral clarity have become deeply implicated in moral confusion. The guidance they offer is more than wrong; when followed to its conclusions, as it was during the Bush years, it is dangerous.

Whenever an act of political evil dominates the headlines – and especially in the days and months after the September 11 attack on the United States – warnings to the effect that we are dealing with the problem of evil without the depth it deserves dominated the discussion. Influenced by the French man of letters Albert Camus, for example, the American political ethicist Jean Bethke Elshtain pursued this line of thought in her reflections on terrorism. Those with generous instincts toward the world and influenced by Western humanistic ideals, Elshtain argued, "have banished the world evil from their vocabularies. Evil refers to something so unreasonable, after all! Therefore it cannot exist." Elshtain singles out naïve religious leaders and left-wing academics as the focus of her sarcasm. They are, she rightly points out, reminiscent of those Reinhold Niebuhr called the "children of light," individuals so certain that human beings are good that they cannot imagine those who are bad.

Elshtain has no doubt that there is a better, a more serious, way to respond to events such as a devastating terrorist attack. We must be willing name evil when we see it, she argues, and we must not back off from confronting it, by military force if need be, unconstrained by false religious doctrines that emphasize the virtues of peacemaking. "He lived," recalls Marlow, the narrator of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* about the evil Mr. Kurtz, as "a shadow insatiable of splendid appearances, of frightful realities; a shadow darker than the shadow of the night, and draped nobly in the folds of gorgeous eloquence." It is that kind of somber confrontation with what Marlow calls "the heart of a conquering darkness" that thinkers such as Elshtain claim we need to regain if we are to understand and ultimately defeat the Osama bin Ladens of this world. Tough-mindedness is not close-mindedness. We owe evildoers nothing less than taking them at their word. They know how barbarous are their tactics and on that point we can all agree.

This way of thinking will no longer do. We are a decade from September 11, 2001 and what looked like serious reflection then seems increasingly hollow now. Naming evil for what it is ends rather than begins the analysis; it leaves nothing left to be discussed or decided. It is as if those who aspire to the mantle or seriousness know all they need to know; the only question in their minds is when and how we will respond as forcefully as we can, not whether we will. There is a direct step from this way of thinking about evil to the effort made by the Bush administration to launch a war against it without ever asking for any serious sacrifice from those presumably engaged in fighting it. Far from taking evil seriously, this way of thinking leads to frivolity by letting evil off the hook. Once the horror is acknowledged the thinking stops. When we react this way we persuade ourselves that the best thing we can do is to talk tough. Whether we accompany our tough talk with tough choices does not follow.

It *is* time to think in tough-minded ways about political evil. The hard part, the part that makes it tough, is that we have to stop relying on the lessons we thought we had learned from the evil of the times of totalitarianism. During those dreadful years in which Adolf Hitler ruled Nazi Germany and Joseph Stalin led the Soviet Union, moral outrage in the rest of the world was all too muted. Hitler had his defenders, especially on the far right, and many of his opponents were defeatists uncertain that there

was much we could do to stop him. Stalin, of course, was a communist, and too many leftists either turned their eyes away from his abuses or wrote what now seem cringing and cowardly excuses for his crimes. It is a credit to the intellectual level of political discourse in Western Europe and the United States in the postwar years that the apologetics and double standards so evident during the 1930s and 1940s went into remission. We saw evil at worked and we learned from out experience. We would neither turn our backs nor duck our heads. What we witnessed we were determined never again to excuse away.

Having grasped the full horror of what we tried to ignore during the era of the dictators, however, we then, as if to overcompensate for our neglect, became too easily persuaded that the evil of totalitarianism was about to make its reappearance in every conflict in which significant numbers of people were being killed. Never again was transformed into everywhere and always. Isolationism and pacifism were replaced by an uncritical acceptance of militarism. Once we may have neglected evil but now we became obsessed by it. In both cases the one thing we needed most in dealing with the problem of political evil – perspective – is the one thing we lacked.

It is time to get the balance right. Political evil, much as Hannah Arendt foresaw, is indeed the fundamental intellectual question of our time. But this does not mean that we must rush to war or throw up our hands in hopeless resignation. However good or bad human nature may be, we do have the capacity to learn from our mistakes. Say this much about political evil: it never seems to disappear. That is all the more reason for getting our response to it right the next time around. Being serious about the problem of political evil demands no less.

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

BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

An International Conference

Paris, 3-4 November 2011

RELIGION AND VALUES: TOWARDS A COMMON RELIGIOUS MARKET?

a provisional draft by

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The common perception of religion in the West as well as in the Middle East is based on the paradigm of the "clash/dialogue" of civilizations: there are two different territorialized civilizations (Islam and the "West" whether the latter is supposedly "Christian", secular or both), defined by two different cultures which are the product of two different religions or are embedded in them. According to this perception, even if, in the West, the secularization process might have reduced the scope of religion conceived as a faith associated with a practice, the ensuing secularized space remains nevertheless profoundly Christian, because, in this case, religion simply was turned into culture. These civilizations are territorialized and the displacements of populations on both sides are understood under the paradigms of colonialism (French in Algeria), migrations or diasporas, which means that a population that migrates is supposed to remain definitively linked with its place of origin and to bring its own pristine culture in the new host country. History is revisited along this parallel axis: after centuries of marches forward and retreats (Islamic conquests, Crusades, Reconquista, the two sieges of Vienna by the Ottomans), until a sudden dissymmetry in industrial development and rationalization of the State opened the door for the Western colonial encroachments on the Middle East, initiating an era of Western superiority that the wave of nationalism and Islamism from the mid of the XIX th century has not really been able to revert. Thus hotly debated contemporary issues, like the Muslim labor migrations to the West, or the post 9/11 wave of radical Islamic terrorism are seen as being part and parcels of a 15 centuries long struggle and divide. The contemporary debate on multiculturalism is inscribed in a very long History.

But in fact in this apparent symmetry between two competing civilizations there is a first obvious flaw: if Middle east is defined as Muslim or Islamic, both in terms of religion and in terms of culture (automatically putting the Middle Eastern Christians in the category of a minority), the definition of what the West stands for is more complex, or more ambivalent: Is the trademark of the West first Christianity as a religion or secularism? Of course this implies an in-depth debate on what is secularism: rejection of religion from the public space (as "laïcité" in France) or just a "cold" religion turned into a dominant culture, which does not presupposes faith nor religious practices; a more sophisticated approached, to be found for instance in marcel Gauchet's writings, is to consider Christianity as the "religion of the coming out of religion", implying that secularism in its different forms is a product of a configuration (sacralization of the State) unique to Christianity. The implicit conclusion would be to consider that secularism is a product of Christianity while Islam has been unable to produce anything comparable. Making Christianity a prerequisite for a true process of secularization means that Islam cannot be secularized without a previous theological reformation. Hence the issue of setting up a "good" Islam, reformed, liberal feminist, and, why not, gay friendly, is pushed a prerequisite for democratization. The supposed sequence would be: development of a liberal Islam, leading to secularization to the public sphere, making thus possible the establishment of a true democracy.

But this approach seems to be both too theoretical and too close to "clichés" on the clash of civilizations, because it ignores the concrete practices and political alignments of the religious actors, either in the West, or in the Middle East. As far as Europe is concerned, even if both canon law and philosophical debates might have provided some intellectual tools to conceptualize secularization, the strong opposition (and persistent lament about it) by the Catholic Church of different forms of secularization (from Gallicanism and Josefism to separation of Church and State (syllabus of 1864) shows that the relationship is more

conflictual and does not allow to speak of The West as an homogeneous cultural and religious entity. Nevertheless such homogeneity is automatically assigned to the Middle East. And, as we shall see, the actual attitude of Muslim societies towards the process of democratization is not based on a theological quest about "what does the Koran say?", but on a recasting of religious norms and values in a de facto secularized public sphere, even if the dominant narrative is still religious.

The problem is that the premises of the clash of civilizations are shared by many intellectuals and experts, but also by the Western public opinion and policy makers, who all stress the need for a theological reform, deemed ever unavoidable or, for some, as impossible. For instance, policies devised by western government to deal with immigration and Muslim countries are based on these premises too: multi-culturalism, integration, promoting democratization and good governance, even the protection of the Middle Eastern Christians, all these issues are dealt with as if Christianity was a trademark of the West. Meanwhile, the bulk of the Middle East Muslim ulamas, as well as the governments, deal with their migrants as if they were part of a diaspora: Morocco, Algeria, Turkey try to keep a hold on Islamic institutions in the West, Al Azhar University in Cairo con siders itself, and is often considered, as the expression of a main stream Islam that could establish norms for any European Muslim. The dialogue of civilization process, set up to counter the "clash of civilizations" enforces in fact the idea that the Mediterranean is divided between a Western Christian side and an Eastern Muslim entity. We intend to contend here that the premises of this perception are being challenged by the changes in religiosity affecting both religion, in the context of globalization, but that neither western or eastern policy makers as well as opinion makers did grasp the extend of the change. There is a definitive gap between perception and social changes.

This perception supposes that the close connection between territory, religion and culture is still at work. The European states forged tools to integrate Muslim migrants by starting from these premises.

These tools took the forms of two models of policy, both officially aiming at insuring the integration of the second generation of Muslim migrants: the mostly French assimilationist model, and the Northern European "multi-culturalist" model. Although apparently in total contradiction, they in fact share the same premise: there is a permanent connection between religion and culture. In the assimilationist model, new citizens should join a new national secular political culture, and thus had to give up their faith or to keep it in the private: to join a new culture is to join a new definition of religion and to embrace a secularism that has explicitly been constructed against religion (*laïcité*). In the multiculturalist model, "religion" is perceived as being permanently linked with a pristine culture and thus both terms (religion and culture) are used as almost synonymous: "Muslim" tend to be used as a neo-ethnic term and not as a reference to an individual faith (hence the head-lines on the "Muslim riots" in France suburbs). I will argue that both models are in fact modern transcription of the old principle "cujus regio-ejus religio".

For the French model, assimilation is conditioned by a prerequisite: secularization. In a word there could be integration only if religion is restricted to the private sphere. *Laïcité* is more or less expressed as the official "religion": instead of being cast merely in terms of neutrality (which is both the letter and the spirit of the Law) it is too often presented as a system of positive values which supersedes the religions. Assimilation here has something to do with the process of conversion, and the State may have the right to check the conformity with the model (see for instance the decision of the Conseil d'Etat to confirm the denial of citizenship to a *burqa*-wearing Moroccan woman). Hence *laïcité* appears more as a

state ideology, or at least as a national political culture, than as just a set of the rules of the game. It is implicitly cast as some sort of an "official" religion. I don't want to make a too far-fetched comparison, but it has something to with the forced conversions imposed on new subjects (Spain after Granada).

Conversely for the multi-culturalist model, the second generations of immigrants should be allowed, and even encouraged, to stick with their pristine culture: that of the country of origin. But the group is defined as a "minority", where religious and ethnic patterns are lumped together. Multi-culturalism is not "métissage" because it does not suppose a synthesis, a quest for a higher identity that could subsume the pristine identities, beyond the purely legal definition of citizenship. The model which makes a come-back here is the ottoman model of the *millet*: it is quite logical to hear proposals to integrate some part of the *sharia* into a personal status code that could be managed through religious courts of arbitration (as the Archbishop of Canterbury proposed last year). Moreover, to use a religious criterion to define the minority means that symmetrically the dominant group is also defined by its religion, even if it is a secularized form of that religion. We still are in the "cujus regio ejus religio". It is not by chance that Prime Minister Tony Blair waited to leave Downing Street before announcing his conversion to Catholicism.

In this sense the policy of the European states is a policy of re-territorialisation, instead of acknowledging the contemporary forms of mobilities (religious, ethnic, geographic or even occupational mobilities): territorializing the second generation of migrants, either by assimilation or by granting them a status of minority, and re-territorializing the populations of the Southern shores of the Mediterranean to prevent them to move towards the north. This has been the thread-line since the launching of the Barcelona process. To sum up:
-preventing new migrations by developing the southern Mediterranean tier.
-integrating Muslims settled in Europe through a policy of some sort of affirmative action.
-defusing political radicalism by fostering peace between Israel and the Palestinians (which means that European Muslims are still perceived as constructing their political identity as foreign Middle Eastern actors).
-preventing religious radicalization through a "dialogue with Islam". And that too often means negotiating with the ruling regimes from the Middle East. This is tantamount to put in place a policy of reciprocal capitulations: the Europeans are supposed to protect the Christian Middle Eastern minorities (they failed, but feel guilty, see for instance the debate on the Armenian genocide), while Muslim states speak in the name of a supposedly Muslim diaspora in Europe (as some Arab countries tried to do during the Danish cartoons affair). The model of the late ottoman "*millet*" paradigm is back or most exactly never ceased to be at the core of the definition of a trans-Mediterranean peaceful co-existence.

The whole approach of the Mediterranean is still based on geo-strategic consideration of security, more than in the acknowledgement of an in-depth tectonic change.

What is the problem with these models? My point is not to advocate an idealist new model. The problem is that these paradigms just don't work. The main trends that are at work around the Mediterranean need new models of understanding.

I will sum-up the main reasons why the old paradigms don't work:
1) Religions are more and more disconnected from the cultures in which they were embedded. Immigration and secularization have separated cultural and religious markers. Many Muslims consider nowadays that religious norms (for instance *hallal* food) could be applied in a

western cultural context (hallal fast-food). Veil wearing is expressed more in terms of personal choice and freedom than as a wish to perpetuate a traditional culture. Fundamentalisms are both a consequence and a factor of deculturation: they shun and even fight the surrounding traditional cultures seen more as pagan than profane.
2) To identify a religion with an ethnic culture is to ascribe to each believer a culture and/or an ethnic identity that he or she does not necessarily feel comfortable with. Conversely it supposes that any member of an ethnic community belongs to a faith, while he or she may in fact reject or just ignore it. To identify religion and culture runs against true religious freedom, which supposes also the right not to believe, and the right to change religion. Multiculturalism has a problem to understand conversions, at a time when the issue of apostasy is becoming the cornerstone of the Europeanization of Islam.

Religions express themselves more and more as "faith communities" instead of established churches or ethno-national groups (with the exception of the Christian Eastern orthodoxies). It is not by chance that traditional middle-eastern Christian churches, embedded in centuries old cultures, are slowly disappearing, while protestant evangelicalism is making a breakthrough among Muslim societies, in North Africa as well as in the immigration. **Symmetrically**, Islamic fundamentalist movements in Europe (including radical ones) are full of converts. The culturally embedded religions are in crisis: the Catholic Church, the traditional forms of Islam, liberal Lutheran Protestantism, Christian orthodoxies, eastern Christian churches. They are challenged by evangelicalism, salafisme, and neo-Sufism.
3) To identify religion and culture means also to identify European Muslim citizens as a "middle eastern diaspora », and thus to import the Middle Eastern conflicts into the European space, precisely at a time when this importation is defined as a source of potential tensions. I have no time to deal with that, but clearly the **supposed** identification of second generation Muslims to the Palestinians ***as a consequence of*** watching Al-Jazeera in Arabic has been largely exaggerated (no youngster who participated in the 2005 riots in France did wave a Palestinian flag, and if AJ decided to create a channel in English, it is precisely because few European Muslims are able to watch it in Arabic; -by the way the English channel is **far** more moderate precisely because it aims at a non Middle eastern audience).
4) the recent events in the Middle east show the emergence of a post-islamist generation. If one looks at those involved in the uprisings, it is clear that we are dealing with a post-Islamist generation. For them, the great revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s are ancient history, their parents' affair. This new generation isn't interested in ideology: their slogans are pragmatic and concrete - "go now!", "*erhal*". Unlike their predecessors in Algeria in the 1980s, they make no appeal to Islam; rather, they are rejecting corrupt dictatorships and calling for democracy. This is not to say that the demonstrators are secular, but they are operating in a secular political space, and they do not see in Islam an ideology capable of creating a better world. And the same goes for other ideologies: they are nationalist (look at all the flag-waving) without advocating nationalism. Particularly striking is the abandonment of conspiracy theories: the United States and Israel (or France in Tunisia) is no longer identified as the cause of all the misery in the Arab world. The slogans of pan-Arabism have largely been absent too, even if the copycat effect which brought Egyptians and Yemenis into the streets following the events in Tunis shows that the "Arab world" is a political reality. This generation is pluralist, undoubtedly because it is also individualist. Sociological studies show that it is better educated than previous generations, better informed, often with access to modern means of communication that allow individuals to connect with one another without the mediation of political parties (which in any case are banned). These young people know that Islamist regimes have become dictatorships: neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia holds any

fascination for them. Indeed, those who have been demonstrating in Egypt are the same people who came onto the streets to oppose Ahmedinejad in 2009.

The blurring of the religious borders is also illustrated by the wave of multi-direction conversions: there has been a wave of conversion to Islam among young Europeans, but also a wave of conversions to Christianity among Muslims, in Europe as well as in North Africa and the Middle East. These conversions are possible because, beyond the religious differences, there has been a growing conjunction on "religiosity", that is the way a believer experiences his or her faith. This quest is now individual, based on the search of personal "realization", and is done in a growing "common religious market" where the products are easily accessible (TV religious channels, internet, travels) and more and more shaped along the same patterns of marketing: for instance the new Islamic TV preachers, like the Egyptian Amr Khaled) borrow not only technics but also values and psychology from the Evangelicalist TV preachers.

Both pressures on the Muslim communities in Western Europe and the endeavours of their members to find some sort of "compatibility" (not necessarily compromise) between their religious practices and the dominant paradigm of what a religion is or should be led to what I called the "formatting" of Islam, that we could sum-up according to the following points:
The consequence of this formatting, both through the personal practices of the believers and through state pressure and action, is to put Islam within the same paradigm as the other religions. What is the new shared "format" that Islam is now more and more sharing with the other religions in the West? There are three dimensions to it:

– a *convergence of religiosities*, in other words, defining faith and the believer's relationship to his/her religion, often expressed in terms of a spiritual quest. The market offers a range of products to fulfil one same demand. This demand thus tends to be standardized by the market which reflects the consumers' image of what they are supposed to be. Nowadays, religion is no longer defined by anthropologists or philosophers, and less and less by the "professionals" – clerics or preachers – who are chasing after the convert/customer. Individual conversions often illustrate this itinerant, nomadic even eclectic characteristic of the new believer.

– A *convergence of definition*: the notion of "religion" becomes a normative paradigm with no specific content. It is the designation of any system as a religion, without taking account of its content, which makes it a religion: these days, it is the courts that decide in the event of dispute, even though they claim not to deal with matters of theology. Even, and perhaps especially, in countries where there is a strict division between religion and power (France, the USA) which prohibits the state from defining what a religion is, it is still necessary to say who is entitled to the label of a "religion", even if it is only to permit religious freedom (exemption from tax, chaplaincy, definition of places of worship, dietary exemptions, religious holidays etc.). Democratization and human rights theory tend to standardize the definition of religion (like that of a minority), in order to treat everyone equally. Secularism thus creates religion since, in order to maintain it at a distance, it must assign religion a place and therefore define it as a "pure religion".[a] Formatting also aims to standardize the manifestation of religion in the public sphere: "religious practice" is thus overseen, from the wearing of the

a See Olivier Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, Columbia University Press, 2007.

headscarf by Muslim women to the erection of an *eruv* (a thread that turns a neighbourhood into a the private sphere for Shabbat) around an orthodox Jewish neighbourhood, the right (or prohibition) to smoke hashish (a demand by the Rastafarians in the United States, which was rejected) or to drink wine (mass in prohibitionist countries) as part of religious practice.

-*an institutional convergence* between religions: the figure of the "priest" or of the "minister" tends to define all religious practitioners or professionals; *ulama* (religious scholars) become theologians, imams and rabbis "parish" leaders. In the name of equality between believers, the law, courts and also institutions tend to format all religions in the same way. For example, in extending the principle of chaplaincy to Islam, the army and the prison authorities reinforce the institutional alignment of Islam with Christianity. In this sense we can speak of the "churchification" of religions by courts and states.

But these changes did not concern only Muslims living in the West. The process of "self-service" (taking in a given religion what fits one's needs and only that), of hybridation (borrowing practices, technics –like Zen meditation-, forms of spirituality from other religions or even other domains, like marketing), juxtaposing very secular attitudes and practices (night-clubs, heavy metal music) with an affirmation of being a true believer, in a word everything linked with the process of individualization of faith contribute precisely to make compatible the return to Islam (on the model of Christian born again) and the process of democratization. Hence some very visible patterns, as the rejection of previous generations' cultural Islam by the younger generation (which might take the form of an adhesion to fundamentalist norms, as in salafism), may paradoxically work in favour of the disconnection of the public sphere and religion. It is not theological reformation that leads to democratization, but the individualization of faith, whatever the form it could take.

The problem is that Europe did not take into account these changes, and still refers to an outdated perception of what Islam as a "culture" could mean, instead of drawing the consequences of the disconnect between religion and culture.

Instead of trying to pursue an elusive multi-culturalism or to impose an assimilation based on a wrong perception of its "common values", Europe should stick to its principles:

- To deal with religions as « mere » religions, not as the expression of cultures or ethnic group. To recognize the faith communities on the basis of an individual and free choice, to promote freedom of religion by treating equally all religions, but only as religions.
- Ethno-linguistic minorities should not be confused with faith communities. Both exist in the EU, but each kind of group should be dealt with different legal paradigms: freedom of religion is not the same thing as minority rights; although it could of course overlap (it is why for instance I am not happy with the term "islamophobia"). A faith is a choice, a racial or ethnic identity is, at least at the beginning, a given fact or an appellation bestowed from outside. The confusion between both does jeopardize the way citizenship and personal freedom have been constructed as the basic principles of political life.

Another last point is that the paradigms I am criticizing don't reflect the new patterns of mobility and settlements around the Mediterranean. The bulk of migrations are coming from beyond the Mediterranean. We are no more at a time of a massive labour migration stemming from the Mediterranean countries. Fluxes are more fluid, circulation goes also in both directions: elderly Europeans are settling in Tunisia and Turkey for retirement, the jet-set has its fashionable quarters in Morocco. Many second generation graduates or entrepreneurs are looking for job opportunity or are investing in business and companies which precisely found an opportunity in playing on trans-Mediterranean joint-ventures (real-estate, travel agencies, import-export, medical activities, education, holydays resorts etc.). The increasing number of people with dual citizenship makes easier these new patterns of circulation. The informal or grey economy is also by definition playing on transnational networks which go far beyond family ties and "ethnic business"

Migrations from the Mediterranean areas are more flexible, temporary and reversible (I am not referring here to the new migrations coming from China, Iraq, Afghanistan or sub-sahelian Africa). In fact we should speak more of labour mobility or even of professional mobility than of labour migration: **some** educated young Moroccans could have a French passport, take a job in London, then go back to Morocco to open a business, or fly to Abu-Dhabi. Instead, governments try to fix the population: restrictions on visa push people to move less, but also to stay when they are in the West, illegally or legally, while they could move in an easier way if they felt more secure on their administrative status. The social status of many from the second generations has improved and is slowly changing the matrimonial patterns. The old pattern (marrying a cousin from the *bled* in order to bring new family members into Europe) is not dead but increasingly replaced by a mobility of young graduates or young entrepreneurs. But students and relatives are treated too often as potential immigrants. The fact that a country like Turkey is almost no more exporting labour power is not taken into consideration. The process of territorialisation has been unable to stop illegal migrations while thwarting many positive dynamics for a mutual development. But once again this endeavour to territorialize the populations is a legacy of the territorial statist nation-state.

The process of the European construction runs against the paradigm of the nation state and is more in tune with contemporary forms of mobility. Often mocked and despised, the evolutive and elusive European Union, where flexibility and bureaucracy make strange but already mature bed-fellows, could perfectly deal with our Mediterranean complexity. Instead of aping the nation-state or dreaming of past empires, Europe could look positively as its own incompletion, a better tool to manage fluxes, de-territorialization and globalization. Europe has inaugurated a new relationship with territorialisation: there are different levels (the 27's, Schengen, euro-zone) and a virtual permanent expansion, because of its inability to define a real border. As we saw this does not mean an open-space: borders have too many often been replaced by internal fences, walls and ghettos, but at least there is a juxtaposition of different spaces.

Europe is a self defining process with no ideological, cultural or religious pre-requisite: and this is good news! The debate on the European values is vitiated from the beginning: there could be no definition of European values except in terms of a formal legal system (freedom, democracy, state of law). If we try to define positive values and a European culture, we have three choices: a Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church (joined by some others), a come back to a "Christian Europe" with norms in place of spirituality, or resettling

the Vatican somewhere between Jerusalem and Mecca (but that's still the Mediterranean !).
We have no choice than to accept pluralism.

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

BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

An International Conference

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SOCIETAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL RESPONSES IN EURO-MED RELATIONS

a draft paper by

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With the support of

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DRAFT- NOT TO BE QUOTED

Introduction

Since long, the European Union (EU) has developed with North Africa an important and comprehensive relations in the framework of the various initiatives it has launched and undertaken in the Mediterranean. In the context of EU external relations, the policy toward the Mediterranean, that is the Euro-Mediterranean policy, has a prominent role. As part of EU neighbourhood, North Africa is not only an important commercial and economic partner, but also a relevant strategic factor.

In the past fifteen years, the North African countries, along those in the Levant, have undergone deep changes in their societies. These changes, because of immigration, are affecting European societies as well. What is the impact of these changes on the important EU-North Africa political relationship we have just hinted at? How are old and new EU policy responses fitting with changes in North African societies?

In the framework of the IAI study project "The Mediterranean Microcosm in the Broader Relationship Between the West and the Arab-Muslim World", other papers have analysed key aspects of North African societal change. This paper takes into consideration the EU political initiatives and responses towards North Africa and the Mediterranean with a view to evaluating the interaction between social change stemming from North Africa and policy responses in the Euro-Med framework.

Let's briefly outline these European/EU responses and initiatives towards the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the 1990s, in their initial stage, EU policies are carried on in an optimistic perspective: the EU believes that international and developmental cooperation with South-eastern Mediterranean governments will allow for changes in the regimes' authoritarian nature and bring about reforms and democratisation in the region. Then, the evolution and reinforcement of Islamism, the use of terrorism by Islamist groups and the poor understanding of differentiations between Islamist trends make Europe see obstacles to democratization less in the authoritarian nature of incumbent regimes than in Islamism. This convinces Europe, in a shift from optimism to pessimism, to lend growing support to the authoritarian regimes, although with hesitations and reservations. The latter are dropped with 9/11 events, which turn support to democracy into sheer rhetoric and strengthen, in contrast, support to existing authoritarian regimes in a perspective of growing inter-state security-oriented cooperation. At the end of the 2000s, the widespread crisis of Arab authoritarian regimes ("Arab Spring") - arisen just in the Mediterranean area and among the partners of the EU Mediterranean policies - has suddenly shed vivid light on the contradiction of the EU and its members states between the democratic rhetoric left over by previous optimism and the support actually provided to authoritarian yet allied North African regimes. This failure in the EU Euro-Mediterranean policy, along the political and institutional weakening of the EU in the framework of increasing re-nationalization trends, makes today's European perceptions of change in relations with North Africa, the Mediterranean and the whole Arab World rather uncertain and problematic, with strong implications on policy-making.

In keeping with this outline, the first section of the paper illustrates the EU Mediterranean policy of democracy support and its interaction with social, cultural, human factors and societal change - that is the EU Mediterranean policy's optimistic stage. The second section takes into consideration the impact of Islamism and cultural factors on the EU policy between promotion of democracy and promotion of stability, that is the emergence of pessimism in the EU approach to the Mediterranean. The third section regards the turn into unreserved pessimism of this policy and delves into the consequences of 9/11 and the impact of immigration issues on Euro-Mediterranean politics and relations. The concluding section considers the "Arab Spring" perspective and draws several conclusions.

1. Democracy and societal change in Euro-Med relations

This section considers the EU policy's objectives of democratisation and political reform in its Mediterranean neighbourhodd, more in particular in the field of social, cultural and human relations. It illustrates the policies pursued by the EU in this respect and the role of the actors involved. It concludes by commenting on the interaction and mutual impacts between EU policy, civil societies and societal change in North African societies.

The objectives of EU policies towards the Mediterranean - The broad objective of the EU foreign policy is the expansion of democracy, which is pursued by the transposition of EU's experience and values of democratisation, development and integration among its members states. This overall approach underpins not only EU foreign policy but also its security policies, as the expansion of democracy in neighbouring areas and the world is seen s a channel to security. The nexus between democracy and security is the cornerstone of the EU Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). With regard to the Mediterranean, both the EU foreign policy's objectives of political reform and the nexus between reform and security in the neighbourhood have been clearly set out in the 2003 document stating principles and objectives of the EU security policy: "Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations."[1].

This approach, while loosely stemming from the concept of the EU as a civilian power, as worked out during the Cold War period after Prof. François Duchêne, has been more definitely articulated at the end of the Cold War, when the EU had to decide what to do with respect to its Central-eastern neighbours. Having decided to include these countries, so as to avoid their instability to put EU's political and economic "acquis" at risk, the conditions set out for them to join the EU - the 1993 principles of Copenhagen – constitute also the rationale of the EU CFSP: "Membership requires ... stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy ...". The enlargement has been, first of all, a policy aimed at promoting democracy.

This policy obviously reflects in the EU Mediterranean policies as well, that is the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-EMP (the most organic Euro-Mediterranean policy among those initiated by the EU), the ongoing European Neighbourhood Policy-ENP (which in 2004 chiefly replaced the EMP bilateral dimension) and, at least in principle, the 2008 Union for the Mediterranean-UfM (which is expected to fully replace the EMP). In fact, all EU Mediterranean policies stress democracy as a priority the Euro-Mediterranean partners are supposed to share and willing to achieve. As for Central-eastern Europe, the EU policy toward the Mediterranean is fundamentally a policy to promote political reform and democracy with a view to strengthening European security.

The promotion of political reform and democracy being at the helm of the EU Mediterranean policy, the policies of economic development and social, cultural and human cooperation implemented in its framework are meant to contribute to achieve this goal, along policies more directly aimed at implementing political reform. Modernisation, welfare, and the societal change the latter are expected to generate, are regarded as inherent agents of democratic political change as well. It is mostly in this perspective that the third "pillar" of the Barcelona Declaration[2] takes care of promoting "Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures & exchanges between civil societies". The third pillar contemplates common action to ensure dialogue and respect between cultures and religions; develop the role of the mass media; support the development of human resources; facilitate human

[1] *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003 (http://europa.eu).
[2] trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf

exchanges; improve health and well-being; stimulate social development; foster civil society and exchanges between young people; regulate migration and take care of migrants.

Beside common action to foster cooperation with partners in the social, cultural and human dimension, the Barcelona Declaration's third pillar (and what has been added to it over time) contemplates also common action to suppress social scourges, namely illegal immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and corruption, which are equally connected to societal change. This aspect of the third pillar, rather marginal in the first optimistic stage of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, has subsequently acquired primary importance, as a consequence of the strategic change entailed by 9/11 events and in parallel with the institutional evolution in the EU, in which a fourth pillar on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has been introduced and a full-fledged policy bringing together justice, security and freedom has consequently been evolved in the Union as well as its external relations, that is also in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Set out in 1995, this "third pillar" agenda of Euro-Med cooperation has remained substantially the same, albeit with several remarkable additions, such as the integration of the concept of "gender" in the last Work Programme approved by the 2005 EMP Summit. Today, after the EMP has been dismantled and the EU financial instrument reformed (from MEDA to the ENPI-European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument), existing programmes of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the social, cultural and human dimension are implemented essentially in the framework of the regional ENP policies or mainstreamed in the bilateral ENP action programmes.

In sum, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is in general directed at achieving domestic political reform in the South-eastern Mediterranean countries. In this perspective, societal, cultural and human change are supported (and its negative outcomes suppressed) as factors of political change.

The role of civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean policy – To support social, cultural and human factors as channels to political reform, the EU employs top-down and bottom-up approaches. The EMP being an official organisation, the top-down approach leverages intergovernmental relations and is of primary importance. The European Commission and national governments promote ministerial conferences having social and cultural agendas. These conferences, in general, adopt non-binding frameworks of action, which individual governments then develop to different degrees in their respective countries. For example, there have been a first "Euro-Med Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society" in Istanbul on 14-15 November 2006 and a second one in Marrakesh on 11-12 November 2009. Furthermore, the ENP Action plans embed numerous measures and agendas regarding social, cultural and human affairs.

However, support to civil society, that is the bottom-up approach, is of particular significance, as clearly stated by the Barcelona Declaration:

> [The EMP Partners] recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples;

The importance the EU assigns to civil society stems from the nexus it sees between the latter and its democracy promotion agenda. In fact, in the Western and European nations, a vibrant civil society is regularly perceived as an essential condition for democracy to flourish.

The nexus between civil society and democracy was significantly tested in the experience made in the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe), in particular with regard to its "human dimension":[3] The end of Communism and the emergence of democracy in Central-eastern

[3] On the transposition of the CSCE "human dimension" in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean-CSCM project (introduced in 1990 by Spain and Italy and then not implemented) see Laura Guazzone,

European countries has been ascribed to a significant extent to the rise of civil societies in those countries and the support they received from the West, as in the case of Solidarność. When. with the end of the Cold War, the West's security focus shifted to the "arc of crisis" stretching from Morocco to Central Asia and, more in general, to Europe's southern approaches,[4] the need to promote political reform shifted to these southern areas as well. In this perspective, the EU transposed the nexus between civil society and democracy to the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the conclusions about the nexus between civil society actors (CSAs) and democracy drawn by political leaders, practitioners and public opinion alike, were also the conclusions of the key research work carried out by Augustus Norton and his colleagues and published in the well-known two volumes on civil society in the Middle East and North Africa, whose policy brief is ultimately that, in order to promote democracy in these regions, their civil societies have to be strengthened.[5] As aptly noted by Annette Jünemann, the strategy of democratisation broadly espoused in Europe is "based on the assumption that there is a causality between civil society [and] democratization."[6].

Which civil society is the EU supporting? While a minor part of EU funding is extended to non-EU CSAs and NGOs based in the partner countries, most funding is assigned to support networks of both non-EU and EU NGOs. Direct support to non-EU NGOs is extended, most of all, in the framework of the EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights). Funding to joint non-EU and EU networks is extended in the framework of programmes of "decentralized cooperation",[7] managed by the ENP (and in some cases even by EIDHR).[8] A list of these programmes and relative details is shown in the tables attached to the paper (tables 1 and 2).

Networking and the bottom-up model it introduces in the picture are innovative approaches[9]. Euro-Med cooperation by means of networks is considered definitely more effective than inter-governmental relations when it comes to channel values and drive societal and political change. It is also worth noting that European CSAs/NGOs' perceive their role of channels to democracy as more relevant than the role of official European actors. The NGOs perceive themselves as "normative and value-laden" actors[10], thus destined to exert a decisive impact on political as well as societal change

"La cooperazione socio-culturale nella regione euro-mediterranea: presupposti e realizzazioni", in Fulvio Attinà et alii, *L'Italia tra Europa e Mediterraneo: il bivio che non c'è più*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998, pp. 143-158.

[4] George Joffe, "Europe Security and the New Arc of Crisis: Paper 1", pp. 53-68 and Curt Gasteyger, "Europe Security and the New Arc of Crisis: Paper 2", pp. 69-81, in IISS, *New Dimensions in International Security, Part 1*, Adelphi Papers No 265, Winter 1991-92, Brassey, London.

[5] Augustus R. Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vol. 2, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995; the other reference book is J. Schwedler, *Towards Civil Society in the Middle East?*, Boulder (Co), London, Lynne Rienner, 1995.

[6] Annette Jünemann, "The EuroMed Civil Forum: 'Critical Watchdog' and Intercultural Mediator", in Stefania Panebianco (ed.), *A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity*, Frank Cass, London & Portoland (Or), 2003, pp. 84-107. She quotes John P. Entelis: "Civil Society and the Authoritarian temptation in Algerian Politics. Islamic Democracy Versus the Centralized State", in Augustus R. Norton (ed.), *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 45-86.

[7] Decentralized cooperation, that is cooperation among non-governmental and non-official actors, was activated by the EU even before the Barcelona process, in relations with Central-eastern European countries and in the New Mediterranean Policy (in which decentralized cooperation was already well articulated), see Franco Pagani, "La cooperazione decentrata come strumento del Partenariato euro-mediterraneo", in Fulvio Attinà et alii, *op.cit.*, pp.159-175

[8] See European Commission, External Relations, *EIDHR, Strategy Paper 2011-2013*, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010, which plans actions and allocates funds to objectives and areas. It allocates a total of € 165.4 million to civil society (the indicative share of the Middle East being 30%); http:// ec.europa/external_relations/human_rights/index_en.htm.

[9] Stefania Panebianco, "The EMP's Innovative Dimension of a Cultural Dialogue: Prospects and Challenges", in F. Attinà and S. Stavridis (eds.), *The Barcelona process and Euro-Mediterranean Issues from Stuttgart to Marseille*, Giuffrè, Milano, 2001, pp. 99.120.

[10] Annette Jünemann, *op. cit.*, who quotes R. Mabro, "Civil Society in the History of Ideas and in European History", in Arab Thought Forum/Bruno Kreisky Forum, *The Role of NGOs in the Development of Civil Society: Europe and the Arab Countries*, Amman/Vienna, 1999, pp. 29-48.

in the EU partner countries and provide a larger and more genuine contribution to political reform than the EU or governments.

Societal change and EU Mediterranean policy - So far we have taken into consideration and illustrated the EU policy towards the Mediterranean and its objectives. Let's now turn to the interaction between this policy and societal change in North Africa.

How has North African and Arab Mediterranean civil society reacted to EU policy of decentralized cooperation and networking? What has been the outcome of the EMP's bottom up policy we have just talked about? The outcome has been obviously uneven; in any case, rather modest. The Arab governments have limited as much as possible the participation of nationally-based NGOs to EU programmes and most of all prevented their NGOs from receiving funds from the EU. Many sectors of the society and culture (Islamists of various brands and nationalists) rejected an offer of cooperation that they regarded as a gross political interference or remained indifferent to it. Islamist thinkers have rejected the very Western notion of a politically conscious and active civil society (*al-mutjama al madani*) arguing for an alternative concept of citizen or civic society (*al-mutjama al-ahli*) building on families, clans and religious institutions. Only a limited number of North African NGOs have accepted to identify themselves as normative and value-laden actors in keeping with their European counterparts' thinking.

The EU notion of civil society employed in the Euro-Med framework, while proving only modestly fitting, if not unfitting, with realities on the ground, seems also unable to take into account changes that have occurred and are occurring in Arab and North African societies. In fact, North African civil societies have been submitted in the last twenty years to the impact of a significant societal change deriving from the boost in globalisation – including enhanced relations with the EU – and economic change (as vividly illustrated in the first part of Paciello & Pepicelli's paper)[11]. The civil society in North Africa is today in flux, between weakness and strength, old and new, tradition and innovation, but there is no doubt that it is growing up and strengthening. Whither this emerging civil society and the societal change that is shaping it?

The significant societal change that has affected North Africa and the Levant in the past two decades has proven only partly oriented towards Western values and solutions and, more often than not, at odds with the latter, instead. In most cases, it attests of a pressing concern to pursue change autonomously in existing cultural frameworks rather than owning the kind of universalistic convergence the West is preaching and expecting, as in the case of the EU policy.

The papers of the "Microcosm" study project dealing with aspects of societal change in North Africa attest that actual change in the varying dimension they took into consideration is evolving in directions that are not necessarily in keeping with those suggested in EU objectives, models and proposals. So, in North Africa there have been lively developments regarding women, in which, beside Western-fashioned feminism, important trends have developed toward an Islam-based feminism. By the same token, information technologies, [12] while contributing to cosmopolitan and Westernizing trends, have also contributed to the emergence of a globalised Islam, as there is no necessary relationship between means to multiply information and information's contents. Not to talk about religion,[13] which has evolved, particularly in North Africa, toward conservative or radical trends but also reform-oriented and moderate Islamism with an emphasis on personal choices. While the West is quick in capturing change when it converges with its own views, it seems to ignore divergent or autonomous changes.

[11] Maria Critina Paciello and Renata Pepicelli, *Gender Dynamics and Social Change in the Arab Muslim World*, updated 30 July 2011.

[12] Gary R. Bunt, *#Islam: Mediterranean Islamic Expression and web 2.0*, updated 11 July 2011.

[13] Olivier Roy, *Religion and Values: Towards a Common Religious Market?*, updated 23 February 2011.

In sum, not only the EU notion of civil societies in North Africa is inadequate but it is unable to capture civil society dynamics stirred up by societal change. In front of the EU initiative, North African parts of civil societies are just rejecting such initiatives or espousing them; to a large extent, though, civil societies are working out alternative responses, ideas and opportunities. Civil society is not opposing democracy, but looking for its own democratic profile.

If this is the situation, it is evident that EU actors – the EU delegations in the Southern Mediterranean capitals as well as the EU NGOs networking with their Mediterranean counterparts – because of their rigid "normative and value-laden" message, have difficulty in transmitting that message. More than that, they risk to misunderstand or not understand ongoing societal change and consequently miss dialogue's opportunities that, in contrast, are available and important.

This rigidity is so entrenched that it comes to affect or hamper also relations with Arab NGOs that share EU actors' philosophy, adopt a universalistic approach, and are responsive to European and Western initiative. As a matter of fact, even in this case, the basically Eurocentric style of EU-Western cooperation - whether at official or civil society level – generates unilateralist approaches by the EU actors and perceptions of interference and prevarication in the Southern Mediterranean NGOs that accept to cooperate with Western programmes.[14].

Concluding remarks – In the first, optimistic stage of its policy toward the Mediterranean, the EU agenda to foster democratic reform in North Africa and the Levant focussed on a unilateral and Eurocentric concept of democracy, both at top-down and bottom up level. As we saw, the concept was "normative and value-laden". This approach, while attractive for a reduced segment of the North African civil society only, has prevented the EU from understanding the political dynamics stemming from societal change in that society. This political dynamics is bringing about the need for democratic change but in connection with the need to assert and evolve cultural and societal differences with respect to Western democracy and society. In front of this development, the European Mediterranean initiative proved too rigid and unarticulated, unprepared to identify convergence and accommodate differences. So, despite optimism and enthusiasm or just because of that, it failed to provide a fitting policy response to both governments and societies.

2. Europe's response to Islamism

This section deals with the problematic relationship between European policies in the Mediterranean and Islamism. The Islamist agenda is largely regarded by EU governments and European opinion as inherently anti-Western and undemocratic. This has directed European regional policy toward keeping the stability of the Arab authoritarian regimes, even when Islamists have happen to win democratic elections. Islamism, however, is also a most significant dimension in the ongoing societal change which affects the Arab/Muslim world. While, this change has profoundly modified earlier Islamist perspectives, this evolution is substantially ignored by Europe. European perceptions' of Islamism have nested a lingering double standard in EU Mediterranean policy with respect to EU's objective of political reform and democracy. This has contributed to EU Mediterranean policy's inconclusiveness and today, in the context of the Arab Spring, it risks once again paralysing EU policy toward the Mediterranean and preventing the Europeans from catching a good opportunity to get out of their Islamist dilemma.

Europe and Islamism - The "optimistic" stage of the EU Mediterranean policy in the 1990s and its objective of democratisation were based on the expectation that Arab regimes would have proceeded to gradual reform. In fact, Arab governments proved very reluctant to adopt reforms alleging that the latter would just open the door to Islamists, terrorism and fundamentalist political

[14] M. Kamel Al Sayyid and H.J. Steiner (eds.), *International Aspects of the Arab Human Rights Movement. An Interdisciplinary Discussion Held in Cairo in March 1998*, organised by the Human Rights Program of the Harvard Law School and the Center for the Study of Developing Countries at Cairo University, Cambridge (MA), Harvard Law School Program, 2000; available at http://www.law.harvard.edu.

regimes. At the end of the day, no reform was ever adopted indeed. When in 2000 the EMP in practice collapsed, many in Europe blamed this on Arab authoritarian regimes and their unwillingness to reform.

Honestly, though, the average thinking in Western chancelleries was not that different from that of the Arab governments. Undersecretary Edward Djeradjian had commented the December 1991 elections in Algeria by saying "one, man, one vote, one time", meaning that a religious regime once in power would never return it to any secular opposition. In Europe, the Algerian elections and the civil war that followed suit opened a thorny debate between those who weighted in their mind the risk of an Iran-like Islamic republic in the Mediterranean and those who were concerned by the European governments/EU's indifference or even support with respect to a coup d'état which had seemingly stripped the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) of a legitimate electoral victory and opened the way to a military regime as well as an array of human rights abuses.

When the Euro-Mediterranean governments signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 it was clear that in supporting domestic reforms the EU and the European governments looked forward to the integration of Islamists in the political process but had no serious response on how this could be done and if it was really feasible. At the end of the day, the EU untold response was that democratisation had to be preferably attained by making regimes more liberal rather than letting Islamist in. All in all, until 2000-2001 the Europeans tried to strike a fair balance between domestic reform and Islamists' inclusion in the political process. While their position was fundamentally ambiguous, it is also true that the equation made by the Arab regimes between Islamists and terrorists was not accepted by the European states, which in many cases extended the status of political refugee to various Islamist opposition figures.

After 9/11, while not dismissing democratisation rhetoric, the EU members states came closer to their Arab partners' views with regard to Islamism and terrorism. They never espoused the equation Islamism-terrorism, and as usual there were relevant differences between EU members states, but in fact the EU governments began to drop their pressure for reform in their bilateral relations. They attenuated pressure in the EMP framework by introducing co-ownership (a principle bound to become a backbone of the ENP), which allows for reforms only in the limits acceptable and accepted by individual partner countries, as well as turning negative conditionality into a kind of positive one. This new security approach of the EU countries has then strengthened over time and turned into a diffuse and significant security inter-state cooperation, that is cooperation between national security services and polices backed up by European common action run by Brussels in the framework of the fourth EU pillar.

In the 2006, the victory of the Islamists, that is Hamas, in the Palestinian elections turned immediately into a replica of Algeria's sequence, although in a significantly more explicit and unambiguous way: the Western countries boycotted the winners and, along Fatah, prevented them from taking over. Admittedly, in 2006 Western ideas about Islamists and terrorists are less elementary or more sophisticated than in 1991-92. However, as a rule, governmental decisions are hardly made on the basis of nuanced academic analyses: as in 1991 the FIS had risked to install an Islamic republic in the Mediterranean, so in 2006 Hamas puts at risk the Camp David Peace, its follow-ups and Israel's security. So, despite academic analyses on Hamas, making available precisely a nuanced profile, the organisation is put on the list of terrorists both in the U.S. and the EU. All in all, in the course of the past fifteen years the EU governments have shifted from perplexities to full distrust with respect to Islamists and from distrust to trust and cooperation with respect to authoritarian governments, seen by now as just bastions against Islamists and terrorism. In that European governments are supported by a conservative majority of opinion thoughouth the EU.

This conservative vision is rooted in a one-dimensional perception of Islamists as believers unable and unwilling to articulate a political perspective inspired by yet separated from their religion. The

idea that Islamist movements may be similar to the Christian democratic movement in Europe is either ignored or cast out as an indefinite possibility and a distant future. In the governmental and mass culture as well as in the media, developments in the Middle East, be they political, cultural or social, are practically unknown and so the perception of Islamism is limited to the figure of a transnational believer fanatically committed to restoring the Ummah no matter by which means, terrorism being no exception. However, even before the 2000s, while a large academic opinion sets out evidences and analyses attesting that there are numerous Islamist parties and movements, rejecting violence and accepting democracy, sociologists and political analysts show the emergence of a secular political space of sorts, which is national rather than transnational in character and aims at toppling incumbent authoritarian regimes to install democracy rather than the kingdom of God.

In the 2000s, there is a long and robust intellectual and academic debate about the emergence of a democratic Islamist movement,[15] especially in North Africa, which comes to more or less optimistic conclusions but in no way changes the official position of reluctance and distrust towards Islamism, in particular after the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections. The European governments keep supporting the Arab authoritarian states - with special regard to the Mediterranean area, where they have an *ad hoc* policy - until when in January 2011 people, without referring to Islamism (nor anti-Americanism or Israel), just topple the Tunisian and the Egyptian tyrannies, ironically making in few days the job that Europe was at first unable and then unwilling to do in the past fifteen years. Taken aback, EU governments even forgot that their rhetoric of democratisation was officially in force and, impudently, tried to save the regimes. Then, they realized that and had to make a step backward whose significance remain to be seen. In the last section, we will try to understand where Arabs and Europeans are going from here.

Social change and Islamism in North Africa **-** Despite EU's fundamentally negative attitude toward Islamism, pressure from academic debates and the unchanged democratic rhetoric of the Euro-Med politics have compelled the EU governments and the EU to accept at least in principle the need for an official engagement toward emerging democratic Islamist trends. So, during the 2000s engagement with Islamists has been a pervasive theme and, as we saw, engagement generated a vast literature. This debate has produced no concrete results, though, as we have already noted. Engagement with Islamist NGOs as well as political parties and movements has been much talked about yet has consistently failed to materialise.[16] If one talks with officials and diplomats the explanation is that, more often than not, Islamists are not really interested in the dialogue nor that attracted by European initiatives of cooperation, but the real explanation is that instructions from governments are extremely conditional and based on ensuring security and political interests rather than exchanges: the problem with EU governments is less about the genuine nature of Islamist democratic thinking or actions than islamists' divergence with Western political and security interests. Consequently, Islamists, as very aptly said by Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs, "judge the range of EU initiatives – insofar as they are even aware of them – to be about containing rather than engaging Islamism."[17]

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[15] See Muriel Asseburg (ed.), *Moderate Islamists as Reform Actors, Conditions and Programmatic Change*, SWP Research Paper 4, Berlin, April 2007; N. J. Brown, A. Hamzawy. M. Ottaway, *Islamist Movements and the Democratic process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones*, CEIP, Carnegie Papers 67, Washington D.C., March 2006.

[16] Kristina Kausch, *Plus Ca Change: Europe's Engagement with Moderate Islamists*, FRIDE, Working Paper 75, Madrid, January 2009.

[17] Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs, "The end of the 'Euro-Mediterranean vision' ", *International Affairs* , Vol. 85, No. 5, 20009, pp. 963-975; s alseeo Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs (eds.), *Political Islam and European Foreign Policy. Perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean*, CEPS, Brussels, 2007; N. Mikhelidze and N. Tocci, "How can Europe engage with Islamist movements?", in M. Emerson, K. Kausch, R. Youngs (eds.), *Islamist radicalisation: the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies and Madrid, Fride, June 2009, p. 151-169.

Even after the events dubbed "Arab Spring", Islamism remains a non-starter for most of the European conservative constituencies – not to say the xenophobic, racist and Islamophobic parties standing on the right wing of conservatives - and the governments representing such constituencies. Why such obstinate reluctance and distrust? One can argue that, beside the strenuous strategic opposition we have just talked about, the Europeans, as better informed as they may be today than they used to twenty or ten years ago, are still ignoring or misunderstanding Islamism evolution's substance and reality.

In Western and European views, the notion of Islamists - as that of democracy we considered in the previous section - remains unrelated to societal change. As EU democracy promoters don't manage to see the democratic substance of societal change in the Arab countries just because that change is less in keeping with Western than Islamic cultural models and concerns, likewise the EU governments don't see the democratic substance of Islamists trends because they continue to see Islamism as a political activity functional and inherent to religion, whereas societal change in the Arab world has brought about a distinction between political and religious activities, which actually may near today's Islamists to Christian Democratic parties. This great change in this field has been analysed and registered by academic sociological studies, in particular by the post-Islamist school of thought.[18]

According to this school, in the past twenty years, the idea of Islamic states based on the *sharia* having proved unfeasible or mistaken, a majority of Muslims has opted for achieving their political interests and objective in the framework of national states and democratic regimes, that is in a sphere which is separated by religion. The new Islamist parties are quite different from the Islamist parties at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. As Olivier Roy argues in his paper on religious values written in the framework of the "Microcosm" project,[19] the new Islamists, while not secular, "are operating in a secular political space". As still noted by Roy, this distinction between spheres reflects also a more comprehensive trend whereby established religions and churches turn more and more into "faith communities" (e.g. neo-Sufism), in which religion does recede from a public to a more individual and personal dimension. This process of separation, though, is not affecting culture and reinforces identity. Societal change produces its own responses and Islamists trends express and evolve their own way with respect to the West.

The European difficulty to understand this process can be measured by the way they read developments in Turkey since the AKP has acceded to power. The Europeans have few difficulties in considering the Turkish AKP a democratic albeit Islamist party as they believe that this party has blossomed in a secular and pro-Western context. However, the real reason why AKP did so is because in the course of the 1990s it dropped its weak traditional Islamist dimension and turned into a modern Islamist party strongly supported by neo-Sufism. No doubt, the process may have been facilitated by the secular context in which the AKP happened to grew up (and by Ottoman heritage). However, the process is the same as the evolution of Islamism in the broad Mediterranean and as soon as Muslim Turkish cultural re-identification will have progressed in next few years, this similarity will be more visible. So, saying, as conventionally Europeans do, that Mediterranean Islamists should look at Turkey is just revealing European strabismus, which does not see that Turkey has been looking at broad Islamist trends and, only because of circumstances , managed to implement Islamist objectives ahead of Arabs. Sunni Turks and Sunni Arabs are on the same path and what circumstances have allowed to happen very quickly in Turkey, sooner or later are going to emerge in Arab countries as well. This political and cultural convergence is very strong. In fact, it is

[18] See: Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995; Gilles Kepel, *Jihad, expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*, Gallimard, Paris 2000; Farhad Khosrokhavar and Roy Oliver, *Irán, de la revolución a la reforma*, Bellaterra, Barcellona 2000. For the philosophical background of post-Islamism see most of all the works by Abdolkarim Soroush.

[19] *Op. cit.*

emerging also in the field of foreign policy, as – with the "Arab Spring" revolution - Turkey strategic convergence with the West is turning into strategic convergence with the Arabs.

Concluding remarks – The societal change unfolding in the Arab countries of North Africa, in the Mediterranean and, more broadly speaking, in the Middle East, generates a distinction between religion and political action in which respective activities acquire more autonomy from one another. Political activities take place in a secular space, more and more separated from religion, which looks for the implementation of democratic regimes rather than Islamic republics. In this political democratic perspective, though, culture and societies provide different responses from those of Western democracies – the latter are stolidly expecting for.

This evolution has been and continue to be ignored by EU governments and the EU Euro-Mediterranean policy. For this reason, the authoritarian regimes could tell the EU in the 1990s that Islamism was the reason why they were unable to proceed to reform and, subsequently, convince the EU that Islamists were a common enemy the EU and the regimes had to fight together. In this way, the EU who started with the idea of promoting democracy, failed to recognize its right partners and ended by supporting undemocratic rather than democratic factors. In 2001, the "Arab Spring" having jump-started to topple, or put in question and weaken existing authoritarian regimes, the misinterpretation given by the EU to Islamism risks again, despite the deafening and futile Western rhetoric, to hinder or even deny the difficult move of North Africa and the Mediterranean toward establishing democratic regimes in the region.

3. EU and immigration

Terrorism and Immigration: two sides of the Muslim coin - In fact, the EMP machinery got out of steam in 2000, when four years of inconclusive Euro-Mediterranean talks about defining a common reform-bound platform and the beginning of the second *intifada* in Palestine made clear that the EMP political ambitions had come to an end. With 9/11, the long-standing and lingering European perception of the nexus between Islamism and terrorism grew stronger and European concerns focussed on countering Islamist-based terrorism. In this perspective, the EU policy decidedly turns toward supporting Arab authoritarian regimes and cooperating with them to counter Islamists and enhance EU security. The attacks in Madrid, London and Rabat confirm Europe in its new approach. The European countries, while not waging a war against terrorism and with more pragmatism than the United States, jump-start a systematic fight based on police and intelligence, new institutions in the JHA framework and enhanced border control. In the 2000s, as pointed out in the paper's introduction, pessimism prevails over 1990s optimism: Europe sidelines the reformist and forward approach of the 1990s, fundamentally entrusted to collective efforts in the EU, and set in motion a securitized approach leveraging containment and defence and mostly run by national governments.

In this approach, the fight against terrorism dovetails with that against illegal immigration. Immigration, especially illegal immigration, is regarded as a potential channel for terrorism, not only because terrorists can enter the territory under the guise of immigrants, but most of all because immigrated people - those just immigrated as well as the generations coming from past immigration - are exposed to radicalisation coming from North Africa and the Levant. So, immigration, seen as a proxy of terrorism, gets securitized, too.

However, immigration, whether legal or illegal, generates among European people cultural and social anxiety and feeds undemocratic political trends, xenophobia and racism, millenarianism and apocalyptic fears as well as Christian fundamentalism. So, immigration turns into a security issue not only because of its nearness to terrorism but also and much so because regarded by large sectors of conservative European constituencies as a danger for European social and cultural integrity. Immigrants come from many quarters, however anxiety concentrates on Muslim immigrants

because of the nexus with terrorism and Islamism and because Islamism, Islam and Muslims in general are more culturally assertive an structured than other immigrated groups[20].

At the end of the day, in the European perceptions terrorism and immigration are two sides of the same Islamist or Muslim coin and what substantially raises anxiety and gives way to securitization is the emergence of a European Islam. Against this threat, Euro-Mediterranean policies in the 2000s have built up a strategy, which could be dubbed of "forward-containment", targeting Islamism as the matrix of both terrorism and immigration spillovers. This strategy is primarily based on support to local authoritarian regimes with a view to enabling these regimes to stop or limit spillovers at their very source. Externalisation in various forms is the policy whereby the EU implements its forward-containment strategy in Euro-Mediterranean relations. We have considered Islamism in the previous section. Let's now focus on immigration.

EU immigration policies and strategies - As known, freedom of movement in the EU space is defined and regulated by the implementation of an area of "freedom, security and justice" whose external dimension includes the discipline of non-EU citizens to enter the area and circulate in it, as set out by a "Global (i.e. comprehensive) Approach to Migration. The aim of the policy is to ensure control over entrances and circulation and to set the conditions for immigration to have a circular character, that is conditions that privilege the return of immigrated people to their origin. In this sense, immigration is submitted to visas and visas are bound to be liberalized to the extent sending countries comply with the conditions set by the EU. These conditions essentially aimd at making sure that sending countries – with EU technical and financial assistance – prevent illegal emigration, stops migrants directed to Europe that cross their territory, and are ready to readmit both citizens and people having transited into their territories. If countries comply with these conditions, visas will be delivered more quickly and easily, although, within the specific limits and the conditions set out by the individual EU member states.

This mechanism is destined to be embedded, on a country-by country basis, in the framework of "Mobility Partnership" - of which so far only three are in existence (with Cape Verde, Georgia and Moldova and no Mediterranean country). As a matter of fact, these conditions, especially readmission, are preferably negotiated by sending countries in the framework of their bilateral relations, because they have here more opportunities and flexibility to link readmission to other objectives they wish; on the other hand, the EU receiving countries can exert at national level a more strict and discretionary control over immigration. On the whole the European approach is restrictive and aligned on the lowest denominator of most restrictive national policies, also because immigration is retained by national governments, which consider it a key security question they want to control directly and substantively.

Beside consensual agreements (to come) within the Mobility Partnerships framework, the EU and its member states set up and are now reinforcing an agency (Frontex) to concretely control borders on top of the strict ground and sea control exerted by national states. In sum, embedded or not as they may be in Mobility Partnership schemes, readmission, externalisation of police tasks vis-à-vis immigration from farther afield, and border controls are the policies Europe carries on to ensure complete control over immigration into its territory and preferably the return of migrants after a short- or long-term stay (which is the earlier German policy of immigrants as "Gastarbeiter").

Societal change in the EU states – The EU "Global Approach to Migration" is a mechanism to make access possible on condition it is strictly controlled. It is a skeleton-framework or a low common denominator, which all members share and whose implementation they can modulate on their own requirements. Given this EU broad framework, it remains to the states to choose a long-term strategy to make sense of migration. For true, a number of EU states just use the EU

[20] See Felice Dassetto, "Islam et Europe: au défi d'une rencontre de civilisations", in Amine Aït-Chaalal et al., *Europe et Mondes Musulmans. Un Dialogue Complexe*, GRIP, Bruxelles, Editions Complexes, 2004, pp. 143-164.

framework to implement short-sighted policies whose sense is just to keep as many immigrants as possible out, refugees making no exception. However, beside this non-policy, most states understand that beyond the "Gastarbeiter" approach and the "bon usage" it can be done of circularity, a more or less large number of immigrants are already citizens and a large number of current immigrants will remain. What to do with them? In general the response is either assimilation or multiculturalism. Are they the best long-term strategy to be adopted?

Both Prof. Roy's and Prof. Fargues papers[21] stress that, for different reasons, relating to societal change in North Africa and the Mediterranean, immigrated people and immigrants the EU has to deal with today are more conspicuous for their individual than collective profile. Prof. Roy suggests that religion is disconnecting from culture and is becoming more of an individual choice or dimension. Prof. Fargues illustrates the demographic and economic circumstances that are sending toward Europe a wave of "single" immigrants, that is individuals coming from a demographic transition in which the rate of dependence (from youngsters as well as from ageing persons) happens to be minimal. While this singleness is bound to be superseded at a point in time, changes in religiosity are more structural and also associated with and reinforced by the effects of deterritorialization (analysed by Pro. Roy elsewhere)[22]. Both kinds of social change seem to make multiculturalist and assimilationist strategies obsolete. In fact, both presuppose the subsistence of a tie between religion and culture which is either outflanked by assimilation, making religion recede in a totally private sphere, or multiculturalism, turning religions into communities similar to the Ottoman "millet", that is minorities.

Concluding remarks – So, what the EU nation states should do is to deal with cultural differences in a liberal perspective, delinking such differences from their supposed religious roots. In a liberal and dynamic society, exposed to global change, cultural differences will confront one another and adjust to one another without giving way to problems of public statuses.

Once again, we come across inadequate European and EU responses, short-sighted if not blind with respect to societal change and its political implications. We have argued that what limits and distort immigration policies is the non-secularized Islam, a theologically still (fundamentalist) Islam the Europeans see behind a society that is in contrast changing and diversifying. As in the case of democracy and moderate Islamism, even the European policies toward immigration are affected and paralysed by their ignorance of or hesitations to acknowledge societal change in North Africa and the broad Arab world.

4. Perspectives after the crisis of the old Arab order

The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have shed vivid light on the EU Mediterranean policy's ambiguity between the rhetoric support to democracy in the Arab countries and the real support to regimes as supposed providers of stability/security. They have shed light also on the EU and its members' inability to read the state of play and ongoing change in Arab societies. The Western media, the opinion and the governments have read uprisings as moves toward democracy in the Western sense. No doubt, in Tunisia and Egypt – partly in Yemen as well – the first move came from peoples and groups near to Western ideas. The use of internet and the role played by the social networks contributed to present developments and to allow the West to construe them as if they were a wave of democratisation in the series described by political analysts and scholars after the events in 1989. Then, some authors began to talk more aptly of 1848, as a longer, less predictable and more tortuous evolution than 1989. By 2011 Summer, it was clear that the vanguards of Tahrir Square and Avenue Bourguiba had acted as sheer midwifes of history and what history is contemplating is a political fight in which Western-style democracy has only a very sideline role.

[21] Olivier Roy, *op. cit.* ; Philippe Fargues, *Demography and Migration across the Mediterranean*, updated February 2011.
[22] Olivier Roy, *L'Islam mondialisé*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 2002.

The fight is between the Islamist masses exposed to societal change we have talked about in previous sections and an array of conservative Islamist groups, going from conservative Muslim Brothers through salafists and other fundamentalist groups.

If the real dilemma is between moderate and conservative Islamist, there should be no doubt about who the West and Europe should support. On this point, however, the West is hesitating, because it knows that, whether democratic or undemocratic, the Islamists, which will win elections will not be in keeping with Western interests in the region, in particular on Israel and the Palestinians. But the ambiguity between security via democracy and via stability cannot be easily dismissed. So, the majority in Europe (from governments to opinion) is still reading Islamism as one homogeneous and negative reality and, in present circumstances, rather than looking at democratic, moderate Islamists as partners, they are at a loss between ideas of ensuring soft changes from previous to future regimes or supporting the weak and confused Western-fashioned liberals.

This will be an awful political mistake. In this paper we have argued about the deceptive political perspective that is affecting Euro-Mediterranean EU policies between optimism and pessimism, support to democracy and support to regimes with a view to pinpointing European security. This is not new and one has to say that this approach, despite the sudden and deadly crisis of the Arab moderate regimes and the overall downgrading of the old Arab order, has been confirmed by the weak role of the EU High Representative, the mediocre test of the new EEAS (European External Action Service) and the policy response provided by the Commission. These responses have improved existing instruments but have not even hinted at any strategic revision.[23]

What is new is the reflection on how deeply EU policies misread societal and related political change in North Africa and the Mediterranean at large. As we saw, the EU is proposing support to democracy hardly recognizing the democratic character of the democratic Islamist discourse and the differences it may entail; the EU tends to see an inherent undemocratic and violent bias in Islam and Islamism hardly recognizing that societal change made many Islamists develop a democratic and non-violent perspective, whose different foreign policy goals should be normally respected; finally, the EU is looking at immigration through the same prism. Ewe can conclude by remembering Prof. Wolfers' well-known paradigm:[24] the EU policy toward the Mediterranean, while presenting itself at the outset as pursuing "milieu goals" in relations between Europe and North Africa, has more and more emerged over time as a policy pursuing "possession goals", which in the Wolferian conceptual paradigm corresponds to strictly pursuing national and security interests, more often than not, at odds with alleged cooperation and democratisation aims. The Arab Spring can be an opportunity to turn page, although so far this is not apparently the case.

[23] Timo Behr, "Europe and the Arab World: Towards a Principled Partnership", Center for Applied Policy Research-CAP, *Perspectives*, No. 2, Universität Munich, March 2011; Tocci and Cassarino, *op. cit.*; Christian-peter hanelt and Halmut Möller, "How the European Union can Support Change in North Africa", Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Spotlight Europe*, 2011/01 – February 2011.
[24] Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962

ATTACHMENT 1

ENPI – EUROMED REGIONAL PROJECTS: AIMS & PARTNERS

AUDIOVISUAL & MEDIA

Euromed Audiovisual III

Contributes to intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity through support to building cinematographic and audiovisual capacity in the Mediterranean Partner Countries
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

CIVIL SOCIETY & LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Civil Society Regional Programme

Strengthens Southern Mediterranean civil society so that it can trigger a more democratic debate at national level and in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and of the Union for the Mediterranean
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

CIUDAD – Sustainable urban development

Aims to help local governments in the ENPI region address urban development problems in a sustainable manner, promoting cooperation between local actors and their EU counterparts
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia (South), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (East)

Civil Protection (PPRD South)

Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD South)
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Turkey. Libya and Mauritania are observer countries

Civil Society Facility

Component 1: Strengthening capacity of civil society, through exchanges of good practice and training, to promote national reform and increase public accountability, to enable them to become stronger actors in driving reform at national level and stronger partners in the implementation of ENP objectives.
Component 2: Strengthening non-state actors through support to regional and country projects, by supplementing the funding available through thematic programmes and instruments.
Component 3: Promoting an inclusive approach to reforms by increasing the involvement of non-state actors in national policy dialogue and in the implementation of bilateral programmes

CULTURE

Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures

Brings people and organizations of the region closer and promotes dialogue, through opportunities to work together on projects
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia as well as all 27 EU member states and remaining members of the Union for the Mediterranean, making a total of 43 countries

Euromed Heritage IV

Contributes to the exchange of experiences on cultural heritage, creates networks and promotes cooperation
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

EDUCATION & TRAINING

Erasmus Mundus

Promotes cooperation between higher education institutions through encouraging partnerships, mobility and exchanges of students, researchers and academic staff

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (East) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia (South)

TEMPUS IV for higher education
Supports the modernisation of higher education, creates opportunities for cooperation among actors in the field and enhances understanding
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (East) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia (South)

GENDER ISSUES

Enhancing Equality between Men and Women in the Euromed Region
Supports gender equality and the full implementation of CEDAW, increases knowledge on gender-based violence and backs the follow up to the Istanbul Ministerial Conference on Gender
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

INFORMATION SOCIETY

EUMEDRegNet – Information society cooperation
Supports the development and reform of Information Society in the ENPI South countries and fosters cooperation with the EU
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

MIGRATION

Euro-Med Migration II
Contributes to the development of a Euro-Mediterranean area of cooperation on migration and assists Partner countries in their efforts to find solutions to various forms of migration
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

POLITICAL DIALOGUE

Middle East Peace Projects (Partnership for Peace)
Supports local and international civil society initiatives that promote peace, tolerance and non violence in the Middle East
Israel, Jordan and Occupied Palestinian Territory

YOUTH

EuroMed Youth IV
Supports and strengthens the participation and contribution of youth organisations and youth from the Euro-Mediterranean region to the development of society and democracy, and promotes dialogue and understanding
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia

Source: ENPI Info Centre (http://www.enpi-info.eu)

ATTACHMENT 2

ENPI – EUROMED REGIONAL PROJECTS: BUDGET and TIMEFRAME

Project	Theme	Budget (million €)	Timeframe
Euromed Audiovisual III	AUDIOVISUAL & MEDIA	11	2009-2012
Civil Society Regional Programme	CIVIL SOCIETY & LOCAL AUTHORITIES	€1.5	2010-2012
CIUDAD – Sustainable urban development		14	2009 - 2013
Civil Protection (PPRD South)		5 (ENPI/IPA[25])	2009-2011
Civil Society Facility		22	2011-2013
Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures	CULTURE	7	2008-2011
Euromed Heritage IV		17	2008-2012
Erasmus Mundus II Erasmus Mundus III	EDUCATION & TRAINING	29 66	2009-2010 2011-2015
TEMPUS IV for higher education		60 in 2009 54.2 in 2010 51.5 in 2011	2008-2013
Enhancing Equality between Men and Women in the Euromed Region	GENDER ISSUES	4.5	2008-2011
EUMEDRegNet – Information society cooperation	INFORMATION SOCIETY	5	2008 - 2012
Euro-Med Migration II	MIGRATION	5	2008-2011
Middle East Peace Projects (Partnership for Peace)	POLITICAL DIALOGUE	Annual budget ranging from €5-10 million	Ongoing
EuroMed Youth IV	YOUTH	5	2010 – 2013

Source: ENPI Info Centre (http://www.enpi-info.eu)

[25] IPA Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance

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

BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

An International Conference

Paris, 3-4 November 2011

MIDWIFE OR SPECTATOR? US POLICIES TOWARDS NORTH AFRICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

a draft paper by

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With the support of

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President Barack Obama's presidency has been punctuated by the regime changes that his predecessor hoped to hasten. Convinced that the pre-revolutionary political stability could not last, the administration of George W. Bush tried to force the hand of several Arab and North African governments with a clear message: democratize or risk extinction. The current administration consistently approached the same brink with similar expectations but a different strategy for reaching the outcome. Whereas Bush acted within a predictable rule-bound regional environment – albeit in the twilight of an authoritarian era – Obama has been dealt his hand from a deck of wildcards. Seeking to lead by example, the previous administration created incentives to reform and provided autocracies a graphic illustration of what democracy might look like in the Middle East. Since taking office in 2009, however, Obama officials have shifted American policy away from a strategy of regime pressure and debates over foreign aid conditionality, towards a wholehearted emphasis on indigenous nongovernmental organizations and economic growth in North Africa. Beginning with the "New Beginnings" address in Cairo and right through the brief speech welcoming post-Qaddafi Libya in October 2011, the Obama administration has consistently avoided the inflammatory rhetoric of a democratization "agenda" and focused instead on helping establish the *conditions* for democracy. If democracy cannot take hold in the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, as Barrington Moore's adage has it, then the administration has joined European allies in an urgent quest to help grow and fortify a democratic-minded middle class.

The gap between Bush and Obama administration policies towards North Africa may ultimately be seen as less about different objectives than different emphases and above all, the wildly different context of political opportunity presented by the popular uprisings of 2011. Policies supporting the voluntary and for-profit sectors existed under the previous American administration, but they were destined to languish as long as the *anciens regimes* in Egypt, Tunisia or Libya remained in place. Civil society could not flourish without greater freedoms and democratic elections, just as economic development strategies driven by investment and loans could not thrive within conditions of crony capitalism.

President Obama, however, has overseen a foreign policy transition to match the political transitions in the region. After being held captive to the three R's that kept autocratic regimes in power – "rent, rhetoric and repression" – American officials are joining their European allies in promoting the three M's that will fuel growth and democracy: "money, market access and mobility."[1] Motivated by the hope that more transparent and accountable systems will lead to greater stability, the Obama administration has consistently placed its wager on the people of North Africa – and their economies – rather than focus its energies more prominently on the often frustrating task of regime guidance, as under the previous administration.

This has entailed a continued commitment to accompany regimes on their paths of liberalization, but also a larger focus on civil society actors and the faceting of middle classes through investment and entrepreneurship. As Ruth Hanau Santini wrote, "Washington sees the success of the transition as dependent on significant economic growth based on innovation and accountable and efficient institutions."[2] The US administration is building a set of democracy-promotion tools that rely on civil society and economic growth rather than cajoling regimes into reform-mindedness.

A further challenge for this administration will be to remain relevant in view of emergent regional powers and issues far removed from democracy promotion strategies. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Cairo in mid-September 2011 drew attention to the "Turkish model," but his applause lines were easier to discern compared to the respectful but subdued reception for President Obama's "New Beginnings," which studiously avoided "models." Erdogan, who donned the mantle of Palestinian nationalism and voiced criticism of Israel, beat Obama exactly where American presidents are vulnerable and constrained. The US-Israeli relationship is precisely the issue about which Arab public opinion has been most critical of Obama. This, despite several recent American attempts to appear tough with Israeli government while assuring a domestic public of his loyalty to the alliance with Israel. This has likely contributed to the current American administration's resolve to focus on civil society, investment and business loans, which are all areas where its expertise has a chance of building lasting partnerships with the Maghreb.

When President Obama declined to personalize the Libyan intervention and opted for a NATO umbrella over American participation, he allowed French President Nicolas Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister David Cameron to brand the effort themselves – and to reap a greater share of the glory given off by Qaddafi's fall. Cameron and Sarkozy made triumphant visits to "free Tripoli" while Obama hailed a liberated Libya from the Rose Garden. On the other hand, the United States has been the commanding force behind air power – from Libya to Yemen and Pakistan – and maintained a robust presence in multilateral institutions, especially NATO. In the words of one German observer, "The Obama Administration has thus shown how to successfully fight terrorism: by avoiding overreactions, putting emphasis on a strong intelligence service and resorting to military violence in controlled doses only when it cannot be avoided."[3] The US has also been the voice on the line with Egyptian leaders during moments of crisis in Egyptian-Israeli relations in 2011, from the Israeli counter-insurgency incursion to the siege of the Israeli embassy.

The focus on security issues and hard power, however, belies a broader and deeper decade-long American effort to encourage the gradual democratic opening of North African societies. As the spread of democracy allows for more space for peaceful dissent, the Obama administration is taking stock of its ongoing democratization efforts and placing its own stamp on them.

Democratization and Foreign Assistance

As the Obama administration crafted its response to the Arab Awakening, it was legitimate to ask what impact could be attributed to existing American democracy promotion and foreign aid programs in the region. Could the events of Winter-Spring 2011 be read, generously, as a vindication of the complex and multi-layered bureaucratic structure of US foreign assistance – and of the previous US administration's strong push for democratization in particular?[4] The diverse budgetary lines established in support of that goal ranged from the Middle East Partnership Initiative and other State Department programs, [5] to the Millennium Development Corporation, USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and public-private partnerships. American taxpayers have poured billions into military and development aid, but it is less well-known that hundreds

of millions of dollars also went into the nurturing of civil society and political participation.[6]

In the first two years of Bush's democratization push, however, some of the early US financial aid to Arab societies funded government programs and paid for government training, giving life support to the very system one hoped to change.[7] Tamara Wittes, in a book published shortly before she joined the US administration as deputy assistant secretary for near eastern affairs, argued that the national interest was no longer served by supporting autocrats for stability's sake. Along with others, she saw the stirrings of growing popular demands for economic and political reform. With regard to "the development of liberal democracies" in the Arab world's major states, she asked at the time, would the US help "midwife the birth of a democratic Arab future" or would "the United States be a mere spectator"?

In fact, the Bush administration initially sent strong signals regarding American expectations for democratic reform. Beginning with Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, and the decision that August to not approve additional aid to Egypt, and followed by Secretary of State Colin Powell's announcement of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) at the end of that year, the administration sought to ratchet up pressure on regimes in the region. MEPI brought grant making into the state department in a more significant way, and has come to fulfill aspects of the role that US Agency for International Development had been fulfilling, but here in combination with diplomatic objectives. In this respect it distinguished itself through its direct funding of indigenous Arab NGOs.[8] In MEPI's first few years, thousands of participants from North Africa and the Middle East undertook projects with American support. This approach aimed to develop "long-term alliances with the people of the Middle East rather than with specific ruling regimes."[9] Through his November 2003 speech at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, in which President Bush criticized the notion that democracy was impossible in the Middle East. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's June 2005 visit to Egypt was bold for what she dared say in public: she called for the rule of law, the end of emergency rule, an independent judiciary, and freedom from fear of violence for democratic activists. Moreover, the US congress in 2008 considered conditioning roughly 8% of US military aid on Egyptians' improvement in judicial reform, police training, and smuggling tunnels on Gaza border. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates weighed in heavily against these plans, and the clause was basically neutered – but not before it thoroughly enraged the Egyptian government.

But the grueling years of state building in Iraq and Afghanistan may have actually diminished the Bush administration's sure-footedness by the end of its second term. Despite the aggressive rhetoric, the Bush administration did not follow its threatening language with commensurate actions. Wittes argued that the U.S. administration at the time "failed to speak up for those who challenge the system" – e.g. Saad Eddine Ibrahim and Ayman Nour (and that in Tunisia, it neglected to call out Zine el Abidine Ben Ali on press freedom violations in 2005).[10] The administration never did something as bold as taking a $100 million tranche from military aid and placing it into its democracy promotion budget. As Glenn Kessler wrote: "Near the end of Bush's term, the Egyptians felt so confident of their position that Rice was told she couldn't visit Egypt until she waived congressional restrictions on $100 million in military aid, which she did."[11]

Secretary Rice's earlier outspokenness was a faded memory just eighteen months later, when she visited again in January 2007, on behalf of an administration sobered by insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and electoral outcomes favoring Islamist parties in Gaza and Lebanon.

Mubarak cooled bilateral relations after the Bush administration spoke of conditioning military aid on judicial and political reforms – "unless you change, things will change" – and he subsequently refused to visit the US. Although Mubarak resented the interference, the neo-conservatives formerly of the West Wing view this as a small price to pay. Mubarak kept cashing the checks and didn't touch his policies towards Suez or Israel, and he later received his comeuppance. Other observers might insist that the uprisings took place *despite* US efforts. Then there are those who argue that any conclusion of US influence is highly improbable given the contrast between America's state-centric approach and the bottom-up nature of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts. Critics of US (and European) policy say there was too much focus on politics and not enough on society. In a recent opinion piece, Anthony Cordesman counsels a whole-country approach: "stop focusing on democracy, human rights and the rule of law" and give more sustained support for governance and local economies.[12]

Continuity or Change in US Policy towards Egypt?

Faced with a set of North African regimes in flux, President Obama's foreign policy has been portrayed, at turns, as a catalyst for change or as a canny improvisation that has been able to do less with more. Did the North African uprisings of 2011 take the American administration by surprise, or were the popular revolts the long-awaited fruit of patient nurturing? Has the US government fumbled the opportunity to positively influence events in their first year, or did American leadership and US-sponsored institutions enable the jasmine revolutions and Libyan overthrow? The administration stands accused of *tout et son contraire*: "crossed wires" in Egypt; "surprise" in Tunisia; "passivity" in Libya; a "double-game" in Algeria. One American official said that the CIA knew Egypt was in an "untenable" situation, but "we didn't know what the triggering mechanism would be,"[13] while another spoke of outright surprise: "We've had endless strategy sessions for the past two years on Mideast peace, on containing Iran. And how many of them factored in the possibility that Egypt moves from stability to turmoil? None."[14]

On the one hand, the legacy of Middle East Partnership Initiative has been embraced and amplified by the Obama administration. It will be the carrot of new aid packages, Wittes wrote in 2008, not the conditioning of existing programs, that will lead to greater political reform.[15] But above all, she found, US foreign aid programs call out for greater "autonomy": direct more of US funds to nongovernmental actors who focus on democracy and governance.[16] By 2011, half of the Middle East Partnership Initiative projects in the Middle East were direct partnerships with indigenous NGOs, as opposed to large projects run by organizations inside the beltway. MEPI's budget grew from $29 million of reallocated funds in 2002 to $86 million in 2010. More than half of this amount ($52.9 million) was earmarked for MEPI's democracy and governance, with $27.2 million tagged for civil society organizations.[17] In 2010, Obama's federal budget doubled requested funding for democracy and governance to $1.54 billion (though 86% destined for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq) and requested an increase of 70% for MEPI.

The Obama administration settled into place as the Egyptian government was still smarting from what it perceived as strong-arming and disrespectful treatment from the Bush administration, especially regarding the pace of political reform. On the other hand, some have suggested that Obama was downplaying democracy promotion in the interest of rallying North African regimes behind his efforts to advance a peace agreement. The context into which President Obama arrived with his June 2009 Cairo speech was one in which the Mubarak regime's rancor outweighed any tangible pro-democracy dividends from the Bush administration's more aggressive tactics. American pressure regarding Ayman Nour and Saad Eddine Ibrahim was resented (although Ibrahim was acquitted in 2003 and Ayman Nour was released one month after President Obama's inauguration in 2009). Writing in the *Washington Post*, Glenn Kessler argued that "in public statements, references to democracy and reform were muted," and human rights issues were downplayed. "We issue these [human rights] reports on every country," she said in an interview with Egyptian journalists in March 2009. "We consider Egypt to be a friend."[18] It was reported in news media accounts that the State Department advised Secretary Clinton, during her first visit to Cairo, to avoid bringing up the issue of judicial persecution against pro-democracy activists and opposition figures. In the days before Obama's New Beginnings address, Ayman Nour wrote in the *New York Times* of his and his colleagues "alarm" at "signals that the Obama's administration's support for democracy may have waned. This year, the United States has significantly reduced financing for democracy support in Egypt."[19]

In fact, rather than emphasize democracy promotion up front, the most tangible follow-on initiative was a focus on entrepreneurship in the Muslim-majority world, instead. Obama thus allowed placed public focus away from regime behavior in order to allow for other aspects of the relationship to flourish, e.g. by way of government-initiated civil society/private sector support in North Africa. This consisted of Global Entrepreneurship Program,[20] followed by a Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship in the Muslim World, hosted by President Obama in April 2010 in Washington, DC and including participants from all North African countries, with the declared goal of "highlighting the importance of social and economic entrepreneurship, and strengthening mutually-beneficial relationships with entrepreneurs in Muslim-majority countries and Muslim communities around the world." The project has involved a number of follow-up conferences, including a US-Maghreb Entrepreneurship conference support of private sector development in Algeria in November 2010,[21] and a follow-up entrepreneurship conference. The White House also sent a National Security Council director to Tunisia in July 2010, who told local audience that the US sought to "strengthen entrepreneurship between the United States and the Maghreb" as a way of "deepening the relationship between the United States and Muslim majority countries."[22] The Obama administration had helped create eight funds to promote science and technology, expanded professional exchanges by more than 30%. "We've begun to deliver on the Cairo speech," the US official said in Tunis. "It's not just about changing minds, but building tangible partnerships. We see a strategic long-term vision for this."

Winning Hearts and Minds: Democracy Promotion or the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?

There was little early positive reinforcement, at least in terms of Arab public

opinion, for Obama's pragmatic focus. Surveys and mainstream Arab and Islamic commentators have suggested that the resonance of President Obama's historic speech at Cairo University in 2009 had already begun to fade within one year. Media reports and editorials from across the Arab Muslim world, including the 2010 22-country Pew poll, indicated that despite the President's well-received speech, average Arabs and Muslims were not impressed by the US administration's record. Muslim countries continued to hold overwhelmingly negative views of the U.S. (Turkey and Pakistan - 17% positive opinion). In Egypt, the drop from 27% to 17% was the lowest percentage observed in any of the Pew Global Attitudes surveys conducted in that country since 2006.[23][24][25]

2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll[26]

	2010	2009	
Views of President Barack Obama of the United States			
Positive	16	51	
Neutral	16	28	
Negative	62	23	
Attitudes toward the Obama Administration policy in the Middle East			
Hopeful	16	51	
Neither hopeful nor discouraged	20	28	
Discouraged	63	15	
Most disappointed with (of Obama Administration)			
Palestine/Israel	61		
Iraq	27		
Attitudes towards Islam	5		
Afghanistan	4		
Human Rights	1		
Spreading democracy	1		
Economic assistance	1		
Attitude toward the United States			
Very favorable	2	3	4
Somewhat favorable	10	15	11
Somewhat unfavorable	38	31	19
Very favorable	47	46	64

As indicated by the poll data above, the continued resonance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict overshadowed even the most momentous attempts to reframe or reset relations. Surveys would reveal that 61% of population in Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, were most disappointed with Obama's Palestine/Israel policies. A 50% drop was recorded in support for Obama in Egypt. President Obama's response to the Gaza flotilla confrontation and his inability to move the Israeli and Palestinian parties forward were cited in numerous media reports from the region as a sign of Washington's diminishing commitment to the Cairo speech, especially regarding the "suffering" and "deprivations" of the Palestinian people. One Egyptian commentator has argued that while President Obama said all the right things in Cairo, the Egyptian public thinks Washington has not delivered. In a forceful column titled "How Obama Lost Muslim Hearts and Minds," another academic wrote, "Unless Obama takes risks in the Middle East, he might end up leaving a legacy of broken promises and shattered expectations in the region." In an op-ed column in the *Los Angeles Times*, a

former Egyptian ambassador to the US wrote that the "New Beginning" speech was highly successful.[27] To sustain the positive reaction generated by the speech requires that "concrete progress on a number of complex regional issues is imperative," according to Fahmy. The first-year anniversary of the speech generated similar comments on al-Jazirah and other electronic and print media.

In what must have been a stinging irony for the Obama administration, this came precisely following the period when the Obama administration's attempt at shuttle diplomacy in Israel/Palestine was most active – appointment of George Mitchell in January 2009, followed by Mitchell and Clinton's visits that spring. It would not be until September 2010 that a White House public statement explicitly referred to political reform in Egypt.[28] In December, just a month before the key January 25 demonstration in Tahrir Square, a high-level State Department official wrote in the *Washington Post* that "Egypt has an opportunity to fulfill the commitments its government has made to the Egyptian people as it prepares for next year's presidential election, if it takes steps to implement several changes to which it has committed" – including "a free, fair and transparent electoral process in 2011," as well as "the end of the long-standing state of emergency, under which the country has been operating since 1981," protections of "the universal rights of the Egyptian people" and media freedoms.[29]

Those who argue that the US stayed ahead of events would point out that President Obama had in fact ordered contingency studies of succession scenarios soon after assuming office, and that he was the first in the situation room to know Mubarak would go.[30] In his reportedly frank conversation with the Egyptian president on January 28, Obama respectfully urged his elder to read the writing on the wall.[31] Relations between the Pentagon and the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries – whose senior officials remained in close contact throughout the unrest – may have been a key element in speeding their respective transitions.[32] In this light, decades of foreign military funding, training, and support of civil society – mere tens of billions compared to Iraq's trillions – offered a significant return. President Obama's dispassionate handling of "democracy promotion" illuminates an important distinction with respect to his predecessor. The President's calls to avoid violence in Tunis and Cairo – without saying much else publicly – suggest a more patient view of the route taken by freedom's march.

How did the US measure up in the moment of Egyptian opportunity? Springborg argues that "the US embraced [the Revolution and Mubarak's] removal from power ... because this seemed the best strategy to protect its security interests. Confident that its long-standing role as tutor to the Egyptian military, including provision of equipment, training, and logistical and maintenance support, would preserve the bilateral relationship and that the military would be a stronger political pillar once the failing and unpopular President Mubarak was jettisoned, Washington had little difficulty presenting its support for change as sincere. But its sincerity was limited to professions of need for change, not necessarily for democratization."[33]

US Attitudes towards the participation of Islamist Parties

With regard to the role of Islamist parties in Egyptian political life, Obama's Cairo speech committed the US to respecting all democratically elected governments who guarantee human rights and equality and reject violence. Wittes argued that "Expanding political freedoms is the best way to level the playing field" which then

heavily favored Islamists' favor. "In a freer environment it will be easier to distinguish" among their different factions[34] The more entrenched Islamists become as the dominant political alternative to the status quo, the more the language of Islamism becomes the [only] language of protest politics and other voices become marginalized."[35]

When asked point blank at the end of September 2011, "Will you be ready or prepared to sit in with a government with members of the Muslim Brotherhood as members?" Secretary of State Clinton said "We will be willing to and open to working with a government that has representatives who are committed to non-violence, who are committed to human rights, who are committed to the democracy that I think was hoped for in Tahrir Square, which means that Christians will be respected, women will be respected, people of different views within Islam will be respected. We have said we will work with those who have a real commitment to what an Egyptian democracy should look like."[36] "Given the changing political landscape in Egypt," Clinton said, "it is in the interests of the United States to engage with all parties that are peaceful, and committed to nonviolence, that intend to compete for the parliament and the presidency."

The Obama administration has indicated since the uprising early this year that it sees a legitimate role for the group in Egyptian politics. In January 2011, then-White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said that a reformed Egyptian government had to "include a whole host of important non-secular actors that give Egypt a strong chance to continue to be [a] stable and reliable partner." Clinton said Thursday that the Obama administration was "continuing the approach of limited contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood that have existed on and off for about five or six years." "So we hope that anyone who runs for election, and certainly anyone who's elected and joins the parliament, joins the government, will be committed to making Egypt work and be open to all Egyptians no matter who you might be."[37] (The U.S. ambassador in Cairo, Anne Patterson, has said she isn't "comfortable" enough with the idea to talk with Brotherhood figures herself.[38])

The administration also encouraged Tunisia and Libya to remain inclusive, pluralist, respectful of human rights, with President Barack Obama saying the Tunisian election of a constituent assembly – which saw Ennahda emerge as a pluralist victor – in October was "an important step forward." "We look forward to working with the TNC and an empowered transitional government as they prepare for the country's first free and fair elections," Mr. Obama said in the statement. "The Libyan authorities should also continue living up to their commitments to respect human rights."

US Policy Responses to the Arab Awakening

The US administration's reformulation of American foreign policy following the Arab spring is a continuation of President Obama's emphasis on entrepreneurship, civil society and the building of a strong middle class. Central and Eastern European countries undergoing transitions two decades earlier were comparably better off economically *and* had institutional frameworks to help anchor their democratic development. In Obama's May 2011 address on Arab transitions, he made explicit reference to the European Union membership that served as "an incentive for reform" in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe. However, no structures like EU or NATO are waiting to guide Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan choices. Despite efforts to create a Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, that institution came just late enough to be firmly anchored in the pre-Jasmine era.

The administration's initial response to the Arab Awakening has tried to put in place the building blocks for new structures. "We think it's important to focus on trade, not just aid; on investment, not just assistance," Obama said in spring 2011. "The vision of a modern and prosperous economy [should] create a powerful force for reform in the Middle East and North Africa." [39] Speaking to the houses of British parliament later in 2011, Obama again evoked the link between economic development and political outcomes, speaking of the need to "deepen ties of trade and commerce" in order to "help them demonstrate that freedom brings prosperity."[40]

Economic Steps Announced by President Obama in May 2011 Speech[41]
Ask World Bank and International Monetary Fund to present plan to G8 summit to stabilize and modernize the economies of Tunisia and Egypt; support the governments that will be elected. Urged other countries to help Egypt and Tunisia meet near-term financial needs.
Relieve a democratic Egypt of up to $1 billion in debt, and work with Egyptian partners to invest these resources to foster growth and entrepreneurship. Help Egypt regain access to markets by guaranteeing $1 billion in borrowing that is needed to finance infrastructure and job creation. Help newly democratic governments recover stolen assets.
Working with Congress to create Enterprise Funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. Modeled on funds that supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. OPIC will launch $2 billion facility to support private investment across the region. Work with the allies to refocus the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development so that it provides the same support for democratic transitions and economic modernization in the Middle East and North Africa
Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa. Work with the EU to facilitate more trade within the region, build on existing agreements to promote integration with U.S. and European markets, and open the door for countries who adopt high standards of reform and trade liberalization to construct a regional trade arrangement. Combat corruption; bureaucracy; patronage; help governments meet international obligations

Part of the American legacy, it is hoped, will be to enable a glorious period of autonomy for civil society and business in North Africa. Investment in creating the conditions for democracy may turn out to be a more stable long-term solution. The administration has been lobbying Congressional leaders to commit greater resources to the new strategic opportunities, leading to unprecedented attention being lavished on both the voluntary and for-profit sectors. In addition to debt relief and debt swap arrangements aimed at allowing more investment in job creation and entrepreneurship, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), now ten years in existence, is a mature and active mainstay of American diplomacy in the region. Furthermore, USAID Cairo launched a $65 million program for "democratic development" (elections, civic activism and human rights) in March 2011.[42]

The model of transatlantic cooperation that framed the transition of Central and Eastern European countries is a precedent that the US would like to emulate, albeit within contemporary budgetary constraints. The Obama administration has therefore pursued concrete cooperation with European and other partners at G20/G8 in Deauville, which led to pledges up to $38 billion for North African countries.[43] (Another main lender is European Investment Bank, $6 billion in loans through 2013, and the IMF and World Bank are also encouraging the pursuit of public-private partnerships in Tunisia and

Egypt, though some observers have questioned these economies' readiness, especially in the banking sector.[44])

American and European officials have also scrambled to expand the competence of the one post-Cold War era institution that can easily be extended to North African countries: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner pushed in April 2011 to promote democracy in the region by making more loans to businesses. Four months later, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) began granting loans to public authorities and private firms in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The EBRD commitment will rise to €2.5 billion annually, to "foster the development of the private sector" and promote foreign direct investment. The projects will range from privatizations and job creation efforts to efficiency improvements in energy and water usage,[45] and from banking reform to private-public partnerships, such as private sector investment in infrastructure and services; improving investment climate.[46] As an assistant Treasury secretary and member of the EBRD's board of governors argued in a speech to the bank's 61 member-states, in North Africa just as in Eastern Europe before it, "authoritarian political systems limited the freedoms of the citizens of these countries, and in both instances the economic systems were dominated by cronyism and state control that limited the regions' economic potential."[47]

Further echoing the would-be parallels between the two regional transitions, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton named a new ambassador to lead the new Middle East Transitions Office.[48] This office is a direct successor to the 1991 Freedom Support Act Office, which coordinated diplomacy after the USSR's collapse. His office will begin by leading State Department coordination on policy toward Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.[49] [50]

Conclusion

Democratic and Republican administrations long sought to mitigate the impression that at its worst, bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation serves to cynically prop up useful dictators. The Libyan intervention in 2011 gave the US an opportunity to clarify its stance. Will Arab public opinion reveal that the American drones that delivered Colonel Qaddafi's convoy to the Libyan National Transitional Council now eclipse the made-in-the-USA teargas cans that failed to disperse crowds in Tahrir Square? One of the administration's most delicate tasks will be to balance the expression of American national interest in a way consistent with revolutionaries' total ownership of their new regimes. As Bruce Riedel wrote in admiration about Obama's Libyan intervention, "No ground footprint, no U.S. casualties and no responsibility for the day after."[51]

But these are early days and new balancing challenges await the administration. Only months had passed since Ben Ali and Mubarak's departures from power when President Obama said in May 2011 that it would be "years before these revolutions reach their conclusion." Any consideration of US influence on regional developments must take into account the liberalization of economic flows. Free trade agreements on paper are what private citizens are allowed to make of them. In the past, a security agenda triumphed over the economic one. Now, to help middle class poor and the underemployed, the US administration must do all it can to avoid reinforcing oligarchies and oligopolies that characterized fin-de-regime Egypt and Tunisia. Moore's aphorism still echoes: No bourgeoisie, no democracy. US influence in the region in the days

forward will depend on a serene accompaniment from afar, combining "hard power" – i.e. the billions in security guarantees and military hardware that the US can give, sell or withhold – and "soft power" and lesser financial means, i.e. the millions in support of local economic development and civil society networks in support of a strong middle class.

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[1] On 3 r's, see Tamara Wittes, Freedom's Unsteady March (2008); On 3 m's, see Catherine Ashton, "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean," (8 March 2011, COM(2011) 200 final) "Money - resources that can go into the region to help support the transition to democracy, the support for civil society and of course the economic needs of countries. For example the loss of tourism in Egypt and Tunisia; Secondly market access - the importance of making sure that we give advantages in trade and the people can take advantage of that by being able to export and import properly. And thirdly mobility - the ability of people to move around, for business people to be able to conduct business more effectively"

[2] "The Transatlantic Relationship after the Arab Spring," Brookings Institution, June 2011

[3] *Guido Steinberg © Qantara.de 2011*

[4] Including, notably, his former officials: Charles M. King; Elliot Abrams

[5] The State Department's broad strategic objectives are indicative: 1) Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) 2) Peace and Security 3) Investing in People 4) Economic Growth 5) Humanitarian Assistance; GJD is further broken down into four categories: A) Rule of Law and Human Rights Assists constitutional and legal reform, judicial independence and reform, the administration of and access to justice, protection of human rights, prevention of crime, and community-based efforts to improve security. B) Good Governance Strengthens executive, legislative, and local government capabilities and improves transparency and accountability for government institutions; also strengthens anti-corruption programs. C) Political Competition and Consensus Building Promotes free, fair, and transparent multiparty elections, and promotes representative and accountable political parties committed to democracy. D) Civil Society. (McInerny)

[6] *McInerny*: the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI); the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) at the Department of State; the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA); the year-old Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) program; institutions outside of the government like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED); and multilateral institutions such as the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF). *Jeremy Sharp*: The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), reform through civil society, micro-enterprise, political participation, and women's rights – including G8's BMENA "Foundation for the Future" NGOs and rule of law, civil liberties, health and education and the "Fund for the Future" (job creation) help small and medium-sized enterprises access capital. U.S. contributions to both funds come from MEPI-controlled accounts and appropriations. Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF); National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Muslim Democracy Program.

[7] Wittes 2004

[8] Jeremy Sharp, June 15, 2010, US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East (FY 2011 Request)

[9] Wittes p.89

[10] (Wittes 94)

[11] 01/29/2011, Obama and Mubarak and democracy--an accounting, *By Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post*

[12] Financial Times, Jan 28, 2011

[13] New York Times, Feb 4, 2011

[14] New York Times, Feb 6, 2011

[15] (116)

[16] (117)

[17] McInerny POMED April 2010

[18] 01/29/2011, Obama and Mubarak and democracy--an accounting, *By Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post*

[19]http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/opinion/03AymanNour.html?scp=69&sq=%22ayman+nour%22&st=nyt
[20] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2010/140960.htm
[21] http://www.us-algeria.org/events.html
[22] http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/policy/news2/business-and-finance-post-activities/following-up-on-the-entrepreneurship-summit.html
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[30] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/world/middleeast/14egypt-tunisia-protests.html?pagewanted=all
[31] Reportedly, his parting words were: "I respect my elders. And you have been in politics for a very long time, Mr. President. But there are moments in history when just because things were the same way in the past doesn't mean they will be that way in the future."
[32] http://www.france24.com/en/20110120-tunisia-america-took-control-of-the-situation-canard-enchaine-mich%C3%A8le-aliot-marie-eco-activists-spies-food-shortages
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

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

BROOKINGS

THE MEDITERRANEAN MICROCOSM BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD

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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

a draft paper by

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Civil society is changing and has acquired a growing relevance in the global polity and in international relations. In a world that is less bellicose and more interdependent than in any time in history, the legitimacy and stability of states may derive less from their capability to defend their citizens from external threats than to ensure justice and improve living standards. Higher interdependence has been occurring because of the predominant Western influence. Yet the West is declining. In order to compensate for the decline and face the changing new reality, it has to develop new paradigms for foreign policy options, choices, and instruments so as to enhance its action towards what has been called 'the Rest', possibly with outdated condescension. This study has chosen that portion of the Rest that is the Muslim Arab world and in particular the North African region. It may however be appropriate to briefly dwell first with the current state of the West.

The West and the US-European relationship in a changing global context

Europe lost its global role during the 20th century. The United States replaced it and became the number one world power, but has since been seen as surrendering primacy during the transition to this century – the extent and nature of the surrender being the subject of much current literature. Does that mean that "The decline of the West", the scenario Oswald Spengler depicted some ninety years ago, is finally coming true, after having been repeatedly been dismissed or recalled ever since? What is the West today?

There is of course a broader West which besides Europe and the United States includes Canada, a NATO member, and to various degrees far away countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Vast peripheral areas such as Eastern Europe and Latin America can also be identified, which all share many features of a common culture and society. Then there are border – or bridge – areas. Japan, a non western nation, has seen its extraordinary post-WWII development closely associated with the West, from its tight alliance with the U.S. to the formation of the G7. Another example: Turkey, also a non western country, has been a NATO member and a longstanding candidate for joining the EU. But today's Brazil, different from yesterday's Japan, wants a role of independent power rising along with China and India. And Erdogan now leads a government aspiring to a regional role and to becoming an emerging economy, with its own culture and religion. The West has uncertain boundaries.

At the center of the West is still the United States, a leader recognised more or less happily for a sizable part of the last century. Its current decline, now also perceived by many Americans, has many facets, some of which border on paradoxical. Most evident is the geo-economic decline as a consequence of the emergence of rival economic powers, unimpeded, actually favoured by worldwide free trade and investment within an international system that is largely a product of the West, above all of American predominance. But there is also talk of a geo-strategic decline, despite the sheer fact that the U.S. remains by far the largest military power, overtaking the next twelve in the global hierarchy combined. The first signs of geo-political decline came just when several historians and observers were indulging in the comparison of the US' lonely position at the top of the world's power pyramid, following 'victory' in the Cold War, with the Roman or British empires. More sober analysis was content with the definition of America as 'the indispensable nation'. The question is: to what extent is it indispensable today?

In fact, when the West is talked about, the most frequent reference is to the transatlantic space, in particular between the United States and Western and Central Europe, the latter with its traditional ambiguity between the EU institutions and a cluster of medium and small states, even when they belong to them. After the heyday of the Cold War – often idealised well beyond reality – and

against many odds, the Atlantic Alliance survived the demise of its *raison d'etre.* The European partners contributed substantially to the advent of the aforementioned multipolar and interdependent world, which is witnessing a power shift whose depth and extent are uncertain. The question is: given this uncertainty, do the United States and Europe still share the same strategic and economic interests?

While the Europeans tend to question the legitimacy of US leadership less (suffice it to mention the case of Sarkozy's France) and its efficacy more, they are no longer seen as a important partners by a growing portion of Americans. Even many liberal internationalists implicitly or explicitly consider Europe's contribution to the building of a new world order negligible and tend to focus on the rising powers, in the widespread perception that the U.S. needs partners even more than in the past, unless it wants to go isolationist. The inadequate military contribution to the onus of upholding international security is a major factor in this disdain for the other side of the Atlantic, followed by the mentioned institutional ambiguities of the European 'subject' and the related return of national priorities in many EU member states – none of which is a global power if taken separately. It remains that the European Union is the world's largest international actor in trade, investment, research and foreign aid, well above China and India. Moreover it is still the geo-political actor most like-minded vis-à-vis the United States.

Things have been made even more difficult by the events following the 2008 financial crisis turned economic. The two shores of the Atlantic are now even more aware of their commonalities – such as high and growing public indebtedness – and of their mutual dependence in terms of both problems and solutions. The differences in their timings and approaches are hardly distinguishable from the internal differences on both sides. Relevant to this conference, two consequences are worth mentioning. First, the exposed weaknesses of economic liberalism may be such as to affect the stability of an international order based on interdependence and constructive international cooperation. A new emphasis on multipolarity may instead suggest a return to one based on balance of power as in 19th century Europe. Second, and regardless of the world order, the economic constrains are such as to seriously affect the foreign policy options and tools of both the Americans and the Europeans.

But also western polities and societies affected by the changing global status of the states they belong to. As for the former, attention is drawn here to the rise of populist, xenophobic, reactionary European parties or movements, opposed to their countries taking a larger burden in terms of peace keeping, human rights protection and fair development assistance, above all to receiving labour migrants, not withstanding their need for them. The last shortcoming is shared by the U.S., where the most acute problem, however, is the widening internal gap in revenues and wealth at the expense of the middle class and the American myth of the country of fairness and equal opportunity, once a source of pride vis-à-vis now rising economies, such as Brazil. Common to both sides of the Atlantic are the debt and the waste, characterizing their way of living – the latter particularly in the US – hardly a model for emerging countries, much less poor ones.

These problems in the political fabric of western nations risk affecting the strength of their societies, which are undergoing, as noted in the introduction, various kinds of transformation, of which two features may be of interest here. First, these transformations are shared by the Americans and by the Europeans more than by most other societies. Second, they are generally more advanced, although not necessarily more rapid, than in the rest of the world. We will not enter here in any detail regarding the areas of societal change chosen by this program. This is only to say that, with reference to the commonalities, they seem to be more evident in the fields of gender relations and internet penetration, although the latter is higher in the U.S. (78%) than in the EU (58%). Some discrepancies are visible instead when dealing with migrations, both for the obvious cultural

difference vis-à-vis the problem (the U.S. a nation of immigrants, Europe new to the challenge) and for the diverse ethnic and religious identity of the incomers. Possibly the area in which the distance has become most evident, at least in the past two decades, is that of religion, including the way faith is the object of proselytism.

Before turning to Islam, let us return for a moment to the scenario of surrender of two centuries of western global hegemony. Such a hypothetical development should not hide the huge impact this 'great culture', to use Spengler's terminology, has had on other civilisations, first thanks to Europe, then mainly to America. Even the current international system will continue to receive a decisive western imprint as long as the world does not 'de-westernise' as a by-product of the West's decline and possibly the rise of an alternative global structure, thanks to new powers or empires. Samuel Huntington identifies nine civilisations, more or less the same as the German philosopher did eight decades earlier: the West is one, of course, Islam another, and so is Latin America, for instance, or Japan, in his description. Then he famously says that they are bound to clash the way nations clashed in the past – a doubtful theory turned into a symbol.

Arab Islam as an interlocutor of the West

Islam has been the clashing civilisation *par excellence* in a widespread Western narrative, especially among conservatives. As in several previous such cases in history, large and expanding multitudes contribute to the alarm. Muslims represent a growing share of the global population, which is expected to increase further in the coming decades. According to the Pew Forum, the share is projected to go as high as 24.9% in 2020 and 26.4% in 2030, compared with 23.4% in 2010. Besides demography, Islam is an important and complex reality and the challenges it provides for western countries and societies are multiple: challenges that occasionally turn – or are perceived as turning – into threats.

Attention here is limited to that part of Islam that is Arab. It is not its largest portion: the five top Muslim populations do not include any Arab country. Nor is it its most important: no Arab state is among the BRICs, the group of the rising powers, and only one, history-rich Egypt, is listed by Goldman Sachs among the Next Eleven, the potentially emerging economies that may hopefully follow China, India and Brazil one day; no Arab state is among the G8, and only one, oil-rich Saudi Arabia, is among the G20, the supposedly new board room of Interdependence Inc.. Despite recurrent demands for an 'Arab bomb', the few initial and vulnerable attempts to build a nuclear device like the one, say, Pakistan has, were stopped by Israel. Few original contributions to multilateralism have come from the region, besides a weak and fractured Arab League. Past attempts to generate stronger cooperation or even integration, such as among Maghreb states, have failed completely. Random proclamations of unity by two or more countries have not had any serious content. In sum, at first glance the Arab world appears to be an intermediate area between a declining but still decisive Atlantic space and the rising Asian continent: hardly a relevant contributor to, and potentially a disturbance in the scenario of a new East-West duopoly turning into either rivalry, possibly confrontation, or dialogue, possibly concert.

This state of affairs was preceded by developments that took place under the predominant influence of external actors, once the fight for independence, largely the result of endogenous forces, was over. The end of colonisation became entangled with the advent of the Cold War, a foreign tension that had direct and indirect consequences in the region, including the experiments of secular states – more or less socialist, more or less capitalistic – turned regimes. The petrodollar bonanza did little in terms of modernisation and empowerment of Arab nation-states, including those hugely endowed with black gold. The end of the oil boom brought about the tutorship of the international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank in particular, that was exerted following their well known

criteria. Throughout, the United States has exerted the strongest external influence, dictated however by changing national security imperatives (containing the Soviet Union, ensuring oil supplies and fighting terrorism) and by the increasingly demanding unconditional guarantee extended to Israel. The European countries and their common institutions were potentially the most important partners, but they have largely failed to fulfill the task, taken as they have been by other priorities such as institutionally reforming and geographically extending the integration process while staying close to the U.S.. The EU actual or potential enlargement has frequently been employed as a policy template to be applied in the Southern Mediterranean. Thus Europe has been seriously underperforming and today even risks being overtaken by some new non-western external actors, such as China, from far away, or Turkey, nearby.

The polities of the Arab States, in particular those in North Africa and the Middle East, have resented these exogenous factors of influence. Many of the internal power elites have been able to consolidate thanks to their capability to adapt to, entrench with and exploit those factors. The priority request from outside political and economic actors has been stability – a priority that has helped the securitization of public affairs and the consequent enhancement of the internal role of the military. Another typically western request has been for the regimes to have legitimacy. Especially in the eyes of the Americans, legitimacy was to be obtained through democracy and democracy to be achieved through elections. Other qualifications of a modern state, such as the rule of law, separation and balance of powers, an independent judiciary – in sum a state apparatus not limited to the armed forces – did not get comparable attention, not even remotely. It was thus sufficient for the regimes to periodically organize more or less fake votes, often plebiscites. Economic growth, however unstable, unfairly distributed, and plagued with cronyism corruption and clientelism, was used to obtain domestic consensus to the extent possible, with the security apparatus taking care of the rest – a big part.

Speaking of democracy, a survey by the Center for Systemic Peace allows us to see a gradual increase in the number of democratic states in the world since the final phase of the Cold War. CSP adopts a distinction between democracies, autocracies and 'anocracies', i.e. 'states with incoherent or inconsistent authority patterns: partly liberal, partly authoritarian'. The evolution of the numbers of world countries seen to belong to each of the three groups, over the 1945-2010 period, is given in fig, 1.a for the world and fig1.b for the MENA region. The latter partly shares the global trend, including the decline of the autocracies towards the end of the 1980s, but until last year remained the only region on earth where autocracies prevail and democracies come last. It is obviously too soon to assess the impact of the so-called Arab Spring on that description, which came out before the Arab Spring started, or to predict the new light its advent may cast on the logstanding debate on whether the impediments to democracy in these countries derive from endogenous cultural, historical and religious factors or from excessive securitization and premature liberalization enhanced by the above mentioned exogenous pressures.

The Arabs have multiple selves, like people in all nations, and the respective, relative importance of each can change according to circumstances. Their current search for an identity, either in the home countries or abroad, is inevitably affected by the perceptions they have of the above problems of belonging, citizenship and place in a globalised world – besides of course those related to the present subsistence and future wellbeing. A survey conducted in 2008 by the Saban Center of the Brookings Institution shows the importance given by the polled individuals to their being Muslim prevailing over their national and Arab identities in that order. This may come as a confirmation of the current strength of the religious factor, but it is also an indication of the endemic weakness of the state-vs-citizenry relationship as well as of the commonality of the Arab cultural heritage and of the secular institutions relevant to it. Again the uprisings in North Africa have been characterized by mainly national references and symbols, thus may are such as to modify that picture.

Changing society in North Africa: the impact of Western old and new models

The societal change that has taken place on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean was subdivided in five areas when devising this project. For three of them there are precedents in history. Religious differences and consequent clashes have been recurrent. Problems related to the movement of migrants between North Africa on the one hand and Europe and the U.S. on the other have been there since colonial times. The gap between big business, including oil companies, and micro-business, as in the *suq*, is certainly not new. But two instances of change are unprecedented instead. One is what may be called a metamorphosis in the role of women, which has been occurring over the last one or two generations – a metamorphosis in the history of humanity since its very origin. The other is the dramatic spread of telecommunications, above all of the use of the internet, which exploded only ten years ago. (Incidentally, the two phenomena happen to be those most common to the Americans and the Europeans, as said above.)

The fall in fertility rates is a major symptom of the feminine revolution. As fig. 2 shows, over the last fifty years there has been a decline in the total births per woman in all regions of the world. Noteworthy is the fact that the data for MENA, still around the same level as Sub-Saharan Africa in the '60s and the '70s, underwent a rapid decrease through the '80s and '90s so as to rank slightly below those for the East Asia-Pacific in the last decade. A profound transformation of the Arab family structure has taken place as a consequence, in a time interval that is approximately one tenth of what it took European families over the 19th and 20th centuries. Though Middle Eastern fertility rates remain higher than the world average, they appear to converge along with the other world regions, with the only – temporary? – exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, towards a zero-growth rate. When that will be reached will have a great importance on how our earth will look like in the coming few decades. It may be worth noting, by the way, that the convergence of fertility rates in all world regions is occurring without visible distinctions related to civilization, culture or religion, thus supporting the argument that the role of women in society is dictated prevalently by socio-economic conditions.

The growing and increasingly open presence of women in public life is another symptom of the gender revolution. Public offices, religious (mainly Muslim) circles, and small enterprises in the Arab countries, but also in the diaspora, are witnessing this development. Women took to the streets in past, occasionally violent, demonstrations but their presence in the recent and current uprisings appears to be different in nature and a sign of their emancipation. Participation in public life however proceeds on a much slower path than birth control because the resistance by men and institutions is more effective in this case. Both the curbing of fertility and the increase in public presence are products of various factors, the most important of which is probably the spreading of education among girls – often more than among boys, by the way.

The influence of the West on the process of Arab women empowerment has taken various forms, from the colonial heritage in the homeland to the interaction between migrant women and host societies in the diaspora. Then there has been the permeating spread of TV and music, with interesting intercultural mixing phenomena, and more recently of the web, which provides women with a new instrument of communication and interaction with the outside world from inside the perimeter of the home. Thirdly there are the substantial number of religious or secular private organizations, explicitly or implicitly dealing with gender issues. These various forms or vehicles of influence appear to be subject to some reappraisal now in their philosophies as well as in their operational procedures, as a consequence of the recent developments. In two respects, one endogenous and one exogenous. The former consists in the rediscovery of national, cultural and religious roots: phenomena such as Islamic feminism, pious commercial or social entrepreneurship,

the Muslim blogosphere, discussed in the respective contributions to this conference, are relevant symptoms. The other relevant phenomenon is globalization and the consequent beginning of a gradual thinning out of the western imprint into a broader, trans-cultural blend.

The second instance of unprecedented transformation is the skyrocketing number of ordinary people acceding to the web. From 2001 to 2011 internet users in the MENA region increased twenty-fold to reach a penetration of some 32% of the population. That is in fact slightly above the global average but well below that in Europe and North America, both specified above. Moreover, of North-African countries, only Tunisia was above the regional average on the eve of the uprisings, while Libya was trailing at a distance with a meager 5% – a meaningful indicator of the backwardness in which the relatively bloody regime change has taken place in that country.

The importance of closely connected PCs and cellphones in bringing about successful mobilizations in the Arab Spring has been largely reported and illustrated by the media. Equally widely discussed has been the subsequent failure of those communications tools to build up structures, because of their 'horizontal' nature, and to generate a durable countervailing power to 'pyramidal' bodies such as the military and the religious organizations – however fissured or even fractured either two may end up being. Nonetheless it would be a mistake to consider the extremely multiform involvement of Arab Islam in the web (the Berkman Center estimated at some 35,000 the Arab blogs in 2009) just a flash in the pan. Something profoundly new and irreversible has happened. The reporting on events and the spreading of messages have taken place instantly for the benefit of small and large audiences: in the neighborhood, in the city, in the country and all over the world. Despite their greater means of repression, often using the same web-based technologies as popular expression, governments are now more susceptible than in the past to requests for transparency, accountability and justice, coming from people who they know are having new capabilities of mobilization. Hence the challenge to the traditional top-down models, in both the political and the religious realms.

The other facets of transformation in Southern Mediterranean societies are not as revolutionary as the two discussed above, but may be as relevant. They are interwoven with them and among themselves to a notable extent. Religion is one of these. Islamists are bound to gain influence in the political sphere from which they were excluded by the fallen regimes. At least in a first phase this influence will be felt to varying degrees from country to country; it will generate problems in western attitudes and policies towards the area, including respect for Christian minorities; it will encourage a pessimistic reading of the outcome of the uprisings as the Trojan horse for the return of Islam instead of the blossoming of democracy. The question is whether and to what degree conservative Islam will remain the same when operating in the new environment. The Europeans may find keys to understanding this question in the Polish experience. The Church and the Catholic majority of the people played a crucial role getting rid of the Soviet yoke in their country. Then the increasing integration with western Europe following membership in the EU has brought about a process of secularization.

Transatlantic policy options towards the changing Mediterranean microcosm

The Mediterranean has rarely been an area of high priority and harmony in the European-American relationship. Most of the concerns are broadly shared, but the relative priorities have often been different and shifting. The United States sought strategic stability during the Cold War and constantly reduced its military presence thereafter; moreover it has focused on the Gulf and above all Israel; the terrorist threat hidden among visitors and immigrants has been an important issue for Americans after 9/11. The European states and the E.U. have been also concerned by Mediterranean stability but more from the angle of economic development and interdependence; oil and gas

supplies have of course been critical; lately crime and religion infiltrating via the immigration have also been a source of problems.

This state of affairs has just been shaken by the uprisings that began in North African, briefly discussed in the previous two chapters. The fact that they took both the Americans and the Europeans by surprise has been repeated at nauseam. The interesting thing is that, after the long period of important external influence, essentially western, mentioned, the build up of anti-authoritarian movement has been largely endogenous, like the anti-colonial one was decades before, even though due appreciation must be given to the western cultural influence that permeated the background of several of the groups initiating the demonstrations. The West has found itself far less relevant than in the past and, though with nuances and different reaction times, has embraced what it calls the Arab Spring. But it has tended to frame it in its own image rather than in the changing local realities that are at the source of that endogenous transformation.

At the moment of writing the results of the Tunisian vote are the object of much reporting and analysis. Other sessions of this conference will provide the opportunity of going into the matter. Attention will also be devoted to lessons to be possibly learned about the next ballot, the one the Egyptians will shortly go to. The outcome of both consultations will of course be important for the future if the region and further discussion of it will take place in due time, but that the electoral process is insufficient to define a democratic state should be stressed here.

Before going into the implications of all this for policy options, reference should be made to Libya as a different case: in two respects. The late Colonel Gadafi leaves behind a country he successfully prevented from becoming either a state or a nation. Symbolic may be the fact that this was the only case in which the rebels and the regime waved different flags throughout their fighting. This means that a new multi-national state structure will have to be built from scratch, provided that protracted inter-ethnic tensions can be prevented from degrading into a civil war. Open to question is whether this will allow for more or less influence from outside, namely from the West, where the dictator's family and acolytes established many Libyan economic and financial interests and where most of the oil conglomerates interested in the huge local resources are located. Which leads me to the second aspect of Libyan specificity. The uprising was endogenous here too, but different from the neighboring countries in that it could probably not succeed without external support, western support in particular. Hence the need to dwell upon the subject a little bit more, though necessarily in sketchy terms.

The outcome of western action in Libya is open to almost opposite readings. On the positive side: unlike what happened in the Balkans, the Europeans took the initiative in this case while the U.S. adopted a low key role famously described as 'leading from behind'; NATO military operations from the sky were on the whole a success, without any loss and with minimal collateral killings; the mission mandated by the UN was implemented, extending it with decently managed ambiguity; the UN's involvement in the situation, which incidentally provided the first opportunity to apply the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) provision, was not the only one by an international body, though that of the Arab League was rather ambiguous and oscillating; another important diplomatic success was the participation of a number Arab states, though to differing degrees. In sum an operation that stands much better in comparison with, say, Afghanistan. On the negative side: serious discrepancies surfaced in the Atlantic Alliance, with a reluctant U.S. pointing out at the insufficient European capabilities to act militarily in an area of their prime interest; even deeper were the divisions among the Europeans with hyper-atlanticist Poland joining the still atlanticist Germany in preferring the company of Russia and China over their allies when voting in the UNSC; protagonists Sarkozy and Cameron overshadowed participation by other states and totally eclipsed the EU's High Representative and the newborn External Action Service; in Washington the Libya

operation, until its successful accomplishment became visible, was frequently mentioned as the number one example of what US foreign policy should no longer contemplate. Following the two opposite readings, there are some who consider the procedure adopted by the alliance on this occasion as a potential paradigm for future action, while others have suggested that this should be the last joint NATO operation ever.

The dilemma may be usefully kept in mind when turning back to the region. First we must remind ourselves of the two new tough realities described above: the more limited room for western influence and action in the Arab and Muslim world, and the severe financial constraints on the US and European foreign policies in both the security and economic realms, forcing governments to establish priorities and make choices more than in the past. Hence the need to do better with less, rather that indulging in the futile rhetoric of a Marshall Plan. It is within this strait jacket that the two sides of the Atlantic must address the traditional alternative with a new vision: whether to act separately or with a sufficiently agreed, preferably coordinated, division of labor, in the light of their partly different but still partly shared interests.

Europe has higher stakes, as is well known, and higher vulnerabilities. Its current energy dependency amounts to some 50% of its consumption and is on the rise. Demography adds to that a demand for imported labor answered by a currently excessive offer in quantitative, but not in qualitative terms. The consequences of an unravelling of the EU common policy on immigrants, including its implementation would be very serious for the European standing in the region. Moreover the capabilities of the individual states to handle current and potential security challenges remain inadequate: if new crisis management requirements emerge, they may find out that following from the front can be as tricky, possibly trickier, than leading from behind. The U.S. has discovered that it may have lost some ground in North Africa, possibly more that its allies, but also that change in the region has negatively affected its stand on Israel and in the Gulf, and thus that it needs a different strong role – not only in military terms.

The survey of western differences and commonalities vis-à-vis the region should cover the respective relationships with Turkey, whose attitudes and actions are undergoing a profound change susceptible of offering opportunities as well as raising obstacles. Policy options to be considered should thus go beyond the hoary issue of Turkish membership in the EU, which significantly contributed to Transatlantic mistrust. Similarly hoary is the advisability of a better consultation across the Atlantic on the Palestinian-Israeli knot, after the apparent failure of the Quartet formula in confronting the latest developments. Differences on the issue, however, may be more serious within each side than between the two. Both questions are critical as to which extent Europe and the United States can come to a shared understanding of what Mediterranean stability means or whether they will have to live with different assessments. This having said, the author admits that as far as the short term is concerned he is unable to go much further than the apparently obvious conclusion that the multiple and difficult challenges and the severe constraints on the West to deal with them would require, first, the Europeans to get their acts together and, second, mutual acknowledgement on the two sides of the Atlantic that they still need each other in many, though not necessarily all, instances.

The purpose of this project, however, is to go beyond the short term and the traditional sphere of foreign policy and try to advance a longer term strategy for Europeans and Americans to maintain sufficient leverage in the area within a more balanced relationship that takes into account the changing societies on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The analysis conducted in the five related chapters suggests that both the extent and the nature of the change may be such as to make understanding between peoples more important today than in the ambiguous conditions that existed under the regimes.

Three directions for potential action seem to deserve priority in order to help those reformist orientations that exist and to reduce distances and enhance communication between our respective cultures and societies while being compatible to as much as possible with the new polity of the region. One is related to religion and values, a second to institutions and a third to the private sector and civil society. A prerequisite for the first is the effort to go beyond both American and European, often opposed, stereotypes and to grasp the potential of transformation of an Islam that is now part of the power structure in North African countries, along the lines referred to above and thoroughly discussed in the paper dealing with the matter in this project. Maximum consistency in addressing the issue in relation to the immigrant diaspora and to western policies towards the origin countries should also be sought. The problem area is closely related to others in this project, the one of the role of women being obviously pre-eminent. The influence of religiously inspired circles both from Europe and the U.S. on the issue of birth control in its various facets should be the object of appropriate attention, for instance, including the related ambiguous convergences with conservative Muslim organizations.

Concerning democratic institutions, the imperative of looking beyond the requirement of elections, whether free and fair or not, to the requirements of a modern state, consistent with the local culture but also compatible with standards now recognised by a spectrum of countries that stretches beyond the West, has already been repeatedly stressed in this paper, including the prerequisite of putting our houses back in order as far fairness and social justice are concerned. Attention is rather called to the option of going back to trying to encourage multilateralism in the new political context, from the regional to the transregional level. The United States has a longstanding tradition in this respect, possibly a little rusty lately, and the European Union has taken a number of initiatives of this kind in its diverse neighbourhood, some more some less successful, the latter unfortunately particularly in the Mediterranean area. Disappointment however should not compromise the future. The question may be asked, what has multilateralism to do with changing societies? The answer is partly rooted in the clauses of conditionality, most frequently applied to civil societies via requirements on human rights. The record of cases is rich. Of course, conditionality becomes trickier to apply when the western actor has less economic and/or strategic leverage to impose it. Hence the need to look for ways to restore leverage wherever possible. But conditionality is only part of the answer: multilateralism can have – even though not necessarily always has – a broader, environmental effect on inter-societal relations, in so far as it can provide the institutional framework for them to develop.

Which brings us to the third and final priority, contemplating a more effective role for the vast array of instruments the western private sector has at its disposal, ranging from business circles to think tanks and religious or secular NGOs. Both the United States and Europe have a remarkable and longstanding record in this field in their dealings with Latin America, Eastern Europe, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, etc. that is with those regions or countries that were listed above as being on the periphery of the West or potential bridges between the West and other cultures. Sometimes the initiatives are shared by the two sides of the Atlantic, sometimes they reflect different degrees of interest and communications with the concerned partners. Sometimes they have been strictly private, sometimes they have benefited from public support. In general, the Americans have played a leading or dominant role thanks, above all, to their richly endowed foundations. The results have often, not necessarily always, been useful in helping western relations through people-to-people exchanges and in conveying messages, occasionally two-way, to the interlocutors.

More recently the effort was extended to the Middle East, also profiting from the involvement of Gulf sovereign funds, especially as far as think tanks and business related activities are concerned. But the field is wider and more varied than that. While the policies of the various governments

involved are the regular object of critical analysis there seems to be much less literature to survey the adequacy and the benefits of the above mentioned parts of the private sector operating in the region, in North Africa in particular. That applies to all the five areas in which our study of a changing society has been subdivided – religion, gender, internet, entrepreneurship and migrations – and one can easily think of existing or potential private sector initiatives related to one or more of them. At first glance the comparison with the precedents just mentioned in other regions or countries appear to be unfavourable, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. But the undertakings in question are in fact private, that is in principle spontaneous and free from governmental control in democratic countries. They reflect different interests and orientations and any evaluation can come to different results depending on the angle – cultural or religious, economic or political – from which it is being made.

An assessment may however be appropriate at this stage, in the light of the profound transformation that has been occurring on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Both the US State Department and the European Union, on their very different scales, have become aware of the need to complement traditional foreign policy activities with timid initiatives aimed at civil societies (the author admits to not being *au courant* of whether and what the single European governments are doing in this field). The said eventual assessment may help provide this 'second track' diplomacy, as it has been called in Washington, with a better compass and possibly encourage the allocation of more resources in a time of scarcity. But the private sector itself – the world of foundations comes to mind first – should consider making something of a comprehensive survey of their own activities so as to allow for a critical analysis and inspiration for change in the future.

Footnotes and bibliography to be added in the final version

Figure 1.a: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/global2.htm



Figure 1.b: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/mideast2.htm



Figure 2 (*Graph based on latest World Bank data)*



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