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PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION

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LABOUR AND CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

by

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This conference is the second of a series of three organized within the framework of a three year research project on stability and development in the Mediterranean financed by the Ford Foundation.

I. Purpose of the study

1. This report proposes to analyze the international movements of labour and capital in the Mediterranean, attempting to explain their dynamic in relation to the development characteristics of the different economic systems which interact in this area. The term "Mediterranean" is to be understood in its non-literal and rather extensive meaning adopted in the research project of which this study is a part: for our purposes, the EEC countries and Switzerland will be included. The study, however, is not concerned with movements within the EEC but rather with the flows between industrialized economies and developing ones (or those in the first stages of industrialization). As far as movements of capital are concerned, only direct foreign investments will be considered: though the distinction with respect to financial movements is rather arbitrary, we are here above all interested in those movements which give rise to the transfer of productive units and the creation of new jobs. The time period examined covers the last 10-15 years.

II. The theoretic framework

2. The neo-classical theory's revealed inadequacy in the analysis of direct foreign investments (or for those of the multinationals) has given rise to modern theoretic formulations which undoubtedly appear endowed with greater explicative capacities: for example, Vernon's product cycle theory or Hymen's theory of oligopolistic competition (1). Yet, apart from their realism, in comparison with the neo-classical theory these interpretations have a fundamental limit: the field to

(1) In particular, see R. Vernon's original essay, International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, in "Quarterly Journal of Economics", May 1966; and the synthesis of S. Hymer's writings, Le imprese multinazionali, edited by G. Luciani, Einaudi, Turin 1974.

which they are applied is not nearly as wide. From the point of view of our research this is of great importance. The neo-classical theory, as is known, offers the analytical instruments for relating the international movements of capital to those of labour (and foreign trade) (2). These relations cannot be grasped referring to the modern theories of direct foreign investment, which alone do not provide a conceptual framework in which the migratory flows can be explained (through offering illumination in the analysis of trade flows).

3. On the other hand, in my opinion, the utilization of the neo-classical models would involve too great a sacrifice in terms of the validity of the hypotheses -- especially for a study of this nature -- making an alternative, even if less coherent approach preferable. The methodological problem can then be confronted as follows: assuming that we employ one of the theories which has had greater empirical confirmation -- Vernon's -- as a scheme of reference for the study of investments, it is a matter of singling out an approach to the interpretation of migratory dynamics which can be used along with it.

4. A few brief considerations will help to define this. As is known, in the postwar period, manpower movements were for the most part "vertical", from the less developed countries to the industrialized areas -- above all from the countries of the Mediterranean basin toward the developed European nations. Given the conditions in which these flows took place, the migratory movements can be considered as an aspect of developed-underdeveloped relations at the international level. One cannot but admit that in the European labour market the initiative and

(2) It is this which seems to attract the many authors who have recently approached the subject: see, for example, the contribution of G. Gallais-Hamonno and F. Bourguignon, Migration of Manpower versus Migration of Capital - A Cost-benefit Analysis from the Stand-point of Developed Countries, report presented at the CICRED Conference of Buenos Aires, March 1974.

decision-making power rests not in the hands of the seller but of the buyer. On the one hand, in the OECD nations the individual's right to emigrate is sanctioned so that the countries of origin cannot control the supply, while the European countries of immigration reserve the right to strictly control the influx and therefore the demand. On the other hand, the workers that offer themselves on the market have no possibility of influencing the firms' decision-making: whether or not they will hire them, whether they will invest in the national economy or abroad (3).

5. This has an extremely relevant implication: the dynamic of migratory flows must be seen above all in relation to the rate and characteristics of the process of capital accumulation in the industrialized area. That is, labour movements must be linked to a variable that appears crucial also for international investments: profit.

6. This approach seems capable of throwing light on the problems under examination especially if, attempting to follow the path indicated by Basevi (4), it is placed in a neo-Ricardian theoretic framework. According to the classical Ricardian view point, the tendency for the rate of profit to decline is checked by a lowering of wages. In England in the XIX century that could be done by suppressing import duties in order to prevent an

(3) In the very typical case of Germany, Böhning found that the variations in the demand for labour in the period 1957-68 explained 96% of the variations in the flow of foreign workers. Cf. W.R. Böhning, The Differential Strength of Demand and Wage Factors in Intra European Labour Mobility: with Special Reference to West Germany, 1957-68, in "International Migration", vol. VIII, n° 4, 1970.

(4) G. Basevi, Migration and Integration of Labour Markets, a comment on K. Mihailovic's report, The EEC and Labour Migration, presented at the Fourth World Congress of the International Economic Association, Budapest, August 1974.

increase in the price of grain. In contemporary Europe it seems legitimate to put forward the hypothesis that profits are sustained not by importing cheap wage-goods but by importing labour.

7. The proposed method has at least one advantage: it makes it possible to satisfy the above mentioned necessity of finding a link between the logic of labour and capital movements. In fact, Vernon's international investments theory, though not centered on the role of profit, implicitly assumes it as a determining factor, and can therefore easily be related to a neo-Ricardian interpretation of the international labour market in the sense indicated.

III. The problem of the supply of labour

8. At the beginning of the 1960s, after a long period of intense development following postwar reconstruction, the industrialized European countries reached a stage of what many economists defined as, "full employment". Despite the ambiguity of this concept and the rather questionable use that has been made of it (for example, applying it to contradictory realities such as that of the Italian labour market) it goes without saying that the labour reserves were greatly reduced. It is this circumstance to which Kindleberger attributes the fall in the rate of growth registered in those years by the European economies: that is, the fluctuation in the rate of growth was due substantially to the absence of the "unlimited supply of labour" which had previously guaranteed the restraint of wage increases, seen as a condition for growth (5).

9. In the terms proposed by Kindleberger, the thesis is not completely convincing. In fact, the conclusion according

(5) C.P. Kindleberger, Europe's Postwar Growth. The Role of Labour Supply, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967.

to which the supply of labour in the industrialized European countries has become infinitely rigid and represents a limit that compromises the possibility of reaching higher rates of expansion, does not seem to be sufficiently proved (6). Nevertheless, Kindleberger's view may be shared in the sense that, undoubtedly, the contraction of manpower reserves and the consequent accentuation of labour militancy in the early 1960s greatly contributed to determining a period of lesser growth by breaking the previous "equilibrium" between wages and profits.

10. In this sort of situation, in the developed European countries the twofold objective of checking labour demands and stabilizing the rates of profit (that is, beyond a cyclical recuperation) could be pursued in three ways:

- a) by substituting labour with capital and introducing improved technology;
- b) by investing abroad;
- c) by importing labour power.

In the past decade all three policies have been adopted. However, they have not all had the same impact.

11. The application of new technologies certainly had important effects on the development and recuperation of profit margins: the great increases in the productivity of labour permitted the payment of the higher wages demanded by local workers, at the same time allowing a relative saving in the use of manpower. On the other hand, the introduction of labour-saving methods met with limits of an economico-technical nature in the dualistic structure of the European economies where, alongside advanced sectors (that often call for, besides a certain proportion of highly qualified labour, a mass of workers

(6) For a critical comment with special reference to Italy, see G. Vaciago, Offerta di lavoro e sviluppo economico, in "Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali", July-Aug. 1968.

by no means skilled), there exist sectors in which the application of technology is either difficult or unprofitable. The latter are represented mainly by:

- a large part of the tertiary sector, where increases in productivity depend for the most part on precarious forms of "learning by experience", and where economies of scale (that in industry constitute the principal factor of increasing returns) and the improved technology of new capital goods seem to have rather limited importance;
- "traditional" manufacturing industries in which many small firms operate and for which the abandon of labour intensive production methods might mean extremely onerous dimensional and technical restructurations.

12. Direct foreign investment in countries of the Mediterranean area with an abundant supply of cheap labour has been modest and the effects on employment in the industrialized European countries have not been relevant (in any case the impact has been much less than that, of an opposite nature, produced by the importation of American capital). The investment flows have been more dynamic only in recent years, and in particular after the energy crisis. It is, however, a not yet defined phenomenon whose implications for the European labour market -- not easy to foresee -- concern the future (see further on).

13. Instead, the importation of labour has increased at a remarkable rate. In the late 1950s, migrations were mainly within the developed area, the labour reserves being supplied by Southern Italy. From 1960 on, within a decade, the process involved almost all the Mediterranean countries: industrialized Europe successively attracted migratory waves of Greeks, Spaniards, Yugoslavs, Portuguese, North Africans, and Turks. According to official statistics, which notoriously underestimate the phenomenon since they do not consider illegal flows (7), by the mid-1970s there were over 7.5 million

(7) It is extremely difficult to estimate the exact size of

(families excluded), representing, in the countries where they are guests, a more than significant quota of the total labour force: on the average 9%, but in Switzerland and Luxembourg 28-29% (see tables 1 and 2). Why has imported labour until now been favored over the alternative of foreign investment? In order to understand the present trend and the future prospects this seems to be the crucial question.

IV. Immigration, profits, and social stability

14. The benefits for the European countries deriving from the growing flow of foreign workers are numerous and not at all marginal. The most relevant can be summarized as follows:

- Thanks to immigration it has been possible to recreate conditions similar to those of "growth with an unlimited supply of labour", but in an area where basic productive structures, know-how, and qualified technician were already available (8).
- Immigration made it possible to avoid or postpone costly reconversion by keeping down the cost of labour in many low-productivity sectors.
- With immigration, the domestic labour markets were split into two relatively isolated sections. This division, which assigned to foreign workers the most disagreeable, fatiguing and

././ illegal immigration. In general, it is calculated at about 10% of the total number of official foreign immigrants (cf. Commission des Communautés Européennes, Programme d'action en faveur des travailleurs migrants et de leurs familles, Bruxelles, Décembre 1974), which would mean an additional one million people. But even this can be misleading if one considers that in 1973 the French Ministry of Labour estimated that illegal immigration in France was at about 40%.

(8) As was observed in a recent OECD report, L'OCDE et les migrations internationales, Paris 1975.

lowest paid activities, helped attenuate the militancy of local workers and spread among them an "aristocracy of labour" mentality, a guarantee of social harmony.

- Besides being advantageous because of its lower cost (above all in terms of indirect wages and social costs) recourse to foreign manpower has proved beneficial because of its low level of organization resulting both from the immigrants' low level of union consciousness and from the harsh limits imposed on their union and political freedoms by the authorities of the host countries.
- The immigrants allowed the European countries to go through phases of cyclical recession with a minimum of social tension since they were usually the first to absorb the impact of the slowing down of the accumulation process.
- Finally, the immigrants stimulated development in the European countries with their demand for consumer goods and infrastructures.

15. It will not hurt to support these affirmations with some data or at least with a few elements for reflection. The fact that the migratory flows can be viewed as an "unlimited" source of labour power seems unquestionable and is not worth dwelling upon: it is enough to recall that in 1973 there were 967,000 Turkish workers on the waiting list to emigrate to Germany, i.e. more than the number of their fellow-countrymen who had already immigrated to the various industrialized European countries (9). On the other hand, the phenomenon of

(9) Cf. O. Gökmen, Les travailleurs turcs en Europe, report presented at the Colloque Européen sur les Problèmes de la Migration, Louvain-la-Neuve, Jan. 1 - Feb. 2, 1974, p. 3. Furthermore, the surplus of labour in Turkey is not a contingent fact. With a rate of demographic expansion of 2.6%, in 15 years the Turkish population will double. Presently, the active population is growing at a rate of 400,000 units while the extension of the occupational base is not more than 250,000 jobs a year.

illegal immigration shows clearly how the controls used by the host countries to regulate the migratory movements have served above all to check a potentially overabundant influx of foreign workers, adjusting the volume to the needs of the domestic economies.

16. This circumstances leads at once to the consideration of the effects of imported labour on the dynamic of wages. However, an aggregate analysis, in which a substantial homogeneity between local and foreign labour power is hypothesized, is not likely to reveal the specific economic effects of immigration. Imported labour power has given rise to a dichotomy in the European labour market, the nature and implications of which must be defined (10). It seems relevant in essentially two areas:

- a) in the structure of employment;
- b) in trade union organization.

17. The first aspect can be studied on the basis of empirical documentation which, even though very fragmentary, leaves little doubt about the type of activities which most immigrants are called upon to carry out in the industrialized countries. They are in fact concentrated in manual, relatively unskilled occupations which correspond to a low social status and, in particular, to the lowest levels of the wage scale. For example, the professional stratification of foreign workers in France in 1973 was as follows: only 2.1% were included in the category of "cadres et techniciens", while the rest were concentrated in

(10) For this reason the neo-Marxist interpretations, which refer to the notion of the "industrial reserve army" are unsatisfactory for they assume that the employed labour and the "surplus population" are perfect substitutes. See, for another Marxist formulation which is however against the utilization of the above category, A. Serafini's introduction to the collection of AA. VV. L'operaio multinazionale in Europa, Feltrinelli, Milan 1974.

the remaining categories of "manoeuvres" (35.0%), and of "employés et ouvriers spécialisés" (36.5%) or "qualifiés" (26.4%). The proportion of the total local labour force employed in these last three categories was significantly lower (by about 75%) (11). If sectorial distribution is considered, the data available for Germany provides clear indications. In 1972 almost 80% of the immigrants worked on construction or in industry. In the industrial sector the branches where the proportion of foreign workers exceeded the average -- 23% -- were those producing rubber based products (31%), metals (28%), textiles (29%) and motor vehicles (28%): that is, in the most technologically advanced branches or in those characterized by particularly laborious or fatiguing work processes. Vice versa, foreigners were much less present in the most advanced industries, such as graphics (9%) or aeronautics (12%). The examination of data concerning the distribution of immigrants in Swiss industry leads to similar conclusions (see tables 3, 4 and 5) (12).

(11) It should also be noted that: "Le nombre assez élevé d'ouvriers dits 'spécialisés' (ou 'agents de production') en France, 31-32% du total des étrangers, ou 'angelernte Arbeiter' en Allemagne, 41-47%, ne doit pas induire en erreur. En général, ces travailleurs se distinguent des manoeuvres uniquement parce qu'ils ont suivi une initiation au travail de courte durée. La parcellisation des tâches, poussés souvent jusqu'à ses extrêmes conséquences, fait de l'ouvrier spécialisé surtout un exécutant de travaux répétitifs et automatiques... Il en résulte que la seule formation réelle de l'ouvrier spécialisé ne se traduit, dans la plupart des cas, que dans l'acquisition d'une habitude à la discipline industrielle". OECD, op. cit. p. 25.

(12) Furthermore, the opinion that foreign labour power is used in those activities that the local labourers little by little abandon because they are undesirable seems to be held by the majority of experts who have done research on this matter. See, among others, S. Castles - G. Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe,

18. Certainly, as the occupational structure develops it is subject to changes; and one might point out that in the 1960s foreign workers greatly improved their position in production, penetrating to a greater degree the expanding sectors of the economy: in Germany, for example, the percentage of foreign workers employed in agriculture, mining and construction fell in that decade from 36.5 to 20.9% of the total, while those employed in the industrial sector rose from 45.2 to 62.7% (see table 6). However the previously mentioned dichotomy was not reduced by this process, it was merely reproduced at a higher level. In fact, the entry and the progressive spread of immigrants to almost all sectors of European industry went hand in hand with another phenomenon: the creation of a number of new, highly specialized roles and duties typical of modern methods of production. The local workers directed themselves toward these jobs leaving to the foreigners the heavier and less skilled ones. As already observed, the need for available unskilled labour is often present in advanced sectors. Furthermore, it can be maintained that many economico-technical factors determine a relatively close complementarity between skilled jobs (with high pay) and un-or semi-skilled ones (with low wages). That means that the possibility of recourse to manpower willing to be employed at the lower levels of the hierarchy was, in many cases, the condition which permitted local workers to move on to more gratifying and better paid jobs.

19. It should also be noted that imported labour not only permitted the preservation of the occupational social structure characteristic of capitalist economies (in which the most undesirable jobs are also the worst paid and the least prestigious), but probably helped to accentuate it: assigning foreigners,

./o. Oxford University Press, London 1973; the essays of W.R. Böning and D. Maillat in The Economic Effects of the Employment of Foreign Workers, OECD, Paris 1974; and also G. Yannopoulos, Immigration from the Mediterranean Countries and its Impact on the Economies of the European Communities, University of Reading, 1974.

above all if they come from what are considered "underdeveloped" countries, to markedly subordinate socio-economic roles may appear more legitimate -- and in any case easier (13) -- than relegating local workers to them. Finally, it is not rash to suppose that the split in the labour markets has been deepened by the negative social image attributed to those professional roles assigned to immigrant labour, inducing local workers to abandon them (14).

20. The second aspect of the dichotomy, that of union organization, cannot be easily described on the basis of statistics, on the one hand, the elements that determine and characterize the participation of foreign workers in union activities cannot, for the most part, be gathered in quantitative terms. On the other hand, where it would be meaningful to quantify, the empirical documentation is almost non-existent: for example, there is not even exhaustive information about the percentage of immigrants who are union members in the various countries (15). However, there are many reasons for believing that this aspect is of great importance. Integration between foreign and local workers in union organizations is in fact obstructed by a number of objective factors. The barriers of different languages, cultural traditions, levels of education and skills, individual and

(13) It must be remembered that the type of job the foreign worker will have is decided when he is recruited; that makes it possible for the authorities to exercise a great deal of control over this part of the labour force (even if, in reality, after a year or two many immigrants change jobs with the hope of bettering themselves).

(14) On this point, as for some of the previous ones, see W.R. Böhning, 1974, op. cit. pages 52-3.

(15) However, the scarce information available indicates that the percentage of unionization among immigrant workers is lower than for local ones (with the exception, perhaps, of Germany). Cf. S. Castles - G. Kosack, op. cit. chapt. IV.

social aspirations are those most often mentioned. But there is another element of division which does not seem to have received the attention it deserves: the particular administrative and legal status of immigrants. The crucial importance of this factor can be assessed keeping in mind that:

- since the entry and residence permit is given in relation to a specific job, the loss of it because of union activities often implies deportation (16);
- more in general, besides not having the right to vote in local and national elections in defense of their union and political interests, the immigrants are always exposed to the risk of expulsion, which can be enforced whenever the local authorities (the police) have sufficient grounds for deeming them a "threat to public order" (17).
- because of formal restrictions or barriers of an administrative nature immigrants do not enjoy the same rights as local workers regarding their eligibility for holding a position on any of the workers' committees (18).

Finally, it should be noted that the "rotation" system, aimed at reducing the permanent settlement of immigrants, has among other effects, that of making it more difficult for the foreign workers to acquire a clear consciousness of their politico-

(16) As was recently repeated by E. Vercellino (representative of the C.G.I.L.) in his report on: "Les garanties syndicales, sociales et politiques des droits des émigrants", at the above mentioned Colloque Européen sur les Problèmes de la Migration (1974).

(17) In Germany the regulations which authorize the expulsion of immigrants are even more vague and extensive: it is in fact enough for a foreigner "to put in danger the free democratic order or the security of German Federal Republic", or that his presence "damages for other reasons the interests of the German Federal Republic". Cf. Ausländergesetz (law on foreigners) par. 10, sec. I, art. 1 and 11.

(18) See S. Castles - G. Kosack, La fonction de l'immigration

-union rights and adequate organizational experience in labour conflicts.

21. The split in the European labour markets, in the terms described, has produced a consequence of fundamental importance: the (relative) weakening of the bargaining power of the working class. In fact, the greater vulnerability of the foreigners, their lesser organizational capacity, the existence of a division in the working class based on elements such as nationality and language, besides the diffusion among a large number of local workers of an "aristocracy of labour" mentality (related to the assigning of subordinate roles to foreign workers), are all factors which reflect negatively on the militancy and bargaining power of the national trade unions. It is in this sense that an analysis of the effects of immigration centered only on trends in the relation between the demand and supply of labour cannot but be an oversimplification: the complex implications (not only economic) of the above factors added to the simple circumstance of an increased supply of labour concur to determine unfavourable conditions for an increase in the average wage rates.

22. The "cyclical" utilization of foreign manpower -- exemplified above all by Germany in the 1967 recession (19); but also by the sudden change in migratory policies following the energy crisis (20) -- might seem to contradict these conclusions. In

././ ouvrière dans l'Europe de l'Ouest capitaliste, in "Travail et Emploi", n° 10, Jan.-March 1973, p. 45.

(19) See B. Kayser, Cyclically Determined Homeward Flows of Migrant Workers, OECD, Paris, 1972; and also N. Abadan, Problems Concerning Cyclically Determined Homeward Flows of Turkish Workers from Germany, Report to the Working Party on Migration, OECD, January 1971.

(20) For a synthetic analysis and description of the restrictive measures adopted by the major European countries see "The Economist", Slamming the door on Europe's guest workers, Aug. 9, 1975, p. 23.

fact, the rather noteworthy advantage that the developed European countries enjoy in periods of crisis by being able to export unemployment (without fear of retaliation) implies a greater rigidity of wages at the lowest levels for the local workers who are therefore less affected by the recession phenomena. However, here too it is necessary to consider the more or less direct implications for the average salary (and the total wage bill): the fact that relevant increases of domestic unemployment can be avoided in the recession phases confirms the privileged position of local workers and further accentuates the dichotomy we have spoken of, with extremely unfavorable long term effects on the dynamic of wages; and also the possibility of cutting down the number of workers (with marginal social repercussions) makes it easier to contain the incidence of average labour costs.

23. It therefore seems legitimate to conclude that the importance of foreign labour appears, in line with the Ricardian hypothesis, as a means for keeping up the rate of profit. This is especially true for those sectors in which it has not been possible to safeguard profits by adopting advanced techniques (where, one might say, there exists a form of quasirent destined to disappear when the influx of immigrants ceases and the homeward flow begins). Furthermore, as we have seen, imported labour power has had an impact on the entire structure of the labour markets, and is therefore not without consequences for the trends of wages -- and profits -- in the most technologically evolved sectors as well.

24. To the above considerations, based on an analysis centered on the supply of the labour factor of production, can be added an observation about the support immigration gives to profits from the standpoint of the demand for goods. Although the immigrants' propensity to consume is rather low (compared to that of local workers in the same wage bracket) because of the remittances to their native country, the demand for consumer goods and social capital from foreigners undoubtedly represents a not to be overlooked incentive to the development of the industrialized European countries. On the basis of an empirical

study by the Dutch Planning Office (21), Böhning comes to the conclusion that the attempt to satisfy the demand for labour power with immigration is to a great extent illusory since the expansion of demand for goods and services originating from the immigrants creates an additional demand for labour (22). From this point of view, if one agrees that the migratory phenomena have an intrinsic tendency to reproduce themselves multiplying the impulses to growth in the host countries, the importance of labour can also be studied as a typical example of Myrdal's "vicious circle", that is as an aspect of the cumulative process causing development/underdevelopment (23).

25. The increase of migratory flows has however also meant growing disadvantages for the industrialized European countries. In fact:

- The non-reconversion of obsolete industries that owe their permanence on the market to the use of foreign labour, may in the long run damage international competitiveness.
- In a number of cities and local situations the excessive concentration of immigrants has ruptured the equilibrium between different nationalities, creating problems of a social nature.
- Macroscopic phenomena, such as the heavy participation of foreigners in the strikes in the early 1970s at the Ford plant in Cologne or at Renault in Boulogne-Billancourt are evidence of the greater political awareness and militancy of the immigrant workers.

These elements and, more recently, the world economic crisis with its repercussions on employment for local workers (without

(21) Central Planbureau, Economische effecten voor Nederland van de werving van buitenlandse werknemers, 1972.

(22) For this he proposes the notion of "Self-Feeding Immigration". Cf. Böhning (1974), op. cit. pages 52-67.

(23) See G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions, General Duckworth & Co., London 1957.

precedent in the postwar period) have led many to believe that a turning point in the trend of migratory flows is near or has already been reached; proof of this would be the restrictions imposed by the immigration authorities of the developed European countries in the last two years. This point of view is usually accompanied by the hypothesis that direct foreign investments will play a much more important role in the future.

V. The foreign investment alternative

26. Before attempting to assess the prospects of the above mentioned eventuality, we must once again consider the following question relative to the past: why has foreign investment until now represented only a secondary instrument for sustaining the profit margins of the European corporations?

27. A brief examination of available data may be useful. At the end of 1967 the stock of direct investments realized by the major industrialized European countries in the Mediterranean amounted to 2.8 billion dollars, a figure only slightly higher than the one for American investments in the same area (see tables 7 and 8) (24). The sectorial breakdown shows a high concentration in one industry: that of petroleum. To this sector were destined 48.4% of the European investments and 72.8% of the American ones. The manufacturing industries as a group came second, absorbing 35.4% and 17.2% of the European

(24) France and Italy being included only in the first group, which also takes in Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, Holland and Belgium. Portugal is not included among the recipient countries since the data is from documentation on investments made in developing countries by members of the DAC (of which Portugal is a member); instead, three important countries which are not really Mediterranean are included: Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

and American investments respectively. Also from a geographic point of view the concentration is significant. Only three countries (Spain, Algeria and Iran) absorbed 65% of the European investments, and four countries (Spain, Libya, Iran and Saudi Arabia) absorbed 75% of the American ones. By the end of 1973 the stock was somewhat higher. Total investments by DAC countries in the Mediterranean area amounted to 9.4 billion dollars (25) with similar geographic concentration (see table 9). The statistical source (26) does not specify the sectorial composition for that year. However, as far as American investments abroad are concerned, the data furnished by the U.S. Department of Commerce (see table 10) does not reveal substantial structural changes: the two sectors indicated absorbed more than 80% of the investments in Southern Europe and the Middle East (27). The petroleum industry still came first, also because manufacturing investments in the Middle East were almost inexistent. The manufacturing industry prevailed in Southern Europe, but total investments did not even amount to one billion dollars. As for the distribution of investments - from all countries - within the manufacturing sector in Southern Europe, table 11 reveals how during the '60s the transfer of productive activities concerned mainly the primary industries (rubber, petrochemicals, metals), and in second place engineering industries. The trend of flows from the industrialized European

(25) In order to compare this figure with the preceding ones, the quota of investments made by the other DAC members, which I was unable to ascertain, would have to be subtracted. In 1967 the incidence of the seven European countries mentioned plus the United States on total DAC investments in the area considered was 98%.

(26) OECD, Investissements par le secteur privé des Pays membres du Comité d'Aide au Développement dans les Pays en voie de développement - Etat des actifs à la fin de 1973, Paris 1975.

(27) The area does not coincide exactly with the one previously defined. See the note, table 10.

countries after the energy crisis cannot yet be specified since we do not have appropriately classified data. However, it should be noted that, on the basis of balance-of-payments data, the total amount of direct investments (in the rest of the world) made by the EEC countries in 1974 and the first half of 1975 increased noticeably (see table 12).

28. These statistical indications, though sketchy, induce a few observations. First, the entity of foreign investments in the Mediterranean area, though relevant from the point of view of the control of the host countries' economies that results (especially in certain sectors), seems rather modest in relation to the accumulation process in the investing countries. For example, in 1972-3, while the flow of investments from all the DAC countries to the Mediterranean countries did not reach two billion dollars (table 9), the gross formation of fixed capital in the EEC countries alone amounted to 368 billion dollars. The stock of investments appears slight from another point of view, i.e. in relation to the volume of capital that would be necessary in order to create jobs for the eight million European migrant workers in their native countries. This was assessed, on the basis of plausible hypotheses concerning the cost of creating a job in the region (7,500 dollars), at 60 billion dollars, equal to the amount of official aid given by the ODA to all the developing world during the decade 1961-70 (28). Secondly, it should be noted that a great part of the investments - those in the oil industry - cannot be seen as the product of a tendency to decentralize to the periphery the plants of the industrialized countries, since it is justified by the availability of raw materials on the other side of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the effects on employment of such investments seem quite negligible. Thirdly, it is interesting to note that the investments made in the manufacturing sector are directed more toward industries with mature technology (primary and engineering industries) than toward those with standardized technology (such as the

(28) Cf. I.M. Hume, Migrant Workers in Europe, in "Finance and Development", vol. 10, n° 1, March 1973, page 5.

textile industry), and more in countries at an intermediate stage of development (above all Spain) than in the most backward ones, even though the latter have abundant supplies of manpower.

29. To what can we attribute the described evolution of foreign investments in the manufacturing sector? With reference to Vernon's theory (29), we can attempt to formulate an analysis on the basis of the following reflections.

30. In the first half of the '60s, when the contraction of domestic labour reserves had already had significant repercussions on the labour markets of the developed European countries, these countries began to feel, in the less technologically evolved sectors, the growing competitiveness of the developing nations where impulse to the expansion of manufactured exports was given either by the governments' efforts to promote industrialization or by the productive units already established there by the multinational enterprises.

31. On the other hand, the low cost of labour in the Mediterranean countries did not seem to stimulate the industries producing traditional goods to transfer their plants to these countries: in the case of many sectors of European industry the third phase of the product cycle, to use Vernon's terminology,

(29) Besides the already cited article, see R. Vernon, The Economic Environment of International Business, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972; Sovereignty at Bay: the Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, New York, Basic Books, 1971; and, edited by the same author, The Technology Factor in International Trade, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970; for an empirical verification of the theory see also L.T. Wells, Test of a Product Cycle Model of International Trade: U.S. Exports of Consumer Durables, in "Quarterly Journal of Economics", February 1969.

seems to be rather delayed (a useful term of comparison is given by the Japanese). And in any case the direct investments in the less developed areas did not favour, with the exception of Spain, those countries from which labour flowed to the industrialized European countries.

32. The existence of favourable wage differences, on the other hand, does not represent for Vernon a sufficient condition for foreign investment. The decision to decentralize plant is made by comparing the marginal costs of production on the internal market - plus the incidence of transport costs and tariff barriers for exports - with the average costs predicted for their production on a given foreign market. These depend, however, not only on the endowment and on the prices of the factors of production, but also on the actual and potential size of the foreign market, keeping in mind the income elasticity of demand for the product. An explicative hypothesis of the observed dynamics can then be as follows: the European firms have limited their investments in the Mediterranean countries essentially because of the restricted markets of these countries. An indirect confirmation of the validity of this hypothesis is the fact that the European investments (and also the American ones) were directed above all toward Spain, i.e. toward the market that, among the countries of emigration, appeared most ample and subject to the most rapid growth (see table 13).

33. We cannot leave out of consideration the effects of the constitution of the EEC at the end of the '50s. The abolition of commercial barriers between the member countries determined, as is known, the creation of a market of enormous dimensions, to which American capital was preferentially directed (in order to avoid the tariff and other barriers put up to impede the entry of products coming from third countries). For the European countries, therefore, the assessment of various investment opportunities was conditioned by an element completely absent in the case of American or Japanese firms, and which discouraged the decentralization of production toward less developed countries.

34. Obviously, in the EEC countries the expansion of the market also meant greater competition, and put the less modern and efficient firms in difficulty. From this point of view, it could have stimulated the transfer abroad of the more backward industries if there had not been the possibility of recourse to low cost manpower on the market. Instead, such an opportunity was furnished by the migrant labourers. This factor can probably also help to explain why there was a tendency to invest in capital-intensive industries with intermediate technology rather than in technologically standardized labour-intensive industries: given the different organic compositions of capital, the latter could take greater advantage of the opportunity to recuperate profit margins by importing labour.

35. What has changed in the European picture which might induce us to maintain that in the near future European entrepreneurs will change their attitude toward the location of plants in the Mediterranean countries, and that the movements of manpower will change? In my opinion, very little.

VI. The prospects

36. The quadrupling of the price of oil has certainly created completely new development potentialities in the Southern Mediterranean, which in some countries are already being transformed into very relevant economic realities. On the basis of considerations relative to the size of the markets, for the European countries, unexpected possibilities for the expansion of exports and for foreign investments have been opened. But that this can check the migratory flows from the Mediterranean area seems doubtful for a number of reasons.

37. Above all, the countries that have benefited from the energy crises are not (except for Algeria and Marocco) countries of emigration. For Algeria and Marocco the crisis has instead had negative effects on employment and this tends to give a further impetus to migratory flows.

38. The investments which the European enterprises are planning or realizing on the other side of the Mediterranean consist only partially of labour-intensive, contracting industries which industrialized Europe would find advantageous to abandon according to Vernon's scheme, thus reducing the internal demand for labour. Such industries are being established above all in Egypt and Tunisia, i.e. in those countries which have benefited least from the increased price of oil, and whose industrialization processes appear to be characterized by the logic of complementarity and dependence on the developed economic systems. Elsewhere, given the limits imposed by the host countries, the European investments tend instead to be capital- and technology-intensive (the same can be said of the American multinational investments). In Iran, for example, foreign capital is called on to participate in an ambitious industrialization plan centered on the construction of gigantic petrochemical and steel complexes, and in engineering industries for the production of stock-in-trade; while Algeria refuses to let in foreign firms unless their investments mean a real transfer of technology, thus consciously impeding any attempts to create new forms of international integration and specialization that would reaffirm the subordinate role of the Mediterranean countries with respect to the industrialized metropolises.

39. It is very unlikely that the new poles of industrial development in the Arab countries will deviate the migratory flows until now directed toward the developed European countries toward the South. On the one hand, the labour reserves of the Arab world are abundant (agriculture is still the predominant sector for employment in most countries), so that the shortage of manpower in certain areas- and in certain states - can be compensated for by internal migratory movements. On the other hand, there is nothing to stop eventual importation of extra-European labour: as seems to be indicated by recent measures to recruit Korean and Philippine workers adopted by Iran, and the intentions to use Indian and Pakistani labour power expressed by Saudi Arabia.

40. More in general, comparing the demographic tendencies and the prospects for the expansion of productive capacity (through

internal and foreign investments) in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East - as was recently done by the OECD (30) -, it does not seem that in the next decade the geographic relocation of labour and capital can be re-equilibrated.

41. In synthesis, it seems justified to come to the conclusion that the profits of the firms of developed European countries in many backward sectors which cannot easily be exported will be sustained mainly by foreign labour, despite the social problems that an increase of immigrants will no doubt create.

(30) OECD, Centre de Développement, Tableau de Bord, document presented at the Vienna Seminar on: "Un redéploiement juste et équilibré des ressources en main d'oeuvre et des capacités d'absorption et d'investissement entre les pays méditerranéens," July 1975.

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Tableau 1

Le nombre des travailleurs migrants - estimation 1974

<i>Pays d'émigration</i> \ <i>Pays d'immigration</i>	Allemagne	Suisse	France	Belgique	Pays-Bas	Luxembourg	Autriche	Suède	Royaume-Uni	TOTAL
Portugal	81 000	3 000	475 000	4 000	4 000	9 000*	—	1 000	10 000	588 000
Espagne	160 000	75 000	265 000	34 000	19 000	2 000	—	2 000	17 000	574 000
Italie	405 000	306 000	230 000	70 000	10 000	11 000	2 000	3 000	—	1 037 000
Yougoslavie	495 000	23 000	50 000	3 000	9 000	1 000	166 000	23 000	—	770 000
Grèce	223 000	5 000	5 000	6 000	2 000	—	—	8 000	—	249 000
Turquie	585 000	14 000	25 000	10 000	33 000	—	29 000	2 000	—	698 000
Finlande	5 000	1 000	1 000	—	—	—	—	105 000*	1 000	113 000*
Maroc	14 800	—	130 000	30 000	23 000	—	—	—	—	197 800
Algérie	—	—	440 000	3 000	—	—	—	—	—	443 000
Tunisie	10 600	—	70 000	—	1 000	—	—	—	—	81 600
Autres	415 600*	158 000	209 000*	70 000	57 500*	18 000	32 000	53 000	1 772 000	2 784 000
TOTAL	2 395 000	585 000*	1 900 000	230 000	158 500	41 000	229 000	197 000	1 800 000	7 535 500
	* dont 100 000 Autrichiens	* établis et annuels; ne comprend pas 152 000 saisonniers et 98 000 frontaliers	* surtout Africains et ressortissants de la CEE autres qu'Italiens; ne comprend pas 130 000		* ne comprend pas 22 500 Antillais et Surinamais	* 15 000 selon les chiffres portugais		* 100 000 selon les chiffres suédois; 110 000 selon les chiffres finlandais	voir note	* ne comprend pas 1 000 Finlandais au Danemark et 2 000 en Norvège

Source: OCDE.

Table 2

Foreign workers as per cent of total labour force - 1973

	<u>Foreign workers</u> <u>(A)</u>	<u>Total labour</u> <u>force (B)</u> millions	<u>(A)/(B)</u> %
Germany	2.500.000	26.5	9.4
France	1.930.000	21.4	9.0
Switzerland	861.000	3.1	28.2
Belgium	265.000	3.9	6.8
Holland	160.000	4.7	3.4
Luxemburg	43.000	0.15	27.9

Source: The Economist, August 9, 1975.

Tableau 3.

Distribution selon le secteur d'activité des travailleurs permanents en France

DISTRIBUTION SELON LE SECTEUR D'ACTIVITE DES TRAVAILLEURS PERMANENTS

SECTEUR	ANNEE 1972		ANNEE 1973		ANNEE 1974	
	Nombre	Pourcentage	Nombre	Pourcentage	Nombre	Pourcentage
Pêche, agriculture, forage	12 508	12,8	15 421	11,7	8 177	12,7
Combustibles minéraux solides	822	0,8	927	0,7	1 662	2,6
Production des métaux	434	0,4	979	0,7	648	1,0
Industries mécanique, électrique	14 202	14,5	19 053	14,4	7 149	11,1
Verre, céramique, matériaux de construction	2 243	2,3	3 191	2,4	1 679	2,6
Bâtiment et travaux publics	26 638	27,2	41 933	31,8	18 718	29,0
Industrie chimique, caoutchouc	2 293	2,3	3 132	2,4	1 323	2,1
Industries agricoles et alimentaires	1 579	1,6	1 719	1,3	961	1,5
Textile, habillement, cuirs et peaux	4 644	4,7	5 528	4,2	1 831	2,8
Industrie du bois, ameublement	2 607	2,7	3 588	2,7	1 616	2,5
Autres industries	2 936	3,0	3 808	2,9	1 923	3,0
Commerces	10 155	10,4	14 302	10,8	8 300	12,9
Hygiène, services domestiques	12 649	12,9	12 706	9,6	5 808	9,0
Autres activités	4 364	4,4	5 768	4,4	4 666	7,2
TOTAL	98 074	100,0	132 055	100,0	64 461	100,0

Source: Ministère du Travail, Bulletin mensuel des statistiques du travail, Supplément 31 - 1975.

Table 4

Occupational distribution of indigenous and foreign workers in Germany
by manufacturing branch - september 1972 (thousands)

Branch	Foreign workers	Indigenous	(A)/(B)
	(A)	blue-collar workers (B)	%
1. Structural parts	43.9	153.2	22.0
2. Iron and steel	81.0	304.1	21.0
3. Other metals	25.2	64.6	28.0
4. Chemical	66.6	299.4	18.0
5. Rubber	32.5	71.1	31.0
6. Wood	16.1	33.5	32.0
7. Paper	35.2	119.1	22.0
8. Steel structures	39.3	118.3	24.0
9. Mechanical engineering	165.7	601.2	21.0
10. Transport equipment	136.1	345.5	28.0
11. Ships and boats	11.2	48.4	18.0
12. Aircraft	2.6	19.4	12.0
13. Electrical machinery	187.1	534.4	25.0
14. Precision instruments	25.6	85.0	23.0
15. Metal products	144.7	291.0	33.0
16. Pottery	14.7	46.3	24.0
17. Glass	18.3	58.7	23.0
18. Woodworking	47.2	142.3	24.0
19. Musical instruments	6.5	37.0	14.0
20. Printing	16.7	156.7	9.0
21. Plastic materials	32.9	108.8	23.0
22. Footwear	22.9	81.2	21.0
23. Textiles	105.5	252.8	29.0
24. Clothing	58.6	256.0	18.0
25. Sugar	1.1	9.0	10.0
26. Tobacco	2.0	19.0	9.0
27. Other food industries	73.9	253.1	22.0
TOTAL	1417.0	4506.3	23.0

TABLE 5

Percentage Distribution of Swiss and Foreign Workers in 1971

	<u>Swiss Workers</u>	<u>Foreign Workers</u>	
		<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>
1. Food, beverages and tobacco	7.5	4.8	6.9
2. Textiles	5.2	7.4	9.5
3. Clothing and linen	4.4	8.3	12.1
4. Timber and woodworking	5.1	4.5	4.4
5. Paper	2.3	2.2	2.3
6. Printing and bookbinding	7.2	5.3	3.2
7. Leather and rubber	2.1	2.4	2.5
8. Chemicals	8.9	5.0	3.6
9. Cement and cement products, bricks and tiles, earthenware and ceramics, etc.	2.6	3.0	4.5
10. Metals	13.3	14.7	14.7
11. Mechanical engineering, process plant, and precision instruments	31.8	35.9	26.9
12. Clocks, watches and jewellery	9.4	6.4	-
13. Musical instruments	0.1	0.1	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

A : Foreign workers holding a permanent settlement permit

B : Foreign workers holding a residence permit

Source: D. Maillat, op. cit.

Table 6

The occupational distribution of the foreign workforce in Germany
by industry

	Agric. lab.	Miners & Quarrm.	Constr. workers	Prod.-Proc. workers	Service workers	Total	Number in thousands
1956	5.9%	9.0%	12.7%	42.6%	29.8%	100.0%	88
1957	7.5%	11.0%	12.2%	38.3%	30.9%	99.9%	105
1958	5.7%	13.5%	14.3%	36.4%	30.1%	100.0%	123
1959	4.7%	10.5%	21.9%	38.7%	24.3%	100.0%	163
	Agric.	Ming.	Constr.	Manuf.	Services		
1960	3.1%	7.8%	25.6%	45.2%	18.3%	100.0%	279
1961	1.9%	7.3%	23.3%	51.0%	16.5%	100.0%	549
1966	1.1%	4.7%	18.2%	59.7%	16.2%	99.9%	1,313
1970	0.9%	3.3%	16.7%	62.7%	16.4%	100.0%	1,949

Source: Böhning (1974), op. cit.

Table 7

Direct investments of seven European countries^(a) in the Mediterranean - end 1967 (U.S. \$ Million)

	Malta	Greece	Spain	Turkey	Cyprus	Syria	Iraq	Lebanon	Jordan	Israel	Egypt	Libya	Tunisia	Algeria	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Total	% of total
1. Petroleum	7.5	41.0	97.0	151.0	4.0	35.0	185.0	45.9	17.0	26.0	50.0	530.0	49.5	667.0	35.0	850.0	625.0	3415.9	60.4
2. Mining & Smelting		12.0	78.5	1.7	11.0								8.0		39.0		6.0	156.2	2.8
3. Agriculture															0.1			0.1	-
4. Manufacturing	10.0	200.0	900.6	89.2	2.0	0.2	1.7	20.0	1.0	54.4	2.0	14.0	51.9	28.0	54.0	7.0	65.0	1501.0	26.5
5. Trade	1.0	11.0	153.9	3.0	1.0			4.5	1.0	7.3	3.0	11.2	5.0	3.0	11.3	5.0	4.0	225.2	4.0
6. Other	16.0	27.0	147.1	8.3	5.5			19.5	5.0	21.0	3.0	23.0	20.7	4.5	40.0	4.0	13.5	358.1	6.3
TOTAL	34.5	291.0	1377.1	253.2	23.5	35.2	186.7	89.9	24.0	108.7	58.0	578.2	135.1	702.5	179.3	866.0	713.5	5656.4	100.0

(a) United Kingdom, Switzerland, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France, Belgium.

Source: OCDE, Les actifs correspondant aux investissements directs du secteur privé des pays du C.A.D. dans les pays en voie de développement, Paris 1972.

Table 8

United States direct investments in the Mediterranean - end 1967 (U.S. \$ Million)

	Malta	Greece	Spain	Turkey	Cyprus	Syria	Iraq	Lebanon	Jordan	Israel	Egypt	Libya	Tunisia	Algeria	Morocco	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Total	% of total	
1. Petroleum	3.0	30.0	93.0	84.0	1.0	20.0	44.0	26.0	15.0	10.0	35.0	440.0	-	110.0	5.0	770.0	280.0	1966.0	72.8	
2. Mining & Smelting		3.0	2.0	1.0	10.0										4.0		3.0	23.0	0.9	
3. Agriculture																				
4. Manufacturing	2.0	82.0	257.0	20.0	2.0	0.2		12.0	0.5	30.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	4.0	12.0	5.0	28.0	464.7	17.2	
5. Trade		2.0	94.0	1.0	1.0			3.0	0.5	5.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	5.0	3.0	123.5	4.6	
6. Other	8.0	12.0	34.0	1.0	4.5			9.0	2.0	20.0	3.0	1.0	6.0		12.0	2.5	8.0	123.0	4.6	
TOTAL	13.0	129.0	480.0	107.0	18.5	20.2	44.0	50.0	18.0	65.0	41.0	447.0	13.0	115.0	35.0	782.5	322.0	2700.2	100.0	

Source: see table 7.

Tableau 9

Investissements directs des membres du CAD dans les pays de la Méditerranée
Etat à la fin de 1973. (Millions de dollars)

Malte	55	Jordanie	25
Grèce	660	Israël	220
Espagne	2.990	Egypte	100
Turquie	420	Libye	1.365
Yougoslavie	70	Tunisie	260
Chypre	65	Algérie	315
Syrie	35	Maroc	285
Irak	185	Arabie Séoudite	1.100
Liban	125	Iran	1.150
		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>9.425</u>

Source: OCDE, Investissements par le secteur privé des pays membres du CAD
dans les pays en voie de développement - Etat des actifs à la fin
de 1973, Paris 1975.

Table 10

United States direct investments in Southern Europe and Middle East
by industry--end 1973 (millions of dollars)

	<u>All</u> <u>industries</u>	<u>Mining &</u> <u>smelting</u>	<u>Petroleum</u>	<u>Manufactu-</u> <u>ring</u>	<u>Other</u>
Spain	1.017	..	107	563	348
Other S-Europe ^(a)	1.086	22	314	378	372
Middle East ^(b)	2.682	5	2.377	130	170
<hr/>					
TOTAL	4.785	27	2.798	1.071	890

(a) Includes Cyprus, Gibraltar, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia, but also Austria, Finland and Iceland.

(b) Includes Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Trucial States, Oman and Yemen.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1974.

Table 11

The distribution of foreign investment in Southern Europe by manufacturing branch
(Percentages)

Branch	Greece	Turkey	Spain (a)	Yugoslavia (b)
	1959-67	1959-67	1960-71	1967-70
Food	{ 1.00	{ 4.56	{ 16.70	8.40
Drink				-
Tobacco	.28	.72	-	.70
Textiles	3.64	2.57	3.20	-
Clothing	.32	-	..	-
Wood	1.35	.22	.50	-
Furniture	-	-	..	-
Paper	2.18	-	3.10	-
Printing	-	-	.20	.30
Leather	-	-	..	-
Rubber	.21	28.62	2.90	-
Chemicals	24.80	27.33	} 36.80	5.20
Oil	14.80	-		1.10
Non-metallic minerals	7.48	4.11	4.70	.30
Basic metals	38.39	-	.10	19.50
Metal products	.05	5.94	6.00	} 63.60
Non-electrical machinery	-	4.02	6.80	
Electrical machinery	.78	16.52	7.90	
Transport equipment	4.38	4.55	8.70	
Miscellaneous	.28	.85	2.40	-
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total \$ million	144.962	50.021	567.511	57.000

(a) Foreign participation-greater than 50 per cent.

(b) Joint venture capital.

Source: OCDE.

Table 12

EEC countries direct investments abroad (flows)

(Mio Eur)

	1972		1973				1974				1975	
	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II
<u>Eur - 6</u>	-626	-988	-590	-614	-777	-803	-1552	-1089	-944	:	:	
D	-307	-367	-289	-238	-329	-479	-355	-322	-421	-434	-445	-376
F	-86	-213	-140	-111	-101	-130	-231	-26	-93	-119	:	
I	-82	-108	-112	-47	-59	9	-20	-40	-101	-1	:	:
N	-100	-314	-33	-195	-210	-182	-364	-160	-451	-268	-230	-58
Belg-Lux	-51	14	-16	-23	-78	-21	-19	-41	-90	-148	-41	-60
UK	-409	-483	-626	-653	-993	-874	-637	-771	-677	-639	-591	:

Source: CEE, Balance of Payments, 1975.

Tableau 13

DONNÉES GLOBALES CONCERNANT LES PAYS MEDITERRANEENS

	POPULATION		POPULATION ACTIVE			PRODUIT NATIONAL BRUT		
	1969	taux de croissance 1960/1959	totale	agricole	pop. agric.	1969	per capita	taux de croissance 1960/1969
	'000	%	' 000		%	'000 \$	\$	%
Espagne	32.949	0,9	12.010	4.105	34	27.018	820	6,5
Israël	2.822	3,3	895	110	12	4.431	1.570	5,3
Malte	323	0,2	85	9	11	229	710	4,1
Chypre	630	1,1	244	95	39	611	970	5,8
Liban	2.645	2,5	736	405	55	1.534	560	2,1
R.A. d'Egypte	32.501	2,5	8.817	4.849	55	5.200	160	1,2
Lybie	1.869	3,7	550	330	60	2.822	1.510	21,7
Syrie	5.866	2,8	1.308	654	50	1.525	260	4,7
Jordanie	2.242	3,2	478	158	33	628	280	4,7
Portugal	9.560	0,9	3.530	1.410	40	4.875	510	4,9
Maroc	15.050	2,9	3.775	2.040	54	2.860	190	3,4
Tunisie	4.919	3	1.602	1.009	63	1.131	230	2,1
Algérie	13.349	2,4	4.649	2.790	60	3.471	260	...
Yougoslavie	20.351	1,1	8.780	4.640	53	11.804	580	4,6
Albanie	2.075	2,9	856	499	58	892	430	4,9
Grèce	8.835	0,7	3.677	1.930	52	7.421	840	6,2
Turquie	34.450	2,5	13.395	9.644	72	12.058	350	3,4

Sources : World Bank : FAO

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