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"THE SITUATION IN THE BALKAN COUNTRIES AFTER THE CYPRUS CRISIS"

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Contents:

The situation in the Balkan countries after the Cyprus crisis

I. Topic clarification

The topic has been presented too optimistically: the Cyprus crisis is not over. True, Archbishop Makarios is back in office, and Turkish as well as Greek troops are preventing confrontations between the two population groups on the island itself; but the danger of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey continues. Even if it should not occur, the political and security-political effects of the crisis on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot yet be perceived.

Therefore, the topic under discussion should be interpreted as follows: what are the forces and the developments within the Balkan states, Turkey and Greece turning the crisis on Cyprus, which is primarily of an ethnic nature, into a fight f o r Cyprus, i.e. a crisis of international proportions? And what will be the possible consequences of this crisis for the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean situation as well as for Western interests in this region?

II. The national content of the Cyprus crisis

1. Cyprus and the domestic Turkish situation

Turkey has supported the Turkish population group ever since Cyprus became independent (1960). Since 1964, its struggle for political status on Cyprus has had a strong impact on Turkey's foreign policy. Respect for the quest of the island's Turkish group for freedom and equality was identical with Turkey's own quest for respect; Cyprus was and is an element of Turkey's national honor.

Thus, the Cyprus problem already had an impact on Turkey's foreign policy in the sixties: President Johnson's declaration whereby the United States and NATO would n o t aid Turkey in the event of a Soviet intervention in Turkey should Turkey intervene in Cyprus, almost caused a national shock and initiated a foreign policy debate. It also signaled the beginning of a reorientation process: Its elements were an alienation from the United States, the revision of

bilateral agreements with it in the sense of a stronger emphasis on national Turkish independence, interpretation of Turkish membership in NATO to the effect that Turkey's contribution would lie mainly in the defense of national security interests, a balancing policy towards the Soviet Union, and a careful activation of ties with the Arab and Islamic world.

This significant function of Cyprus within Turkey's overall foreign policy must also be kept in mind when analyzing its present Cyprus policy as well as its domestic situation.

The domestic scene is presently characterized by two facts:

- A growing internal polarization. This development dates back to the second part of the sixties. The internal liberalization caused the development of leftist forces ("Turkish Labor Party", "center left" - course of the "Republican's People Party") as well as that of rightist forces ("National Salvation Party", the extreme rightist groups led by Alparslan Türkesh). The bloody conflict between these two extremes caused the country to become increasingly "ungovernable" as of 1968 and led to the intervention by the military in March 1971.

  The same forces have become active again following a normalization of the domestic situation (October 1973) - this time, however, a polarization appears to be taking place even among the heretofore moderate parties: the quasi Social Democratic "Republican's People Party" is being faced on the right by a "National Front" consisting of four parties, the largest of which being Demirel's "Justice Party". The most characteristic trait of this process is the introduction of religious, political, and social-political elements of Islam, strong enough to justify the statement that Turkey is being "Islamized".

- The growing difficulty of the Turkish parties to form a working majority in parliament. These difficulties became visible after the elections in October 1973, the first since the March 1971 military involvement in Turkish politics. Ecevit's "Republican's People Party" came out the strongest. Although it won 185 seats (its strongest competitor,

the "Justice Party", 149 seats), it was not able to form a government by itself in view of parliament's total of 450 seats.The result of difficult coalition talks was a curious coalition between the "Republican's People Party" and the extreme rightist Islamic "National Salvation Party" (48 seats). The vague "program of social progress" and the striving for "foreign-political independence" formed the basis for this coalition consisting of a "center left" party with a social-political program containing socialist traits, and an Islamic party, its ultimate goal being the reinstatement of an Islamic-Caliphic empire based on Islamic law. It was guarded as a secret that both parties interpreted said basis in a different manner: To one party, "social progress" implied progress in the socialist sense, to the other it implied "Islamic socialism". While the "People's Party" interpreted "foreign-political independence" as increased independence from NATO and West European economic influence as the prerequiste for the establishment of a socialist society, the "Salvation Party" wanted it to mean breaking off ties with the West (in the broadest sense) as the prerequiste for reinstating an Islamic society and an integration into the Arab-Islamic world. The eruption of the Cyprus crisis caused this coalition, which was not capable of exercising real government function anyway to collapse. Since then, Turkey has been unable to establish a government based on a parliamentary majority.

In this internal political stagnation the Cyprus issue represents a welcome foreign-political explosive apt to conceal the domestic crisis which seems to be unsolvable at present. In view of the difficulty to obtain a political profile in the field of domestic, social, and foreign policies, the Cyprus crisis is serving as a "national wave" on which Turkish politicians are hoping to gain public backing and support.

The eruption of the conflict had already served as a welcome opportunity for Prime Minister Ecevit to break with the coalition partner. Although Turkey's intervention in the conflict was based on the Zurich and London agreements, it gave him the opportunity,following half a year of fruitless tactics in domestic policies

during which not even part of the reforms promised by the "People's Party" had been implemented, to become a national hero and, taking advantage of the emotional wave, to make his party the sole government party. When new elections intended by Ecevit did not take place, Turkey slid into a permanent internal crisis.

At present, the Cyprus crisis is serving as a sort of political alibi: Since the internal political, social, and economic development is stagnant, the entire public attention can be drawn to Cyprus and to the related foreign-political implications. While the party leaders are trying to gain popularity by delivering strong statements on Cyprus (e.g. Ecevit's visit to Cyprus in January 1975), the internal polarization is continuing. The "center left" groups and the rightist parties, combined in the "National Front", are putting the blame on each other for the domestic crisis and in particular for the escalating militant showdown between leftist and rightist groups. On the one hand, the establishment of a fait accompli on Cyprus by occupying too large an area (approx. 35-40%) as compared with a Turkish population on Cyprus of about 18-20%, as well as the proclamation of an "autonomous Turkish-Cypriot Republic" are providing the basis for Turkey to settle once and for all the problem of the position of the Turkish ethnic group. On the other hand, this will mean a retardation for Turkey's domestic policy situation and the shifting of the main emphasis of Turkish politics to foreign policy. This does not change the fact that the fragile situation is continuing in the country and is likely to exacerbate even more.

2. Greece and Cyprus

To Greece the Cyprus problem presented itself in a different light: Cyprus is the last area with a Greek majority that does not yet belong to Greece politically. As an after-effect of the "megali idea", Greece, with varying emphasis, has demanded that the island be united with the mother country (enosis).

Thus, Cyprus was a "national matter" also for Greece, although in a different light than for Turkey. Even though the main goal of "emphasis" could not be achieved, it became a "national duty" to search for a political

status for the island's "Hellenic group", which would correspond to its "Hellenic character".

In this sense the Cypriot unitary state, represented by a strong Greek President, was the best of all,given poor possibilities. The Turkish group was only of minor political significance.

As nebulous as the events that led to the coup against Makarios may be, there seems to be little doubt that the Greek government in Athens itself pulled the strings. The national motivation is obvious: in view of lacking public support, a worsening economic situation in Greece, and outside reservation toward the military regime, the junta was led to believe that it would acquire legitimacy by "solving" the Cyprus question in the national sense.

The Cyprus crisis has changed the domestic scenery in Greece. The failure of the dictatorship and the introduction of democratic forms have given the country's politics a new start, but has at the same time burdened it with serious problems. True, Prime Minister Karamanlis' party came out of the November 1974 elections with the absolute majority (54.47%), and the leftists were only moderately successful. (Andreas Papandreou's "Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement" received 13,68% und the "United Left" 9,14%). Still, the domestic structure remains unstable: discussions concerning the Constitution have not yet been completed; a reorganization of the party system is planned in order to avoid future political splittings by clientele manipulations, a basic evil of Greek politics. In addition, the still unresolved fate of those responsible for the seven years of the military regime,gives further cause for domestic tensions.

Contrary to Turkey, for which the Cyprus crisis has so far had an integrating effect, Greece's domestic situation, which has not yet been consolidated, is adversely affected by the crisis. It is forcing the government to assume an extreme nationalist attitude which has to be oriented towards not giving away any "national positions". Thus the government is largely incapacitated in view of an opposition claiming the "safeguarding of national dignity" in regard to the Cyprus matter in its own right. (It is no coincidence

that those officers, who in February 1974 planned the coup against Karamanlis are also members of those forces that started the Cyprus crisis). Thus Greece's domestic policy finds itself entrapped in a vicious circle: in view of the continuing unstable internal situation a solution for the Cyprus crisis remains difficult for Greece; and as long as this is smoldering, the democratizing process in turn will be hampered.

III. Greek-Turkish rivalry

The depth of the "national" dimension of the Cyprus question cannot be fully understood without tracing the general Greek-Turkish rivalry rooted in their historical development. These roots are the domination of Greece by the Ottoman occupation and the anti-Ottoman emotions fed by the Greek liberation struggle (1821-1830). After Greece's independence (1830), the confrontation continued on the political-ideological level: The Ottoman leadership tried to preserve its old status on the basis of the ideology of "Ottomanism", whereas Greece attempted to expand its territory - small in the beginning - on the basis of the "Greek idea" (megali idea). The collapse of the Turkish Empire and the failure of the "megali idea" during the Turkish war of liberation were prerequisites for a relaxation of tensions, which later led to the friendship, neutrality, and non-aggression treaties concluded on June 10, 1930, and September 14, 1933.

The political development of Greece and Turkey following World War II also points up common features: both sides were subjected to Soviet-Communist pressure: both looked for support from the Western powers; the Truman doctrine was applied to them in the same manner; their accession to NATO was decided on the same day; both countries concluded the Balkan defense treaty with Yugoslavia - which has had no political repercussions, however; and both have entered into association agreements with the European Economic Community.

Notwithstanding the seeming "normality" of relations, rivalries have continued on: the Greeks wanted to demonstrate that they were the representative of Europe as well as of the West in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Turks wanted to prove that they were no longer the

"sick man on the Bosphorus", but instead an indispensable power for the West. Both sides have kept a suspicious eye on each other and have competed against each other regarding their economic development, the equipment of their armed forces, the search for international support, outside economic aid, etc.

The behavior of both states during the Cyprus crisis must be viewed against the background of this rivalry - in addition to the above mentioned implications for the domestic situation of Turkey and Greece. During the sixties the political status of the Turkis and Greek ethnic groups on the island constituted an element of the bilateral competition of the mother countries. At the beginning of the seventies, both sides seemed to have found a new understanding: strengthening bilateral cooperation, decreasing mutual distrust and - following an improvement of relations - exercising positive influence on the international talks concerning Cyprus.

This positive trend which peaked in the offer of then Greek President Papadopoulos to establish a confederation between the two states, did not last very long, however: n particular, the conflict over the drilling rights and exploitation of petroleum in the Aegean Sea which flared up again at the beginning of 1974 - a problem which has reached vital importance following the oil crisis - again pointed up the old controversies, thus destroying the beginnings of a bilateral cooperation. Long before the Cyprus crisis had erupted, this petroleum conflict had caused relations between the two states to slide into a deep political crisis.

In this situation the Cyprus conflict proper again changed its nature: its solution has now become associated with the solution of the Aegean issue, thus barring once more those basic rivalries and contrasts which characterize the history of the two nations. The effects of the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts are complementing each other: the question of the Aegean petroleum is vital for the economy of both states, with the aspects of the law of the seas and of international law still undecided. Although Turkey has agreed to present the problem to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, it insists on prior bilateral negotiations on the oil issue. Ankara

insists on its drilling rights in the Aegean Sea, while Greece denies this claim rejecting it for national economic reasons. With regard to Cyprus, however, the Turks, thanks to their military superiority, are holding a trump against Athens: they are demanding a Cypriot state on the basis of a geographic federation led by a President with only minor political authority. Athens considers this demand as a violation of the treaties of Zurich and London.

These conflicts of interest at the same time reflect the "fundamental" Greek-Turkish antagonism. This is why both sides find it difficult to make concessions: Greece is unlikely to become more flexible in the Aegean Sea unless Turkey relents at least in terms of a partial troop withdrawal from the island; and Ankara will not do so as long as Athens shows no readiness to make concessions in the Aegean conflict. And on Cyprus Turkey will not withdraw any troops or enter into any negotiations as long as Greece keeps withholding its basic assent to a federal solution. Conversely, Athens will not change its attitude as long as the Turks show no willingness to clear part of their occupied territory and entrust the central government with real political power.

Another factor adding to this overlapping of economic and political interests, complicated by the dimension of national rivalry and national pride, is that of the real weakness on the domestic level which is common to both states, although based on different motivations. In such a situation the two governments are in no position to make concessions to the other side in matters of "national magnitude" without toppling over them and, worse than that, disrupting the entire internal structure. Thus, in view of the difficult internal situation in Turkey, the Turkish Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces alluded to the escalation of the difficult domestic problems in his New Year's message of 1975 and announced "that positive steps must be taken about the current problems which are increasing to the degree to which the nation despairs - before they reach the point of no return". (The Pulse, January 2, 1975, page 3). And in Greece Karamanlis' position is not yet sufficiently consolidated to make him strong enough to risk the "national prestige" vis-à-vis Turkey. The attempted military coup of February 1975 proved this.

IV. Implications for the security in the Eastern Mediterranean

The growing national motivation underlying politics in the Eastern Mediterranean which characterizes the Cyprus issue and the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, also determines the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is true that this development is also a result of political changes since the mid-sixties and cannot be separated from the changes in the East-West relationship. But the aggravation of the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is not lastly a consequence of the "energy crisis" in the broadest sense. Its most important elements are:

- The feeling of military threat by the East bloc and in particular the Soviet Union has further receded and has been replaced by the perception of a greater threat, namely an economic threat caused primarily by the shortage or higher costs of raw materials.
- The "energy crisis" has plunged the Western industr - ialized states into an obvious economic and political (perhaps even intellectual) crisis which has challenged the leadership role they had claimed before. It has thus shaken the foundations of a policy which was based on the recognition of the political, economic, and intellectual leadership of the West.
- The fact that the Arab world has found visible forms of a political and economic cooperation and was able to confront the world powers with a political counterweight on the basis of this cooperation, has proved the decentralization of the world-political power structure. Although forces have been at work for years in the "Third World" demanding or trying to demonstrate the sovereignty of regional national states, these attempts have had very little success due to the lack of economic and political support. However, the Arab example has accorded new and realistic perspectives to the concept of the importance of regional groupings.

If one views the Greek und Turkish behavior vis-à-vis NATO and the United States during the crisis against this background, one comes to the conclusion that the consciousness of a common defense interest within the Western alliance has diminished continuously on the part of the states of the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, the

weight of national interests has reached a degree making any commitment for joint action almost impossible.

This really is the most crucial factor concerning western security in the eastern Mediterranean. It represents a graver danger to western security - so it seems - than any possible Greek-Turkish military conflict, which is not very likely to break out because of the clear power balance and the great dependence of both sides on military support from NATO states. Any choice between an alliance-oriented behavior and the implementation of national interests will, however, be made in favor of the latter.

Both sides have good reasons not to leave the alliance altogether: the supply of weapons and spare parts, participation in new weapons technologies, strategic planning etc.,- these are factors that neither state can do without in the forseeable future. But on the other hand, the alliance itself and membership in the alliance are rated lower than aspects of national policy: in the case of the Greek-Turkish rivalry the mechanism of this policy became apparent: the Cyprus coup and the installation of the Sampson regime which invoked the danger of the "enosis" as well as an impairment of the status of the Turkish Cypriot ethnic group, affected American-Turkish relations. Conversely, the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus led to great tensions in the Greek-American relationship and to Greece's withdrawal from the military organization of NATO. In the meantime,Turkey offered the United States to replace at least part of its positions lost in Greece. The anchoring of the aircraft carrier "Saratoga" in Izmir in January 1975 represented the first visit of the US fleet in Turkey within the last four years. The blockade of American military aid for Turkey in February 1975 caused Turkey to tentatively close essential NATO facilities and to deliver statements to the effect that Turkey was going to review its NATO membership. At the same time, the deterioriation of Turkish-American relations had caused Greece to cautiously improve its relations with the United States. Negotiations about the status of the bases and their use on the basis of Greece's national defense interests have meanwhile been initiated.

The two southeastern alliance members view the value of the NATO alliance primarily in terms of national interest which they basically define themselves, in particular in

light of their mutual rivalry. That does not mean that the security-political developments in connection with the Cyprus crisis are but an expression of momentary emotions which only disturbed the status quo without really changing it. What broke out during the Cyprus crisis was a fundamental attitude of the two rivals which was reflected in complex developments. The Cyprus crisis thus may be compared to the "oil crisis" which also indicates changes of world-political dimensions and cannot be discarded as simply a problem of oil and oil prices. It is becoming clear that the Cyprus crisis cannot be settled by solving the crisis on Cyprus. On the contrary, it is evident that the security situation of NATO's southeastern flank has undergone structural changes of such magnitude that a reassessment and reorganization seem indispensible.

V. Regional-political developments

An intensification of regional-political relations, i.e. of the political coherence of states with similar geographic or geopolitical conditions or with similar historic, religious, and cultural backgrounds, already became apparent during the second half of the sixties in the Mediterranean/Middle East area - a development which paralleled the world-political change towards a political rapprochement between East and West. This opened up a further political margin of action to the regional powers.

1. Turkey and the Middle East

Thus, as of 1965, Turkey also began to strive for better relations with the Arab nations which had been strained by various factors until then. While religiously motivated political forces started to get organized and to discover common "Islamic" traits within Turkey, whereas its relations towards the United States and NATO became more and more problematic at the same time, Turkish foreign policy strived to improve relations with the Arabian Middle East as a new political "hinterland" in order to establish a security base. It took up economic relations with these nations (the establishment of a common Turkish-Arab market is still under discussion). But the most significant token of this southeastern orientation was Turkey's participation in Islamic conferences - a truly remarkable Turkish

step in view of the principle of "Laicism" which is rooted in the Turkish Constitution. In the past Turkey had been represented by a minor representative in these conferences. But in February 1974, at the summit conference of Lahore, Turkish Foreign Minister Günes was the first Turkish cabinet member to attend such a meeting. In this connection, it might also be interesting to note that in 1974 Turkey put up the largest contingent of Mekka pilgrims.

The energy crisis, the shortage and higher cost of oil together with the growing difficulties of the Turkish economy, led to a stangthening of ties with the Arab world. The diplomatic and economic relations have multiplied, and in particular the visit of Libyan Foreign Minister Jallud in Ankara in January 1975 is significant of the political climate between Turkey and the Arabs as well as of the chances of an economic cooperation: The Libyans emphasized the Islamic brotherhood which culminated in Jallud's demand to Turkey that it assume a leadership role among the Islamic states. Jallud even used Ottoman reminiscences in this plea by alluding to the "formerly happy community of fate" and to the "severed ties between the Arab world and Turkey" which should be remedied. This verbal enthusiasm was backed up by agreements on a comprehensive economic-technical cooperation, ranging from the delivery of three million tons of petroleum to Turkey. Libyan support in the buildup of a Turkish arms industry, the opening of a Libyan market to Turkish industrial products to the admittance of 600,000 Turkish workers by Libya. Libya had already taken the Turkish side in the Cyprus crisis during the military conflict by supplying Turkey with petroleum.

These are the outlines for a possible regional Turkish policy in the Middle East. That does not necessarily imply its withdrawal from NATO. But a political area has been opened up against whose background Turkey will dispose of a wider margin of action towards NATO and the superpowers, in particular as far as national problems are concerned. However, in a political phase in which national problems rank above international solidarity, it cannot be ruled out that Turkey would take advantage of this leverage.

2. Greece and the Balkan states

The possibilities for Greece to establish a similar leverage on the Balkan as the Turks did in the Middle East, are somewhat less, but they do exist. Under the military junta at the end of the sixties its relations with the Balkan states, notably Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, had improved. In May 1971, diplomatic relations with the latter resumed after 32 years of interruption.

An improvement of Greek relations with the Balkan states has now, in view of Greece's changed attitude towards NATO, become all the more necessary. Due to its withdrawal from the military organization of NATO,Greece's position vis-à-vis the Communist Balkan states, in particular towards the Warsaw Pact member state Bulgaria, has been weakened. Greece exposed its northern border in favor of a buildup at the Turkish border in the Northeast - a fact that makes good political relations all the more important.

For the Balkan states the situation has also changed because of the Greek-Turkish conflict and in particular because of the Greek measures towards NATO. Although the position of the latter seems to have been diminished, this weakening has different implications also for the Balkan states. While to Bulgaria as a member of the Warsaw Pact; whose opponent at its southern border has been considerably weakened, this change means a definite advantage, Yugoslavia probably sees things in a different light: For although the Greek action meant a step in the direction of a neutralization of the Mediterranean which Yugoslavia desires, a strong NATO as its southeastern border represented an effective threat against a possible Soviet attempt to reintegrate Yugoslavia to a higher degree than before into the Soviet power sphere - militarily and politically; this concern appears justified, in particular with regard to the post-Tito era.

Similar considerations might well apply also to Bukarest to which any advancing of the Soviet power sphere means a sliding off into the hinterland which in turn increases Soviet pressure. For Albania, too, a safe southeastern NATO flank represented a certain

protection against possible Soviet pressure.

Indeed, it seems that both Yugoslavia and Albania are keeping a close watch on these changes. Although Yugoslavia tries to keep its political relations with Greece and Turkey balanced, it is apparent that it is in fact closer to Greece than to Turkey. Although it had harshly condemned the coup against Makarios, a "personal friend" of Tito's, it had likewise criticized the Turkish invasion and continued occupation of the island and opposes the division of Cyprus which would reduce the President's functions to the level of representation. On the occasion of the visit by Foreign Minister Minic in Athens in December 1974, both sides therefore stated that the present situation endangers "peace and stability in that region in the most deplorable manner".

From the viewpoint of its bilateral relations with Greece, Yugoslavia views Turkey as a force urging a change of the status quo. Greece is faced by a Turkey "that is continuously increasing its claims, not only with regard to Cyprus, but also with regard to Greece itself - in the Aegean Sea, in the Dodekanes - which makes the United States and NATO antagonistic towards Greece. And Greece which is entirely left to its own devices, having been abandoned by its alleged NATO partners, had to look on without being able to interfere as one third of Cypriot territory was occupied by Turkish troops and 40 per cent of the Greek island population were made refugees". (Internationale Politik, Belgrad, Vol. 25, 588, 5.10.74, p. 11; transl. from German version).

It is obvious that Yugoslavia is trying to convince Greece of the uselessness, even dangerousness of its NATO membership. It should instead use its new independence "for a more active cooperation with the socialist neighbor states of the USSR and all socialist European nations as well as with the non-alligned countries". (ibid, p. 12)

The political objective behind this Yugoslav recommendation must be seen within the framework of its Mediterranean policy and its policy of non-allignment: a Greece

which would sever its ties with NATO and base its security on an intensification of its relations with the "non-aligned" nations, would represent a step in direction of a neutralization of at least the eastern Mediterranean. Once the presence of NATO in that region were totally eliminated, the coastal states would probably also exert pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from that area.

Like Yugoslavia, Albania also reacted to the events around Cyprus and its implications. And the concern about its own security only appears to be reflected in contrasting arguments: on the one hand, concern about the weaknening of NATO and the subsequent Soviet increase of power is being expressed - a distinctly Chinese-inspired argument. On the other hand, Enver Hodza appealed to Greece and Yugoslavia in November 1974 to maintain friendly relations with Albania and not to tolerate any military bases and naval visits. The idea of establishing a regional security bloc against the threat from outside powers with a simultaneous expulsion of the superpowers from the region, also appears to be evident in this context. Last but not least, the Romanian Foreign Minister, during his visit in Athens in March 1975, proposed a conference of all Balkan states, thus also showing the Romanian interest in a reorganization on the Balkan.

Thus a certain parallel with the development in Turkey appears to be obvious: while the latter seeks to compensate its changed relations with NATO (and the United States) by intensifying its regional policy, Greece strives to make up for its reduced security by pursuing a policy of active relations on the Balkan. True, it cannot be at all predicted that Turkey will eventually withdraw from NATO or that Greece is shifting to a policy of neutrality or non-alignment. At the moment only trends can be indicated - trends that are, however, changing the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean distinctly and irrevocably.

VI. The role of West Europe

The events on Cyprus and the changes in the wake of the Cyprus crisis have unquestionably and without West Europe having shown any active engagement so far, brought up the question about its role in these developments. Also in this regard, common as well as diverging traits can be detected in the attitudes of the two states. They have in common that Western Europe is viewed only marginally in terms of military or security interests. Both states identify NATO with the United States. They do not quite realize the fact that West Europe is also affected by the Greek-Turkish dispute.

Moreover, West Europe is viewed primarily as an economic, political, and intellectual-cultural factor. Its economic value is seen in its role as a partner with whom the complex economic difficulties ranging from unemployment and inflation to a growth stagnation, may be solved. Possibly the two countries also expect West Europe to replace at least part of the curbed or canceled American military aid. Greece in particular, whose most important foreign-political steps after the restitution of democracy consisted in the resumption of relations with the European Community, is anxious to become a full-fledged member of the European Economic Community.

In political and intellectual-cultural terms Europe is seen as the superior body within the framework of which both nations find their political and intellectual place in the international political hierarchy. Regardless of their membership in a US-dominated military bloc and regardless of the strong economic and military American support, both states were European states according to their perception of political adherence.

After the deterioriation of their relations with the United States, the importance of West Europe has become even greater. The Cyprus crisis plunged both states into a kind of political vacuum: both act on behalf of and under the impulse of "national interest": The interests of other states, world powers or political groupings, are of secondary importance and only considered if they back up these "national concerns". Thus both states

have alienated themselves from the United States. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, remains a distant and foreign power with interests of its own which are congruent to an extent with those of Turkey and Greece as far as certain tactics are concerned, but with which there can be no identification in the long run. The regional element though already visible is still too weak to be considered as a true political alternative.

This is where West Europe should come in, in order to fill the "political vacuum". It is the only possible partner that can understand the national motivation because it has experienced it itself and continues to act by it, while at the same time being a big enough international power to get the conflicting parties interested in cooperation with it and to induce them to make compromises for this cooperation. In addition, it has the authority and legitimacy to exercise influence on both sides. This fact elucidates why both states at the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis behaved in a narrow-minded nationalistic manner, regardless of international opinion, but were nevertheless anxious to obtain West European support and sympathy.

In this context, however, the differences between the Turkish-European and the Greek-European relations become evident: they go hand in hand with the European elements of Turkish and Greek history. Since the end of the Turkish wars of liberation, Turkey has considered itself a European state: with the abolition of the Caliphate by Atatürk in 1924, it left the Islamic culture and entered the European cultural sphere. The process of "Europeanization" always extended to a limited elite only; the major part of the population, above all the Anatolian rural population, stuck to its traditional ways of life and religion. However, since the beginning of the fifties these forces have begun to play a prominent role in the political life of Turkey again. After Menderes had already depended on the support of these layers, numerous parties have been established since 1961, which are trying to gain political influence within the Turkish democracy. Religious principles play a major part in this process, and in fact "reislamization" is a process that has a very great weight in present day Turkish politics. The big mosque in the heart of Ankara across the Atatürk mausoleum is an

unmistakable symbol of this fact.

In the course of this development the "European character" of Turkey has been somewhat suppressed. The introduction of European ideas and ways of life is more likely to be viewed as a means to destroy the Turkish heritage which resulted from the Islam and the past, and to make Turkey a satellite state of the West.

The "identity crisis", a parallel phenomenon to the political crisis of Turkey, also results in a visible alienation of relations with Europe. The effects of this process cannot yet be assessed. However, Turkey's intellectual and political relationship with the East remains a Turkish option which has been added to the former inclination towards West Europe.

In contrast, Greece's adherence to West Europe is not challenged in any way. On the contrary, the replacement of the military junta by democratic politicians has even reinforced these ties: the rejection of the Greek military regime by West Europe which led to this country's exclusion from European institutions, the support of the democratic forces in Greece on the part of public opinion and the mass media, as well as the exile of Greek politicians and artists have served to strengthen relations between the new Greece and West Europe. Reintegration of the country into European institutions, which culminates in Greece's demand for an early full membership in the European Community, has put these ties on a firm base. As far as political and intellectual-cultural bonds are concerned, there is no alternative to Europe, in contrast to Turkey.

All these statements permit a conclusion regarding a possible mediating role of West Europe in the Cyprus conflict: in contrast to the Middle East conflict, West Europe does indeed have an opportunity for a conflict mediation. The economic relations with both sides as well as the fact that both states are basically "European" (that s t i l l holds true for Turkey inspite of the reservations mentioned), provide the leverage for such a mediation. The strange paradox of rejecting NATO and the United States while at the same time striving for closer ties with West Europe, is solved by the fact that the latter is able to understand the national problems as a

friend on the one hand, and to accord these problems international political weight on the other hand.

VII. The role of the Soviet Union

If one assesses all the changes and developments that have taken place, the question where the Soviet Union stands in the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan area, is of vital importance. Put bluntly, this question may read as follows: do the Cyprus conflict and the profound changes (which may be only in an initial stage) mean a strengthening of the position of the Soviet Union or what are the limitations of Soviet gains in view of further changes in that area?

To answer this question, one must first of all rule out the case of a total military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Not only because it is not very likely (partial tensions may indeed occur), but because the consequences of such a contingency would be disastrous for the political situation of the entire region: It is not hard to conceive that Iran and Pakistan might be equally involved as NATO members, the United States or the Arab world. Such a conflict could disrupt the existing forms of the political, security-political and economic cooperation, leaving a vacuum for the Soviet Union in which to increase its political and military influence as well as its presence.

The realistic assumption is that the Soviet Union will have to try to maintain or improve its position under the present conditions. A few remarks may serve to eludicate this:

- The most important Soviet goal is to break through the "Northern Belt" of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Dardanelles are an essential stake in this strategy, whose importance will increase even more once the Suez canal is reopened. The Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, which began in 1965, also aimed at inducing Turkey to take a flexible attitude towards the Montreux agreement (1936), an attitude which became all the more urgent as the Soviet Union tried to build up its position in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East. And the overflight rights, too, which Turkey granted the Soviet Union during the Fourth Middle East

war for its weapons transports, were important to the Soviet Union.

- A more extensive rapprochement, however, meets with distinct limitations: for control of the straits touches upon the "national Turkish nerve"; a great part of the Turkish public still considers the Soviet Union as an "arch enemy"; and in the Cyprus issue distinct Turkish-Soviet differences became evident because of the presence of Turkish troops on the island and the de facto division of Cyprus.

  Even if Turkey increases its alienation from NATO and even in the event of a possible strengthening of the regional element, a genuine "neutralization" of Turkey is unlikely. The "Iran model" probably constitutes the ultimate degree of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

- In regard to Cyprus the Soviet Union pursues an open policy aimed at an independent and unitary state with equal rights for the two ethnic groups and a strong position for the President. The creation of faits accomplis on the part of the Turks has brought the Soviet Union closer to the Greek side and has in particular led to closer ties with Archbishop Makarios.

  True, this development also has its limitations: although the Soviet Union - in spite of the promises for aid made to Makarios in 1971 - had not been able to prevent the coup against Makarios, and although it has no effective means to pressure Turkey into a withdrawal from the island, an alliance with Makarios is all the more unrealistic in as much as it would act diametrically against Turkey which would view such an alliance as a blow against its ethnic group on the island as well as against itself. A choice between good relations with Turkey and an alliance with Makarios is probably made in favor of Turkey.

- The attitude of the Soviet Union towards Greece is at present characterized by reticence and uncertainty about the future course of Karamanlis. Especially the question about the future role of the left is being raised again and again. On the other hand, Greece is an interesting option for the Soviets vis-à-vis Turkey:

in the long run a dissociation from NATO (which the Soviet Union has been suggesting to Greece for several years) as well as the gaining of certain transit rights through Greece toward the Mediterranean could diminish the importance of the straits to the Soviet Union.

It should be borne in mind, however, that an intensification of Greece's relations with the Balkan states, with which it has historic ties, does not yet immediately imply a gain of position on the part of the Soviet Union. This is because, for one, there are still some strong resentments in Greece - consequences of the civil war - towards the Soviet Union; second, the Balkan states themselves (i.e. Yugoslavia and Romania, also Albania) though interested in a neutralist policy on the part of Greece, are trying to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining more influence.

The triangle Turkey-Cyprus-Greece is extremely vulnerable, a circumstance that stands in the way of a real improvement of the Soviet position. A temporary success on one end of the triangle may entail setbacks on the other end. In recognition of this fact, the Soviet Union has taken a remarkably cautious stance in the past.

VIII. Weakening of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Thus the question must be put whether the Cyprus crisis and its implications really mean a weakening of Western security in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is without doubt that changes are taking place that are so profound as to confuse our conventional perception of security in this area. But perhaps we are simply finding it difficult to adapt to new forces and to the situation created by them. As has already been indicated, the changes in the eastern Mediterranean should indeed be seen in connection with the developments in the Middle East. The forces that caused the "oil crisis" were also new and unexpected, and the situation created by them was a "crisis" for the politics, economy, and the social structure of the western industrialized world. In the meantime, the latter has learnt to live with this crisis, and the impulses emanating from it are beginning to open up new political and economic dimensions in European-Arab cooperation.

The "Cyprus crisis" like the "oil crisis" is a label for complex changes. On the one hand, both have an immediate political connection. On the other hand, they also have in common that the West has not yet learnt to recognize their roots and to find an answer. What is happening in the eastern Mediterranean is a breakdown of the conventional structure of our security system, but also of the conventional criteria for an assessment of our "strength" or "weakness" in that area. From the statistical point of view the security of the West seems to have been weakened, since two partners have partially withdrawn from the alliance.

And indeed, that is probably a correct assessment in the short run: in Greece, borders are left unprotected; the observation and warning system is disturbed; the use of bases has become uncertain. But in the long run it might be possible to find other political elements to give security in this area a new structure.

Let us take Turkey as an example: a further emphasis on the regional element on the part of that country would necessitate an inclusion of Turkey into the Middle East policy of the West in a broader sense, reaching beyond the area of the Middle East conflict. If the West succeeded in developing forms of a cooperation with the Middle East that contribute to a lasting stability of the entire region, Turkey's withdrawal from the alliance framework would not necessarily mean a weakening of the alliance and a gain for the Soviet Union. A changed framework would not substantially impair the security-political status of the eastern Mediterranean.

Similar arguments would apply to Greece. An intensification of relations among the Balkan states, in particular between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania, would not yet increase the Soviet position: none of these three states (plus Albania) is interested in such a development, in as much as it is probable that the People's Republic of China would endorse that trend. If it were possible to establish a closer political Balkan area (compare the Romanian-Greek proposal for a conference of all Balkan states), security on the Balkan and in the eastern Mediterranean would be changed structurally, albeit not impaired fundamentally.

But West European politics would in fact take on considerable weight. Will it be able to demonstrate actively and credibly that it feels a co-responsibility for the states of the eastern Mediterranean? Will it be able to offer its partnership in a cooperation in the manner desired by these states? Will it make an effort to assume an active commitment in national problems (above all Cyprus, Aegean Sea) on the one hand and to accord to the interests of these states international political weight by incorporating them closely in its own interests? On this willingness the future development of the eastern Mediterranean will largely depend.