

## EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

### Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks

E-newsletter of the European Network of Independent Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Think Tanks

#### NEW CHALLENGES FACING THE UN NUCLEAR AGENCY - AN INTERVIEW WITH JACEK BYLICA



Mr Jacek Bylica took up his post as Chief of Cabinet to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna in January 2020. Prior to this appointment by Director General R.M.Grossi, Amb. Bylica since 2013 worked for the EU as Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament based at EEAS headquarters. Between 2008 and 2013 he was the Head of WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO International Staff in Brussels. As a career diplomat in the Polish diplomatic service since late 1980s, from 2004 to 2008 Amb. Bylica was Resident Representative of Poland to the UN Office, the OSCE, and other international organisations and control regimes in Vienna.

##### What are the Agency's main priorities concerning nuclear installations in the context of armed conflicts, specifically in the case of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)?

The world is witnessing for the first time a major conventional conflict being fought in a country possessing an extensive civilian nuclear programme with a number of nuclear facilities and plenty of nuclear material.

That is why, immediately after the Russian invasion, the focus of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been to prevent any nuclear or radiological incidents, while continuing to apply nuclear safeguards under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since January 2023 IAEA experts have been stationed on long-term basis in all Ukraine's NPPs, including from September 2022 at the ZNPP, which has been under Russian control since March 2022.

The most important milestone of IAEA's efforts was at a UN Security Council meeting on 30 May 2023 when five concrete principles for protecting nuclear safety and security were established by the Agency's Director-General, Rafael Grossi: [1] there should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant; [2] the plant should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons or military personnel which could be used for an attack from the plant; [3] off-site power should not be put at risk; [4] all structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of the ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage; [5] no action should be taken to undermine these principles.

There is no doubt that the five principles, which are a result of months of negotiations with both sides, have been very successful, as the number of military accidents in the vicinity of ZNPP has markedly decreased compared to the previous year. However, the situation remains precarious and continues to be closely monitored by the Agency, including by the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to ZNPP (ISAMZ), now in its twentieth rotation.

##### Some civilian nuclear programmes raise proliferation concerns in the West, in particular those that are being developed with assistance from Russia and China. What can the Agency do to address those concerns?

With global nuclear energy demand and concerns about climate change on the rise, nuclear power continues to play an important role in the energy mix of many countries, including in a number of EU Member States. At the beginning of 2024 there were 412 operating nuclear reactors in 31 countries worldwide, providing circa 10% of global electricity. There are now 58 reactors under construction in 17 countries. China is building the highest number of domestic reactors, while Russia is a major vendor, building nuclear power plants abroad including in EU and NATO Member States.

Choosing a vendor is a sovereign decision of each country, nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities. The achievement and maintenance of a high level of safety during the lifetime of nuclear facilities and the duration of activities requires a sound governmental, legal and regulatory framework.

IAEA works to strengthen such frameworks in its Member States through its safety standards and review services.

The IAEA is required by its Statute to promote international cooperation. Its Statute authorises it to establish or adopt safety standards for the protection of health and to minimise the danger to life and property. The Agency develops such standards on the basis of an open and transparent process for gathering, integrating and sharing the knowledge and experience gained from the use of technologies and from the application of the Safety Standards themselves. The IAEA offers its Member States a wide array of review services in which an IAEA-led team of experts compare actual practices with IAEA standards in, for example, nuclear safety and security, energy and safeguards or the health sector.

You mention proliferation concerns. These are addressed by the Agency's robust system of safeguards. Safeguards are implemented in accordance with the type of safeguards agreement in force for the particular Member State. They are obviously different for Russia and China, as nuclear-weapon states, than for countries which are non-nuclear-weapon states. In 2023 the Agency was able to draw soundly based conclusions for all states for which safeguards were implemented by the Agency.

##### The Iranian nuclear programme continues to be a major source of concern, not least in light of the escalating tensions in the Middle East. What is the Agency currently doing in this regard?

The Iranian nuclear issue has been high on the international agenda for over two decades. The EU, particularly some of its Member States, played a very important role in the negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. However, since February 2021 Iran has not implemented any of its nuclear-related commitments under JCPOA, including implementation of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). This has seriously affected the IAEA's verification and monitoring, although it is continuing under the CSA.

The Iranian nuclear programme has been growing in both size and sophistication. Also, some outstanding safeguarding issues remain unresolved. This, combined with some public statements stemming from Iran, has increased concerns about the correctness and completeness of reports provided by Iran under its NPT obligations. Unless these concerns are resolved, the Agency will not be able to provide assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The Agency's verification work continues, as do its contacts with the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of the recent tragic accident in the country. DG Grossi has travelled to Teheran a number of times, most recently in early May 2024.

#### CLASH AT THE UN OVER ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

On 24th April, a draft resolution aimed at preventing the deployment of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in space, was rejected by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as Russia used its veto power. The resolution, introduced by the US and Japan, largely reaffirmed the obligations undertaken in 1967 by the states party to the Outer Space Treaty (OST). A proposed amendment from China and Russia urging the Council to take immediate action to prevent the placement of weapons in space, as well as banning any threat or use of force there, also failed to pass.

Russia's veto has heightened concerns about space militarisation, particularly following US intelligence reports indicating that Russia is developing a nuclear anti-satellite weapon to put in space. Following the vote, the US accused Russia of undermining the global non-proliferation regime. Russia's permanent representative at the UNSC defended Moscow's position claiming that the resolution was overly narrow, as it focused exclusively on banning WMDs, and failed to cover other crucial aspects of the weaponisation of outer space that are equally threatening. The Chinese representative, which abstained from the vote, argued that the issue of WMDs represented only one aspect of outer space security governance. He added that the amendment proposed by China contained language from a previously supported General Assembly resolution.

The US, Russia, China and other spacefaring nations have different approaches to preventing an arms race in outer space that reflect their contrasting geopolitical interests and the role they play in international fora. The US aims at maintaining strategic dominance while advocating for norms of responsible behaviour in space. In line with this dual approach, it has called for a moratorium on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons testing. On 18th April 2022, after Russia conducted a direct-ascent ASAT test, the Biden Administration announced a unilateral self-ban on ASAT weapons testing. The EU welcomed this US commitment, which was joined by France and Germany.

In 2002 Russia, along with China, proposed a ban on the use of force and the deployment of weapons in space. In 2008 they presented a draft at the UN Conference of Disarmament (CD) for a 'Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)', which has been opposed by the US. Negotiations at the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on reducing space threats are currently at a standstill. The EU has continuously advocated for the establishment of a global normative framework to regulate space activities. The space strategy for security and defence adopted by the EU in March 2023 reiterated the EU's support to multilateral efforts to reduce space threats.

Russia's veto has once again highlighted deep divisions among major spacefaring nations on how to address the militarisation of space. It underscores the geopolitical complexities and differing priorities among major powers regarding space security. Navigating these tensions and finding a common ground among member states within the OEWG is a daunting challenge. What has ultimately stopped states from agreeing on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is their wish to not have their freedom of action hindered. This has led to a recurring impasse. The way forward should involve continuing the dialogue within the OEWG and seeking to incorporate the perspectives of all actors, while trying to balance the need for strategic security with the imperative to maintain outer space as a global common free from conflict.

Maria Vittoria Massarin, junior researcher within IAI's Defence and Security programmes.

# Latest Publications

Intangible Transfers of Technology and Software: Challenges for the Missile Technology Control Regime. Lauriane Héau and Kolja Brockmann. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

The failed negotiations to restore the Iran nuclear deal. Tom Sauer. Global Policy

Crisis Prevention and Management in South Asia: Mutual Confidence, Risk, and Responsibility. Chiara Cervasio, Nicholas J. Wheeler, and Mhairi McClafferty. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

What Happened to Demand? Getting Small Arms Control Back on Track. Callum Watson and Aline Shaban. EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers no. 88, March 2024

## Network Calls

The *Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP)* is recruiting three trainee research assistants, ideally Masters students or recent graduates, with an interest in international peace and security issues.

More info: [Here](#)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) seeks to appoint the next Head of our Strategy, Technology and Arms Control (STAC) programme in IISS-Europe Office. The role is based in Berlin, reporting to the Director, Defence, Technology and Future Conflict.

More info: [Here](#)

The European Leadership Network (ELN) is seeking a Policy Fellow in Multilateral Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. A Policy Fellow at the ELN helps ensure that the organisation is influential and effective in building better security for Europe. The position holder will play a key part in building ELN's influence by using its policy development to inform government decision-making in relation to multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

More info: [Here](#)

The European Leadership Network (ELN) is seeking a Senior Policy Fellow in Multilateral Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Senior Policy Fellows at the ELN will help ensure that the organisation is influential and effective in building better security for Europe through an innovative, well-evidenced, and practical policy agenda. The position holder will lead the ELN's programme on multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, focusing on ways to strengthen the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

More info: [Here](#)

## EU NEWS

### STATEMENT ON THE ATTEMPTED SATELLITE LAUNCH BY NORTH KOREA

ON 28 MAY, THE EU CONDEMNED THE LAUNCH OF A SATELLITE WITH MILITARY BALLISTIC TECHNOLOGY BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) ON 27 MAY. THIS LAUNCH CONSTITUTED A CLEAR AND FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

ACCORDING TO THE EU, THE DPRK'S DISREGARD FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS CONTINUES TO THREATEN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY; AND CALLED ON PYONGYANG TO CEASE ALL ACTIONS THAT RAISE TENSIONS AND TO ACCEPT OFFERS OF DIALOGUE FROM THE MAIN PARTIES.

READ THE FULL STATEMENT: [HERE](#)

## NETWORK NEWS

### 2024 ASSER INSTITUTE/OPCW WMD TRAINING PROGRAMME ON DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION NORMS REGARDING THE USE AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ARE UNDER PRESSURE. THE THREAT POSED BY NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAS REACHED LEVELS OF URGENCY NOT SEEN SINCE THE COLD WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS A GROWING DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONALS WITH THE NECESSARY LEGAL, TECHNICAL AND POLICY EXPERTISE TO TACKLE THE CHALLENGES OF TODAY'S NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT AGENDA. REGISTER NOW FOR THE FIFTEENTH TRAINING PROGRAMME ON DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, CO-ORGANISED WITH THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OPCW) ON 30 SEPTEMBER TO 4 OCTOBER 2024 IN THE HAGUE.

DURING THIS INTENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAMME, YOU WILL RECEIVE A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FRAMEWORK. YOU WILL LEARN FROM RENOWNED EXPERTS AND PRACTITIONERS IN THE FIELD AND ENGAGE IN ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT KEY TOPICS AND CURRENT DEBATES. THE PROGRAMME ALSO PROVIDES YOU WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD YOUR PROFESSIONAL NETWORK WITH EXPERTS IN THE FIELD, AS WELL AS WITH YOUR FELLOW PARTICIPANTS.

FIVE FULL SCHOLARSHIPS (TUITION FEE, INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, ACCOMMODATION AND PER DIEM) ARE AVAILABLE FOR CANDIDATES WORKING IN THE FIELD OF WMD FROM LOW/LOWER MIDDLE INCOME ECONOMIES OF THE WORLD BANK. DEADLINE 23 JUNE 2024.

FOUR TUITION FEE ONLY SCHOLARSHIPS ARE AVAILABLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATIVES (INCLUDING NGOS, THINK TANKS, RESEARCH OR ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS). DEADLINE 23 JULY 2024.

MORE INFO: [HERE](#)

### 7TH PRAGUE SPACE SECURITY CONFERENCE

ON JUNE 16—18, 2024, THE PRAGUE SECURITY STUDIES INSTITUTE (PSSI) WILL CONVENE IN PRAGUE ITS 7TH PRAGUE SPACE SECURITY CONFERENCE, ENTITLED "FORGING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS IN THE GLOBAL SPACE RACE". THE CONFERENCE WILL REFLECT THE RATHER SHARP DETERIORATION IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING RUSSIA'S CONTINUED WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE, CHINA'S ACCELERATING ESTRANGEMENT FROM THE WEST, INCREASED MILITARY PROVOCATIONS BY IRAN, AN ESCALATING NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR AND MISSILE THREAT -- AND WHAT ALL THIS TURMOIL AND MORE MEANS FOR SPACE SECURITY GLOBALLY. IT PROMISES TO PROVIDE UNIQUE INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES CONCERNING HOW THESE AND OTHER TERRESTRIAL CHALLENGES IMPACT ON THE SPACE DOMAIN AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL SPACE ECONOMY.

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Funded by  
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Union