Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Med Area

A Research Report by the Istituto Affari Internazionali

Roberto Aliboni, Laura Guazzone, Daniela Pioppi

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Introduction

The November 1995 Barcelona Declaration holds the essential elements for developing joint crisis-response policies and there is no doubt that Euro-Med co-operation in responding to crises[1] is focussed on peace-building and longer-term conflict prevention policies. The present political predicament, however, shaped as it is by the collapse of the Oslo process, puts strong limits on co-operation towards such policies in the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP).[2] Moreover, still little has been done to articulate and implement conflict prevention (CP) and early warning (EW) in the EMP.

At the official level, CP and EW were envisaged by the 1996 Action Plan, a text aimed at implementing the Barcelona Declaration put forward by the EU Presidency at the very beginning of the process. Subsequently, CP and EW were more or less regularly mentioned in the successive drafts of the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability, i.e. the more comprehensive understanding the Parties began to negotiate in July 1996 for the same implementation purpose. The Action Plan, however, had almost no follow up. On the other hand, after more than four years of talks, the Ministerial Conference in Marseilles in mid-November 2000 failed, contrary to expectations, to adopt the Charter. Officially, therefore, while peace-building is largely the automatic result of Euro-Med economic co-operation, no comprehensive EW/CP concept or policy has substantive existence in the EMP.

Equally, CP and EW in the Euro-Med framework have attracted little attention at the non-governmental research level. The issue has been considered and analysed essentially by a 1996-97 research project carried out by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome[3] and by the 1996-97 and 1998-99 EuroMeSCo Working Groups on the Euro-Med Charter of Peace and Stability[4].

The present research Report, commissioned from the IAI by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Directorate of the Mediterranean and the Middle East at the beginning of 2000, is now trying to take some steps forward. The Report offers a model of early warning intended as the basis for a database to be established with a view to introducing EW facilities concretely in the EMP framework. The Report accounts for the important strengthening of CP and EW in the EU, but focuses on the need for developing joint CP and EW in the EMP.[5]

The model and database are expected to become operational first at a non-governmental level

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1   According to the conceptualisation used by International Crisis Group.
2   The EMP is the process of co-operation initiated at Barcelona by the EU with its member states and twelve Southern Mediterranean Partners (three candidate states to become members of the Union, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey; Israel; the Palestinian National Authority; and seven Arab states, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia).
3   With the support of the United States Institute of Peace. The project has given way to the following publications: Aliboni and Miggiano 1999, Biad 1999, Guazzone 2000, Marquina 1999, Soltan, Said Aly 1999.
4   With the support of the European Commission. The EW/CP dimension has been dealt with by Aguirre in the 1996-97 Group (Aguirre 1998) and by Aliboni, Calleya, Stefanova in the 1998-99 Group (EuroMeSCo 1999).
5   European Union 2001a; International Crisis Group 2001.

in that a network of selected Euro-Med research institutions should be set up as soon as possible. In this perspective, the same Directorate supported co-operation between the IAI and the Amman Jordan Institute of Diplomacy in 2000-01, with the aim of creating an initial nucleus capable of rendering the model operational and beginning to feed the database. Once enlarged and consolidated, it is hoped that this network of non-governmental Euro-Med institutes will be able to co-operate with the official side of the EMP.

The Report is divided into two parts: The first part takes into consideration the concepts and instruments of EW and CP likely to fit the specific political and institutional context of the EMP in which they are to operate. The second part outlines the conceptual foundations of a conflict prevention system in the EMP context (the Euro-Med CPS) and illustrates the rationale and basic design of an early warning model for the Euro-Med CPS; the model consists of two tools: the Country Conflict Profile (CCP) database and the Conflict Prevention Background (CPB) format.

The Report is part of a wider project, directed by Roberto Aliboni, aimed at working out a model of early warning and early response, thus completing the present model over time.

The research Report has been compiled by Roberto Aliboni, Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi. The authors of the Report and the IAI would like to express their gratitude to Minister Antonio Badini, head of the Directorate of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, for making this research possible and for his constant support and encouragement.

I Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Med Context

Roberto Aliboni

This first part of the Report takes into consideration the concepts and instruments of EW and CP likely to fit the specific political and institutional context of the EMP in which they would operate. In the first section, it describes the political context of the EMP, its characteristics and limits. In the second section, it illustrates what an EMP system of EW/CP could be like and, then, analyses the interaction between the EU and the EMP in the realm of EW and CP. In the third section, it provides some suggestions on what EW/CP arrangements could be developed in the EMP.

1. The political context of the EMP

The EMP's political context must be assessed from three principle points of view: (a) the character of conflict in the Mediterranean area after the Cold War; (b) the fragmentation and heterogeneity of strategic and security relations in the area concerned; (c) the outlook for political and security co-operation between EU and non-EU Partners in the EMP.

1.1 The character of conflict

There is no doubt that in the last ten years the Southern Mediterranean region (as defined by the Euro-Med framework: North Africa and the Near East) has been characterised by a relative increase in intra-state conflict.

Apparently, the increase in domestic conflict is in tune with the developments that have taken place in the European East as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet "empire". However, the situation in the Southern Mediterranean is significantly different. While domestic conflicts in the European East, particularly in the Caucasus and the Western Balkans, have been triggered by the collapse of state structures, in the Southern Mediterranean these structures have not collapsed at all. Even in the worst such domestic Southern Mediterranean conflicts, i.e. the Islamist attack on the Algerian state, the latter upheld a relatively high degree of what Baker and Weller call "sustainable security"[1] and proved able to survive by repressing Islamist violence. An even clearer case of sustainable security is the opposition between the Turkish state and the PKK.

Thus, the increase in domestic conflict is not due to state collapse. The reason is that the end of the Cold War terminated the most relevant inter-state conflicts in the area without proving able so far to give them a political solution.

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[1] I.e. the ability of the state to perform basic functions (e.g. police and justice) effectively enough as to prevent it from collapsing (Baker, Weller 1998).

In fact, the end of the Cold War has strongly curtailed the military capabilities of a number of Southern Mediterranean countries and changed their strategic perspective. As a consequence of this change, the two most relevant conflicts in the area - the Western Saharan and Arab-Israeli - have declined militarily and entered into negotiations towards a peaceful solution. These major conflicts are, thus, terminated, in the sense that prevailing political and military conditions prevent them from re-erupting internationally in a violent form. Still, they are not yet solved or completely solved as mirrored by the re-eruption of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with the new Intifada.

To a considerable extent and particularly in the Near East, this terminated character of major Southern Mediterranean conflicts has shifted violence from the international to the domestic arena.[2] In fact, the peace processes the governments have been compelled to enter into have raised strong domestic opposition from nationalist as well as religious quarters and have weakened their internal legitimacy.

As a consequence of this situation, in the Southern Mediterranean region there is a unique combination of pre- and post-Cold War patterns of conflict: the prevailing typical post-Cold War pattern of intra-state conflict is the result of an unsolved pre-Cold War pattern of inter-state conflict. For this reason, besides the current pattern of violent intra-state conflict, the underlying pattern of unsolved inter-state conflict remains of the utmost importance in this region.[3] In any case, factual analysis of the region[3] shows the importance of inter-state conflict.[4]

1.2 Fragmentation and heterogeneity

When it comes to international relations and security, the Euro-Mediterranean area emerges as being very fragmented and heterogeneous. It is well known that the Mediterranean basin must be considered a crossroads or frontier where a set of great regions which have their focus elsewhere meet. Furthermore, because of its global relevance, the region is highly penetrated by distant international actors, such as the United States and Japan. These characteristics do not help to make the area internally consistent. The EMP, in fact, must be considered an inter-regional entity combining countries with political and economic features that are very different if not at odds with one another.

The discontinuity in security conditions is particularly relevant. The North-South security and strategic perspective does not match at all with the South-South. While violent conflict is excluded in the Northern part of the EMP thanks to the European process of institutionalised integration, conflict dominates EMP's Southern part and continues to hover over it. In addition, while the eastern sector of the Southern Mediterranean area revolves around the Arab-Israeli conflict and, mostly because of the latter, is very much bound to the United States, the western part is more closely linked to the EU. The Maghreb feels marginal with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and is characterised by its own pattern of sub-regional conflicts. Finally, whereas threats prevail both internationally and domestically in the South-South sector of the EMP, in the North-South sector different sides perceive different risks in their mutual relations.

In sum, there are many diverse security agendas in the EMP which prevent the area from acquiring

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2   Aliboni and Miggiano 1999, pp. 3-5.
3   Guazzone 2000; Soltan 1999.
4   Part II § 2.1 and Appendix 1 in this Report.

a homogeneous strategic perspective. To this, it must be added that, while they are not part of the EMP, Iraq, Iran and, to a considerable extent, the Arabian Peninsula are a part of the Near East security agenda and cannot be excluded from any rational concept of the regional Middle Eastern strategic equation.

1.3 Perceptions and political relations in the EMP

This fragmentation is not the least important reason for the difficulties encountered by the Euro-Med Partners in seeking to set up political and security co-operation in the EMP framework. Besides the plurality of the security agendas, which has prevented the Partners from starting the security co-operation envisaged by the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, there is significant opposition to the implementation of human rights and democracy as well as economic liberalisation. On the Southern side, a sense of Northern unilateralism and intrusion strongly prevails. Thus, the most important concern of the majority of Southern Partners is to avoid interference from the EU. With differences from Partner to Partner, two points are most sensitive and divisive: the use of military instruments, in particular in a crisis- and conflict-management perspective, and the policies to strengthen democratic practices and human rights observance. On these two points, co-operation in the EMP is bound to be much less relevant than was expected at the time the Barcelona Declaration was launched in 1995.

In sum, consensus in the EMP framework is as necessary as it is difficult to achieve. Relations are based on a significant wish to co-operate but, for the time being, on a very low common denominator and weak political context.

2. The institutional context

The weakness and limits of the Euro-Med political relationship mentioned above reflect on the EMP institutional context. While - despite a degree of ineffectiveness - the economic partnership is working, there is little consensus on the other factors that are broadly supposed to bring about, in the EU vision, long-term stability by building peace, namely respect for human rights, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and democracy. In this sense, EMP political co-operation, including crisis-response concepts and policies, is still fairly undeveloped.

These differences have not come as a surprise. Yet, in seeking to achieve political and security co-operation in the EMP in the five years since the inception of the Barcelona process, the EU has somehow dealt with such differences unilaterally and inflexibly.

In fact, crisis-response co-operation in the EMP cannot result from the sheer transposition of EU concepts and aims. It must be based on a common ground. The EU has largely hesitated to realise this point. In this respect, though, the long talks on the Charter have not been in vain. The Charter could not be approved in Marseilles because of the insurgency in Palestine, but otherwise the Parties came close to narrowing the gap. As soon as the Middle East crisis will allow for talks to resume, the EU should be prepared to accept compromises conducive to a common ground and, thus, to a degree of co-operation in crisis-response policies, especially with regard to CP and EW.

These remarks have to be kept in mind when looking at the institutional scenario in which a distinctive EMP policy of CP and EW might be developed, as this Report tries to do. Such an

institutional scenario is worked out in this section. First, we analyse what the status of CP and EW was in the framework of the last negotiating rounds that took place before the Charter talks were suspended in Marseilles. In fact, these negotiations have provided indications on the main orientations the Partners would seemingly be prepared to adopt in regard to EW and CP arrangements in the EMP.

Second, we use these orientations to sketch out what EMP institutional and organisational context would be needed to support a system of EW and CP.

Finally, some comments are provided on the interaction between present EU and EMP institutional set-ups and the likely influence on such interplay from an eventual EMP political and institutional upgrading.

2.1. The institutional agenda in the Charter talks

Neither CP nor EW are mentioned in the Barcelona Declaration. They were first introduced by the 1996 "Action Plan". Subsequently, while CP has been constantly mentioned in successive drafts of the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability, EW has only resurfaced - as a topic for possible further discussion - in the "Progress Report on the Charter" presented by the Portuguese Presidency in May 2000. In the most recent draft of the Charter prepared for the Conference in Marseilles, there were no explicit and specific allusions either to EW or CP. The draft suggests, though, that in the "longer term" the Parties would consider the adoption of "several instruments crucial to preventive diplomacy" according to a list to be agreed upon. One can assume that such a list, when approved by EMP Parties, might include instruments of CP as well as some mechanisms for EW.

The most complete attempt at illustrating the EW and CP system that the Parties might adopt is provided by the text of the Portuguese Presidency just mentioned (hereafter "Progress Report"). This text does not change the substance of its antecedent (i.e. the "Guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability" approved by the Foreign Ministers in Stuttgart on 15-16 April 1999). Yet, it presents the substance in a clearer and more elaborated way. Furthermore, it takes up the idea of EW.

As far as CP is concerned, the "Progress Report" envisages the establishment of a number of "means and mechanisms", namely:

- "an enhanced political dialogue which should play a key role in preventing tensions and crises"; the "Progress Report" says that "Senior Officials will undertake within the enhanced political dialogue the establishment of arrangements for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; they will also hold emergency meetings in the event of tensions or crises";
- the setting up of "structures that would facilitate crisis prevention meetings and common perceptions in identifying structural risk factors and root causes of conflict";
- the working out of "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation";
- the fostering of the "judicial settlement of differences and disputes" and "adherence to appropriate international conventions";
- the establishment of a "Euro-Mediterranean mechanism for preventive diplomacy and crisis management";
- "training in conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy".

With reference to EW, the "Progress Report" points out that among the suggestions put forward but not yet discussed by the Senior Officials, there are some for "special early warning, crisis management and/or supervisory bodies monitoring the political and security, but also economic, social, cultural and human aspects of the Partnership".

This agenda is not presented by the "Progress Report" in an orderly fashion. Still, it makes it possible to get an overall tentative view of what kind of EW/CP system could be set up in the EMP framework:

- EMP's institutions would consider available information and eventually make decisions on joint preventive action; as in other bodies of regional co-operation (e.g. the Permanent Council in the OSCE), they would work as an element of EW, using the "dialogue as an early warning procedure" (as the "Action Plan" put it); it must be noted that, in this perspective, EW would be understood as an information-sharing activity, intended eventually to start processes of preventive intervention (information > consensus > action);
- besides coming from information-sharing in EMP institutions, EW would also come from "structures that would facilitate crisis prevention meetings and common perceptions in identifying structural risk factors and root causes of conflict", i.e. from some kind of EMP situation centre or national and/or intergovernmental (e.g. EU) situation centre;
- in implementing joint preventive actions, EMP institutions would be supported by some kind of conflict prevention centre, i.e. a "Euro-Mediterranean mechanism for preventive diplomacy and crisis management"; besides logistics, this centre would provide "training in conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy" (and possibly other facilities of the same kind);
- EMP institutions would dispose of a set of specific instruments of conflict prevention, that is "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation"; "judicial settlement of differences and disputes"; and "adherence to appropriate international conventions", which – depending on the case - could be operated by the institutions themselves, by means of "Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms" (e.g. the CP centre or centres), or deferred to incumbent international courts.

All in all, this agenda looks definitely more articulated than the one the "Action Plan" put forward in 1996. It must be noted, however, that its implementation is envisaged in a looser and more cautious way than in 1996. In fact, like previous drafts, the "Progress Report" points out that, with the exception of the enhanced political dialogue, the other provisions "will be developed in an evolutionary way and progressively strengthened" and strictly based on consensus, according to the general principles that would govern the Charter. This is the minimalist approach that would be adopted if the EMP were to agree on an EW/CP policy framework.

2.2. Remarks on some instruments the EMP may develop in the field of EW and CP

As already pointed out, EW can be generated in the context of the enhanced political dialogue and could then give way to joint action, according to the decisions the institutions of the dialogue would make. From the point of view of this Report, however, it is important to point out in more detail that EW can be provided by permanent organisational structures rather than by the political process alone. For example, as we know, the "Progress Report" foresees "structures that would facilitate crisis prevention meetings and common perceptions in identifying structural risk factors and root causes of conflict" as well as a "Euro-Mediterranean mechanism for preventive

diplomacy and crisis management". Some remarks are in order about these instruments and mechanisms. They have already been extensively analysed within the 1998-99 EuroMeSCo Working Group on the Euro-Med Charter, to which reference is made here.[5]

Situation Centres - A Euro-Med Situation Centre could take on a number of very different profiles. A first could be a situation centre relying substantially on the situation centres and similar structures within the EU, like the situation centre that has begun to operate as part of the Policy Unit (Cell for Policy Planning and Early Warning) under the guidance of the Secretary-General of the EU Council of Ministers, or the situation centre that is emerging within the Commission's Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit (it is less likely that it could rely on the emerging structures within the Military Staff). The procedure could be arranged through a protocol stating the limits and ways in which the EMP would be enabled to accede to EU information and/or the "services" demanded by the EMP. The EMP could also just delegate EW to the EU.

A second profile would make Euro-Med information rely on the EU but would secure Southern Partners' access to the EU situation centres by means of measures and policies to be defined (e.g. liaison officials).

A third profile would try to achieve the networking of EU and non-EU situation centres, by means of protocols defining the limits and purposes of co-operation. The problem with this solution would be the asymmetries between the integrated intergovernmental EU system, on one hand, and the individual non-EU national systems, on the other; besides, EU as well as non-EU systems may not necessarily be willing to achieve direct co-operation with other systems, let alone to pool resources or information.

A fourth solution is establishing a Euro-Med situation centre proper.

Conflict Prevention Centres - In general, a conflict prevention centre is less an instrument to gather information than one to manage procedures seeking to settle disputes and prevent latent or potential conflict between more or less consenting parties.

A conflict prevention centre might be given the task of developing and performing, first of all, the functions of preventive diplomacy outlined by the "Progress Report", such as "procedures of clarification, mediation and conciliation for settling disputes between parties by peaceful means of their own choice".

The existence of a number of sub-regional centres would be helpful. These, appropriately located, could be mandated by the EMP central institutions to proceed on a case-by-case basis. They could be asked to perform fact-finding missions and set up local round tables for analysis and recommendations whose outcome would be deferred to the Senior Officials. The sub-regional centres could be directly addressed by parties and thus act as an element of decentralised EW. In this way, they could be enabled to perform an essential job in securing good neighbourly relations.

Political Planning And Analysis - The functions of political planning and analysis can be carried out by dedicated centres. They are generally associated, however, to situation and sometimes even conflict prevention centres. In the emerging EU structures, in particular in the Council, the

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5   EuroMeSCo 1999, § 3.1.2; Aliboni 2000.

two functions tend clearly to be brought together and directed more specifically at pursuing conflict prevention.

It must be noted that situation centres and policy planning units, whether acting as separate structures or not, can work either as in-house structures more or less segregated with respect to civil society or as structures more or less open to input from and exchanges with civil society's actors, such as think tanks and NGOs.

To conclude on this point, it must be noted that, broadly speaking, policy planning is usually generated by some politically cohesive entity or process. This not being the case with the EMP, policy planning will likely remain out of reach. However, if the EMP wanted to develop a policy planning activity, such activity could be developed more easily by associating a civil society networking (in a way similar to the EU Conflict Prevention Network).[6]

2.3 The interaction between the EU and EMP institutional set-ups

In this section we consider, essentially, the interaction of EMP and EU respective institutional set-ups as they stand today.

Let's begin with some general remarks. The Southern Mediterranean countries are much less equipped than the EU and its member states. Furthermore, the latter are definitely preponderant within the EMP institutional set-up. If this asymmetrical character of the EMP is combined with the weakness of its political context and the limits it puts on actual action (see § 1), it is clear that, in interacting with the EU, the EMP suffers important limitations:

a) an EW system consists not only of its ability to anticipate crises and conflicts but also of the resources and institutions that make a concrete response possible; for this reason, whatever EW system the EMP were able to set up, it would presently prove to be short on response capabilities and heavily dependent on other bodies, primarily the EU, with respect to EW;

b) as already pointed out, whatever security co-operation is likely in the EMP, it tends to focus on peace-building and, possibly, on actions of preventive diplomacy basically geared at maintaining peace (less likely at restoring peace); this pattern of co-operation leaves the bulk of response on the EU's shoulders, though in principle it does not rule out some EMP joint diplomacy in maintaining and restoring peace (monitoring, special envoys, conciliation, etc.); the same pattern suggests that EW geared to early prevention (e.g., the analysis and monitoring of the "root causes" of conflict) constitutes a most important issue in the EMP;

c) we also pointed out that EMP joint action entailing the use of military instruments for whichever kind of peace support operations is largely unlikely as yet; this trend tends to exclude or make unlikely an EMP joint military action as well as an EMP mandate to the EU to use military instruments in a CP perspective.

These general remarks suggest that EMP-EU interaction in the field of EW and CP seems more relevant in warning and early prevention stages than in response and late prevention. At the same time, such interaction looks unlikely, if not impossible, in early as well as late management, particularly when military instruments are involved. For this reason, this section considers cases of interaction limited to EW directed at early prevention (peace-building operations, in particular economic and financial co-operation), as well as actions taking place in a stage of late prevention

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6   See Appendix 3, 2.1

(or early management, whenever it proves feasible), that is the use of the tools mentioned by Art. 33 of the UN Charter and the like.

Coming to today's EMP-EU interaction, the EU institutional setting with regard to EW and CP has been examined in detail by the International Crisis Group in a recent report, to which we refer here.[7] As for the EMP decision-making, the main lines of the process must be briefly recalled.[8]

Decisions are prepared by either the Commission or the Senior Officials Committee, according to the division of labour dictated by the EU Treaties. It is the Commission, though, that acting as the Secretariat of the EMP, prepares the decisions that the EU Presidency (after deliberations by the intergovernmental Committees) submits to the Euro-Med Committee for the Barcelona Process. This Committee, composed of the Partners' representatives and chaired by the EU Presidency, prepares the decisions for the next Conference of EMP Ministers and approves the measures for implementing the ongoing work programme (e.g. the national and regional indicative plans of development). The follow-up is then secured by the Commission. The latter is also in charge of securing and administering MEDA funding.

When and where could these institutions interact in regard to EW and CP? EW information and requests for late prevention (let alone early management) could be shared in the Senior Officials Committee and brought in by individual Partners (both EU and non-EU) as well as by the EU institutions (drawing on their system of EW/CP facilities in the Council and the Commission). Once EW information is shared, the problem is that the EMP has not, as yet, approved any framework for implementing its own EW/CP capability. For this reason, the EMP institutions would not be able to proceed. All they could do is to prepare a specific decision and submit it to the Ministers for it to be approved and then implemented. A long and uncertain process which makes EW helpless and early action unlikely.

As things stand today, the EU-EMP interaction fits more with early (long-term, structural) prevention, that is the realm that basically belongs to the Commission's initiative. Here, before approval of the national and regional indicative plans and other economic measures by the Euro-Med Committee, there are significant opportunities of early interactions between the Southern Partners and the Commission. These opportunities are mostly provided by the Association Agreements' organisational and institutional set-ups and, where these agreements are still not enforced, by long-standing relations and diplomatic contacts between the Commission and the interested countries. Thus, national and regional plans submitted to the MED Committee[9] and later to the Euro-Med Committee do incorporate previous negotiations. This means, among other things, that the relevance of these plans in terms of EW and CP must be shared.

With the mainstreaming of the Country Strategy Papers in the EU's system of EW/CP, the shared relevance just mentioned above is bound to assume a compelling significance. In fact, the strategy papers will focus on the identification of the "root causes" of instability in the countries concerned and result in far-reaching and diffuse consequences in terms of policies and objectives.

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7   International Crisis Group 2001.
8   Edwards, Philippart (1997); Monar (1998).
9   The MED Committee is an EU institution run by the Commission, where the member states are represented, with the task of considering and approving national and indicative plans supported by MEDA.

The analysis of the root causes of instability by the strategy papers and its policy implications, legitimate from the point of view of EU policy-making, may not receive the Partners' consensus. The countries concerned may disagree, even strongly, with donors' analysis and have difficulty in accepting policies stemming from that analysis – policies which, if presented in a more general perspective, they would otherwise accept. The explicit statement on root causes of instability by the strategy papers may, in fact, create a political problem which would otherwise not exist.

If this is true, either the strategy papers must remain strictly EU in-house documents and not be circulated as "early warning" evidence for working out shared peace-building measures, or they should at least be commented, if not approved, in some EMP political instance, like the Senior Officials Committee. In other words, the strategy papers should be mainstreamed in the EMP political dialogue. Otherwise, their conclusions may be accepted by individual Partners, but not by the EMP as a whole. This result would enhance current Southern perceptions of EU unilateralism and prevent shared EMP policies of EW/CP from emerging. Furthermore, their conclusions could be accepted by some Partners and not by others, thus impressing on the EMP a strong bilateral pattern of action. All in all, it would affect the effectiveness of the overall EU/EMP policy of early/structural prevention.

The introduction of strategy papers in the political dialogue would be a strong stimulus to developing some degree of EW/CP policy in the EMP. Even if the EMP did not develop its own instruments, a debate among all the Partners on the strategy papers, their significance and their implications could not but have a positive impact on security and political co-operation in the EMP.

Another measure that could contribute to introducing EW/CP in the EMP would be establishing some kind of co-operation relative to the compilation of the country strategy papers between the CPN and a similar Euro-Mediterranean network of think tanks. This agenda would be without prejudice to the Commission and EU conclusions, but would certainly attenuate perceptions of unilateralism and improve confidence.

The interaction between civil society and EMP officials in the field of analysis and EW has been already pointed out in § 2.2. More in general, the problems raised in this section would be alleviated by the existence of some even modest EMP instruments, allowing for situation centres, centres for conflict prevention, centre networking and other kinds of liaisons, as suggested in § 2.2. Some indications on this point are provided in the next section.

3. What EW/CP arrangements in the Euro-Med Partnership?

Analysis of the political and institutional contexts of the EMP provides the broad parameters for sketching out what kind of EW/CP arrangements are allowed and could be developed in these contexts. The following parameters seem to be the most important:

- the EMP rests on a weak rationale: its members have different security agendas so that it cannot work as a "security complex";[10]
- political relations are weakened by Southern perceptions of EU unilateralism and intrusion;
- in particular, security co-operation is almost excluded from the EMP not only by the

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10 In the sense this concept has been worked out in the theory of international relations (Wœver, Buzan 2000).

encroachment of the as yet unsolved Arab-Israeli disputes, but also by the strong Southern perception of interference from the North (political, military, cultural); this hardly allows for the use of military instruments in the EMP for purposes of co-operative and collective security;
- the institutional and organisational preponderance of the EU in the EMP may hinder the upgrading of EMP decision-making; the entanglement of the two entities, as it stands today, should therefore be alleviated.

In this context, the incentive to share information (as a form of EW) in EMP institutions cannot but be weak. At the same time, EW deriving either from EMP or EU/EMP structures or independent sources risks receiving only a limited and uncertain audience or not being able to reach its audience. Alternatively, EW may reach its targets only to find that EMP institutions are unable or unwilling to act. Implementation of the institutional agenda, as articulated as it may be, may prove weak and uncertain.

To make such implementation more likely and effective, it is important to work out an EW arrangement as conducive as possible to promoting political will, facilitating decisions and fostering common action. In this perspective, what characteristics should be impressed on the EMP's EW arrangements?

To respond to this question, four main points must be taken into consideration: (a) the location of institutional EW in the complex framework of EMP-EU relations; (b) the concept of EW which best fits with the political-institutional context of the EMP; (c) the importance of civilian EW targets with respect to political and military ones; (d) the importance of giving priority to an inter-state vs. intra-state approach in trying to develop security co-operation.

3.1 Where should EW facilities be located?

The main options have already been set out in the above (§ 2.2). With respect to situation centre(s), apart from the unlikely decision to set up an independent, full-fledged EMP situation centre, other options might contemplate (a) a mandate to incumbent EU Units to focus on the Euro-Med area with a view to eventually generating EW and informing EMP according to ad hoc understandings; (b) setting up appropriate Southern Partners' liaisons in the EU structures; (c) networking Partners' national situation centres.

Full delegation of EW activities to the EU would expose EU unilateralism instead of healing Southern Mediterranean perceptions relating to it. It would weaken rather than strengthen political will and cohesion in EMP institutions and, as a consequence, make chances of co-operation and common action more distant.

In this sense, while there is no doubt that the EU Units in charge of EW/CP will in any case receive a specific mandate from the Union's leadership to monitor the Med (rather than Euro-Med) area in the framework of its wider institutional mandate, there can be no doubt either that possible EMP EW arrangements should have a degree of autonomy, distinctiveness and visibility with respect to EU facilities. In this sense, it has been maintained that the most convenient profile would be a combination of Southern access to EU systems and a modest Euro-Med unit based on the networking of information from national and international agencies.[11]

Where the EMP could assume a higher profile is in setting up a conflict prevention centre, or - as maintained in the above (§ 2.2) - a plurality of such centres, with the task of taking decisions

11 Aliboni 2000.

and executing specific mandates coming from the political institutions of the EMP. Again, it must be pointed out that, unless there is proper and conscious co-ordination, these centres may be hindered or played down by EU "competition" (the Commission, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and, in the unlikely case of the implementation of peace-related operations, from the EU Military Staff (EUMS)).

Although in principle conflict prevention centres have executive tasks (like agencies), this would not prevent the EMP from entrusting them with the task of collecting information with a view to contributing to generating EW. In other words, the "modest" Euro-Med EW facility(ies) just mentioned could be located within conflict prevention centre(s).

Problems raised for Euro-Med co-operation by EU-EMP institutional relations should not be underestimated. Solutions are never easy. On one hand, it is true that the EU tends to mistake Euro-Med co-operation for its Mediterranean policy and, consequently, to be or appear intrusive and unilateral. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Partners (on both sides) want to invest in making the EMP a complex and expensive novel international organisation. A number of balancing acts will be necessary, without forgetting the primary necessity of giving the EMP more autonomy.

3.2 The concept of Early Warning that fits the Euro-Mediterranean context

As it is known, there is a gap between EW and actual action, whether such action is directed at CP or other kinds of crisis response. This gap is inherent in the political process, in the sense that there is no necessary link between information and political will. On the other hand, an important part of research work on EW is not concerned with the action that may eventually follow a warning - and this doesn't help to close the gap.

Thus, EW can or cannot be a response-oriented activity. It can or cannot be concerned with its own ability to transmit operational information to decision-makers, that is, warnings deliberately tailored to foster action. However, if EW is to have an impact in terms of action, its modes and capabilities have to be highly response-oriented and consistent with the political-institutional context to which messages are addressed. EW cannot be developed independently of the context in which it is expected to be applied and, as a consequence, it must almost be shaped by the latter. In this perspective, recent trends in conflict-prevention response-oriented research emphasise specific contexts rather than attempting to develop general approaches. This is, for example, FEWER's modus operandi. These trends tend to reverse the sequence of anticipation and action by deriving instruments and procedures from given political and institutional contexts. Ultimately, this is the approach developed by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.[12] It has worked out a Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF) as a model in which conflict and possible policy responses are brought together in a given institutional-political context so that preventive policies/tools are inherently interrelated with EW capabilities. In practice, this means that the EW-generating body should also indicate instruments with which to intervene and formulate options.

To the extent that this approach would help close the gap between EW and CP, it would also help reinforce political will and consensus in the EMP. To use Greco's conceptual framework,

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12   Van de Goor, Verstegen 1999 & 2000.

in addition to other ingredients needed to make preventive diplomacy feasible, EW must contribute to consensus-building among concerned parties, so as to make conflict prevention action possible, and provide a "convincing" selection of cases deserving intervention.[13] In the EMP, it is evident that an EW shaped by these tasks would help consensus and political will to emerge. For this reason the adoption of a CPAF-like approach is desirable. The project that has generated this Report applies this kind of approach (see Part II).

3.3 EW civilian targets

We have argued that, in order to be politically feasible and have an impact, the EMP's EW must have a degree of autonomy and visibility with respect to the EU and must provide response-oriented information, i.e. messages that bring together an assessment of prospective crises/conflicts and the means for them to be countered. A third factor that would make EW more consistent with its context, and thus contribute to strengthening its activities, is that, while directed at detecting political and military developments, it should be strongly concerned with civilian developments as well, that is developments concerning environment, crime, terrorism, poverty, etc.

After four years of talks, Partners reached a consensus about the relevance of civilian security in their concept of partnership and co-operation. The Portuguese "Progress Report", for example, states that the latter would focus on "economic, social, environmental, cultural and human aspects as far as they affect and determine peace and stability", and emphasises "the importance and relevance of the human dimension for peace and stability".

Consequently, EW in relation to civilian developments must be an important part of EMP activity, for it would prepare a kind of joint action that the Partners perceive as essentially consistent with the EMP identity and tasks. EuroMeSco has drawn up a set of indications to develop civilian EW.[14]

3.4 An inter-state-first approach

If EW activities in the EMP have to be shared by Partners and carried out in view of conducting common actions to manage crises and prevent conflicts, these activities should not focus on intra-state factors of conflict, like abuses of human rights and minorities.

Such a focus would go against the South's acute sensitivity to interference and jurisdiction. Certainly, this sensitivity exists in the OSCE as well, and has often prevented the Organisation from acting. Still, the OSCE had an opportunity to develop autonomous institutions, in particular institutions like the High Commissioner on National Minorities, which are legitimised to limit such sensitivity. Above all, the OSCE, in the broader context of the European drive towards institutional integration, has contributed to political amalgamation and value-sharing, all things that made the signing of the Pact of Stability in Europe possible. This is not the case with the EMP (a similar Pact has been excluded by the Arabs since initial EMP negotiations). The EMP intends to begin a (probably long) process to arrive at shared values, but at the moment political values are not shared. Finally, sensitivities relating to sovereignty and interference have been made even more acute by international developments in the 1990s, such as the consequences of the UN intervention against Iraq and the Kosovo campaign.

13   Greco 1996.
14   EuroMesco 1999, § 3.1.3.

Also to be taken into consideration is the fact that - as noted in § 1.1 - Southern Mediterranean states are largely able to "sustain security" domestically. The existence of a situation of sustainable security in the Yugoslav Federation did not exclude the Kosovo intervention. Broadly speaking, however, it makes intervention on humanitarian ground more difficult anyway, particularly against states that, in the end, are very close to - sometime allies of - Europe and the West. For sure, there are secessionist and irredentist factors in the EMP area. Still, even in the case of the Turkish Kurds, these factors seem to be under control and, with respect to the past, show recessive characters. In any case, the EMP is not emerging as a regional entity supported by the means and charged with the tasks of collective security. Consequently, it can hardly share a scheme of EW focusing on domestic factors of conflict.

In sum, EW in the EMP must focus on inter-state relations. This is not to say that EW facilities will not monitor or consider domestic factors of conflict and crisis. They have to be considered because these factors, more often than not, have international implications. The mandate for EW in the EMP, however, should be that warnings would concern Parties only when it comes to conflict between states, whether triggered by international or intra-state factors.

II Tools for a Conflict Prevention System for the Euro-Mediterranean Area: The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain and The Med Country Conflict Profile

Laura Guazzone

This second part of the Report is about the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain and the Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP). The former is a model of early warning and early response developed with a view to concretely introducing conflict prevention facilities in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP); the latter is a computerised tool for early warning devised to be used in the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain. It describes the conceptual framework, operational mechanisms and potential developments of both the Chain and the CCP, developed at the Istituto Affari Internazionali of Rome as part of a project called Setting Up a Nucleus for Conflict Prevention in the Euro-med Framework: Towards a model for early warning and early response.

Sections one and two delineate the conceptual foundations of both the Chain and the CCP, while sections three and four analyse their workings and state of development. More precisely: section one summarises the basic concepts about conflict prevention adopted in order to determine the main requirements of a conflict prevention system (CPS) for the Euro-Med area, while section two analyses the patterns of conflict in the Mediterranean-Middle East areas in order to determine what are the object and main requirements of early warning in this regional context. Taking a more operational approach, section three sketches the 'conflict prevention chain' of the envisaged Euro-Med CPS and elaborates on its early warning components, while section four analyses in detail the mechanisms and state of development of the CCP.

The elaboration of the IAI model builds on existing knowledge in conflict prevention and early warning methodologies and benefits from the ideas of many authors; in this regard, it is particularly indebted to two sources of inspiration: the work by Luc van de Goor and Suzanne Verstengen of the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International relations 'Cligendael', and the work by Albert Jongman and Alex Schmid at the PIOOM Center of Leiden University in the Netherlands.

1. The conceptual framework of conflict prevention

The focus of this section is on the conceptual foundations of conflict prevention mechanisms to be developed in the framework of the EMP. It explores the current debates on conflict prevention models to determine the main requirements of an overarching conflict prevention system for the Euro-Med area. In order to do so it stresses the basic requirements of any conflict prevention system, as they emerge from the literature on conflict prevention theories, empirical models, and policy experiences.

1.1 Basic concepts [1]

The idea that the international community could and indeed should act to prevent or terminate violent conflicts worldwide really only emerged at the end of the Cold War, although it had circulated before. However, after almost two decades of academic research and policy experience on conflict prevention, the stark reality is that the international community –international organisations and individual states- can field only very limited political consensus and operational capabilities in implementing conflict prevention policies in the face of a high number of new and recurring conflicts. As a consequence, just like conflict management and conflict resolution, conflict prevention remains an elusive goal: so much needed and so difficult to achieve. In addition, experts lament that there is still "little agreement amongst theoreticians and practitioners on the most effective practical methodologies".[2]

Our model of early warning and early response in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EMP adopts as working definitions a few, widely shared concepts of conflict prevention, as elaborated by several authors:

- The purpose of conflict prevention is not to abolish violent conflicts, but to reduce the number of political tensions and disputes which turn into armed conflicts, thus mitigating the human, economic and political costs that armed conflicts bear to all parts directly or indirectly involved;

- Conflict prevention is a policy that deals with political tensions to avoid their evolution into armed conflicts and embraces all "actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken...to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle political disputes";[3] following this approach, also in the Euro-Med context conflict prevention policies should deal only with potential conflicts (see below).[4]

- The fundamental components of conflict prevention are early warning and early response; early warning is "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from area of crises [and] the provision of policy options to influential actors";[5] adopting this definition, the Med Country Conflict Profile collects and analyses data about potential conflicts in the Euro-Med region, while the other early warning tools of the Euro-Med conflict prevention system (see section three below) link conflict analysis to policy options for preventive actions;

- Preventive action or (early) response, the other essential component of conflict prevention, consists of timely and targeted actions, undertaken by concerned actors on the basis of early warning, with the aim of preventing the (re-) emergence of violent conflicts; more precisely, preventive action embraces "response measures to deal with root causes and risk factors in politically tense situations"; more remote or diffuse conflict factors are addressed through "structural measures", while more focussed "operational tasks" address short-term risk

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1   Those interested in the subjects touched upon in this section can refer, among others, to Bloomenfeld and Moulton 1997, Brown and Rosecrance 1999, Holl 1997, Reychler 1994, Walraven 1998. See also Appendix 3 for a brief review of conflict prevention projects and the references at the end of this report.

2   FEWER 1999, p. 3.

3   Schmid 1999, p. 16.

4   Sometime conflict prevention is defined to include any kind of activity aiming to prevent the escalation of violence; I have not adopted this broader definition because, although plausible and widely used, it is confusing as it includes a number of quite different policies -- such as preventive diplomacy, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace-building (for more details see Schmid 2000, p. 24-25).

5   FEWER 1999, p. 3.

factors;[6] therefore, the aim of the response component of the Euro-Med conflict prevention system is the definition of a response strategy for the potential conflicts of the region and the selection, planning and implementation of the more appropriate preventive actions.

- Types of conflict conflicts can be defined quite differently according to the different parameters considered (e.g. participants or issues involved; stage in the conflict life-cycle etc.);[7] conflicts are not always violent, nor necessarily detrimental, and only violent conflicts require prevention; the envisaged Euro-Med conflict prevention system deals only with potential conflicts and in its framework violent conflict is defined by the existence of systematic armed violence between the conflicting states and/or groups;[8] theorists of early warning have often stressed that early warning tools should be different according to the different types or aspects of the conflict to be analysed.[9]
- Potential conflicts are situations of political tension where armed violence is absent or sporadic, but likely to (re-)erupt; in the conflict life-cycle (the sequence of phases in which a conflict can pass through)[10] potential conflicts are situated in the pre- and post- conflict phases; the main aim of the Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP) is to evaluate the origin of vulnerability to violent conflict of the regional countries, and to analyse the content of the single potential conflicts detected.

1.2 Recent trends

In its initial phase, research on conflict prevention methodologies focussed on early warning, a natural choice since prevention requires first of all that potential conflicts be detected and their causes and dynamics understood. Priority on early warning oriented research towards "detection tools" (e.g. indicators) and formalised systems for data collection and classification. However, the sophisticated results of this first wave of research often remained remote from the policy-making needs of conflict prevention. This is why more recent research on conflict prevention methodologies,[11] striving to develop viable conflict prevention capabilities, shows a strong shift of emphasis from warning to response, and adopts a bottom-up approach that focuses not only on the individual conflict, but also on the "end-user", i.e. the state/institution that tries to prevent and manage conflicts.

Our effort to develop a model of early warning and early response for the Euro-Mediterranean context, shares the objectives of this more policy-oriented wave of research and builds on its main tenets, which can be summarised as follows:

- a conflict prevention system consists of dedicated structures (e.g. situation centres) operating on the basis of: (a) a political mandate and process; (b) a formalised sequence of procedures;

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6 This distinction, introduced by the Carnagie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Schmid 2000, p. 67), has been adopted by the EU which distinguishes between "structural long-term and direct short-term preventive actions" (EU 2001b, point III).

7 For instance, Schmid lists twelve acceptable definitions of conflict (Schmid 2000 pp.12-13).

8 See § 4.1.2 below.

9 As detailed in section two below, the CCP adopt this definition, as it is especially designed for the conflictuality of the Mediterranean area.

10 See Schmid 2000, pp. 19-21.

11 For an overview of past and ongoing research in conflict prevention methodologies Van de Goor 1999, Appendix 1 and 2; Appendix 3 in this report.

to be politically and practically viable, the system needs standardised procedures and parameters, but conflict prevention remains a political act and cannot be automated;
- the prevention of each potential conflict requires a specific <u>conflict prevention strategy</u>, tailored to its unique characteristics and the overall political contingency in which it takes place, structured according to a coherent methodology and customised to the aims and means of the specific institution establishing it;
- <u>effectiveness</u> is the second most important ingredient for the success of conflict prevention, (after political will); in order to be effective, response actions must be framed in an integrated, customised system of conflict prevention, based on a "good enough" methodology,[12] which should be practical enough to permit timely response, and should be evaluated only against its concrete impact on conflict prevention.[13]

Putting theory to work, it emerges from the above that a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area (Euro-Med CPS) must satisfy two main specifications: (1) it should be tailored to the basic characteristics of conflictuality in the region concerned – the Mediterranean-Middle East area[14] and (2) it should be customised to the aims and means of conflict prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean context.

1.3 Conflict prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean framework[15]

The "security environment" of the Mediterranean countries is characterised by a substrate of basic instability -made up of underlying factors such as economic and social underdevelopment and inadequate political institutions in the Southern and Eastern rims, widespread cultural and ethnic differences, sharp South-South and North-South cleavages- which represent diffuse and interdependent factors of risk throughout the region. This structural instability of Mediterranean security is aggravated by more proximate causes such as the link between conflict, demography and migration,[16] the vulnerability of strategic communication lines, the diffusion of unconventional weapons, the transregional impact of long-standing internal and external conflicts (such as the confrontation between regimes and Islamic oppositions or the Arab-Israeli conflict), and the high number of open and potential conflicts (see Survey in Appendix 1).

This interdependence and transnationality of risk factors in the Mediterranean region is not matched by a coherent set of national and multilateral security policies. Quite to the contrary, the security perceptions and needs of regional states differ widely and co-operative security schemes are absent or weak. EU countries (and more in general G-8 countries) feel threatened by instability and conflict in the non-EU Mediterranean countries and would like the latter to co-operate in conflict prevention by applying their recipes to address the structural and proximate sources of instability in the region. Non-EU Mediterranean governments reject the component of conflict prevention policies which they perceive as Western intervention in their internal

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12 The importance for early warning of "a Good Enough Model instead of a Causal Explanatory Model" is stressed by Helen Fein (de Goor 1999 p. 8 and Appendix 2; Fein 1994).
13 An ongoing effort concerns the development of standardised methods for the evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of response actions (see Lund, M. & Rasamoelina (eds.) 2000)
14 This requirement is discussed in § 2 below.
15 This subject is developed in greater depth in Part I of this report; see also Soltan 1999 and Guazzone 2000.
16 For an analysis of this issue, see Choucri 1997.

affairs, but confronted as they are with multidirectonal threats, need Western help to increase their security.

As a result of this security environment, there is a real demand for a new, more co-operative security architecture in the Mediterranean region today. Its development is nevertheless hindered by numerous political constraints due to the asymmetries of the security agendas of the countries of the region. These asymmetries make any agreement on the mandate and mechanisms of a multilateral conflict prevention system for the Mediterranean region very difficult to achieve. Witness to this difficulty are the meagre achievements to date of the security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

In principle the EMP is the institution best equipped to develop a co-operative security regime for the Mediterranean: not only does it bring together more regional countries than any other of the existing initiatives for Mediterranean co-operation but, more importantly, it is the only forum were the security needs of non-EU Med countries are approached comprehensively through economic, political and security co-operation.[17] The Barcelona Declaration undersigned in November 1995 by the European Union and the foreign ministers of twenty seven countries - the EU members plus their Mediterranean partners-[18] established a "comprehensive partnership" based on three pillars: economic, political and socio-cultural cooperation. The content of the security chapter of the Declaration indicates that the participants in the EMP agree on building an environment conducive to a regional system of cooperative security ("the common area of peace and stability").

In fact, because of the diverging security agendas of partners in the Barcelona process and of the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EMP Parties have been unable in their negotiations so far to establish any common conflict prevention policy, or mechanisms.[19] Still, in spite of its many limits, the EMP remains to date the only institution that could produce a multilateral political mandate for conflict prevention in the Euro-Med region. Waiting for political conditions for co-operative security to mature, conflict prevention in the Mediterranean area remains the task of the individual countries and of the European Union. This is of direct relevance to our model, whose Euro-Med Chain assumes some EMP autonomy with respect to the EU. In any case, when and if an EMP policy of conflict prevention were to mature, it could not but depend to a very large extent on the use of EU instruments, in particular when it comes to structural measures and long-run policies.

It is therefore interesting to note that the European Union, which has included conflict prevention among the objectives of its external relations since 1995, has recently delineated the main features of an emerging conflict prevention system.[20] This development consists of: [21] the establishment

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17 See part I in this report.
18 Non-EU countries participating in the EMP include Malta, Cyprus and Turkey (which are candidates to become members of the EU); Israel, which has a "special relationship" with the EU; the quasi-state represented by the Palestinian National Authority; the seven Mediterranean Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon).
19 For more details see Part I § 2.1.
20 This evolution is documented in recent statements by the EU Commission and the EU High Representative (see European Union 2000, 2001a); the more comprehensive description of the EU conflict prevention system (mandate, structures procedures) to date is a Coreper document endorsed by the Göteborg European Council in June 2001 (see European Union 2001b).
21 For a detailed analysis, see International Crisis Group 2001.

of new institutions (the Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit) and the streamlining of existing ones, the development of a set of guidelines and procedures for more coherent use of instruments for conflict prevention. As regards instruments:

The Union has an extensive set of instruments for structural long-term and direct short-term preventive actions. The long term instruments include development co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights and environment policies as well as political dialogue. The Union also has a broad range of diplomatic and humanitarian instruments for short-term prevention. Structures and capabilities of civil and military crisis management, developed within the framework of the ESDP, will also contribute to the capabilities of the EU to prevent conflicts.[22]

The Commission has set out a concept of long-run structural policy that allows for more rational and effective use of the instruments it possesses as well as an improved division of labour with the Council, which in turn looks decidedly oriented towards providing responses to crisis in the shorter run. Both the Commission and the Council propose to base their crisis response and preventive policies upon the use of models of early warning and conflict analysis.

The evolution of the political and institutional context for conflict prevention in the Mediterranean is of direct interest to our model of Euro-Med CPS. Its overall design will remain valid whether the end user is the EU itself or the EMP; of course, the differences would instead be significant for the political mandate, structures and policy instruments.

2. The conceptual framework of patterns of conflict

Most of the existing early warning models have been constructed starting from a preliminary hypothesis about the kind of conflict, or conflict parameters, to be observed. For instance the Minority at Risk and the State Failure projects -both developed at the University of Michigan and directed by Prof. Ted Gurr- focus on a specific kind of conflict (involving communal minorities or failing states, respectively) and concentrate on the identification of the structural indicators of that kind of conflict.[23]

Our model for early warning and early response in the Euro-med context also starts from a preliminary hypothesis: it is designed to detect (and hopefully contribute to prevent) potential interstate conflict, the most diffuse cause of violence in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Of course, our model analyses domestic sources of conflicts, as well existing internal conflicts, but considers them mainly as precursors of violent interstate conflicts.[24]

The choice to focus our model on interstate (potential) conflicts derives from a basic fact: in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and namely in the Near East and North Africa, the incidence of interstate conflicts is (still) high (see point 2.1 below). To a much lesser extent, our focus is also due to a policy-oriented consideration: since the political consensus that supports the security dimension of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation excludes explicit intervention in internal conflicts, conflict prevention in the EMP is likely to concentrate on interstate conflict (see point 1.3 above).

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22 European Union 2001.
23 See Appendix 3, § 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.
24 How this focus is reflected in the mechanisms of the CCP model is described in section four.

2.1 Patterns of Conflict in the North Africa and the Middle East in the post-Cold War Period

2.1.1 Global patterns and Early Warning

It is a common perception that after the end of the Cold War and with the rise of the information revolution the world has been changing at an unprecedented speed not only in the political sphere, but also in almost every aspect of human activity. A considerable body of literature has already tried to interpret the impact of these changes on the prospects for international war and peace, noting the emergence of new security concerns - including ethno-nationalism, environmental degradation, economic competition, and technological fault lines - and the new prevalence of internal conflict over 'traditional' interstate wars. In this regard, Jongman drew the following global picture of conflicts:

The majority of 110 armed conflicts between 1989-99 were internal, with most of the fatalities being civilians…Of the 110 conflicts, 60 reached the level of war (1,000 battle-related deaths in a year) at some time during the period 1989-99. Only 7 were inter-state wars…9 cases were intrastate wars with foreign intervention.[25]

But as Levy remarked, "the perception that the end of the Cold War has changed 'all the answers and all the questions' goes too far, however, and the theme of change must be tempered by that of continuity."[26] In other words, it is true that the influence of societal, bureaucratic-organisational and individual factors on the causes of war and, more in general on international behaviour, "in the past has been seriously underestimated",[27] however, the present and future influence of these factors should not be overstated either. 'Traditional' systemic factors,[28] like geopolitics or the search for power, which are at the heart of the realist paradigm, continue to have an important role in determining the emergence of violent conflicts, including interstate wars, which have not disappeared. In addition, events at the global level suggest that some "new" trends in conflict patterns may already be losing their prominence, as Jongmann recently noted:

Recent assessment suggests that the role of ethnicity in warfare may be on the wane …of 59 armed ethnic conflicts under way in early 1999, 23 were de-escalating…and only seven were escalating. Between 1993 and the beginning of 2000, the number of wars of self-determination has been halved…The shift is due, according to Gurr,[29] to the emergence of improved methods of managing minority-majority relations.[30]

Therefore, there is a general agreement that the end of bipolarism has brought about profound changes in global patterns of conflict, but the consequences of these changes are still emerging and, in the end, their respective role may be different in different places and times.

What matters here, in view of developing the conceptual basis for a conflict prevention system, is that most existing early warning models are structured on the assumed prevalence of internal conflicts and of some specific kind of internal causes of conflict.[31] The majority view among

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25 Jongman 2000, p.1.
26 Levy 1996, p. 3.
27 Idem.
28 'Systemic' here refers to the international system level of analysis of international politics (see Levy 1996, p.4).
29 Gurr 2000.
30 Jongman 2000, p.2.
31 Van de Goor 1999.

early warning pratictioners is that this is the right focus because of: (1) the statistical prevalence of internal conflicts world-wide; (2) the prevalence of internal causes in the violence afflicting the most conflict ridden regions of the world, namely Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, south-east Asia.

My hypothesis does not contradict this view, rather it specifies that the focus on internal conflict may not be the most appropriate when dealing with Middle East and North Africa, where early warning needs to focus also on interstate conflicts. The reason for this rests on two main arguments: (1) the empirical observation of the patterns of regional conflictuality: which stresses the high incidence of interstate conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region; (2) the structural analysis of patterns of Middle East and North Africa security, which stresses the centrality of interstate relations in the prevalent causes of conflict in the region.

2.1.2 Regional patterns of conflict and Early Warning

Security studies centred on the Middle East and North Africa provide a structural analysis of the regional patterns of conflictuality, and help to single out regional peculiarities within the global context. As regards the relative role of systemic and sub-state factors, in their "Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context" [32] Korany, Brynen and Noble argue that "though still relevant, geopolitics …[are] more useful if limited to being one variable in an explanatory scheme".[33] Their basic explanatory scheme is that in the Middle East and North Africa, the "specific properties of the conflict phenomenon are a function of the Arab - and Third World - state, with its two main characteristics for national security analyses: internal fragility and external vulnerability".[34] Korany and his co-authors trace the reason for these characteristics back to the specificities of the process of state- and nation-building in the Third World, a process which is still at an early stage but has to be "telescoped" to adapt to international realities.[35] This remark suggested some interesting (although debatable) reflections to Mohammed Ayoob, who argues not only that a degree of societal and state violence is inevitable in the Third World (an enduring and growing category in world politics, according to Ayoob), but also that the imposition of some international standards (namely the inalienability of statehood and individual and group political rights) has an adverse security impact on Third World states.[36]

Starting from the premises discussed above, Korany and his co-authors analyse "the many faces of national security in the Arab world" and note the regional "prevalence of a special type of conflict…dubbed protracted social conflict. It is essentially multidimensional…The internal, religious, cultural and socio-economic factors become inextricable from interstate conflicts…The result is an interconnectedness and overlapping - rather than separation - between internal and international politics".[37]

The basic security implications of the "internal fragility" of the Arab state discussed in Korany's book coincide with the main focus of most early warning models developed for conflict

32 Korany et al. 1996.
33 Idem, p.6.
34 Idem p. 11.
35 Ibiden
36 Ayoob 1996.
37 Korany et al. 1996, p. 11.

prevention purposes. By contrast, "external vulnerability" - the other characteristic of regional states most relevant for international security - is usually considered less (if at all) by early warning models. Here again it can be argued that vulnerability to external pressures and dependence on the outside is typical of Third World regions (and small countries). However, the extent and nature of external vulnerability in the Mediterranean-Middle East is specific to this region: on the one hand, due to its unique endowment with strategic resources of global relevance (most notably energy), no other region in the contemporary world has experienced the same degree of foreign intervention and competition.[38] On the other hand, the reactions of Middle East and North Africa countries to external penetration have been particularly intense.[39] In other terms, while state fragility and external vulnerability are common features of Third World conflictuality, the way these ingredients combine in the MENA region is specific, especially as regards the incidence and nature of interstate conflicts.

Some light on the nature of interstate conflicts in the MENA region is provided by Aliboni and Miggiano in their Conflict and Its Sources in the Near East and North Africa.[40] Their arguments about the quality and patterns of conflict in the Near East and North Africa confirm Korany's findings, and expand the analysis in a conflict prevention perspective, stressing the role and incidence of different kinds (intra-state/interstate) and levels (underlying and proximate) of factors of conflict in the region. Aliboni and Miggiano's main arguments can be summarised as follows:

- In the post-Cold War period, patterns of conflict in the Near East and North Africa countries are similar to those observed globally, as far as the incidence and causes of domestic ("intra-state") conflict are concerned, but differ from global patterns as far as inter-state (international) conflict is concerned, because of a higher than average propensity to and persistence of international conflict.
- In the region, the main causes of domestic conflict derive from two underlying factors: structural fault lines in the "ethnic, religious and communitarian geography" and "weaknesses in nation- and democracy-building".
- The origins of inter-state conflicts, in ultimate analysis, go back to one main underlying cause "the existence of (three) unsolved national questions": the Palestinian question (with its cluster of associate Arab-Israel conflicts), the question of primacy in the Maghreb (symbolised by conflict over Western Sahara) and the question of Turkey's national and international identity (which irradiates over relations with Europe, the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia). (To these, I would add the Iraqi national question, with its reverberation on conflicts in the Gulf region).
- Some of the main interstate conflicts in the region, namely the Arab-Israeli and Western Saharan, are terminated but not solved: i.e. the prevailing political and military conditions prevent them from escalating, but they reverberate into intrastate conflicts (and could revert to violence under different conditions). The Iraqi question is neither solved nor terminated.
- Intrastate ethnic and religious conflicts (e.g. Islamist opposition vs. regime in Algeria and Egypt) "is not bound to translate in inter-state conflict and will hardly give way to international actions",

38   Morris 1993.
39   Binder 1964, Chapter 9.
40   Aliboni and Miggiano.

mainly because they will not bring about the failure or collapse of the state (as in Somalia), since regional states, in spite of their many weaknesses, are well "implanted" and consolidated. The conclusions reached by structural analysis of regional patterns of conflict are therefore that state fragility and external vulnerability specifically combine in the MENA to produce a high incidence and persistence of interstate conflicts. These theoretical findings are confirmed by the empirical observation of today's regional conflictuality, which is summarised in the "Survey of tensions and conflicts in the enlarged Mediterranean region" provided in Appendix 1.

In particular, the analysis of the survey confirms the high incidence of interstate conflicts in the MENA region and the necessity to target them through conflict prevention since:

- the large majority of the cases recorded (18 out of 25) are interstate conflicts (conflicts in which the main parties are states);
- in more than half of the cases recorded (13 out of the 25), conflicts are in a pre- or post-violent stage and therefore should be monitored through early warning and could benefit from preventive actions;
- the large majority of potential conflicts (11 out of 13) are inter-state tensions and disputes.

3. The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain

As argued above, a conflict prevention system for the Euro-Mediterranean area should operate on the basis of: (a) a political mandate and process; (b) dedicated resources[41]; (c) a formalised sequence of procedures. The focus of this section is on this formalised sequence, dubbed the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain.[42]

3.1 Reference models

Two recent works provide particularly useful models for the development of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain: Conflict Prognosis: the Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Cligendael";[43] and the Peace Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries: A Practical Guide, by the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)[44]. The relevance of these works is manifold: they build on a thorough survey of previous research and -to a lesser extent- of policy experience; they blend European and US approaches to conflict prevention; and last, and most relevant to our purposes, they are policy-oriented and the envisaged 'end user' is either the European Union (CPN), or one of its member countries (Cligendael).

The work by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International relations 'Cligendael' –elaborated on the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs- develops in detail an operational "conflict and policy assessment framework (CPAF)" to be used by the

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41 The content of the political mandate and the nature of the dedicated structures of an Euro-Med CPS linked to the EMP are analysed in part I of this report. See also Aliboni 2000.

42 This label is modelled on Krummenacher and Schmid's "early prevention chain" (as quoted in Van de Goor 1999, Appendix 2-VI).

43 This project, consisting of two parts (Van de Goor 1999 and 2000), is also reviewed in Appendix 3, § 2.2

44 Lund and Mehler 1999: this publication is a draft and its continuation was recently announced (see Atlantic News, n.3251, 5 dec. 2000, p. 3); this project is reviewed in Appendix 3 § 2.1

Dutch Foreign Ministry for the purposes of its development cooperation policies. The purpose is to provide a single and coherent framework to devise, implement and assess a conflict prevention strategy tailored for a specific potential conflict; the basic pillars of the CPAF are three format documents: the Conflict analysis paper, the Strategic policy paper and the Plan of Action.

The Conflict Prevention Network (CPN, established in 1997) is a network of European research institutes, NGOs and individual experts, commissioned to provide the European Commission and the European Parliament with analyses and policy options vis-à-vis potential conflicts. Michael Lund and Andreas Mehler developed the Practical Guide for the CPN on the request of the Directorate General VIII of the European Commission. The Guide is intended to provide "informed and practical guidance for policy-makers and administrators of the European Commission" to help them identify "what concrete measures exist and are likely to be effective in addressing the causes of conflict and problem areas that have been identified as significant in a particular country".[45]

As mentioned above, the different components of a conflict prevention system form a sequence (chain), and each main component is composed of different procedures and steps that may require specific tools, such as databases and format documents.[46] Figure 1 summarises the main components of the conflict prevention chain according to the Cligendael and CPN works. Looking at the two "chains" described in Figure 1, it appears that the two approaches are similar, but have some differences. Both Cligendael and CPN consider four main steps in the chain:

5 early warning and conflict analysis: to track a potential conflict and its characters;

6 policy analysis: to map the available response options and their implications;

7 policy planning and implementation: to translate options into practical actions;

8 impact assessment: to review the effects of preventive actions and feed results back into the chain.

As regards early warning, Cligendael's work offers detailed guidance incorporating the model developed by the Fund for Peace,[47] while in this respect the CPN's Guide offers only some broad guidelines (namely the basic concepts about causes and stages of conflict, and modalities of response).[48] As regards the following steps in the chain, both models offer useful insight for the development and implementation of preventive actions and, in spite of differences in terminology and focus, are quite similar in their approach. For instance, both models base the elaboration of policy options on a system of key linkages between "problem areas" and policy measures. However, the Cligendael model is more detailed and comprehensive, while the CPN provides a quick reference to the "toolbox" of response measures available to the EU, the most relevant "prevention actor" in our region of concern.

It is a combination and re-elaboration of these two models that provides the matrix of the conflict prevention chain envisaged for the Euro-Med CPS (described in Figure 2) and of the early warning tools to be used in that framework.

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45 Lund and Mehler 1999, p. 8.

46 This conceptualisation borrows from Cligendael's work (see Van de Goor 2000, figure 2.2 "A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework in Practice", p.12).

47 Baker and Weller 1998.

48 This concepts developed by Michael Lund are more detailed in other works (see Lund 1996 and Creative Associates 1998).

Figure 1: The Conflict Prevention Chain

Clingendael:

Mission Statement	→	Early Warning	→	Policy Analysis	→	Planning, Assessment Decision	→	Implementation

| Fund for Peace Model | | Five stages of policy and measures assessment (model and formats) | | | | Impact assessment monitoring |

| Conflict Analysis Paper | | Strategic Policy Paper | | Plan of Action |

CPN:

EU Mission Statements	→	Early Warning	→	Policy Analysis	→	Assessment and Decision	→	Implementation through EU sectorial policies

| Evaluation of stage, root causes and problem areas (no formal model) | | Identification of policy objectives and areas of intervention based on formal model | | Choice of measures associated to areas of intervention based on formal model |

Figure 2: Euro Med Prevention Chain

EMP Mission Statement	→	Early Warning	→	Policy Analysis	→	Policy Planning	→	Implementation
		↓		↓		↓		↓
		Country Conflict Profile		Identification of policy objectives and areas of inter - vention		Choice of measures associated to areas of intervention		Implementation through EMP sectorial policies
		↓		↓		↓		↓
		Conflict Prevention Background Paper		Strategic Policy Paper		Plan of Action		Impact Assessment Paper

3.2 Early Warning tools of the Euro-Med Chain

The Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain (see Figure 2) envisioned for the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention System is composed of four building blocks: early warning; policy analysis; policy planning; implementation and assessment. Each building block represents a phase in the process of conflict prevention and has a series of requirements, which include the use of formalised tools.

It may be useful to specify that formalised tools are not a whim of theory addicts: they are needed to optimise the use of the often scarce resources -time, funds, manpower and political will- available for conflict prevention. More in particular, the standardisation of evaluation procedures makes it possible to compare the requirements of different potential conflicts and the results of different conflict prevention actions: in the field of early warning this will, for example, mitigate the distortion effects of political proximity to (or remoteness from) a given conflict; in the field of impact assessment, standardisation allows for, among other things, systematic feedback of "lessons learned" into the prevention chain in order to refine or change procedures and tools.

However, for all their usefulness, the merits of formalised tools in conflict prevention (and political processes at large) should not be misunderstood: they should complement case by case qualitative analysis, planning and decision making, but cannot (and must not) substitute them. It is with this caveat in mind that I have striven to develop some "good enough" early warning tools.

Two main early warning tools have been designed for use in the Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Chain:
- The Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP) software (analysed in section four);
- The Conflict Prevention Background Paper (CPB) format (briefly described below).

The CCP provides systematic data collection and analysis about potential conflicts, while the CPB furthers conflict analysis and maps basic policy options. The sources of inspiration of the CPB format are manifold: FEWER's conflict analysis model,[49] Cligendael's 'Conflict analysis paper' and 'Strategic policy paper' formats and CPN's Guide system of correspondences between the EU's policy objectives and tools.

3.3 The Conflict Prevention Background Paper Format

The Conflict Prevention Background Paper (CPB) format is a short written document (ideally 3-4 pages) that builds on the CCP database to provide a basic assessment of an individual potential conflict and of the main policy options for its prevention. The purpose of the CPB format is to provide the key linkage between early warning and policy planning. The methodology of the CPB combines standardised inputs, mainly deriving from data provided by the CCP, with qualitative analysis provided in a narrative form. The blueprint of CPB format (still to be fully developed and tested) is given below. The CPB format is divided into two parts:

CPB Part I: Conflict Analysis
The first part should provide a concise analysis of the potential conflict singled out by the CCP, reviewing its structure and conjunctural situation through the following elements:
1 identification data of the potential conflict (data from CCP[50])
- name of conflict
- stage of conflict
- history stage (new, new phase etc.)
- main belligerents
- escalatory potential
- victims
2 concise history of potential conflict (narrative)
3 synopsis of sources of risk (data from CCP)
- by category
- by problem area
- by disputed issue
4 analysis of the problem areas and disputed issues (narrative)
5 list of the actors of conflict (data from CCP)
- by role (adversaries, allies, mediators...)
- by issue
6 analysis of nature, actions, and agenda of the actors of conflict (narrative).[51]

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49 FEWER 1999.
50 Our main reference here is the CCP database that will contain historical series of the Country Profiles; the CCP database (still to be developed) should be integrated (e.g. on history and denomination) with data provided by other compatible databases on conflicts such as the KOSIMO database http://www.kosimo.de (see Pfetsch and Rohloff 2000), and the A study of Crisis database (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, CD-ROM); see Appendix 3, § 3.

CPB Part II: Policy Background

The second part should map out the main policy options for preventive action by relating the data about the conflict described in the first part to: (a) the mission statements of the Euro-Med conflict prevention system (CPS) and (b) the Euro-Med CPS toolbox of preventive measures. The Policy Background should include the following elements:

7 Elements of mission statement(s) relevant by country, stage of conflict, or problem area involved (narrative)

8 List of most relevant areas of intervention and functional objectives according to the problem areas involved (synopsis: see table 1)

9 List of main tools available to the Euro-Med CPS:
- by area of intervention (synopsis)
- by stage of conflict (synopsis)

10 Analysis of the main policy options and instruments available (narrative).

51 See FEWER 1999.

Table 1: From Problem Areas to Functional Objectives. Synopsis of Correspondences

PROBLEM AREAS	AREAS OF INTERVENTION[1]	FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES[2]
Political	*Governance*	
Regime	Democratisation, good governance, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights	Political dialogue, capacity building, international incentives, dispute resolution
Institutions	Democratisation, civil society development, judicial & legal reform, human rights	Capacity building, monitoring & controlling, political dialogue
International relations	International organisations membership, democratisation, good governance, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights	International political dialogue, international incentives, capacity building, dispute resolution
Economic	*Economic setting*	
Economic stability	Good governance, economic reform, resource management	Capacity building, monitoring & controlling, international incentives
Living conditions	Economic development, poverty reduction, education, resource management	Capacity building, monitoring & controlling, political dialogue
Economic relations	Good governance, economic reform, investment patterns	Capacity building, dispute resolution, international incentives
Socio-cultural	*Socio-Cultural Development*	
Type of society	Democratisation, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights	Political dialogue, dispute resolution, capacity building, monitoring & controlling
Socio-demographic transition	Democratisation, civil society development, economic stability & reform, human rights	Capacity building, dispute resolution, international incentives
Culture and ideology	Democratisation, civil society development, education, media	Political dialogue, dispute resolution, capacity building
Cultural relations	Democratisation, civil society development, education, media	Capacity building, dispute resolution, international incentives
Security	*Security Structures*	
Role of security forces	Democratisation, civil society development, judicial & legal reform, human rights	monitoring & controlling, capacity building, political dialogue
Internal disputes	Migration & resettlement, resource management.	Dispute resolution, political dialogue
Strategic power	International organisations membership, arms control	monitoring & controlling, capacity building, political dialogue
International disputes	International organisations membership	Dispute resolution, political dialogue, monitoring & controlling
Victimisation		
injured & casualties	Humanitarian aid	
Refugees, endangered people	Humanitarian aid, migration & resettlement	

List of Functional Objectives Applied

Functional objectives are the main functional results that the preventive actions planned should try to reach, according to the analysis developed in the CPB paper. The five main objectives listed in table 1 may have a different orientation and content according to the problem areas in which they are applied. The list below suggests some of the potential sectorial aims that can be reached through different sets of practical measures (not listed here).

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1   The main source for this list is Clingendael 's list of "policy fields" (see Van de Goor and Verstegen 2000, p. 61).
2   This list elaborates on the CPN list of "areas of intervention" (see Lund and Mehler 1999, p.70-75).

1. Capacity building

Strengthening of political & public institutions
Elections (example of associated measures: voter registration, election observers)
Improvement of the performance of public services
Strengthening of professional standards
Access to basic needs and public services

2. Political dialogue

Awareness raising (example of associated measures: training on human rights for civil servants, army, police)
Stimulation of public debate
Re-establishment of trust & reconciliation
Creation of opportunities for dialogue
Demobilisation & reintegration

3. Dispute resolution

International mediation (by international organisations, concerned states or NGOs)
Strengthening of domestic dispute resolution mechanisms
Alternative (NGOs) dispute resolution

4. Monitoring and controlling

Arms proliferation control systems
Development of domestic systems of accountability (key fields: tax, corruption, human rights)

5. International incentives or sanctions

Economic aid (extension or withdrawal of)
Diplomatic support (extension or withdrawal of)

4.The Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP): Model and software[52]

The following paragraphs provide first a concise overview of the CCP, with a focus on its main functions and underlying conceptual assumptions, and then an assessment of the state of development of the CCP (prototype, testing program, future use). Here, the term "Country Conflict Profile (CCP)" is used comprehensively, to indicate both the underlying analytical model and its software application; when the description refers only to one of the two, this is explicitly mentioned.

4.1 An overview[53]

The Med Country Conflict Profile (CCP) is a computerised tool for the analysis of potential conflicts in the Mediterranean countries. The CCP was designed as the main building block of early warning in the Euro-Med conflict prevention chain (see section three above), although much of its content and methodology is relevant to other countries and users of concern and can be used independently of the Euro-med CPS.

The principal aim of the CCP is to single out the sources of risk and the stage of development of potential conflicts involving the non-EU Mediterranean countries of the EMP.[54] To this end, the CCP works through standardised mechanisms of evaluation of conflictuality, based on the values attributed to a list of indicators covering the main components of the country-system. The CCP analyses the underlying structure of conflictuality of a given country-system and its medium term (6 months to 1 year) modifications.

The data produced by CCP can be used for background monitoring, through databases (of the individual countries and the region as a whole), as well as to provide the basic inputs for conflict analysis and policy planning (for instance through the CPB format described above). Used in the framework of a conflict prevention system (as defined above), in conjunction with other practical tools, the CCP can be usefully applied for both long-term and short-term conflict prevention; if used alone, the CCP is best applied to long-term structural conflict prevention.

4.1.1 CCP: Main features[55]

As its name suggests, the CCP is centred on two elements: country and potential conflictuality. Each Country Profile is structured in two parts:
1. Questionnaire (data input);
2. Assessment (data output);
(1) The Questionnaire part consists of a list of indicators (see Appendix 2),[56] which appear as questions about the potential conflictuality of the country considered (indicators are negative,

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52   The Country Conflict Profile model and software were developed for the IAI by this author with the assistance throughout of Daniela Pioppi; software engineering was by I.Soft (Rome, Italy).
53   For a full description of the CCP software, see The CCP Handbook (Guazzone and Pioppi 2001a).
54   Non-EU countries participating in the EMP are the seven Mediterranean Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), plus Palestinian National Authority, Israel, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
55   Terms underlined are defined in the CCP Glossary (see Guazzone and Pioppi 2001a).
56   The CCP list of indicators elaborates on a number of existing lists and namely on PIOOM's Domestic Conflict Escalation Early Warning Indicators in A. P. Schmid (1996), PIOOM Master List of Potential and 'Good Prospect' Domestic Conflict (De-)Escalation Indicators, Leiden, PIOOM.

conflict prone factors, used as predictors or signals of potential conflict). In the CCP, indicators are distinguished according to: categories (political, economic, socio-cultural, security), levels (underlying factors, root causes, triggering events) and problem areas (regime, international relations, economic stability, etc.) The questionnaire requires the input of information about each indicator, assessing it in three fields: activation (is this factor active or not as a cause of conflictuality?), intensity (what is the relative weight of this cause of conflictuality on a 1-5 scale?), and actors (what states, groups or organisations are associated to this factor? in what role?); data input is facilitated by pop-up memos that help to interpret the issues involved. Figure 3 shows a page in the Questionnaire (Egypt 2000).

(2) In the Assessment part, statistical elaboration of the data associated with the indicators allows for various quantitative and qualitative assessments. The CCP assesses four main parameters of potential conflictuality:

- Risk: indicating the overall propensity to violent conflict;
- Vulnerability: considering the likelihood of the eruption of a violent conflict in the short term (6 months to one year);
- Sources of risk: identifying the functional areas most vulnerable to conflictuality because of structural weaknesses or specific ongoing tensions;
- Actors of conflict: involved with different roles in the set of tensions and disputes that constitutes a conflict potential.

The CCP assessment part allows for queries about specific aspects of potential conflictuality. Queries by country are carried out on all data and assess the characteristics of the country conflict potential. In the CCP software, queries by country are listed under Country Assessment.

Queries by conflict assess the characteristics of a single potential conflict and are carried out on data associating the profiled country and a given adversary actor. In the CCP software, queries by conflict are listed under Potential Conflict Assessment.

Figure 4 shows the home page of the CCP assessment section (Egypt 2000) and gives an overview of the queries that can be elaborated through it. A sample of data elaborated through the CCP is given in charts 1 to 3. (Data used in charts 1-3 derive from the Country Profiles developed by a team of the Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy: see § 4.1.4 below).

Chart 1 compares the evolution of the conflict potential of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco over the 1991-2000 period.

Chart 2 shows the sources of risk by category (i.e. by country's sector) of Egypt (chart 2 a) and Jordan (chart 2b) in the 1991-2000 period.

Chart 3 (a-d) shows the sources of risk by problem areas of Egypt in the same period of time (problem areas of the political category chart 3a; problem areas of the economic category chart 3b; problem areas of the socio-cultural category chart 3c; problem areas of the security category chart 3d).

**Figure 3: CCP Questionnaire (Data Input) – Egypt 2000**

Figure 4: CCP Assessment (Data Output) - Egypt 2000

4.1.2 CCP: Criteria and mechanisms

The CCP is based on a series of general criteria: the conceptual basis and main references for criteria about the patterns of international conflict, the aims of conflict prevention, and the mechanisms available for early warning are analysed in sections one and two above. There are however other criteria underlying the CCP model: some are broad and relate to the basic tenets of political science (e.g. the notion of 'country-system'), international relations (e.g. the role of perceptions in foreign policy behaviour) or security studies (e.g. the dynamics of arm races); other concepts are more specific (e.g. phases in the conflict life-cycle and their relation to violence thresholds). This author's assumptions for each of these criteria have somehow been translated into (or adapted to) software mechanisms. The following paragraphs give a sample of some of these correspondences between concepts, assumptions and software mechanisms. (More technical aspects, such as the mathematics behind the assessment part, are considered only incidentally.)

- The emphasis of the CCP model on interstate conflict is reflected at various levels. To give an example, it is reflected in the choice of indicators through: (1) the inclusion of a category of indicators labelled "security", which regroups and details factors typical of interstate conflict (e.g. disputed borders); (2) the inclusion of a problem area about "international relations" in each of the four categories of indicators considered (political, economic, socio-cultural and security). The focus on interstate conflict is also reflected in the assessment mechanisms: (3) each active indicator bears equal weight in the statistics on which the assessments described above are based, but the model includes a great number of indicators relating to factors typical of interstate conflict; (4) also, each category of indicators - security, political, social-cultural and economic - participates equally in the statistics, but according to the assumed difference in their relevance for interstate conflict, categories, areas and levels include a different number of indicators: thus, in the final analysis, security, political, social-cultural and economic indicators weigh differently, in descending order.

- The choice of indicators gives emphasis to causes of conflictuality which are deemed more (or less) important in the North Africa and Middle East countries. Thus, contrary to other early warning models, which focus on specific patterns of internal conflict (such as human rights violations or state failure) and specifically target certain problem areas, such as the fractured communal structure of society, the CCP model always considers ethnic or religious issues as component parts of broader political, cultural or security problem areas. In other words, ethnic or religious diversity is not listed as a distinct problem area, but is dealt with through specific indicators in relevant problem areas (e.g. among political indicators, in the problem area "type of regime" or in the socio-cultural indicators, in the problem area "culture and ideology"). Conversely, the CCP model emphasises - through a number of dedicated indicators - other factors for their assumed relevance in the specific regional context: these are, for instance, the historical legacies of the Islamic (especially the Ottoman) empires and the colonial experience, which are detailed through a number of underlying political, cultural and security indicators. Also, analysts using the CCP are advised to evaluate the intensity of each indicator (which assesses the relative weight of a specific conflict factor on a 1-5 scale) keeping in mind not just the profiled country, but also the regional context; (i.e. considering the weight of same indicator in other regional countries).

- Country-system and problem areas : like most early warning models, the CCP adopts the country-system as the framework of the early warning analysis. The country-system is represented in its

components parts and dynamic processes through the indicators: the four categories of indicators considered – political, economic, socio-cultural, security - separate the different spheres of the country on a functional basis, while the different kinds of indicators (structural, root and trigger) corresponds to the different level of analysis of country's dynamics seen in an historical perspective.[57]

In the CCP perspective, the country-system concept stresses the interdependence and yet the autonomy of component parts: interdependence within the system is mirrored in the concept of "conflict potential" (see below), while the relative autonomy of the conflictual dynamics taking places in different sectors/levels of the system translates into the concept of "problem areas". The combined assessment of these two interrelated aspects is a crucial linkage to response analysis: response measures should target problem areas differently according to the overall conflict potential.

The CCP <u>Country Conflict Potential</u> indicates the overall intensity of the country's propensity to internal and external conflict; this potential is ranked on a three-level scale as high, medium, low, according to the average intensity totalled on all active conflict indicators, plus a complexity premium associated to the percentage of active indicators on the total of indicators (it is assumed that a high number of distinct tensions/disputes involving the same country has a cumulative effect and enhances the country's propensity to conflict); the country conflict potential does not necessarily indicate the more or less aggressive "nature" of the country's regime and society; instead it indicates the likelihood of political tensions escalating into violent conflicts, because of the concomitance of a high (or low) number of factors of conflict, such as an unfavourable historical legacy, a hostile international environment, an irredentist political culture or the lack of appropriate mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The <u>Sources of Risk queries</u>, developed through the assessment part of the CCP (see above), analyse the country conflict potential in its component parts to highlight the fault lines of the country-system. It singles out the sectors (i.e. categories) of the country's life and activities most vulnerable to conflictuality because of structural weakness or specific ongoing tensions; sources of risk can emanate from policies and structures in the political, economic, social-cultural and security sectors. Once singled out, the main sources of risk can be analysed by problem area (e.g. economic stability), and with regard to a single issue (e.g. decline of foreign aid, tense bilateral relations), and/or to a single actor associated. These data make it possible to target preventive actions in the most risky sectors/areas/issues (or, according to policy choices, in less sensitive, but still relevant areas).

- Stages of conflict and levels of violence: in addition to assessing the conflict potential of the country-system, the CCP can be used to assess the characteristics of individual potential conflicts involving the country considered in a given profile. The more general of the queries by conflict (see above) assesses the stage of the potential conflict detected. In line with the concept of conflict prevention adopted, the three stages considered in the CCP are pre-violent stages, that is they are not characterised by armed violence, however they do not exclude some casualties and victims:

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57 This typology of indicators, adopted by many authors for early warning purposes, corresponds to the hierarchical distinction between "structure, conjuncture and event" adopted by historians and sociologists alike to analyse social processes (see for instance Braudel 1977 and Tilly 1981)

(1) Political tension refers to an apparent, although often undeclared, degree of tension between the country of the profile and the adversary actor(s); the object of the dispute is limited and still largely controlled by political means; it might also refer to previous crises successfully managed and/or repressed by the regime;

(2) Political dispute refers to an open, declared dispute between the country of the profile and the adversary(s); it might entail some degree of violence (assumedly between 1-30 casualties). Political means of conflict resolutions might at this stage fail to have a positive effect and the conflict might degenerate into a crisis or worse.

(3) Crisis refers to tense confrontation not yet escalated into a full blown armed conflict; it might entail deployment of armed forces and significant violence (assumedly 30-100 casualties).

The CCP three stages of potential conflict are characterised by the overall intensity of the political tensions and disputes, not by the level of violence or material damage. Violence is however considered in the CCP through a separate category of indicators ("victims"), which does not consider only casualties (battle-related or not), but also endangered populations (refugees and others). The tentative choice of these mechanisms relating to stages of (pre-) conflict and levels of violence touches a key and much debated point in early warning theory.[58] Violence is clearly a key determinant of conflict escalation and often the main trigger of conflict prevention actions, however trying to establish any mechanical relation between levels of violence and response risks would be highly misleading, because the same level of violence (and material damage) can impact differently on different countries, for instance because of the different size of the population and the economy.

There are, of course, a number of other assumptions underlying the workings of the CCP: some are detailed in the CCP Handbook, others become self-explanatory when using the CCP software. In any case, the structure of the model and, to some extent, of the prototype software[59] itself, has been designed to allow a certain degree of flexibility: for instance, the number, content and distribution of the indicators can be changed without prejudice to the overall working of the CCP; this will enable a progressive fine-tuning, as the database is tested and some of the initial choices are revised or reconsidered.

4.1.3 CCP: Progress Report

Research on the CCP has now passed the initial development stage and is approaching the operational phase. The following phases have already been completed: 1) design of the software prototype (CCP 1st release); 2) trial testing and second release of the prototype (CCP 2nd release); 3) testing program carried out jointly by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy; 4) Agenda for Improvement of the CCP. The next steps envisaged are: 5) the development of a new CCP software to be used through a dedicated website; 6) the development of a CCP database, recording the patterns of conflict in the Euro-Mediterranean region in the last two decades and monitoring their evolution on a (tentatively) bi-monthly base.

The development of a web version of the CCP and the creation of a CCP database are designed to provide a hub for the network of NGOs working on early prevention in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

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58 The relationship between levels of violence and types of conflict is a moot point in conflict research, resulting in sometimes substantial differences in the evaluation of global trends (see Jongman 2000, p.2).
59 The CCP prototype is an Access 1997 application (see Guazzone and Pioppi 2001b).

CHARTS
Sample of Data Elaborated by the CCP Software

Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi

Chart 1
Conflict Potential of Morocco, Egypt and Jordan in 1991, 1995 and 2000

See Part II § 4.1.2

Chart 2 (a)
Sources of Risk by Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000

Risk

0=null
1=low
2=medium
3=high

Year

See Part II § 4.1.2 (Sources of Risk Queries) and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 2 (b)
Sources of Risk by Category
Jordan 1991, 1995, 2000

Risk

0=null
1=low
2=medium
3=high

Year

Legend: Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Security

See Part II § 4.1.2. (Sources of Risk Queries) and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (a)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Political Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000

Institutions
International Relations
Regime

Risk

0=null
1=low
2=medium
3=high

Year

1991   1995   2000

See Part II § 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (b)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Economic Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000

Legend:
- Economic Relations
- Economic Stability
- Living Conditions

Risk

0=null
1=low
2=medium
3=high

Year

See Part II § 4.1.1 - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (c)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Socio-cultural Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000

□ Type of Society
▦ Cultural Relations
■ Cultural Identity
□ Socio-demographic Transition

Risk

0=null
1=low
2=medium
3=high

Year

1991   1995   2000

3   2   1   0

See Part II § 4.1.1. - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

Chart 3 (d)
Sources of Risk by Problem Areas
Security Category
Egypt 1991, 1995, 2000

Legend:
- □ Role of Security Forces
- □ Strategic Power
- ▨ Internal Disputes
- ■ International Disputes

Risk

0=null
1=low
2=medium
3=high

Year

See Part II § 4.1.1. - 4.1.2 and Appendix 2 (List of Indicators)

APPENDIX 1
A Survey of Tensions and Conflicts in the Enlarged Mediterranean Region[1]

Daniela Pioppi

1. Definition of area

This review focuses on the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean areas encompassed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). However, other adjoining regions are considered due to the influence they exert on the area of the EMP from a conflict analysis perspective. In particular, the review includes the following countries: *Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen.*

2. Definition of tension/ violent conflict

This review considers violent conflict following the Uppsala University's definition of armed conflict,[2] i.e. 'a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties (or more), of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility'.

However, to keep a 'conflict prevention' perspective in tune with the CCP project,[3] the review will also consider situations of tension, that is to say a contested incompatibility where the use of force between two or more parties has occurred in the past and/or could not be excluded in the future.

In order to consider both situations (conflict and tension) the review will utilise two measures of intensity. The first, following the Uppsala University definition, is quantitative and rests on the number of battle-related deaths per conflict:[4]

minor armed conflict (less than 25 battle-related deaths per year); *intermediate armed conflict* (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but less than 1,000 death per year); war (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year); *major armed conflict* (includes the two most severe levels of conflict, i.e. intermediate armed conflict or war). The second measure adopted is qualitative and indicates the position of the given conflict in the conflict life-cycle: *cold peace, tense peace, unstable peace, low-conflict, quasi-crisis, crisis, war.*[5] The first three stages are non violent situations of political tension (potential conflicts), while the remaining four are characterised by growing levels of armed violence (open conflicts).

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1 Updated June 2001
2 Sollemberg 1998, p. 21.
3 This review covers potential and open conflict and does not use the same terminology of the CCP model, which is focused on 'potential conflict' (the CCP model considers three stages of potential conflict: 'Political Tension, Political Dispute, and Crisis).
4 Sollemberg 1998.
5 This is an elaborated version of Lund's categories (Lund 1996) adopted by Guazzone (Guazzone 2000).

3. Chronology

The review briefly considers the main stages or events in the evolution of the conflict/tension starting approximately from the last two decades.

4. 'Underlying factors' and 'root causes' [6]

In this review 'underlying factors' are considered as being those factors which, although they are not prevalent causes of conflict, are nevertheless important in understanding the situation, or can be considered as 'prerequisites' to the escalation of violence. In particular, the underlying factors mentioned by the review are:
colonial legacies (state formation, boundaries); *uneven development* or *economic crisis; a larger conflict in which the specific conflict under analysis should be placed* (i.e. Cyprus and the Turkish-Greek conflict); *external involvement* (when it is not the direct cause of conflict); *ethnic geography/nation state;*
Root causes of conflict are:
sovereignty (disputed sovereignty of a state over a territory or a population); *territory* (conflict over the control of a territory-s); *legitimacy* (incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of central government or change in its composition); *state structures* (incompatibility arising from the way the state is organised, structured or exclusionary nationalist policies); *ethnic factor; natural resources* (disputes over the control of natural resources); *international involvement; economic problems or harshness.* (Some of the categories used as prevalent causes could become underlying factors when they are relevant but not the direct cause of conflict).

5. Definition of main actors/parties

Main actors/parties of a conflict/tension can be other states, internal or external opposition organisations, ethnic groups, international institutions, and so on.

6. Main sources of the review

Brown M. (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,* The MIT Press, Cambridge - Massachusetts, London - England.
Guazzone L. (2000), 'Who Needs Conflict Prevention in the Mediterranean?', *The International Spectator,* vol. XXXV, no.1, January-March.
IISS, *Strategic Comments*
Keesing's, *Record of World Events.*

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6   Here again the terminology of the survey does not concide with that adopted in the CCP model, but it is compatible with it (see section two).

Lund M. (1996), *Preventing Violent Conflict. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy,* USIP Press, Washington, D.C.

Middle East Contemporary Survey, The Moshe Dayan Center, Westview Press.

Miggiano P, Aliboni R. (1999), *Conflict and its Sources in the Near East and North Africa: A Conflict-prevention Perspective,* Al -Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Strategic Papers n. 81, Cairo.

Sollenberg M. eds, *States in Armed Conflict 1998*, Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 54.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press.

Joffé G. (1994), State Boundaries in the Middle East and Arab World, Paper presented at the Conference 'Global Interdependence and the Future of the Middle East', Rome, November 7-8.

	Main party	Other party	Root cause-s	Underlying factor-s	Chronology (80s-2000)	Intensity (Lund)	Intensity (Uppsala)
1	Algeria	Fis/Gia[1]	legitimacy structures /state	uneven development/ economic crisis	1992 military coup/ banning of Fis. 1993-98 the conflict escalates to full scale war. 1999 beginning of a process of 'civil concord' with a referendum. 2000 violence continues. 2001 rioting and unrest in the north-eastern region of Kabylia and in Algiers.	crisis	major armed conflict
2	Republic of Cyprus	Turkish Republic of Cyprus	territory; ethnic factors	see Turkey-Greece conflict	1974 Turkish intervention and de facto partition of the island. 1997-98 Republic of Cyprus starts negotiation with the EU for inclusion. 1999 the situation improves when Turkey is accepted as EU membership candidate following an improvement of Greece-Turkey relations.	low conflict	minor armed conflict
3	Egypt	Islamic opposition	legitimacy	uneven development	1981 murdering of Sadat. Mubarak comes to power. 1990s the confrontation between the Islamic opposition and the regime escalates with various terrorist attacks - also to foreign tourists - and the use of the army by the regime. 2000 the Islamic opposition is successfully repressed by the regime and appears to be more and more incapable of presenting a real alternative to government politics and economic reforms.	low conflict	minor armed conflict
4	Egypt	Israel	sovereignty		1978-82 Camp David and normalisation process between the two countries. 1993 Middle East Peace Process. 1996 Netanyahu government. The Middle East peace process is stalled. 1999 Barak government gives a new push to the peace process. 2000-2001 breakdown of the Oslo process and new Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories. 2001 Ariel Sharon wins elections.	cold peace	
5	Egypt	Sudan	territory; government legitimacy	see Sudan-NDA conflict	1989 NIF[2] coup d'etat in Sudan - Egypt is not favourable to the new Islamic government. 1992 Egypt assert its claim to the Hala'ib Triangle. 1992-95 clashes at the borders. Egypt occupies the disputed territory.	crisis	minor armed conflict
6	Iran	Mujahidin al-Khalq	legitimacy		1970-78 Mujahidin al-Khalq start activity as an opposition organisation to the Shah government. 1978-79 Islamic Revolution. 1980-90 the Mujahidin al-Khalq are successfully repressed by the Islamic government. 1991-1993 popular riots and terrorists attacks are claimed by the Mujahidin al-Khalq. 1997 Khatami wins presidential elections, it is the beginning of a period of reforms. 2001 Khatami wins elections and is confirmed for the second term.	unstable peace	

[1] Front Islamique du Salut/Groupe Islamique Armée
[2] National Islamic Front

Main party	Other party	Root cause-s	Underlying factor-s	Chronology (80s-2000)	Intensity (Lund)	Intensity (Uppsala)
7	Iran	United Arab Emirates	territory	legitimacy	Disputes over islands in the Persian Gulf (Lesser Tumb and Greater Tumb, Abu Musa). 1997 in Iran Khatami wins presidential elections and starts a normalisation process. 2001 in Iran Khatami is confirmed for the second term.	unstable peace	
8	Iran	US-Israel	legitimacy (Us and Israel vs. Iran), sovereignty (Iran vs. Israel)		1978-79 Islamic Revolution – American hostages. 1997 Khatami wins elections. 2001 Khatami wins elections and is confirmed for the second term.	unstable peace	
9	Iran	Iraq	territory, legitimacy	external involvement	1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran. 1980 Iraq attacks Iran. 1988 end of the war. 1990-1991 Second Gulf War and UN embargo against Iraq. 1992-2001 Iran and Iraq slowly restore diplomatic relations but are still trying to work out written agreements settling outstanding disputes (border demarcation, prisoners of war, freedom of navigation, sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab).	tense peace	
10	Iraq	Kurdish minority	ethnic factors, state sovereignty, structures	ethnic geography/ nation-state; external involvement	1980s Kurdish tribes' rebellion against Sunni central government. 1988 violent repression from Baghdad. 1990-1991 Second Gulf War. Allied establishment of a no-fly zone in the North of Iraq, and 'operation provide comfort' to protect the Kurdish-Iraqi population. 1992-94 US attempts to create an autonomous Kurdish government in North Iraq. Clashes between the Puk and Kdp[3]. Turkey intervenes various times in Iraqi territory against Pkk bases.	crisis	major armed conflict
11	Iraq	Shia community (SAIRI[4])	legitimacy, factors	ethnic	1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Shia community rebels against the Sunni government. It is violently repressed. 1990-1991 Second Gulf War. 1991-1992 intensification of riots followed by central government repression. A no-fly zone is established in the South allegedly to protect Shia population.	unstable peace	
12	Iraq	US-GB	Iraqi compliance to the disarmament programme; legitimacy		dec. 1998-2000 a controversial military action is taken by the US and GB in response to Iraqi refusal to fully comply with its obligations under security council resolutions. Since then occasional bombing is carried out by US and UK air force. Dec. 1999 a new commission is set up by the UN (UNMOVIC[5]). Iraqi authorities react in an ambivalent way towards the new UN commission.	crisis	Intermediate conflict
13	Iraq	Kuwait	territory	colonial legacies; economic indebtedness	1990 Iraq invades Kuwait. 1992 The UNIKBDC[6] announce its demarcation of the borders between the two countries. 2000 the problem remains of Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf (Warba and Bubiyan island).	low-conflict	

[3] Patriotic Union of Kurdistan/ Kurdistan Democratic Party
[4] Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
[5] UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
[6] UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission

	Main party	Other party	Root cause-s	Underlying factor-s	Chronology (80s-2000)	Intensity (Lund)	Intensity (Uppsala)
14	Israel	Jordan	sovereignty; territory		1994 peace agreements between Jordan and Israel. 1996 The Netanyahu government puts in question a number of previous agreed matters and leaves the final status in a limbo. 1999 Barak wins elections in Israel. 2000-2001 breakdown of the Oslo process and new Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories. 2001 Sharon wins elections. The conflict escalates.	tense peace	
15	Israel	Lebanon	territory, sovereignty	see Israel-Syria conflict	1975 -1989 civil war in Lebanon 1978-82 Israeli occupation of Lebanon to Beirut (1982), 1985 Israel unilaterally withdraws from Lebanon, but maintains a 'security zone' on the Lebanese side of the frontier. The Shia Hezbollah in South Lebanon starts guerrilla activities against Israel. 2000 After the failure of the peace talks with Syria, Barak decides to withdraw unilaterally from the security zone in South Lebanon. 2001 the breakdown of Oslo process, the al-Aqsa Intifada in the occupied territories and the new government of Ariel Sharon bring new tension between the two countries. Hezbollah in South Lebanon resume guerrilla activities.	quasi-crisis	major armed conflict
16	Israel	Palestinians	sovereignty		1987-1991 Intifada 1991 Madrid Conference 1993 the Middle east Peace Process begins 1996 Netanyahu wins elections in Israel. The Peace process is stalled. 1999 Barak wins the elections in Israel and gives a new push to the peace process. 2000 Barak and Arafat fail to reach an agreement on the final status at Camp David. New Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories. 2001 Ariel Sharon wins elections in Israel, the conflict escalates.	crisis	major armed conflict
17	Israel	Syria	territory; sovereignty		1975-89 Civil war in Lebanon with Israeli and Syrian involvement. In 1985 Israel withdraws from Lebanon except the security zone. Syria (with Iran) supports Hezbollah guerrilla. 1993 Middle East Peace Process. Peace talks between Syria and Israel. 1996 Netanyahu wins elections, peace talks are interrupted. 1999 Peace talks resume following Barak elections, but fail to reach an agreed solution. 2000 Israel unilaterally withdraws from the security zone in South Lebanon. 2000 Breakdown of the Oslo Process and new Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in the occupied territories.	Crisis	Major armed conflict

	Main party	Other party	Root cause-s	Underlying factor-s	Chronology (80s-2000)	Intensity (Lund)	Intensity (Uppsala)
					2001 Ariel Sharon wins elections in Israel. Israel hits Syrian military in Lebanon.		
18	Libya	US	legitimacy	.	1980s US-Libyan relations worsen 1986 US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. 1988 alleged Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie case. US/UN sanctions against Libya. 1999 Libya hands over the two suspects to an extra-territorial Scottish court at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands and shows a more open international approach. 2001 one of the two Libyan defendants is found guilty and the other aquitted the issue is renewed. 2001 Libya and the US have not re-established official relations.	low conflict	
19	Morocco	Sahrawi-Algeria	sovereignty	colonial legacies; natural resources	1991 UN resolution for a referendum and establishment of a UN presence in Western Sahara (MINURSO[7]). The peace plan is accepted by Morocco and POLISARIO.[8] 1992 Algeria and Morocco sign the Convention on the demarcation of their common borders. Although Algeria still contests Morocco's sovereignty in Western Sahara. 1992-2001 the referendum on self-determination is postponed over and over. 2001 new plan of the UN criticised by both Algeria and the POLISARIO for being pro-Morocco and for passing up the promised referendum.	tense peace	
20	Sudan	NDA[9]	sovereignty; legitimacy; natural resources; ethnic factor	colonial legacies; uneven development; external involvement	1983-85 Sudan's second civil war commences notwithstanding the peace treaty of 1972 which granted a more autonomous status to the South. Nimeiri government introduces Islamic laws. 1986-89 new elections, Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes new Prime Minister. The NIF of Hassan al-Turabi becomes more and more powerful. 1989 a military coup, backed by the NIF, brings to power al-Bashir. 1990-2000 war with the South continues with the NDA, largest opposition group comprising the SPLM/A[10] of John Garang, been backed by external actors (Eritrea, Etiopia, Uganda, Egypt).	war	major armed conflict
21	Turkey	Syria	ethnic factors, territory (Hatay or Iskanderum)	see conflict Iraq-Syria-Turkey/ Syria-Israel	1980s PKK[11] launches military operation in Turkey from the Syrian territory. Damascus shelters Ocalan, the PKK leader. 1996 Turkey and Israel agree to military co-operation. Sept. 1998 Turkey masses 10,000 troops on the border with Syria and threatens Damascus with military action unless it expels Ocalan. Oct. 1998 Syria expels Ocalan.	unstable peace	
22	Turkey	Syria-Iraq	natural resources (water)		1990 Turkey starts the Gap[12] project: a system of control and utilisation of the Euphrates' water in Kurdish areas. Both Iraq and Syria are concerned for the reduction in quality and quantity of the river's water. 2001 Although the parties involved reached temporary agreements, a final agreement has not been signed yet. The general political situation of the region (the renewed Israeli-Palistinian conflict), bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria, and the situation in Iraq do not ease the matter.	tense peace	

[7] UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
[8] Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro
[9] National Democratic Alliance
[10] Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army
[11] Kurdish Workers Party
[12] Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (South-East Anatolia project)

	Main party	Other party	Root cause-s	Underlying factor-s	Chronology (80s-2000)	Intensity (Lund)	Intensity (Uppsala)
23	Turkey	Kurdish minority	ethnic factor, state structures	uneven development	1984 the PKK starts its guerrilla warfare in South East Anatolia. 1991-94 PKK activities reach a peak, establishing a de facto control over large parts of south-east Turkey. 1994-98 Turkey's securities forces begin to regain control, pushing the PKK towards the mountains and Iraqi territory. 1998 Syria expels Ocalan. 1999 Ocalan is captured by Turkey.	cold peace	Major armed conflict
24	Turkey	Greece	territory; ethnic factors	colonial legacies	1980s -90s Greece and Turkey come various times near a crisis. Greece puts its veto to allocation of European funds to Turkey and to the Turkish candidacy to the EU. 1996 the new Greek government (Costas Simitis) starts gradually a less nationalist approach towards Turkey. After the brief Cyprus crisis in 1997-98, the two countries seem to start a slow rapprochement. The events of the Ocalan capture and the acceptance of Turkey as candidate country to the EU (1999) contribute to this rapproachment.	tense peace	
25	Yemen	Saudi Arabia	territory		1994 South Yemen attempts to break away from the newly formed union of Yemen supported by Saudi Arabia. The North successfully acts to crush the secession. In late 1994 Saudi troops move in the Asir province, already contested by Sana'a and Riyadh in the 1930s. In 1995 fighting was renewed along the Saudi-Yemeni border and there were reports of Riyadh claim to a permanent lease of a strip of land running through Yemeni territory from the Saudi border to the Indian Ocean along the border with Oman. 1995 a memorandum of understanding is reached between Riyadh and Sana'a and a Commission is nominated to settle territory disputes. However the situation remains tense.	unstable peace	

APPENDIX 2
List of Indicators[1]

Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi

POLITICAL INDICATORS

Underlying Factors

Regime

1) Unfavourable legacies of previous political regime

International relations

2) Unfavourable position in the international system
3) Unfavourable position in the regional system

Root Causes

Regime

4) Authoritarian regime
5) Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House)[2]
6) Regime is controlled by a communal (religious or ethnic) group
7) Legitimacy deficit of government /regime
8) Instability of the regime
9) Ongoing regime transition
10) Detrimental political leaders personality

Institutions

11) Lacking or ineffective legal framework
12) Repressive or discriminatory legal system
13) Ineffective governance

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1   The CCP list of indicators elaborates on a number of existing lists and namely on PIOOM's Domestic Conflict Escalation Early Warning Indicators in A. P. Schmid (1996), PIOOM Master List of Potential and 'Good Prospect' Domestic Conflict (De-)Escalation Indicators, Leiden, PIOOM. Each indicator is associated in the CCP software to an explanatory note (including examples and/or details) to help the analyst to understand and assess it.
2   Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondences are: average score 1-2 = null; average score 2-3 = intensity 1; average score 3-4 = intensity 2; average score 4-5 = intensity 3; average score 5-6 = intensity 4; average score 6-7 = intensity 5.

International Relations

14) External pressures to adopt international standards
15) Uncooperative foreign policy behaviour
16) Detrimental external actor(s)'s political interventions
17) Troublesome country's political intervention abroad
18) Detrimental external actor(s)'s policy of mediation
19) Troublesome country's international political alliances
20) Tense bilateral relations

Triggering Events

Regime

21) Separatists declare independence
22) Attempted/ successful coup d'etat
23) Breakdown of internal peace negotiations/peace accord
24) Opposition establishes government in exile
25) (Attempted) assassination of political leader
26) Political power passes to the military

Institutions

27) State of emergency is introduced
28) Sudden deterioration of the capacity of public services to provide basic needs

International relations

29) Hostile foreign policy behaviour
30) Aggressive foreign policy behaviour
31) Hostile foreign policy behaviour against country
32) Aggressive foreign policy behaviour against country
33) Breakdown of international mediation
34) Breakdown of external peace negotiations/peace accord

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Underlying Factors

Economic stability

35) Poor geographical features
36) Scarce natural resources

Economic relations

37) Unfavourable position in the international economy
38) Unfavourable position in the regional economy

Root Causes

Economic stability

39) Negative structural indicators
40) Negative macro-economic indicators

Living conditions

41) Human development index, UNDP[3]
42) Large income inequalities (gini index)[4]
43) Decline of the economy (last 5 years)
44) Economic transition

Economic relations

45) High external economic vulnerability
46) Low degree of economic openness and trade
47) Tense economic bilateral relations

Triggering Events

Economic stability

48) Presence of current risk indicators

Living conditions

49) Sharp decline of the economy (last 6 months)
50) Sharp worsening of environmental conditions

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3   Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondence is: score 0.9-0.8 = nul (high human development); Score 0.8-0.6 = intensity 1 (medium human development); score 0.6-0.5 = intensity 2 (all developing countries); score 0.5-0.4 = intensity 3 (least developed countries); score 0.4-0.3 = intensity 4 (very low human development); score below 0.3 = intensity 5 (alert situation).
4   Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondence is: score 0-35 = nul; score 35-40 = intensity 1; score 40-50 = intensity 2; score 50-60 = intensity 3 score 60-70 = intensity 4; over 70 = intensity 5.

Economic relations

51) Hostile foreign economic policy
52) Aggressive foreign economic policy
53) Hostile foreign economic policy against country
54) Aggressive foreign economic policy against country
55) Economic boycott/sanctions/embargo imposed against country
56) Marked decline in international economic aid
57) International economic crisis with a negative impact on country economy
58) Detrimental external actor(s)'s policy of mediation
59) Detrimental external actor(s)'s political interventions in economic dispute
60) Debt crisis

SOCIO-CULTURAL INDICATORS

Underlying Factors

Type of society

61) Rapid social modernisation
62) History of fighting among communa[5] groups

Culture and ideology

63) History of cultural (religious, linguistic, etc.) diversity among population
64) Late/ traumatic modernisation

Cultural relations

65) History of discrimination in the international system

Root Causes

Type of society

66) High degree of communal diversity
67) One sizeable group has dominant/ sub-servient position within society
68) Great social inequalities coincide with communal divisions
69) Communal groups are concentrated in specific parts of the country
70) Population age distribution shows relatively large age cohort 15-29 (youth bulge)
71) Gender discrimination (GDI index, UNDP)[5]
72) Manifest signs of cultural (religion, language) exclusion/ oppression

---

5   Indicators referring to a specific index (e.g. Freedom House, UNDP Development Index) are associated to a fixed
    correspondence grill between the country's score in the index and the indicator's intensity. In this case the correspondence
    is: score 0.9-0.8 = nul; score 0.8-0.6 = intensity 1; score 0.6-0.5 = intensity 2; score 0.5-0.4 = intensity 3; score 0.4-0.3 = intensity
    4; score below 0.3 = intensity 5.

Socio-demographic transition

73) Demographic population shift threatens dominance of most powerful social group;
74) Increasing population pressure through influx of large numbers of refugees or migrants
75) Society suffers from consequences of recent foreign or civil war

Culture and ideology

76) Regime has a religious or nationalist/racist ideology
77) Opposition has a religious or nationalist/racist ideology
78) Regime identifies and targets internal/external enemy
79) Opposition identifies and targets internal/external enemy

Cultural relations

80) Minority groups receive support from abroad
81) Detrimental external actor political interventions in cultural sphere
82) Detrimental country's political intervention in cultural sphere abroad
83) Revanchist attitudes towards international/regional system
84) Country is culturally isolated from the external world

Triggering Events

Type of society

85) Regime policies towards communal groups worsen suddenly

Culture and Ideology

86) Regime begins to prescribe official religious belief or ideology
87) Fanatical groups with exclusionary ideologies/religious belief gain strength

Cultural relations

88) Rising hostile attitudes towards external actors
89) Rising hostile attitudes towards country

SECURITY INDICATORS

Underlying Factors

Internal disputes

90) History of civil wars
91) Recent history of violent changes of regime

Strategic power

92) Unfavourable geo-strategic position

International disputes

93) History of external conflictuality
94) History of national military defeat

Root Causes

Role of Security Forces (armed forces, police, special corps)

95) High degree of militarisation
96) Controversial role of military in society
97) Security forces as a "state within the state"
98) Communal security forces (militias)

Internal disputes

99) Frequent use of armed violence in support of political struggles
100) Large numbers of refugees/immigrants are a security problem
101) Presence of foreign armed forces on national territory

Strategic power

102) Unfavourable international military balance
103) Unfavourable regional military balance
104) Troublesome country's military alliances
105) Country's armed forces abroad

International Disputes

106) Disputes over refugees or migrants abroad
107) Disputes over transnational minorities
108) Contested borders (land, maritime, waterlines)
109) Disputed territories
110) Disputed water resources
111) Disputed energy resources
112) Disputed access (to sea, river; overland transit)
113) Dispute over strategic political interests

Triggering Events

Internal disputes

114) Hostile acts over problem groups (refugees, immigrants, etc.)
115) Hostile acts from problem groups (refugees, immigrants, etc.)
116) Intense revolutionary/separatist political activity
117) Police force are given special power to provide domestic security

International disputes

118) External military support of country's communal groups, opposition forces
119) Military support of foreing communal groups, opposition forces
120) Hostile acts over contested borders or disputed territories
121) Foreign hostile acts over contested borders or disputed territories
122) Hostile acts over disputed resources
123) Foreign hostile acts over disputed resources
124) Aggressive acts over contested borders or disputed territories
125) Foreign aggressive acts over contested borders or disputed territories
126) Aggressive acts over disputed resources
127) Foreign aggressive acts over disputed resources
128) Hostile military deployments
129) Foreign hostile military deployments

DATA ON VICTIMS

1) Civilian casualties
2) Armed/Security forces casualties
3) Refugees
4) Endangered population

APPENDIX 3
A Review of Early Warning
Projects/Models and Databases

Daniela Pioppi

This review of early warning projects/models and databases was compiled during the first phase of the IAI project *'Setting up a nucleus of conflict prevention in the Euro-Med framework'.*[1] Its purpose was to build the IAI model (CCP) for the Euro-Med area on existing knowledge in the field by describing the main characteristics of and trends in conflict prevention/early warning projects.

Main sources of this review are two recent analytical surveys, one made by Gurr and Davies in 1998 and the second by Van de Goor and Verstegen in 1999.[2] The data taken by these two reviews were complemented and updated by a website search and recent early warning projects' publications.

Consistently with the rest of the project[3], this review uses the following definition of conflict prevention and early warning: conflict prevention is 'a policy that deals with political tensions to avoid their evolution into armed conflicts and embraces all "actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken...to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle political disputes"[4]; Early warning is 'the first fundamental component of conflict prevention, and consists of "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from area of crises..[and] the provision of policy options to influential actors";[5] This review does not take into consideration all those activities, programmes, organisations and NGOs which, while working in the field of conflict prevention in the broad sense (i.e. any kind of activities aiming to prevent the eruption or escalation of violence), are not strictly related to early warning models/systems or databases. Moreover, the review does not pretend to be exhaustive, but to describe briefly the projects/models of interest for IAI work.

The State of Art, Conflict Prevention/Early Warning Projects: A General Typology

It is not easy to describe the vast array of conflict prevention/early warning (CP/EW) projects in a systematic and clear way because any standard comparison between them is complicated by the fact that the methodologies and the definitions of conflict used differ greatly.

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1 This review is the abridged version of Part III of the IAI report, Aliboni et al. 2001.
2 Respectively Gurr and Davies 1998 and Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999.
3 See chapter by Guazzone, § 1.1.
4 Schmid 1999, p. 16.
5 FEWER 1999, p.3.

However, an attempt at classifying can start with some considerations on the broad detectable trends in the field. A first observation can be the general shift from the focus of the initial period on pure early warning through complex systems of conflict analysis (indicators, etc.) but without a clear institutional framework to respond, and the most recent trend of response-oriented models concentrating on the end-user of the system, i.e. the state or institution which is trying to prevent the conflict.

Response-oriented projects clearly differ (we will see it in more detail below) from simply analytical or descriptive projects. That is why a first important distinction is made by Verstegen and van de Goor between 'theoretical models' - for the most part highly statistical retrospective projects - and 'practical efforts in a policy setting'- concerned with operational guidelines and focused on direct application.[6]

A second general remark should be made on the fact that the vast majority of EW projects, whether they are response-oriented or not, concentrate on internal or intra-state conflict. That is to say that they predominantly stress ethnic or communal type of conflict and are concentrated mainly on non-state actors.[7] The IAI model, on the contrary, focuses on inter-state conflict and is mainly state- and security-centred. This choice is not based on a theory of conflict, but is justified by the study of conflict patterns in the region of interest for the model (the region encompassed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and by realistic evaluations of the political possibility of implementing an early warning system in the Euro-Mediterranean region.[8] This discrepancy poses some limits to the prospect of getting theoretical insight from existing models, although the IAI project does not totally exclude internal conflict or economic and social variables, but only considers them as far as they have an impact on international conflict.

1. Theoretical projects

Theoretical models can be further differentiated according to the methodological approach used.

1.1 Explanatory-structural models[9]

Explanatory-structural models focus on structural root causes of conflict. The two prototypes of this approach are the projects of the University of Michigan directed by Prof. Ted Gurr: The State Failure Project and the Minority at Risk Project. These project are concentrated in detecting structural indicators of conflict and causal relations between them. Both projects are retrospective, i.e. they make large use of statistical data regarding past conflict situations, trying to determine statistically relevant constant variables of conflict.

PIOOM[10] can be taken as another example of these structural-explanatory approach models. In

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6   Op. cit., 1999, p. 6.
7   A major exception to non-state centred approaches is the Fund for Peace model, which assume that state collapse or crisis is the primary cause of internal and/or ethnic conflict and not vice versa.
8   See chapter by Guazzone § 2 and 2.1.1.
9   These models are called by Van de Goor and Vertegen (1999, appendix 1) 'structural' or 'correlational'. The terminalogy and typology comes from Gurr and Harff eds. (1994), "Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises" The Journal of Ethno-Development 4 (1). See aslo Gurr and Davies 1998.
10   Dutch abbreviation for 'Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights'.

fact, PIOOM Manual for Assessing Country Performance is an example of an effort to gain a better understanding of the root causes of fundamental human rights violations as well as their facilitating and inhibiting factors.

The value added of explanatory-structural projects is the study of structural causes of conflict and the final selection of a list of conflict indicators that can be used or are used for other models.[11]

1.1.1 Minorities at Risk (MAR)[12]

Background and objectives

The MAR project was established at the end of the eighties at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDM) at the University of Maryland under the direction of Prof. Ted R. Gurr.

MAR is dedicated to the empirical study of ethno-political groups around the world, as well as to the dissemination of information on those groups.[13] This data collection on minorities is aimed at helping researchers develop models of the causes and dynamics of ethnic conflict and test factors linked to conflict escalation as well as at identifying the groups that are at greatest risk of future conflict and/or repression. However, using the models drawn from the MAR database for operational forecasting is not a major aim of the project as it operates more retrospectively.

General approach and methodology

The MAR project focuses on the structural conditions for ethnopolitical conflict. Statistical analysis is used to develop a range of indicators for the assessment of potential risks for communal conflict, focusing on group incentives, capacity and opportunities for collective actions.

On the basis of these indicators, a Risk Index was developed that quantifies information in an attempt to help answer the question what potential active communal groups are at greater risk of ethnopolitical rebellion. Serious future rebellions are more likely among groups with high incentives, and medium to high capacity and opportunities.

As mentioned above, the project limits itself to structural conditions, consciously excluding dynamic indicators/accelerators and trigger events.[14]

The project has already been through three phases. The first covered the years 1945-1989 and was summarised and utilised for model testing in "Minorities at Risk", a publication by Ted Gurr et al., 1993. Phase II consisted of an in-depth analysis of groups involved in protracted communal conflict. The material was not separately analysed or published, but incorporated into phase three. Phase III consisted in a major restructuring of the data set and criteria reflecting the shift in information and communication technologies of the last decade.

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11 The IAI CCP list of indicators elaborates on these structural models list and namely on PIOOM's, see chapter by Guazzone § 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 and Appendix II.

12 Sources: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar; Gurr T. 1993; Gurr T. and Davies J.L. 1998; Gurr T. and Harff B. 1998; Gurr, T. (Forthcoming) Peoples versus States: Minority at Risk in the New Century, (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/pubs.html); Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999.

13 The MAR project's empirical data are for politically active communal groups only. They do not suffice as data to identify non-communal groups at risk of politicide.

14 Gurr T. and Harff B. 1998.

Availability of results
The website contains a project description and the project's data set and codebook. Data is accessible at no cost through e-mail registration. The project also produces database and analytical work in the form of publications. Therefore, MAR could be a source of structural indicator data (in this event, the criteria used for the database should be verified).
MAR provides data for the International Studies Association; the Defence Intelligence College (Washington, D.C.); the United Nation's World Institute for Development Economics Research (Helsinki); and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri). Expertise from the project also provides input for ongoing consultations with the (White House-sponsored) State Failure Project; the Swiss foreign ministry and the London-based NGO International Alert.

1.1.2 State Failure Project (Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1954-1996)[15]

Background and objectives
The State Failure Task Force was established in 1994 to implement a data-driven study on the causes of state failure,[16] with the aim of developing a methodology to identify key factors and critical thresholds signalling high risk of political crisis in countries some two years in advance. The study was commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in response to a request from US policy makers. The White House sponsors the project. The research team is directed by Prof. Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff (US Naval Academy).

General approach and methodology
In the first phase of the project, 113 cases of state failure were identified for the time span 1955 - 1994, which were matched with a random sample of control cases to identify the independent sets of variables that are most efficient in distinguishing between the two situations (crisis and non-crisis). In the second phase of the project, multivariate analysis identified a single best model (about 70% accuracy) including only three statistically determinant variables: openness to international trade; infant mortality (marker indicator that represents a basket of interdependent conditions, which could be substituted by another quality of life indicator); democracy (summary measure of open political institutions, correlating strongly with indices of political rights, civil liberties and party legitimacy).[17]
As noted by van de Goor and Verstegen,[18] the project – however useful from a theoretical perspective – is still too complicated and not sufficiently developed to be used as a source of inspiration for a conflict prevention and crisis early warning system. Its structural and extremely generic approach needs to be complemented by accelerators if it is to be used to forecast the type and degree-duration of prospective cases.

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15 Sources: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail. State Failure Task Force Report, Working papers, 1995; State Failure Task Force Report 1998; Chap. III in Gurr T. and Davies J.L. 1998; Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999, Appendix I.
16 'State failure' is a label that encompasses a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exemplified by events of the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Afghanistan and Congo-Kinshasa.
17 See Phase II report; Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999, Appendix 1.
18 Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999, Appendix 1.

Availability of results
State Failure Project results are available in the form of publications. Reports of Phase I and II can be requested by contacting the project's staff.

1.1.3 Program of research on root causes of human rights violations (PIOMM)[19]

Background and objectives
PIOOM is an independent, non-partisan organisation established in 1988 at Leiden University in the Netherlands and directed by A. Jongman and Alex P. Schmidt.[20] PIOOM's main goals are: (a) to gain a better understanding of the root causes of fundamental human rights violations, determining the facilitating and inhibiting factors of abuses; (b) to search for the optimal strategy for IGOs and NGOs to counter contemporary human rights violations and to prevent future violations.

General approach and methodology
PIOOM has developed monitoring 'checklists' on human rights violations, to be submitted regularly by two in-country monitors and one regional expert (examples of the checklists can be found on the website). This approach of standardised monitoring was chosen as a middle way between traditional fact-finding and future early warning. The more than 500 indicators provide the basis for a data set which can be inserted into various models to forecast increased risks.
PIOOM also monitors signals that can serve as early warning for conflict escalation. One instrument for this is the Manual for Assessing Country Performance, a research tool that monitors conflicts and the observance or violation of twelve fundamental human rights. On the basis of statistical indicators and expert assessment, PIOOM seeks to forecast political and humanitarian crises which might require preventive diplomacy.

Availability of results
The PIOOM databank consists of books, articles, reports, papers and documents, both published and unpublished, that deal with the root causes of gross human rights violations. Since 1996 it has been enlarged with the Albert Horstman Library on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention.

1.2 Dynamic models[21]

Dynamic models focus on the intensification of the conflict situation by emphasising dynamic factors (accelerators and trigger incidents) that may exacerbate or modify the structural condition to accelerate or 'de-accelerate' the emergence of a crisis. Some dynamic models focus on explaining patterns of conflict and critical thresholds. Examples of this approach are Pattern Recognition-Conflict Early Warning Project (CEWP) and Cluster Analysis - Transition between Stages of Conflicts.[22] Both projects are highly computerised and statistical and still in their early phase.
A similar approach is the one used by the Protocol for the Assessment of Non-violent Direct

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19　Sources: http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl; L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999; Schmid A.P 1996.
20　At the moment (2000) the project is directed by Jongman alone.
21　This definition is used by Gurr and Davies 1998, section II and by Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999, Appendix 1.
22　Sources: L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999; Gurr T. and Davies J.L. 1998.

Action (PANDA),[23] in the sense that it does not focus on the root causes of conflict but on its manifestation.

This project, still in a very theoretical and abstract phase, is interesting in that it is based on a broader definition of conflict which includes non-violent confrontation as an important part of what could transform into violent conflict. The model attempts to study the way in which society manages conflict in its violent and non-violent forms.

Other dynamic models focus on the sequences in which violent conflict has most commonly occurred in the past, so as to track when tense and high-risk situations are likely to erupt into crisis. In dynamic-sequential models, analysis of accelerators makes it possible to track which sequence of events leads to violence.

The advantage of dynamic models is that they started to make a useful distinction between background conditions, intervening conditions and accelerators to monitor crisis situations as they evolve over time[24]. An example of this approach is Harff's Accelerators of Genocide Project, which is an attempt to give the University of Maryland long-term risk assessment projects on state collapse and communal conflict a more short-term warning apparatus.

1.2.1 Accelerators of Genocide Project[25]

Background and objectives

Pilot project directed during the 90s by Barbara Harff (US Naval Academy), who also collaborates with Prof. Ted Gurr's team on the State Failure Project.

The model tries to identify international and internal background conditions for geno/politicide,[26] a set of intervening conditions, and accelerators that are the immediate antecedents of systematic killings. The final aim of the project, which has not been extensively tested yet, is to determine a set of pre-specified standardised indicators in the form of accelerators and decelerators. These indicators would provide short-term warning of humanitarian emergencies.

General approach and methodology

The model was first developed and tested on a series of comparative case studies. Accelerators were specified, operationalised, and analysed in a comparative study on the antecedents of genocide in four episodes of the early 1990s: Rwanda and Bosnia, both of which involved genocide, and Burundi and Abkhazia, where ethnic warfare did not lead, in the time periods studied, to geno/politicide.

The project uses accelerators-events taken from event data system (GEDS).

The project could be a significant attempt to investigate the possibility of monitoring political situations through pre-specified standardised indicators (see PIOOM's list of indicators for human rights monitoring).

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23 Sources: http://data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/panda.html. L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999; Gurr T. and Davies J.L. 1998.

24 In the CCP model underlying factors, root causes and triggering events, see chapter by Guazzone § 4.1.1 and 4.2.1.

25 Sources: Gurr T. & Harff B. 1997; L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999.

26 Genocide and politicide are defined as the promotion, execution and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents - or in case of civil wars, either of the contending authorities - that result in the death of a substantia portion of a communal, political, or politicised communal group (Gurr and Harff 1997).

Availability of results
The project is considered groundbreaking and has not yet been fully tested. Results are available only in Gurr and Harff publications.[27]

1.3 Response oriented models

The response oriented approach diverges from the previous explanatory-predictive one in that it emphasises how early warning models are put to policy use. Fein's 'Life Integrity Violation Approach (LIVA)' focuses on a policy response in conflict situations. The aim of the project, therefore, is not to understand root causes of conflict, nor to determine conflict patterns, thresholds, or sequences, but to identify the points in the conflict process in which strategic interventions are likely to make a difference in outcome. This is done without the pretention of building the best explanatory model, from which the name 'Good Enough Model'.

1.3.1 Life Integrity Violation Analysis (LIVA) – 'Good Enough Model'[28]
Background and objectives/ General approach
Similarly to Harff's Accelerators of Genocide Project, Helen Fein's (Cambridge University, UK) Good Enough Model focuses on the specification of preconditions of geno/politicide and life integrity violations. Fein mainly uses Amnesty International Reports to assess whether states perpetrating geno/politicide can be distinguished from other states before a humanitarian emergency actually begins. The model is directed towards the understanding of the geno/politicide phenomenon and the response to it, but is not a causal explanatory model (hence the name 'good enough'). While there is broad agreement between Harff and Fein on the accelerators, Fein focuses on the responses at the 'pressure points'. The testing of the 'good enough model' does not involve testing of the indicators, but rather testing of the effects of intervention/response. The model is not based on a quantitative-statistical approach, but is in line with response-oriented warnings and conflict impact assessments.
The idea of a 'Good Enough' model could be useful for a realistic response-oriented model and conflict impact assessment system.

2. Practical efforts in a policy setting

Although there is not yet any fully effective operative model, several efforts have been made to put into practice the findings of the previous theoretical projects/models.
The first attempts were made by the United Nations (*Humanitarian Early Warning System and Office for Research and Collection of Information*),[29] by governments (German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Swiss Foreign Ministry)[30] and by the EU

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27 See general sources of the project.
28 Sources: Fein H., 'Dangerous states and Endangered Peoples: Implications of Life Integrity Violations Analysis', in Rupesinghe, M. Kuroda (eds.) 1992; L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999.
29 http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha ; Cross P. (eds.) 1997/98, p. 76; L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999; K. Rupesinghe, M Kuroda (eds.) 1992.
30 Source: Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999; http://www.swisspeace.ch/htm/res_ear_Frame-Set.html;

(*European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation*[31] and *Conflict Prevention Network*[32] at NGOs level and finally the *Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit*[33] part of the Council of Ministers' Secretariat in Brussels).

These practical early warning efforts, although different from each other, share a common focus on policy prescriptions and practical implementation problems stem from their institutional prerequisites.

The project of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), *Conflict Policy Research Project*, can also be located in this group. The Clingendael project in fact sprung from the need to develop an adequate Dutch conflict prevention policy to guide future interventions, mainly development co-operation, in conflict-ridden societies.

Other practical efforts in early warning are at NGO level. The most developed of this kind is the *Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)*.

Other organisations, such as Creative Associates Inc.[34] and the Swiss Fund for Peace[35] have developed manuals for practitioners also with the aim of co-ordinating international action to promote peace. The Fund for Peace model has been used in the Clingendael's Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (see below).

2.1 Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)[36]

Background and objectives

The Conflict Prevention Network is a network of institutions, NGOs and independent experts active in the field of conflict prevention. It was established in 1997 following a Resolution of the European Parliament and is financially supported by the Commission. The CPN is directed by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Germany.

The Conflict Prevention Network has the task of providing the European Commission and the European Parliament with analyses and policy options on potential conflicts.

Michael Lund and Andreas Mehler developed a Practical Guide for Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention for the CPN upon the request of the Directorate General VIII of the European Commission. The guide attempts to assist Commission officials with (1) the identification of key trouble spots in a given situation; (2) the consequent definition, design and implementation of measures to address these trouble spots in a targeted manner, with an adequate combination of all available instruments.[37]

The CPN is currently developing for the Commission a model of potential conflict indicators which will be the basis of brief reports called Country Strategy Papers to identify at an early stage potential conflict in countries receiving assistance from the EU.[38]

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31 Source: http://www.euconflict.org
32 See below.
33 Source: http://ue.eu.int/
34 Sources: http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai; L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999;
35 Sources: http://www.fundforpeace.org/; Baker P. & Ausink J.A. 1996; L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen 1999.
36 Source: http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~cpn/
37 Lund M. & Mehler A. 1999.
38 Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, European Commission, 11/4/2001.

2.2 Clingendael Conflict Research Unit[39]

Background and objectives

The Clingendael Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is part of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) research department and focuses on the study of intrastate conflict and conflict management.

An initial research project in Early Warning and Conflict Prevention focused on the causes of conflict in the Third World.[40] In 1999 the CRU's staff embarked on the 'Conflict Policy Research Project' (CPRP) requested by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The overall goal of the CPRP is to study the current situation with regard to (Dutch) conflict prevention policies, focusing on the development of an adequate policy mix to guide future interventions in conflict-ridden societies (Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework, CPAF) in an attempt at maximising Dutch co-operation policies.[41]

The CPAF place itself in the 'response oriented' trend of conflict prevention by aiming at creating a 'conflict and policy assessment framework that integrates conflict analysis and policy analysis, as well as issues of institutional capacity and political priorities, in order to come to realistic policy opportunities for intervention'. In doing so the CPAF takes into account the potential response capacities of the model 'end-user' (in this case the Dutch Foreign Ministry) working on specific response instruments and capacities.

2.3 Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)[42]

Background and objectives

In 1996, a group including representatives of international agencies, academia and NGOs were called together at a meeting of International Alert[43] in London to discuss how early warning for complex emergencies might be advanced. The group created FEWER. The founding members were: the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), PIOOM, the Prevention/Early Warning Unit at York University, International Alert, The Swiss Peace Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology, and the Centre for European Policy Studies.

FEWER has the following specific objectives:

1) To provide a forum for effective early warning and early action that promotes co-operation between UN bodies, IGOs, governments, NGOs and academic institutions, strengthening the collective capacity for prevention, contingency planning and early response and ensuring high quality standards and a coherent framework for assessing risks.

2) To produce response options for regular distribution to interested parties.

3) To encourage effective policy and practice in the interest of linking early warning to early action.

4) The establishment of standard formats for reporting conflict situations for clarity, consistency and the use of common terminology in reports from different sources.

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39   Source : http://www.clingendael.nl/cru
40   See 'Causes of Conflict in the Third World' (abridged version) on the website.
41   Van de Goor and Verstegen 1999 and 2000; see chapter by Guazzone.
42   Sources: http://www.fewer.org; Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual, 2nd Edition, FEWER, July 1999; FEWER Strategic Plan 1999-2000; Challenges and lessons Learned in setting Up Early Warning Pilot projects in the Caucasus and the Great Lakes, FEWER (on the web).
43   Source: http://www.international.org

General approach and methodology
FEWER is mainly concentrated on co-ordinating and developing already existing projects/models.
Therefore, it can be classified as a 'promoter' rather than a conflict forecasting device.
To guide its activity in this sense, FEWER has developed a 'strategic plan' which is available
on its website.
In addition to this, FEWER has developed (December 1998 – new edition July 1999) a manual
for early warning and early response, which it considers a 'provisional framework for
understanding trends in areas of potential and actual conflict, as well as identifying approaches
for conflict prevention'.[44] But the manual may also be used as a tool to identify common ground
and common strategies for peace among protagonists in conflict situations.

Availability of results
FEWER analytical results are available in the form of publications or on the web.
FEWER currently has analytical capabilities in three pilot regions: former Soviet Union, West
Africa and the Great Lakes region. One of FEWER's primary objectives is to add value to and
complement existing early warning systems and processes.

3. Databases for Early Warning use

Two event data systems are used as sources of data for early warning models. The US
National Science Foundation funds them both.   Event data systems are systems for screening
and analytically coding public news sources either by human coders (as in the case of the
GEDS Project[45]) or through automated event-data analysis (KEDS Project [46]).
Another type of open access database is that of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) which provides annual reports on world conflicts.[47] Beyond the annual
reports the SIPRI has an ongoing project with the International Relations and Security
Network (ISN) *called Integrating fact databases in the field of international relations and*
security.[48] The project aims at creating a system of databases organised geografically
accessible through a single integrated user platform.
Other databases on conflict are the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project;[49]
the Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST[50]); the Kosimo Database[51]
and A study of a crisis.[52]

44   Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual, 2nd Edition, FEWER, July 1999, p.3.
45   Source: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/geds
46   Source: http://www.ukans.edu/~keds/index.html
47   Source: http://www.sipri.se
48   Source: http:// www.sipri.se/projects/database/index.html
49   Source: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/overview/overview.html
50   Source: http://first.sipri.org
51   Source: http://first.sipri.org/kosimo2.html; www.kosimo.de; Pfetsch, F. and Rohloff C. 2000.
52   Source: Brecher M. and Wilkenfeld J. 2000.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACRS	Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
CCP	Country Conflict Profile
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CEWP	Conflict Early Warning Project
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIDCM	Center for International Development and Conflict Management
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CP	Conflict Prevention
CPAF	Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework
CPB	Conflict Prevention Background Paper
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CPS	Conflict Prevention System
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
EW	Early Warning
FAST	Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Finding
Femise	Forum Euro-Méditerranéen des Instituts Economiques
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FIRST	Facts on International Relations and Security Trends
GEDS	Global Event Data System
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System
IAI	Istituto Affari Internazionali
ICG	International Crisis Group
KEDS	Kansas Event Data System
LIVA	Life Integrity Violation Analysis
MAR	Minority at Risk
MEDA	Mésures d'accompagnement à la reforme de structures économiques et sociales (EU)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ORCI	United Nations Office for Research and Collection of Information
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe
PANDA	Protocol for the Assessment of Non-violent Direct Action
PIOOM	Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

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