

Green Deal Watch

Issue no.14

Building the
Green Deal 2.0

About the Green Deal Watch

The “Green Deal Watch” was launched in 2020 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. The aim of the project is to follow the evolution of the ambitious and cross-cutting “European Green Deal” (EGD) strategy towards climate neutrality launched by the Von der Leyen Commission in December 2019. The “Green Deal Watch” follows the “Energy Union Watch” which IAI published from 2015 to 2019 to monitor the evolution of energy and climate policies under the previous legislature. IAI covers the debate among national and European stakeholders and reports the key dynamics in order to help the reader better navigate the challenges and opportunities of implementation of the EGD. The Watch is produced on a quarterly basis, collecting official documents, public information and open source data, which are processed and analysed by the IAI team.

About IAI

The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation, focusing on topics such as European integration, security and defence, energy and climate policies, as well as key regions such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas. The IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffarInternazionali), two book series (Trends and Perspectives in International Politics and IAI Research Studies) and other paper series related to IAI research projects.

<https://www.iai.it/en/>

About the authors

Lorenzo Colantoni is Senior Fellow of the Energy, Climate and Resources (ECR) Programme of IAI.

Margherita Bianchi is the Head of the ECR Programme of IAI.

With the support of **Nicolò Ferretti and Veronica Calienno**, trainees at the ECR Programme of IAI.

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This is the 14th issue of the Green Deal Watch, a quarterly report produced by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. This publication aims at monitoring and analysing the initiatives launched by the European Commission and discussed by EU institutions and member states under the umbrella of the Green Deal. Starting from Issue 12, the Green Deal Watch IAI no longer follows the former division into four dimensions: "Driving the Green Deal", "Greening Industry", "Supporting the Transformation" and "Strengthening Security and Diplomacy". Instead, each issue is now structured as an analytical assessment of the main Green Deal developments in the three months that it covers.

In each issue, the analysis is followed by an interview. This time we look at the conversation between Francesco Corvaro, Special Envoy for Climate Change of the Italian Government, and Nathalie Tocci, director of IAI.

A timeline of initiatives envisaged under the European Green Deal concludes this report.

OVERVIEW | BUILDING THE GREEN DEAL 2.0

The Green Deal is alive, at least for the time being. The June European elections did not deliver the shift into the composition of the European Parliament that many feared. With the [confirmation](#) of Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President, the Green Deal initiative – flagship of her previous term – will keep existing also during her second one. In her political [guidelines](#) for the 2024-2029 cycle, Ursula Von der Leyen indeed stated that the Commission “must and will stay the course on the goals set out in the European Green Deal”, claiming the importance of a solid decarbonization path for the Union. However, it is not yet clear what shape this initiative will take – whether it will change substantially to accommodate the changing European political and economic landscape, and how the need to implement the astounding amount of legislation enacted in the past five years will impact the next steps of the Green Deal itself.

The composition of the European Parliament has not changed particularly after the elections but the greens entered the “governing majority”. [Comparing](#) the outgoing hemicycle with the upcoming constitutive session, the European People’s Party (EPP) remains the leading party (188 seats vs 179 in 2019-2024), followed by the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D, which obtained 136 seats instead of 138). Not by chance, similarly to [2019](#), von der Leyen has been elected thanks to the support of the EPP, the S&D and the liberal group Renew Europe. Scratching under the surface, there have been however some less apparent, but still relevant changes: Renew Europe has lost twenty seats (from 98 to 78) and the support to a second von der Leyen Commission has been much less compact in the EPP than in the past, particularly from [French members](#) belonging to the Les Républicains party. A deal with the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) was excluded as it would have likely threatened the support from the Socialists, and von der Leyen had thus to resort to the help of the Greens (despite these having abstained over the 2019 candidature and having lost 17 seats in these past elections). Patriots for Europe, a new far right group that swallowed the former Identity and Democracy, also showed relevant gains, jumping from 49 to 84 seats, despite the [epuration](#) of the German AfD. This new setup thus implied that the greens entered the “governing majority” and that von der Leyen did not need to bend over backwards to lure the climate-sceptic European Conservatives and Reformists as to secure her re-election. Indeed, she

did not, presenting a fairly ambitious agenda that held the line on the Green Deal.

Different domestic circumstances compared to the previous institutional cycle have impacted the debate. The situation has evolved in recent times particularly for France and Germany. In the past two years, several MS have shifted towards a right-wing government (Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Italy, and Sweden), some of them with mixed attitudes towards the Green Deal (particularly Italy and the Netherlands). The most relevant and recent changes however took place in France and Germany; Macron called for snap domestic elections following the Le Pen's National Rally net victory in the last European elections, which the far right-wing party came close to win. Only a series of strategic moves by the left-wing alliance New Popular Front and Macron's Ensemble could lead to the success of the coalition (despite the National Rally being anyway France's first party). While a Le Pen victory would have likely resulted in a significant reduction of French Green Deal [ambitions](#), the mixed electoral results have however weakened Macron and increased confusion on the French political scene, eventually leading to the appointment of Michel Barnier as Prime Minister. Perhaps the situation in Germany is however even more complicated, especially considering that the 2025 federal elections are approaching; Chancellor Scholz's Social Democrats suffered from the [worst performance](#) in a century during the last European elections, adding to an already low approval rate. Such a negative picture however got worse when the far right party AfD won a historic victory in the state elections for Thuringia in [September](#) – the first since it was created eleven years ago. Considering the significant [opposition](#) of the AfD to climate policies and the already tough discussion in Germany on several key Green Deal issues, this situation will likely bring further uncertainty in Brussels.

As much as climate was central in the electoral debate (see our [previous Green Deal Watch issue](#)), it will likely remain very politicised for the months to come. Immediately after the elections, the EPP's leader Manfred Weber [attacked](#) the much debated 2035 phase out of the internal combustion engine, promising a reverse of the ban thanks to the success of the group in the latest elections. These declarations were also strengthened by the [call](#) for a "less restrictive Green Deal" by MEP Peter Liese, and were shortly followed by the [opposition](#) of the S&D which strongly backs the ban. More generally, several MEPs have been very vocal about the future of the Green Deal: Alexandr Vondra, a Czech MEP from the right-wing European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, envisages a more "[realistic](#)" climate policy in the future, while several among the Greens still [hope](#) for an even more ambitious Green Deal (despite their election results).

These visions have been at least partially translated into the groups action plans, impacting the negotiations on von der Leyen's second mandate. The EPP has been particularly [clear](#) in its priorities for the Green Deal: in addition to reverting the internal combustion engine ban they listed more investments in carbon, capture, usage and storage (CCUS), more space for low-carbon hydrogen, a new strategy for alternative fuels, more attention to small modular nuclear reactors (with the constitution of a dedicated industry alliance). Unsurprisingly, they have devoted strong attention to farmers' interests and above all, they have proposed a switch from a "Green Deal" to a "Green Deal for Growth", which should be achieved through an "Investment Plan for European Jobs". Renew and S&D are instead much more focused on [regulating agriculture](#), particularly through a reduction of pesticide use many farmers oppose. The S&D focus more on the social costs of the transition. In general, shifting priorities might bring

challenges (e.g., there's a risk that stronger attention on other policy pillars at the EU level – e.g., defense – are reflected in a smaller or slower disbursement of EU financial reallocations to the Green Deal) but at the same time there are also several opportunities if the industrial dimension of the decarbonisation is built wisely.

The European Green Deal is indeed now couched in a broader narrative highly focused on prosperity and competitiveness. While the Green Deal has significantly and positively evolved in the course of the past five years to address the pandemic and the Ukraine invasion (as widely discussed in our previous Green Deal Watch [issues](#)), some of the key factors that supported the initiative throughout its existence have now clearly changed: the consensus surrounding climate action in 2019 has much diminished and security and defence have [overcome](#) the climate crisis as a priority for European voters – likely one of the main causes behind the electoral losses suffered by the Greens. European Member States (MS) have also changed their attitude towards green priorities, with Germany for example approving a weakened climate law in April 2024. A general Green Deal fatigue is perhaps one of the reasons why the final Nationally Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) MS should have sent by the 30th of June have been delayed by many Member States: the documents are a requirement under the [2018 EU Governance Regulation](#) and are key to coordinate efforts to reach the 2030 emissions target, but many [have still not handed](#) their update to the Commission. The invasion of Ukraine and the pandemic produced spikes in heavy energy prices that hit a large share of the European population and economic activities. An inflation that only recently [returned](#) to 2.2% (but which still remains high for some MS) and a [still low economic growth](#) across the EU further exasperated some of the most fragile strata of the population, which in several cases have blamed the green agenda. These changed conditions are also one of the reasons why the European Green Deal is now embedded in a broader narrative on prosperity, with a specific attention to the industry.

Von der Leyen's picks for Vice Presidents and Commissioners suggest a renewed energy and climate architecture in the EU. Choices have been quite convoluted (starting from the [resignation](#) of Thierry Breton and his fiery criticism towards the Commission President) but were finally [announced](#) on September 17. A VP for a clean, just and competitive transition will be [tasked](#) to set the strategic vision on climate and energy. Considering the key industrial and international trade policies of the next phase of the Green Deal, the role will likely wield significant power in the external dimension of the Deal as well. The chosen candidate is Spain's current Vice President and Minister for the ecological transition Teresa Ribera Rodríguez: her profile is well known in Brussels and beyond for her significant experience as an international climate negotiator. In her current role she negotiated in Brussels the so-called Iberic exception during the crisis, among many other delicate dossiers. Energy and climate are also a competence of other Commissioners. The proposed Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth (which will also have competence over taxation – another very relevant addition considering the debate over an EU-wide energy taxation) is the Dutch Wopke [Hoekstra](#), while Dan [Jørgensen](#) (Denmark) is the Commissioner-designate for energy and housing. Another relevant role would be covered by Jessica [Roswall](#), designated Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy.

The Green Deal hierarchy in the designated college is however not crystal clear. France – whose proposed commissioner, Stéphane Séjourné, has been **asked** by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to work with Ribera to develop a new “Clean Industrial Deal” – has secured another particularly decisive nomination, on prosperity and industrial policy. The two Commissioners should indeed work in sync to deliver what Ursula Von der Leyen has promised in the first **100 days** of her mandate. But at the time being, debates around the industrial pillar of the Green Deal are highly debated between Member states, as smaller ones have repeatedly argued that the EU’s current state aid rules unfairly favour Europe’s larger countries, which have the fiscal firepower to support their industries and households – making their job particularly hard. Given the complexity of these challenges, it will be crucial to understand how all these key figures with fragmented competences will coordinate their strategic agenda and their work to follow a common vision. Indeed, while in the past five years Frans Timmermans coordinated the Green Deal agenda, an equivalent figure does not seem to exist anymore, and this proposed setup would likely give Ursula Von Der Leyen a stronger decision power. Nonetheless, all Commissioners will be “grilled” – to use a EU bubble jargon – on their views by the newly formed EP committees. All eyes on the hearings, to be **held** from November 4 to November 12.

The EU bubble is in the meantime discussing Draghi’s **report on European Competitiveness,** which was finally published in September. The report delivers a harsh statement that made headlines throughout Europe and beyond: either the EU will adapt to a (very much) changed world, or it will disappear. It then assesses what is required to avert this destiny – above all a huge investment push (some 750-800 billion euros per year to keep up with competitors), reforms in key sectors and a stronger European integration. The first of the ten chapters in the report addresses energy – clearly emphasising that one of the main reasons behind the current competitive gap suffered by the EU relies in high energy prices. The report also addresses many of the key questions over the future of the Green Deal through its strong focus on industry, decarbonisation and green tech and it is reasonable to assume that it will indeed somehow influence the energy and climate discussions in the new von der Leyen Commission: the report is indeed mentioned in several mission letters to the chosen Commissioners-designate.

Reducing the overall energy system cost is considered key although some among the measures proposed have been widely discussed in the past: Draghi underlines the need to reduce the volatility of gas prices to reduce the energy bill of both European companies and consumers (but above all for energy intensive industries - EIs). Many of the proposed solutions on the gas and electricity market have been however discussed widely in the past: e.g., the marginal pricing system and some dossiers have been recently negotiated and closed such as the electricity market design. According to Draghi the EU should also strengthen its joint gas purchasing activities to make best use of its collective bargaining power and reduce its exposure to volatile spot prices.

While proposing a tech neutral approach that will build on MS’ individual specificities, the report also suggests avoiding black and white solutions on cleantech: Draghi recommends avoiding focusing solely on a total repatriation of cleantech production (either impossible or too expensive), nor on a full reliance on cheap, foreign imports, rather to choose depending on sectors and on the added value for a EU production. In this sense he distinguishes between sectors where the EU has lost its comparative advantage entirely, those that are employment-rich,

those that are critical for security, and infant industries: they all require a different mix of trade and industrial policies ranging from accepting imports to bringing in foreign technology to setting up trade protections. In some areas it will be easier to choose: the advantage the EU has on solar panels is for example very limited, while the added value of wind turbines production is clear. In some it will be more complicated, as in the cases where competition is growing (hydrogen) or where China has a strong advantage and yet it will be crucial to develop an EU capacity, even if at great cost (e.g., batteries).

Draghi clearly remarks the need for public support to boost private funding, proposing joint EU financing – a solution that he has long since supported. And yet, **according** to Draghi this should be done “if the political and institutional conditions are in place.” Considering the strong reluctance of key Member States against joint EU debt (Germany, the Netherlands, and others in Northern Europe in particular), it is however not clear when these conditions will be met (or if).

Whatever this Green Deal 2.0 will be, it will face a complicated mission: matching its internal competitiveness agenda with its foreign reach. This second Von Der Leyen Commission will have to reconcile growth, environmental sustainability and security in a EU where the three are increasingly threatened and perceived more and more as incompatible. Matching a strategic and competitive internal agenda with an external one will require strong coordination and coherence – in particular with regard to the reshoring of critical supply chains, and to the role the Global Gateway.

IN-BETWEEN LEGISLATURES: OPEN DEBATES

As the economic and social impact of the ecological transition has become the dominant discussion in relation to the Green Deal, the Commission has been particularly active on topics such as the new industrial policy and improving European competitiveness in the race for clean technologies against China and the US, as well as reshoring part of the supply chains. The most relevant piece of legislation in this sense is the Net-Zero Industrial Act (NZIA), which has been finally **adopted** on the 27th of May and whose approach was echoed also by other items, such as the Strategic Agenda **approved** by the Council in June. While the Regulation does address longstanding key issues, its actual effectiveness has been **questioned** since the proposal stage. There is very little space for European coordination, and much is left to the implementation of MS: this not only reduces the possibility of leveraging the single market, but it does not address the heterogeneity of the EU's cleantech industry across countries and of European, regional, and national industrial initiatives. The proposed Platform is indeed not enough to boost synergies and attract more investments – the latter likely the most pressing issues for the European clean industry. The Regulation has a strong connection to another piece of legislation, the **Critical Raw Materials Act**, which was proposed alongside the NZIA in March 2023, has been approved in April 2024 and **entered into force** in May. The Commission is taking rapid action: its entry into force was also marked by the first meeting of the Critical Raw Materials Board, opened by Vice President Šefčovič, which should be key for the implementation and coordination of the tools provided. In particular, the EU has been particularly active in promoting partnerships through the Global Initiative and other tools with producing countries, particularly in **Sub Saharan Africa** and, more recently, **Australia**. This last agreement could prove useful for the EU also to indirectly access the Southeast Asian resources, a region where attention on critical minerals is growing but which Brussels has struggled to access, despite the relevant **involvement** of von der Leyen herself in previous years.

The “de-risking” strategy towards China will likely remain on the agenda. At the moment the EU is also trying to protect its industry through a series of **probes** into Chinese imports that are suspected of unfair state subsidies. While the investigations on wind turbines, wood flooring and tinsplate steel are still open, the probe on electric vehicles (EV) was closed during the summer, leading to the **announcement** of substantial tariffs on imports from Chinese carmakers by

current Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas on June 12. This have been **updated** on the 20th of August and ranged from 9% (for Tesla, which provided detailed information on the subsidies received for their Chinese production) to 36.3% for SAIC (considered a “non-cooperating company” in the investigation by the Commission). Also, European carmakers producing in China (BMW and Volkswagen) will be subject to an import duty of 20.3%, these taxes are on top of the 10% standard EU import levy. The decision triggered an immediate response by the Chinese government, accusing the EU of protectionism and Beijing finally **confirmed** it filed a lawsuit at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU’s move follows the much more radical approach of the US and Canada, which announced a 100% tariff on Chinese EV imports respectively in **May** and in **August** 2024, together with other levies covering steel and aluminium (for the US and Canada), and lithium batteries, critical minerals, solar cells, and semiconductors (for the US alone).

Such a debate has also touched another, emerging EU industry: hydrogen.

The Commission has indeed **announced** a second auction for its Hydrogen Bank for a total of 1.2 billion euros. While the industry expected a greater amount, it is however remarkably higher than the first (which was **720 million**) and has thus triggered the remarks of European players, which **pushed** the Commission to direct the funding to European producers. Competition is particularly fierce on electrolyzers, as China has allegedly **increased** its share of global manufacturing capacity from 10% in 2023 to 40% (at least according to the European hydrogen industry). This comes at the time in which the Commission is also under **scrutiny** by the European Court of Auditors, which in July criticised the 2030 targets as unachievable and politically driven in a dedicated report. The document was also critical towards the uncertainty that had surrounded the definition of green hydrogen for years and was finally cleared through the **additionality delegated act** in 2023, as it slowed down investments. The Court however praised the substantial rulebook enacted on the topic, and indeed this is going quickly forward: in **June** the Commission reached an agreement on hydrogen transmission rules with future operators. Cooperation on hydrogen production and trade has been also boosted through a series of **agreements** between European and Japanese companies during a visit of Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson to Japan in the summer. The joint **statement** of Simson and the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry however strongly focused on competition with China again; although Beijing is not mentioned directly, the document states that “[Japan and the EU] shared deep concerns about economic dependence on specific sources of supply for strategic goods due to a wide range of non-market policies and practices, such as market-distorting industrial subsidies.”

Despite the strong focus on the future of the Green Deal, much is still happening concerning legislation that will soon enter into force, that was waiting for a final green light after the end of negotiations, or that will be likely approved soon. On June 17th, the Council finally gave its **approval** to one of the most debated pieces of Green Deal legislation, the Nature Restoration Law. While this will consolidate the EU’s position in the upcoming UN Conference on Biodiversity in Colombia, a proper implementation will be however fundamental. The legislation expects the restoration of at least 30% of the EU’s degraded ecosystems by 2030 (and 90% by 2050) to stop a declining trend that led to some 80% of all European habitats into poor conditions. An inadequate implementation could however severely undermine its effectiveness, which has already decreased because of the numerous brakes and safety clauses included during the negotiations.

The EU Deforestation-free Regulation (EUDR) has been also at the centre of a rather convoluted story. Unlike the Nature Restoration Law, the adoption of the legislation in December 2022 had been relatively smooth and so the formal approval and its entry into force in June 2023. The EUDR however proved immediately controversial with the producing countries that would be affected; the Regulation indeed forbids seven key agricultural commodities from being imported in the EU market if they caused deforestation after a cut-off date, established as 31st of December 2020. Producers of soy (like Brazil) or palm oil (like Indonesia) heavily protested against what they perceived as a Regulation imposed by the EU without any chances for consultation. These objections quickly **expanded** and reached first other countries in the Global South, and the US finally got **involved** in June 2024; the Biden administration indeed sent a letter to the Commission asking for a delay in the implementation of the already approved Regulation, particularly over fears for its paper industry. While also Australia already **showed** its opposition in May, some MS **joined the chorus** in June, as some of the provisions would also impact domestic producers and because of the cost imposed on European companies importing these products. The EPP also **asked** for a two-years delay in the implementation. At the beginning of October The European Commission proposed to **postpone** the start of enforcement by 12 months for large companies and 18 months for micro and small enterprises. It also proposed delaying the country risk benchmarking process until June 2025, stating that most countries would be ranked “low risk.” The EUDR The legislation is however another cornerstone of the Green Deal, since it represents the most ambitious attempt to curb deforestation so far not only by the EU, but globally, and the first ever to directly address its leading cause – agriculture. Nevertheless, even parts of the civil society are **worrying** it may be too complicated to implement it as it is, and the debate is still strong on how the EUDR implementation will actually develop.

Other relevant legislation has also been discussed in these past months. In particular, the Council finally **adopted** its general approach on the **Green Claims Directive**, thus starting talks with the European Parliament. The Directive aims at regulating the environmental claims made by companies in Europe to prevent greenwashing or misleading advertisements. The EU is not the first one in launching such a proposal: the UK launched a “**Green Claims Code**” already in 2021, while Norway regulates the matter with a **package** of laws and through extensive **guidance**. This will be however the first attempt to focus on the issue in the EU and follows a “Call for Evidence on greenwashing” **launched** by the three EU supervisory authorities in November 2023. It is a quite needed piece of legislation, since green claims are multiplying as a consequence of the advancement of the ecological transition while, according to a Commission **report**, already in 2020 53.3% of these claims were “vague, misleading or unfounded” and 40% “completely unsubstantiated.” The Green Claims Directive will back an already **approved** Directive against greenwashing and will require companies to support their claims with scientific evidence. Some NGOs, such as the Environmental Coalition on Standards (**ECOS**) are however worried that too much space has been left to offsetting – which has been recently linked to lack of transparency and even **scandals** – and to companies’ self assessments. Among other news, the **Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation** has come into force in July 2024, while the Council **gave** the green light to the right-to-repair Directive in May and adopted the revised Regulation on trans-European transport network (TEN-T) guidelines in June.

The Hungarian presidency however will have little margin of maneuver. Talks on the energy taxation directive (the only open “Fit for 55” file) have restarted after the Belgian presidency decided to move talks to after the June 2024 EU Parliament elections. However, despite the many initiatives presented in July by the Hungarian rotating presidency – from the promotion of geothermal and nuclear energy to electricity grid development – this presidency won’t have much space to strategically guide the climate and energy debate given the delicate timing in-between legislatures.

IN DEPTH

CONVERSATION

FRANCESCO CORVARO

SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

NATHALIE TOCCI

DIRECTOR, IAI

IAI: *Italy's special climate envoy is a key figure for our country, for a number of reasons: the importance of environmental issues in our foreign policy in view of the important international negotiating tables on climate change that await us in the coming months and, not least, of course, in the context of Italy's presidency of the G7. Italy is currently in a position to lead a number of key conversations, such as the establishment of effective partnerships with the African continent, proposing initiatives and instruments to advance faster sustainable development at a global level in clubs even larger than the G7, starting, for example, with a greater and more transformative use of climate finance. Nathalie Tocci, global climate diplomacy is progressing, but not without obstacles, while the challenge of decarbonisation does not admit delays. What is the global landscape in which climate diplomacy has to operate today?*

NATHALIE TOCCI: *It is a very complex and very tense landscape because, first, what we see is a transformation in the international system. We no longer live in the 'unipolar' world that revolved around the power of the United States and where Europe basically followed, but was also part of a global leadership. That world no longer exists. We have a world in which there is a new bipolarity that revolves around China and the United States, which in turn becomes a competition that deeply affects the energy transition and especially the competition on green technologies. Yet, while we do have this bipolarity, we are also facing a new multipolarity, because we know that there are a whole series of other powers, the EU first. However, we also have Brazil, South Africa, India. This new multipolarity shows signs of cooperation; for example despite everything, despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite the war in the Middle East, the G20 still holds – a kind of half miracle. And then, in addition to this, we have another kind of dynamic, a sort of "apolarity", where a whole series of countries refuse to take sides.*

So on the one hand we have this transitional phase of the international

system, which is turning into something that is still difficult to capture, to consolidate, to explain. On the other hand, we have a growing gap between the global north and the global South, which has much to do with climate change. We have seen how, especially in the latest COPs and in the way all of this is manifested in relation to climate finance, that in reality so many of the pre-existing resentments that were often linked to other issues are now also spilling over into the climate issue and therefore into climate diplomacy.

IAI: *Francesco Corvaro, clearly one of the sectors in which Italy can aspire to achieve greater influence and winning partnerships is the Mediterranean area and the African continent. Energy, both hydrocarbons and renewables, however, embody a paradox for the continent: while the continent is rich in vast resources, it is also the most energy-deficient continent in the world. What role does Italy play in jointly supporting this dual battle of decarbonisation and wider access to energy?*

FRANCESCO CORVARO: *As you know Italy has made this a priority within the G7 and in a world, as we heard before, which has changed much. The main purpose is precisely the one that was originally proposed by Mattei (and not by chance we refer to the “Mattei Plan”), whose idea was to create cooperation with the countries he was going to work with. So the aim is to refuse predatory acts of resource exploitation, and to develop a path to be taken together for a common benefit, for Italy and Africa. Let us always remember that climate change primarily affects human life on Earth. It is not the end of the world, as I often say, it is an evolution towards new environmental balances that do not necessarily foresee the status quo that we have today in terms of occupying the emerged areas of the world. So it also generates an immigration problem in the future. Thinking of a cooperation that allows the African people, and its very young population, to sustainably develop in their own country, producing indirect benefits for Europe and Italy as well as a possibility for the development of our industrial sector, which has a very strong know-how in the green transition.*

IAI: *The National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) was sent to Brussels in early July and highlights the need to develop interconnection capacity for both electricity and gas and potentially hydrogen, particularly with North African countries. What competitive advantages does Italy have in order to become an energy hub in the Mediterranean? This particularly considering the huge local decarbonisation needs of the South Shore partner countries, the progressive reduction of gas in Europe in the coming decades and the need to deliver a just energy transition. How do we set up a transformation, in your opinion, that is both rapid and supportive for our relations with neighbouring countries?*

FRANCESCO CORVARO: *Certainly the crisis we are experiencing with the Russia-Ukraine war has shifted the balance of the energy equilibrium*

towards the south of Europe, and Italy holds a strategic position in the Mediterranean. It can and must act as a reference both for Europe and for African countries. How? Well, this will be possible by investing in infrastructure that allows energy transfers of hydrogen or electricity produced from renewable sources from African countries to Italy and then to Europe. This will be achieved by making investments that must work on two types of interventions. First, we must focus on adaptation. Even turning to a net-zero emissions system tomorrow, some of the climate changes that are taking place now will continue and African countries will be among those that will need to adapt the most. Countries like Italy can help on that; we are the most impacted European country by climate change - think of the floods in the north, the droughts in the south. We need to adapt ourselves, but we have also have expertise to help others adapt. Take the example of the launch of the G7 Adaptation Hub in Venaria, which focuses exactly on this need. We did this because adaptation initiatives are linked to other issues, such as mobilising private capital, or to a just and sustainable development. If we act on adaptation, we can reduce the risk of certain types of investment in areas that are currently not too safe, not least because of climate issues. So by putting all this into a system, we can use public resources in a certain direction and expand the reach of the green economy to the private sector as well. Let's remember that trillions of dollars will be needed in the next few years for climate issues alone, and it is unthinkable that all this money will come only from public finances. This is simply not possible. So you have to strategically use public finances to attract private capital. And this, for example, is a target that the government is pursuing and Minister Tajani in particular strongly believes in this kind of cooperation – one in which developing countries growth is supported by the know-how and knowledge of developed countries. It is the only way not to leave anyone behind on this path and to accelerate as much as possible considering that, concerning climate change, time is not on our side.

IAI: *Nathalie, in these days there is a lot of discussion about the new European institutional set-up and the priorities of the new Commission, in particular with reference to the future of the Green Deal which, as we know, constituted the pillar of the previous Commission. Much remains to be built, especially in the external dimension of this strategy. But both energy policy and foreign policy are largely in national hands in many respects, and climate policy often shows different levels of ambition. How can we build a coherent external action also at the European level?*

NATHALIE TOCCI: *Let me take a step back. What happened in the last five years? What has been the focus of the European Green Deal? It was mostly achieving from a legislative point of view what is needed to ensure climate neutrality by 2050. Above all, a whole series of measures, for instance the ETS II or the CBAM itself, have all been developed to create a legislative and regulatory framework that allows us to get to that objective. Now, once this phase is over, we have come to a second one – let's call it a European*

Green Deal 2.0 – which I believe will probably revolve around three words. The first is compensation. We have put in place everything we need from regulatory and legislative point of view, but we know that such transition is almost a revolution. Revolutions have winners and losers, at least if you can't slow down (and, as Francesco Corvaro rightly said, we don't have time to do that). So if you can't slow down, you have to compensate those who will be the potential losers from this transition because if you don't do this, then inevitably you will still create pockets of resistance that could actually slow you down. Not that there wasn't compensation in the first phase – we have the Just Transition Fund, the Climate Social Fund - but compared to what is needed now we will have to do much more.

The second word is implementation. The legislative agenda is completed, and now this transition is taking the form of a radical transformation of our energy systems. So if this has to be implemented, it is actually a whole economic system that has to be transformed. This will require industrial policies, measures to increase competitiveness, an acceleration of the single European market. All measures that will have to make sense on their own, but especially when linked to the legislative agenda that was agreed in the first phase of the Green Deal.

Third and last, we have the external dimension. Concerning the Green Deal 1.0, we have done very well internally, but the external dimension has been a bit missing. It is true that we have agreed that 30 per cent of our cooperation budget at European level must be climate finance oriented. Yet, the truth is that this is not the case. And above all, as Francesco said, climate finance must be, I won't say exclusively, but predominantly targeted at adaptation, because for mitigation it will be the private sector that will do the most. We will have thus to facilitate the role of the private sector in mitigation while concerning adaptation, where unfortunately there is less money to be made, it will likely be the public sector and therefore European institutions that will have to take the lion's share.

***IAI:** Francesco Corvaro, how can Italy and Europe effectively integrate Africa into global value chains for green technologies? What in particular can Italy do in your opinion to support the emerging will of several African countries to become an active part of them, and not just a simple exporter of raw materials? This bearing in mind that also other players, such as China or Japan, also appear open to the development of local supply chains.*

FRANCESCO CORVARO: *One possibility that Italy and Europe have is to follow the outcome of COP28 which, in my opinion, has highlighted an aspect that is not always emphasised, i.e. the need for this transition to be technology-neutral. This is a fundamental factor because this also allows us to develop several supply chains, not just one. I will give an example where there is often a misunderstanding, concerning the automotive sector. The Italian government has never been against electric cars; indeed what the Italian government supports is that they are definitely a part of*

the transition, but also that all other solutions that have a neutral impact with respect to climate change must also be included. This would make it possible to broaden the spectrum of interventions. For example, in Africa the biofuel supply chain can be developed, as we are already doing through the Mattei Plan. The COP has been very clear on this and perhaps even quite ambitious, by introducing a variety of technologies in relation also to energy generation and nuclear power in particular. There is no time: we cannot be picky about the types of technologies that engineering makes available to us today. Some sectors, for example, can be decarbonised by focusing on, say, biofuels, which could play an important role in the supply chain, for example, in African countries and create synergies on this. Some of the projects of the Mattei plan are going precisely in this direction: diversifying and putting on track all those technologies that today in 2024 can help Europe be competitive, support the development of the African continent and break free from the 'monopolies' linked to the Chinese supply of rare materials, among the others.

IAI: *Nathalie, what conversations should Italy promote and advance in the EU in order to fully grasp the industrial opportunities offered by the energy transition process?*

NATHALIE TOCCI: *As I was saying, we will have a European landscape where most likely the priorities will be implementation, compensation and the external dimension. In this, Italy will actually have something to contribute to each of them. We have talked extensively about the external dimension and we can see clearly a connection between the Green Deal and the Mattei plan. On compensation, there too Italy can play a role concerning the distributive effects that the transition can have. When we come to implementation, especially when this is done through industrial policies, this is where it becomes more complex. This is because we had an early perception that the EU industrial policy could have some real grip and budget. Now this has a bit deflated, and this is a problem. Why? Well, because we are facing China playing its state capitalism, the United States competing with China, delivering the Inflation Reduction Act and putting a lot of money on the table. This is what European industrial policy is facing, and this is why we need it. Yet, we can do it in two different ways; you can either do it at European level, and that means finding a lot of new money, or you do it at national level. It is this second way that is being followed at the moment – particularly relaxing the rules on state aid, a key point for countries that can afford it, like France or Germany, much less so for countries with a greater debt (like us). So Italy's battle in Europe concerns mostly this: being serious about a EU-level industrial policy, avoiding a focus on national policies that could repeat the dynamics of the Eurozone crisis.*

IAI: *Nathalie, what conversations should Italy promote and advance in the EU in order to fully grasp the industrial opportunities offered by the energy transition process?*

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IAI: One last question for Francesco Corvaro. The issue of industrial competitiveness will be fundamental in the coming years, both domestically and globally, particularly given the difficulties in decarbonising Italy's heavy industry – I am thinking of the steel, cement and chemical sectors. What do you think will be Italy's role in steering these green policies? Do you think of particular instruments, or of partnerships that we might need?

FRANCESCO CORVARO: For the first time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will participate to the COP29 jointly with the Directorate for Cooperation and Development and the Italian Agency for Cooperation and Development. Why is this a decisive step? Because, in my opinion, it is a shared approach that we need to strengthen, which countries like Germany and France adopted before and which is need to deliver a system able to maximise our added value and expertise. Let's remember that our high energy costs has always been an issue first for our entrepreneurs. We had to manage and minimise this problem, which meant investing in efficiency, in certain cost reductions and so on. This has however allowed us to become the second largest manufacturers in Europe, and this approach could help us in the transition too. And I believe that the smartest thing we can do is to give a proper, strong direction to all of this. A direction that can be developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The fact that for the first time there is a pavilion of this kind at COP29 indicates the government's attention to focusing on what we have in our industry, and showing it as a coherent national system. How do the others put so much money on the international level? They have a very strong system for

international cooperation, which Italy is trying to build with this government, which will create a flywheel effect that will generate wealth that will then also return to the country itself. In this way, I see the possibility of being able to achieve sufficient critical mass and thus win the challenges that await us in the coming years.

The transcript and the translation from Italian have been done by IAI and are the Institute's sole responsibility. The original audio is available here: <https://www.iai.it/it/news/lo-iai-dialoga-linviato-speciale-il-clima-francesco-corvaro>

AP -
PEN -
DIX

TIME
LINE

This timeline highlights the main elements proposed by the Commission under the umbrella of the Green Deal since its first presentation in December 2019. The list is not exhaustive, but aims to provide an overview of the Commission's work during these years. The list is an expanded version of the Commission's own timeline, available here:

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

17 September 2024

The Commissioners-designate are [announced](#).

11 September 2024

The EU Governance Regulation report [shows](#) that the EU has a comprehensive integrated legal framework and tools in place to meet its decarbonisation goals.

9 September 2024

The Draghi Report on "The future of European competitiveness" is [published](#).

30 August 2024

New monitoring rules [agreed](#) for the EU ETS.

22 July 2024

The Council [renews](#) economic sanctions for a further 6 months towards Russia.

18 July 2024

The Parliament [re-elects](#) Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President. The new Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation [enters](#) into force.

27 June 2024

The EU [notifies](#) its withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty.

24 June 2024

The EU [adopts](#) 14th package of sanctions against Russia for war against Ukraine.

17 June 2024

The Council [gives](#) final green light to Nature restoration law.

30 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) final approval to right-to-repair directive.

29 May 2024

The Commission [hosts](#) the first General Assembly of the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors.

28 May 2024

The EU and Australia [sign](#) partnership on sustainable critical and strategic mineral.

27 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) its final approval to the ecodesign regulation.
The Council [gives](#) final approval to the net-zero industry act.

24 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) its final approval to the corporate sustainability due diligence regulation.

24 April 2024

Parliament approves a review of the [Common Agriculture Policy \(CAP\) Strategic Plans Regulation](#) and the [CAP Horizontal Regulation](#).

12 April 2024

The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive [is formally adopted](#).

11 April 2024

Parliament [adopts reform](#) of the EU electricity market.

10 April 2024

The Parliament [adopts](#) new law to reduce emissions from energy sector, especially methane emissions.

12 March 2024

The Commission publishes the [Communication on managing climate risks in Europe](#) as a response to the first ever European Climate Risk Assessment.

4 March 2024

The Council reaches [political agreement](#) on a recommendation to continue coordinated demand-reduction to secure sufficient gas storage for next winter

20 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) on EU-wide certification scheme for carbon removals.

Political [agreement](#) on new air quality standards in the EU

19 February 2024

European Hydrogen Bank pilot [auction](#): 132 bids received from 17 European countries.

8 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) to ban all remaining intentional uses of toxic mercury in the EU.

6 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) on the Net-Zero Industry Act.

The Commission adopts an EU Industrial Carbon Management [Strategy](#), setting out how to sustainably capture, store and use CO₂.

Commission [presents recommendation](#) for 2040 emissions reduction target to set the path to climate neutrality in 2050.

31 January 2024

Commission [proposes](#) to allow EU farmers to derogate for one year from certain agricultural rules.

25 January 2024

The Commission launches [Strategic dialogue](#) on the future of EU agriculture

19 December 2023

Council approves Commission's proposals to [prolong energy emergency measures](#).

18 December 2023

Commission publishes the [assessments](#) of the 21 member states which submitted updated draft National Energy and Climate Plans.

8 December 2023

Council and the Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the [Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package](#), establishing common internal market rules for renewable and natural gases and hydrogen. The agreement also proposes the creation of the European Network of Network Operators for Hydrogen (ENNOH).

7 December 2023

Council and Parliament reach provisional political agreement on the [Energy Performance of Buildings Directive \(EPBD\)](#).

Council adopts negotiating positions on [Net-Zero Industry Act](#) and

proposes an expanded list of ten strategic net-zero technologies.

28 November 2023

Commission proposes to [prolong energy emergency measures](#) by 12 months.

Commission proposes the [Electricity Grid Action Plan](#) and publishes the [sixth list of key infrastructural energy projects](#).

23 November 2023

Commission presents the first pilot auction [under the European Hydrogen Bank](#) for a total of €800 million of subsidies for renewable hydrogen production.

22 November 2023

Commission proposes a new [forest monitoring law](#) to improve resilience of European forests.

16 November 2023

Council adopts [EU position for COP28](#) and stresses that it will call for a “phase-out of unabated fossil fuels”.

Council and European Parliament reach provisional agreement on a [proposed EU law](#) that would improve the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes.

15 November 2023

Council and Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the [Regulation on Methane Emissions Reduction in the Energy Sector](#), agreeing on deadlines for monitoring, reporting and inspection of sources of methane emissions.

13 November 2023

Council and Parliament reach provisional agreement on the [Critical Raw Materials Act](#).

9 November 2023

Parliament and Council reach agreement on [Nature Restoration Law](#). Member states will put in place restoration measures in at least 20 per cent of the EU's land areas and 20 per cent of its seas by 2030.

24 October

Commission presents the [European Wind Power Action Plan](#).

Commission publishes the [2023 State of the Energy Union Report](#).

17 October 2023

Council adopts negotiating positions on [electricity market reform](#). The Council agrees that two-way contracts for difference will be the mandatory model used when public funding is involved in long-term contracts.

5 October 2023

European Parliament [approves](#) Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action and Maroš Šefčovič as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal.

14 September 2023

European Parliament adopts negotiating positions on [electricity market reform](#) and Critical Raw Materials ([CRM](#)) Act.

13 September 2023

Ursula von der Leyen delivers State of the European Union [speech](#); European Parliament adopts negotiating position on recast of the Clean Air Directive.

12 September 2023

European Parliament [adopts](#) amendments to Renewable Energy Directive (RED III).

29 August 2023

Ursula von der Leyen [proposes](#) Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action.

22 August 2023

Frans Timmermans [resigns](#) as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal; Maroš Šefčovič is appointed as new Executive Vice-President and Acting Commissioner for Climate Action.

19 July 2023

Beginning of trilogues on nature restoration law; ITRE Committee [adopts](#) report on electricity market reform.

12 July 2023

European Parliament [adopts](#) negotiating position on nature restoration law.

11 July 2023

Commission presents Greening Freight Transport [Package](#); Parliament adopts agreement on recast of Energy Efficiency Directive; European Parliament [adopts](#) negotiating position on Industrial Emissions Directive.

7 July 2023

Commission [presents](#) a proposal for coordinated withdrawal from Energy Charter Treaty.

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second [tender](#) for joint gas purchases.

27 June 2023

Amended version of the Nature Restoration Law does not reach the [majority](#) in the Environment Committee; final vote sent to plenary.

26 June 2023

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second [round](#) of demand pooling for joint gas purchases by EU companies.

20 June 2023

The Commission publishes the two delegated [acts](#) defining the rules for the production of renewable hydrogen.

16 June 2023

EU ambassadors reach political deal to [approve](#) the Renewable Energy Directive (REDIII).

8 June 2023

European Parliament reaches political [agreement](#) to approve the Nature Restoration Law after facing opposition from MEPs of the European People's Party (EPP).

16 May 2023

25 gas supplying companies [respond](#) to EU's joint gas demand, providing more than 13.4 bcm of gas.

After being approved by the European Parliament, the CBAM enters into [force](#).

The EU Deforestation-free Regulation ([EUDR](#)) is adopted by the Council after its adoption by the Parliament and thus enter into force.

15 May 2023

EU Member States [agree](#) to raise renewable target from 32% to 42.5% by 2030.

4 May 2023

First joint gas [purchase](#) attracts demand from more than 65 EU companies.

26 April 2023

The European Parliament and the Council reach a political [agreement](#) on the ReFuelEU Aviation proposal

25 April 2023

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches first [call](#) for companies to jointly buy gas

Council [adopts](#) key pieces of legislation delivering on 2030 climate targets: Revision of the ETS Directive; Amendment of the MRV shipping Regulation; Revision of the ETS Aviation Directive; Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund; Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

21 April 2023

The Commission proposes a [revision](#) to the existing marketing standards of agri-food products

18 April 2023

The European Parliament [approves](#) the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

30 March 2023

European Green Deal: EU agrees [stronger legislation](#) to accelerate the rollout of renewable energy.

28 March 2023

Member states [agree](#) to extend voluntary 15% gas demand reduction target.

28 March 2023

EU ministers sign off on [legislation](#) phasing out sales of new polluting cars and vans by 2035.

16 March 2023

Proposal for a [European Hydrogen Bank](#).

16 March 2023

EU proposes the [Critical Raw Materials Act](#), a comprehensive set of actions to ensure the EU's access to a secure, diversified, affordable and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.

16 March 2023

EU releases [Net Zero Industry Act](#) establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem.

14 February 2023

The Commission proposed [new CO2 emissions targets](#) for new heavy-duty vehicles from 2030 onwards. These targets will help to reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector.

13 February 2023

The Commission proposed [rules](#) to define what constitutes renewable hydrogen in the EU, with the adoption of two Delegated Acts required under the Renewable Energy Directive.

1 February 2023

The Commission presented a [Green Deal Industrial Plan](#) to enhance the competitiveness of Europe's net-zero industry and support the fast transition to climate neutrality.

24 January 2023

The European Commission introduces the revision of the [EU Pollinators Initiative](#).

18 December 2022

The European Commission welcomed the [provisional agreement](#) reached with the European Parliament and Council to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System, apply emissions trading to new sectors

for effective economy-wide climate action, and establish a Social Climate Fund.

9 December 2022

The Commission welcomed the deal reached between the European Parliament and the Council to help make the aviation sector 'Fit for 55', setting in law its contribution to our target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

6 December 2022

EU agrees [law](#) to fight global deforestation and forest degradation driven by EU production and consumption and the a political agreement is reached on the revision of the EU Emission Trading System rules on aviation.

30 November 2022

The Commission proposed new EU-wide [rules](#) on packaging, to tackle this constantly growing source of waste and of consumer frustration.

24 November 2022

During the extraordinary Council for Energy, EU energy ministers agreed on a Council [Regulation](#) "enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks", as well as on a Regulation speeding up permits to deploy renewable energies.

27 October 2022

The Council and the European Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on stricter CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans.

26 October 2022

Commission proposes stronger [rules](#) for cleaner air and water, including PFAs, several pesticides, bisphenol A and some pharmaceuticals.

15 September 2022

Commission proposes for an [emergency market intervention](#) to reduce energy bills for Europeans, through reduced demand and a revenue cap on some producers (among other measures).

20 July 2022

Commission proposes a "[Save gas for a safe winter](#)" plan to reduce gas consumption until the following spring.

22 June 2022

Commission launches a [Nature protection package](#), focusing on restoring ecosystems and halving pesticide use by 2030.

18 May 2022

Commission launches the [REPowerEU plan](#), a set of measures triggered by the invasion of Ukraine and focusing on energy saving, supply diversification and the promotion of renewables.

5 April 2022

Commission proposes two [Regulations](#) to phase down fluorinated greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances.

5 April 2022

Commission proposes an [update](#) to the Industrial Emissions Directive, to modernise EU industrial emissions rules to steer large industry in long-term green transition.

30 March 2022

Commission launches [Proposals](#) to make sustainable products the norm in the EU, boost circular business models and empower consumers for the green transition, as part of the Circular Economy Action Plan.

23 March 2022

Following the REPowerEU Communication, Commission publishes [options](#) to mitigate high energy prices through common gas purchases and minimum gas storage obligations.

8 March 2022

As a direct response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Commission publishes the [REPowerEU Communication](#), focused on energy prices, storage and diversification.

15 December 2021

Commission publishes a set of [proposals](#) for a new EU framework to decarbonise gas markets, promote hydrogen and reduce methane emissions, namely a Directive and a Regulation.

15 December 2021

Commission publishes a [Communication](#) on Sustainable Carbon Cycles, to remove, recycle and sustainably store carbon, which will be followed by a proposal for a regulatory framework by the end of 2022.

14 December 2021

Commission launches a new transport [proposal](#) targeting greater efficiency and more sustainable travel, focusing also on the TEN-T network.

17 November 2021

Commission [proposes](#) two Regulations and a Strategy to stop deforestation, innovate sustainable waste management and make soils healthy.

15 September 2021

Commission publishes a Communication launching the project [New European Bauhaus](#), focusing on initiatives and funding dedicated to energy efficiency in buildings.

14 July 2021

Commission adopts a large [package](#) of proposals to achieve a 55 per

cent emissions reduction by 2030. The comprehensive package deals with revision of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive, a ReFuelEU Aviation Initiative (on air transport), a Regulation on Land Use, Forestry and Agriculture, a proposal for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive.

17 May 2021

Commission proposes a [Communication](#) on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU.

12 May 2021

Commission adopts a [Zero Pollution Action Plan](#) for Air, Water and Soil, to improve quality standards for all three, and reduce the impact on health, among other goals.

25 March 2021

Commission publishes an [Organic Action Plan](#) as part of its Farm-to-Fork strategy.

24 February 2021

Commission adopts a new [EU strategy on adaptation](#) to climate change.

18 January 2021

Commission first launches the design of the [New European Bauhaus initiative](#), dedicated to energy efficiency in building.

10 December 2020

Commission proposes an upgrade on the legislation on batteries, also trying to boost the [European Battery Alliance](#), launched in 2017.

9 December 2020

Commission launches a [European Climate Pact](#), to spread awareness and increase the involvement of citizens.

19 November 2020

Commission presents an [Offshore Renewable Energy strategy](#), aimed at increasing the current 12 GW capacity to a minimum of 60 GW by 2030 and 300 GW by 2050.

14 October 2020

Commission publishes three significant elements for the Green Deal: a [Renovation Wave](#) initiative on energy efficiency for building, a [Methane Strategy](#) focused on decarbonised gases, and a [Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability](#) to strengthen legislation on hazardous chemicals.

17 September 2020

Commission presents its [2030 Climate Target Plan](#), raising its ambition to reach a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030.

8 July 2020

Commission adopts [EU strategies](#) for energy system integration and hydrogen to pave the way towards a fully decarbonised, more efficient and interconnected energy sector.

20 May 2020

Commission presents two key strategies: its [EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030](#), and its [Farm-to-Fork Strategy](#) to make food systems more sustainable.

11 March 2020

Commission proposes a [Circular Economy Action Plan](#), to expand and integrate previous work on circularity into the Green Deal.

4 March 2020

Commission proposes a [European climate law](#), aimed at reaching climate neutrality by 2050.

14 January 2020

Commission presents two founding elements of the Green Deal: the [European Green Deal Investment Plan](#) and the [Just Transition Mechanism](#).

11 December 2019

Commission presents the [European Green Deal](#).

Istituto Affari Internazionali
Via dei Montecatini, 17 00186 Roma
Tel: +39 066976831
[**iai@iai.it**](mailto:iai@iai.it)

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