

# Green Deal Watch

Issue no.15

Towards a  
competitive and  
clean Europe

## About the Green Deal Watch

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The “Green Deal Watch” was launched in 2020 by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. The aim of the project is to follow the evolution of the ambitious and cross-cutting “European Green Deal” (EGD) strategy towards climate neutrality launched by the Von der Leyen Commission in December 2019. The “Green Deal Watch” follows the “Energy Union Watch” which IAI published from 2015 to 2019 to monitor the evolution of energy and climate policies under the previous legislature. IAI covers the debate among national and European stakeholders and reports the key dynamics in order to help the reader better navigate the challenges and opportunities of implementation of the EGD. The Watch is produced on a quarterly basis, collecting official documents, public information and open source data, which are processed and analysed by the IAI team.

## About IAI

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The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation, focusing on topics such as European integration, security and defence, energy and climate policies, as well as key regions such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas. The IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffarInternazionali), two book series (Trends and Perspectives in International Politics and IAI Research Studies) and other paper series related to IAI research projects.

<https://www.iai.it/en/>

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This is the 15th issue of the Green Deal Watch, a quarterly report produced by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of Edison. This publication aims at monitoring and analysing the initiatives launched by the European Commission and discussed by EU institutions and member states under the umbrella of the Green Deal. Starting from Issue 12, the Green Deal Watch IAI no longer follows the former division into four dimensions: "Driving the Green Deal", "Greening Industry", "Supporting the Transformation" and "Strengthening Security and Diplomacy". Instead, each issue is now structured as an analytical assessment of the main Green Deal developments in the three months that it covers.

A timeline of initiatives envisaged under the European Green Deal concludes this report.

# 1. THE NEW COMMISSION IS FINALLY AT WORK

At the end of a long institutional turnover year, in the November confirmation hearings, the Parliament approved all Commissioners-designate without any rejection for the first time in twenty years: the [new Commission](#) is finally at work since December 1. This despite Spanish national politics risked blocking the deal on Commissioners that party politics had largely agreed in the months before. The Spanish People's Party indeed attempted to deflect responsibility for the devastating and deadly floodings in Valencia by [shifting](#) the blame onto the then Social Democrat VP candidate and the country's ecological transition minister Teresa Ribera. On top of this, Von der Leyen's decision to go on with Italy's nominee (and hard-right ECR) Raffaele Fitto as Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms in her Commission was a difficult pill to [swallow](#) for the Greens, half of which declined to support von der Leyen's new team despite her assurances of staying committed to climate goals. Looking ahead, the Greens need to figure out how to navigate a Parliament where the distinction between the centre-right and far-right is increasingly blurred.

As part of the hearing process, the nominees were grilled and went through the topics they will be working on to the mercy of MEPs who would pose challenging questions on how they intend to run things during their mandate. As expected, EVP Ribera (responsible of a clean, just and competitive transition) came across as a strong defender of the Green Deal, [insisted](#) that implementation of existing green policies will be her core task and made clear statements on the need to provide businesses with a clear (green) direction of travel. She promised a new European Climate Adaptation Plan to strengthen responses to climate impacts and committed to prioritising water resilience. Before her, Hoekstra had also suggested EU funds should be distributed only to adaptation-proofed projects. Ribera didn't offer many specifics about the Clean Industrial Deal and when questioned about whether she would support state aid for new nuclear plants, just months after the outgoing executive [approved](#) similar measures for the Dukovany power plant, she [stated](#) that in the future a case-by-case basis should be applied.

In his hearing – held just before the COP29 climate negotiations in Baku – [Hoekstra](#) (Commissioner for Climate, Net-zero and Clean Growth) said that the EU needs

to be more assertive in outlining expectations for other countries. He pledged to bring further support to the steel industry and to Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies and – [similarly](#) to Ribera – advocated for sticking to the agreed timetable on the 2035 ban on combustion engines to ensure predictability for the industry. The crisis surrounding the automotive sector was also a topic for Greek politician [Tzitzikostas](#) (Commissioner for transport and tourism), who committed to an exception to the 2035 law for e-fuels (as requested by the EPP). Hoekstra also wants to hike airline taxes as part of the effort to reduce emissions from transport by 90 per cent by 2050.

[Jørgensen](#) (Commissioner for energy and housing), facing the huge task of bringing down energy prices in the bloc, promised to focus on renewables and efficiency, improved grid infrastructure and digitalisation, faster permitting and new technologies such as green hydrogen. [Séjourné](#), tasked with revitalising Europe’s struggling industries in his role as Commissioner for prosperity and industrial strategy, emphasised the importance of focusing on strategic sectors with the greatest potential, reducing energy costs, and fostering robust markets for products like heat pumps and electric vehicles. He reaffirmed his dedication to strengthening the single market and pledged support for the steel, automotive, and aeronautics sectors. Similarly to other fellow nominees, he [provided](#) blurred answers about the size and the functioning of the EU’s future competitiveness fund. As expected, he mentioned China’s unfair policies and strongly opposed the EU-Mercosur trade agreement (whose negotiations were [finalised](#) in early December).

Several other Green Deal-related questions came up during hearings. Commissioner Christophe [Hansen](#) (Agriculture and Food) answered many questions related to what is probably the most untouched sector: agriculture. He promised fair pricing for farmers and environmental mirror clauses on agri-food imports, while expressing opposition to legislating Europeans’ meat consumption and criticising the idea of an “agri”-ETS. He leaned more progressive on other issues, defending the deforestation law and suggesting that farmers’ fears over Ukraine’s accession were exaggerated. Responsible for the environment, water resilience and a competitive circular economy, [Roswall’s](#) hearing was a reminder of the need for a critical step towards the transition to a circular economy, something that in previous cycles was incredibly fragmented across various commissioners. Commissioner Jozef Síkela (International Partnerships) was asked about the EU’s memorandum with [Rwanda](#) on building up sustainable supply chains for raw materials, which is sparking accusations of fuelling conflict in Congo.

Poland in the meantime has taken over the presidency of the Council of the European Union at a time of uncertainty and has therefore outlined its [agenda](#) prioritising energy security while pursuing climate objectives. The Polish presidency strongly promotes a full stop to Russian imports – in line with the EU target of ending using Moscow’s fossil fuels by 2027 –, a reduction of energy prices and a revision of EU’s energy security framework to enhance the physical and cyber security of infrastructure in the EU and its neighbourhood. It’s worth saying that in the past Poland has proactively shaped EU energy policy: Prime Minister Tusk proposed the “Energy Union” ten years ago and was a strong advocate for a reduction of reliance on Russian gas. In general, there are [expectations](#) Poland will be particularly vocal and active on this matter.

In this sense, the EU’s rising purchases of Russian LNG – not sanctioned and

cheaper compared to US gas – are a particular concern for the next five years: in 2024, the EU [imported](#) 16.5 million metric tons of LNG from Russia (15.2 in 2023). Additionally, some EU countries have failed to take bold steps, including the pro-Russian governments of Hungary and Slovakia: in 2024 the latter deposited more into Russian accounts for fossil fuels than [France](#), the second largest buyer of Russian LNG. Long story short, Russia still makes up [18 per cent](#) of all EU natural gas imports as of late 2024. Russian petroleum continues to reach EU shores, with oil products refined from Russian crude often entering the bloc via third countries. G7 and EU sanctions on Russian crude oil however [reduced](#) export revenues by 10 percent in the second year of implementation. Russia is also still the dominant fuel and technology provider to much of Europe’s nuclear-power industry. As of December 2024, Europe imports 20% of its raw uranium from Russia and 23% from Kazakhstan where Rosatom, the Russian state-owned company holds stakes in six of fourteen [Kazatomprom’s](#) deposits exerting significant influence over the country’s sector. Commissioner Jørgensen wants sanctions on Russian nuclear imports, which the EP has advocated for. However, Hungary, which is heavily relying on [Rosatom](#) for the expansion of its Paks nuclear plant, is expected to oppose the proposal.

In the past five years Poland has also advocated for a stronger attention to the social dimension of the transition towards those coal-dependent regions mostly impacted in the short term by the decarbonisation of the bloc. In this sense the country has pushed for financial mechanisms supporting the transition, such as the Just Transition Fund. Given the current politicisation of climate policies and the strong resistance to the implementation of the Green Deal, a Polish leadership in the Council is likely to stress over the distributional dimension of the transition, hopefully guiding discussions on the much indispensable need of [maintaining](#) consensus around it.

However, lack of political leadership remains a problem within the Council and for the role of the EU on the global stage, while some member states struggle with complex internal issues. In Germany the post-election ride could be rough. Additionally, German automakers are highly exposed to the Chinese market – making Berlin a staunch opponent of the Commission’s duties on made-in-China EVs. As other Member States, Germany’s export-based economy would also [suffer](#) if it’s caught between Trump’s tariffs and Chinese subsidies. In EU’s second-largest economy – France – the far right and left wing joined forces to eject Barnier from office, making him the shortest-lasting prime minister in the Fifth Republic. Bayrou [formed](#) the country’s new government while France is facing a critical economic situation amid growing national debt and a large budgetary deficit. In Romania, radical right-wing parties have achieved [unprecedented](#) success in the past elections and the country undergoes a deep political crisis. In Croatia, the populist (and pro-Moscow) President Zoran Milanovic was [re-elected](#).

Additionally, the Green Deal fatigue thoroughly described in the [previous](#) Green Deal Watch issues, is still a much prevalent sentiment in national contexts. In November the formal EU Commission called on Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia to urgently [submit](#) their final updated National Energy and Climate Plans – theoretically due in June 2024. These plans are key to understanding how Member States intend to meet their 2030 targets, thus being a fundamental tool for getting a sense of direction and advance plans for implementation. The European Environment Agency (EEA) indeed projects that the EU is currently set to miss its

55% reduction target for 2030 – while the European Climate Law requires the EU to adopt a climate target for [2040](#) (something to be discussed in this institutional cycle).

While members of the European Parliament began holding hearings, on the other side of the Atlantic DC's attention was on the US election and the Trump Presidency 2.0. Trump's re-election, with his America First approach, is worrying many across the EU bloc as it might constitute yet another problem for the EU which has limited leverage to counter his 'energy dominance' vision and avoid a growing EU-US energy price gap in the short term. The EU may also face a slowdown of its decarbonisation efforts in the long term because of US policy [impulsiveness](#). With the US constituting the EU's largest LNG supplier since 2023, the incoming Trump administration may use gas exports as a bargaining tool. To enhance its resilience, the EU must prioritise reducing gas dependency and accelerating the transition to renewable energy and electrification.

In a crowded concurrence of events, the COP29 and G20 also happened in November. In Baku, developing nations got a promise of at least \$300 billion a year in climate finance by 2035 - coming from public finance and cash transfers, including money delivered through multilateral development banks from many countries – including China. The new target replaces a 15-year-old pledge in which richer countries promised to deliver \$100 billion annually from 2020 to 2025 (a pledge they never met until 2022). This was considered largely insufficient by poorer states. The talks also produced a deal that settles the rules for global carbon markets after a decade of negotiations. In Baku the former Commission has [launched](#), among other initiatives, a new Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap to further accelerate the reduction of methane emissions associated with fossil energy production and consumption; the U.S. delegation – just two months away from Trump retaking the US presidency – maintained a quiet presence. In his very first day as 47th President of the US, Trump has signed an order to [withdraw](#) the US from the Paris Agreements, as he did in his previous term.

The way the international system is transforming clearly displays a growing distrust between the Global North and the Global South, with multilateralism being increasingly under pressure and BRICS's influence growing stronger, trends that were visible at [both](#) COP29 and G20. These tensions threaten both Europe's industrial competitiveness and clean tech leadership ambitions as well as its very path to climate neutrality. Rising fragmentation at the international level may lead to higher costs for accessing low-carbon materials or may complicate the implementation of key regulatory measures such as the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). The way the EU reacts in this legislature will make or break the Green Deal.

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# 2. THE FIRST 100 DAYS

In the aftermath of her re-election, Ursula von der Leyen [pledged](#) to implement seven key initiatives within the first 100 days of her mandate. This symbolic timeframe has once again been adopted by von der Leyen as a benchmark for signalling the Commission's strategic vision. Notably, her previous mandate was inaugurated by the launch of the European Green Deal, which has since profoundly shaped Europe's policy landscape and political discourse. This term's first 100 days are likely to be equally consequential, as they will serve as a crucial indicator of the Commission's capacity to rapidly and efficiently address a host of unresolved issues and emerging challenges. After an eventful first term marked by a global pandemic and wars at Europe's doorsteps, von der Leyen now faces the challenge of implementing an ambitious agenda geared towards galvanising the Union's competitiveness, mitigating internal frictions, and navigating an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape.

Having taken office on December 1st, Commissioners have until the beginning of March to translate their respective portfolios into the concrete actions pledged in Von der Leyen's political guidelines. These seven initiatives, reflecting the Commission's defining priorities, span key policy areas such as defence, enlargement, agriculture, industry, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and youth engagement. Two proposals in particular – the Clean Industrial Deal and the Vision for Agriculture and Food – are poised to play a particularly pivotal role in shaping the future of the European Green Deal and the broader EU economy.

Amid the urgent need to secure Europe's competitive edge in a rapidly evolving global market, expectations for the long-awaited Clean Industrial Deal are high. Presented as a joint plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness, the initiative will be a cornerstone of the recently announced Competitiveness Compass, a major framework inspired by Draghi's landmark [report](#), which will guide the Commission's activities for the next five years. This emphasis on competitiveness comes at a time of economic strain for the Union, which is grappling with slowing productivity growth, high energy costs, the crisis of international trade and rising geopolitical instability, as largely described in the previous [issue](#) of the Green Deal Watch.

According to Draghi's report, a persistent lack of vision about integrating Europe's ambitious climate policies with an assertive industrial strategy has prevented the EU from leveraging decarbonisation as a catalyst for industrial growth and, ultimately, as a way out of the crisis.

Against this dire background, the Clean Industrial Deal represents an ambitious attempt to reverse this trend by complementing the Green Deal with a comprehensive industrial policy. Aimed at implementing the Fit-for-55 package in a manner that enhances rather than undermines industrial competitiveness, the plan focuses on streamlining regulations, facilitating investment, and fostering



a favourable business environment. Operating on two levels, it will include an emergency plan for struggling sectors such as steel, aluminium, cement, and energy and a long-term strategy for the broader economy.

Spearheaded by multiple top EU officials, the plan is **expected** to take the form of a broad, non-binding action program supplemented by legislative proposals. While its full details will be unveiled upon its **scheduled** launch on February 26th, its primary instruments have already been **outlined**. Among these, an Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act is being developed under Séjourné and Hoekstra's supervision with the objective of fostering clean technology markets and expediting permitting processes for energy-intensive industries. Hoekstra is also responsible for proposing a new Climate Law, as part of the Clean Industrial Deal, enshrining a 90% emission reduction target by 2040 into EU legislation. Meanwhile, Ribera has been tasked with developing a new State Aid framework to accelerate renewable energy deployment and an "Action Plan for Affordable Energy Prices", the latter in collaboration with Jørgensen. Additionally, a European Competitiveness Fund will be established under the supervision of Séjourné and Ribera to catalyse investments towards Important Projects of Common Interest, including green steel and hydrogen projects. Holding significant global implications, the Clean Industrial Deal will also incorporate an external dimension aimed at fostering trade in clean tech and securing the supply of raw materials and energy through international partnerships.

The announcement of a Clean Industrial Deal has been warmly received across the Union, particularly by those sectors, signatories of the **Antwerp Declaration**, that were already advocating for a stronger industrial focus in early 2024. Nonetheless, the plan is not devoid of challenges, especially considering how previous efforts to revitalise European industries have faltered. The 2023 Green Deal Industrial Plan, initially criticised for merely reallocating existing funds and risking a subsidy war among member states, achieved its objectives only partially: while it effectively identified key areas requiring action, it ultimately **struggled** to deliver a fully cohesive industrial policy. The Commission has the difficult task of striking a balance between internal competition and external competitiveness, in order to prevent market distortions in favour of oligopolistic market structures while ensuring Europe remains globally competitive and avoids trade tensions with third countries. Moreover, portfolio overlaps within the Clean Industrial Deal might pose an additional challenge, necessitating seamless collaboration among several Commissioners with differing political perspectives.

Meanwhile, contentious debates over the Deal's structure and funding are already looming. Concerns have been raised about the **Competitiveness Fund**, which is expected to consolidate existing resources into a common financing instrument. In particular, the Committee of the Regions is **worried** that the Fund could further widen the innovation divide among European regions, while **experts** and **academics** have warned that an overly hierarchical, centralised approach to funding decisions could stifle independent research and market-driven innovation. It has also been **observed** that the Fund's broad scope could hinder competitive decarbonisation, as cleantech companies will have to contend with other capital-intensive industries to secure control over funding. Moreover, the choice of what technologies the Clean Industrial Deal should prioritise represents a matter of contention among member states, with **Germany** opposing the inclusion of nuclear power and **Italy** calling for technological neutrality.

With a new Vision for Agriculture and Food set to be delivered within the first 100 [days](#), agriculture is poised to play a central role in shaping the future of the Green Deal. The Vision will outline Von der Leyen's strategy to decarbonise European farming while enhancing its attractiveness, profitability and competitiveness. It is [expected](#) to mark a significant shift in the Commission's approach to agricultural policy, making it more responsive to the agrifood sector's needs and priorities after years of mounting pushbacks on environmental regulations, trade deals and high costs. Throughout the 2019-2024 term, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was partially [revised](#) to better contribute to the bloc's climate and environmental ambitions. As part of the Green Deal, the Commission also released the [Farm to Fork Strategy](#), a comprehensive vision for sustainable food supply chains which set quantitative targets for reducing chemical pesticides and fertiliser use while expanding organic farming. However, by the time these measures were introduced, the sector was already facing multiple [challenges](#). Extreme weather events linked to climate change reduced [productivity](#), while inflation and the energy crisis drove costs upward, shrinking revenues. Market distortions by large buyers and competition from cheaper imports with weaker standards further reduced farmers' incomes, leading to perceptions that new Green Deal regulations were an additional threat to profitability. These tensions culminated in widespread farmer protests across the EU at the end of Von der Leyen's first term. In an effort to appease farmers, the Commission quickly and unilaterally scaled [back](#) several CAP conditionalities linked to environmental standards and [abandoned](#) plans to halve pesticide use. In January 2024 Von der Leyen launched a [Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture](#) to reduce polarisation across Europe's agribusiness, promising to use its outcomes in a new Vision for Agriculture and Food.

The Vision, due on February 19th, will be delivered by [Christophe Hansen](#) in the form of a non-binding strategy for the sector's competitiveness and sustainability. While its details remain unclear, it is certain that some of the recommendations outlined in the Strategic Dialogue's final [report](#) will serve as a blueprint for the plan. A key [component](#) will be the reform of the CAP into a more targeted, less expensive subsidy programme, aimed at supporting small- and medium-sized farms and encouraging sustainable agricultural practices. Since there's a significant gap between farming incentives and the bloc's green targets, as [confirmed](#) by the European Court of Auditors, such reform is deemed unpostponable if the EU wants to achieve its climate goals. The Vision is also expected to focus on sustainable food systems, after plans for a legislative framework on this topic were shelved amid political opposition at the end of the previous term. In contrast, it remains uncertain whether the new vision will, for the first time, establish emission reduction targets for agriculture.

One of the Dialogues' recommendations the Commission has swiftly acted upon was the establishment, just days after taking office, of a [European Board on Agriculture and Food](#) – a permanent multistakeholder body tasked with advising the Commission on agricultural policies, including the Vision for Agriculture and Food. Besides the Board, other entities aspire to shape the strategy's contents, especially regarding the post-2027 CAP, which is poised to become the most contentious aspect of the Vision. As part of its [priorities](#), the Polish Presidency of the EU Council has already announced its own policy debate on the strategy, intending to highlight its connections with EU enlargement plans. Meanwhile, the Commission is [considering](#) reallocating CAP funds to other policy instruments, although agriculture ministers and the farming lobby will likely resist any subsidy cut for large-scale farms. Conversely, environmental NGOs are [advocating](#) for

a revised CAP that better supports the transition to agroecological farming by funding organic farmers and youth and women in the sector

Embodying the Commission's dual focus on economic competitiveness and sustainability, the first 100 days represent a pivotal moment for the Green Deal's next five years. As the road ahead is fraught with challenges, success will depend not only on the coherent design and implementation of the Clean Industrial Deal and the Vision for Agriculture and Food, but also on the Commission's capacity to balance competing interests and build consensus around ambitious climate action.

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# 3. OPEN DEBATES: HYDROGEN, CCS AND NUCLEAR

The new Commission is enhancing efforts to promote essential decarbonisation technologies. In his hearing Jørgensen has placed particular emphasis on developing systems to convert renewable electricity into low-carbon fuels, with hydrogen emerging as the most prominent one. In parallel, in November, the Council [called](#) to accelerate the implementation of the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package. The package entered into force in August 2024, but its operationalisation remains problematic due to a lack of a standard methodology for evaluating greenhouse gas emission savings of low-carbon hydrogen (e.g., produced from nuclear, CCS and electricity directly from the grid). After a [consultation](#) lasting up to the end of October, the Commission is expected to present its proposed methodology soon, but until then lack of regulatory clarity is undermining producers' and investors' confidence. The EU is also increasing its financial support to ramp up hydrogen projects. On the 3rd of December, the European Hydrogen Bank's (EHB) second [auction](#) opened with a funding capability of 1.2 billion euros, significantly increasing the budget of the first auction held in April, which allocated 800 million euros. Additionally, the second auction designated 200 million euros of the total amount to finance maritime projects, aligning with the FuelEU directive.

However, despite this support, companies have delayed or cancelled hydrogen projects, lamenting that there is no sufficient incentive to produce green hydrogen and that [demand is largely covered by grey hydrogen](#). In October, [Repsol](#) put on hold all planned green hydrogen projects in Spain, while in November [Uniper](#) postponed its target to invest eight billion euros in clean fuels due to a lack of demand for green hydrogen and high production costs.

Another factor burdening the sector is the growing reliance on third countries for hydrogen technologies, such as electrolysers and storage systems. China alone accounts for almost [60%](#) of the world's electrolyser manufacturing capacity and if left unaddressed the EU risks becoming irreversibly reliant on its imports. In response to these concerns, the Commission has revised the EHB's auction [rules](#) to limit parts sourced from third countries to be no more than 25% of a plant's production capacity.

Lack of significant cross-border interconnection projects also hinders efforts for a functioning European hydrogen network. Hydrogen pipelines are proving to be [costlier than expected](#), with projects facing significant slowdowns and delays. Equinor and RWE cancelled plans to build a [pipeline](#) between Norway and

Germany, while [Energinet](#) has postponed the planned commissioning date for a cross-border interconnection from Denmark into Germany from 2028 to the end of 2031. Interconnectivity is also weakened by a lack of coordination in Member States' plans. Indeed, while a majority of Member States have given substantial space to hydrogen in their NECPs and have now adopted [National Hydrogen Strategies](#),<sup>1</sup> there is a substantial lack of coordination between them which translates in insufficient plans to build cross-border hydrogen pipelines.

Carbon management has also gained attention in the EU agenda, particularly as a complementary tool for producing low-carbon gases and decarbonising industrial processes as well as power generation. However, progress in establishing a clear legal framework for CCS technologies has been slow. Jørgensen has cited a need to advance CCS technologies and related infrastructure. In his [hearing](#) and a legislative package could be put forward under his mandate.

Other challenges previously highlighted in the industrial carbon management [strategy](#), published in February 2024, are yet to be addressed. For example, high risks for companies attempting to establish carbon value chains, such as liability for CO<sub>2</sub> leakages and a lack of standards in certifications across different Member States. The main challenge, however, remains the financial viability of the sector. In October the Innovation Fund [announced](#) support for several Carbon management projects, but this mobilisation may still be not enough. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis [estimates](#) that the total cost of Europe's planned CCS projects could reach up to €520 billion. Therefore, it will be essential to scale up both public support and private investments.

Meanwhile, the debate around nuclear power in the EU, which had been largely static due to opposing blocks of pro- and anti-nuclear Member States, is gaining new momentum. The debate was sparked in December after a revised mission [letter](#) to Jørgensen mentioned a proposal for a new renewable energy target for 2040. In response, a joint [declaration](#) by representatives from 12 countries<sup>2</sup> stressed that achieving the EU's climate targets will require increasing support for all decarbonisation solutions, particularly, nuclear power. They also added that a target specifically focused on renewable energy will detract support from the nuclear sector.

Commissioner Jørgensen [criticised](#) this position and while ensuring that nuclear energy will be part of the Commission's clean energy plans, also casted doubts on the imminent rollout of advanced small-scale reactors (SMRs), a technology that is gaining momentum as an alternative for many Member States.

Nuclear power has long divided pro-nuclear Member States led by France against skeptics like Germany, but the balance of these opposing blocks may be shifting. After elections in February, Germany may be governed by a CDU-led government more leaning towards the idea of [supporting](#) a fleet of small modular reactors. Similarly, Italy, a country that had previously opposed nuclear power, [announced](#) in October that it will introduce a state-backed company to construct reactors.

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<sup>1</sup> All Member States have adopted a National Hydrogen Strategy with the exception of Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden as of January 2025

<sup>2</sup> Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Hungary

# 4. DEALING WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RESISTANCES

As the European Commission is trying to reconcile decarbonisation and competitiveness within its Clean Industrial Deal, the EU faces mounting challenges in key industrial sectors. In this context, the steel, automotive, and chemical sectors struggle with insufficient public support, increased global competition, and the cost of transitioning to clean technologies.

During his hearing, Séjourné **voiced** European support for the steel sector. He announced that the European Investment Bank (EIB) would provide increased attention to the steel industry, specifically with their decarbonisation efforts. Indeed, the EIB has already supported the sector in its decarbonisation and green steel production strategy, for example **granting** 100 million euros to Italian steel company Marcegaglia in December. However, many companies are lamenting the EU's insufficient support as a reason to delay or halt their decarbonisation plans. For instance, ArcelorMittal postponed plans to transition to hydrogen-based steel production in November, citing insufficient EU support and policy uncertainty.

The EU has yet to provide solutions on how to address the sector's consequences of global **overcapacity** which has lowered prices and left European companies at a competitive disadvantage. European producers have also lamented weaker-than-expected demand, particularly for green steel, which is regarded as not yet sufficient to justify the industry's transition. Many companies have urged the EU to foster demand for green steel, for instance, through green steel **quotas** for companies in the automotive sector.

In November, the Industrial Steel Association (Eurofer) has **called** for the Commission to adopt a Steel Action Plan, starting with stricter tariff system and ensuring that CBAM will reduce competition from not-decarbonised steel imports, particularly from Chinese companies, which reached in 2024 their highest steel **exports** levels in eight years. Von der Leyen has tasked Séjourné with developing a **Steel and Metals Action Plan**. While details are still lacking, and it is unclear how it will tackle the sectors' structural and market-based challenges, the Plan may be presented alongside tariff and safeguard **measures** to limit steel imports and external competition. However, their use will need to be traced carefully. Europe already faces potential trade disputes on multiple **fronts**, with the new Trump administration adopting a protectionist stance and trade friction with China persisting. Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefcovic underscored these concerns during his **hearing**, criticising the "negative externalities of China's state-driven economic model and industrial policy" and expressing a need to find lasting solutions to "US tariffs on steel and aluminium."

Automotive companies are also grappling with high production costs and growing competition from China. The sector is also experiencing weak [demand](#), specifically regarding electric vehicles (EVs). These factors are prompting plant closures and significant [layoffs](#). The automotive sector employs nearly 14 million people across Europe and lost over 30,000 [jobs](#) in 2024 alone, more than doubling the 2023 losses. These cuts have sparked significant protests, triggering particularly widespread [strikes](#) in Germany.

Some companies are accusing the Commission that the crisis has been intensified by the EU decarbonisation efforts. While the economic slowdown is the result of multiple factors, the recent tightening of emission [standards](#) has placed further pressure on manufacturers. Indeed, as of January 1, 2025, stricter EU CO2 emission standards have entered into force, capping emissions from new vehicle sales to 94 grams/km from 116g/km, and exceeding it will lead to fines of 95 euros per excess CO2 g/km for each vehicle sold.

The European People's Party (EPP) has pushed to relax CO2 regulations for carmakers and in December, German MEP Jens Gieseke presented a [proposal](#) to the Commission advocating adjustments to the de facto ban on internal combustion engines by 2035. Similar opposition came also from different Member States. In September, Italy advanced [demands](#) for an early review of the ban, then joined by [Germany](#) and the [Czech Republic](#). The Commission has refused to revise these targets, and instead in December President von der Leyen announced a ["Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry in Europe."](#) The Dialogue, set to launch in January 2025, will bring the Commission, automotive companies, trade unions, and infrastructure providers to address the industry's challenges. However, this initiative – currently focused primarily on promoting dialogue between stakeholders - seems to fall short when compared to the measures for the sector proposed by Mario Draghi in his [report](#). Draghi called for a dedicated Automotive Action and stressed the pressing need to tackle the structural challenges specific to the European sector, particularly its 30% higher vehicle production costs compared to China. He underlined the need to drastically cut energy and labour expenses and invest in automation. However, some of these proposals directly clash with the social issue of job preservation already threatened by the layoffs.

The chemical sector, another hard-to-abate industry, is also facing economic [fatigue](#). However, the new Commission has offered few concrete proposals to address its specific challenges. Séjourné has declared his intention to position chemicals as a key strategic sector within the Clean Industrial Deal, describing it as ["the industry of industries"](#) but he has provided little detail on how this vision will translate into actionable policies. In October, he underlined the need to work together with Roswall, to define the priorities of a new [Chemical Industry Package](#). However, in November 2024, during her [hearing](#), Roswall confirmed that the Package will focus primarily on simplifying and updating the [2007 REACH regulation](#), and not on sustaining the sector in enhancing its industrial competitiveness.

While this update aims to streamline the regulation's environmental provisions and potentially simplify regulatory burdens, it offers little clarity on how the Commission intends to sustain chemical companies from a competitiveness standpoint. This lack of clarity is especially troubling given the sector's heavy reliance on fossil fuels, which would necessitate tailored decarbonisation strategies. In particular, petrochemical production depends on fossil fuels not only as energy sources for

its energy-intensive processes but as raw materials as well, making it one of the most challenging industries to decarbonise.

The energy transition's industrial challenges are also increasingly accompanied by social repercussions, including job losses and declining public acceptance. The new Commission has emphasised citizen involvement as a key element for fostering bottom-up decision-making in the decarbonisation policies. On December 5, during the sixteenth [Citizen's Energy Forum](#), the Commission launched efforts to develop the Citizens' Energy Package. This initiative aims to establish a cohesive framework for citizen participation in energy transition discussions while ensuring the process remains fair and inclusive. The forum gathered representatives from the Commission, EU institutions, national and local stakeholders, regulators, and member states to shape the Citizens' Energy Package. Discussions spanned issues such as energy communities, decarbonising residential heating, increasing energy efficiency in buildings, energy poverty and affordable housing.

However, the Forum made limited progress on addressing the critical issue of job losses and how the EU should address industrial transformation from a labour perspective. The lack of an employment strategy focused on reskilling and training for workers exacerbates the challenges faced by the industrial sector. Indeed [shortages](#) of skills related to clean and digital sectors had already been individuated among the factors hindering the decarbonisation of the European industry.

While the new Commission is focusing its attention on industrial transformation, key European Green Deal legislations passed in the previous legislative cycle are encountering significant delays and implementation challenges.

The planned expansion of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) to include heating fuels and transportation, set to take effect in 2027, has sparked significant opposition. A coalition led by Czech is pushing for a delay up to a least [2028](#), citing rising cost-of-living pressures due to energy prices. While critics are arguing that the scheme's direct impact on citizens will exacerbate financial burdens, the expansion of the ETS is critical to mobilize resources for the transition as it generates revenues for the [Innovation Fund](#) through the monetisation of its allowances.

Similarly, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSRD), adopted in 2022 and designed to enforce sustainability standards across supply chains, has faced domestic and international backlash. Within the EU, critics such as German Justice Minister [Marco Buschmann](#) argue that the directive hampers economic competitiveness. On the global stage, Qatar, which became a critical supplier of LNG to the EU since its decoupling from Russian gas, has [warned](#) that enforcement of CSRD penalties - up to 5% of global turnover for violations - may lead it to halt LNG shipments to Europe.

The Commission has also announced an upcoming "[Omnibus Simplification Package](#)" designed to streamline overlapping requirements and enhance clarity in the application of the EU Taxonomy Regulation, the CSRD and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) without altering their fundamental objectives. Séjourné has said that, in alignment with the [Budapest Declaration](#), this initiative will reduce administrative, regulatory, and reporting burdens by 25%. However, while specific changes are yet to be determined, there is increasing opposition from civil society concerned about excessive [deregulation](#).



Lastly, the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), aimed at preventing imports of commodities linked to deforestation, has also faced delays and attempts to be limited in scope. Respectively on 17th and 18th December both the [Parliament](#) and the [Council](#) have agreed to postpone the Regulation enforcement by 12 months for large companies and 18 months for smaller enterprises to allow more time for compliance.

However, during the Parliamentary passage, the EPP also proposed a series of amendments aimed at further diluting the regulation. These included exempting traders of certain commodities from control obligations and introducing a category of countries deemed to have “no deforestation risks.”

Both proposals were widely criticized as limiting the efficacy of the EUDR and while the provision [exempting](#) traders was ultimately removed, the “[no-risk](#)” category was adopted. This addition not only weakens the regulation’s capacity to tackle deforestation but also risks provoking opposition from third countries, many of which already viewed the previous classification as arbitrary and flawed. To address these international concerns, the Commission has developed a [Framework for International Cooperation and Engagement](#), aimed at fostering collaboration with trade partners, however this tool seems to arrive very late in the life of the EUDR, after many third countries have already been alienated by unilateral decisions from the EU.

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# AP- PEN- DIX

# TIME LINE

This timeline highlights the main elements proposed by the Commission under the umbrella of the Green Deal since the re-election of Ursula Von Der Leyen in July 2024. Previous activities are listed under the "Timeline Archive", available at the end of this report.

The lists are not exhaustive, but aim to provide an overview of the Commission's work during these years. The list started as an expanded version of the Commission's own timeline, available here:

[https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en)

## 14 January 2025

The Commission published an independent [study](#) detailing the net-zero manufacturing industry landscape in Europe and a [Regulation](#) on the verification of CO2 emissions for heavy-duty vehicles.

## 9 January 2025

The Commission President established 14 [Project Groups](#) chaired by Members of the College to ensure coordination on political priorities.

## 1 January 2025

[Poland](#) assumed the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

## 18 December 2024

The Council formally adopted the regulation on the one-year postponement of the application of the [EU Deforestation law](#).  
The Commission President announced the launch of a [Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry in Europe](#).

## 17 December 2024

The Council affirmed its position on a [Regulation](#) for the prevention of

plastic pellet losses.

### **16 December 2024**

The Council formally adopted a [Regulation](#) on packaging and packaging waste and approved [conclusions](#) on promoting geothermal energy.

### **12 December 2024**

The Energy Community Ministerial Council adopted the first [Projects of Energy Community Interest](#).

### **9 December 2024**

The Council approved [conclusions](#) on the post-2027 CAP.

### **6 December 2024**

The Commission finalised negotiations with four Mercosur countries for an EU-Mercosur partnership [agreement](#).

### **5 December 2024**

The Commission launched the [European Board on Agriculture and Food](#).

The [16th Citizens' Energy Forum](#) took place in Budapest, kickstarting the Commission's work on developing the Citizens Energy Package.

### **3 December 2024**

The Commission established the [cap](#) on emission allowances under the ETS2 for 2027.

The Commission earmarked €4.6 [billion](#) for two calls for proposals to accelerate the deployment of decarbonisation technologies and announced a new [partnership](#) with the European Investment Bank to support investments in the battery manufacturing sector.

### **1 December 2024**

The [Commission 2024-2029](#) took office.

### **24 November 2024**

The Commission and EU Member States [negotiated](#) a New Collective Quantified Goal for Climate Finance at COP29, broadening the global contributor base.

### **19 November 2024**

The Council adopted a new regulation on ESG rating [activities](#) and greenlighted the [proposal](#) for an EU certification framework for permanent carbon removals, carbon farming and storage.

The [2024 Carbon Market Report](#) showed that carbon pricing drove emissions from power and industry installation to a 16,5% reduction in 2023.

### **14 November 2024**

The Parliament agreed to the one-year [postponement](#) of the

Deforestation Regulation.

### **12 November 2024**

The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Stéphane [Séjourné](#) (Prosperity and Industrial Strategy) and Teresa [Ribera](#) (Clean, Just and Competitive Transition).

The Commission [launched](#) a new Methane Abatement Partnership Roadmap at COP29.

### **8 November 2024**

The Council released the [Budapest Declaration](#) on the New European Competitiveness Deal.

### **7 November 2024**

The Commission launched an [Ecodesign Forum](#) to accelerate progress on sustainable products.

The Parliament conducted the confirmation hearings of Commissioner-designate Wopke [Hoekstra](#) (Climate, Net-Zero and Clean Growth)

### **5 November 2024**

The Council adopted the [Construction Products Regulation](#) and called for swift [implementation](#) of the EU's regulatory framework for renewable hydrogen.

The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Dan [Jørgensen](#) (Energy and Housing) and Jessika [Roswall](#) (Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy).

### **4 November 2024**

The Parliament conducted confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate Christophe [Hansen](#) (Agriculture and Food) and Apostolos [Tzitzikostas](#) (Sustainable Transport and Tourism).

### **29 October 2024**

The Commission [imposed](#) duties on imports of battery electric vehicles from China for a period of five years.

### **22 October 2024**

The European Parliament [approved](#) the reform of Single European Sky rules for a more efficient and greener airspace.

### **16 October 2024**

The Council [agreed](#) to postpone the implementation of the Deforestation Regulation by one year.

The Commission adopted a delegated act [clarifying](#) the inclusion of offshore vessels in the emissions monitoring system.

The European Network for Transmission System Operators for Gas's annual winter supply outlook [confirmed](#) the security of gas supplies for

the upcoming winter and summer season.

### **14 October 2024**

The Council [asked](#) the Commission to propose a comprehensive EU-wide action plan against desertification, land degradation and drought.

### **8 October 2024**

The Council [approved](#) conclusions on climate finance ahead of COP29.

### **2 October 2024**

The Commission [proposed](#) a one-year postponement of the application of the EU Deforestation Regulation and [published](#) an international cooperation framework to support stakeholders in the implementation.

### **27 September 2024**

The Commission [launched](#) a consultation on the draft methodology for low-carbon hydrogen and fuels and published the final Terms and Conditions for its second auction for the production of renewable hydrogen via the Innovation Fund.

### **17 September 2024**

The Commissioners-designate are [announced](#)

### **11 September 2024**

The EU Governance Regulation report [shows](#) that the EU has a comprehensive integrated legal framework and tools in place to meet its decarbonisation goals.

### **9 September 2024**

The Draghi Report on “The future of European competitiveness” is [published](#)

### **30 August 2024**

New monitoring rules [agreed](#) for the EU ETS.

### **22 July 2024**

The Council [renews](#) economic sanctions for a further 6 months towards Russia.

### **18 July 2024**

The Parliament [re-elects](#) Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President. The new Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation [enters](#) into force.



# TIMELINE

# ARCHIVE

# 2019-2024

## 27 June 2024

The EU [notifies](#) its withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty.

## 24 June 2024

The EU [adopts](#) 14th package of sanctions against Russia for war against Ukraine.

## 17 June 2024

The Council [gives](#) final green light to Nature restoration law.

## 30 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) final approval to right-to-repair directive.

## 29 May 2024

The Commission [hosts](#) the first General Assembly of the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors.

## 28 May 2024

The EU and Australia [sign](#) partnership on sustainable critical and strategic mineral.

## 27 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) its final approval to the ecodesign regulation.  
The Council [gives](#) final approval to the net-zero industry act.

## 24 May 2024

The Council [gives](#) its final approval to the corporate sustainability due diligence regulation.

## 24 April 2024

Parliament approves a review of the [Common Agriculture Policy \(CAP\) Strategic Plans Regulation](#) and the [CAP Horizontal Regulation](#).

## 12 April 2024

The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive [is formally adopted](#).

### 11 April 2024

Parliament [adopts reform](#) of the EU electricity market.

### 10 April 2024

The Parliament [adopts](#) new law to reduce emissions from energy sector, especially methane emissions.

### 12 March 2024

The Commission publishes the [Communication on managing climate risks in Europe](#) as a response to the first ever European Climate Risk Assessment.

### 4 March 2024

The Council reaches [political agreement](#) on a recommendation to continue coordinated demand-reduction to secure sufficient gas storage for next winter

### 20 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) on EU-wide certification scheme for carbon removals.

Political [agreement](#) on new air quality standards in the EU

### 19 February 2024

European Hydrogen Bank pilot [auction](#): 132 bids received from 17 European countries.

### 8 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) to ban all remaining intentional uses of toxic mercury in the EU.

### 6 February 2024

Political [agreement](#) on the Net-Zero Industry Act.

The Commission adopts an EU Industrial Carbon Management [Strategy](#), setting out how to sustainably capture, store and use CO<sub>2</sub>.

Commission [presents recommendation](#) for 2040 emissions reduction target to set the path to climate neutrality in 2050.

### 31 January 2024

Commission [proposes](#) to allow EU farmers to derogate for one year from certain agricultural rules.

### 25 January 2024

The Commission launches [Strategic dialogue](#) on the future of EU agriculture

### 19 December 2023

Council approves Commission's proposals to [prolong energy emergency measures](#).



### 18 December 2023

Commission publishes the [assessments](#) of the 21 member states which submitted updated draft National Energy and Climate Plans.

### 8 December 2023

Council and the Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the [Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package](#), establishing common internal market rules for renewable and natural gases and hydrogen. The agreement also proposes the creation of the European Network of Network Operators for Hydrogen (ENNOH).

### 7 December 2023

Council and Parliament reach provisional political agreement on the [Energy Performance of Buildings Directive \(EPBD\)](#).

Council adopts negotiating positions on [Net-Zero Industry Act](#) and proposes an expanded list of ten strategic net-zero technologies.

### 28 November 2023

Commission proposes to [prolong energy emergency measures](#) by 12 months.

Commission proposes the [Electricity Grid Action Plan](#) and publishes the [sixth list of key infrastructural energy projects](#).

### 23 November 2023

Commission presents the first pilot auction [under the European Hydrogen Bank](#) for a total of €800 million of subsidies for renewable hydrogen production.

### 22 November 2023

Commission proposes a new [forest monitoring law](#) to improve resilience of European forests.

### 16 November 2023

Council adopts [EU position for COP28](#) and stresses that it will call for a “phase-out of unabated fossil fuels”.

Council and European Parliament reach provisional agreement on a [proposed EU law](#) that would improve the investigation and prosecution of environmental crimes.

### 15 November 2023

Council and Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on the [Regulation on Methane Emissions Reduction in the Energy Sector](#), agreeing on deadlines for monitoring, reporting and inspection of sources of methane emissions.

### 13 November 2023

Council and Parliament reach provisional agreement on the [Critical Raw Materials Act](#).

### 9 November 2023

Parliament and Council reach agreement on [Nature Restoration Law](#). Member states will put in place restoration measures in at least 20 per cent of the EU's land areas and 20 per cent of its seas by 2030.

### 24 October

Commission presents the [European Wind Power Action Plan](#).

Commission publishes the [2023 State of the Energy Union Report](#).

### 17 October 2023

Council adopts negotiating positions on [electricity market reform](#). The Council agrees that two-way contracts for difference will be the mandatory model used when public funding is involved in long-term contracts.

### 5 October 2023

European Parliament [approves](#) Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action and Maroš Šefčovič as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal.

### 14 September 2023

European Parliament adopts negotiating positions on [electricity market reform](#) and Critical Raw Materials ([CRM](#)) Act.

### 13 September 2023

Ursula von der Leyen delivers State of the European Union [speech](#); European Parliament adopts negotiating position on recast of the Clean Air Directive.

### 12 September 2023

European Parliament [adopts](#) amendments to Renewable Energy Directive (RED III).

### 29 August 2023

Ursula von der Leyen [proposes](#) Wopke Hoekstra as Commissioner for Climate Action.

### 22 August 2023

Frans Timmermans [resigns](#) as Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal; Maroš Šefčovič is appointed as new Executive Vice-President and Acting Commissioner for Climate Action.

### 19 July 2023

Beginning of trilogues on nature restoration law; ITRE Committee [adopts](#) report on electricity market reform.

### 12 July 2023

European Parliament [adopts](#) negotiating position on nature restoration law.

### 11 July 2023

Commission presents Greening Freight Transport **Package**; Parliament adopts agreement on recast of Energy Efficiency Directive; European Parliament **adopts** negotiating position on Industrial Emissions Directive.

### 7 July 2023

Commission **presents** a proposal for coordinated withdrawal from Energy Charter Treaty.

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second **tender** for joint gas purchases.

### 27 June 2023

Amended version of the Nature Restoration Law does not reach the **majority** in the Environment Committee; final vote sent to plenary.

### 26 June 2023

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches second **round** of demand pooling for joint gas purchases by EU companies.

### 20 June 2023

The Commission publishes the two delegated **acts** defining the rules for the production of renewable hydrogen.

### 16 June 2023

EU ambassadors reach political deal to **approve** the Renewable Energy Directive (REDIII).

### 8 June 2023

European Parliament reaches political **agreement** to approve the Nature Restoration Law after facing opposition from MEPs of the European People's Party (EPP).

### 16 May 2023

25 gas supplying companies **respond** to EU's joint gas demand, providing more than 13.4 bcm of gas.

After being approved by the European Parliament, the CBAM enters into **force**.

The EU Deforestation-free Regulation (**EUDR**) is adopted by the Council after its adoption by the Parliament and thus enter into force.

### 15 May 2023

EU Member States **agree** to raise renewable target from 32% to 42.5% by 2030.

### 4 May 2023

First joint gas **purchase** attracts demand from more than 65 EU companies.

### 26 April 2023

The European Parliament and the Council reach a political [agreement](#) on the ReFuelEU Aviation proposal

### 25 April 2023

EU Energy Platform: Commission launches first [call](#) for companies to jointly buy gas

Council [adopts](#) key pieces of legislation delivering on 2030 climate targets: Revision of the ETS Directive; Amendment of the MRV shipping Regulation; Revision of the ETS Aviation Directive; Regulation establishing a Social Climate Fund; Regulation establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

### 21 April 2023

The Commission proposes a [revision](#) to the existing marketing standards of agri-food products

### 18 April 2023

The European Parliament [approves](#) the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

### 30 March 2023

European Green Deal: EU agrees [stronger legislation](#) to accelerate the rollout of renewable energy.

### 28 March 2023

Member states [agree](#) to extend voluntary 15% gas demand reduction target.

### 28 March 2023

EU ministers sign off on [legislation](#) phasing out sales of new polluting cars and vans by 2035.

### 16 March 2023

Proposal for a [European Hydrogen Bank](#).

### 16 March 2023

EU proposes the [Critical Raw Materials Act](#), a comprehensive set of actions to ensure the EU's access to a secure, diversified, affordable and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.

### 16 March 2023

EU releases [Net Zero Industry Act](#) establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem.

### 14 February 2023

The Commission proposed [new CO2 emissions targets](#) for new heavy-duty vehicles from 2030 onwards. These targets will help to reduce CO2 emissions in the transport sector.

### 13 February 2023

The Commission proposed [rules](#) to define what constitutes renewable hydrogen in the EU, with the adoption of two Delegated Acts required under the Renewable Energy Directive.

### 1 February 2023

The Commission presented a [Green Deal Industrial Plan](#) to enhance the competitiveness of Europe's net-zero industry and support the fast transition to climate neutrality.

### 24 January 2023

The European Commission introduces the revision of the [EU Pollinators Initiative](#).

### 18 December 2022

The European Commission welcomed the [provisional agreement](#) reached with the European Parliament and Council to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System, apply emissions trading to new sectors for effective economy-wide climate action, and establish a Social Climate Fund.

### 9 December 2022

The Commission welcomed the deal reached between the European Parliament and the Council to help make the aviation sector 'Fit for 55', setting in law its contribution to our target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

### 6 December 2022

EU agrees [law](#) to fight global deforestation and forest degradation driven by EU production and consumption and the a political agreement is reached on the revision of the EU Emission Trading System rules on aviation.

### 30 November 2022

The Commission proposed new EU-wide [rules](#) on packaging, to tackle this constantly growing source of waste and of consumer frustration.

### 24 November 2022

During the extraordinary Council for Energy, EU energy ministers agreed on a Council [Regulation](#) "enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks", as well as on a Regulation speeding up permits to deploy renewable energies.

### 27 October 2022

The Council and the European Parliament reach a provisional political agreement on stricter CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans.

### 26 October 2022

Commission proposes stronger [rules](#) for cleaner air and water, including

PFAs, several pesticides, bisphenol A and some pharmaceuticals.

### **15 September 2022**

Commission proposes for an [emergency market intervention](#) to reduce energy bills for Europeans, through reduced demand and a revenue cap on some producers (among other measures).

### **20 July 2022**

Commission proposes a "[Save gas for a safe winter](#)" plan to reduce gas consumption until the following spring.

### **22 June 2022**

Commission launches a [Nature protection package](#), focusing on restoring ecosystems and halving pesticide use by 2030.

### **18 May 2022**

Commission launches the [REPowerEU plan](#), a set of measures triggered by the invasion of Ukraine and focusing on energy saving, supply diversification and the promotion of renewables.

### **5 April 2022**

Commission proposes two [Regulations](#) to phase down fluorinated greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances.

### **5 April 2022**

Commission proposes an [update](#) to the Industrial Emissions Directive, to modernise EU industrial emissions rules to steer large industry in long-term green transition.

### **30 March 2022**

Commission launches [Proposals](#) to make sustainable products the norm in the EU, boost circular business models and empower consumers for the green transition, as part of the Circular Economy Action Plan.

### **23 March 2022**

Following the REPowerEU Communication, Commission publishes [options](#) to mitigate high energy prices through common gas purchases and minimum gas storage obligations.

### **8 March 2022**

As a direct response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Commission publishes the [REPowerEU Communication](#) focused on energy prices, storage and diversification.

### **15 December 2021**

Commission publishes a set of [proposals](#) for a new EU framework to decarbonise gas markets, promote hydrogen and reduce methane emissions, namely a Directive and a Regulation.

### **15 December 2021**

Commission publishes a [Communication](#) on Sustainable Carbon Cycles, to remove, recycle and sustainably store carbon, which will be followed by a proposal for a regulatory framework by the end of 2022.

### **14 December 2021**

Commission launches a new transport [proposal](#) targeting greater efficiency measures.

### 17 November 2021

Commission [proposes](#) two Regulations and a Strategy to stop deforestation, innovate sustainable waste management and make soils healthy.

### 15 September 2021

Commission publishes a Communication launching the project [New European Bauhaus](#), focusing on initiatives and funding dedicated to energy efficiency in buildings.

### 14 July 2021

Commission adopts a large [package](#) of proposals to achieve a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030. The comprehensive package deals with revision of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation, the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency Directive, a ReFuelEU Aviation Initiative (on air transport), a Regulation on Land Use, Forestry and Agriculture, a proposal for a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive.

### 17 May 2021

Commission proposes a [Communication](#) on a new approach for a sustainable blue economy in the EU.

### 12 May 2021

Commission adopts a [Zero Pollution Action Plan](#) for Air, Water and Soil, to improve quality standards for all three, and reduce the impact on health, among other goals.

### 25 March 2021

Commission publishes an [Organic Action Plan](#) as part of its Farm-to-Fork strategy.

### 24 February 2021

Commission adopts a new [EU strategy on adaptation](#) to climate change.

### 18 January 2021

Commission first launches the design of the [New European Bauhaus initiative](#), dedicated to energy efficiency in building.

### 10 December 2020

Commission proposes an upgrade on the legislation on batteries, also trying to boost the [European Battery Alliance](#), launched in 2017.

### 9 December 2020

Commission launches a [European Climate Pact](#), to spread awareness and increase the involvement of citizens.

### 19 November 2020

Commission presents an [Offshore Renewable Energy strategy](#), aimed at increasing the current 12 GW capacity to a minimum of 60 GW by 2030 and 300 GW by 2050.

#### **14 October 2020**

Commission publishes three significant elements for the Green Deal: a [Renovation Wave](#) initiative on energy efficiency for building, a [Methane Strategy](#) focused on decarbonised gases, and a [Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability](#) to strengthen legislation on hazardous chemicals.

#### **17 September 2020**

Commission presents its [2030 Climate Target Plan](#), raising its ambition to reach a 55 per cent emissions reduction by 2030.

#### **8 July 2020**

Commission adopts [EU strategies](#) for energy system integration and hydrogen to pave the way towards a fully decarbonised, more efficient and interconnected energy sector.

#### **20 May 2020**

Commission presents two key strategies: its [EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030](#), and its [Farm-to-Fork Strategy](#) to make food systems more sustainable.

#### **11 March 2020**

Commission proposes a [Circular Economy Action Plan](#), to expand and integrate previous work on circularity into the Green Deal.

#### **4 March 2020**

Commission proposes a [European climate law](#), aimed at reaching climate neutrality by 2050.

#### **14 January 2020**

Commission presents two founding elements of the Green Deal: the [European Green Deal Investment Plan](#) and the [Just Transition Mechanism](#).

#### **11 December 2019**

Commission presents the [European Green Deal](#).



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